Now that I have returned from my sabbatical, one of the most exciting and challenging parts of my job is attending negotiations between the government of the Philippines (GPH) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). The current round of talks, hosted in Kuala Lumpur by the Malaysian Facilitator, started Monday and features for the first time the attendance of all five governors of the provinces comprising the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Their opinions have recently been examined by the International Crisis Group, and as elected officials from the area being covered by the peace talks, it is important that they have input into deliberations.

Negotiations between the government of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front resumed this week, and for the first time, featured the attendance of all five governors of the provinces comprising the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Photo by Karl Grobl.

Beyond consulting leaders, how can the opinions of ordinary citizens be taken into account? One of the glories of working on social issues in the Philippines is that there is access to a great deal of high-quality data from scientific probability samples. Social Weather Stations, Pulse Asia, and Laylo Associates are examples of organizations that regularly provide the public and analysts timely and relevant information on the opinions of citizens.

The relation between individual opinions about public issues as aggregated in surveys and political outcomes can be a tricky one. I ran into it as a freshly minted Ph.D. in American Electoral Behavior newly in the Philippines when, for the 1982 Barangay Elections, I did a survey with the standard question, “if the election were held today, who would you vote for?” In the mountains of Northern Luzon, the Cordillera, where traditional indigenous culture is still strong, I frequently got the response, “I don’t know – the elders haven’t told us yet who to vote for.”

There are lots of further questions embedded in this topic, such as is there such a thing as “public opinion” as a whole, rather than just a summation or average of individuals’ opinions?  What is the relation between opinions expressed in an interview situation and those expressed on the street or in coffee houses? What is the relation between verbal opinions and actual actions of the individual?

This line of inquiry is particularly acute when dealing with organized revolutionary movements. In December 1986, the communist New People’s Army (NPA) held a public celebratory parade down the main street of Samal province in Bataan province. When that town overwhelmingly voted in February 1987 to ratify the “Cory Constitution,” an NPA cadre shrugged off the contradiction with remarks about “false consciousness.”

Similarly, Father Conrado Balweg, leader of the Cordillera People’s Liberation Army (CPLA), told me while I was preparing to do a survey on Autonomy for the Cordillera in 1987 (supported by a grant from The Asia Foundation to the University of the Philippines Baguio’s Cordillera Studies Center) that I was wasting my time – what mattered was the revolutionary analysis and action of the CPLA. At least in this case he was clearly mostly wrong, since the autonomy that the CPLA has had (until now) as the centerpiece of its political platform depended on ratification in a plebiscite, which never happened.

Since small numbers of activists are able to cause internal wars, the relationship in conflict between mass opinion and political outcomes can be particularly problematic. This ability of a few to carry on fighting is one of the reasons why so many of the sub-national conflicts we see are so long-lasting. In Afghanistan, Southern Thailand, and Mindanao, the Foundation conducts sample surveys to get people’s opinions, and we wish to make them useful for improving development as well as being scientifically sound.

Colin Irwin in his peace polling (Northern Ireland and elsewhere) has tried to square the circle by having the political negotiators on both (all) sides specify the questions they want to put to the public in aid of a peace process. The results are published in full as part of the public communication process. In this way the negotiations are still confidential but the public does get a sense of what the negotiators are wondering about and negotiators get a feel for the shape of public opinion.

For myself, I see polling as part of building an “inclusive enough” coalition for a peace settlement. The concept comes from the 2011 World Development Report and has been suggested for the GPH-MILF peace process. The notion that it is difficult to sell Mindanao peace to the average Filipino can be pernicious – better to ask the citizenry and then transmit that information to the political class. Of course, particular leaders of influence need to be involved: to gauge their reaction to the views of citizens, what they think about particular issues in the negotiations, and how consultations can improve a peace outcome. Both the government and the MILF have been assiduously talking to a wide variety of stakeholders in Mindanao and throughout the country.

Building peace is a long, complex process involving many steps and a wide variety of tools. One way to involve the citizenry is through surveys. Negotiators and others involved in peace processes need not slavishly follow public opinion, but it is indeed best to take it into account.

Steven Rood is The Asia Foundation’s country representative in the Philippines, and represents the Foundation as part of the International Contact Group for the GPH-MILF negotiations. He can be reached at srood@asiafound.org. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.

Around midnight on May 27, when most Nepalis were waiting for the new constitution to be unveiled, Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai announced a fresh election for Nov. 22, 2012, from a hurriedly put-together press conference at his residence.

With that announcement, Nepal’s Constituent Assembly(CA)  – elected four years ago specifically to draft a new constitution  – ended its tenure without even a draft.

Nepal's political parties in the Constituent Assembly failed to agree on a new blueprint for the nation by their deadline of midnight May 27. Now, citizens anxiously await next steps after the premier called new elections. Photo by flickr user eriktorner.

It was only around 3 p.m. earlier that day that TV channels in Kathmandu were busy announcing a breakthrough in the talks, raising hope of a new constitution and perhaps an end to Nepal’s four years of transitional instability. By about 10 p.m., the TV tickers had started to change their tack, and by midnight it was clear that the CA process had burnt about $100 million of public funds and wasted four years of deliberation.

What exactly happened between 3 p.m. and 10 p.m. is still murky, and the political motive behind the snap poll announced by the prime minister remains unclear. For now, Nepali politics is embroiled in accusations of blame.

What we do know is that the big issue is federalism. The political demand for federalism in Nepal has come from a long-standing aspiration for self-governance in regions outside of Kathmandu. From their standpoint, the Nepali state is seen as a distant and unresponsive authority that has historically failed to recognize the ethnic diversity of the country in a politically meaningful manner. These aspirations have been politically articulated and electorally consolidated by different geographic and ethnic constituencies as well as identity movements in Nepal. The Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (UCPNM) and the larger parties from the Terai (the grasslands at the foot of the Himalayas) have understood and electorally capitalized on the political undercurrent of these identity movements much more effectively than the older national parties such as the Nepali Congress (NC) and the Unified Marxist-Leninists (UML). The political rewards of federalism have been unequal for Nepali political parties for some time, with polarized positions on federalism persisting until the CA’s dying moments. Whether the divergence on this issue alone motivated the UCPNM prime minister to allow the CA to dissolve is another story.

Determining the basis of federalism in Nepal has been a contentious process from the outset. The reality is that Nepal’s ethnic mix and settlement pattern is not amenable to an ethnic or linguistic division of provinces. Analyses show that no matter how the boundaries are drawn it is impossible to produce an ethnic majority in any province, even with significant gerrymandering. And resorting to an all-out carving of the state would result in provinces too small to remain economically viable. Despite this reality, the political demand of many of the larger ethnic groups in Nepal has been to create single-identity ethnic provinces. The UCPNM and the regional parties are determined to appease seven of these large ethnic groups in order to consolidate their own electoral prospects in the post-constitutional elections. The NC and UML too sense an electoral base ready to be captured among other ethnic groups beyond the seven who are opposed to single-identity provinces. From the parties’ point of view, in a country with 103 recognized ethnic groups, the political field is highly fertile if the game is played right.

Taking decisions on federalism had become especially difficult for parties in the run up to the May 27 deadline. From about early May, a multi-nucleated political contestation among those demanding single-identity provinces, those rejecting single-identity provinces, those demanding large geographic provinces, those demanding smaller linguistic divisions and those opposing federalism had started in earnest. All across Nepal there were demonstrations and bandhs (general shutdown). Over the last two weeks Kathmandu itself was under gripping bandhs called by those opposing and supporting single-identity provinces. There were no smart win-win solutions available as giving in to one meant denying the other. In the end parties decided not to decide.

Now, the abrupt call for an election has ended any possibility of a shorter, less-expensive and politically acceptable alternative to the CA. But the announcement of the election itself has raised several constitutional and political questions. The interim constitution never intended to have a re-elected CA beyond its tenure; constitutionally, there is no basis for holding a CA election for the second time. What, for instance, should be the tenure of the re-elected CA? Who gets to determine it?

A Supreme Court verdict that disallowed further extension of the CA recommended seeking a fresh mandate if the CA failed to deliver. The prime minister has taken that as the basis for announcing a fresh election; but after expiry of the CA’s tenure there are no legislative or constitutional assemblies left to endorse this decision. A number of parties, including the NC and UML, have already rejected the call for elections questioning its legality and political relevance. A faction leader within the UCPNM, Kiran Baidya – who supposedly holds about 100 Members of the Constituent Assembly in his grip – has asked the prime minister to resign and rescind his announcement of the election. The president in Nepal is a ceremonial one, with limited ability to intervene and provide a political alternative to election. The parties too cannot legally remove the prime minister without an election.

What happens next is difficult to predict. The prime minister might not be able to conduct the election as his majority in Parliament appears to be gradually defecting to the other side, as recent developments within the Maoist party suggest. The Supreme Court may be able to block the election on technical grounds but will not be able to give a political solution to the crisis. In the end, the parties have to come together again, and find a way to stitch together a national government and constitution. The prospect of Nepal’s constitution being written by an all-inclusive, 601-member, elected Constituent Assembly, however, appears to have been lost forever.

This article was originally published on East Asia Forum on May 30, 2012.

Sagar Prasai is The Asia Foundation’s deputy country representative in Nepal. He can be reached at sprasai@asiafound.org. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.

Timor-Leste marked 10 years of independence over the past weekend, with UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon commending Asia’s newest nation for its “impressive advances,” and congratulating the new President, Taur Matan Ruak, on his inauguration. While many are reflecting on the nation’s great achievements, others are also asking, how much real change has the preceding 10 years really brought to the citizens of Timor-Leste in terms of the economy, political participation, justice, and other social aspects of life?

Over the past three years, Timor-Leste has logged double-digit economic growth figures. However, some are concerned that this growth largely remains concentrated in the capital, Dili. Photo by Molly Mueller.

Indeed, Timor-Leste has seen many changes over the past 10 years since independence was restored following a landmark referendum. For starters, it has managed to build the state, from scratch, following the devastating scorched-earth campaign by military backed pro-Indonesian militias. The efforts to build state institutions, by nature, have a fair share of sweet success and bitterness. Timor-Leste’s journey was tarnished by some early setbacks beginning in 2002 with the burning of the then prime minister Alkatiri’s house and Hello Mister, the biggest supermarket at the time in Timor-Leste. These events were followed by ethnic conflict in 2006 which resulted in the displacement of more than 100,000 people from their homes, hundreds of which were destroyed. In 2008, the country had the world on the edge of its seat with the alleged assassination attempts on both former president Ramos Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao. The incident resulted in the death of Alfredo Reinaldo, the leader of breakaway military faction and Ramos Horta shot and seriously wounded, while Prime Minister Xanana escaped unhurt.

Despite these setbacks, the last 10 years have also brought some very positive economic changes. Over the past three years, Timor-Leste has logged double-digit economic growth figures (although some do doubt how long the government can sustain the current level of spending in the absence of a viable private sector, as the country’s economy is still heavily subsidized by the government). Also, most of this exponential economic growth remains concentrated in the capital, Dili, despite efforts by the current government to offset this imbalance through a wealth redistribution policy.

A growing concern among private business owners is that the adoption of a free market economy at the small business level has made even the smallest businesses, such as local shops, face stiff competition from foreign nationals, mostly Chinese. This is forcing some local competitors into “survival mode” as they struggle to compete with the influx of well-funded, business-savvy foreigners, resulting in the closure of many local businesses. Governing small business ownership by foreign nationalities will be an important task for the new government.

In the justice sector, there have been many achievements in the past 10 years:  from the enactment of important legal frameworks, such as a witness protection law and money laundering law, to the growing number of trained lawyers and judges. One remaining challenge is that the judges and lawyers need to build their capacity to deal with growing social problems, which have lead to an increase in court cases.

Questions on justice for past atrocities still resonate strongly among victims – estimates suggest that 183,000 East Timorese lost their lives from fighting, disease, and starvation during Indonesian occupation. Despite this contentious issue, Timor-Leste is currently heavily reliant on import products from Indonesia, and not surprisingly, the government is deeply concerned about maintaining relations with Indonesia. Any policy decision that could upset the Indonesian government could lead to destabilization in the border area. Moreover, Timor-Leste is keen to join ASEAN and sees Indonesia as a strategic partner that could assist in Timor-Leste’s ASEAN accession process.

However, despite the country’s violent history with the Indonesian occupation, recent civil unrest, and attempted assassination against top leaders of the country, four years of relative stability and peace has given citizens a great deal of hope for the future.

At the same time, the government has made efforts to fight corruption, starting with establishing an official anti-corruption body in 2008. While some remain skeptical about the body’s ability to be impartial, others say it has done an excellent job. Since its inception, many accused of corruption are now under investigation, most notably the recent suspension of Justice Minister Lucia Lobato accused of corruption and abuse of power. Another minister is about to face court soon, while a local newspaper recently reported that the anti-corruption body is to question the president of the National Parliament on the purchase of 65 luxury cars for members of Parliament. This is a step in the right direction. Regardless of the body’s imperfections, for a new country and a newly set up body, this is an achievement in itself. This past four years has set a good precedent in the fight against corruption, and has sent the message that no one is untouchable, be it a minister or the president of the National Parliament.

The national strategic development plan announced by Prime Minister Xanana Gusmao has set a clear path for Timor-Leste in the next 10 to 20 years. The nation must now concentrate on laying the groundwork for achieving those goals. Looking at Timor-Leste’s current condition, it is on the right track. However, we must ensure that security and stability remain intact in order to continue in a positive direction.

Mário F. Costa Pinheiro is a program officer for The Asia Foundation’s Parliamentary & Ministerial Strengthening Programs in Timor-Leste. He can be reached at mfpinheiro@asiafound.org. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.

Nearly two decades of market-based development has dramatically changed the way Vietnamese live and work, transforming patterns of personal and commercial saving, borrowing, and lending. By 2011 there were 93 banks in Vietnam, about 32 million bankcards, 52,000 points of sale (POS), and 12,000 ATMs. With Vietnam joining the rank of lower middle-income countries in 2010 and aiming to continue the upward growth trajectory, the country’s population of 90 million will need a better understanding of and access to the range of financial and banking services at the heart of a modern and integrated economy.

Our survey of service industry workers, such as waiters, drivers, barbers and beauty salon staff, and restaurant and shop guards in Hanoi showed less than 50 percent had used banking services. Many are concerned this could hold back Vietnam's growth trajectory.

The regulatory, management, and strategic challenges faced by Vietnam’s fractured banking sector have been the subject of increasing commentary of late. Lending for consumption remains low compared to the rest of the world, and cash is dominant. While commercial banks are increasingly visible in Vietnam’s cities, they are not well connected with the majority of low and emerging middle-income Vietnamese. One bank official we talked to estimated only about a third of the population comes into contact with banking services. Most people operate primarily in the informal market, vulnerable to exploitative interest rates (25 percent or more is not uncommon) and unregulated practices. However, increasingly, if you want to make money, you need to understand and access banking services and credit. The failure of banks to engage the bulk of the population presents both challenges for the Vietnamese banking sector in engaging and educating new customer groups, and wider questions around how financial literacy, or lack of it, among large sections of the population affects the prospects for equitable development.

To gauge Vietnamese attitudes to money and banking practices, earlier this year, The Asia Foundation completed a survey of low- and middle-income residents of Hanoi, complemented by in-depth interviews with Vietnamese bank staff. While the sample was limited, the survey revealed some interesting data.

Where’s the bank?

While most commercial banks only have branches in the largest cities, some 70 percent of Vietnamese live in rural areas. The major cities account for 80 percent of bank revenue from personal financial services. Even in the major cities, commercial banks are largely restricted to downtown areas and have a narrow customer base. One Vietcombank official interviewed estimated only about one-third of the urban population use financial services and banking products.

Our survey of service industry workers, such as waiters, drivers, barbers and beauty salon staff, and restaurant and shop guards in Hanoi showed less than 50 percent had used banking services. The reasons they gave for not using banking services varied, although by far the biggest proportion felt banks weren’t for them because their incomes were too low (44%). Five percent of respondents said that the return from bank savings was not sufficient; another 5 percent indicated that cash was more convenient; and 3 percent did not trust the banks.

While large numbers indicated that they were not engaging with the banking system, respondents were actively borrowing and saving. Fifty-six percent of respondents said they had savings, but most kept their savings at home, sending them back to their families in their native provinces through networks of family members and friends. Over half had borrowed money with a quarter in debt because of an investment, and a further 9 percent borrowed for consumption. Out of 500 individuals surveyed, almost 80 percent indicated that they had run out of money before their next pay check. Of those, 26 percent had borrowed from friends and relatives to tie them over, but only 2 percent had used credit cards and 3 percent of respondents having borrowed from banks.

Preparing for modern banking

As the country gets richer, most Vietnamese banks are eyeing an expanding personal banking market, reaching out to low- and middle-income groups to market their products and services. Whether these groups have the financial knowledge to take advantage of those opportunities is a larger question. Half of all those that we interviewed had no knowledge of financial and credit services provided by banks. While around 20 percent of people kept some form of financial records, most did not. Family finances were often opaque with traditional roles affecting financial knowledge. For example, the majority of women interviewed did not know exactly how much their husbands earned. Seventy-five percent of respondents said decisions on significant purchases were made by the husbands or, when living with extended family, husbands and parents. However, women were much more likely to be in charge of daily expenditures.

Poor personal financial management is having serious consequences on families across Vietnam. According to a survey conducted by the Hanoi Department of Labor and Social Affairs (DOLISA), over 70 percent of farmers who had received compensation to move from their land used that money for consumption, rather than investing in livelihood development or income generation activities. Fifty percent subsequently suffered financial difficulties.

Improving financial literacy

There are some developing financial literacy programs associated with the Women’s Union, international NGOs, and businesses such as Prudential. More recently the Bank of Social Policy (BSP) and Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (VBARD) have introduced financial training associated with their loans. However, for the majority of the population there remains limited financial education available. At schools, basic personal financial management skills are not taught, and little guidance is provided through families, even those in higher income brackets. Most of the banks we interviewed are developing strategies to promote private banking services and increase the number of people using bank services. However, expansion into these markets so far has been ad hoc, frequently depending on the personal networks of bank staff and not associated with programs to raise the financial literacy of their customers. Several of the banks surveyed did not have customer care units.

Whether it is the banks’ responsibility or not to increase financial literacy, a rapid expansion into a market with a low base of knowledge and skills seems a risky prospect. Developing countries across Asia, from India to Malaysia to Indonesia, have devoted more attention to increasing their citizens’ understanding and access to banking and financial services. How well banks, financial institutions, the government, and NGOs help low- and middle-income Vietnamese raise their financial literacy will affect not just the future of Vietnamese banking but also the financial stability of Vietnamese households and the future economic health of Vietnam.

William Taylor is The Asia Foundation’s deputy country representative in Vietnam. He can be reached at wtaylor@asiafound.org. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.

It is no wonder that political and economic analysts have dubbed our era “The Asian Century,” and quite timely that we will soon be seeing the White Paper on Australia in the Asian Century commissioned by Prime Minister Gillard last September.

The region accounts for 27 percent of global GDP, and with the right mix of national, regional and global policies, the Asian Development Bank predicts that Asia’s GDP will increase nine-fold to account for half of global GDP in 2050. China is now the world’s second biggest economy, and it is expected to overtake the U.S. as the world’s top trading nation by 2016. Australia and Asia of course retain a special relationship in this regard. The proportion of Australia’s total exports going to Asia exceeds 50 percent, with exports to China having doubled since 2008.

As noted by Prime Minister Gillard’s remarks on the White Paper, China and India  – with two of the largest emerging donor assistance packages and reach throughout the region – are frontline voices in Asian development cooperation. As both of these rising donors and Australia increase their commitments to programs in Asia, it has become pressing to develop a fuller understanding of each for fruitful engagement.

China’s aid, 45 percent of which is directed to Africa and about a third of which flows to Asia, has been the subject of much recent discussion. The country’s first White Paper on Foreign Aid, released last April, reveals an aid program that has been increasing at approximately 30 percent per year for the past few years.

In fact, estimations of the total size of China’s aid flows vary considerably, ranging from US$2 billion to over US$110 billion annually.

The huge variations stem from different delineations of which flows are considered development aid. In its White Paper, China itself categorises its aid primarily as grants, interest-free loans, and concessional loans administered through China Eximbank. This represents only a small element of China Eximbank’s loan program. Its other official flows, such as export credits, constitute the majority of Chinese development financing. These other flows are often incorrectly classified as aid (which they are not, according to the definition of Official Development Assistance), thereby leading to considerable misconceptions about Chinese aid. In addition, Chinese aid is often part of a broader investment package in a given country.

Due to such misconceptions and the fact that several Chinese agencies, rather than one, coordinate aid, it is difficult to analyse Chinese aid alongside traditional aid or within frameworks like the Paris Declaration. Nevertheless, we can be sure that China’s development cooperation activities will continue to increase. As such, it will be critical for Australia, given its special reach in the region, to engage with China.

India presents another interesting case. Although often overshadowed by China’s rising presence, India’s engagement in development cooperation dates back to the 1950s. Today, India is the 5th largest donor to Afghanistan. Like China, guiding principles include mutual benefit, non-interference, and technical and economic South-South cooperation. India disbursed over $1.5 billion in traditional foreign aid in 2011, even while it remained the world’s largest recipient of multilateral assistance.

Quantifying and categorising Indian aid is a bit of blur, as it is with China, largely because Indian aid has been managed and disbursed through an array of government departments and technical agencies. The Government recently announced its intention to establish a dedicated Development Partnership Administration within its Ministry of External Affairs, a move which has long been under discussion.

For both China and India, foreign assistance is a “soft power” tool for developing strategic economic and political relationships with other countries. As the Asian Century unfolds, we can look forward to reflecting on how this soft power impacts China’s and India’s engagement with recipient countries in the region and with each other.

To leverage this momentum, it is important for OECD-DAC donors like Australia and organisations like The Asia Foundation to engage with emerging powers like China and India. Given their rapid growth, in terms of both magnitude and soft power reach, these nations will play an increasingly important role in shaping regional and global development in the years ahead.

This article was originally published by the Lowy Institute’s blog, The Interpreter.

David D. Arnold is president of The Asia Foundation. He can be reached at president@asiafound.org. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.

This slideshow captures some highlights of programs stemming from our collaboration with AusAID that have been implemented across Asia since 2004.

If you are unable to view the slideshow below, click here.

Last week, Nepal’s Constituent Assembly (CA) members drafted citizenship provisions in the country’s long-awaited constitution, causing much consternation and almost guaranteeing that approximately 2.1 million persons out of an estimated population of nearly 30 million will remain stateless.

Nepal’s citizenship laws and eligibility provisions have created a large number of stateless persons who are effectively denied access to formal sector employment opportunities, banking facilities, property and more. Photo by Jon Jamieson.

The specific draft provision that is deeply problematic and regressive refers to how a child may obtain citizenship by descent in the new Nepal: a child would be granted Nepali citizenship if both mother and father prove they are Nepali citizens. In contrast, the current Interim Constitution of Nepal (2007), the Citizenship Act of 2006, and a 2011 Supreme Court directive all provide for citizenship if a child is born to a Nepali mother or a Nepali father.

The “and” provision is likely to increase the number of stateless children in Nepal as it requires the presence of both parents at the time of registration. The absence of either parent would be enough to disqualify the child. It also means that children with one Nepali and one foreign parent would be ineligible for citizenship if the foreign parent cannot (due to conflicting provisions) or does not wish to take on Nepali citizenship.

A compromise suggested by some CA members is that the “and” provision be accompanied by language permitting exceptions to be made in “special situations.” But vague language permitting exceptions abandons the crucial matter of citizenship to bureaucratic discretion and does not provide any assurance that statelessness in Nepal will be reduced or avoided. In fact, even under the relatively liberal provisions of the Interim Constitution, bureaucrats had used their discretion to avoid providing citizenship on the basis of the Nepali mother if the father was identified as a foreigner. Therefore, such cursory appeasement of opposition in the CA cannot credibly be seen as an effective resolution of contending positions on a serious issue.

The debate between “and” and “or” has characterized the current discourse on citizenship with strong and competing notions of gender: proponents of the former favor a stricter law to deter land ownership issues resulting from cross-border marriages of Indians with Nepalis and to preserve what they see as gender equality (both parents’ names will be written on the child’s citizenship certificate); while proponents of the latter advocate for individual identity and value, equal access to rights for all Nepalis, and protection against future generations of stateless persons.

Worryingly, the debate continues with widespread misunderstanding of some critical language, its meaning, and its consequences. Some of those in favor of “and” have expressed fear that if “or” were chosen, Nepal would transform from a patriarchy to a matriarchy. This dangerous conflation of patriarchy with patrilineal, and individual value and independence (or an absence of patriarchy) with matriarchy, should be immediately addressed and clarified in order to ensure a fair, well-informed debate and outcome.

Critical to the citizenship discourse is that it should not be positioned solely as a gender empowering or disempowering debate. Nepal today is a fledgling democracy at a crossroads, and is struggling to achieve a common understanding on the process of nation-building and a national identity. The added complexity of millions of stateless people can pose serious threats to internal peace, stability, and security. Most countries that have faced ethnic and class-based conflicts have struggled with redefining nationality laws and citizenship after conflict. The key has been to naturalize those that are born on your soil (jus soli) and/or whose birth giver (mother or father) are citizens of that country (jus sanguinis). The logic being that if you keep them stateless on your soil, you create a community of people without allegiance – politically, socially, or morally – to your country.

Of course, the fact that current discriminatory provisions negatively affect the rights of minority groups should also be recognized with the understanding that these provisions directly violate a number of Nepal’s international commitments. The proposed requirement that both parents be present for a child to be granted citizenship by descent is of great concern, especially with regard to women. For Nepali women, securing legal proof of citizenship can be difficult, especially when a male family member refuses to assist them (for example, if he does not accept that the child is his) or is simply unavailable to do so because he’s away working in another country like millions of Nepali migrant workers. Denying women proof of citizenship is an expedient way of ensuring that they cannot assert their rights to marital property or inheritance. Furthermore, that Nepali women have been unable to confer citizenship reflects a dependent notion of nationality that is based on and conforms to a patriarchical hegemony. The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) clearly states that nations should grant citizenship rights regardless of gender and goes on to state that, “State Parties shall grant women equal rights with men with respect to the nationality of their children.”

Statelessness also has a particularly pernicious impact on children, which often impinges on their rights to access to education, affordable healthcare, and land ownership. As Article 7 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child states, a child “shall have the right from birth […] to acquire a nationality.” And it continues that “State Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.”

International law requires countries to consider applicants’ “genuine and effective links” with a country when evaluating nationality claims, including the social, cultural, and economic ties they have established over time, which is particularly relevant in context of the residents of Nepal’s southern plains, the Terai, and other areas adjoining India. While other countries strive toward citizenship norms based on international best practices, Nepal’s discourse on citizenship is redolent of its antiquated feudal structures: politicians have expressed fear of creating a matriarchical society and of inciting an influx of Indian settlers in the Terai. Worse, they have shown an unwillingness to work together on statelessness and perhaps most dangerously have, across the board, sidelined the citizenship issue as less important than state restructuring.

In addition to its inability to provide satisfactorily for the development and progress of its people over the past five decades, Nepal’s citizenship laws and eligibility provisions over the same period have created a large number of stateless persons who are effectively denied access to formal sector employment opportunities, banking facilities, property transactions, business opportunities, and a modicum of social security. Excluding even larger swathes of the population through regressive provisions in the new constitution will only exacerbate the situation. Today, approximately 2.1 million Nepalis are without citizenship certificates and are effectively stateless. The Election Commission of Nepal indicates that the number could be even higher. A large number of these did not vote in 2008, and unless the restrictive provisions on citizenship are changed, this number will only increase. Under proposed constitutional provisions, the children of these stateless parents could also be excluded from access to citizenship, and as generations unfold Nepal will see sharp increases in an undocumented, uneducated population that could lead to significant and costly political and administrative hurdles in the near future. The denial of citizenship and, therefore, participation in political process for a significant portion of the population will severely undermine democracy in Nepal.

As Nepal looks to finalize a new constitution, it is critical that its leaders examine the issue of citizenship outside of the context of individual power groups. If Nepal’s lawmakers do not lead by example, the entrenched patriarchy and xenophobia of their constituencies will lead the country toward a looming crisis of statelessness and a potential regeneration of political instability and violence.

Pema Abrahams is a program associate and George Varughese is country representative for The Asia Foundation in Nepal. They can be reached at pabrahams@asiafound.org and gvarughese@asiafound.org, respectively. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.

On Monday, NATO leaders, with Afghan and Pakistani leaders joining, formally approved the plan for drawing down international forces and handing over security responsibilities to Afghanistan by 2014. The Asia Foundation’s Senior Director for Governance, Law, and Conflict, William Cole, joined experts live on NPR affiliate, KQED’s The Forum with host Michael Krasny to discuss the transition, the implications for the Afghan people, and more. Below is an excerpt from the interview (edited for space and readability).

Michael Krasny:
[Under the agreement] NATO troops will presumably be training and advising Afghans, and NATO Secretary General Rasmussen said the withdrawal will take place over the next two and a half years. How viable is this, particularly with all the strife and corruption in Afghanistan and with only 42 percent of operations presently being led by Afghans?

William Cole:
In terms of the viability of the Afghan state after the transition, there are obviously serious questions. The commitment of the United States to a long-term strategic alliance with Afghanistan is now clear. The U.S. won’t be leaving entirely, there will be something like 15 or 20,000 troops remaining after 2014. The real question is whether the Afghan National Army can carry the ball once the NATO troops are gone, and what happens after the Afghans have taken over the full responsibility for combat. Nobody really knows the answer to that question. What we hear from troops on the ground is that many are impressed with the progress that has been made by the Afghan National Army, but they still have a long way to go. Meanwhile, the insurgency has gotten tougher. There seems to be some willingness to negotiate on the part of the Quetta Shura, but the Haqqani network working out of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan seems less willing to negotiate, so there are a lot of variables here.

Krasny:
Do you see things moving toward an Afghan-led government?

Cole:
If you look at what the international community has constructed over the last decade in Afghanistan, in many ways, it has been based on a development model, which is taking Western institutions and transferring those to developing countries. This is particularly problematic where you have a context of starting from scratch, as was the case in Afghanistan. The difficulty is that what you end up with is “best practice institutions” that you have put in place, but those institutions don’t articulate very well with the underlying distribution of power and influence among the elites. The result is a lot of corruption, a lot of malfeasance, and there will be a lot of difficulty in sustaining that kind of state.

Krasny:
How do we make better connection with the Afghan people?

Cole:
The difficulty is that as long as NATO is present at this troop level, at the level of influence that the international community has in terms of policy and institution building in Afghanistan – as long as that’s there, we can at least on paper ensure rights – rights for women, rights for minorities. But as you move the international presence out, those forces who have the greatest voice in Afghanistan now will be able to reassert themselves and many of those voices are going to lead in a direction in which we’re not going to be very happy on the women’s front. The Asia Foundation has a survey that we do every year in Afghanistan, and one of the things that has been very clear on the issue of women is that most Afghans want their girls educated, they want women to be able to go to the marketplace freely, they want them to be in public freely, they don’t agree with what the Taliban had done in the 1990s. That’s on the one hand. On the other hand, there isn’t as much support as you might expect, and we might hope, for women in senior positions of government. When you combine those things together, they might look incongruent to Americans, but they aren’t necessarily incongruent to Afghans on the ground. As things move forward, and as deals are cut with the Taliban, and as you have more of an Afghan say in what the policies and institutions are going to be, I think you are going to see a slippage of the position of women in Afghanistan. It’s not going to be nearly as bad as it was in the 1990s, but it will slip from where we might have hoped it would be over the next few years.

Listen to full program on KQED.

At the end of a sabbatical team-teaching one course and blogging weekly, I am eager to get back to my work on the ground in the Philippines. At the end of this “Representative Professor” series, it’s interesting to look back at both what I’ve written and some of what has transpired in the past four months.

First, and probably most familiar to international readers, has been the continuing saga of competing Philippine and Chinese claims in the West Philippine/South China Sea. The dispute seems to have spilled over into economic affairs, with banana exports to China being held up (though there are reports of an agreement on joint phytosanitary inspection by the two governments and of joint oil exploration between Philippine and Chinese companies). Japanese interest has apparently been piqued, with reports that 10 coast guard vessels will form part of Japan’s ongoing developmental assistance to the Philippines. Considerable attention is now being paid – with the International Crisis Group examining internal Chinese decision-making on these maritime events, while the Asian Center at the University of the Philippines has launched a useful new website examining international affairs from a Philippine standpoint.   Interesting implications for the conflict in Mindanao have been drawn by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front on their website, suggesting that the government of the Philippines would be well advised to solve the Moro problem in order to be better able to focus on external defense.

But enough about this – I keep trying to insist “it’s not all about China.” I’ve written about the multi-faceted relationship between the Philippines and the United States, which will (one hopes) be on display in the upcoming state visit of President Aquino to the United States next month.

On the domestic front there has been a considerable amount of attention paid to the role of religion. One of the most famous Filipinos in the world, boxer and member of Congress, Manny Pacquiao, became entangled in controversy when his remarks expressing doubt about gay marriage were conflated with a quotation from Leviticus in the Old Testament of the Christian bible (and he was declared persona non grata at a L.A. shopping center). Meanwhile, after her banning in Indonesia, Lady Gaga ran into opposition from religious Christians in the Philippines, but she did manage to have two shows in Manila. Such religiosity might seem surprising since Bob Tebow, missionary father of football star Tim Tebow, thinks that 65 million of the 92 million Filipinos have not had the bible preached to them.

And a good illustration of why I wrote there is controversy about the current level of anti-Muslim prejudice, the Philippine Daily Inquirer ran a photo of a woman in a full burqa (she was the mother of an official of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao being sworn into office by President Aquino) with a caption, “Security Risk.”  This immediately caused a backlash, accusing the newspaper of being insensitive and biased (while security officials insisted, of course, that she had been properly screened).

Reviewing my first blog, I see that I did not blog about the cherry blossoms in Washington (they came early and were gorgeous) or whether country experts are better at predicting events in-country (I’ve not gotten around to reading Expert Political Judgment by Philip Tetlock).

Looking at the immediate future, it seems that the twists and turns of the dramatic impeachment trial of the Supreme Court Chief Justice Renato Corona requires more devoted attention than casual readers are likely to muster. But given the importance of the event for the Philippines it cannot be ignored. So, I offer one final (and simplifying) recommendation:  the decision is likely very soon, so wait to see if Chief Justice Corona is convicted by the Philippine Senate. If he is, then President Noynoy’s political capital will be very much enhanced and the current administration will for a time be master of all it surveys in Philippine domestic politics. If the Chief Justice is not convicted, the administration will be mortally wounded and attention will turn to the next presidential transition (scheduled for June 2016) – a full four years early.

This is the eighteenth and final posting in the series, “A Representative Professor,” a weekly series during a teaching sabbatical at Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies.

Steven Rood is The Asia Foundation’s country representative in the Philippines. He can be reached at srood@asiafound.org. The views and opinions expressed here are those of the individual author and not those of The Asia Foundation.

Afghans seem to want their government to be strong and capable, accessible and accountable, modern and democratic. But perhaps Afghans do not compare how Afghanistan is today with how much better it could be, as most internationals seem to: that comparison would surely suggest Afghan governance falls far short of the ideal. Perhaps, instead, Afghans compare how Afghanistan is today with how much worse it could be, possibly with how much worse it has been in recent memory. …

The vision for governance laid out in Afghanistan’s constitution, its national development strategy, and the communiqués of international donor conferences is a vision of good governance and modern democracy – a vision that most Afghans strongly support, at least in principle. But the “rule of law” and the “rule of man” still operate side by side in Afghanistan today, and most Afghans seem to recognize that it will take many years for the latter to give way to the former. Meanwhile, they have lives to live, jobs to create, roads to build, children to educate, problems to solve, injuries to treat, conflicts to resolve, and decisions to make. No community that wants to preserve – or establish – a modicum of peace and stability can afford to wait around for a government (or foreign donors) to catch up to their needs for rules, decisions, institutions, services, and so on; instead they will use whatever governance options are available to them, whether from formal, informal, or even illicit sources. The result, inevitably, is going to be a hybrid system, and Afghans themselves will argue over its form, its rate of formalization, and its fairness, for many decades to come.

The withdrawal of ISAF troops and the transition to Afghan lead over the next few years will be accompanied by a heightened sense of uncertainty and potential for civil war. The top priority for the international community should be to keep the current hybrid system from falling apart so that those arguments can take place without resort to violence. That objective might best be served by helping to give as many Afghans including power brokers and insurgents – a stake in the system as possible. Doing so, however, would require that foreign donors make some uncomfortable compromises to their own visions for Afghanistan’s governance, and take Afghans’ views – contradictory and nuanced as they are – much more seriously.

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