Scott Snyder directs The Asia Foundation’s Center for U.S.-Korea Policy. He recently presented a paper at a conference called “Nuclear Politics, North Korea and the Political Economy of Northeast Asia in the Wake of the World Economic Crisis” at the University of Washington. Download the paper here. Also, an English-language version of Scott’s blog piece “Is North Korea Playing a New Game?” first posted on Chosun Ilbo, is featured on GlobalSecurity. He can be reached at ssnyder@asiafound.org.

North Korea’s nuclear aspirations have served as the driving force for the development of ad hoc security multilateralism in Northeast Asia. This development has occurred in stages, with each successive phase in responding to the North Korean crisis resulting in strengthened regional cooperation, despite persisting underlying strategic mistrust among the parties. This presentation will briefly evaluate the significance and contributions of three stages in the development of ad hoc security multilateralism in Northeast Asia: KEDO, the Four-Party Talks/establishment of the Trilateral Coordination and Oversight Group (TCOG), and the Six Party Talks. Then, the author will offer a critical evaluation of prospects for Six Party Talks and analyze whether the six party process might develop into a permanent feature of the security architecture in Northeast Asia or whether a fourth stage might be necessary to achieve a lasting security framework for the region. The author will also evaluate the extent to which the North Korean nuclear issue and the U.S.-led bilateral alliance system, respectively, may be both a catalyst and an obstacle to the establishment of an effective Northeast Asian regional security framework.

Read the full paper.

Silas Everett is The Asia Foundation’s Country Representative in Timor-Leste and Butch Ragragio is Chief of Party for the USAID-funded local governance, elections, and civil society project. They can be reached at severett@asiafound.org and bragragio@asiafound.org, respectively.

It’s a sunny day and the wind is blowing in off the sea from the port in Dili. Behind the government palace, the white, octagon-shaped parliament building shines in the hot, tropical sun. Outside the parliament – a few pick-up trucks, then a taxi, drives by some sauntering pedestrians.

In front of the Parliament stands Senor Jose Barreto amid a group of university students smoking cigarettes, one of whom is text messages on his phone. Senor Barreto is Chief of Lauhata Suco. Suco is a term that describes a traditional administrative unit of governance and is often translated into English as “village.” In practice, however, Suco means more than that: it is an administrative unit that has been the main local governing structure for the majority of East Timorese for at least five centuries.

While Timor-Leste, newly-independent, rebuilds itself, state services are still far from the reach of many. Chiefs of Suco, like Senor Barreto, find themselves organizing road maintenance, planning for water and irrigation, enforcing local rules on use of common land, including forests, and settling local disputes that depend on their good counsel. Yet Senor Barreto’s activities are not planned or resourced through the state budget. Because there is no decentralized budget and planning authority, Senor Barreto must appeal to ministry officials in the country’s capital, Dili, for his Suco’s resources.

Senor Barreto has come to Parliament for a public hearing on a set of laws that could change all that. In early March, the Council of Ministers of Timor-Leste approved four draft laws on decentralization. However, the draft laws themselves fall short of the kind of decentralization that Senor Barreto had hoped for.

The draft laws call for a strong central government with nominal powers for local government and give the central government control over everything the local government does, including the legislative assembly. And the central government proposes to retain the power to review all the legislative assembly’s decisions.

Perhaps worse, the draft laws have no provisions for Suco representation in the local government. This means that Senor Barreto would not be able to address the concerns of his constituency in Timor-Leste’s national budgeting and planning process.

The government’s ruling coalition had every reason to expect quick passage of the draft laws on local government: they hold the majority in parliament and, as September’s local elections loom closer, pressure is mounting on the legislature. Parties within the ruling coalition pushed for a one day public consultation to cover a total of 84 pages of legal text in Portuguese. But public consultations are always a challenge, even moreso in a place where almost half the population has not finished any formal schooling and less than seven percent of the public speak Portuguese.

Timor-Leste’s independence has given Senor Barreto and the country’s citizens a glimmer of hope. According to the nation’s new Constitution, bills — such as the laws on decentralization – require approval from the National Parliament before becoming law. The Constitution also states “on matters of territorial organization, the State shall respect the principle of decentralization of public administration.”

However, Timor-Leste, like many new democracies in Asia and around the globe, is constrained by the lack of knowledge, independence, and power in the legislature to judiciously provide the checks and balances on the government to adhere to the Constitution.

Senor Barreto – with more than a hundred other Chefe de Sucos and scores of civil society representatives – attended the public consultations on the bills. The public seating in the plenary hall of the parliament was packed. In total, almost 400 Suco officials and civil society representatives attended the three sets of public consultations, the largest turnout for any such public hearing in Timor-Leste to date.

Adino Cabral of Lao Hamutuk, a Timorese non-governmental organization (NGO), spoke about how unclear the draft laws were on the purpose and functions of the proposed local government and lamented the weakness of its legislative assemblies to the point of calling these “Tukan Stempel” (”stamp pads”).

Dinorah Granadeiro of Fongtil, Timor-Leste’s umbrella organization for NGOs, insisted on greater and stronger women representation in the draft law.

For the Chefe de Suco in Baucau District, it was his first time to be invited to such an event. He stood and just thanked the Parliament for allowing him to participate.

While the public consultations’ long-term impact on decentralization is unknown, the immediate impact is certain: the ruling coalition has agreed that more time is needed for sufficient deliberation of the draft laws.

As for Senor Barreto, he is watching the government and the draft law to see if his voiced opinions will be incorporated into the final drafts. “A lot is riding on this,” he said. “It’s a matter of whether the people will rule the state or whether the state will rule the people.”

Herizal Hazri is The Asia Foundation’s Program Director in Malaysia. He can be reached at Herizal@asiafound.org.

I was on my way to University Teknologi Petronas in Malaysia’s Perak state the other day when a colleague of mine, better known as Ali, whilst driving, posed a question to the four passengers: “Why doesn’t the government just shut down PROTON (the Malaysian national automobile manufacturer)? It’s a failure by any international standards and it is an inefficient company. Why must we support an inefficient company?” He then went on to suggest a solution, which is to sell the manufacturing component to multinational car manufacturers like Mazda or Honda, but to retain the sales and delivery units. So, in fact, stick to the downstream selling and after-sales service activities and let the more efficient car companies manage and build the cars. This move, he continued, will also make the account books “cleaner” because you are selling your liability, which in this case is a non-profit making car industry. I interjected at this juncture, “but what will happen to the thousands of workers and their families working in the production plants?” The reply was not unexpected, “Well, the new owners will retain some employees and the rest will just have to find other jobs; I do sympathize with their fates but we have to concentrate on the bigger picture here. In time things will be better, that is the way the market sort itself out, it will find a new equilibrium.”

It is interesting to note that there are many budding economists-in-the-making when it comes to the fate of PROTON (and Malaysia Airlines as well). To my mind this suggests firstly, a territorial view of a state-owned conglomerate, which is not a bad thing since citizens should care for our beloved country. Secondly, it reveals an ill-informed public on the ideological underpinnings of an economic system.

I remember reading that in 1969 at the University of Cambridge, a young academic, Tony Atkinson, (recently retired from Nuffield College, Oxford) investigated the timescales of various models in economic theory. In particular, he looked at equilibrium solutions in the standard theory of growth and calculated how long it takes for a system to move to a new equilibrium once a change (say, a tax is imposed on a certain good which increases the price of the good) is introduced. He found that the answer was typically over a hundred years. In other words, within the safe confines of economic theory, a system which is in equilibrium will take more than a century to stabilize once a “change” is administered to it. Inadvertently the system spends a long time in disequilibrium, when supply and demand do not balance, when decisions made by both consumers and suppliers are in the period of adjustment – in short a period of volatility and uncertainty, to say the least.

So, then I asked; “Isn’t it too early to judge PROTON a failure? According to that guy who was the prime minister in Malaysia for the longest time (at least for now), “PROTON is a long term economic plan” (and if Mr. Atkinson’s timescale is correct, that is going to be quite a while). Furthermore, if we were to add to the returns in terms of gains in technology know-how, research ability, management capacity, bla bla bla … (if only there is a way to translate these into dollars and cents) will we still be reading PROTON’s account in red ink?”

Chong, the guy on my right, who was coincidentally wearing a t-shirt with Malaysia Boleh!! (a famous political slogan coined by former Prime Minister Mahathir that champions Malaysia’s ability to achieve anything and everything it aspires through unity and productivity) printed across his chest, looked at me and said “it can work if he is still the prime minister, but he cannot be prime minister forever.”

I must say that Chong’s logic is worrying. Nevertheless, it represents the thinking of many people in Malaysia.

Ramasamy, whom I just met on this trip (seated on my left) grinned, then said, “Actually Chong, it’s not all about leadership. Selling an inefficient component of a business will always be an option for any business entity during any leadership; in fact even during Dr. Mahathir’s time it was quite fashionable to sell non-profit entities – especially state-owned ones. However, selling state-owned assets to multinational companies begs a different analysis altogether, because there are different dimensions attached to this transaction. As Joseph Stiglitz observed, the largest companies these days are larger than whole countries considered in terms of their assets and their turnover. Large organizations do not have the power of the states and do not, legally exercise force as states do. However, they are, in many ways, equal to if not more powerful than states. What they do influences the prosperity of industries and regions. The kinds of people they choose to employ can have significant effects on the prosperity of individuals and whole classes of people. How they choose to realize their profits can undermine economic policies and affect the stability of governments. Nor do large businesses have to be bound by the desires and interests of their employees, as states are bound by the needs and aspirations of citizens. In many developing countries, where the pursuit of rapid economic development takes precedence, this is not made crudely apparent, of course.” There was silence after he finished. I suspect this guy must be an economist or must have read The Economist before this trip. He sounded so intelligent.

After a few seconds, I broke the silence (and of course trying to sound as smart as Ramasamy) to address Ali’s reasoning that the government need not administer help to inefficient firms. “Let’s look at an example of the housing property market in Malaysia. Recently, we see that it is not as vibrant and as lucrative as it should be. In other words, from what I have read in the mainstream media, the economy is not going into recession but the general public is not buying any new properties. By logical deduction, if population growth and real income are progressing well, people will have to buy a house to live in. But never mind the conventional wisdom that explains the general condition of the economy, maybe the housing developers have built too many houses – leading to an over-supply. So one of the measures our government took was to abolish real property gains tax due from foreign buyers when they buy housing units here. One would imagine that foreign-buying would then take up the glut of houses not sold in the market. But the reality of this is somewhat different. What we have is a group of developers building new high-end condominiums and selling at record-breaking prices, to a select group of targeted clients and cornering government policy towards self serving ends under the pretext of reinvigorating the housing industry as a whole … ah well, you can not blame developers for behaving opportunistically!

So, is there anything amiss in the way in which these developers behaved? That would, I suspect, depend on one’s point of view. They were behaving in a rational economic way and if our country is in a capitalist system, it makes perfect sense. We must all behave in an efficient capitalist manner. Any endeavor that does not, will cause wealth accumulation to be deemed inefficient. So now, the question is to which firm should the government offer its help? To put it starkly, do we facilitate the smooth operations of ‘efficient’ companies that create wealth for their own consumption or do we help the ‘inefficient’ ones who create more jobs for the general public?” That was more than what I originally intended to say. As usual, I got carried away.

Ali took the next opportunity to rebut: “I think the concentration upon the issue of equity does not of itself necessitate any conflict with the objective of maximum efficiency, and indeed the introduction of a welfare state (for example health and education) presupposed that no serious conflict would occur. But efficiency in the private sphere is dependent on the profit motive. I agree that the profit motive has to be subjugated to the wider ‘public interest’ if equity issues are to be given greater priority, however in the case of PROTON, I think the public have little interest … it’s the minority elites that is afraid of losing their stakes. What do you think Ramasamy?”

Ramasamy: “Well Ali, that is a rather strong statement to make, and I must say it’s a hard one to defend. However, I agree that there must not only be a trade off between efficiency and equity, but more of a question of finding a right balance. This has always been a perennial problem and it poses a dilemma in economics. Government on the other hand must tread extremely carefully with their policies and should not be seduced by the language of ‘efficiency’ and ‘profit motive.’ The government is, after all, the last bastion that protects the public interest and the well-being of its citizens. …”

Again there was silence after Ramasamy. I didn’t say anything more as I agree with him. As for Ali and Chong – I am not sure. Maybe they’ve had enough of this urban middle-class talk – in which case I don’t blame them.

We arrived at the university five minutes later and found a parking spot. Chong, who had been a patient listener, got out, shut his door and turned to Ali – the driver and owner of the car – and said “that was quite a nice ride Ali, thank you … and thank god for this PROTON!”

Nilan Fernando is The Asia Foundation’s Country Representative in Sri Lanka. He can be reached at nfernando@asiafound.org.

Situated at Sri Lanka’s highest point, the Nuwara Eliya District is one of the county’s most popular tourist destinations with refreshingly cool breezes that offer a respite from the sultry tropics of the lowlands. The hillsides shimmer a vibrant green from the tea bushes that produce the famous Ceylon tea enjoyed throughout the world. The residents of this mountain retreat, however, have a far different story to tell.

A combination of factors, including erosion, heavy rains, and urbanization, have greatly increased the risk of landslides in the area, making residents of Nuwara Eliya vulnerable. In January, 2007 alone, for example, landslides and flooding displaced over 18,000 people from Walapane and Hanguranketha, resulting in a massive need for shelter and aid. While immediate aid is obviously crucial, much of the area’s infrastructure and morale was also badly damaged, making long-term, post-disaster rehabilitation and development essential.

When disasters occur, those affected rely on the local government for immediate relief and short- and long-term rehabilitation. Without comprehensive relief and aid, affected areas are also in danger of experiencing conflict between host communities and the internally displaced.

The Asia Foundation and the International Organization for Migration (IOM), through a grant from the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), have helped communities and the government to respond to the natural disaster and become better prepared for future ones. The project has made remarkable progress in a relatively short period of time. IOM provided immediate relief to the landslide affected communities, including providing access to water and sanitation, and later coordinating with communities and local governments to provide longer term needs, including permanent shelter, solar powered lanterns, reconstruction of roads, community centers, preschools, etc.

Working to organize local housing committees that identify shelter needs and resources, the Foundation is providing rebuilding tools, such as cement stabilized earth bricks and round poles as roofing materials to rebuild sustainability and structurally. We’ve developed and provided community members with architectural plans, so that those constructing their own permanent shelters will incorporate precise technical specifications and cost estimates to better mobilize financial resources and start rebuilding their homes and lives.

We’ve helped formulate policy guidelines to influence future government-assisted landslide relief and rehabilitation efforts. In the future, a national policy will enact measures that will minimize the vulnerability of communities in landslide-prone areas, and provide better coordinated response efforts between disaster management agencies. In addition, and perhaps most important, is incorporating disaster considerations into local development planning.

Scott Snyder directs The Asia Foundation’s Center for U.S.-Korea Policy. Below are excerpts from his June 17, 2009, testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Environment Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. The transcript of his full testimony is posted on our website. He can be reached at ssnyder@asiafound-dc.org.

Snyder on The Six Party Process: A Regional Framework for North Korea’s Denuclearization: “North Korea’s unilateral pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities over the last two decades has ironically been a primary catalyst for strengthened regional cooperation in Northeast Asia. But this cooperation has thus far been insufficient to deter North Korea’s nuclear development given the existence of longstanding regional security cleavages. … No single actor, including the United States, can meet this challenge without cooperation and collective action from North Korea’s neighbors. But the concerned parties most directly affected by North Korea’s destabilizing actions have been least willing to challenge or block North Korea’s nuclear development.”

Snyder on North Korea’s Nuclear Threat: Implications for the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK Alliances: “In contrast to the aftermath of the 2006 North Korean missile and nuclear tests, at which time the United States, Japan, and South Korea seemed to have divergent responses, the responses of the three administrations appear to be converging following North Korea’s 2009 provocations. The Obama administration’s initial emphasis on reassurance and consultation with allies, the political transition in Seoul from the progressive Roh Moo-hyun administration to the more conservative Lee Myung-bak administration, and the emergence in Japan of a view that North Korea’s missile and nuclear development must be dealt with alongside the abduction issue have opened the prospect for more intensive coordination on North Korea policies among the three governments. The deeper the consensus that can be achieved among the United States, Japan, and South Korea, the more likely the prospects that a firm and coordinated stance will be able to influence China and Russia to take a stronger position toward North Korea in the context of the six-party process. … New administrations in Japan and South Korea have for the time being been able to set aside chronic territorial and textbook disputes and have begun to seek practical forms of cooperation (e.g., joint development projects in Afghanistan).”

Snyder on Prospects for a Strategic Understanding with China Regarding the Future of North Korea: “China faces a moment of decision in its own policies toward North Korea, given that North Korean actions continue to place Chinese strategic interests at risk. North Korea’s nuclear and missile tests have driven it higher on the overloaded agenda of items in the U.S.-China relationship, but it remains to be seen whether the United States and China might engage in strategic policy coordination over how to deal with North Korea. Ultimately, the prospects for such a dialogue appear to be slim at this stage since such a dialogue would probably be successful only if the North Korea issue were to rise to the top of the U.S.-China agenda, either as a result of renewed conflict or North Korea’s political collapse.”

Snyder on Political Implications of Pyongyang’s Inward Focus: “An even more challenging aspect of North Korea’s rapid series of provocations is that they appear to be connected to North Korea’s attempts to lay the institutional and political foundations for a succession process from Kim Jong Il to a successor leadership. This is a complicating factor because it appears to make North Korea’s elite more conservative and inward-focused. Or, North Korea’s leadership may have made an assessment that the external environment is sufficiently unfavorable that North Korea’s best strategy is to hunker down in the porcupine position as the best way to cover its vulnerabilities. Certainly, in light of his recent illness, Kim Jong Il personally must feel that time is not on his side.”

Nadia Tariq Ali is The Asia Foundation’s Senior Program Officer in Pakistan. She can be reached at ntali@asiafound.org. For more information on ways to support our work with internally displaced persons in Pakistan, please contact Bulbul Gupta, Grants Manager for Programs and Private Philanthropy, at bgupta@asiafound.org.

United Nations officials have described the recent displacement of Pakistanis as the biggest humanitarian crisis since the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. It is also the largest dislocation of people in the region since the partition of the South Asian subcontinent in 1947 and, arguably, the worst crisis facing Pakistan since Bangladesh separated from Pakistan in 1971.

After years of procrastination, in late April of this year, Pakistan launched a full-scale military operation against Taliban militants and their Al Qaeda associates in its restive northwestern territories. Since the Taliban were consistently undermining the writ of the state, the battle has been long overdue: Taliban militants carried out suicide attacks across the country, targeting Pakistan’s security forces, intelligence community – and innocent civilians – which has made it nearly impossible for the Pakistani government to work with its allies in the region.

The United States, seeing the Taliban threat as an issue affecting its own national security, has clearly conveyed that it expected Pakistan to fight Taliban militants to not only restore its writ in the Taliban-occupied territories, but for Pakistan’s own survival. In order to eliminate the militants’ leadership, the Pakistani government took this war to the tribal badlands – believed to be the conflict’s center of gravity. However, while the international community and Pakistan’s government have put an emphasis on supporting the counter-insurgency efforts, it seems far less attention or planning has gone into dealing with the mass exodus of people from the conflict zone, leaving a vulnerable population of over 2 million officially reported as internally displaced persons (IDPs) by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (as of June 16).

The IDP problem in Pakistan is immense and growing. The military offensive uprooted millions of people from three northwestern districts. As the offensive gained strength and people fled their homes for safety, the Pakistani government seemed unprepared for the crisis. Initially, no refugee camps existed, so many people went to the homes of their relatives and friends in other cities. However, in subsequent days, tens of thousands of people have gone to the special sites established for the IDPs in Mardan, Swabi, and Peshawar. Unfortunately, these facilities lacked even the most basic amenities of life: food, proper sanitation, and health facilities. The disruption of normal life has affected displaced persons psychologically, economically, socially, and emotionally. Women and girls face an extra risk of sexual and gender-based violence like rape, forced impregnation, forced abortion, trafficking, and sexual slavery in most internal displacement situations.

The international response to the situation leaves much to be desired. According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, the United Nations and humanitarian agencies have issued an appeal for $543 million. As of June 12, only 22 percent of the appeal has been funded. If more money does not come through soon, the dire IDP situation will be compounded.

In a recent Washington Post op-ed, Ahmed Rashid reported on the miseries of the World Food Program in Pakistan, which is currently feeding over 2.1 million people. The organization, he claimed, was “60 percent short of its estimated costs to buy more food,” and he quoted its top official in Pakistan as saying that it would run out of food “in a few weeks” if pledges were not made immediately.

Large numbers of refugees still have acute needs for basic assistance. As an immediate response to the crisis, The Asia Foundation’s Pakistan office is actively supporting trusted partners with disaster response expertise and recovery planning. Also, we are linking them with private fundraising resources in the U.S., such as Give2Asia, to support the daunting relief work ahead. The immediate focus includes support for critical services such as the establishment of camps, food, and clean drinking water, health and hygiene, continuation of literacy efforts for children, and information centers to assist IDPs in registering for access to government services. The Foundation is also focusing on ways to extend ongoing programming in Pakistan with current partner organizations to specifically reach out to this large IDP population.

Children are particularly negatively affected by such displacements. According to a government estimate, there are tens of thousands of IDP children from ages 4 to 16. There are hardly any schools at the camps, and government initiatives to provide education are still inadequate. Schools and learning activities in camps are vital to not only ensure continuation of education for children, but to also provide children a positive alternative to the traumatic situation they are facing. In this context, The Foundation is planning to revive its Box Libraries initiative, originally implemented during the 1980s, as part of its significant Books for Asia in Pakistan program, which delivered almost 80,000 books throughout Pakistan in just the last year. English-language books donated from the United States will be combined with books purchased locally in Urdu (the national language) and other local languages and dialects. These materials are then packaged into mobile, metal “box library” containers and delivered to teachers in the camps.

Given the crisis, the Foundation also plans to expand its work on increasing women’s participation in governance in northwest Pakistan to include a special focus on IDP women. Programs addressing the needs of women IDPs will offer referral services, address medical and trauma associated with experiencing violence, and protect women against gender-based violence such as sexual harassment and trafficking. Women must be made aware of their legal rights, as history shows they can be exploited during disaster situations. The Foundation is also exploring developing economic empowerment programs to help displaced women start up their own enterprises and become self-sufficient.

Donor-supported efforts for IDPs will also need to continue beyond immediate relief efforts. Focusing on longer-term reconstruction and recovery through economic and social empowerment will help people move forward and rebuild their lives. Pakistan, after all, is not only fighting for its own survival but also for greater regional stability and security, which could face serious setbacks if the displacement issue is not adequately addressed.

Mumtaza Abdurazzakova is The Asia Foundation’s Director for the Ministry of Women’s Affairs Initiatives to Strengthen Policy and Advocacy (MISPA)project in Afghanistan. Kate Francis is the Foundation’s Deputy Director of the Women’s Empowerment Program based in Washington, D.C. They can be reached at mabdurazzakova@asiafound.org and kfrancis@asiafound-dc.org, respectively. All names below have been changed.

Ara called in to Radio Zorha in Kunduz Province, imploring her fellow Afghans to be aware of the dangers of being tricked by promises of a better life through employment opportunities in foreign countries. Upon hearing radio messages about human trafficking, she wanted others to hear the story of her 16-year-old son who had left with a group of friends to find work in Iran, and hasn’t been heard from since. Had Ara heard about human trafficking earlier, she would have counseled her son to make different decisions.

Sadly, Ara is not alone as she awaits news of her son. The outpouring of personal stories and cautionary tales from radio listeners across Afghanistan who have heard the Ministry of Women’s Affairs’ radio campaign on human trafficking is an indication that the problem is as vast as it is complicated. Many listeners have called in to express concern about issues ranging from the kidnapping of women and children for the purpose of sexual exploitation, to drug cartels deceiving illegal immigrants into unknowingly smuggling drugs to Iran.

While the details differ, a handful of common threads run through these stories, forming a shared narrative that is rooted in poverty, illiteracy, and hope for a brighter future. Roughly 50 percent of Afghans are living below the poverty line, and that number is substantially higher for female-headed households. Almost 40 percent of adults are unemployed, and over 80 percent of the population lives in rural areas. Moreover, Afghanistan has one of the largest child populations – and the smallest proportion of working age populations – in the world, with approximately half of the population under the age of 18. A staggering 57 percent of men between the ages of 15 and 49 are illiterate, and that figure rises to a dismal 86 percent among women. Meanwhile, gender-based violence – including child marriage, domestic violence, sexual harassment, forced prostitution, and so-called “honor killings” – remains pervasive in Afghan society, both in the public and private spheres of life.

These factors create an environment ripe for human trafficking, a term which refers to the transport and trade in human beings for the purpose of exploitation. Few Afghans have the money to acquire official travel documents and permits. But, with families to support and few economic opportunities at home, they fall prey to the ploys of human traffickers designed to trick, coerce, and win the confidence of potential victims. Often they are taken across borders via dangerous routes through inhospitable terrain to Iran, Pakistan, and beyond. In addition to risking their lives, the victims are forced to pay large sums of money as payment for transportation and other expenditures, and are then promised employment, education, and even marriage opportunities in return. Family resources, already meager, are depleted, pushing them into situations of debt. Worse, traffickers sometimes extort additional sums of money from the victim’s family by threatening the life of the victim. Once in the hands of the traffickers, victims have little control over where they are taken and for what purpose – and they often end up in exploitative situations from which they cannot escape. Additionally, children are trafficked within the country to work as beggars or as bonded labor in the brick kiln and carpet-making industries. And women and girls are kidnapped or sold for forced marriages and prostitution.

Stemming the tide of labor migration is neither possible nor desirable; the priority must therefore be to arm citizens with the knowledge and skills to migrate safely. The Ministry of Women’s Affairs’ radio campaign conveys critical information on human trafficking to thousands of people in remote provinces of Afghanistan, through radio dramas and call-in programs built around such slogans as, “Your journey could begin with a dream – but, the dreams and promises could quickly turn to lies!” These local-language radio spots have elicited strong responses from local communities, and the Ministry of Women’s Affairs is planning to expand the public information and awareness activities under the campaign to also include listeners’ stories to respond to the high demand for further coverage of trafficking issues. Campaign slogans are also displayed prominently on billboards in border provinces, admonishing literate travelers to protect themselves and others from potential exploitation.

Many listeners have already used their newfound knowledge to educate their friends and families about safe migration and human trafficking, and some have even convinced their loved ones to reconsider risky plans to migrate through illegal means.

The campaign on trafficking in persons in Afghanistan implemented by the Ministry of Women’s Affairs project is clearly alerting the Afghan population that human trafficking exists and is mobilizing people to stop it.

Hallie Schiffman-Shilo is The Asia Foundation’s Program Assistant for the Women’s Empowerment Program based in Washington, D.C. She can be reached at hshilo@asiafound.org-dc.org.

Human trafficking is one of the most egregious human rights abuses. Each year, millions of men, women, and children are trafficked within their own countries or abroad into exploitative, abusive, and often illegal labor sectors. Many trafficking victims are forced into sexual slavery, domestic servitude, or hard labor and suffer from both physical and psychological abuse. Official statistics are hard to determine because of the illicit nature of trafficking. However, the International Labor Organization estimates that there are 12.3 million people in forced or bonded labor, forced child labor, or sexual servitude at any given time. Furthermore, an estimated 80 percent of transnational trafficking victims are women and girls.

Asia Foundation programs focus on the prevention of trafficking, the protection and reintegration of survivors, and the prosecution of traffickers. We work with local partners on the ground throughout Asia to implement our programs.

In Nepal, for example, we provide vocational training to teach women and girls marketable trades like becoming welders or mechanics, and then we provide microcredit loans and equipment to help them start up their own businesses. They can become financially stable, and models for other women to find their own ways to succeed in traditionally male-dominated jobs.

In Mongolia we’ve made progress prosecuting traffickers and strengthening the legal framework surrounding human trafficking. Our local partners successfully advocated for the ratification of the UN Convention on International Organized Crime and its Palermo Protocol on Trafficking, which is a legally binding mechanism that officially defines human trafficking, and binds its signatories to take measures to combat human trafficking. In addition, we successfully backed the amendment and ratification of articles in Mongolia’s criminal code that redefine prosecution boundaries associated with trafficking. We worked with police, prosecutors, and judges to make sure they knew about the new criminal codes and that they could prosecute traffickers under these new codes. This contributed to a significant increase in the number of trafficking cases that were investigated throughout the duration of the project.

And in Cambodia, our anti-trafficking programs have achieved significant results toward increased protection of victims. The program works closely with the Royal Government of Cambodia, through the High Level Working Group to Combat Trafficking and the Anti Human Trafficking Unit to strengthen the capacity of the police and social service workers on victim protection, investigative techniques, and ensuring a rights-based framework for rescue of trafficked victims. We’ve collaborated with the Ministry of Social Affairs, Veterans, and Youth Rehabilitation (MoSVY) and NGO partners to develop the National Minimum Standards for Protection of Victims of Trafficking. These will be adopted as the official policy guideline on victim support and care by MoSVY.

While our partners have made significant gains in combating human trafficking, more work remains. The United States Department of State just released its 2009 Trafficking in Persons report, which each year details the human trafficking situation in many countries worldwide. Countries are rated on a three-tiered scale determined by how severe the problem is and how their government is responding. Each year, countries move up or down the scale, gaining or losing ground based in part on their anti-trafficking initiatives. Some remain in the same tier year after year, unable to change the status quo due to a lack of resources, a lack of political will, or both. The publishing of the annual report is a harsh reminder that human trafficking continues to affect the lives of millions every day.

These programs are made possible through the generous support of the United States Department of State and the United States Agency for International Development.

Asfundyar Khan is The Asia Foundation’s Senior Program Officer in Pakistan. He can be reached at akhan@asiafound.org.

The deteriorating law and order situation in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and Balochistan Province is Pakistan’s most urgent problem. A new kind of war waged by extremist elements using suicide bombings, targeted attacks - and the takeover of strategic areas - has shaken the entire nation. Here, the militants are increasingly posing a formidable challenge to Pakistan and its law enforcement.

The recent surge in conflict and violence in these provinces - and in Afghanistan - mainly stems from the Taliban phenomenon. For this, Pakistan and Afghanistan continue to blame each other, causing tremendous strain between the neighboring countries. Recently, on the Pakistan side, the Taliban has transcended the ungoverned tribal areas on the border and moved into the “settled,” picturesque Swat Valley of the NWFP. The militants successfully challenged the government’s writ in Swat, violating a peace deal with the Pakistani government, and then made their expansionist designs evident by moving into adjoining districts down the hills and into the plains. An alarmed Pakistani government launched a military offensive in the occupied areas at the end of April 2009. The fallout of this has been the displacement of over two million people.

Supported by the firepower of modern and sophisticated weaponry, these militants have introduced their own brand of religious extremism and promises of implementing Shari’a (Islamic law). According to many analysts, the Taliban’s initial success in winning the hearts and minds of some residents of NWFP - and especially the residents of the Swat Valley - was because of the difficulty the state has been experiencing in providing timely and effective justice, among other basic benefits of democracy. The justice system in Pakistan is generally perceived as inaccessible, slow, and favoring those with money and power. In addition, police work is hampered by the administrative burden of channeling cases through the courts, which can take years. Militants in the NWFP pointed to these systemic weaknesses to challenge democracy in general - and the recently-elected democratic government in particular.

Addressing issues related to conflict resolution and justice is central to confronting the underlying problems in troubled areas of Pakistan. Significant areas of the NWFP and Balochistan, particularly the regions on the border with Afghanistan, have maintained very strong traditional societies. These societies govern by age-old institutions such as the hujra and jirga through which issues are identified, deliberated upon, and resolved. These jirgas are mandated to resolve disputes and conflicts within the tribal code of norms and to maintain overall peace; decisions of the jirga are considered to be binding on all parties.

In order to strengthen and enhance the work of these traditional justice mechanisms, in 2008, The Asia Foundation - in cooperation with the NWFP police force and a Peshawar-based NGO, Just Peace International - piloted a project to test Alternative Dispute Resolution concepts and mechanisms in two districts of the NWFP. The idea was to fortify community-based dispute and conflict resolution with Alternative Dispute Resolution tools and, especially, “restorative justice” practices that channel cases away from the courts, reduce the administrative burden on the police force, and help traditional forums render more effective and timely justice.

In a recent meeting with police officials, we found that the success rate in currently unresolved cases through use of Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms were reported to be in the range of 25-50 percent. The nature of cases resolved with these newly-learned tools and principles vary between Peshawar and Abbottabad districts. Cases resolved in rural settings tend to relate to issues of family, marriage, and disputes relating to land and property. Cases resolved in urban areas included disputes relating to traffic accidents and ownership disputes over commercial and residential facilities.

Both Musalihat committee members (conciliatory committees established under the project) and police personnel in police stations reported a change in their attitude and an enhanced ability to solve problems through skills gained in trainings under the ADR project.

This year, the Foundation expanded the initiative to five additional districts of the NWFP and the project now includes a focus on building community awareness. During the pilot project’s implementation, we learned that the majority of people are not aware of the presence of dispute resolution and mediation facilities present in the country. The project now aims to address both the demand and the supply factors for maintaining peace and security through two broad objectives. First, to increase citizens’ knowledge of and participation in community dispute resolution through public awareness. And second, to enhance the Pakistani government’s ability to facilitate the peaceful resolution of conflict by strengthening community dispute resolution mechanisms. The project is also assisting civil society organizations and the government to help communities realize maximum human potential in an environment of peace, justice, and dignity.

A second project in Balochistan related to Community Policing has similar objectives and elements. Formal police services have just recently been introduced in most of Balochistan, so this initiative focuses on overcoming citizen distrust of the new law enforcement. The project aims to establish or revitalize institutions for citizen-police engagement, which was envisioned in the Police Order of 2002 and the Local Government Ordinance of 2001. These institutions were envisaged to provide a bridge between the people and the police force for joint planning, implementation, and monitoring of policing functions. They are also meant to help communities to complement and support the role of police as protectors and promoters of the rule of law. The development of this project benefitted from the Foundation’s experience with community-oriented policing in Indonesia (since 2001) and Bangladesh (since 2003).

Given the dramatic events that have erupted in the NWFP, these two initiatives are very timely. In the long-term, we hope to contribute to citizens’ and local leaders’ capacity to resolve conflicts and ensure justice in their communities. Our long history of investment in the justice sector - including with ADR and community-oriented policing in Pakistan and elsewhere in the region - helps to make these goals attainable.

Robin Bush is The Asia Foundation’s Country Representative in Indonesia. She can be reached at rbush@tafindo.org.

Indonesian Muslims looked forward with great anticipation to the long-awaited “speech to the Muslim world” by a president they consider at least partially their own. With the possible exception of Obama’s inauguration, the Indonesian public has not, in recent history, ever so eagerly anticipated a speech by a U.S. president.

More than one national television station aired the speech live in its entirety, and featured expert panels in the studios to discuss it before and after. Around Jakarta, there were many “speech viewing” gatherings - mini-seminars where experts provided commentary and analysis.

Reaction from the Indonesian Muslim public was generally positive, although - like everything else in Indonesia - the response tended to vary widely between the general public (more positive)  and elites (more negative), and among the various elite commentators.

In general, though, even Islamist commentators found the speech itself to be hopeful, sincere, and an accurate identification of the issues and challenges that need to be confronted. There was a general appreciation of the focus on education, on pluralism and tolerance, on positive views of Islam - all themes that are familiar to an Indonesian audience. There was an appreciation for the new tone and position on Israel and Palestine. Many Indonesian Muslims pointed out a dramatic difference between Obama’s stance on, and understanding of, Islam from his predecessor.

A widespread reaction, however, was, “the speech is great, but let’s see if any action follows.” The degree of skepticism ranged widely, but the skepticism was largely focused on the huge challenges Obama faces domestically with a strong pro-Israel lobby, and with the degree of hostility still felt by most of the Muslim world. So a strong “wait and see” attitude prevailed. Some Indonesian leaders grudgingly gave Obama a thumbs-up on the speech, but a deadline of three months for some concrete change to take place.

Some Muslim leaders, however, saw a role for Indonesia in helping to realize the goals laid out in Obama’s speech. They pointed to the positive relationship that Indonesia has with both the U.S. and Middle East states, and argued that they could be part of the bridge between the two. Others pointed out that differentiating between “speech” and “action” was unhelpful, and that a speech by a world leader is a kind of action; further, that the action that needs to happen is not only on the part of the U.S. president or public, but also is on the part of the Muslim world itself.

So, overall, the Indonesian response was not the euphoric swooning that followed Obama’s election and inauguration speech, but it was a measured, hopeful, yet cautious “wait and see.”