To be fair I was quite impressed with Lockhart’s brutally frank analysis of what currently passes for mathematical edification in K-12. Apart from teaching kids to sit still and signaling social status¹, for 95% of the class everything after multiplication (and a good bit before) is totally pointless. Go talk to some doctors (GPs), lawyers, managers, etc.. to solve a simple algebra problem (say two linear equations in two unknowns) and see just how few have the slightest clue. No one’s benefiting by making them rotely memorize some rules they promptly forget. However, the notion that if we only taught children real math they would gobble it up is simply absurd.

I remember taking a differential geometry class in college that was taught in what was (at least for me) an abominable way. No rigor, just vague comments about pictures and twisting so unsurprisingly I kept putting that homework off and gradually falling further behind. At that point understanding became nigh impossible. Just doing the problem sets made me feel frustrated, angry and perhaps a bit inferior and I’m unreasonably over confident about my mathematical abilities. Naturally one then puts them off and when you force yourself to work you just grind through the problems without any curiosity or hope of understanding the bigger picture. Psychologically you just can’t force someone to be curious and deeply thoughtful about a subject that makes them feel bad and that’s what understanding math requires. So certainly a sufficently bad teacher (who won’t follow a book) can discourage real learning but could better teaching really significantly encourage real mathematical understanding in K-12?

Sure if you somehow eliminate the social significance of mathematical ability and turned math class into a non-threatening fun activity like most HS art classes you might make some progress. That, however, is simply impossible. Nothing the teacher says can erase the knowledge that actually showing interest and talent in mathematics opens up many lucrative doors and signals intelligence. So long as the mathematically gifted are financially rewarded students (and their parents) will care about how they perform in the subject. Unlike art or literature math also has right and wrong answers and can often leave one feeling lost and frustrated so unavoidably half your student body will resent math for making them feel stupid and inferior even if they would never admit it. No matter how excellent the teacher they can do no more than try to distract the under performing students from inevitable comparisons with those who are doing better. Worse, any attempt to discourage people who dislike the subject from taking the courses will simply increase the incentive for them to camouflage themselves as someone who does like math to future schools and bosses. The problem would be a lot easier if it was just that some people weren’t smart enough.

I don’t really know what we should do about this situation. However, I suspect one reason people are so reluctant to face this possibility is that it would require us to explicitly consider how we want to trade off the benefit to the small fraction students who could benefit immensely from non-rote proof based mathematics and in turn contribute disproportionately to our economic growth against the interests of the larger number of students who are too intimidated by the subject to do anything but rote work. I think we ought to consider using programming, with it’s more video game/slot machine pace of rewards, as the means to teach logic and quantitative thought but that still doesn’t answer the math question.

Perhaps this will be my last post here? A simple reiteration of negative Platonism, situating its significance in the context of awakening from the wrong expectations performed so thoroughly and unconsciously in the second Critique.

To put it once again with maximal simplicity: The diagonal is what relates, without religious/imaginary synthesis, our mathematical/cognitive and ethical/existential lives.

We already live in both places: in consistency through calculation and consciousness, in completeness through care and the unconscious. What we suffer from, as both theoretical inadequacy and ethical alienation, is an inability to relate these in a way that makes sense and is good.

Thus it has suddenly become possible, after long stagnation, to say something rigorous and suggestive, something that opens logoi both mathematically lucid and existentially thick (again without synthesis: it’s a matter of bridges and transitions, not of sovereign unities or systems) about the fundamental Socratic question: which knowledge, which part, of knowledge, would do us any good?

At stake here is exactly what gets talked about, prephilosophically, as “the meaning of life”. It is good philosophical practice to avoid this question until one has something real to say about it, and instead, to work the problem from either side. But it is not good practice, once the relation has become clear, to remain squeamish about naming it: Idea of the Good, Diagonalization.

Note, if you read the rest of the blog it’s totally clear that he really means diagnolization in the sense of the mathematical technique employed by Godel. Moreover, he seems to genuienly understand the mathematics (Godel’s theorem is a result in a meta-system describing provability in some formalized system) so what’s going on here is surely not mathematical confusion. It’s the philosophy that’s totally fucked (I’m pretty confident now that it’s not a hoax).

However, to be fair to this blogger, he isn’t some isolated crank, but rather a participant in a ‘respectable’ philosophical tradition. Indeed, one of the famous philosophers he references, Alain Badiou is even more incoherent. While he would almost certainly quibble with the description given on wikipedia if the following is even remotely accurate he might as well be spouting gibberish.

Badiou’s use of set theory in this manner is not just illustrative or heuristic. Badiou uses the axioms of Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory to identify the relationship of being to history, Nature, the State, and God. Most significantly this use means that (as with set theory) there is a strict prohibition on self-belonging; a set cannot contain or belong to itself. Russell’s paradox famously ruled that possibility out of formal logic. (This paradox can be thought through in terms of a ‘list of lists that do not contain themselves’: if such a list does not write itself on the list the property is incomplete, as there will be one missing; if it does, it is no longer a list that does not contain itself.) So too does the axiom of foundation — or to give an alternative name the axiom of regularity — enact such a prohibition (cf. p. 190 in Being and Event). (This axiom states that all sets contain an element for which only the void [empty] set names what is common to both the set and its element.) Badiou’s philosophy draws two major implications from this prohibition. Firstly, it secures the inexistence of the ‘one’: there cannot be a grand overarching set, and thus it is fallacious to conceive of a grand cosmos, a whole Nature, or a Being of God. Badiou is therefore — against Cantor, from whom he draws heavily — staunchly atheist. However, secondly, this prohibition prompts him to introduce the event. Because, according to Badiou, the axiom of foundation ‘founds’ all sets in the void, it ties all being to the historico-social situation of the multiplicities of de-centred sets — thereby effacing the positivity of subjective action, or an entirely ‘new’ occurrence. And whilst this is acceptable ontologically, it is unacceptable, Badiou holds, philosophically. Set theory mathematics has consequently ‘pragmatically abandoned’ an area which philosophy cannot. And so, Badiou argues, there is therefore only one possibility remaining: that ontology can say nothing about the event.

For any readers familiar with set theory the part about drawing ethical maxim’s from Cohen’s method of forcing might be even more amusing. Sure, he is hardly the first continental philosopher I’ve read who should be properly regarded as a crackpot but when it’s about my subject (mathematical logic) it just makes the point all the more clearly.

Now reading this sort of BS is kinda amusing but I do have a broader point. Despite being essentially indistingushable from the sort of crank theories that pop up from physics crackpots all the time the people publishing this stuff are still seen as respectable, even acclaimed, philosophers. If philosophy wants to be a serious intellectual discipline it needs to take the same hard line that they physicists do about crackpots, even if it means tossing out entire university departments.

The physicists wouldn’t simply sit quietly and say nothing about a crank being allowed to teach physics courses, nor attend conferences or journals that treated them as respectable researchers. Moreover, were they to do so the progress of the discipline, and certainly the public understanding of physics, would be greatly harmed. My point is ultimately that it’s not enough for analytic philosophers (particularly tenured ones) to sit back and privately dismiss all this crap as rubbish. They have a positive duty to denounce these people as cranks and eliminate them from the field. Failing that they have a duty, even if it imperils funding, to demand departments be split and otherwise clearly distingush what they do from what the continental crankpots do.

To be clear not everyone one might classify as a ‘continental philosopher’ should be deemed a crank. Despite being notoriously confusing Kant surely is not. Mere error or poor writing is not enough to be a crank. However, neither the blurriness of the line or our inclinations to charity are an excuse for tolerating obviously incoherent gibberish as valid philosophy. Since it’s notoriously difficult to conclusively establish that some convoluted continental style ‘argument’ lacks any reasonable interpretation the burden should be on the person presenting the apparent gibberish to convince others they are merely really poor writers with a meaningful point.

Seems to me that this is the result of biased thinking from an industry reluctant to change. The internet is an amazing tool that radically increases the efficency of news delivery but increases in efficiency are always painful. Just like the printing press before it the increased efficency offered by digital delivery is going to put some people out of work.

Far from being an efficent industry when I look at the newspaper business I see an unimaginable amount of waste. The most obvious form of waste is physical printing and delivery. The overhead of running a printing press every night and distributing the paper plus the indirect costs this incurs is huge. However, even ignoring this I’m constantly amazed at the amount of duplicated effort between newspapers. The need for local physical printing has let each newspaper to employ their own movie reviewers, editors etc.. etc.. Heck, having 20+ reporters at a press conference doesn’t help journalism it just wastes money.

It’s going to be painful for newspapers. Many journalists may lose their jobs. Local papers may be reduced to merely local news but there is an awful lot of efficiency that can be gained without sacrificing any investigative journalism.

The article begins inauspisciously by hanging the whole premise of the article on a blatant fallacy. Do women preferentially bully other women? I don’t know but the study quoted in the article sure as hell doesn’t say so. What it actually says is that women report being bullied by women and men about equally often, and at about the same rate as men report being bullied by men but men report being bullied by women much less. Of course, this is exactly what one would expect to see if men were simply reluctant to admit being bullied by women. So the entire effect could be nothing more then men feeling embarrassed to admit being bullied by a woman.

As if to further refute her own hypothesis the author then informs us that women are taught they should be supporting and nurturing to each other so they feel bad treatment from other women particularly disturbing. But, hmm, wouldn’t that suggest that women are holding women up to a higher standard? Of course the author doesn’t seem to realize this would inflate the women on women bullying numbers nor that, this expectation itself might cause women to retaliate against each other for perceived failures to live up to this higher standard.

After pointlessly observing she knows some women who feel they are bullied more by women the author suddenly jumps tracks to ask why women are less likely to be perceived as leaders. Drawing up the dark cloud of discriminatory/unfair treatment she tells us that women are perceived negatively if they behave as aggressively as the men but can’t get promoted if they don’t. That, indeed, is a worthwhile question to ask but instead we get a heartwarming story about a group of female executives getting together to role-play scenarios and help them discover their political blind spots.

I’m sure that plays well to the majority of readers who (as I often am myself) are more interested in the emotional journey than thinking hard about the right answer but it should also set off a giant flashing red “DANGER” sign in anyone who has been paying attention. I mean at least skip a paragraph or two after observing how unfair it is that women can’t display the aggression men do before telling them you expect them to be more supporting and cooperative. I mean she might as well have suggested women get together every month to bake and let each other know if any of the guys aren’t getting enough of their cooking. Besides, if you are worried, as the author is, about women picking on each other because they see themselves as competing for the same female slots in the cooperation you might want to hesitate before encouraging women to see themselves as female employees. Indeed, the results on stereotype threat would seem to suggest that thinking of themselves as women encourages them to behave more like the traditional gender stereotype. So no, it may not be necessary or desirable for women to be “aware of their shared identity as women.”

As if to make sure she hammered home the point that women had better be cooperative and supportive as their gender dictates the author approvingly includes this view before the end of the article.

Televerde reversed that attitude in Perryville, Ms. Cirocco said, by encouraging women to work for a common cause, much like the environment envisioned by the Canadian researchers. “It becomes a very nurturing environment,” Ms. Cirocco said. “You have all these women who become your friends, and you are personally invested in their success. Everyone wants everyone to get out, to go on to have a good healthy life.” If the level of support found at Televerde were found elsewhere, Ms. Klaus said, it would solve a lot of problems.

I mean this stuff is right up there with (actually far worse since it’s more respectable) the worst of the perversions of evolutionary psychology used to assure the author they were inferior. It masquerades as science and analysis despite lacking anything of the kind while using hackneyed emotional ploys to convince the reader that women need to try even harder to play their traditional supportive and nurturing gender role and worst of all do so subtly enough to be reasonably successful. If people aren’t going to get outrage by this sort of piece they should stop pretending they are fighting gender stereotypes and want to move beyond traditional gender roles and just admit it’s just all about group pride. If your really worried about the culture pushing gender stereotypes onto women here you go. Outrage over this kind of article might actually accomplish something. So if you aren’t going to make a big deal about this kind of article just drop the pose. It’s in the New York Times for crying out loud.

To explain what I mean we first need to go back to Quine’s seminal paper Two Dogma’s of Empiricism. Even though I think Carnap clearly had the better of the argument about analyticity¹ I want to give Quine credit for pointing out to me the way in which the concepts we use depend on our background assumptions (how we model/conceptualize things) for their very coherence. Just as the concept of an equivalence class stops making sense once you start talking about non-transitive relations so too do many of our scientific and everyday notions cease to be well defined when we no longer accept the assumptions they were defined with respect to.

Stealing an example from Quine consider the Newtonian concept of kinetic energy. A good Newtonian physicist would have said that the kinetic energy is defined to be .5mv² where m is the object’s mass and v it’s velocity. However, kinetic energy is obviously also intended to be in some sense a measure of the work it would take to stop that object. Since these two notions coincide on the Newtonian picture there isn’t any problem. So long as we believe (or even use as an approximation) Newtonian physics there isn’t any question as to which is the right definition of kinetic energy. We are simultaneously committed to the concept capturing both notions. What Quine observed is that once we abandon the Newtonian conceptual framework there isn’t really any objective fact about which commitments we should honor and which we should discard. If scientists had responded to special relativity by using kinetic energy to describe the Newtonian formula and started theorizing about the conservation of Eisensteinian smenergy we couldn’t really accuse them of having made a mistake. Just as there is no right way to extend the notion of an equivalence class to non-transitive relations there often isn’t any right way to extend our scientific or everyday concepts outside of the frameworks they were conceived in.

The upshot of all this, in my view, is that our most useful concepts often presuppose certain assumptions. When these assumptions no longer hold the concepts themselves may cease to be coherent. So keeping this in mind let’s take a look at the assumptions that give rise to our concept of rationality.

Without going into too much detail I think it’s fairly safe to assume that a major (primary?) grip on (belief) rationality comes by way of postulating that people hold various beliefs where we take those beliefs to behave in some loose way like propositions. In other words we gloss over complexities like the effect of context and social situation on the views people express and simply pretend they either do or don’t believe some claim. Of course you can embelish this view a great deal and allow people to believe things in varying degrees or even take them to merely have some transitive implication relation. However, we can only stretch these concepts so far before they become unwieldy and useless, something we all implicitly recognize when we hesitate to attribute beliefs to ethnic groups, countries, or our computers.

So what? It’s hardly news that some aspects of people’s behavior won’t be well described by idealizing them as having something like beliefs. However, the point I want to press home is that rationality isn’t a property that big fleshy globs of atoms have. Rationality, is a concept grasped in terms of a certain kind of idealization about human behavior. It’s a useful concept and useful idealization but it’s still a type error to think of it as a property that applies to actual physical beings. We frequently forget this because in most contexts there is an obvious “right” way to idealize someone as an agent with certain beliefs so we talk about people having irrational beliefs and find it useful. However, it’s important to remember this shorthand only makes sense as long as this kind of idealization makes for a decent model of human behavior. Just like it’s simply confused to talk about the Newtonian kinetic energy of a particle traveling at .999c there are situations in which idealizing people as having something like belief is such a bad way to model their behavior that talking about rationality is similarly confused.

But the situation for a viewpoint independent concept of rationality applicable to real people only gets worse once you realize just how sensitive the ascription of rationality is to the way we choose to idealize the situation. Choosing to idealize a split brain patient as a single agent will yield very different judgments about his degree of rationality than idealizing his actions as the result of two seperate agents with distinct beliefs. It’s not that one of these idealizations is wrong and the other right (what could that even mean?) but just that in certain contexts one will be more useful than the other. And it’s not just split brain patients, Frued and many others have often taught that people were better modeled as the result of several competing agents or personalities. To really drive home the dependence of ascriptions of rationality on your choice of model just try to work out how you could make a principled application of the concept to a network of partial autonomous, partially integrated AIs.

My point is that it’s not just that we can’t ever be fully rational. It’s that the very notion as applied to living breathing people isn’t even coherent. Rationality is a concept that lives in an abstract idealize realm populate by agents possesing something like beliefs. It’s only applicable to real creatures insofar as this kind of idealization is useful and people largely agree on how it should be done. Step beyond that and it just doesn’t make sense anyone. I also think this realization can help alleviate some of the confusion over various paradoxes like the surprise quiz but that’s another post.

Still, if this amounted to nothing more than a national venting no big deal. The extent to which this seems to be motivated by a desire to see others suffer as they are would still be disgusting but that’s a sad part of human nature. Horrifyingly, however, congress really seems to be going through with this plan to levy a 70-90% tax on bonus payments to AIG employees. This law will be subject to constitutional challenge as a bill of attainder (meaning the taxpayers might get to pay for the bonuses and the lawsuits) but even if it fails to meet the constitutional qualifications to be struck down in such a fashion it surely violates the spirit of the prohibition on bills of attainder.

I mean it doesn’t take a genius to figure out that the primary motivation here isn’t to save money or raise revenue for the government. If those were the motivations we would at a minimum be broadly taxing compensation at AIG. No, the public is angry at these people and wants to punish¹ them. But even if you think these people deserve to be punished the principal that we don’t punish individuals based merely on public anger is an important one. If this sort of thing passes muster there really is no way to say that taxing the principal of Bill Gate’s investments at 99% because we are pissed about the shody programming in windows is out of bounds or just because we don’t like the way he treated his wife. Ultimately when it comes to this question we have to set aside all consideration of it being taxpayer money or the unfairness of the situation. The government here isn’t acting as an investor in AIG but as the soverign. Nor does it make a difference that these bonuses haven’t been paid yet and that Bill Gates already has his money. Gates doesn’t keep a giant wad of cash in his house, he is content to let banks owe him the money just as AIG owes their employees their bonuses.

And for the love of god what could possibly motivate people to engage in this sort of dangerous punitive action when they don’t even know how most of the people who are receiving the bonuses behaved?

Consider google’s (well stanford’s) PageRank patent. Recognizing that one could create a useful measure of a page’s importance by summing up the importance of the pages linking to it and realizing that this could be efficiently computed using tricks from linear algebra was anything but trivial. Indeed, this kind of non-trivial application of mathematics to an ill-defined problem (return the best search) is a prototypical example of the sort of discovery that benefits from patent protection. Society can derive great benefits from these kinds of discoveries and money will lure people with the expertise to solve these problems away from pure mathematics or the sciences but without the ability to patent the discovery the financial incentives wouldn’t exist². While most software patents are more like the 1-click patent than the PageRank patent there is no shortage of real world problems that are crying out for a similarly brilliant solution.

In the face of examples like google’s PageRank patent it’s tempting to say that software patents are just dandy and the real problem is obvious patents. Unfortunately, it’s not that simple. Consider a hypothetical patent on the use of a LRU (least recently used) cache for texture data in a MMORPG client³. It’s certainly obvious in the sense that any decently skilled software developer would consider that solution if he was asked to solve the problem but until you actually try this design it’s not clear that an LRU cache would work. Maybe players don’t backtrack much so an LRU cache would simply waste resources on rooms the player won’t see again for awhile. At least in this example it seems clear that simply noticing that a fairly obvious approach solved the problem shouldn’t warrant a patent. The cost of actually testing out the ‘discovery’ is quite low and usually there are only a few obvious approaches to try.

However, such a rule would be totally unworkable in another industry where there might be a vast array of potential approaches that experts in the field would agree seemed promising but the cost of investigating them are quite high. For instance in the pharmaceutical industry everyone might realize that a certain large class of compounds are promising candidates to treat depression but actually evaluating each of these compounds for efficacy and safety is very costly. Incentivizing drug development requires that we let the pharmaceutical company patent their discovery that compound 5043A1 actually works to treat depression.

Ultimately I think the real problem stems from the fact that we are lumping two very different kinds of invention into the patent system. There is the first type of invention, like the google PageRank system, that represents a flash of inspiration to try something that no one else thought of and then there is the second type of invention that consists of the discovery that some potential solution really works. Ideally the patent system would protect the first kind of discovery pretty broadly but only protect the second sort of discovery in industries where it requires considerable resources to ascertain which of many potential solutions succeeds.

UPDATE 2: The bit about fraud seems to have been more populist BS spread by Andrew Cuomo, the New York Attorney General. It seems highly likely this was just an attempt to ride the wave of populist anger to ‘get those guys.’

Anyone who has been paying attention to the media lately will have noticed the outrage over the bonuses being paid to AIG employees, particularly employees in AIG’s financial products division. The division responsible for the deals that necessitated the government bailout. Disgustingly even relatively clearheaded individuals have jumped on this populist bandwagon and just in case we needed another lesson in the failures of democracy congress is demanding heads. People complain about the lack of transparency about the government’s response to the financial crisis but if this is how the public responds maybe they don’t deserve it.

Let’s be totally clear. This outrage is over mere terminology. No one was making a fuss about the fact that AIG employees, even those in the financial products unit, continued to be paid their salaries. Getting mad because some employee compensation is called bonuses rather than salary is about the stupidest thing imaginable. No one even looked at what these people were payed before this bonus scandal. People are mad for no other reason than the fact that wall street pays out significant chunk of it’s employee compensation in the form of bonuses. Sure, there were demands that the very top level of the company (CEO, CFO etc..) no longer be paid their huge salaries but we aren’t talking about sweatheart deals cut by a friendly board in this case but relatively standard payments on wall street to top level talent¹.

Just in case rational thought escapes you on this issue let me put this question another way. Do you think that the government should stop payment on all uncashed paychecks to AIG employees in the financial products division? Even those employees who did their job well and are needed to help unravel this mess? If not why do you think it should take away bonuses for these employees? In both cases the employee was promised certain compensation in return for certain work/performance and calling it a bonus or paycheck doesn’t change that fact. Certainly it’s totally unacceptable for the US government to void valid employment contracts made by AIG after tricking those workers into continuing to labor under them since the bailout.

More reasonably one might think that the government should have allowed AIG to lapse into bankruptcy and simply fail to honor employee compensation agreements in general, no merely the bonuses. Of course this has nothing to do with the outrage being expressed by the public and their elected officials but it’s at least coherent enough to rebut. However, this would undermine the very motivation for rescuing AIG from bankruptcy as it would have created doubt about whether AIG would make good on it’s debts. Sure, the government could have decided to guarantee some AIG debts despite the bankruptcy but that leaves everyone wondering if the government will pay off their claim or if some unpopular behavior on the part of the creditor would convince congress to leave them on the hook. Any plan that let the government pick and choose which preexisting AIG obligations they would honor would have been a disaster.

Still, whatever you think about the wisdom of the bailout of AIG at this point it would be totally unacceptable for the government to renege on these bonuses. The government choose to simply infuse capital as if they were some private investor rather than to nationalize the company now it needs to live with that choice. Trying to use it’s legislative power to eliminate these bonuses now would induce fear in other AIG creditors, reduce the government’s flexibility to infuse banks with capital, and generally do great harm to future bailout attempts. Not to mention that the cost to the taxpayers from the resulting lawsuits and our interest in keeping top talent at AIG to unravel their finances. Even assuming none of the employees due bonuses leaves in anger or can find a better offer (the best people always have offers) so long as the government still owns part of AIG every single highly paid employee will wonder if they will really get the package promised them.

What’s so particularly absurd about all of this is that all this opposition that is being generated towards future bailouts or stimulus packages as well as the potential for harm if the government really voids these contracts is happening over about 1 400th of the amount we paid to bail out AIG. It’s like lending your friend $1000 to cover his mortgage this month and then making a big fuss over the fact that he still purchased coffee for the girl he asked out the month before.

The more I see the more convinced I am that democracy is a truly awful system.

If you had read only the proponents of this legislation one might think the only constitutional obstacle to this legislation was this language in Article 1 Section 2 (emphasis mine)

The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several states, and the electors in each state shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature.

While one can reasonably argue that DC residents are “people of the several states” and if you strain a bit one could interpret the second clause as merely a restriction on how states may choose their representatives, not an implied restriction on who may have representatives. However, the subsequent passage devastates any hope of such an interpretation.

No person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that state in which he shall be chosen. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.

Short of biting the bullet and saying that DC is a state, which would imply they were due a pair of senators as well, there is simply no way for the representative from DC to “be an inhabitant of that state in which he shall be chosen” since they won’t have been chosen in any state. Nor can one give any sensible interpretation of the requirement that representatives be apportioned among the several states that would permit DC to have a representative. Moreover, any theory allowing congress to use legislation to grant DC a representative would pose a fundamental threat to our electoral system. Either you interpret the formula for apportioning representatives demands DC be given one or forbids it but not both. Thus if congress has the power to either grant or deny representation to DC it must, on any logically consistent interpretation, somehow have the power to grant DC representation unconstrained by this formula. If congress can choose whether to grant DC 0 or 1 representatives then it would seem nothing prevents it from granting DC 200 representatives.

The justifications the proponents offer spend a lot of time arguing that the Framers surely didn’t intend to deny DC residents representation but that merely demonstrates a deep confusion about the role of intent in legal interpratation. The relevant question is whether the framers (original public understanding/whatever) intended the rule to apportion representatives only among the states, not whether they intended a particular consequence of that rule. If Blagojevich had signed an anti-corruption law the fact that he didn’t intended the law to be used against him wouldn’t pose any obstacle to prosecuting him under it. The only time we should look beyond this narrow kind of intentionality is when the legal rule is vague and requires additional preciscification which most assuredly isn’t the situation here. Observing that the alternate rule granting representation to the states and DC according to their population would have better served the framer’s ultimate aims is no more justifies the constitutionality of this legislation than pointing out that war veterans are often wise beyond their years would allow us to elect a 25 year old war veteran to the presidency in violation of the age requirement.

The proponents also try to use court precedents which establish congress’s power to treat DC as a state for the purposes of judicial jurisdiction or to apply other laws to the district to argue that congress has the power to grant the district a representative. This argument is so confused that it’s hard to make sense of it. The courts have ruled that the broad grant of authority the constitution explicitly grants congress over DC gives congress additional powers to pass legislation affecting DC that it’s enumerated powers might not allow with respect to the states. Thus even when the constitutional justification that congress uses to pass a law affecting the states fails congress can still fall back on this alternative authority. However, none of this gives congress the power to ignore specific constitutional restrictions when it comes to DC. Congress still can’t restrict free speech in the district and it can’t ignore the requirement that it apportion representatives among the several states.

Finally, what appears to be the best argument the proponents have is that when DC was first ceded to the federal government congress granted the citizens of that area the right to continue voting in their former congresional districts. At first blush this would seem to conflict with the argument here but on closer examination it’s apparent that no such conflict exists. The constitution merely guarantees that representatives be apportioned amoung the states according to a certain formula, if Maryland or Virgina decided to let citizens of Kentucky vote in their elections I see no obvious constitutional violation. Congress could likely, with the consent of some state, grant the district residents the right to vote for representatives in that state (but it’s unclear if they would count for the purposes of apportioning representatives) but unless you think that congress could dilute Wyoming’s votes by allowing any US citizen to vote in Wyoming elections the state could always revoke this privilege. Moreover, this would have the perverse consequence that DC residents couldn’t select another DC resident to represent them by the residency clause.

This is as clear as constitutional issues ever get. The politicians need to stop posturing and start trying to pass an amendment.

Taking a broader perspective on the attitude we take to cheating in baseball it’s simply absurd to try and hang your the outrage at steroid use on the notion that it’s cheating. When a pitcher is caught scuffing the ball or applying spit it’s not a big issue the way it would be if they were found to be using steroids. Of course some would argue that steroid use by a player undermines the validity of their records by making it impossible to compare them to the past greats and thus damages the game. Why anyone would think that violating a policy that everyone understood wasn’t a genuine rule of the game should undermine the validity of your record but actually cheating during the game doesn’t count for that much totally baffles me but it doesn’t matter as the whole notion that tis nonsensical. As people have throughly documented past players have unfairly benefited from evils like segregation and rule changes to such a degree that the notion of comparing players from one era to another simply by examining the numbers doesn’t make any sense.

Finally, when pushed on these two arguments the people making a fuss about about steroids usage retreat to the argument that these players are role models and setting a bad example for children. Even if so where is the outrage over players who spend the night carousing, who leave their wives or don’t save enough money? Children see baseball players publicly flaunt all kinds of bad behavior all the time but they only hear about the steroid use because moralizing fans and prosecutors insisting on digging it up. Moreover, while these players certainly take some risk they aren’t desperate body builders, even with the steroids they live a healthier lifestyle than most public figures. In my view we should simply take the use of performance enhancing drugs as just another evolution in the long series of changes to the game.

So if the revelations about baseball players past steroid use hasn’t upset me what has? Government prosecutors threatening to prosecute a man’s wife and mother in law for tax violations just to pressure him into spilling the beans on Barry Bonds.** As I’ve said previously I think it should be illegal (frankly I would add it to the constitution) to threaten someone’s family to secure their testimonty. Even if the practice itself doesn’t seem repugnant to you if the defense can’t (openly) pay witnesses to testify for fear it would bias their testimony why should the prosecution be able to threaten their family with jail time? But even if you accept the practice is sometimes nencessery is the Barry Bonds case really that important?

I can’t believe that the government is threatening to screw over a man’s family just so he will help them prove Barry Bonds lied. That really is a new low.

He should have known better this time, and at this point, you wonder if Phelps has a problem. He has shown up in plenty of pictures on the Web, and you never know how credible they are. But they become more and more realistic with each verified mistake. He promises never again. To me, he has promised that already wearing red, white and blue. Maybe that Olympic ideal seems hokey to some, but he has packaged it and made the most of it.

I particularly liked the attempt in this article to reach out to the pot sympathetic crowd by suggesting that even if it was ok for a random guy to smoke pot somehow it wasn’t for Phelps. Presumably because he was a role model which would have the harmful effect of….I know, letting random guys know it’s ok to smoke pot. Hmm.

Does she not realize how many middle- and high-school kids look up to Michael Phelps? That he’s on the front of Wheaties boxes right now? That we all warn our kids about the dangers of drug use? Most parents find that photo sad and disappointing and will use it as a Teachable Moment for teenagers. What Michael Phelps did was a shame, but adults’ defending—and even encouraging—his drug use are far more shameful.

This one just demonstrates the reasons I tend not to convince many people. I just don’t do the whole underhanded shift from, they disagree with me about what is dangerous, to, they must be recklessly encouraging behavior they know is bad. More on this later.

However, this whole situation raises a puzzling issue. If people realize that pot use is actually pretty common, indeed pretty common even in the sort of person they would see as being on the ‘right track’¹, why does opposition to pot remain so strong? I mean one might think that if many of your friends, major political figures you know, famous scientists and Olympian record holders all smoked up why would they think legalizing pot would be a big deal?

The explanation is that we don’t always, or even mostly, go from evidence to conclusion as we pretend it does. Often there is some reason we would like to accept the conclusion so we manufacture a story to tell ourselves about how we are justified in that belief. For instance we all realize that “My parents were catholic” isn’t a valid justification for accepting the doctrine of original sin or salvation by faith and works but yet somehow people who are born to catholic parents are very likely to be catholic and many of them would give you a very different explanation of why they believe in Catholicism rather than Islam. Something very similar goes on when it comes to moral issues in politics.

Most people in our society grow up hearing the message that even occasional pot use in college is some kind of shameful dirty behavior, the sort of thing that people might whisper about many years later. Unlike getting totally smashed on cheap vodka at college parties where, despite it’s danger, people are usually happy to publicly laugh about after graduation most people still don’t want their grandma² knowing they smoked up or even that they are okay with people getting stoned. Therefore when the subject comes up around the family table people have a strong incentive not to voice support for loosening pot laws. Indeed, if you have actually gotten stoned the conversation likely makes you anxious about being found out and the last thing you want to do is to give them cause to suspect you think smoking pot isn’t a big deal. Thus there is a strong pressure to adopt some kind of rationalization which lets you avoid thinking of yourself as a hypocrite without requiring you tell grandma that her worries about pot are overblown. Of course when you get to the age where you are having kids yourself an older sister or a prudish new friend take grandma’s place.

This is where your baby brother (alternatively your child) steps into the equation. You recognize that pot can become a harmful habit for some people. Sure so can WoW but if you buy your baby brother WoW for Christmas no one will view you as foolish and irresponsible for encouraging MMORPG playing. We want other people to think we are responsible and mature so we make sure to make grave sounding statements about the risks of pot, especially if grandma is in the room. Even in private we tend to feel guilty about telling a younger brother it’s ok to go smoke up where we wouldn’t have the slightest qualm about taking him out to get smashed when he turns 21. The harms we do by failing to be sufficiently cautionary are very concrete and those done by going overboard are diffuse and abstract so we are motivated to talk up warnings and dangers.

There are a whole host of ills to be laid at the feet of our CYA approach to giving advice but in the case of drugs it augments the granny factor and hands us a ready made excuse for our hypocrisy. Well sure, the reasoning goes, my friends and I can handle pot fine but people my little brother’s age/son’s age shouldn’t be able to get it. Or if you got stoned at that age you instead substitute a concern about the increased strength of today’s weed or it’s increasing association with hard drugs. Of course in actuality making drugs illegal tends to make them easier for youth to access (drug dealers rarely card) and stronger weed is actually more healthy weed but we aren’t evaluating an argument we are searching for a narrative that makes us the mature and responsible party and avoids a disapproving lecture/look from grandma without forcing us to think we are hypocrites. Once ‘grandma’ becomes on older friend and our little brother is replaced with our daughter it takes incredibly strength of character (or a bunch of hippie friends) not to just go along with the flow and accept this narrative.

Frankly, I’m not sure what can be done about this problem. The baby boomers seem to illustrate the fact that the pressure to conform and be thought well of is so strong that even people who smoked up back in the 60s have become the older generation who disapproves of anyone who is foolish enough to suggest to youth that pot smoking isn’t a big deal. I fear it is a stable equilibrium.

Before we can see this we first need to eliminate the spectre of principled libertarianism from the discussion. Many self identified libertarians seem to take the position that the government is absolutely forbidden from interfering in certain vaguely defined kinds of private behaviors no matter what the consequences. However, it’s no accident that, apart from Ayn Rand’s Dexedrine fueled rantings², the deontological restrictions on acceptable government are always left vague or unexplored. Given any supposed inviolable libertarianesque restriction on governmental behavior it’s easy to create a hypothetical where the impact of this principle is so repugnant no one would endorse it. You think the government ought not to ever seize private property solely to distribute the benefits more broadly? What if that property was billions of doses of the only cure for a devastating global plague and the owner was dead seat on destroying them? Would anyone really oppose government seizure of property in that circumstance?

Sure, some people will bite the bullet and endorse deontological moral theories but the rules they endorse don’t resemble the sort of governmental restrictions libertarians have in mind. Given the consistent failure of anyone to articulate a remotely attractive inviolable set of libertarian restrictions on the government we can dismiss any supposed principled libertarian objection to governmental action unless it comes with an attractive articulation of those inviolable restrictions. In other words you can’t just insist that there is some unstated but intuitively compelling rule out there which prevents the government from doing what you find objectionable and expect others to just take it on faith.

Once we accept that in theory severe enough consequences can justify what libertarians would otherwise see as objectionable government interference the whole argumentative structure shifts. The libertarian can no longer say, “that policy would violate personal property it’s unacceptable,” he admits that sometimes the government must do just that. Instead he must argue that the consequentialist benefits of the policy aren’t sufficient to balance the harms to liberty. Indeed, it would be perfectly reasonable for a libertarian to say, “I think that 2 accidental deaths per thousand people is a reasonable price to pay to be free of gun regulations but not 3 per thousand.”³. However, this kind of argument is never made since it saps the appeal to libertarianism of all it’s appeal. Whatever valuations you place on liberty seem arbitrary and the argument is mired in the same kind of consequentalist quibbles that an purely pragmatic objection would face.

Of course a sophisticated libertarian would instead say that libertarianism is a formula for producing good policy outcomes. On this view it’s not that protecting liberty necessarily has some kind of intrinsic value but that when liberty is protected good consequences tend to result. This kind of libertarian tends to emphasize the effectiveness of private property and the market economy in creating wealth and alleviating suffering and try to parlay this into an argument against whatever policy they are currently opposing. That argument might be enough to suggest we should default to a libertarian approach but it isn’t enough to counter specific claims that this policy will lead to beneficial results. After all it’s only in most cases that the libertarian approach is superior but the other side has given specific arguments to the effect that in this case government intervention would be beneficial. If the argument in favor of this specific policy is valid then it should be enacted as one of the few exceptions to the superiority of the libertarian approach. If the argument is shown to be invalid then the reference to libertarianism does no extra work in rejecting the policy. All that being a libertarian does for the author or audience is arm them with the conviction that there is probably a flaw in the arguments for some governmental intervention. It doesn’t resolve them from the responsibility to pinpoint those flaws.

Perhaps the best case that someone could use to bring a general libertarian philosophy to bear on a specific question of policy is to argue that people are irrationally biased toward governmental intervention and against the, usually better, libertarian solution. If the libertarian can convince us that we lack the facilities to rationally evaluate arguments for this policy he can leave us with nothing but the raw general preference for libertarian solutions to guide us. In other words if we are no better evaluating specific policy arguments in our native language than in esperanto we might as well follow the same strategy in both cases and always guess the more libertarian solution is better. Unfortunately, at best this gets us a vague, “well it’s more likely than not that intervention will be bad,” which is far weaker than the conclusion the libertarian in the debate desires. Moreover, it’s simply implausible to believe that we can somehow rationally evaluate the argument that on average the libertarian policy tends to be superior but can’t gain any greater information about the better solution in any specific case. After all if we can’t tell what policies tend to work and which don’t how did we ever conclude that the libertarian policies were preferable in most instances in the first place?

Ultimately one should be a (sophisticated) libertarian only if in most cases the arguments for the libertarian style solution are compelling. One justifies being a libertarian by reference to many specific arguments for the superiority of the libertarian solution. You can’t justify rejecting an argument for a specific government intervention because you are a libertarian.

I mean how many of us pay thousands of dollars to get a new car or purchase houses for 100s or thousands? These aren’t truly necessities. Sure, I live four miles from work and it’s almost always below freezing but I could leave two hours early every morning and walk. Sure, it might be shameful and unpleasant but most of us don’t have to buy a house or even rent an apartment of our own. We could live in our parents basements or share an apartment with others. Even if we walked miles in the snow every day and choose to live in our parents basement we would still be many times better off than the billions of people who live on less than a dollar a day. Our purchase of a new car or choice of a nice apartment is as wasteful relative to the way most of humanity lives as an executives expenditure of 1.2 million to redecorate his office.

Ultimately we evaluate our standard of living relative to our friends and associates. Owning a car or living in our own residence seems reasonable because that’s what our colleagues do and our social circle expects that we will do as well. The fact that we, just like these executives, could pass up those conveniences and gift that money to the poor doesn’t make us monsters in our eyes because we aren’t being any more selfish than our friends. Similarly in the circles these executives travel in these expenditures aren’t out of line. Sure, they look obscene to us but no more so than our use of resources looks to the worlds poor.

To summarize briefly the google researchers pointed out that by comparing your friends on different social networking sites or data mining comments you or your associates leave on blogs it will frequently be possible to associate your pseudonymous identity to your official identity (name). While it says nothing particularly surprising the paper is interesting for vividly demonstrating how easy it is for people to have their pseudo-anonymity stripped. It is also interesting for the responses it suggests to these dangers.

To combat the risk of a friend’s trackback accidentally connecting your official and pseudonymous identities the researchers suggest automated link analysis to warn users when data mining might allow third parties to learn more about them or their friends than they intended. Presumably the idea is that some kind of automated warning would tell you before you added a trackback to your friends blog that might connect his blogging handle and real name. Similarly they suggest providing users with a tool to warn them when information they reveal on myspace might allow someone to associate their myspace and twitter accounts.

These suggested countermeasures are interesting not because they are workable but because they are so horribly flawed. Warnings about unintended information exposure are only as good as the current generation of data mining techniques but once published information can’t be put back in the bottle². When the Netflix dataset was published it was thought to be impractically difficult if not impossible to connect rental histories with individuals but researchers developed a new technique that allowed them to do just that. Moreover, this incident also demonstrates that even trivial pieces of information like what movies you like or your favorite TV show can help connect your pseudonymous and official identities. Each time you wanted to answer a question for an internet quiz or a compatibility test for online dating you would have to study the report warning of the information that could be inferred from this data and your friends would have to be just as cautious on your behalf as unmasking them would likely unmask you.

Indeed, even if you never set foot online it would be enough for someone to analyze the people who claim to be your friend and their answers to questions like “Do you have any gay friends?” to discover you are gay³. Even if your friends are willing and contentious enough to avoid ever mentioning their favorite movies on their livejournal because of the drunk post you made five years ago revealing you and doglover69 were friends you still aren’t safe. Complete strangers can unmask you by revealing trivial information about your friends. Separate posts on different sites revealing the favorite movies of your four friends favorite movies could be compared with your blog post about the day your supportive friends each brought over their favorite movie and watched them all with you after learning you were gay. And these are only the inferences that are simple enough for people to easily imagine. By integrating all sorts of statistical information from social networks comments by people who don’t even know your friends could unmask you. The situation becomes completely hopeless when you consider other tools like Stylometry that, with a proper search tool, might allow your employer to search for blogs with similar linguistic style to yours.

Even though the authors of the paper must realize how weak these techniques are they still can’t accept (or believe their audience can’t) that information technology fundamentally changes the nature of social interaction in a large society. I suppose this shouldn’t be surprising as we have seen the same kind of response when other technologies have fundamentally altered the social ‘economics.’ Just as before the invention of the printing press each copy of a book required substantial effort to produce so too did finding out about other parts of someone’s life require great cost or effort, e.g., hiring a private investigator. The printing press changed the equation so that one person’s labour in setting up the press could cheaply distribute that information to large populations and similarly data mining reduces the marginal cost of discovering public but obscure information (what you did at that party) to nearly zero. Only one person needs to come up with the clever algorithm to ferret out yet more information from our online activities and everyone can now mine that information.

It’s hopeless to imagine that we will stop revealing any personal information about ourselves or our friends online. We are evolutionarily hard wired signal our preferences, opinions, subcultural affinities (pot smoker, party girl, player, slacker, bear/twink⁴) and sexual daring as well as to gossip about the behavior and sexual couplings of our friends. The idea that teens or adults will avoid advertising their sexual attractiveness, social status, or scandalous behavior online makes the idea that people only have sex inside marriage sound plausible. I mean a major reason that people flash the bar during spring break, go streaking across campus, cross dress at a party or other scandalous public behavior with on vacation is to advertise ourselves as fun, sexually daring, brave or whatever else so it’s absurd to think we won’t distribute this advertisement in the social context in which we wish to project that image. The very point of sharing that information is to build social connections and portray who we are (or want to be) so inevitably enough information will be revealed to demask all but the most reclusive or paranoid individuals social networking accounts and blogs and what gets revealed will include drug use, sexual kinks, and how trashed we got at that party.. It’s time to accept the fact that the era of obscurity is coming to an end and to start working on how to deal with it. At least pot will probably finally be decriminalized.