A Washington psychiatrist sued a competing nurse practitioner and her clinic for trademark infringement and misappropriation of his name and identity. Plaintiff David Penner, owner of the Olympia Center for TMS & Psychiatry in Thurston County, Washington, claimed that defendant Diana Wilcox and her competing clinic, Clear TMS+, used his registered OLYMPIA TMS trademark as a Google Ads keyword, causing his name to appear in advertisements for Clear TMS+ without his consent.

What each side asked for

Defendant moved for summary judgment on the trademark claims, arguing that plaintiff had abandoned the OLYMPIA TMS mark and that it was not entitled to protection. Plaintiff cross-moved for partial summary judgment, asking the court to rule that the mark was descriptive rather than generic, while reserving the question of secondary meaning for trial. On the name appropriation claim, plaintiff sought to hold defendant liable for the unauthorized commercial use of his name in its advertising.

The court’s bottom line

The court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment on abandonment and ruled in plaintiff’s favor that the OLYMPIA TMS mark is descriptive. It left the question of secondary meaning, required to make a descriptive mark protectable, for the jury. On the name appropriation claim, the court allowed the claim to proceed to trial.

Abandonment: a question for the jury

On abandonment, the court found a genuine factual dispute because plaintiff presented evidence of continuous use of the mark through his website domain name, social media presence, and successive clinic names that all incorporated “Olympia” and “TMS.” The court applied the tacking doctrine, under which a trademark owner may modernize a mark over time while maintaining continuity, and concluded that a reasonable jury could find that plaintiff never truly abandoned the mark.

Descriptive, but maybe protected by secondary meaning

On descriptiveness, the court held that the mark answers the question “who are you?” rather than merely describing a category of services, placing it in the descriptive rather than generic category. Because the mark was on the USPTO’s Supplemental Register rather than the Principal Register, it carried no presumption of validity, meaning plaintiff must prove at trial that the mark has acquired secondary meaning, specifically that the public primarily associates “Olympia TMS” with plaintiff’s clinic rather than with TMS therapy as a general service.

A name used without permission

On the name appropriation issue, the court found sufficient evidence that defendant’s advertisements displayed plaintiff’s name without authorization, and determined that the number of unauthorized advertisements and the resulting damages were questions for the jury.

The question the court left open

One issue the opinion left notably unresolved is the precise mechanism by which plaintiff’s mark was allegedly infringed. The opinion indicates that defendant used “Olympia TMS clinic” as a keyword to trigger Google search advertisements, and that plaintiff’s personal name appeared in the resulting ads. But it does not clarify whether the mark itself appeared in the visible text of the ads that consumers actually saw, or whether it functioned only as a behind-the-scenes keyword trigger invisible to the public.

That distinction matters. A mark used only as a keyword trigger raises harder questions about whether consumers were ever actually exposed to it in a way that could cause confusion. The court does not engage with this threshold question.

David Penner MD PLLC v. Clear TMS+ PLLC, 2026 WL 1045235 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 17, 2026)

Plaintiff record companies sued defendant Udio, an AI music generation platform that allows users to create songs from text prompts and audio inputs. Plaintiffs alleged violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act based on assertions that defendant – by using stream ripping tools such as YT-DLP – circumvented technological protections to copy copyrighted music from YouTube and use that music to train its models.

Defendant asked the court to dismiss the DMCA anticircumvention claim, arguing that plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that YouTube’s technological measures qualified as protected access controls under the statute or that defendant’s conduct constituted unlawful circumvention.

The court denied the motion. It held that plaintiffs plausibly alleged that YouTube employs technological measures that control access to copyrighted works and that defendant circumvented those measures, and the court held that the technical classification of those measures could not be resolved without a more developed factual record.

Sony Music Entertainment v. Uncharted Labs, Inc., 2026 WL 1019199 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 15, 2026)

Since the mid-90s, Section 230 (47 U.S.C. §230) has functioned as a kind of legal safety net for internet platforms, shielding them from lawsuits and liability tied to user-generated content. Many companies have built entire business models with that protection in mind. And one might reasonably conclude that social media would not be as omnipresent today but for the protections of Section 230 which allowed the ecosystem to develop.

But a recent decision from Massachusetts’ highest court suggests that this protection is narrower than many assume, and that courts are increasingly willing to look beyond content and into how platforms are actually designed and operated.

Quick overview of the dispute

The Commonwealth of Massachusetts brought suit against Meta, alleging that Instagram was intentionally designed to keep young users engaged in ways that could be harmful. The complaint focused on features such as infinite scrolling, constant notifications, and algorithmic content delivery — all tools that encourage users, particularly teenagers, to spend more time on the platform.

At the same time, the state alleged that Meta publicly downplayed or misrepresented the risks associated with Instagram, presenting it as safe while internal research suggested otherwise. It also claimed that Meta failed to effectively enforce age restrictions, despite representing that it did.

Meta’s response was predictable: it argued that Section 230 bars these claims entirely.

What the court decided

The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts disagreed. While it acknowledged that Section 230 can provide powerful protection, including immunity from having to litigate certain claims at all, it concluded that the statute does not apply here, at least at the motion to dismiss stage.

The court allowed the case to proceed, holding that the Commonwealth’s claims were not based on third-party content, but rather on Meta’s own conduct — its design choices, its business practices, and its public statements.

Why the court reached this decision

At the heart of the court’s reasoning is a distinction that is becoming increasingly important in technology litigation: the difference between liability for content and liability for conduct.

Section 230 was designed to prevent platforms from being treated as the publisher of harmful content created by users. But the court emphasized that this protection has limits. It does not extend to situations where a company is being held accountable for its own actions, particularly where those actions involve how a product is designed or how risks are communicated to users.

Here, the claims did not depend on what users posted on Instagram. Instead, they focused on how the platform itself is structured. The alleged harm flowed from features that encourage compulsive use, not from any specific piece of content. In that sense, the platform’s design (and not its role as a publisher) was being challenged.

The court applied the same reasoning to the Commonwealth’s deception claims. The court made clear that Section 230 does not shield a company from liability for its own statements. If a company represents that its product is safe or non-addictive, and those representations are alleged to be misleading, those claims stand on their own, independent of any user-generated content.

Commonwealth v. Meta Platforms, Inc., — N.E.3d —, 2026 WL 969430 (Mass. Apr. 10, 2026)

The Court of Appeals of Wisconsin affirmed an order holding a husband in contempt for violating a family-court ban on social media posts about his divorce case and the parties’ children.

Petitoner-wife asked the circuit court to hold respondent-husband in contempt, enforce the social media restrictions, and impose sanctions. She requested that the husband be punished for violating the court’s directives and that the court order remedial steps to stop further violations.

What the court ruled

The family court entered the requested relief and the husband sought review. On appeal, the court affirmed the contempt order. It held that the husband had not shown any error in the circuit court’s finding that he willfully violated the court’s oral and written directives barring social media posts about the children and the case. The court also declined to consider husband’s other challenges, including his First Amendment and overbreadth claims, because they were undeveloped and unsupported by legal authority and record citations.

Rationale

The appellate court concluded that the circuit court reasonably exercised its contempt power because the husband admitted posting a video after the oral ruling that barred posts about the children, and that recording included material from the hearing about custody-related recommendations. The court said this was enough notice and support for contempt. As to the rest of the appeal, the husband failed to present coherent, legally developed arguments, so those issues were not considered.

In re the marriage of Fox, 2026 WL 945666 (Wisc. Ct. App. April 7, 2026)

A federal court in California has denied emergency relief in a cybersquatting case involving Vlad Tenev, the co-founder of Robinhood, the popular investment platform. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California declined to issue a temporary restraining order over the domain name vladtenev.com, but ordered the defendants to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be entered.

Background of the dispute

Plaintiffs Robinhood Markets, Inc. and Vladimir Tenev brought suit against Libin Zhu and Dynadot Inc. after Zhu registered the domain name vladtenev.com and allegedly offered it for sale for $16,800. Plaintiffs asserted claims under the Lanham Act and the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, along with unfair competition, common law trademark infringement, and violation of California’s right of publicity statute.

Before turning to federal court, Tenev pursued a Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy proceeding. That effort was unsuccessful. The UDRP panel denied his claim in February 2026, a fact that influenced the court’s view of the timing of this lawsuit.

Requested relief

Plaintiffs asked the court to enter an ex parte temporary restraining order blocking the alleged cybersquatting conduct, requiring transfer of the disputed domain name, and prohibiting defendants from using or marketing the “VLAD TENEV” name or confusingly similar identifiers. They also sought an order to show cause regarding a preliminary injunction.

The court’s ruling

The court denied the request for a temporary restraining order. At the same time, it granted the request for an order to show cause and set a briefing schedule and hearing on whether a preliminary injunction should issue.

Key reasoning

The court found that plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on their Lanham Act or ACPA claims. Personal names are treated as descriptive under trademark law and are protectable only if they acquire secondary meaning. That requires showing that the public primarily associates the name with a product or service rather than the individual. Here, the court found it implausible that “Vlad Tenev” functions primarily as a source identifier for public speaking services, rather than identifying Tenev himself, particularly given his prominence as a co-founder of Robinhood.

The court did conclude that plaintiffs raised serious questions under California Civil Code section 3344, which governs the right of publicity. But that alone was not enough to justify ex parte relief.

The court also emphasized delay. Plaintiffs were aware of the domain listing in early January 2026, pursued and lost the UDRP proceeding in February, and then waited more than a month after that adverse decision to seek a TRO. That delay undermined any claim of immediate and irreparable harm, which is required for emergency relief.

Takeaways

The decision underscores how difficult it can be to assert trademark rights in a personal name without strong evidence of secondary meaning, even for a well-known figure such as the co-founder of Robinhood. It also highlights a practical point about timing. Pursuing a UDRP proceeding does not eliminate the need to act quickly in court if emergency relief is sought.

Robinhood Markets, Inc. v. Zhu, 2026 WL 915291 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2026)

The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana dismissed with prejudice all claims brought by plaintiff author Keith Bell against Bartholomew Consolidated School Corporation and one of its teachers and allowed them to seek attorneys’ fees. Bell, the author of the book Winning Isn’t Normal and the owner of the copyright in the work, filed suit after a March 2022 social media repost involving a passage from his work.

The parties

The dispute centered on the conduct of one Timothy Bless, a high school teacher and football coach employed by the school system. Bless was not acting on behalf of the school in any official capacity when the events occurred. Instead, he used his personal X account, which he controlled independently. On that account, Bless reposted a post originally made by a college football coach. The post contained an image of one of Bell’s well-known motivational passages. Bless did not add any commentary or attempt to connect the repost to the school or any official activity.

Bell alleged that this repost violated copyright law and a prior settlement agreement between the parties. He also brought claims for vicarious liability against the school and for violations of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. He sought damages and a finding that the defendants had used his copyrighted work without authorization.

The court’s decision – fair use

The court rejected all of Bell’s claims. The central issue was whether Bless’s repost constituted copyright infringement. The court concluded that it did not because the repost qualified as fair use. In reaching this conclusion, the court focused heavily on the purpose and context of Bless’s actions. It found that Bless shared the passage to motivate or inspire student athletes, not for any commercial purpose. There was no evidence that he profited from the repost or used it in connection with any business activity. This noncommercial and educational context weighed strongly in favor of fair use.

The court also considered the nature of the work and the amount used. While the passage had some creative elements, it largely consisted of familiar motivational ideas. Although Bless reposted the entire passage, the court found that copying the whole excerpt was reasonable because its full text was necessary to convey its inspirational message. The fact that the passage was already widely available online further supported this conclusion.

Most importantly, the court found no plausible harm to the market for Bell’s work. There was no indication that the repost reduced sales of the book or related merchandise. If anything, the court suggested that widespread sharing of the passage could increase interest in Bell’s work rather than diminish it. Because market harm is often the most significant factor in fair use analysis, this finding strongly supported the court’s conclusion.

Other claims failed as well

The claims against the school also failed because Bell did not plausibly allege that the school itself copied the work or controlled Bless’s personal social media activity. The repost occurred on Bless’s private account, and there were no facts linking the school to that decision. The vicarious liability claim was dismissed as conclusory, and the DMCA claim failed because Bell did not adequately allege that copyright information had been knowingly removed. The breach of contract claim was also dismissed because Bell did not plausibly allege actionable use or damages.

Given Bell’s litigation history and the weakness of the claims, the court determined that any amendment would be futile and dismissed the case with prejudice. It also concluded that an award of attorneys’ fees was appropriate, in part to deter similar claims in the future.

Bell v. Bartholomew Consolidated School Corporation, 2026 WL 828677 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 26, 2026).

The United States District Court for the District of New Jersey transferred OKLegal.com’s lawsuit against Meta Platforms, Inc. and Mark Zuckerberg to the Northern District of California under Instagram’s forum-selection clause.

Plaintiff OKLegal.com sued defendant Meta Platforms, Inc. and defendant Mark Zuckerberg after Instagram indefinitely banned its account, (1) alleging the ban violated the First Amendment, (2) seeking a declaration that Section 230 is unconstitutional, and (3) asserting tortious interference with an advantageous business relationship.

Plaintiff asked court to keep the case in New Jersey and deny defendants’ request to enforce the Instagram Terms of Use forum-selection clause, while also opposing defendants’ alternative request to dismiss the complaint.

The court’s ruling

The court granted defendants’ motion in part by transferring the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). It denied the remainder of the motion without prejudice, allowing defendants to raise their dismissal arguments in California.

Reasoning for the transfer

The court found plaintiff could have brought the action in the Northern District of California because Meta’s principal place of business and Zuckerberg’s residence are located there. It also found plaintiff agreed to Instagram’s Terms of Use when creating and using the account, and that those terms required non-arbitrated claims to be litigated exclusively in the Northern District of California or a state court in San Mateo County. The court rejected plaintiff’s arguments that the clause was unenforceable as clickwrap, adhesive, unconscionable, or contrary to public policy, concluding plaintiff failed to show that relevant public-interest factors overwhelmingly disfavored transfer.

OkLegal.com v. Meta Platforms, Inc., 2026 WL 850812 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 2026)

The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York largely trimmed a content creators’ suit over alleged affiliate commission hijacking by a browser extension, but let the tortious interference with contract claim proceed.

Plaintiffs, a group of online content creators, sued defendants RetailMeNot, Inc. and Ziff Davis, Inc., alleging that defendant’s browser extension wrongfully overwrote plaintiffs’ affiliate tracking codes and diverted sales commissions that plaintiffs otherwise would have received from merchants.

Motion to dismiss

Defendants asked the court to dismiss the case, arguing that plaintiffs lacked Article III standing and that the complaint failed to state any viable claims, including common law, computer fraud, and consumer protection claims.

The court ruled that plaintiffs had standing to sue and denied dismissal on that ground, but it otherwise granted the motion in substantial part and dismissed all claims except plaintiffs’ claim for intentional interference with contractual relations.

Why the tortious interference claim survived

The court found that the complaint plausibly alleged an actual and traceable injury through test purchases and statistical evidence, and that plaintiffs adequately pleaded that defendants knew of plaintiffs’ affiliate contracts and intentionally caused merchants to breach those contracts by crediting commissions to defendants instead of plaintiffs. But the court found the remaining claims deficient for reasons including failure to allege that plaintiff conferred a benefit on defendant, failure to plead interference with a prospective relationship rather than an existing contract, failure to identify convertible property, failure to show unauthorized computer access, and failure to allege the consumer harm required under the cited state statutes.

In re RetailMeNot Browser Extension Litigation, No. 25-CV-783, 2026 WL 820585 (S.D.N.Y., March 25, 2026)

The United States District Court for the District of Colorado left a jury’s verdict intact by denying defendants’ bid for judgment as a matter of law and denying plaintiff’s request to increase punitive damages.

Plaintiff Eric Coomer sued defendant Michael J. Lindell, defendant Frankspeech LLC, and defendant My Pillow, Inc. for defamation and related claims based on statements accusing Coomer of helping rig the 2020 presidential election while he worked for Dominion Voting Systems. After trial, the jury found defendant Lindell and defendant Frankspeech liable on certain defamation claims, found defendant Frankspeech liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive damages, and found defendant My Pillow not liable.

Frankspeech was a streaming and broadcasting platform that Lindell created, that aired interviews, hosted shows such as “The Lindell Report,” and livestreamed events like the Cyber Symposium, rather than simply operating as a passive message board or social media site.

Post-trial requests

Defendant Lindell and defendant Frankspeech asked the court to enter judgment as a matter of law in their favor on several grounds, including that Frankspeech was immune under 47 U.S.C. § 230, that plaintiff had not proved economic damages, and that the evidence did not support actual malice. Plaintiff asked the court to amend the final judgment to increase the punitive damages award against defendant Frankspeech based on alleged continuing misconduct during the case.

Motions denied

The court ruled that both post-trial motions should be denied. It refused to overturn the jury’s findings against defendant Lindell and defendant Frankspeech, and it also refused to enlarge the punitive damages award against defendant Frankspeech.

Why the court ruled the way it did

The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that Frankspeech was not entitled to Section 230 immunity because it was not merely hosting third-party content. Instead, Lindell, acting as Frankspeech’s agent, made defamatory statements on its broadcasts, and the company also promoted, sponsored, and livestreamed the Cyber Symposium where additional statements were made. This allowed the jury to find that Frankspeech participated in the development and dissemination of the content, rather than acting as a neutral intermediary. The court also found sufficient evidence of economic harm and actual malice, and it determined that plaintiff had not met the high burden required to justify increasing punitive damages under Colorado law. Finally, the court ordered defendants to show cause why additional Rule 11 sanctions should not be imposed for another inaccurate citation in their briefing.

Coomer v. Lindell, 2026 WL 817370 (D. Colo. Mar. 25, 2026)

The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted Anthropic’s motion for a preliminary injunction, finding it likely to succeed in challenging federal actions that barred it from government work and that labeled it a national security supply chain risk.

Plaintiff AI company Anthropic PBC sued defendant U.S. Department of War and other federal defendants after the government moved to cut it off from federal contracts, pressure defense-related companies to stop working with it, and designate it a supply chain risk. Plaintiff alleged the measures were unlawful retaliation for its public criticism of defendant’s demand that Claude be available for all lawful military uses, including mass surveillance of Americans and lethal autonomous warfare.

Requested relief

Plaintiff asked the court to preliminarily enjoin defendant from implementing or enforcing three challenged actions: (1) a presidential directive ordering agencies to stop using Anthropic technology, (2) a directive from Secretary Pete Hegseth cutting Anthropic off from military-related commercial relationships, and (3) the Department of War’s supply chain risk designation. Plaintiff argued these actions violated the First Amendment, the Fifth Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act.

Court’s ruling

The court granted the preliminary injunction in a modified form (that varied from what Anthropic had proposed). It concluded plaintiff was likely to succeed on its First Amendment retaliation claim, its procedural due process claim, and its APA claims that the supply chain risk designation and Hegseth directive were contrary to law, exceeded statutory authority, and were arbitrary and capricious. The court also found plaintiff had shown irreparable harm, that the equities and public interest favored relief, and that a nominal $100 bond was sufficient.

Why it ruled

The court found the record supported an inference that defendant acted to punish plaintiff for speaking publicly about AI safety and for criticizing the government’s contracting position, rather than to address a genuine national security threat. It said the broad federal ban and supply chain risk label went far beyond simply stopping use of Claude, and it emphasized that the Department of War had previously praised Anthropic and raised no comparable security concerns until the public dispute. The court also found serious procedural flaws, including lack of notice and opportunity to respond, and held that the statutory supply chain risk framework did not fit plaintiff’s conduct because the record did not show sabotage, subversion, or any reasoned determination that less intrusive measures were unavailable.

Anthropic PBC v. U.S. Department of War, et al., Case No. 26-cv-01996-RFL (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2026)

[Read the full opinion]