Rarely in the annals of terrorism is there a case where a group with virtually no known terrorist antecedents and, at worst, a marginal presence within the domestic conflict dynamic, bursts out into the open with a catastrophic act of terror comparable to the serial bombings on Easter Sunday in Sri Lanka (April 21, 2019). At the time of writing the death toll in these coordinated attacks had already risen to 359, with many of the wounded still critical, making it by far the worst terrorist incident in the country.

Rarely, again, does a state have such specific intelligence repeatedly communicated to it by a friendly power, so far in advance and in unprecedented detail, identifying the date, the locations, the nature of imminent attacks, the perpetrator group and, indeed, the identities of individual perpetrators.

Rarely has a state failed so comprehensively to react even minimally to such specific intelligence, and to initiate even the most rudimentary preventive measures.

While the non-governmental strategic community was taken completely by surprise by the Sri Lanka serial bombings, it must be abundantly clear that there were no rational grounds for the Sri Lanka intelligence and enforcement authorities to be caught unawares.

Indeed, the failure of the intelligence and enforcement apparatus goes much deeper than the scandalous neglect of detailed intelligence provided by ‘a foreign agency’. Terrorist groups do not appear abruptly, fully formed and capable. The capacities demonstrated in the Easter bombings will have evolved over extended periods of time, and from lesser patterns of malfeasance.

While the National Thawheed Jamaath, the first group identified in the Easter Sunday attacks, has little documentation in the English language open source, there is certainly a history here of which the Sri Lankan intelligence community could not be unaware.

The Thawheed Jamaat is a fractious Salafist complex of many splinter formations, and has been involved for years, both in sectarian conflicts between various Muslim groups, as well as escalating, invective riddled, and fitfully violent confrontations with militant majoritarian Sinhala-Buddhists. Every faction of such groups would be expected to be under vigorous surveillance, and their drift towards terrorism, particularly any linkages to entities abroad – including any linkages or extraordinary interest shown in the Islamic State (also known as Daesh) in sustained internet searches – well documented.

There is little evidence in the wake of the serial suicide attacks of April 21 that the Sri Lankan intelligence community had any significant details on the activities of the National Thawheed Jamaath or the second affiliate now named in the attacks, the Jammiyathul Millathu Ibrahim. Zahran Hashim the leader of the National Thawheed Jamaath and believed to be one of the suicide bombers, had a long history of preaching hatred and violence.

It now emerges that one of the suicide bombers had, in fact, been arrested for acts of vandalism in a Buddhist temple, but had been let off, reportedly due to ‘political pressure’. Such actions are unsurprising, but the complete lack of effective surveillance and intelligence gathering on such volatile organisations and individuals is incomprehensible, as, indeed, is the paucity of documentation, reportage and research in the open source.

Processes of extreme radicalization, the preparation of multiple suicide cadres, the complex conspiracy leading up to the eventual attacks, and the logistical chain that would have gone into the acquisition of necessary know how, materials and assembly of multiple explosive devices, also appear to have completely escaped the attention of Sri Lankan security agencies.

Two top officials, Hemasiri Fernando, the defence secretary, and Pujith Jayasundara, the Inspector General of Police, have been directed by President Maithripala Sirisena to resign. There are fears that associates of the Easter bombers may still be active, and these were reinforced by an explosion on April 25 at Pugodo town, east of Colombo, though there were no casualties.

The Islamic State has claimed responsibility for the Easter bombings, with video’s and photographs of the bombers swearing allegiance to Abu Bakr al Baghdadi as evidence, but no logistics chain has yet been established between the local conspirators in Sri Lanka, and international Daesh leaders or actors. Investigations are in early stages, and much will emerge over the coming weeks and months.

Whatever the outcome, the Easter bombings in Sri Lanka raise larger issues for CT agencies across the world. The most significant of these is the phenomenon of a terrorist group or cell crystallizing domestically to a high level of capability, entirely unnoticed by local agencies; and the related challenge of defining the stage and scale of intervention appropriate to lawfully constrain groups that propagate ideologies of hatred and that advocate – as against explicitly incite or engage in – violence.

With the global rise of regressive right wing ideologies, much of the precursor behaviour of potentially terrorist groups is akin to what many ‘mainstream’ political formations engage in. Moreover, the Christ Church mosque shootings in New Zealand on March 15, 2019, among other incidents, demonstrate that it is not sufficient to focus on Islamist terrorist groups alone. Sri Lanka’s present tragedy is a warning to intelligence and CT agencies across the world, of the increasing complexity of terrorist threats everywhere.

Dr. Ajai Sahni is an author and expert on counter-terrorism, and serves as the Executive Director of the Institute for Conflict Management in New Delhi, which maintains the South Asia Terrorism Portal, a website focusing on terrorism in South Asia. Author also edits ‘South Asia Intelligence Review’ and ‘Faultlines’.

An Indian Prime Minister has always been the Minister-at-large of External Affairs. Even though there is a close-knit group for foreign policy making, the leadership style of the head of the government is really important factor for foreign policy formulation. Like his predecessors Nehru and Gujral, Prime Minister Modi has an impressive image in the realm of foreign affairs.

Modi kicked-off his diplomatic innings even before sitting on the throne of Prime Minister. He invited the South Asian supremos and that invitation elicited well responses. Right from the early days of honeymoon period, Modi has been in the glare of global media. Perhaps, no Indian Prime Minister understood the mediacracy better. Modi and Media eventually became friends. In the survey of ORB International’s International World Leader Index 2015, Modi ranked seventh.

ReetaChowdhari Tremblay and Ashok Kapur, two Canada based erudite academicians, take a close look at Prime Minister Modi’s foreign policy and reveal the observations in their book Modi’s foreign Policy. The work accounts roughly three years of Modi at the PMO. The 256-page-long exercise is divided into five distinctive, topical and incisive chapters, followed by an eighteen-page-long remarks.

The introductory chapter appears with a narrative – where the authors explain the parliamentary victory of Modi’s league BJP. According to Chowdhari Tremblay and Kapur, “Modi has been able to bring about a shift in the global thinking from a perception of Indian Foreign Policy that lacks direction to one that is coherent, well-articulated and proactive.”

The first chapter, A New Interpretative Framework of Foreign Policy is divided into a few broad sections. The chapter narrates how the protagonist, his PMO, MEA, Parliamentary Standing Committee, CCS work together – in order to achieve the foreign policy goals.

While talking about the goals of the Modi-Era, the authors have explained three main areas: neighbourhood re-conceptualization, bringing about multilevel alignments and projecting India as a global brand. Act East policy – a revised, reviewed and re-imagined version of Look East policy has been brought into functionality.At the same time, Modi has shown tremendous interest in Linking (the) West.

In the book, the duo has attempted to look beyond the Modi Mandate. The Indian Prime Ministers, as Walter Anderson says, “have maintained a free hand in the conduct of foreign policy due to the lack of effective parliamentary restrains on the PM.”

The policies, visions and choices of Nehru, architect of Indian foreign policy, are discussed concisely. The volume strives to find the differentiating factors in the external policies of Nehru and Modi.

“Nehru’s foreign policy prescriptions were ill-equipped to deal with the military requirements to counter hostile neighbours and to form a diplomatic strategy to counter the expansionist activities of Pakistan, the United States and China in relation to India during the 1950s and the 1960s,” opine the authors in the second chapter: The Nehruvian Legacy: Policy Anomalies and Policy Failure.

India’s foreign policy is very much traditional. The values of NAM, Panchasheel, Buddhism, Arthashastra are reflected in the foreign policy. But in certain cases, the foreign policy appears to be transformational. The views of Nehru, the architect of Indian foreign policy is given less importance in recent times. Hence, what Stephen Cohen calls -‘Militant Nehruvian’ foreign policy, clashes with the concept of conventional foreign policy.

Due to its huge economic growth in recent decades, India has exercised its greater power of influence. The third chapter, Extended Neighbourhood and Multilevel Alignments starts with the tale of Modi’s outreach to SAARC nations during 18th SAARC summit in Kathmandu. The outcomes from Indian ministers’ tête-à-tête with Asian and European leaders as well as several other summits are penned in the chapter. The reference of Heart of Asia conference comes often in the book.

The fourth chapter of the book is a stage – where the dragon dances with the elephant. The writers attempt to sniff the vapour of love between two Asian giants- China and India, in this chapter. Why the new equation comes in, or how the Beijing’s tryst with Islamabad begins, the book does not deny to disclose. Much attention is given to the changing dynamics of Sino-India relationships.“Nehru’s diplomatic rhetoric about China’s importance was an assertion, not an argument …Zhou Enlai’s writings also brought out the reality that China’s leaders operated on the basis of cold-blooded calculations and not on sentiments,” the authors indite.

The fifth Chapter, Pakistan Policy- Déjà vuor Something New appears to be inquisitiveas it seeks to explore the shift in the relationship of two nuclear neighbours. The chapter illustrates the bilateral issues in recent time and how the China’s BRI project effects the regional geo-politics. The chapter includes a wide range of issues – from the proxy war in Kashmir to Islamabad’s Sinophilia. Importance of CPEC is elucidated. Chowdhari Tremblay and Kapur are of the view that Modi has followed PM Vajpayee’s mantra of Insaniyat, Jamhooriyat and Kashmiriyat –while dealing with Kashmir. Modi once expressed, “It is my wish to complete the work started by Vajpayee.”

This chapter provides an analysis of the Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue, chaired by Sushma Swaraj and Sartaj Aziz in detail. The discussion was fruitful and didnot end in an accusatory manner. When the two nations were expecting the dawn of hope, two attacks – in Uri and Pathankot by Pakistan-based terror outfits altered the situation. Addressing Islamabad, EAM Swaraj clearly stated, terror and talks cannot go together.

Modi’s India is entirely different from Nehru’s. There are hardly any similarity in the leadership. The shift in power has given birth to a parivartan in the governance. During the incumbency of coalition governments, the world saw a different India. The book does not neglect all those factors related to governance, and governments. But what makes the book – Modi’s Foreign Policy highly readable is eloquent analysis of the foreign policy of the Modi-squad. The publication also gives an account of the instrumentalists behind the big picture. EAM Swaraj, Foreign Secretary Sujatha Singh and her successor S Jaishankar, NSA Doval are among them. Their acts, views, visions and speeches can be found in the book.

The Feroze-Indira marriage bore two sons. Javed Iqbal Shah and Mehbooba Mufti have two daughters, Irtika and Iltija. They are both known as girls of the Mufti clan; their father, and the protagonist of this story, has not had any touch with them in a long time. “The inner workings of the Muftis are strange, and to me very upsetting,” he tells The Telegraph. “In fact their ways are responsible for my parting with Mehbooba. It’s a long story.”

Shah has chosen to speak his mind at a time when Mehbooba Mufti, PDP boss and anointed heir of the late Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, is struggling to extract a new deal from the BJP as precondition for reviving the alliance in Jammu and Kashmir.

“I would like to hope Mehbooba is able to deliver but the fact is she is wrapped up in contradictions, this alliance (with the BJP) re-staged or re-adopted, does not leave much room for delivery,” Shah says. “It is close to two months since Mufti sahib passed away, so if she chooses to take the plunge even if things (in the alliance) are amiss, I doubt she is herself hopeful of making a difference.”

To many Kashmiris, Shah has become known as a fierce animal rights activist – he has fought against the culling of street dogs in the Valley to control their exploding population – but Shah remains a political person with sharp, even acidic, views.

Of the Muftis’ PDP he is perhaps the most trenchantly critical. “From seeking to empower people, the PDP ended up with one family centralising power. Every second relation is legislator, contesting candidate or office bearer,” Shah says.

“The present standoff (between Mehbooba and the BJP) is nothing but the usual blackmail that this opportunist conglomeration of people called PDP is given to. Why are the terms it is negotiating with the BJP a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma?

“Personal comforts apart, where are the benefits for which PDP formed the coalition? Having described Prime Minister Modi as the best PM India has had and his Jammu & Kashmir package as historic, what are the Muftis now seeking and for whom?

“The PDP is a depreciated form of the National Conference, that’s all. Time will prove the PDP-BJP alliance is farthest from the interests of the people of the state.”

So does Shah himself want to turn a player on the political stage? He did get inducted into the National Conference a while ago, but didn’t last there long. “I cannot play chamcha, that is my problem, not in the PDP, not in the NC, I have a mind of my own, I have ideas, I am working on things, but I will not subscribe to political dynasties.”

Shah’s troubles with the Muftis began not very long after he and Mehbooba were married in 1984. They were close family. Shah and the late Mufti were first cousins. Mehbooba, in fact, was seven years Shah’s senior. But they were both young – Mehbooba finishing her LLB, Shah on the doorstep of university. It was, according to Shah, Mehbooba who took the initiative and proposed; they decided it was a good idea to get married. Perhaps not, Shah was soon to realise.

“I found the Muftis’ political practices perverted entirely to suit their personal interests. I was, in fact, never in favour of Mehbooba joining politics but that was not to be. I was very young, perhaps I also did not realise many things at the time. But politics was the start of our frictions. If Mufti sahib had a political guest, he would expect her (Mehbooba) to be on his side…. I was never comfortable with that,” Shah says.

He also holds the late Mufti responsible for the toppling game that ousted Farooq Abdullah’s elected government in 1984. “I consider 1984 the beginning of the slide in Kashmir, the genesis of the militancy that was to follow. We have never recovered from that.”

More than that, Shah claims, he is privy to many ploys employed by the Mufti, then in the Congress, to become the chief minister. The first was in 1984 when he engineered a split in the Farooq Abdullah-led government and installed a faction led by his brother, Ghulam Mohammad Shah, with Congress backing.

Shah is also a severe critic of the exchange of militants that followed the abduction of the Mufti’s daughter, Rubaiya, in 1990, when he was Union home minister. “That exchange in return for Rubaiya multiplied many times over. It was the turning point, in a sense we have never recovered from that.”

It is no secret that Iran has continued to enrich uranium, while practicing denial and deception and playing for time. Today it seems that the last resort of a military assault on Iran is imminent. Israel has been making all the noises, indicating that a strike as early as April is possible. The top leadership in the United States has attempted to curtail these noises, but beyond a point Washington cannot prevent a unilateral decision from Tel Aviv. And any attack from Israel will be followed by the Iranians retaliating, as they must, launching counter attacks from their own country as well as via their supporters in Hamas and Hezbollah. A call to arms against the west and the Jewish community will go up around the world and there is no way of judging how many terror cells will awaken. Even if America stays on the sidelines, its silence will be perceived as complicity and Iran, directly or through proxies, will go after American bases, oil installations and allies in the Gulf. The future could be catastrophic at best. 

In the immediate short term it is very important to think about the morning and days after. It is extremely unlikely that Israel will succeed in destroying all of Iran’s nuclear facilities, for the simple reason that many are still unknown and some of the more important facilities like Fordow are invulnerable to an attack. A direct attack will only serve to motivate the government to rally more support and legitimacy to the programme, reinforcing the ideology that a nuclear weapon is needed as a form of deterrence. Such an attack will only set the country back by a decade at the most. Iran is an extremely sophisticated country with well educated elite that has strong national tendencies, and even those sitting on the fence or the ones who quietly denounce the president will rally behind him. 

On the other hand, Iran, armed with a bomb, would pose a deep threat. Even if one were convinced that they only want the ability to build a bomb for protection, it will spur Saudi Arabia, Egypt and perhaps even Turkey to move in that direction. Many fear that this race could make the region even less stable. 

A potential way to prevent Iran from having nuclear weapons is for the international community to craft a deal that the Iranians cannot refuse. A deal where Iran would agree to stop after achieving a nuclear-weapons capability; while the world’s leading powers would agree to reintegrate Iran into the international community by dropping sanctions, unfreezing assets and admitting Iran into the World Trade Organization. Utopian perhaps, and most certainly extremely difficult. But faced with the other two alternatives of an armed Iran or a full scale attack, this is the only viable option left to the international community.

The Russians, an old, sometimes warm ally of Iran, with the most to lose or gain are warily watching the game unfold. For them both options of a nuclear Iran or another US war so close to home are worrisome. Russian diplomats also believe that more stringent sanctions won’t necessarily affect the nuclear programme, as previous sanctions have not stemmed the flow of money to the research and scientific community. But these sanctions do hurt the public and serve to sow discontent against the regime. With a 70 percent decline of the economy in the last few weeks, and 22.5 percent inflation, the country has turned into an all cash economy with bags of currency being shipped over from Dubai, creating a greater bugle in corruption. The President has also been called by the Supreme Council and the parliament to explain the state of affairs. With Syria in a crisis, Iran has an uncertain ally in Assad, which should be taken advantage of.

Diplomacy, it would seem, should be given more weight and another sustained chance. Any diplomatic negotiation will have to present a solution that presents Iran with credible choices and confidence building measures; it will also have to go beyond involving the members of 5+1. And therein lies one of the most difficult problems. The simple fact that there are clear internal differences between the 5+1, as well as with the Arab countries and others such as Turkey and China, will make any future negotiations and agreement extremely difficult. While it is clear that the existence of an offer does not guarantee success, conversely the failure of a clear credible solution will definitely guarantee failure. 

The Iranian view of diplomacy is largely to divide, delay and divert, while creating fait accompli for a bargaining chance. And the vocabulary in the nuclear negotiations is all about resistance and steadfastness, very much the vocabulary of the war, which was about holding out and resisting outside pressure. The international community must not allow the country to delay and divert and must use the opportunity presented by the Iranian Foreign Minister’s request to the EU for a meeting. But before there is any meeting with Iran, the parties involved must come to some form of agreement to prevent Iran from using the discord amongst them to its advantage. The period following the parliamentary elections in Iran will be crucial to both the regime in the country and America and the EU. If this window of opportunity is lost, the western world should start preparing their defences while Israel prepares the offensive.