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	<title>Lawnix Full Text Case Law</title>
	
	<link>http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext</link>
	<description>State and federal court case law.</description>
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		<title>Marsh v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeals Board 257 Cal.App.2d 574 – Lawnix</title>
		<link>http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/california/marsh-workmens-compensation.html</link>
		<comments>http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/california/marsh-workmens-compensation.html#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 25 Mar 2009 05:02:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Lawnix</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[California]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[1968]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[case law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[death benefits]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[insurance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[remittitur]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[res judicata]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Second District Division 4]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[workmens compensation]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/?p=690</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Claimants contend that the court’s order was simply a referral of the matter back to the appeals board to affirm the findings and award. Claimants contend that the carriers who did not seek review were not entitled to redetermination of the merits of the case. Liberty Mutual asserts that the order of the court vacated the original award against all of the defendants and set the entire matter at large for further proceedings. The other defendants have not answered. The opinion of the appeals board indicates that it agreed with Liberty Mutual. It is also argued that the decision should be sustained on the theory that we may regard it as a decision after reopening; that is, an exercise of the board's continuing jurisdiction to affirm, rescind, alter, or amend for good cause a previous order, decision, or award. In our opinion the decision of the board cannot stand. The original award against the three carriers who did not seek review when the time to petition for review expired was unaffected by the subsequent order of this court. The doctrine of res judicata precluded the board from redetermining the issues on which their liability is based. The order of the court annulled only the award against Industrial Indemnity Company. […]]]></description>
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		<title>Wise v. Clapper 257 Cal.App.2d 770 – Lawnix</title>
		<link>http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/california/wise-clapper.html</link>
		<comments>http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/california/wise-clapper.html#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 24 Mar 2009 17:48:16 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Lawnix</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[California]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[1968]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[case law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[contracts]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fourth District Division 2]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[guarantors]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[joint tenants]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[promissory note]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[surety]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/?p=686</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The acceptance by a creditor of partial payment reduces to that extent the obligation of a surety, but does not otherwise affect it or exonerate the surety. And a mere delay on the part of the creditor to proceed against the principal does not exonerate the surety. But an extension of time of payment without the consent of the surety constitutes a material alteration of the original obligation and discharges the surety. Injury to the surety is presumed as a matter of law and, hence, it is not a matter which the creditor may inquire into. Although extension of time has been characterized as 'one of the more technical suretyship defenses', it is still a valid defense in this state.

        The prevailing rule in the United States is that, in order to exonerate a surety, the agreement to extend time must be binding on the creditor and the principal; that is, it must possess all of the elements of a valid contract, including consideration. This was formerly the rule in California, both by decisional law and by section 2820 of the Civil Code. […]]]></description>
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		<title>Dewitt v. Magma Copper Co. 492 P.2d 1243 – Lawnix</title>
		<link>http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/arizona/dewitt-magma.html</link>
		<comments>http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/arizona/dewitt-magma.html#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Feb 2009 16:02:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Lawnix</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Arizona]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[1972]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Arizona Income Tax Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Court of Appeals of Arizona]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[net income limitation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[news]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[percentage depletion allowance]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pinal County Superior Court]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[taxes]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/?p=664</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The questions which Magma raises here have been before the appellate courts of three other states. In each case the position urged by Magma has been rejected. Magma attempts to distinguish these cases on the grounds that interpretation of different statutory language is required and that the two latter cases dealt with oil and gas rather than minerals. We have, however, examined these cases and the applicable statutory provisions and find no significant difference regarding the concept of depletion allowance as a percentage of net income that would require a different outcome in Arizona, e.g., there is no difference in the language of those statutes that would allow us to construe our statutory provisions differently for the purpose of determining what 'net income from the property' means. […]]]></description>
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		<title>Quintana v. Myers 492 P.2d 1202 – Lawnix</title>
		<link>http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/arizona/quintana-myers.html</link>
		<comments>http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/arizona/quintana-myers.html#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Feb 2009 14:04:23 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Lawnix</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Arizona]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[1972]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[action dismissed with prejudice]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[crime]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[indictment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Maricopa County Grand Jury]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[sufficient prima facie evidence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Supreme Court of Arizona In Banc]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/?p=661</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Quintana contends that the requirement that the endorsement contain the words 'a true bill' is mandatory and jurisdictional, that the trial cannot proceed, and that it was error to deny his motion to quash. It must be conceded that the law is not uniform in the several states, and that in Arizona the issue is one of first impression. Quintana cites several cases containing language favorable to his position. Ohio's statute is nearly identical to ours, and the court said that because the grand jury is secret there is no way to be sure that it actually returned an indictment unless the foreman's signature appears on its face. […]]]></description>
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		<title>Jizmejian v. Jizmejian 492 P.2d 1208 – Lawnix</title>
		<link>http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/arizona/jizmejian-jizmejian.html</link>
		<comments>http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/arizona/jizmejian-jizmejian.html#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 11 Feb 2009 03:39:27 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Lawnix</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Arizona]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[1972]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[alimony]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Brown Decree]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[community property]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Court of Appeals of Arizona]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[divorce decree]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[domicile]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[life insurance policies]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Pima County Superior Court]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/?p=657</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The ability of a serviceman to gain domiciliary status in this state was decided Clark v. Clark, wherein the court held that a person present in the State of Arizona while in the military service can become a domiciliary if he has the necessary intention to make a home in Arizona and performs some act to carry out such intention. In Clark v. Clark, the plaintiff was a serviceman stationed at Williams Air Force Base, Arizona. When he was off-base, he resided with his foster mother in Tempe, Arizona. The court held that his intent was outwardly manifested by his residence with his foster mother at Tempe, Arizona, when he was off-base and that his residence was sufficiently corroborated by other witnesses. […]]]></description>
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		<title>State v. Dziggel 492 P.2d 1227 – Lawnix</title>
		<link>http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/arizona/state-dziggel.html</link>
		<comments>http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/arizona/state-dziggel.html#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Feb 2009 21:23:55 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Lawnix</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Arizona]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[1972]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[crime]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Division 1 Department B]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[felony]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[justice court criminal jurisdiction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[justice of the peace]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[preliminary hearing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[probable cause]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/?p=654</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The defendant contends that the legislature has no power to confer jurisdiction upon a justice of the peace to conduct a preliminary examination in a felony case. The thrust of his argument is that the Arizona Constitution limits the jurisdiction of justices of the peace to misdemeanors. Therefore, A.R.S. § 22--301, subsec. 5, which confers jurisdiction upon justice courts to conduct a preliminary examination in felony cases, is therefore unconstitutional being in conflict with the constitutional provision. The argument then continues that the defendant did not have a preliminary hearing, and defendant's motion to quash the information should have been granted. […]]]></description>
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		<title>State v. White 492 P.2d 1217 – Lawnix</title>
		<link>http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/arizona/state-white.html</link>
		<comments>http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/arizona/state-white.html#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Feb 2009 20:42:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Lawnix</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Arizona]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[1972]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[constitutional rights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[crime]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Division 1 Department B]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fifth Amendment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Food State Market]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Miranda warning]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[right to remain silent]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[right to speedy trial]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/?p=650</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Under both federal law and Arizona law, a direct or indirect comment upon the failure of the defendant to testify or give evidence at the trial violates his Fifth Amendment rights under the United States Constitution and his Article 2, Section 10 rights under the Arizona Constitution. Appellant in his brief and at oral argument merely advances the general legal proposition that such comment would be reversible error. He does not specifically analyze the allegedly reprehensible comment in order to demonstrate to this Court its inherent evil. [...]]]></description>
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		<title>O’Donnell v. Maves 492 P.2d 1205 – Lawnix</title>
		<link>http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/arizona/odonnell-maves.html</link>
		<comments>http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/arizona/odonnell-maves.html#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Feb 2009 20:13:56 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Lawnix</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Arizona]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[1972]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[car accident]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[directed verdict]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[erroneous jury instruction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[negligence per se]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[rear end collision]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Supreme Court of Arizona In Division]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/?p=646</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[We hold that when it is shown that the statute has been violated, the burden shifts to defendant to prove to the satisfaction of the jury that his failure to comply with the statute was without fault, and that if there is sufficient evidence from which the jury could find that the brake failure was not due to the fault of the defendant, it then becomes a question of fact for the jury to decide whether fault in fact existed.]]></description>
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		<title>State Compensation Fund v. McComb and Industrial Commission 492 P.2d 1241 – Lawnix</title>
		<link>http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/arizona/state-compensation-mccomb.html</link>
		<comments>http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/arizona/state-compensation-mccomb.html#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Feb 2009 14:41:04 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Lawnix</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Arizona]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[1972]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Division 1 Department B]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Industrial Commission of Arizona]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[jurisdiction]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[mutual mistake of fact]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[res judicata]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[State Compensation Fund]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[workmens compensation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[workplace related injury]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/?p=643</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[If this Court were of the opinion that the Martin decision was still controlling, we would have no hesitancy in holding that upon the facts alleged in petitioner's 'Petition for Hearing' the Commission would have jurisdiction to amend the questioned award. Here, as in Martin, the employer alleges that it has made a mistake--it mistakenly submitted to the Commission a wrong figure as and for the injured workman's monthly earnings. Although we fail to see any 'mistake' in the alleged circumstances on the part of the claimant, still under facts identical in principle, the Martin opinion allowed the award to be amended, electing to treat the employer's mistake as a mutual mistake of fact. However, it is our opinion that based upon subsequent res judicata decisions of the Arizona Supreme Court, a fact situation analogous to that in Martin can no longer be held to justify the amendment of a final Commission award on the basis of mutual mistake of fact.]]></description>
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		<title>Walthers v. Kroll 492 P.2d 1220 – Lawnix</title>
		<link>http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/arizona/walthers-kroll.html</link>
		<comments>http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/arizona/walthers-kroll.html#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Feb 2009 03:15:34 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator>Lawnix</dc:creator>
				<category><![CDATA[Arizona]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[1972]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[car accident]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Division 1 Department A]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[law]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[motion for summary judgment]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[negligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[opinion]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[recovery by parent precluded]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[wrongful death]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.lawnix.com/fulltext/?p=639</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The plaintiff, as Administratrix of the estate of Richard A. Gonzales, instituted this action on behalf of Ida Roper, the mother of the deceased, to recover for the death of her son allegedly wrongfully caused by the negligence of the defendants in an automobile accident. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment upon the grounds that the spouse who survived Gonzales settled the negligence action involving the same accident, thereby precluding any recovery by the parent. [...]]]></description>
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