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	<title>legalgist.com</title>
	
	<link>http://www.legalgist.com</link>
	<description>Legal Questions and Answers</description>
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		<title>What is a top Illinois case involving confidential informants?</title>
		<link>http://www.legalgist.com/case-confidential-informants</link>
		<comments>http://www.legalgist.com/case-confidential-informants#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Thu, 09 Feb 2012 03:20:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator />
				<category><![CDATA[Legal Questions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Constitutional Law Cases]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.legalgist.com/?p=10903</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[McCray v. Ill.: This case stands for the proposition that nothing in the due process clause of the 14th Amendment requires a state judge in every probable cause or evidence suppression hearing to assume arresting officers are committing perjury and therefore require disclosure of the informant’s identity. However in situations where there is distinct and [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p><strong>McCray v. Ill.:</strong> This case stands for the proposition that nothing in the due process clause of the 14th Amendment requires a state judge in every probable cause or evidence suppression hearing to assume arresting officers are committing perjury and therefore require disclosure of the informant’s identity.</p>
<p>However in situations where there is distinct and real doubt, the court may order disclosure to the defense of who the informant was.  However, this is discouraged.</p>
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		<title>What happened in Kelly v. Marx</title>
		<link>http://www.legalgist.com/elly-v-marx</link>
		<comments>http://www.legalgist.com/elly-v-marx#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 20 Jul 2011 22:05:31 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator />
				<category><![CDATA[Legal Questions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Property Law Cases]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.legalgist.com/?p=10884</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Ps seek to recover earnest money for purchase of Ds property (entered agreement to buy house, then were unable to sell current home and backed out of deal – Ds accepted offer of other prospective buyers, selling for more than price agreed to with P) – SC granted motion for summary judgment of Ds concluding [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Ps seek to recover earnest money for purchase of Ds property (entered agreement to buy house, then were unable to sell current home and backed out of deal – Ds accepted offer of other prospective buyers, selling for more than price agreed to with P) – SC granted motion for summary judgment of Ds concluding they were entitled to deposit because the liquidated damages clause (determines in advance damages in case of default) in their agreement was enforceable<br />
•  AC reversed under “second-look” doctrine: examined circumstances at contract formation AND actual damages suffered by each party – concluded Ds not entitled to keep deposit because they suffered no actual damages and therefore<br />
liquidated damages would serve as a penalty and not as compensation for a loss<br />
Court’s analysis:<br />
•  Reject the second look approach and conclude that a liquidated damages clause in a purchase and sale agreement will be enforced where, at time agreement was made, potential damages were difficult to determine and the clause was a<br />
reasonable forecast of damages expected to occur in the event of a breach<br />
•   Judge should examine only the circumstances at contract formation – liquidated damages should not be enforced only if sum is grossly disproportionate to an estimate of actual damages made at contract formation<br />
•   Should enforce contracts according to their plain meaning<br />
•   Therefore, Ps not entitled to the return of the deposit and liquidated damages were a reasonable estimate of the damage to the Ds – seller retains liquidated damages</p>
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		<title>What are the 3 types of Common Law Concurrent Interests?</title>
		<link>http://www.legalgist.com/3-types-common-law-concurrent-interests</link>
		<comments>http://www.legalgist.com/3-types-common-law-concurrent-interests#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 19 Jul 2011 17:01:50 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator />
				<category><![CDATA[Legal Questions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Property Law Terms]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.legalgist.com/?p=10882</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Tenants in Common Characteristics Separate but undivided interest in the property Conveyable by deed or will No survivorship rights between tenants in common Each tenant in common owns an undivided share of the whole Default position under Modern Law – in cases of ambiguous transfers it was the presumption Creation Creation by will or deed [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<ol>
<li>Tenants in Common
<ol>
<li>Characteristics
<ol>
<li>Separate but undivided interest in the property</li>
<li>Conveyable by deed or will</li>
<li>No survivorship rights between tenants in common</li>
<li>Each tenant in common owns an undivided share of the whole</li>
<li>Default position under Modern Law – in cases of ambiguous transfers it was the presumption</li>
</ol>
</li>
<li>Creation
<ol>
<li>Creation by will or deed</li>
</ol>
</li>
</ol>
</li>
<li>Joint Tenants
<ol>
<li>Characteristics
<ol>
<li>Regarded as a single owner</li>
<li>Each tenant is seised by the share and by the whole
<ol>
<li>Livery of seisin replaced by the deed</li>
</ol>
</li>
<li>Nothing really passes when a joint tenant dies, because the other joint tenant was seised of the whole even while the other joint tenant lived</li>
<li>Requires the 4 unities (without these it is a tenancy in common):
<ol>
<li>Time – interest must exist at the same time (beginning and end), any deviation makes a tenancy in common</li>
<li>Title &#8211; interest must arise from same transaction, intestate succession can’t create joint tenancy</li>
<li>Interest – all joint tenants have equal undivided shares and interests</li>
<li>Possession – each joint tenant must have a right to possession of the whole, granting of exclusive possession doesn’t destroy the joint tenancy</li>
</ol>
</li>
<li>Default position under Common Law – in cases of ambiguous transfers to more than one person it was the presumption</li>
</ol>
</li>
<li>Creation
<ol>
<li>Magic Words – “joint tenants with the right of survivorship”</li>
</ol>
</li>
</ol>
</li>
<li>Tenants by the Entireties
<ol>
<li>Characteristics
<ol>
<li>Only husbands and wives</li>
<li>4 unities plus 5<sup>th</sup> unity of marriage</li>
<li>H + W hold as one person, not equal share like Joint Tenancy</li>
<li>Divorce terminates the 5<sup>th</sup> unity and the tenancy by the entirety</li>
<li>Only half the states recognize this today</li>
<li>Default position for ambiguous transfer to H+W under Common Law</li>
</ol>
</li>
</ol>
</li>
</ol>
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		<title>What happened in Gay Jenson Farms Co. v. Cargill, Inc.?</title>
		<link>http://www.legalgist.com/happened-gay-jenson-farms-cargill</link>
		<comments>http://www.legalgist.com/happened-gay-jenson-farms-cargill#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Mon, 18 Jul 2011 16:10:07 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator />
				<category><![CDATA[Legal Questions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Real Estate Law Cases]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.legalgist.com/?p=10878</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Cargill loaned money to elevator operator Warren Grain and Seed Co., which operated a grain elevator. Cargill subsequently took more and more control and loaned more money to Warren as its financial condition deteriorated. Eventually, Warren went bankrupt, causing many farmers to lose money owed them by Warren. The farmers sued Cargill, claiming Warren was [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Cargill loaned money to elevator operator Warren Grain and Seed Co., which operated a grain elevator. Cargill<br />
subsequently took more and more control and loaned more money to Warren as its financial condition deteriorated.<br />
Eventually, Warren went bankrupt, causing many farmers to lose money owed them by Warren. The farmers sued<br />
Cargill, claiming Warren was its agent. Farmers won case because Restatement (Second) of Agency § 14 O (1958)<br />
says that a security holder who takes over the management of the debtor’s business either in person or through an<br />
agent, and directs what contracts may or may not be made, becomes a principal, liable as a principal for the obligations<br />
incurred thereafter in the normal course of business by the debtor who has now become his principal agent. Cargill<br />
exercised too much control over the business to deny the relationship was more than a normal debtor-creditor situation.</p>
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		<title>What is an Easement by Necessity?</title>
		<link>http://www.legalgist.com/easement-necessity</link>
		<comments>http://www.legalgist.com/easement-necessity#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Wed, 13 Jul 2011 12:21:22 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator />
				<category><![CDATA[Legal Questions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Property Law Terms]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.legalgist.com/?p=10870</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Easements of necessity: Two parcels may be so situated that an easement over one is “strictly necessary” to the enjoyment of the other. If so, courts are willing to find an “easement of necessity. Unlike an easement by implication, the easement of necessity does not require that there have been an actual prior use before [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Easements of necessity: Two parcels may be so situated that an easement over one is “strictly necessary” to the enjoyment of the other. If so, courts are willing to find an “easement of necessity. Unlike an easement by implication, the easement of necessity does not require that there have been an actual prior use before severance.  Conversely however, the necessity must be “strict” rather than “reasonable.”</p>
<p>The most common example of an easement of necessity is where a parcel of land is “landlocked” and access to a public road can only be gained via a right of way over an adjoining property.</p>
<p>There are three separate elements the law has established:</p>
<p>1. prior common ownership of the dominant and servient estates<br />
2. transfer of one of the estates by the common grantor, creating the lack of access, and<br />
3. necessity of the easement for making use of the transferred estate</p>
<p>A right to a way of necessity can lie dormant and be activated by a remote<br />
grantee</p>
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		<title>What happened in United States v. Causby?</title>
		<link>http://www.legalgist.com/happened-united-states-causby</link>
		<comments>http://www.legalgist.com/happened-united-states-causby#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Jul 2011 18:43:17 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator />
				<category><![CDATA[Legal Questions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Property Law Cases]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.legalgist.com/?p=10866</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[Issue: Are plane flights that fly over the airspace above a land owner’s property a proper cause for a government taking if it can be proven that such flights were the direct and immediate cause of damages that caused P to not have full enjoyment of his property? Holding: Reversed. The Court of Claims decision [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Issue: Are plane flights that fly over the airspace above a land owner’s property a proper cause for a government taking if it can be proven that such flights were the direct and immediate cause of damages that caused P to not have full enjoyment of his property?</p>
<p>Holding: Reversed. The Court of Claims decision that the low-level and frequent flights<br />
over P’s land were a government taking, but the cause is remanded to discover whether or<br />
not the taking was complete or temporary.</p>
<p>Rationale:</p>
<p>- The doctrine of “ ” has no place in the modern world. The air is a public highway and Congress has implemented law that indicates that all airspace over the United States is public property. However, that principal does not apply to this case. The US conceded on an oral argument that if the flights over P’s property rendered it uninhabitable, there<br />
would be a taking under the 5th Amendment.<br />
- If by reason of the frequency and altitude of the fights, P could not use their land for any purpose, their loss would be complete and therefore subject to a market value taking by the government. The fact that the planes never touched the surface is irrelevant. This is not like an adjacent railroad that creates a legal nuisance. Here, P’s airspace is being<br />
appropriated by an outside influence in such a way as to render the land useless to its proper owners<br />
- The gov’t taking the land and reducing its value as opposed to making it completely<br />
useless is not controlling. So long as there is a servitude placed on the owner. If a land owner is to have full enjoyment of his land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. Otherwise, buildings could not be erected, trees could not be planted, and fences could not be run.<br />
- Also, according to Congressional regulations, the flights were not within the navigable airspace which Congress placed within public domain. Therefore, the path of glide hereis not within the minimum safe altitude of flight within the meaning of the statute.</p>
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		<title>What is acquisition by Adverse Possession?</title>
		<link>http://www.legalgist.com/acquisition-adverse-possession</link>
		<comments>http://www.legalgist.com/acquisition-adverse-possession#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Jul 2011 06:15:32 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator />
				<category><![CDATA[Legal Questions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Property Law Terms]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.legalgist.com/?p=10864</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[The party that wishes to assert adverse possession despite not having true title must:  Make an actual entry giving the adverse possessor exclusive possession that is: open and notorious; adverse and under a claim of right; and the adverse possession must be continuous for the statutory period. Note: Usual requirement for exclusive possession is cultivation [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The party that wishes to assert adverse possession despite not having true title must:  Make an actual entry giving the adverse possessor exclusive possession that is:</p>
<ul>
<li>open and notorious;</li>
<li>adverse and under a claim of right; and</li>
<li>the adverse possession must be continuous for the statutory period.</li>
</ul>
<p>Note:</p>
<ul>
<li>Usual requirement for exclusive possession is cultivation and a claim of title.</li>
<li>Some requirements require substantial enclosure (Van Valkenburgh)</li>
<li>Paying taxes may = adverse possession</li>
<li>State of mind of the person asserting adverse possession is not relevant.</li>
<li>Open and notorious must be a big encroachment or known to the person who has title.</li>
<li>Open and Notorious meets the reasonable notice requirement</li>
<li>Adverse must equal hostile, hostile must equal adverse to true title.</li>
</ul>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
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		<title>What happened in the McCulloch v. Maryland case?</title>
		<link>http://www.legalgist.com/happened-mcculloch-maryland-case</link>
		<comments>http://www.legalgist.com/happened-mcculloch-maryland-case#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Tue, 12 Jul 2011 03:03:24 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator />
				<category><![CDATA[Legal Questions]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.legalgist.com/?p=10862</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[There are 2 parts of this opinion: The chartering of the Bank was w/in the constitutional power of federal gov’t because it bore a reasonable relationship to constitutionally-enumerated powers of gov’t (power to collect tax, borrow money, regulate commerce) Since Bank was Constitutionally chartered, the tax was unconstitutional.  Marbury saw possibility that this taxation by [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>There are 2 parts of this opinion:</p>
<p>The chartering of the Bank was w/in the constitutional power of federal gov’t because it bore a reasonable relationship to constitutionally-enumerated powers of gov’t (power to collect tax, borrow money, regulate commerce)</p>
<p>Since Bank was Constitutionally chartered, the tax was unconstitutional.  Marbury saw possibility that this taxation by state could be carried to extremes and lots of things could be taxed.  M disposed of the argument of the states that the Bank was not Constitutionally chartered because the powers come directly from the states.  M says powers come from the PEOPLE.  M says that all powers need not be EXPLICIT.  They can be implied. “necessary and proper” (most significant part of the opinion) – M rejected opinion that necessary meant “absolutely necessary”.  Says all means which are appropriate are OK.  Therefore, all means are rationally related to a constitutionally specified object the means is constituational.  M says power to punish for violation of federal laws is implied; post offices; roads, implied.<br />
Marshall also believes that the S. Ct. should strike down laws only when it is quite clear that no constitutionally-specified object was being pursued.  Anything closer should be left to Congress – not courts!<br />
Marbury’s argument like taxation w/o representation.  You can’t tax people who don’t have a say in the affairs of the state.  M says taxes on federal government violate the supremacy clause.<br />
McCulloch today-The court shows great deference to congress and will not inquire into legislators’ motives.  Therefore, as long as legislation is rationally related to one constitutionally-enumerated motive that Congress might have been pursuing . . . the fact that other ends not w/in the enumerated powers might have been achieved does not invalidate that power.</p>
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		<title>In tort law, when is someone subject to a battery tort?</title>
		<link>http://www.legalgist.com/tort-law-subject-battery-tort</link>
		<comments>http://www.legalgist.com/tort-law-subject-battery-tort#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 08 Jul 2011 22:45:46 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator />
				<category><![CDATA[Legal Questions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Tort Law]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.legalgist.com/?p=10860</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[An actor is subject to liability for a battery if he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact to a person, or an apprehension that such a contact will imminently occur, and that person or another person suffers such a contact as a result.  Restatement (Second) of Torts §13 Case on point:  Vosburg [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>An actor is subject to liability for a battery if he acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact to a person, or an apprehension that such a contact will imminently occur, and that person or another person suffers such a contact as a result.  Restatement (Second) of Torts §13</p>
<p>Case on point:  <em>Vosburg v. Putney</em></p>
<p>Boy kicks, or lightly touches, another boy’s leg just below the knee while they are at school. The kicked boy’s leg eventually had to be amputated. The kick was found to be the cause of the harm.</p>
<p>Also, note that consent is a defense to Battery.</p>
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		<title>What are the requirements for mental incapacity to contract?</title>
		<link>http://www.legalgist.com/requirements-mental-incapacity-contract</link>
		<comments>http://www.legalgist.com/requirements-mental-incapacity-contract#comments</comments>
		<pubDate>Fri, 08 Jul 2011 19:31:14 +0000</pubDate>
		<dc:creator />
				<category><![CDATA[Legal Questions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Contract Law]]></category>

		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.legalgist.com/?p=10856</guid>
		<description><![CDATA[1.   -If previously adjudicated incompetent, the contract is void.  If not yet adjudicated incompetent, but reviewed as incompetent, the contract is voidable. 2.   Tests of mental capacity: Did party understand the nature and quality of the transaction or grasp its significance?  OR Was party able to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the [...]]]></description>
			<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>1.   -If previously adjudicated incompetent, the contract is void.  If not yet adjudicated incompetent, but reviewed as incompetent, the contract is voidable.</p>
<p>2.   Tests of mental capacity:</p>
<ul>
<li>Did party understand the nature and quality of the transaction or grasp its significance?  OR</li>
<li>Was party able to act in a reasonable manner in relation to the transaction and the other party had reason to know the party was acting reasonably?</li>
</ul>
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