Marine Knowledge

MARPOL Amendments: 01 Jan 2014

noreply@blogger.com (Neptune) — Wed, 08 Jan 2014 18:28:00 +0000

The amendments which entered into force on 1 January 2014 include a revised MARPOL Annex III Regulations for the prevention of pollution by harmful substances carried by sea in packaged form, to include changes to the Annex to coincide with the next update of the mandatory International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code, specifying that goods should be shipped in accordance with relevant provisions.

Source: IMO

SOLAS amendments: 1 January 2014

noreply@blogger.com (Neptune) — Wed, 08 Jan 2014 18:23:00 +0000

The SOLAS amendments which entered into force on 1 January 2014 include the following:

- amendment to SOLAS regulation II-1/8-1, to introduce a mandatory requirement for new passenger ships for either onboard stability computers or shore-based support, for the purpose of providing operational information to the Master for safe return to port after a flooding casualty;

- amendment to SOLAS regulation III/20.11.2 regarding the testing of free-fall lifeboats, to require that the operational testing of free-fall lifeboat release systems shall be performed either by free-fall launch with only the operating crew on board or by a simulated launching;

- amendment to SOLAS chapter V to add a new regulation V/14 on ships' manning, to require Administrations, for every ship, to establish appropriate minimum safe manning levels following a transparent procedure, taking into account the guidance adopted by IMO (Assembly resolution A.1047(27) on Principles of minimum safe manning); and issue an appropriate minimum safe manning document or equivalent as evidence of the minimum safe manning considered necessary;

- amendment to SOLAS chapter VI to add a new regulation VI/5-2, to prohibit the blending of bulk liquid cargoes during the sea voyage and to prohibit production processes on board ships;

- amendment to SOLAS chapter VII to replace regulation 4 on documents, covering transport information relating to the carriage of dangerous goods in packaged form and the container/vehicle packing certificate; and

- amendment to SOLAS regulation XI-1/2 on enhanced surveys, to make mandatory the International Code on the Enhanced Programme of Inspections during Surveys of Bulk Carriers and Oil Tankers, 2011 (2011 ESP Code, resolution A.1049(27)).

Source: IMO

MPA Singapore: Guidance for Company Security Officers

noreply@blogger.com (Neptune) — Wed, 26 Jan 2011 14:45:00 +0000

Source: http://www.mpa.gov.sg/
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AMSA: Fitness for Duty

noreply@blogger.com (Neptune) — Mon, 17 Jan 2011 16:17:00 +0000

Source: http://www.amsa.gov.au/
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AMSA: Hot Work and Safety

noreply@blogger.com (Neptune) — Mon, 17 Jan 2011 16:11:00 +0000

Source: http://www.amsa.gov.au/
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AMSA: Limitations of the International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes Code (IMSBC Code)

noreply@blogger.com (Neptune) — Mon, 17 Jan 2011 16:06:00 +0000

Source: http://www.amsa.gov.au/
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D.G.Shipping, India: Guidelines for anti piracy measures to be implemented on Indian Ships

noreply@blogger.com (Neptune) — Mon, 17 Jan 2011 14:07:00 +0000

Source: http://www.dgshipping.com/

M.S. Notice 01 of 2011
Subject: Guidelines for anti piracy measures to be implemented on Indian Ships

Dated: 14.01.2011

1. Introduction:

1.1 Attention of the ship Owners / Managers / Masters is invited to the increasing number of pirate attacks on merchant ships transiting the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia. It has been observed in the past two years that the attacks have also occurring further off the east coast of Somalia.

1.2 Various measures to prevent a pirate attack have been promulgated by the issuance of Circulars / Notices by the Directorate General of Shipping, IMO and the shipping industry.

1.3 Recently, during the 88^th Maritime Safety Committee, a MSC circular No. MSC.1/Circ.1390 dated 09-12-2010 (copy enclosed for ready reference), has been issued on the subject of Guidance for Company security officers - Preparation of a company and the crew for the contingency of hijack by pirates in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden. This circular takes into account the Best management Practices (BMP version 3) developed by the shipping industry.

1.4 BMP3, which was circulated to Industry in July 2010 and is available on DG website, highlights following anti-piracy measures that a merchant ship should undertake while transiting through the piracy infested region:

a) Enhanced vigilance during watch-keeping including use of dummy 'look out'

b) Control of access points and Close circuit television monitoring of vulnerable boarding points by pirates

c) Evasive manoeuvres

d) Alarms

e) Upper deck lighting

f) Deny use of ship's tools and equipment

g) Enhanced bridge protection

h) Physical barriers such as barbed wires, 'anti-climb' paint, 'dummy' signs for electrification of barbed wires etc.

i) Use of Water spray, foam monitors and trailing wires

j) Safe house

1.5 One of the important component of counter-piracy measures is the concept of "Safe House" where, in case when boarding by pirates seems imminent despite all other anti-piracy measures being in place, the crew could muster and lock themselves, out of the reach of pirates and are able to guide the naval forces to undertake a rescue operation.

2. Safe House Concept

2.1 The concept of 'safe house' for vessels is based on the fact that seizure of crew members is one of the main means of pirates gaining control over the ship. Therefore prevention of seizure of crew members by intruders will be a key to foil a pirate attack. The crew can stave off a pirate attack by mustering in a secure compartment or 'safe house' so that safety of those on board is ensured until the rescue forces can arrive.

2.2 The design of safe house is based on the fact that initial evasive measures were employed by the vessel and pirates have been able to board the vessel evading these measures. However these measures have been able to delay the time taken by pirates to board the vessel.

2.3 Location of safe house: The 'safe house' should be sturdy enough to resist the attempts by the pirates to break into it. The safe house should be located at an imperceptible location so that it is difficult for the pirates to locate it onboard. However it is important that all crew members are well versed with the location and routes to reach the safe house so that the time taken by the crew members to muster inside the safe house is minimized.

2.3 Pirate alarm: As soon as it is appreciated that boarding of the vessel by pirates is inevitable despite the use of all the evasive measures, a 'pirate alarm' should be sounded which will not only alert the crew that pirates have boarded but also instruct them to muster in the pre-defined 'safe house'.

2.4 Once all the members of the crew have assembled inside the safe house, the engines would be immobilized and entire ship would be blackened out. Immobilization of the engines is recommended, since all piracy is done in the high seas away from hazards of navigation. However, in a recent case, it was observed that the crew had the control of steering compartment alongwith the engine room as 'safe house' and therefore were able to steer the ship in general direction, away from known navigational dangers. The decision, therefore, to 'shut off' the ship's engine would need to be ship specific and upto the ship's command.

2.5 Further, International law does not permit international military forces to protect ships attacked in Yemeni territorial waters. A ship that cannot be operated under its own power is unlikely to be taken into territorial waters of Yemen or Somalia. Immobilization is therefore an effective passive measure that does not involve confrontation with pirates. Ships Emergency Generator would also be cut off remotely from the safe house. A pirate unfamiliar with the ship would find it almost impossible to navigate in blackened out ship and it would not be feasible for them to locate the safe house.

2.6 The safe house would also be provided with communication equipment. The crew would immediately inform the position and information about the attack to the security forces, using available means of communication. The security forces would be informed that no hostages have been taken and rescue efforts / military action can be taken against the pirates without any harm to the ship's crew. In order that the communication is effective, a proper communication protocol would need to be developed by the company security officer in consultation with security agencies and Directorate General of Shipping.

2.7 In addition to above provisions the ship may also be fitted with a Pirate Warning System. This system could be activated from the safe house and would warn the pirates that security forces are on their way for help. The system would also create masked crew noise from different locations on the ship and thereby disorienting the attackers onboard the vessel. The safe house would be provided with facilities for the crew to survive till the time the help arrives and once the vessel is free from pirates, the crew can be intimated through agreed communication protocol communication to vacate the safe house.

2.8 Based on these facts two options for design of safe house have evolved. The safe house can be an exclusive compartment, purpose built into the ship Or in order to avoid major alterations to the ship's layout, an existing compartment such as an engine room, steering gear room, or any other compartment considered suitable based on vessel's design and risk assessment by the Company, may as an alternative option be used as a safe house. Such alternate compartment shall be suitably reinforced for use as a safe house.

2.9 The salient features for a safe house design are as follows:

2.9.1 Construction: The water tight doors, frames and surrounding bulkheads of the safe house should be constructed of steel. The material would be resistant to repeated hits by bullets, sledge hammer, grenades and cutting charges. It would also be difficult to make access to the safe house by undertaking oxy acetylene cutting of the bulkheads / doors. Internal cross-bars would be provided for additional security and rigidity and to avoid the dependence on locks / hinges. Steel covers with internal cross bars and securing arrangements from inside shall be provided for all openings in the safe house. These steel covers shall be of similar construction as the adjoining bulkhead.
The area shall be capable of being sealed off so that CO2 gas cannot be released into the area, the area cannot be flooded with water from outside, and explosives such as hand grenades cannot be thrown into the area. These considerations would define the location of the safe house onboard a vessel. Exact location of the safe house will largely depend on the type and size of the ship.

2.9.2 Size: Size of the safe house would depend on the size of the vessel and number of crew on board. The safe house would be designed to accommodate the crew for at least 3 days, which is the maximum time security forces are expected to locate the vessel and neutralize the pirates.

2.9.3 Equipment / Facilities: The safe house should be provided with the following equipment/facilities for the crew to survive and safely undertake the various activities required for communicating with the security forces and during the operations by security forces:

i) VHF communication equipment

ii) Satellite phone

iii) Few bunks / chairs for crew to rest

iv) Automatic Identification System (AIS)

v) Hand held GPS

vi) Local control for immobilizing the main engines and blackening out the ship

vii) CCTV display of boarding points, upper decks / bridge etc.

viii) Emergency power supply for operating lights, ventilation (as far as practicable), communication equipment etc. only within safe house

ix) Toilet facilities

x) Tinned food and water for the entire crew to survive for 03 days

xi) Provision for forced and natural ventilation

2.9.4 The Company, in consultation with Indian Navy, should develop a communication protocol for informing the security agencies and The Directorate General of Shipping (Dgcomm) in case a pirate attack is imminent. This protocol should as a minimum address communication to be sent from the ship when:

i) pirates are chasing the ship (Stage 1)

ii) in spite of all evasive measures, pirates are boarding / have boarded the ship (Stage 2)

iii) all crew has taken refuge in the safe house and (no) crew is left outside (Stage 3)

2.9.5 Anti-Piracy Drill: The operational readiness of the 'safe hose' procedure should be exercised with the security agencies. In addition, it is recommended that safe house entry procedure is rehearsed well before vessel's expected entry into the high risk area. The drill among other things should also test the sealing, communication and shutting down procedures.

2.9.6 It is feasible for the ship's crew to evade a pirate attack, by locking themselves inside a safe house with necessary communication and survival facilities till the time rescue forces can reach and engage the pirates. The whole concept of safe house is lost if any crew member is left outside before it is secured.

3. Implementation: It is strongly recommended that all Indian ships transiting the piracy infested waters should at the earliest implement the anti-piracy measures outlined above including the concept of 'safe house' and ship-owners are advised to submit the progress of implementation of these measures to the Directorate General of Shipping within 3 months of date of issue of this notice.

4. This is issued with the approval of Director General of Shipping & Ex-officio Addl. Secretary to Govt. of India.

Sd/-

(Capt. Harish Khatri)

Dy. Director General of Shipping (Tech)
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Bahamas Maritime Authority: Use of Fall Preventer Devices (FPD)

noreply@blogger.com (Neptune) — Sun, 09 Jan 2011 05:37:00 +0000

Source: Bahamas Maritime Authority

Note for all seafarers:
SOLAS does not require anybody to be inside the boats when being lowered. Most of the lifeboat accidents involve inadvertent release of hooks due to complicated design/ lack of training. FPD are intended to protect against the consequences of an unintended release of the hook. It is simple to use- and may save your life one day.
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Barbados Maritime: Amended text for Oil Record Book Part I & Part II (Effective 1st Jan 2011)

noreply@blogger.com (Neptune) — Sat, 08 Jan 2011 15:06:00 +0000

Double click to enlarge
Source: Barbados Maritime Ship Registry
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The Paris Memorandum of Understanding's New Inspection Regime (NIR)- Jan 1, 2011

noreply@blogger.com (Neptune) — Sat, 08 Jan 2011 07:08:00 +0000

Double click to enlarge
Source: Transport Canada
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SOLAS: Asbestos to be banned onboard ships from 2011

noreply@blogger.com (Neptune) — Wed, 05 Jan 2011 17:43:00 +0000

SOLAS – Asbestos to be banned onboard ships from 2011

The new amendment to SOLAS II-1 (2005)/3-5.2, MSC.282(86) coming into force on 1^st of January, 2011 prohibits without any exemption any new installation of materials which contain asbestos. (SOLAS, MSC.282(86)). This applies for all newbuildings and existing ships with 500 GT and above.

The mandatory requirement is also reflected in the new IMO Convention for "Safe and Environmentally Sound Recycling of Ships" which was adopted by the Diplomatic Conference in 2009 in Hong Kong and is expected to come into force in 2015. The aim is to prevent hazardous working conditions and to ensure environmentally sound ship recycling operations in ship recycling facilities. The convention will affect approximately 50,000 existing ships above 500 GT worldwide, requiring them to have a certified "Inventory of Hazardous Materials" (IHM) on board within five years after entry into force with an individual due date of the next class renewal. The IHM lists relevant hazardous materials present in the vessel's structure and equipment as like asbestos, PCB, Ozone Depleting Substances and TBT. (SOLAS II-1 (2005)/3-5.2)

Application date for the above is January 1^st of 2011 as new SOLAS amendments are entering to force.
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Performance Standards for Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm System (BNWAS)

noreply@blogger.com (Neptune) — Mon, 03 Jan 2011 15:03:00 +0000

PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR A BRIDGE NAVIGATIONAL WATCH ALARM SYSTEM (BNWAS)

1 SCOPE

The purpose of a bridge navigational watch alarm system (BNWAS) is to monitor bridge activity and detect operator disability which could lead to marine accidents. The system monitors the awareness of the Officer of the Watch (OOW) and automatically alerts the Master or another qualified OOW if for any reason the OOW becomes incapable of performing the OOW.s duties. This purpose is achieved by a series of indications and alarms to alert first the OOW and, if he is not responding, then to alert the Master or another qualified OOW. Additionally, the BNWAS may provide the OOW with a means of calling for immediate assistance if required. The BNWAS should be operational whenever the ship’s heading or track control system is engaged, unless inhibited by the Master.

2 REFERENCES

- IMO resolution A.830(19): Code on alarms and indicators

- IMO MSC/Circ.982: Guidelines on Ergonomic Criteria for Bridge Equipment and Layout

- IMO resolution A.694(17): General Requirements for shipborne radio equipment forming part of the Global Maritime Distress and Safety System (GMDSS) and for Electronic Navigational Aids.

3 DEFINITIONS

Bridge- Wheelhouse and bridge wings.

4 OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS

4.1 Functionality

4.1.1 Operational modes

4.1.1.1 The BNWAS should incorporate the following operational modes:

- Automatic (Automatically brought into operation whenever the ship.s heading or track control system is activated and inhibited when this system is not activated)

- Manual ON (In operation constantly)

- Manual OFF (Does not operate under any circumstances)

4.1.2 Operational sequence of indications and alarms

4.1.2.1 Once operational, the alarm system should remain dormant for a period of between 3 and 12 min (Td).

4.1.2.2 At the end of this dormant period, the alarm system should initiate a visual indication

on the bridge.

4.1.2.3 If not reset, the BNWAS should additionally sound a first stage audible alarm on the bridge 15 s after the visual indication is initiated.

4.1.2.4 If not reset, the BNWAS should additionally sound a second stage remote audible alarm in the back-up officer.s and/or Master.s location 15 s after the first stage audible alarm is initiated.

4.1.2.5 If not reset, the BNWAS should additionally sound a third stage remote audible alarm at the locations of further crew members capable of taking corrective actions 90 s after the second stage remote audible alarm is initiated.

4.1.2.6 In vessels other than passenger vessels, the second or third stage remote audible alarms may sound in all the above locations at the same time. If the second stage audible alarm is sounded in this way, the third stage alarm may be omitted.

4.1.2.7 In larger vessels, the delay between the second and third stage alarms may be set to a longer value on installation, up to a maximum of 3 min, to allow sufficient time for the back-up officer and/or Master to reach the bridge.

4.1.3 Reset function

4.1.3.1 It should not be possible to initiate the reset function or cancel any audible alarm from any device, equipment or system not physically located in areas of the bridge providing proper look out.

4.1.3.2 The reset function should, by a single operator action, cancel the visual indication and all audible alarms and initiate a further dormant period. If the reset function is activated before the end of the dormant period, the period should be re-initiated to run for its full duration from the time of the reset.

4.1.3.3 To initiate the reset function, an input representing a single operator action by the OOW is required. This input may be generated by reset devices forming an integral part of the BNWAS or by external inputs from other equipment capable of registering physical activity and mental alertness of the OOW.

4.1.3.4 A continuous activation of any reset device should not prolong the dormant period or cause a suppression of the sequence of indications and alarms

4.1.4 Emergency call facility

Means may be provided on the bridge to immediately activate the second, and subsequently third, stage remote audible alarms by means of an .Emergency Call. push button or similar.

4.2 Accuracy

The alarm system should be capable of achieving the timings stated in section 4.1.2 with an accuracy of 5% or 5 s, whichever is less, under all environmental conditions.

4.3 Security

The means of selecting the Operational Mode and the duration of the Dormant Period (Td) should be security protected so that access to these controls should be restricted to the Master only.

4.4 Malfunctions, alarms and indications

4.4.1 Malfunction

If a malfunction of, or power supply failure to, the BNWAS is detected, this should be indicated. Means shall be provided to allow the repeat of this indication on a central alarm panel if fitted.

5 ERGONOMIC CRITERIA

5.1 Operational controls

5.1.1 A protected means of selecting the operational mode of the BNWAS.

5.1.2 A protected means of selecting the duration of the dormant period of the BNWAS.

5.1.3 A means of activating the .Emergency Call. function if this facility is incorporated within the BNWAS.

5.1.4 Reset facilities

Means of activating the reset function should only be available in positions on the bridge giving proper look out and preferably adjacent to visual indications. Means of activating the reset function should be easily accessible from the conning position, the workstation for navigating and manoeuvring, the workstation for monitoring and the bridge wings.

5.2 Presentation of information

5.2.1 Operational mode

The operational mode of the equipment should be indicated to the OOW.

5.2.2 Visual indications

The visual indication initiated at the end of the dormant period should take the form of a flashing indication. Flashing indications should be visible from all operational positions on the bridge where the OOW may reasonably be expected to be stationed. The colour of the indication(s) should be chosen so as not to impair night vision and dimming facilities (although not to extinction) should be incorporated.

5.2.3 First stage bridge audible alarm

The first stage audible alarm which sounds on the bridge at the end of the visual indication period should have its own characteristic tone or modulation intended to alert, but not to startle, the OOW. This alarm should be audible from all operational positions on the bridge where the OOW may reasonably be expected to be stationed. This function may be engineered using one or more sounding devices. Tone/modulation characteristics and volume level should be selectable during commissioning of the system.

5.2.4 Second and third stage remote audible alarm

The remote audible alarm which sounds in the locations of the Master, officers and further crew members capable of taking corrective action at the end of the bridge audible alarm period should be easily identifiable by its sound and should indicate urgency. The volume of this alarm should be sufficient for it to be heard throughout the locations above and to wake sleeping persons.

6 DESIGN AND INSTALLATION

6.1 General

The equipment should comply with IMO resolutions A.694(17), A.813(19), their associated international standards and MSC/Circ.982 regarding Guidelines for Ergonomic Criteria for Bridge Equipment and Layout.

6.2 Specific requirements

6.2.1 System physical integrity

All items of equipment forming part of the BNWAS should be tamper-proof so that no member of the crew may interfere with the systems operation.

6.2.2 Reset devices

Reset devices should be designed and installed so as to minimise the possibility of their operation by any means other than activation by the OOW. Reset devices should all be of a uniform design and should be illuminated for identification at night.

6.2.3 Alternative reset arrangements may be incorporated to initiate the reset function from other equipment on the bridge capable of registering operator actions in positions giving proper look out.

6.3 Power supply

The BNWAS should be powered from the ship's main power supply. The malfunction indication, and all elements of the Emergency Call facility, if incorporated, should be powered from a battery maintained supply.

7 INTERFACING

7.1 Inputs

Inputs should be available for additional reset devices or for connection to bridge equipment capable of generating a reset signal by contacts, equivalent circuits or serial data.

7.2 Outputs

Output(s) should be available for connection of additional bridge visual indications and audible alarms and remote audible alarms.

Please refer RESOLUTION MSC.128(75) (adopted on 20 May 2002) for details.

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International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes Code (IMSBC Code)

noreply@blogger.com (Neptune) — Mon, 03 Jan 2011 14:23:00 +0000

The International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes Code (IMSBC Code) has now replaced the Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes (BC Code) w.e.f 01st January 2011, which was first adopted as a recommendatory code in 1965 and has been updated at regular intervals since then.

The aim of the mandatory IMSBC Code is to facilitate the safe stowage and shipment of solid bulk cargoes by providing information on the dangers associated with the shipment of certain types of cargo and instructions on the appropriate procedures to be adopted.

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IMO Action Dates (01st Jan 2011- 01st Jan 2014)

noreply@blogger.com (Neptune) — Mon, 03 Jan 2011 14:12:00 +0000

List of amendments expected to enter into force in the coming years

1 January 2011: Entry into force of December 2008 amendments to SOLAS

Amendments to SOLAS chapter VI to make mandatory the International Maritime Solid Bulk Cargoes Code (IMSBC Code) The IMSBC Code will replace the Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes (BC Code), which was first adopted as a recommendatory code in 1965 and has been updated at regular intervals since then.

1 January 2011: Entry into force of June 2009 amendments to SOLAS

ECDIS and BNWAS to be made mandatory under SOLAS
Amendments to SOLAS regulation V/19, to make mandatory the carriage of Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS) and Bridge Navigational Watch Alarm Systems (BNWAS), under SOLAS chapter V, Safety of Navigation. The requirements will be mandatory for new ships and phased-in for existing ships.

Other SOLAS amendments coming into force:

· an amendment to SOLAS regulation II-1/3-5.2, to prohibit all new installations of asbestos on board ships, without exceptions; and

· amendments to the title of Chapter VI to read, Carriage of Cargoes "and Oil Fuels" and to Regulation VI/5-1 on Material safety data sheets (MSDS) to require MSDS to be provided for ships carrying oil or oil fuel, prior to the loading of such oil as cargo in bulk or bunkering of oil fuel. The MSC also approved Recommendations for material safety data sheets (MSDS) for MARPOL Annex I type cargoes and oil fuels.

1 January 2011: Entry into force of July 2009 amendments to MARPOL

MARPOL Annex I - transfer of oil cargo between oil tankers at sea
Amendments to MARPOL Annex I for the prevention of marine pollution during some ship-to-ship (STS) oil transfer operations.

The new chapter 8 on Prevention of pollution during transfer of oil cargo between oil tankers at sea will apply to oil tankers of 150 gross tonnage and above and will require any oil tanker involved in oil cargo STS operations to have, on board, a plan prescribing how to conduct STS operations (the STS Plan), which would be approved by its Administration.

Notification to the relevant coastal State will be required not less than 48 hours in advance of the scheduled STS operations although some relaxation to this rule is allowed in certain, very specific, cases. The regulations are not intended to apply to bunkering operations.

Consequential amendments to the International Oil Pollution Prevention (IOPP) Certificate, the Supplement to the IOPP Certificate and the Oil Record Book.

Amendments to MARPOL Annex I regulations 1, 12, 13, 17 and 38, relating to the on board management of oil residue (sludge). The amendments clarify long standing requirements and remove existing ambiguities in order to facilitate compliance by ships' crews. Definitions for oil residue (sludge), oil residue (sludge) tanks, oily bilge water and oily bilge water holding tanks are introduced for the first time. Related amendments to the Supplement to the IOPP Certificate, Form A and Form B, and to the Oil Record Book.

1 August 2011: Entry into force of March 2010 amendments to MARPOL

Amendments to MARPOL Annex VI (Prevention of air pollution from ships) to formally establish a North American Emission Control Area, in which emissions of sulphur oxides (SOx), nitrogen oxides (NOx) and particulate matter from ships will be subject to more stringent controls than the limits that apply globally.

New MARPOL regulation, to protect the Antarctic from pollution by heavy grade oils, in MARPOL Annex I (Regulations for the prevention of pollution by oil) on Special requirements for the use or carriage of oils in the Antarctic area, a new chapter 9 with a new regulation 43, which would prohibit the carriage, in bulk as cargo, or carriage and use as fuel, of: crude oils having a density, at 15°C, higher than 900 kg/m3; oils, other than crude oils, having a density, at 15°C, higher than 900 kg/m3 or a kinematic viscosity, at 50°C, higher than 180 mm2/s; or bitumen, tar and their emulsions. An exception is envisaged for vessels engaged in securing the safety of ships or in a search-and-rescue operation.

1 January 2012: Entry into force of May 2010 amendments to SOLAS

Goal-based standards

International Goal based Ship Construction Standards for Bulk Carriers and Oil Tankers, along with amendments to Chapter II-1. The new SOLAS regulation II-1/3-10 will apply to oil tankers and bulk carriers of 150m in length and above. It will require new ships to be designed and constructed for a specified design life and to be safe and environmentally friendly, in intact and specified damage conditions, throughout their life. Under the regulation, ships should have adequate strength, integrity and stability to minimize the risk of loss of the ship or pollution to the marine environment due to structural failure, including collapse, resulting in flooding or loss of watertight integrity.

Other SOLAS amendments entering into force on 1 January 2012:

A new SOLAS regulation II-1/3-11 on Corrosion protection of cargo oil tanks of crude oil tankers, to require all such tanks to be protected against corrosion, with related performance standards also adopted.

Also amendments to SOLAS regulation II-2/4.5.7 on Gas measurement and detection and to SOLAS regulation II-2/7.4.1 relating to fixed fire detection and fire alarm systems. Amendments to the International Code for Fire Safety Systems (FSS Code).

1 January 2012: Entry into force of June 2010 Manila amendments to STCW

Major revisions to the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (the STCW Convention), and its associated Code adopted at a Diplomatic Conference in Manila, the Philippines, held from 21 to 25 June 2010.

"The Manila amendments to the STCW Convention and Code" are aimed at bringing the Convention and Code up to date with developments since they were initially adopted in 1978 and further revised in 1995; and to enable them to address issues that are anticipated to emerge in the foreseeable future.

Amongst the amendments adopted, there are a number of important changes to each chapter of the Convention and Code, including:

Improved measures to prevent fraudulent practices associated with certificates of competency and strengthen the evaluation process (monitoring of Parties' compliance with the Convention);
Revised requirements on hours of work and rest and new requirements for the prevention of drug and alcohol abuse, as well as updated standards relating to medical fitness standards for seafarers;
New certification requirements for able seafarers;
New requirements relating to training in modern technology such as electronic charts and information systems (ECDIS);
New requirements for marine environment awareness training and training in leadership and teamwork;
New training and certification requirements for electro-technical officers;
Updating of competence requirements for personnel serving on board all types of tankers, including new requirements for personnel serving on liquefied gas tankers;
New requirements for security training, as well as provisions to ensure that seafarers are properly trained to cope if their ship comes under attack by pirates;
Introduction of modern training methodology including distance learning and web-based learning;
New training guidance for personnel serving on board ships operating in polar waters; and
New training guidance for personnel operating Dynamic Positioning Systems.

1 January 2014: Entry into force of 2010 October MARPOL amendments

Revised MARPOL Annex III Regulations for the prevention of pollution by harmful substances carried by sea in packaged form adopted in order for changes to the Annex to coincide with the next update of the mandatory International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code, specifying that goods should be shipped in accordance with relevant provisions.
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