Seattle Mariners Musings

The .400 Solution

2012-02-03T04:30:00.000-08:00

Yesterday, I wrote about the .400 problem. Really, I wrote about a growing issue in baseball: some of the most optimal baseball strategies are also the most boring. As much as the Yankees-Red Sox marathons are chastised by baseball fans for their unwatchability (<- new word right there), the reality is that they play with superior strategy. Other teams ought to copy their ways to win more games.

How has baseball come to this? Has it always been more advantageous to do boring things?

To a degree, I think that things like walks and less risky base-running have been undervalued for much of baseball history. Only recently, statisticians have analyzed the game, and provided the hard evidence for superior strategies that Moneyball made famous. Knowledge is power, and there is no turning back once knowledge has been acquired. So, baseball is where it is at this point, for better and for worse.

That's not the whole story though. Or, at least, I think there is more to the story. There is a reason this post is called the .400 solution.

There is an equipment change that I think could be made that both would not be revolutionary, and also alter strategy more in favor of contact. Major League Baseball needs to give some critical thought to baseball mitts.

The evolution of defense is rarely discussed, even though it is striking. Take a look at some of these mitts. Vintage images are from Baseball Glove Collector.com:

One of Honus Wagner's mitts, Hall of Fame shortstop that played from 1897-1917

One of Mickey Mantle's mitts, Hall of Fame outfielder that played from 1951-1968

A modern Rawlings baseball mitt

The evolution is obvious. Fielding, way back in the late 1800s, was typically a bare-handed affair. It's pretty easy to see that mitts started as glorified mittens, and have progressively developed deeper pockets between the thumb and index finger. They have also becoming much larger in general. The Rawling's glove above could probably completely swallow both Mantle's and Wagner's mitts. In addition, the basic fundamentals of a proper catch with a modern mitt (get it in the pocket) would be lucky to work with Honus Wagner's glove.

With constantly improving equipment, it seems safe to assume that defenders have become more sure-handed. Data backs that up. Here is a chart of MLB fielding percentages, by year, from 1901 (birth of the American League), through 2011:

Again, there is an unmistakable trend - defense is getting cleaner and cleaner. Granted, errors are rather subjective, so perhaps some of the variation is due to "inflation" in scoring decisions (a natural de-emphasis on errors). Potentially supporting that possibility is a fact already discussed earlier - BABIP has generally increased the past 70 years. However, it's hard for me to look at how fielding percentages have changed, along with how mitts have changed, and think the two aren't connected.

Using the least squares method, there is a 0.8 correlation between runs scored and BABIP. Going a step further, also using the least squares method, that suggests that 64% of the variation in runs scored is explained by BABIP. Intuitively, this makes very good sense - the data suggests that when more balls in play fall in, a team scores more runs.

In recent years, people have noticed that offense across the league has sunk considerably, and most point to the drop in home runs, which is usually attributed to the drop in steroid use. However, along with a drop in home runs, BABIP has also dropped notably in recent years. Using the same method I used to study BABIP suggests that home runs explain 16% of offensive variation. Arguably, BABIP has four times the impact on offense that home runs do. The rise in defensive efficiency the past few years does not get the credit it deserves for sinking offensive numbers.

I would like to see Major League Baseball impose new requirements on baseball mitts. I'd like to see what would happen if they shrunk, and didn't have quite as deep of pockets. Smaller mitts should make fielding more difficult, meaning a few more balls should fall in. It only takes 1 more ball out of 100 in play to jump a .290 BABIP up to .300. That's a small difference that goes a long way.

Hopefully, if hitters knew that fielding is more difficult, they would try to make contact more often. There would be more of an incentive to make contact. That would help make games a little more exciting to watch.

On the flip side, pitchers might pitch for strikeouts more often if they know their defense can't help them out as much. That might lead to more walks and heavier bullpen use, which would make games worse to watch.

Perhaps no change is needed at all. Baseball naturally ebbs and flows. The way to keep a defense from shifting into bizarre configurations is by hitting to all fields. "Pure" hitters will likely become a more desired commodity as defenses ruthlessly punish hitters with optimal positioning. Pitchers and defenses have learned how to turn uppercut strokes against hitters. At some point, hitters will find ways to turn today's cutting-edge advantages into weaknesses.

However, knowledge is power, and there is no turning back from what we know about how to play the game most efficiently at this point. Pitchers and defenses have never been better at manipulating balls in play for their advantage, and they still have room to improve (and most likely will). Hitters can only adjust so much when defensive equipment continues to aid defenders better, and also when pitchers and defenders know every hitting tendency and weakness better than ever before.

I'm not so sure ebbs and flows can counteract quantum leaps in understanding. Major League Baseball should look at ways to make contact a little more hopeful and worthwhile. Mitt dimensions are an underrated place to start. More mitts are involved in baseball plays than bats, yet it is the lumber that is more restricted.

It is in the game's best interest to make more exciting strategies also the best ways to win. Maybe smaller mitts would make hitters pursue a .400 batting average a little harder, and allow for some captivating runs at the mark. Bottom line, baseball would be better with a little more contact in it.

The .400 Problem

2012-02-02T04:30:00.000-08:00

Photo via Baseball Collection on Flickr

The last player to bat .400 remains Ted Williams, back in 1941, when he hit .406. That says something about how impossible batting .400 is. However, consider this: the highest BABIP since 1980 belongs to Jose Hernandez, when he hit .404 on balls in play in 2002.

BABIP removes all strikeouts and home runs. It only considers balls in play that stay on the playing field. If a player can't post a .400 BABIP, there is virtually no hope of them batting .400 straight up. There are debates from time to time about if anyone will hit .400 again, and it sure looks impossible to me in today's game.

There are several theories as to why .400 isn't threatened in today's game. The revolution of bullpens makes some sense. Better scouting would make sense too. The lack of segregation, as well as the explosion of international players in today's game, could perhaps play a role. Baseball has expanded substantially since Williams hit .400 also. Maybe the proliferation of teams across the nation has something to do with it.

In general, many of the most intuitively plausible arguments have something to do with the nature of the game itself changing drastically. If that were the case, it would seem reasonable to expect that BABIP across the board has sunk since Williams batted .400. Interestingly, that simply is not true. The league-wide BABIP in 1941, when Williams batted .406, was .280. In 2002, when Hernandez posted a .404 BABIP, the league posted a .296 BABIP. In fact, as the following graph shows, BABIP league-wide has generally been increasing the past 60 years:

How come nobody hits .400, even in environments that at first blush should be more conducive to high batting averages?

The simplest answer is that fewer balls go into play. There are good arguments that pitching to contact is important, but great pitchers have the stuff to generate whiffs when needed. Strikeouts have always been a part of the game, but not at the frequency we see today. A generation ago, 100 strikeouts in a season was a mark of shame for a hitter. Now, hardly anyone blinks at that rate. In fact, the 9 highest single-season strikeout totals in MLB history have come since 2007. Furthermore, 25 of the top 50 single-season totals are owned by current players, and 55 of the top 100. Neither of those totals count players such as Sammy Sosa and Richie Sexson either, who show up on the list rather frequently, and did not retire all that long ago.

I doubt anyone would say that strikeouts are desirable, but they are certainly more permissible in today's game than ever before. It probably should not be too surprising, because sabermetrics have revealed the value in home runs and working deep into counting. A negative consequence of gearing hitting more towards both of those strategies is an increase in strikeouts. That's only exacerbated by the heavier usage of bullpens, and the realization that pitchers are often more effective in shorter stints.

Add it all up, and the average baseball game today is longer, and features less contact. What is strategically advantageous creates a product that is aesthetically inferior. A good game is a bad game, and I'm far from the first person to notice this problem. Tom Verducci wrote a piece about this issue over a year ago in Sports Illustrated.

Since Verducci's 2010 article, things have only gotten worse. Strikeouts are still a huge part of the game, but there are indications that defense is figuring out how to convert more balls into play into outs. For starters, the cutter continues to become more and more popular. The secret in its effectiveness for most pitchers is that it's harder to square up, as evidenced by a BABIP a full 40 points lower than the average for all pitches. Unlike many other pitches, it's not that hitters are prone to missing it; rather, they are prone to making weak contact.

On top of that, the information age has erupted across baseball, thanks to more advanced fielding data, and the iPad. It's getting harder to hit 'em where they ain't, because "they" know where the hits are most likely to go. The Rays are making a living off of this, and concocting odd (for now) alignments, but with great results. Other teams are bound to catch on, just like they did when they realized the Athletics cobbled together effective offenses on the cheap during their "Moneyball" era.

Given what teams know about offensive strategies now, and how it is getting progressively harder to get a ball to drop in for a hit, what incentive is there for hitters to make more contact? What's stopping hitters from going for home runs even more? Isn't that the logical direction for most hitters to go, given how pitching and defense is evolving? As much as Yankees-Red Sox marathon contests are loathed by baseball fans, that's the type of game baseball is most likely heading towards in the future, barring some sort of significant change.

I like how mystical the .400 batting average feels. It's one of those numbers that makes baseball seem so magical. There have been some serious runs at the number within memory too. Larry Walker batted .379 in 1999. Tony Gwynn batted .394 in 1994, and perhaps would have cracked .400 that season if not for the strike. We'll never know. John Olerud batted .363 in 1993, but flirted with .400 until a slump at the end of the season. George Brett batted .390 in 1980, and much like Olerud, slumped right at the end of the season.

However, even with the most contemporary close calls, there are none in the past decade. I do not think that is a coincidence. The game has evolved, and the .400 hitter could very well be dead. Maybe that's the price of progress, but to me it doesn't feel much like progress. The death of .400 batting averages might be a symptom to a problem.*

*You, the astute Musings reader, might have already thought of this, but there's a reasonable statistical explanation for the phenomena of rising BABIP rates without players even having high enough individual BABIPs to make a run at .400. Baseball's globalization has expanded the available talent pool without the league expanding. If the pool has really increased without more job openings, then an even slimmer sliver of the cream of the crop is making the majors (assuming the ceiling on talent hasn't gone up with expansion of the pool, just the amount of elite talent available). As a result, it would be reasonable to expect less variation in player talent, and thus less variation between the best and worst seasons from individual players. .400 averages have always been wild exceptions, and maybe the talent gaps between players are just too small these days to allow for such anomalies. Personally, I think this is a factor, but there's still an issue with how unaesthetic walks and strikeouts are.

Winning will always be the most important thing in any sport, but any fan intuitively feels a difference between victories. Envision a walk-off win. What do you dream of seeing? A walk-off balk? A walk-off hit-by-pitch? Those are victories (even in the final at-bat!) but they feel anti-climactic. They simply aren't as pleasing as other ways to win games (home runs and suicide squeezes, to name a few).

Major League Baseball needs to wake up and realize that the game is trending towards a place where the most strategically sound outcomes are also some of the most boring things to watch. What's a team to do? "Look good" and lose, or clock marathon contests, rife with pitching changes and hitters watching balls and strikes alike whiz by, and win? The product will be better if there are more incentives for teams to strive for more exciting outcomes.

Today's post was about identifying a problem. Tomorrow will be about my crack at a solution. I welcome your solutions in the comments thread though.

Top Rated Future

2012-01-28T09:03:00.000-08:00

Yesterday, Baseball America posted its first list of top 10 prospects for the 2012 season. According to them, the best set of 10 in all of baseball belongs to...the Seattle Mariners. This is more than a feather in the franchise's cap. It is validation of the team's process.

As the BA article briefly touches on, 2011 did not look all that much different from 2010 in some sobering ways. The M's still couldn't generate offense, and largely because of that they lost a ton of games.

However, the turnover on the roster was staggering. Nearly a whole roster's worth of rookies (18 to be more precise) played for the Mariners last year. Teams talk about getting younger every year, particularly when they are out of the pennant chase, but few commit to it like the Mariners did. When you think about it, the Mariners almost fielded an entire roster's worth of players that had never played in the majors before.

With that said, it's really quite easy to get younger. Any team could do it. All a team has to do is call up a bunch of minor-leaguers. Heck, the Mariners could have signed me to a contract and said they were getting younger!

*Though maybe not. I've got to get used to being "old." I just turned 25, though 2011 would have been my age 24 season. I'd be sinking on prospect lists at this point :(

Younger rarely means better, because inexperienced players in hyper-competitive arenas like the sports world generally have to learn their lessons the hard way. Getting younger comes with the promise of getting better though, and that's the real trick. Will the young talent be something some day?

It's hard to believe things are going in the right direction when a team more or less exhibits the same problems two years in a row. I remember listening to Jack Z on some post-game radio shows last year, and he was adamant about growing from within (which he has been since day one on the job), and increasingly said that the home-grown talent was close.

Jack Zduriencik hasn't been pulling a fast one on us. Baseball America agrees. The talent is good, and it is close.

Baseball America is an independent scouting agency. It has no vested interest in pumping up or undermining the value of any team's prospects. They over and underrate scores of players every year, but not due to biases against teams. If I had the time to sit down with their prospect handbook, I bet I would disagree on hundreds (if not thousands) of their evaluations, but that's baseball. Really, that's life. The difference would be a difference of opinions. If anyone were to come in with a bias for against teams, I'd bet that I would be the more likely person.

I digress. More importantly, the Mariners front office has preached the value of building within, and asserted to the fan base that there is good talent brewing in the farm system. Now, a group of scouts completely independent of the Mariners, after evaluating all of Major League Baseball, picked the M's top 10 prospects as better than anyone else's top 10. That's powerful validation of what we have been hearing.

Ultimately, talking about prospects is really about the hopes and dreams of a better tomorrow. The future doesn't always pan out quite as planned. In fact, it rarely does. It's not as if the Mariners are all of a sudden in a better position to compete now that Baseball America has bestowed high praise on their farm system.

There are good and bad signs though. I always thought it was ominous when Carlos Silva signed his mega-deal seemingly before the ink dried on the contract proposal. If Z's plan of building within really is working, we should expect these prospect rankings by outside organizations to be high before the Mariners really start winning games.

In the end, the Mariners are going to have to win some games for this whole process to be a success. However, to date, things line up. When Jack Zduriencik asks for patience, I'm still willing to give it to him and the Mariners. Whether there are better days ahead for the franchise is yet to be seen, but a growing mass of people believe those days are coming.

Posting Fees

2012-01-20T08:30:00.000-08:00

Tokyo Dome
(image courtesy eyeonjapan.com)

I'm too late to really say much about the Rangers signing Yu Darvish that hasn't already been said. I'm okay with that. I want to try to come up with some method to quantify what a reasonable posting fee is, but I still haven't come up with anything. Leave something in the comment thread if you have an idea. I'm all ears.

Instead of continuing to feel like I'm hurling myself against a brick wall, I'm going to go in a different direction.

Darvish just signed a 6-year, $60 million deal as a 25-year-old. Much is being made of the $100+ million package the Rangers spent on him, including the posting fee (and much should be made of that), but let's pause and let that $60 million total sink in. Even though there's a good chance that Darvish is worth more than $60 million over the life of the deal, that's still a chunk of change that 25-year-olds rarely get in Major League Baseball.

Engrained in MLB's economic system is a ruthless method for underpaying good, young players. A player must play five or six seasons in the majors before they are a free agent, where they in theory will make fair market value. Without any competition in the open market, there is no incentive for teams to give players much beyond the league minimum. There is an arbitration process after two or three years, but even that works mostly as a system to gradually escalate a player's annual salary up to what they would earn in an open market. While arbitration gets a player closer to their true value, it is also a system built to underpay good, young talent.

Even though MLB's payscale is clearly unfair to young players, there's not much motivation to change it. MLB owners certainly aren't opposed to underpaying for talent, and the most influential leaders in the MLBPA will always be established veterans, who are also beneficiaries of this system. Plenty of players do not last six years in the majors, meaning there are less players available in the open market. That should increase competition for available players, which drives up their price. On top of that, teams have more money available to spend that they would not have otherwise if they had to pay younger players something closer to their market value.

Yu Darvish is a good, young talent, if you couldn't guess where this post might be going already. You can also probably guess the question I'm about to pose: would Darvish have a 6-year, $60 million deal right now if he had started his career in America?

If Darvish had been in America from day one of his professional career, he would have had to crack the majors at 19 years old to have hit free agency in this off-season. That's not impossible (just ask guys like Adrian Beltre, Felix Hernandez, B.J. Upton, and Justin Upton), but it's not very common. For a little more perspective consider this: as much as Taijuan Walker's prospect status continues to rise, he would have to make his MLB debut this year to hit the bigs at 19 years old.

We'll never know if Darvish could have been one of these extreme exceptions, but I highly doubt it. It would have required Darvish to be drafted as a high schooler (which he totally could have been with his talent), and make it through a minor league system in a year. Even though King Felix arrived on the scene at 19, his pro career started at 17. He took around two years to go through the M's minor league system, and that doesn't count time in the Mariners academy in Venezuela before (and after) he officially signed.

However, even if Darvish would not have been a free agent at this point in his hypothetical MLB career, perhaps he could have leveraged the arbitration system into a deal like the one he received. How likely would that have been?

King Felix is once again an obvious comparison. The Mariners bought out two of his arbitration years, and three free agent years*, when they inked him to his current five-year deal. Even though Felix did not hit free agency, he earned $10 million in a season for the first time in his career in 2011, his age 25 season. We've already gone through the problems with comparing Hernandez and Darvish though.

*This is the new trick to play with young players. It doesn't make sense to sign any young player to a long-term contract unless some free agent years are bought out. The arbitration system is that good at underpaying them. By the way, Felix's salary almost doubles this season, which happens to coincide with what would have been his first season on the open market.

Another interesting comparison to make is Tim Lincecum. He made the majors at 23 years old, a more realistic age for Darvish to hypothetically make it. If anyone could break the bank in arbitration, it should be Lincecum, considering he entered the process after winning back-to-back Cy Young awards. Ultimately, he and the Giants avoided arbitration when they agreed to a 2 year, $23 million deal. Lincecum got $8 million the first year, $13 million the second, and a $2 million signing bonus.

In the end, Tim Lincecum first earned $10 million in a season in 2011, his age 27 season. That's two years older than Darvish is right now, and Lincecum signed his contract immediately after winning back-to-back Cy Young awards. So, Darvish would have theoretically had to accomplish even more at a younger age than Lincecum to get more than $10 million at 25 years old, which is what he just got in his deal with the Rangers.

Simply put, it is very difficult to dial up a scenario where Yu Darvish earns $10 million in 2012, much less $60 million over 6 years, if he had started his career in the United States. I'm tempted to even say that it is impossible. This leads to an interesting conclusion: Yu Darvish probably increased his earning potential by starting his career in Japan.

What's stopping an American born player from pulling the same trick?

The new CBA clamped down on draft spending a ton. Draftees can only be signed to minor league deals now, with accompanying signing bonuses, and the bonus pool a team has at its disposal is now restricted too. With guaranteed minor league deals, every prospect will earn league minimum for at least their first couple years of service, and likely their first three years.

To date, Stephen Strasburg has received the biggest signing bonus of all-time. It was worth $8 million, and he also signed an MLB deal. Let's say under the new system that the top pick signs for an $8 million bonus, and opens up their first full season in pro baseball on the opening day roster for their MLB team. This should be a ridiculous scenario that overestimates how much any draft pick can make with the way the CBA is structured now.

This theoretical player would earn roughly $9.5 million their first three years in professional baseball ($8 million from the signing bonus, and then $500,000 in base salaries, although some teams give nominal raises to players after each season).

Wily Mo Pena, this offseason, signed in Japan for 2 years and around $5 million. Former MLB outfielder Matt Murton made around $1.5 million in Japan last year. There's some money to be made in Japanese baseball.

What would happen if some Japan team offered the next Gerrit Cole a 4-year, $15 million contract? That's way beyond the money that Wily Mo signed for, but I'll come back to why it still might be a financial windfall in the end for a Japanese team. For an MLB team to offer a contract worth similar value, they would have to offer at least a $12-$13 million signing bonus, which would likely leave them with literally no money to sign any other draft picks. No MLB team could do that.

A Japanese team could make a potential fortune off of a deal like this for a top American prospect. To start with, a polished college player could probably step into a small role in Japan, and at least be okay, and quickly develop into a really good starter. Even if that's not enough production to justify $15 million, it doesn't matter. A Japanese team could put the prospect up for a posting fee before their contract expires. Certainly, some baseball team would give up at least $15 million to talk to a 23 or 24-year-old Gerrit Cole, even if they only had mild success in Japan.

Consider this: what if a guy like Gerrit Cole went over to Japan and absolutely dominated? Maybe he could with his huge fastball. Whatever team he plays for would have a star they could anchor a championship run around, and on top of that they would get a massive return on the posting fee. Maybe it would be hard for fans to say goodbye, but they already face that issue with current stars like Darvish. How crazy is it that a team could end up getting a superstar for less than free?

Going to Japan makes sense from the prospect's perspective too. Not only could they make more money in Japan for a few years than they would under MLB's rules, but they would then be signed to an MLB deal after getting posted, or simply leaving in international free agency. They wouldn't go to the majors and earn the league minimum; they would get $4 or $8 or $10 million, or whatever, depending on how good teams think they are. It certainly would be more than $500,000. Plus, their MLB career would barely be shortened, if at all. The years spent in Japan would be ones that they likely spend in the minor leagues anyway. Maybe if Dustin Ackley had gone to Japan he would have been posted this offseason, and missed out on three months in the majors. For his trouble, maybe he would have earned one and a half times the money he has so far, and I bet he would get more than the $1.5 million or so he is due in 2012.

There is a catch to all this (there's always a catch). Not many prospects would really profile as candidates to benefit from a jump overseas. The Japanese leagues are really good. The talent level might be somewhere between AAA and the majors. It would take an advanced college prospect, or high school phenom, to likely be respectable enough from the start of their pro career to survive in Japan. I think the most likely candidates are the ones that have been able to grab MLB contracts straight out of the draft - we are talking about guys like Danny Hultzen, Dustin Ackley, Anthony Rendon, Matt Purke, and Stephen Strasburg. The vast majority of draftees would still sign straight out of the draft, and report to rookie ball.

However, the exceptions would be very high profile. If enough of them didn't sign, resentment towards the current system could develop.

What would stop advanced amateurs from going overseas? Does some Japanese team have the guts to approach a top American prospect? Would that prospect have the guts to turn down an MLB team, especially as a top draft pick, to go to Japan? It would be a monumental deal if it happened. Maybe the sheer audacity of it all will keep it from happening.

You don't think that Scott Boras noticed the Yu Darvish deal though?

Snow Day

2012-01-18T08:00:00.000-08:00

With snowmageddon 2012 dumping whatever it shall bring, today is a perfect day to talk about snow. What better day to remember one of the more unique series in Mariners history? I'm talking about the early-season showdown between the Mariners and Indians in 2007.

From Thursday, April 5 through Sunday, April 8, the Mariners were scheduled to play a 4-game series against the Indians in Cleveland. The entire series in Cleveland was snowed out, and neither team's season would be the same. As it turns out, rescheduling an entire four-game series is a nightmare in modern Major League Baseball.

Game one was made up on May 21, about a month and a half after the series was supposed to happen. The Mariners lost 5-2. Cha Seung Baek took the loss, while Tom Mastny got the win in relief for Cleveland. The Mariners didn't seem to have much of a chance with Baek facing CC Sabathia, but Baek arguably out-pitched CC until he was left in too long in the 7th inning (CC only lasted 5 innings, somehow scattering 8 hits to the tune of 1 run). Also somewhat noteworthy: the Mariners loaded the bases with no outs in the ninth inning, and came away with just one run.

Game two was made up on June 11. The Mariners won 8-7, plating the winning run in the top of the ninth inning, thanks to an RBI double from Raul Ibanez. In fact, Ibanez had a huge day, going 4 for 5 with 2 home runs, 5 RBIs, and finishing a single short of the cycle! Brandon Morrow came away with the victory with this gem of a pitching line: 2 innings, 3 hits, 4 walks, 1 strikeout, 1 run (earned).

It would be a while until the series continued - roughly two and half months, as it turns out. Game three was made up on August 30. The Mariners lost it in frustrating fashion, 6-5, in the bottom of the 9th on a walk-off walk.

Rick White was brought in with score tied in the 9th after Eric O'Flaherty got the first batter, Travis Hafner, to ground out, but then allowed a single to Victor Martinez and hit Ryan Garko with a pitch. White got his first batter, Jhonny Peralta, to fly out, meaning the Mariners were one out away from extra innings. However, White would then walk the next two batters he faced to force in the winning run.

The best part of all this? O'Flaherty still took the loss, since it was one of his baserunners that scored.

O'Flaherty is still getting the last laugh though. He posted a 0.98 ERA with Braves last year, playing a prominent role in their bullpen. White only recorded 2 more outs in the majors after that meltdown in Cleveland.

The last game of the snowed-out series was played on September 26, in Seattle, at Safeco Field. The Mariners were designated the home team, but batted first. It was the closest thing the M's had to a road game at home until they legitimately were this past year, thanks to a U2 concert in Miami.*

*Really, isn't it more amazing that the Mariners have been involved in multiple scenarios that involved road games being moved to Safeco Field?

The Indians clobbered the Mariners in the final game, 12-4, mainly on the strength of an 8-run 3rd inning. Ryan Fiereband couldn't escape the frame, and Jorge Campillo didn't exactly limit the damage before finishing it. The Indians, as a team, hit for the cycle in the inning, and threw in another double and four singles for good measure. Most of the time, walks and errors add gas to a bad inning, but that wasn't the case here. In fact, there were no walks, hit batters, or errors. Cleveland just wailed away.

Perhaps most impressive (or embarrassing) is that every run in the inning came with 2 outs. *sigh*

Three other novel notes from the game:

The Mariners used 3 pitchers in the game (including the starter), and each of them went 2.2 innings.
Jeff Clement got his first MLB hit, a pinch-hit double. At the time, it seemed like it might be a sign of things to come, and to a degree it was. Clement has hit 13 more MLB doubles since then!
Wladimir Balentien hit his first MLB home run. At the time, it seemed like it might be a sign of things to come, and to a degree it was. Balentien hit 14 more dingers in the majors before going to Japan!

Ultimately, the Mariners lost 3 of 4 games in the "series," getting outscored 30-19. Some fun facts from the 4 games as a whole:

7 Mariners played in all 4 games (Adrian Beltre, Willie Bloomquist, Ben Broussard, Jose Guillen, Ichiro, Kenji Johjima, and Jose Lopez).
4 Indians played in all 4 games (Travis Hafner, Ryan Garko, Victor Martinez, and Grady Sizemore).
Willie Bloomquist played second base, shortstop, left field, designated hitter, and pinch ran over the course of the 4 games.
Willie Bloomquist also went 0 for 6 with 4 strike outs in the series (but he did get a walk, and even scored a run).
Mariners hitters combined for 5 walks over the 4 games. The Indians accumulated 18.
Cha Seung Baek started 2 of the 4 games for the Mariners.

I had forgotten how frustratingly entertaining the 2007 Mariners were. They ended up winning 88 games, which means the 4 games I just talked about aren't the most representative sample of the season. However, in some ways, they totally are. The hitters never drew walks, and seemed to be equally adept at stranding runners in crucial situations. This was doubly frustrating when the bullpen came in and didn't throw strikes. The whole team seemed to be built for heart attacks, but somehow they pulled out way more games than they had business winning.

Of course, Bill Bavasi saw a contender where many others saw a fluke, and traded much of what turned out to be an already thin farm system for Erik Bedard. Oops.

If you've read through this whole post, and even killed time clicking on the oodles of links, I'm pretty sure enough snow has fallen at this point to make a snowman, or at least a snow angel. Go out and enjoy yourself.

The Somewhat Shocking Pineda Trade

2012-01-15T08:00:00.000-08:00

Maybe this is finally the deal that convinces the national media that the Mariners will not trade Felix Hernandez.

Michael Pineda and Jose Campos are both gone, to the Yankees for Jesus Montero and Hector Noesi. The deal involves lots of young, talented blood, which makes it the kind of deal that stings for both teams.

The upside for the Yankees is clear. They already had offense, but coupled that with a shaky rotation. If Pineda has any sort of legitimate encore to his rookie campaign, the Yankees are in good shape to contend for a world championship. I wrote a post on Pineda back in May, when he was emerging as a force. I stand by my words I wrote back then.

Campos is a loss that could make the Mariners look bad. He's still young, and a young pitcher to boot, but he looks like he is going to be quite good. The Yankees might have just acquired a decade worth of talent in the front end of their rotation.

The Mariners definitely got some talent in return though.

Hector Noesi feels like a throw-in, but Dave Cameron wrote up an intriguing (or maybe calming is a better word?) profile on why he might be more than that. I am curious to see how he does, and I'm certainly pulling for him. As much as I like Campos, there is something to be said for certainty. Campos is still at least a couple years away from the majors, if not farther. He is still all potential, while Noesi has already tasted some success in the majors. History suggests that there is a real chance that Noesi turns out to be a more productive pitcher than Campos ever is. One of my general rules of thumb is that the more certain/immediate asset is the more valuable one, so Campos's ceiling has to be higher to be worth as much in a trade. If Noesi really is a solid fourth or fifth starter, that means Campos has to project as a front-line starter to make this part of the deal even. That's a high bar. It's not a gimme.

With that said, the centerpiece of the deal is clearly Jesus Montero. The Mariners finally got a big bat, and it's one that could be a legitimate long-term solution to boot. Montero comes with his liabilities though, mostly on the defensive end. I personally see him as a designated hitter, who can play first base if necessary. The consensus is that his defense at catcher leaves much to be desired, and the toll catching takes on a body wears down hitting skills. Why keep Montero at a position he's not that good at, especially when it will erode his best skills more quickly? One reason catcher is a "premium position" is because guys with big-time tools like Montero are moved to positions where those tools will last. The pain of keeping him at catcher is not worth the gain.

One way or another, the acquisition of Montero seems to officially take the Mariners out of the Prince Fielder sweepstakes (though faithful readers of the Musings already knew the M's wouldn't sign Fielder). In my eyes, Fielder and Montero even have similar skillsets - both of them have all their value tied up in their bats, even to the point that their bats have to compensate for defensive shortcomings.

Presumably, 2012 will be Montero's first full year in the majors, and he will be 22 years old. That happens to be the same age when Fielder broke through. He wasn't Prince Fielder quite yet as a rookie, but still pretty good. His OPS was over .800, and in his second season it went over 1.000.

Could Montero follow a similar track to Fielder? You be the judge, based on their cumulative minor league track records:

	Prince Fielder	Jesus Montero
Plate Appearances	1,929	2,058
Walks	237	159
Strikeouts	320	337
Home Runs	91	76
AVG	.297	.308
OBP	.398	.366
SLG	.524	.501
SB-CS	24-17	2-1

One significant thing worth noting is that Montero spent an additional year in AAA than Fielder. In general, Montero was pushed through the minors quicker than Fielder, and so it is fair to say that Montero's numbers might look better if he had been brought along at Fielder's pace.

Still, even without considering Montero's more aggressive path through the minors, his numbers do not look terribly different than Fielder's. There are some concerns over his contact rate, but I don't see them. What I do see is a relative lack of walks. However, hitters young for their league tend to walk less and strikeout more. As Montero figures out MLB pitching, he might develop a bit better eye.

I would argue that Montero is a better pure hitter than Prince Fielder, but shockingly enough, I'd also say that Fielder is the better athlete.

The biggest difference in Montero and Fielder's minor league careers is in stolen bases. Prince Fielder attempted a surprising number of steals. It's a good thing he has knocked that off in the majors, but steals are an underrated way to measure athleticism and/or baseball instincts. Decent athletes with good baseball IQs tend to steal bases, and it's only at the highest levels where that's no longer enough to keep swiping bags (that takes tremendous athleticism, and/or a terrific baseball IQ).

Even though Jesus Montero looks like a better athlete than Prince Fielder, he isn't. Montero's lack of steals is why he's a designated hitter for me. Not only should he be moved off of catcher to preserve his best talents, but I wonder if he has the athleticism to be a quality defender anywhere.

Overall, this trade stings. How couldn't it? The Mariners gave up some home-grown talent. Losing Pineda is particularly tough, because he was no longer a prospect. His dominance was a reality. We saw it, and it was awesome.

However, it takes talent to get talent in a trade. If Pineda does not develop his off-speed offerings, he could have a pretty short prime. Most pitchers do not maintain velocity at his level for a long period of time. Campos is still a teenager. While the Mariners traded talent, they traded volatile talent.

In return, the Mariners acquired in many ways safer bets. While it is true that Jesus Montero does not have the MLB experience that Pineda does, he's still a bat, and bats are stabler commodities than arms. They just are. On top of that, Noesi is a surer arm than Campos, simply because Noesi already is in the majors, and was at least decent in his first year in the majors.

My gut reaction was that the Yankees got the better end of this trade, and truth be told, I still think that. I've trended more towards the middle though. The Yankees clearly got more upside, but that's not the whole story. The Mariners clearly got more certainty. They also got a bat, and maybe the best young bat in the game. James Paxton, Danny Hultzen, and Taijuan Walker should make it easier to move on without Pineda sooner rather than later too. If this wasn't the trade to make, then what was the trade worth making?*

*Meant to be a rhetorical question, but I do have an answer: the Reds package for Mat Latos would have been that deal for me. It's one reason I still think the Yankees are the winners of the Pineda trade. Pineda should be worth more than Latos in my book, and I do not think the Mariners got more from the Yankees than what the Padres got from the Reds.

The trade the M's and Yankees pulled off is not a feel-good trade. No trade is going to feel good when it involves losing Michael Pineda and Jose Campos. However, it was a necessary trade. The Mariners desperately needed some hitting, and now they have some semblance of balance on their roster for the first time in years. I still do not like the trade, but I probably disliked even more the thought of going into 2012 with the same bunch of hitters from 2011. Something had to be done, and something was done.

Mariners Will Not Sign Prince Fielder

2012-01-09T08:30:00.000-08:00

Prince Fielder (photo by Steve Paluch, Flickr)

There is a strong argument that Prince Fielder to the Mariners is a natural fit, maybe even the most natural fit in baseball at this point. The only other seemingly obvious teams are the Nationals and Rangers (though the Rangers keep saying they aren't interested, and Yu Darvish is going to be a huge investment, so Texas is probably telling the truth). Certainly, no team could use Fielder's power more than the Mariners, and it probably doesn't hurt that Jack Zduriencik was the guy that scouted him when Milwaukee drafted him.

With that said, it dawned on me this week why the Mariners are not going to sign Prince Fielder.

The reason is as simple as a 73-page aluminum-plated binder. Scott Boras always makes "educational" binders for his top clients when they hit free agency, and Prince Fielder was far from an exception. Boras handed Fielder's binder out to several different folks in baseball, but in my estimation, the book is really directed at owners.

Here's the deal: MLB front offices put their own price tags on all players. They find a way to calculate how much money they are willing to pay in posting fees for Japanese players. They are certainly more than capable of sticking a price tag on a premier free agent. I highly doubt that anything Scott Boras points out in a shiny binder would significantly alter a front office's assessment of a player.

The same cannot be said of owners. They care about the on-field product, but sports is a big business now. Owners become owners by making lots of money, and making lots of money tends to involve business sense. Scott Boras understands this, and understands that the way to unlock a team's deepest pockets is through wooing its owner. The argument for big bucks is built upon a player's value as an asset to the franchise, which encompasses more than production on the field. It includes a player's "it" factor, generated quite a bit by talent, but also by career milestones, personality, marketing potential, etc.

That's how Scott Boras comes up with 73 pages about Prince Fielder. That's also why the Mariners are an unlikely fit.

Who would be wooed in the Mariners leadership? The owner is in Japan. Howard Lincoln is CEO, and acts to a degree like the team's owner...but he still is not. Hiroshi Yamauchi is, and he lives in Japan, and has never even seen the Mariners play (though perhaps that changes this spring when the M's open up the season in Japan).

That's worth re-stating. The Mariners owner has never even seen the team play.

I don't think any front office in baseball will negotiate the deal that Scott Boras seeks for Prince Fielder. They might technically, but I would be surprised if the contract does not at least include a strong nudge or endorsement from ownership.

As a mildly related aside, the ownership issue is why the Cubs were never a Fielder candidate once Theo Epstein was hired. Cubs owner Tom Ricketts had to give Theo Epstein total control of baseball operations, especially right out of the gate, to get him. Epstein came out and said he would make the Cubs a "scouting and player development machine." Clearly, Theo was not going to spend an exorbitant amount on Fielder, and Ricketts was not going to influence Epstein either. Much like the Mariners, the Cubs were a great fit for Fielder on the diamond, but a bad fit off of it.

For the Mariners, the nudge to sign Fielder clearly would not come from their owner. It would have to come from Howard Lincoln, or maybe Chuck Armstrong.

However, even if Lincoln wants the Mariners to sign Fielder, would he have enough of an urge to talk to both Zduriencik and Yamauchi? Would Lincoln be persuasive enough from his position to make the deal happen? Those are honest questions; I do not know what the dynamic is like between Lincoln and the rest of the Mariners leadership.

Still, my gut feeling is that whatever conversations the Mariners are having about Fielder do not look like the kind of conversations Scott Boras wants to generate. Boras has a knack for making teams feel like they need his top clients. Zduriencik never feels that he absolutely needs any player, and it is hard to envision anyone above Zduriencik in the M's front office feeling strongly about any individual player not already on the team.

So, where would the push for 8 years and $200 million (or whatever) come from in the M's leadership?

On the field, the M's and Prince Fielder are a natural fit. Off the field, they are an awkward one. The last time I checked, contracts are not signed at first base.

2012 BBA Hall of Fame Vote

2012-01-04T18:42:00.000-08:00

I posted my Hall of Fame ballot right before the new year. The results for the BBA vote are in. Barry Larkin and Jeff Bagwell made the cut. I am sad that Edgar Martinez did not, but he made a pretty strong showing. Click "continue reading" for the official release, complete with voting results:

BBA RECOMMENDS LARKIN, BAGWELL FOR HALL OF FAME

In the annual polling of members of the Baseball Bloggers Alliance, former Cincinnati Reds shortstop Barry Larkin and former Houston Astros first baseman Jeff Bagwell were recommended for induction to the Baseball Hall of Fame. This is the third year the organization has conducted this survey of the membership.

Larkin, a 12-time All-Star who fashioned an .815 OPS over 19 seasons, received the largest percentage of votes, being named on 84.25% of the 148 ballots cast. This is the highest percentage garnered by any player in the three years of BBA voting.

Bagwell, who hit 449 HR and had a .948 OPS in his 15 seasons in Houston, was selected on 115 ballots for a 78.77% rate. As with the official voting done by the Baseball Writers of America, a player must be named on 75% of the ballots to be recommended by the alliance.

Last year, the BBA recommended second baseman Roberto Alomar and pitcher Bert Blyleven, both of whom were inducted into Cooperstown during the summer. In 2010, no player reached the 75% mark in BBA balloting, the year that outfielder Andre Dawson was selected for the Hall by the baseball writers.

The Baseball Bloggers Alliance’s vote has no impact on the official vote taken by the Baseball Writers of America. However, the BBA has often been a predictor of major awards granted by the writers.

The final voting results are as follows:

Barry Larkin 84.25%
Jeff Bagwell 78.77%

Edgar Martinez 60.27%
Tim Raines 57.53%
Alan Trammell 44.52%
Mark McGwire 41.10%
Larry Walker 35.62%
Lee Smith 33.56%
Jack Morris 32.19%
Don Mattingly 29.45%
Rafael Palmerio 28.77%
Fred McGriff 28.08%
Dale Murphy 16.44%
Bernie Williams 11.64%
Juan Gonzalez 6.16%
Javy Lopez 2.74%
Brad Radke 2.05%
Tim Salmon 1.37%
Bill Mueller 0.68%
Phil Nevin 0.68%
Ruben Sierra 0.68%
Tony Womack 0.68%
Jeromy Burnitz 0.00%
Vinny Castilla 0.00%
Brian Jordan 0.00%
Terry Mulholland 0.00%
Eric Young 0.00%

The Baseball Bloggers Alliance was established in the fall of 2009 for the purpose of fostering collaboration and communication among bloggers from across baseball. The BBA has quickly grown to its current membership of 347 blogs, including some of the most prominent blogs on the Internet, spanning all major league teams and various other general aspects of the game.

More information about the BBA can be found at their website, baseballbloggersalliance.wordpress.com, or by contacting the founder and administrator of the organization, Daniel Shoptaw, at founder@baseballbloggersalliance.com.

2011 Mariners Connections

2012-01-03T08:30:00.000-08:00

On the personal/professional side, things are going to change significantly for me this year, and we will see how that impacts my blog posts (most importantly, my frequency). Regardless, one thing I hope to do is provide more data visualizations.

So, I'll kick off 2012 with the type of graphic that I hope to make a little more often. Just how connected are MLB teams these days? Let's take a look at the 2011 Mariners to get a feel for what modern baseball movement looks like:

Every player who appeared for the Mariners in 2011, and at some point of their career was in another organization, is visualized on the map. Blue dots are the 30 MLB teams. Red lines symbolize players that left at some point in 2011. Green lines indicate acquisitions. Brighter greens mean the move was more recent. More opaque lines are more direct. Click on the image for a larger view. More details after the jump.

"Directness" is the degrees of separation from the move the Mariners used to acquire a player. For instance, Franklin Gutierrez was acquired from the Indians, but the Indians originally acquired him from the Dodgers. The Indians-Dodgers move is also represented on this map with a line, but one that is more transparent than the move that directly brought Guti to Seattle.

Some of the direct lines are thicker than others. The thicker ones are for trades that involved multiple players that appeared for the 2011 Mariners. Now, on to a few thoughts about this graphic.

First of all, Seattle is the ideal baseball team to do this type of visualization with. Since no teams are geographically close, there is plenty of room for connections to come into Seattle without covering up another city. A team like the Baltimore Orioles might have as many connections, but the lines would likely be shorter and more cluttered, thanks to their location.

Second, it is amazing to me how connected MLB teams are by player movement. Just using the 2011 Mariners roster alone, there were players that had been in every organization but Houston and Tampa Bay. I can't say it's a shame that the M's didn't have any former Astros on their 2011 roster, given their struggles. It is probably a shame that they had no Rays though.

Also, the notion of avoiding division rivals seems to be dead, to a degree. There are plenty of connections with other west coast teams, although many of them are indirect. Perhaps this is a sign that the Mariners are more familiar with division foes because they play them more often, and eventually those players are more prone to returning to the division once it does not take a direct trade with a division rival.

With that said, the 2011 Mariners also had a ton of connections to the Washington Nationals. I don't see any good reasons for the strong connections. They also did not have a player acquired directly from the Rockies, but quite a few who spent time at some point in the organization. Maybe there is no rhyme or reason at all to the connections.

There are connections though. No question about that.

2012 Hall of Fame Ballot

2011-12-28T08:30:00.000-08:00

This might be the last post of 2011, we'll see. I'm hoping that if I say enough times "this is the last post of 2011," the Mariners will make me look foolish by completing some big move. I also find it ironic that the last post of this year has next year in the title.

I digress. As a member of the Baseball Bloggers Alliance, I have the privilege of filling out a Hall of Fame ballot. It does not count in the real HOF vote, but it does count for the BBA voting. I am curious to see how my fellow BBA bloggers vote, and whom we would elect if we were the BBWAA.

I won't drone on and on about how I decide who is a Hall of Famer, but I do put some thought into my standards. I believe the Hall of Fame's primary function is to preserve what baseball looks like in its highest form. This generally means accumulating remarkable statistics, but that's not everything, as you will see with my ballot. More than anything, I see the hall as where we acknowledge and define what baseball at its best ought to look like.

Because I am a fan of transparency (and ready-made blog posts), here are the players voted yes for, in alphabetical order:

Jeff Bagwell - I don't think Bagwell did steroids, but even if he did, he stays on my ballot. I have written about steroids before. Long story short, I believe baseball was as juiced in the 1990s as anyone - and because of that, I also believe there were tons of juicers who did not reach the heights that the stars did. It's unfair to the 1990s to eradicate everything that happened. Bagwell should be in the hall, no doubt. He was too good for too long, and is synonymous with the Astros.
Barry Larkin - Larkin was the last guy I gave a yes to. He was right on the cusp for me. No single number pops off the page for me, but the total package for such a long time at shortstop is remarkable. He also was the face of the Reds for at least a decade, which counts for something.
Edgar Martinez - Edgar is, and likely will always be, my favorite player of all-time. I'm terribly biased here. I've written about how I feel designated hitters ought to be considered when thinking about the Hall of Fame, and Edgar stands the test for me. Plus, like it or not, the designated hitter is a part of baseball. Who epitomizes what a DH should be and can be more than Edgar Martinez? The designated hitter award is named after him. Enough said.
Mark McGwire - It's a shame that McGwire has been lowered and shamed so much for his steriod use. He still was the first man to hit 62 home runs, and I would argue that his epic home run race with Sammy Sosa stands as the most captivating baseball story of at least the past 20 years. I remember daily reports on the national news, updating all of the US on what was going on. As far as I'm concerned, McGwire and Sosa resuscitated baseball out of the post-lockout doldrums more than anyone else. Yeah, they were probably juiced, but those home runs still counted, and my Hall of Fame has no issue honoring the incredible amount of good that came out of the home run chase.
Dale Murphy - Peaks matter for me. Murphy didn't have as long of a career as most Hall of Famers, but his prime was incredible. He won back-to-back MVPs, and had five consecutive seasons where he was an All-Star, won a Gold Glove, and posted an OPS north of .800. In the early to mid-1980s, it is hard to argue there was a better player in baseball. That's a Hall of Fame stretch in my book.
Rafael Palmeiro - 3,000 hits, 500 home runs, and a positive test for steroids. By now, I doubt any of you reading this are surprised that Palmeiro is on my ballot. Palmeiro was always great, but also overshadowed by other first basemen of his generation (such as Bagwell and McGwire, already on this ballot). I remember being surprised as Palmeiro approached some of the impressive benchmarks that he achieved. He always seemed like a great player, but never an elite one. Still, Palmeiro's longevity, and friction-free swing, just nudge him onto my ballot. It was a close call.
Larry Walker - While Walker had some of his best seasons in one of the most prodigious launching pads of all-time (Coors Field in the 1990s) his numbers are just that ridiculous. He had three seasons where his OPS was over 1.100 (I swear that's not a typo). He has the magical .300/.400/.500 triple-slash for his career. Along with the sick hitting numbers, Walker played right field most of his career, and his cannon for an arm earned him six Gold Gloves. Injuries and some healthy Coors Field skepticism have dampened Walker's accomplishments, but he is still worthy of enshrinement.

Everyone has their own view of the Hall of Fame, and I don't ever want to see a formal definition for enshrinement. Much of the beauty of the Hall of Fame lies in the debates over individual players. This is where we figure out what baseball should be all about. I could have picked up to 10 players, but only these 7 were Hall of Famers this year, among the players eligible...at least in my eyes.

Gio Latest To Go

2011-12-23T11:32:00.000-08:00

image taken by deb roby on Flickr

I feel like I'm maintaining an A's blog right now. Another week, another mega deal involving the M's foes from the bay area. The latest sent shipping is LHP Gio Gonzalez, to the Nationals for RHP Brad Peacock, LHP Tom Milone, RHP A.J. Cole, and C Derek Norris.

Gonzalez, in my eyes, is a good but not great pitcher. That's not meant as a slam on him - good is good in my book. He has posted 3+ WAR the past 2 seasons. For me, on an ideal pitching staff, that's a number 3 starter. Gonzalez gets more than his fair share of strikeouts, which is nice, and his numbers across the board suggest that he is hard to square up. However, Gio also has a small penchant for walks, his biggest blemish. What I am interested to see is how Gio's move from a pitcher's park to a more neutral one will impact him. His home run rate allowed has been below league average, but perhaps that has more to do with the park than him. We'll have a better idea a year from now.

In return, the Athletics got an impressive quartet. Both Peacock and Milone got cups of coffee in the majors last season, and should compete for rotation spots this spring training. I remember watching Peacock in this year's MLB Futures game, and liking what I saw. I stand by my belief that he could be a dependable starter in the middle of a starting rotation. While I haven't seen Milone at all, his numbers continue to improve, even as he has been promoted to higher levels. He seems to be a bit of a late bloomer, and I wonder when his development will stop.

The gem of all the pieces might end up being A.J. Cole, but it is too early to tell. He is the youngest, but his 6'4" frame is what you look for in an ideal pitcher. He also had a high strikeout rate, and an impressively low walk rate for his age. While Cole is at least a couple years away, the upside is there. A hot start this spring will get him more in the national spotlight as a pitching prospect to watch out for.

Lastly, Derek Norris is the kind of "classic Moneyball" prospect the A's are fabled for since that book. Norris seems to hit for less and less average as he climbs the minor league ladder, but he walks a ton, and gets his share of dingers. For me, he looks like a bit like Braves backup David Ross, who I think is one of the more underrated backstops of the past five years. He could have been a solid everyday player in his prime, but never really got a chance.

Somewhere in the trio of arms the A's received, there is a replacement for Gio Gonzalez. That's the beauty of this deal - the A's got quality and quantity. Besides Cole, none of the players seem to have a chance to be great players, but in my estimation the A's also did not give up a great player. They gave up a good one, and got several good prospects in return.

The popular belief is that the Athletics are dismantling their team, and giving up on the season. To a degree, that is true. They weren't in much of a position to contend, even before the Angels and Rangers went ballistic in free agency. However, I wonder how much worse the A's are right now than they were at the start of the offseason.

It is true that Oakland has blown up its starting rotation, with Gio Gonzalez and Trevor Cahill being traded away. However, their contributions last year are getting overrated. Both were productive players, but they are replaceable. Moreover, the A's acquired pieces in the trades involving both of those players that could step in and replace them decently well this year. Statistically speaking, their best pitcher last year was Brandon McCarthy. Brett Anderson could conceivably put together a more healthy season, and if he does, he could easily replace any lost production. It's not hard to imagine the A's pitching staff being just as good next year as it was this year.

The places where there are real question marks for Oakland are on offense, particularly in the outfield. They've lost Josh Willingham and David DeJesus, two of their best everyday players. Their only replacement that they have acquired in the offseason is Collin Cowgill. There are issues on the offensive side, but their offense was bad already. How much worse can it get?

The Athletics aren't going to contend next year, but I won't be surprised if they are just about as good next year as they were last year, at least with the roster they have now. In the process, they have strengthened their farm system, and if they ever move to San Jose, they just might be able to lock some of their young talent one of these days.

What does this mean for the Mariners? Not much, probably. They should still be building towards the future around the young talent that Jack Zduriencik has acquired. However, the A's trades are good news, if anything. Young, team-controlled pitching is clearly a hot commodity on the trade market right now, and I doubt it's about to cool off. The Mariners are flush with young pitching at the moment, and the past month has made me secretly want the team to trade Michael Pineda. It's not that I don't like Pineda (far from it), but the returns on young pitchers are so good right now, and there are several promising arms not far away from the majors in the system.

It will be nice if/when the Mariners act more like the rest of the AL West, and make big moves. The Angels made their big splash in free agency. The Rangers just paid the biggest posting fee for a Japanese player ever. The Athletics have just about acquired a new top 10 prospect list for the farm system. The Mariners have added George Sherrill, as well as their usual assortment of minor league free agents. I'm a Sherrill fan, but the Mariners have been flying under the radar for long enough now.

Reds Acquire Latos

2011-12-17T18:28:00.000-08:00

Photo taken by SD Dirk on Flickr

The most significant trade of the offseason (to date) happened today. The Reds acquired RHP Mat Latos from the Padres for RHP Edinson Volquez, 1B Yonder Alonso, C Yasmani Grandal, and RHP Brad Boxberger. It's hard not to like this deal for both sides.

Cincinnati's end is quicker to write about, so I'll start there. Latos is a 24-year-old budding star. He's already good, and is young enough to think that he might become great. The mid-90s heat and 6'6" frame Latos possesses certainly make it easy to dream of greatness. Still, even if Latos is a finished product, he's an upgrade for Cincinnati. He is a bona fide top-of-the-rotation starting pitcher.

I doubt the Padres really wanted to give up Latos, but this was a trade they couldn't refuse.

Edinson Volquez is not as good as Mat Latos at this point, but he's got a chance to rebound in San Diego. He was a rebound candidate anyway. There's no getting around that Volquez hasn't been the same pitcher that busted out in 2008, but he is still just 28 years old, and his stats give reasons to believe a solid pitcher still lurks inside of him. Volquez's 5.71 ERA last season is very hard to stomach, but a shocking 20.7% of fly balls hit against him went for home runs. That's double the general league average, and double his career rate. That number was set to drastically sink in 2012 already, and factor in a move from The Great American Ballpark to Petco, and the home run rate could plummet. If Volquez can stay healthy, and log 150 innings or so, he will re-emerge as a good starter.

This trade certainly clouded the situation at first base in San Diego. Anthony Rizzo was a coveted prospect in the Adrian Gonzalez trade just a year ago, and he ought to still be a coveted prospect (even with his struggles in the majors this past season). The strength of his game is a powerful stroke, which is the prototypical tool teams like to find in a first baseman.

However, Petco Park is death to power hitters of all shapes and sizes. Personally, I think Alonso's game is built well for Petco, and the Padres are better with him at first base. Alonso has great plate discipline (which plays anywhere), and he projects to have good gap power, but not necessarily lots of home runs. Petco has spacious gaps, so doubles shouldn't be an issue. Home runs are the problem. Alonso will have fewer dingers in Petco, just like any hitter, but his game isn't much about home runs anyway. His offensive numbers shouldn't be suppressed as much by Petco's dimensions as other hitters, such as Rizzo. Ultimately, I think Rizzo went on the trading block today, and I'm curious to see what the Padres get in return for him.

Yasmani Grandal is one of the most underrated prospects in baseball. He's a switch-hitting catcher with a great idea of the strike zone, and some intriguing power. Legitimately quality hitters that can also catch are rare. One of the biggest reasons he has stayed a bit under the radar is because the Reds have Devin Mesoraco, whom many see as the best catching prospect in baseball, in their system. Grandal also doesn't have one tool that pops out at you, but rather a variety of likable skills at a premium.

Brad Boxberger is a power arm with marginal control. He moved to the bullpen last year, and progressed rapidly through the minors. He'll be as good as his fastball command. Boxberger's arm makes him an intriguing final piece, particularly for a team that traded away Mike Adams, and lost Heath Bell in free agency.

As a general rule of thumb, I say 4-for-1 swaps like these favor the team getting the 1 player. These trades are the quality-for-quantity type, and it takes multiple quality players to be a great team, not multiple decent ones. In this deal, the Reds acquired quality, and dealt away the starting pitcher replaced by Latos, a first baseman blocked by Joey Votto, a catcher blocked by Devin Mesoraco, and a bullpen prospect. They dealt from their positions of strength to bolster an area of weakness.

However, I actually like San Diego's end better. Their ballpark is good at masking pitching deficiencies, so their staff will live on without Latos. In fact, I like Volquez's chances to do a surprisingly nice job for them. More than that, the Padres acquired a first baseman and catcher for their future, and could potentially pick up more pieces for the future with a Rizzo trade (plus maybe even some more pieces in return for a revitalized Volquez at the trade deadline). Usually, when a team acquires quantity, they don't get the quality that the Padres acquired. That's the difference with this deal.

Padres GM Josh Byrnes just put his stamp on the franchise, and it will be interesting to see what else he does this offseason. While trading Latos must have been difficult, he clearly did a great job reading the market.

On a more local note, the Latos trade is good news for Mariners fans. The Mariners have several talented young pitchers, and might one day in the near future be demanding a package of talent like this one. If a package like the one San Diego just received is also available for a guy like Michael Pineda, I would listen. In fact, I'm so intrigued that I might go and try to build some hypothetical trades right now...

Everyone Wins Cahill Deal

2011-12-11T12:01:00.001-08:00

Image taken by mwlguide on Flickr

This is old news now, but the Athletics seemed to throw in the towel on 2012 a day after the Angels signed Albert Pujols and C.J. Wilson. They dealt starting pitcher Trevor Cahill, along with lefty reliever Craig Breslow, to the Diamondbacks for pitching prospect Jarrod Parker, outfielder Collin Cowgill, and relief prospect Ryan Cook.

The timing is interesting, but probably coincidental. As much as the A's look like they gave up, this deal was likely in the works at the winter meetings. It probably would have happened no matter where Pujols signed.

Let's take a look at who the Diamondbacks acquired:

Trevor Cahill is a known commodity, to a degree. Though only 23 years old, he already has 3 full seasons in the majors under his belt. While 2010 is considered his breakout season, many numbers suggest that he continued to improve in 2011. Cahill's strikeout rate went up, without much of a change in his ground ball or home run rates, which probably has something to do with his overall increase in WAR - despite an ERA over a run higher.

It will be interesting to see if Cahill takes another step forward with the Diamondbacks. It's possible. He is still young, and the lack of a DH favors pitchers anyway. For me, Cahill has been a number 3 starter, but perhaps he can push more towards number 2 territory in Arizona.

Craig Breslow is a 30-something lefty, though without big platoon splits. He's a solid bullpen arm that has been alarmingly consistent, particularly by bullpen standards. Breslow is not a major piece of the deal - or if he is, then the Diamondbacks will be disappointed.

Now, on to the Athletics return:

Jarrod Parker is the centerpiece going to Oakland. He has been among the best pitching prospects in the game for three years. A major arm injury caused him to miss all of 2010, but he came back pretty strong in 2011. Many pitchers really gain their form in the second season after a major injury, so Parker might be poised to take off. While a prospect, he is about ready for the majors. It would not surprise me if he opens the season in the A's rotation.

Collin Cowgill will almost certainly be somewhere in the A's outfield. He put up a monster year in AAA before being promoted to Arizona for the final few months of the season. Cowgill struggled some, thanks to a high strikeout rate, but his minor league track record suggests that he'll hit for more contact as he adjusts to the new level. All in all, Cowgill doesn't bring one particularly great tool to the table. His speed might be his best asset, but he doesn't have a real weakness either. Cowgill does a little bit of everything, and as a guy I highlighted in the 2006 draft, I'm pulling for him to find success.

Ryan Cook looks to have a pretty good arm, and ran through the minors pretty quickly once being shortened up to a bullpen role. He might be with the A's on opening day. He might not. Cook, particularly at this point, looks like bullpen depth. He has some upside, but I think he's depth more than anything.

To me, the most interesting thing about this trade is that Jarrod Parker is only about 8 months younger than Trevor Cahill, yet there are completely different perceptions about the two pitchers. Cahill is seen as an established workhorse, while Parker is more of a young gun with big upside. In reality, Cahill was clearly better at a younger age, and also doesn't have a major arm injury in his past. It's clear to me the pitcher I'd rather have.

Still, the Athletics had holes to fill, and Cahill is a bit overrated at this point. His best single season WAR to date is 2.5, which simply isn't top-of-rotation material. It's valuable, don't get me wrong, but the production doesn't match his reputation. The ironic twist is that I think Cahill has a chance to bump up to a new level in Arizona, but if he does, I bet most people will simply say the D'Backs "got what they expected." Parker has a very good chance to be as good of a pitcher as the A's just lost, and maybe even as early as this season. Along with that, Oakland was able to get an outfielder that I think can safely play every day for them.

Overall, this is a good deal for both sides. The Diamondbacks bolstered their rotation with a young guy that's at worst an innings-eater, and at best a pretty good impersonator of Brandon Webb. The Athletics got a pitcher and hitter who they can use right away, and hold on to both for several years at affordable prices. Both sides have a chance to be happy with their returns.

Why The Angels Stink

2011-12-08T23:12:00.001-08:00

Photo taken by SD Dirk on Flickr

When a team signs a guy like C.J. Wilson for 5 years, $77.5 million, and that's completely overshadowed, that team has had a big day.

The Angels had a big day. They landed Albert Pujols for the cool price of a quarter billions dollars or so, spread over a decade. It's the kind of deal that's so big it's hard to comprehend. $100 million feels like an eye-popping threshold. Albert just got two and half times that, plus a little more on top.

Or how about this: Jayson Werth got the biggest free agent deal last offseason, and it's total worth ($126 million) is a little less than half what Pujols just got ($254 million). For even more perspective, A-Rod's contract is still worth $21 million more total than Albert's. Talk about getting paid.

Still, I bet Pujols will be able to find an apartment in his price range, even in the greater Los Angeles area. No need to come straight outta Compton*. Maybe he and Wilson can be roommates to pool costs, if it's a real issue.

*Unrelated to baseball, but an interesting article on the influence of gangs in amateur athletics.

Even as a realistic Mariners fan, it's hard not to feel demoralized. The M's probably weren't about to be serious contenders in 2012, but Wilson and Pujols combined for 11.0 WAR last year, and they are bringing those wins to a division rival. That stinks. I shouldn't resent the Angels for making themselves better, because that's what a good, competitive team looks to do. Moreover, it's not exactly as if they got a discount, or used some sort of loophole. Maybe C.J. Wilson gave a bit of a hometown discount, but not much of one.

However, these are the Angels, and I hate the Angels. Not in the way I hate the Yankees (and I do hate the Yankees), but a hatred nonetheless. In fact, I'd say that I hate the Angels more than the Yankees, and how can I not hate them even more after today?

The thing with the Yankees is that I enjoy hating them, and they have to be the Yankees to hate them - which, again, I enjoy. So really, in a back-handed way, it's disappointing to me when the Yankees don't spend a ton of money. That's what makes them the Yankees, what makes them so easy to hate, and ultimately what makes them such an enjoyable team for me to root against. In a paradoxical way, I've accepted that the Yankees must enjoy a degree of success for me to feel satisfied as a fan that hates them. They need that degree of success to be the entity I enjoy rooting against.

With the Angels, I simply straight-up hate them. I want them to lose, and lose often. I don't want them to acquire any talent. I want empty seats in their stadium, and a rally monkey that has to choke some uppers down to do it's stupid little dance on the big screen. I felt bad for Kendry Morales, the person, when he broke his leg on that walk-off grand slam a few seasons ago, but I was thrilled that the Angels lost an emerging star for the rest of that season. The Angels are the enemy, not unlike communist Russia with all the red they wear.

So, perhaps the following analysis is slightly jaded, but it's analysis nonetheless. There are reasons to believe that the Angels just shot themselves in the foot, and perhaps did not improve as much as expected. Here are my theories for why the Angels will fail at baseball, even after signing arguably the two best free agents available this off-season:

The Angels aren't as improved as they look on paper - Realistically, C.J. Wilson (5.9 WAR) takes the spot of free agent Joel Pineiro (1.3 WAR). Albert Pujols (5.1 WAR) takes the spot of Mark Trumbo (2.3 WAR). While the Angels acquired 11.0 WAR worth of talent, their net upgrade is "only" 7.4 WAR. That takes their 86-win team from last year, and puts them on track to win 93-94 games (and maybe closer to 96 wins thanks to the upgrade that Chris Iannetta is at catcher). That's a great team, but not legendary.
C.J. Wilson is good, but not as good as advertised - C.J. Wilson just posted a WAR a full 1.3 ahead of any other season in his career, and he will be 31 years old on opening day 2012. Granted, Wilson was a reliever until 2010, but this looks like a classic case where a player reached free agency after his peak season. The safe money is on C.J. being a worse pitcher in 2012 than he was in 2011, and never again having a season like he just did. I'd pencil him in for something closer to 5 WAR.
Albert Pujols is overrated - It feels shocking to write that, but I promise it's not blasphemy. Here's the deal: Pujols, for a decade, put up elite numbers at a rate that Major League Baseball has never seen before. He's already one of the all-time greats, and will be revered as such for the rest of his career, which he has earned with his incredible production. However, the Pujols we are talking about right now will be 32 years old at opening day, and his WAR has dropped precipitously the past 3 seasons - from 9.0 in 2009, to 7.5 in 2010, to 5.1 in 2011. I even wonder if some pitchers noticed Albert slowing down, considering his walk rate this past season was also the lowest of his career to date. Pujols is still a great baseball player, but he's not what he once was, and there's a good chance his prime has already passed. Scary thought for a team that just signed someone for a decade, isn't it?
The disaster factor is elevated, with no good way out - All of a sudden, the Angels have several major salary commitments to players who will make big money in the twilight of their primes (or worse). Consider this: the 2014 Angels already have $83 million invested in 4 players - Albert Pujols, Jered Weaver, Vernon Wells, and C.J. Wilson. Those players will be 34, 31, 35, and 33, respectively in 2014. They produced 16.9 WAR as a quartet this past season, and given their ages and career tracks, it's safe to assume that production is more likely to sink than rise. Even at their current production levels, Los Angeles of Anaheim isn't exactly getting good bang for their buck, though they are getting a bang. Still, if/when these players fade, there's no way the Angels will be able to get rid of them, with their big deals. Half the Halos payroll is sunk for a while with these guys, and they already look like an inefficient investment at best. I will concede that, as of now, it's Wells dragging down this group, but I don't think it will be just him by 2014.

All Angels-bashing aside, I question if Albert Pujols was really a good investment for them. He makes them better, no doubt about it. However, how much better? If the Angels turn out to be a 100-win team, Pujols and Wilson are likely to receive a lion's share of the credit. However, I'm willing to bet that Chris Iannetta and a precocious season from Mike Trout would push LA of A to that height as much as the big free agent splashes, if the Angels turn out to be that good.

And that's the point: the Angels were already on track to push 90 wins, especially with Wilson, and with or without Pujols. I wouldn't be surprised if the Angels just paid $254 million for an extra 3 wins this year, and maybe 3 or 4 more for the rest of the deal. Adding Albert Pujols is a good baseball move; signing Albert Pujols doesn't look like a good investment though.

Maybe I should secretly be happy that the Angels got Albert Pujols after all.

Rays Are Picking Machines

2011-12-04T10:20:00.000-08:00

When the Rays traded John Jaso to the Mariners, I wondered who their starting catcher would be. I didn't see a strong candidate on their roster, though they had options. A day after trading Jaso, they signed Jose Molina, and Rays GM Andrew Friedman had this to say:

Jose has been one of the best defensive catchers in baseball over the past decade, and his presence will bring even more stability to our defense, and he will, of course, be a great asset to our young pitchers.

(you can check this article to confirm he really said this)

Now, it's not like a GM will ever come out when they sign a guy and say, "well, he has limited offensive upside thanks to huge holes in his swing, but he's adequate." There's always some gamesmanship when commenting on an acquisition. You want people to feel good about the player just acquired.

Still, when Friedman says someone is a good defender, he knows what he is talking about. Friedman took over the Rays in 2006, and under him the Rays clearly made defense a priority, right around the 2007 offseason. The following is a list of Tampa Bay's defensive efficiencies (which is simply the percentage of balls in play that turn into outs) since 2006, along with their rank in Major league baseball that year:

2006: 67.1%, 30th
2007: 65.2%, 30th
2008: 70.8%, 1st
2009: 69.5%, 8th
2010: 70.9%, 3rd
2011: 72.4%, 1st

In particular, the Rays defense this past season was extremely good. The league average was 69.4%, meaning the Rays were a full 3% above average at converting balls in play into outs. That may not sound like much, but consider how many balls go into play. That 3% turns into tangible differences in a hurry. Moreover, it's a huge increase over the last time they were the best in baseball. In 2008, the Rays were only 1.9% above league average.

Going back through the past decade, only a couple defenses really compare with the 2011 Rays - and interestingly enough, they are both Mariners teams. The 2003 Mariners come close to the Rays fielding prowess. That team was 2.7% above league average that year. The memorable 2001 M's squad has the 2011 Rays beat. Their defensive efficiency was 72.7%, good enough for 3.6% above league average. It's just another example of how superb that team really was.

Clearly, the Rays have figured something out about defense. Given what Friedman shared about Molina, it certainly seems that he fits into whatever the Rays have figured out.

I'm still happy the Mariners acquired Jaso. They didn't get fleeced in the deal. He brings some much-needed plate discipline. It seems pretty obvious now that Jose Molina was a target for the Rays though, and they just got a player they highly desired.

What I'm interested to see is how much longer it takes for other teams to scrutinize Tampa Bay's strategy, and copy it. Their rise perfectly coincides with their defensive improvement. Granted, the Rays improved in many facets the past five years, but the drastic increase in defensive efficiency played a major factor. Moreover, they can still find a guy like Jose Molina in the current market - a guy most see as a journeyman backup, but that the Rays see as one of the most valuable assets available. Either the Rays are way off, or there is a major market inefficiency - and recent history suggests that the Rays know what they are doing.

I thought defense was on its way out as a market inefficiency, given how much more teams have paid attention to it in recent years. However, apparently one team - and the one that just happens to be the best at piecing together a defense - can still find guys they love for modest prices.

Signing Ford a Minor Deal

2011-12-02T22:45:00.001-08:00

photo via Aunt Juli on Flickr

The Mariners made a small move, signing OF Darren Ford to a minor league deal with an invitation to spring training. Geoff Baker sees this as a precursor to some major deals, and he may be right. The Mariners are in on Prince Fielder, and that would be a major deal.

Well, I take that back. Geoff Baker isn't right. The Mariners might be on the cusp of a major deal, but signing Darren Ford has little to do with it.

First of all, Ford is the most interesting guy the M's have signed to a minor league deal to date (and he does have a little bit of competition). Ford is a first-rate thief on the bases, thanks to blazing speed. That makes him a nice pinch-running option, and based on limited fielding data, a rangy player in center as well.

The biggest downfall in Ford's game is his struggle to make contact. His strikeout rates have been high throughout the minors, and he struck out in nearly a third of his plate appearances in limited time with San Franisco last year. I doubt Ford will ever hit much, which is why he's available for only a minor league deal.

Still, tremendous speed, and potentially awesome defense are two great traits to have. It's good to see Darren Ford in the M's organization, and he could make a real nice outfielder coming off the bench. At first glance, his skillset reminds me of Charles Gipson, who for whatever reason is still one of my favorite Mariners ever. I just loved the way he played the game, and I wanted him to develop into enough of a hitter so badly. He never did, but he was still awesome.

Anyway, back to my main point. The reason the Mariners signed Darren Ford is because they wanted to sign Darren Ford. This is not connected to some bigger move.

To start with, a minor league deal is a small investment. It's not much money, and does not take up any space on the 25 or 40-man roster. This is the way a baseball team can take risk-free shots at acquiring talent, which is why I'm a strong proponent of signing tons of minor league FAs. Most of them won't amount to much, but the downside is non-existent. Every now and then, someone will emerge. Guys like Darren Ford are worth signing no matter a team's circumstances.

Jack Zduriencik's history with Ford is a factor as well. Ford was originally signed by the Brewers when Z was the head of Milwaukee's farm system. There's a relationship and familiarity there. Baseball is like any other business - relationships matter. There are reasons Ford was in Zduriencik's farm system in the first place, and those reasons are likely still there. Connections are built in farm systems, and they last, even as people move to different organizations.

Lastly, a team's priorities are messed up if it refrains from pursuing a great player until a role player is in place. Teams make room for great players. Those are the ones built around! The role players, such as Darren Ford, are the ones that round out a roster. A guy like Prince Fielder would be a quantum leap forward for the offense. He might create some payroll issues, and displace a guy like Justin Smoak or Mike Carp, but those are issues a team deals with once they are there. If the Mariners actually think to themselves, "We can't get a guy like Prince Fielder until we have Darren Ford signed to a minor league deal," then they are in trouble.

I see how signing Darren Ford might make Franklin Gutierrez a little more expendable, which in turn would free up more money for Prince Fielder. Maybe there ends up being a connection there. However, that's only one way things could turn out. There are many other scenarios where Darren Ford makes sense. Ford simply makes sense, no matter what happens. This is no harbinger of greater things to come. It's simply a move that improved the talent pool the 2012 Mariners will pick from, no more, no less.

Prince Fielder's Price Tag

2011-11-30T08:30:00.000-08:00

The Mariners are in the running for Prince Fielder, on some level at least. I'd hope they look at him. He is the painfully obvious answer to energize an offense that's a year removed from being the worst in American League history. If money wasn't an object, there would be no debate over signing him.

However, money is an object. More importantly, it's an object that Prince Fielder will demand and receive. The Mariners (in my estimation) are not just Prince Fielder away from being a championship contender. He raises their expected win total considerably, but the M's need to be able to acquire other pieces, even if they secure Prince's services.

So, the real question is not whether Fielder is worth going after or not. What needs to be asked is how much is Fielder worth going after?

Let's start with how much Prince has been worth. Even though he is only 27 years old, he has already accumulated 6 full MLB seasons, playing every day. In those seasons, he has been worth $100.2 million according to FanGraphs. That averages out to $16.7 million annually. However, Prince obviously has developed since his rookie year, so not surprisingly, he's been worth a little more in recent seasons. He's been worth $66.9 million the past 3 seasons ($22.3 million annually), and was worth $24.6 million this past season alone.

$20 million a year is a fair starting place for Prince Fielder...which the Mariners can swing, by the way. More than $20 million came off the books this offseason (mostly thanks to Milton Bradley/Carlos Silva coming off the books), and Ichiro's $18 million salary is gone after this year (perhaps along with Ichiro too, but that's another post).

However, $20 million is only a good number as long as Prince Fielder keeps performing. Much of his value is wrapped up in superb power numbers, and when power decays, it doesn't come back. The dropoff is can be pretty fast too (look no further than Jack Cust and Ken Griffey Jr., some recent local examples). Furthermore, Fielder's body type has always been a concern. He doesn't look like a guy who will age gracefully.

All in all, Prince Fielder seems like a guy destined to fall off a cliff at some point. If he's still getting $20+ million once he's washed, his contract will be a franchise crippler. So, Fielder begs a couple questions: 1) Is he really the type of player who will fade extremely fast? 2) If so, when is he likely to fade?

My personal favorite tool to get a feel for a player's future is the Baseball-Reference similarity scores. B-R's model isn't built to be a career predictor, but I think there is quite a bit of wisdom in looking at history to tell the future. Similarity scores do a nice job of matching up relevant history.

Prince Fielder just wrapped up his age 27 season. Here are the 10 most similar batters to Prince Fielder through the same age:

Eddie Murray - A Hall-of-Fame switch-hitter with over 500 home runs to his name, it's pleasing that Murray tops the list. He posted a pair of .900 OPS seasons, followed by a trio of .800 OPS seasons, right after his age 27 season. At 33 years old, Murray looked like he might have hit a wall when he dipped to a .743 OPS, but then surged back to a .934 mark at age 34. After that, he pinballed around the .700s through his mid to late 30s, with the notable exception of his age 39 year, when he was part of the potent 1995 Indians. All in all, after age 27, Murray had a couple more great seasons left in him, and many good ones. He would have been worth a long-term deal, though not worth paying elite money all those seasons.
Juan Gonzalez - Injuries ultimately cut Gonzalez's career short (though I always felt he also was a bit of a mercenary; I think he got a bit lazy once he got paid), but he had three seasons with an OPS above .900, along with one above .800, after his age 27 season. After that, injuries took their toll, and he didn't play full seasons. Gonzalez would have been worth a four-year deal, and he would have earned the big checks over those four years.
Jose Canseco - We know Canseco juiced, and presumably Fielder does not, so maybe this comparison should be thrown out. However, Canseco had eight and a half productive seasons at the plate after he was 27 years old, with a few duds thrown in - and the duds were league average, not complete collapses. Canseco's best years were already behind him by the time he was 27, but he was worth good (though not great) money for a long time.
Mark Teixeira - Mark is only 31 years old, so we can't definitively say how his career has turned out. Since his age 27 season, he's enjoyed a couple great years (over .900 OPS), and a couple good ones (over .800 OPS). If the trend continues though, Teixeira's best days are behind him. It's not looking like he was worth massive money long-term.
Greg Luzinski - The long-time Phillies masher from the '70s, Luzinski was great up through his age 27 season. Then, he had back-to-back seasons where his OPS didn't get over .800, which probably helped trigger a trade to the White Sox. That helped him find a mild career resurgence in his early 30s, as he posted 3 good seasons (.841, .837, .854 OPSs, respectively) before being completely washed up, pretty much overnight. Luzinski was never worth big money after turning 27, and in fact only had 5 years left in his career at that point - 2 of which were mediocre, and 3 that were nice.
Darryl Strawberry - Unlike Fielder, Strawberry's age 27 season was disappointing, and he rebounded quite nicely for a couple seasons afterwards, before trailing off in his early 30s. Strawberry also had some significant issues with drug abuse, which presumably/hopefully Fielder does not have. Strawberry found some success as a part-time player in his 30s, but was done earning significant money just two seasons after he turned 27.
Kent Hrbek - A key clog in the two Twins championships (1987 and 1991), Hrbek gently faded into the sunset over a long period of time. His highest OPS came when he was 27 years old, and it slowly declined for 7 seasons running afterwards, before he retired at 34. Hrbek was still an everyday player when he retired though, and his final OPS was .773 - hardly elite, but also quite respectable. He wasn't worth elite money for seven seasons, but would have been worth a long-term deal at 27 years old.
Boog Powell - Although B-R's similarity score algorithm doesn't agree with me, I think Powell is the most comparable player to Fielder. His best season came as a 22-year-old, when he erupted on the scene as a precocious slugger. Afterwards, Powell was rather inconsistent, mixing in mediocre seasons with dazzling ones, though his age 27 season was among his best. This is remarkably similar to how Fielder has performed to date. As it turned out, Boog had another great season in him at age 28, and then 4 more good ones after that, followed by a last blaze of glory at 33 years old, and then he was pretty much done (though he played for two more seasons). Powell wouldn't have been worth elite money at 27. His best days were behind him, as it turns out, but he was a contributor for 6 seasons after the age that Fielder is at.
Jim Rice - Rice had 6 quality seasons after he turned 27, though a couple of them clearly lag behind the rest. He was also a league-average player for two more seasons. His best seasons, save for his age 30 one, were behind him by the time he was 27.
Orlando Cepeda - Unfortunately, Cepeda barely played in his age 27 season, thanks to a major injury. A glance at his numbers suggests that he never was the same player afterwards, though he was still good for the next three seasons, and serviceable for the next six (with a bit of a resurgence late in his career). His best days were also behind him by the time he had turned 27 years old, though he remained a contributor for many years.

With all those players chronicled, it should be noted that the most similar player to Prince Fielder by age has changed every year (although four of the six players are on the above list). This isn't about figuring out whether Fielder is the next Jose Canseco or Boog Powell - it's about trying to get a feel for what Prince Fielder is most likely to do.

In my estimation, there's a good chance that Prince Fielder's best seasons are already behind him. He's also coming off of one of his best years, which will drive up his market value. Historically, there is a very high correlation between the annual value of a player's contract, and how well they performed in the year immediately preceding their free agency. Fielder's particular scenario is one built for overpaying him. If I had to guess right now, it's going to take $25 million annually for 5-6 years to sign Prince Fielder.

Given the context, my gut reaction is that a team under my leadership wouldn't sign him. I'm pretty reluctant to overpay for talent, because it's an inefficient use of salary. I'd be even more likely to be stingy if I'm in control of a team like the Mariners, where I'm still trying to build a long-term core, and they don't have a payroll that allows for an overpaid core (though I don't think a core paid market value is out of the question).

With that said, many players that are similar to Fielder have been productive for a long time after the age that Fielder is right now. Most of them weren't as good as they were before, but still good. Given modern training and medicine, it's reasonable to be optimistic about Fielder's longevity.

Overall, if I were pursuing Prince Fielder, I'd be willing offer him a couple different contracts. He could sign a shorter term deal for more money annually. I'd be willing to give him $20-$25 million a year for 2-4 years. I'd start with something like 4 years and $80 million, and I'd be willing to go higher in negotiations. I'm not sold that Fielder would be worth the money, but he wouldn't be a sunk cost, and I doubt he'd hamstring the franchise with the relatively short deal, along with the production he'd provide.

If Fielder wanted a longer-term contract, I'd start with something in the 6-year, $100 million range, and I'd prefer to frontload it. Based on history, the odds are against Fielder maintaining his high level of production into his 30s. There's a decent chance he will still be a productive player at that point, but additional money would be needed to acquire other players to bolster the offense in the future.

To be clear, both of those numbers I threw out are starting figures. They would open up negotiations, so a final deal would likely be higher. With the shorter deal, I'd walk away at $100 million, if not sooner. For the 6-year model, even $115 million would be pushing it, though the structure of the deal would matter too. I think a front-loaded deal could make sense for both sides, though I've never really seen front-loaded deals struck in free agency.

Would either of these potential deals be enough to lure Prince Fielder to Seattle? I guess that would be up to Fielder to decide. My gut says no, but looking around the free agent market, I wonder who will pay him.

Mariners Acquire Jaso

2011-11-27T16:33:00.001-08:00

The Mariners have traded RHP Josh Lueke to the Rays, along with a player to be named later or cash considerations, for C John Jaso. Presumably, Jaso will be Miguel Olivo's backup, and also becomes the closest thing the organization has to a long-term solution this side of Adam Moore.

Jaso is what he is, a left-handed hitting catcher without much of an arm, but steady hands, and a steady bat. He has a bit of power (which Safeco won't kill, because he's left-handed), but his patience is his greatest asset.

Interestingly enough, Jaso and Olivo's strengths and weaknesses complement each other nicely. It makes a platoon a logical possibility, but in reality, I think some of Olivo's value comes in his tough-nosed insistence on playing every day. My sense is that Olivo is a leader within the clubhouse, and that's a good thing with his toughness and competitive fire. This is still a young team looking to impart "the Mariner way" on inexperienced players, which is why I am pretty sure Jaso won't be playing too much. Still, the Mariners lacked depth at catcher. Jaso is a welcome and needed addition.

The flip side of this deal is as interesting. It made sense for the Mariners to trade out of their stable of young relievers. I don't think it is a mistake that Lueke was the first guy to go. His inclusion in the Cliff Lee trade was always somewhere between puzzling and troubling. If Lueke had to go, he would have been gone a while ago - but all things considered, he was probably right up there with Chone Figgins as far as "available" players go, if you catch my drift. This trade makes sense purely from a baseball standpoint, but the back story can't be ignored. It makes the deal make even more sense.

Jaso for Lueke is a nice deal for the Mariners. It's not a big enough move to have a real winner or loser of the trade, but the roster is in better shape this evening than it was this morning. Moreover, these are the kind of deals that show why talent is more important than balance in a farm system. Jack Zduriencik has spent a couple years building up internal options, and he's been a bit pitching heavy. If that's where the talent is, a team has to take it, and trust that prospects can be used as assets in the trade market to get what is needed. That's what happened today, and in a small way it is refreshing to see the Mariners in a position to use prospects in role-filling trades. It's been a while since the Mariners have traded a prospect, and I haven't wondered how the M's will replace the hole in the farm system. There's no need to worry about that tonight.

The New CBA

2011-11-22T21:52:00.001-08:00

Major League Baseball and the Major League Baseball Players Association officially have a new five-year Collective Bargaining Agreement. The preceding one was set to expire December 11, so this deal was struck weeks before the deadline. Based on very recent history in the NFL, NBA, and even NHL a few years ago, baseball should be nominated for Nobel prizes. Major American professional sports leagues simply don't reach agreements until the 11th hour, or later...or much later.

What's even more remarkable is that the MLB reached a new deal easily despite making massive changes within the CBA. Legitimate negotiating had to take place to make this deal happen. This isn't a case where everyone got around a table, and agreed to keep the status quo. There are tons of changes with seismic implications.

Realignment

The Astros are coming to the AL West in 2013. The divisions, for the first time since leagues went from two to three divisions, will be balanced (a good thing in my book). The Astros and Rangers have a chance to develop more of a rivalry, which I also consider a good thing.

However, both leagues now have 15 teams - meaning there has to be year-round interleague play for every team to play on the same day (which typically happens four or five times a week). The AL and NL operate more and more like two large divisions of Major League Baseball, which sounds like a "duh" statement, but it isn't. The books I've been reading recently are about older baseball eras - even as far back as the 1880s right now. Baseball, for most of its history, has had a bunch of separate leagues that compete against each other. The American and National Leagues emerged as relatively superior giants to many of the leagues that still survive as part of the minor league system. For most of history, they have operated as distinct leagues, and I kind of like that. The modern games is getting away from that, and I miss it.

People say that interleague play will expand with the new agreement, and to a degree that's true. However, there don't have to be more games. Baseball's season lasts roughly 24-25 weeks, meaning teams play about 50 series. Because 15 games are played when nobody has a day off, only 1 of 15 matchups has to be interleague. So, a team only has to play 1 interleague series out of every 15. That averages out to 3 or 4 interleague series over the year. The games will be way more spread out with the balanced leagues, but there do not necessarily need to be more match-ups.

While I don't like the idea of year-long interleague play, the positives outweigh the negatives. It's a good decision to move the Astros to the AL West, and balance the divisions.

Expanded Playoffs

Each league will have an additional wild card slot, and the two wild card teams will play a one-game playoff to advance to the division series. With the changes, 10 of 30 MLB will make the playoffs every year. For comparison, 12 of 32 NFL teams make the postseason, and 16 of 30 NBA and NHL teams qualify for the playoffs.

For my taste, the NBA and NHL let in too many teams to the playoffs. The NFL feels about right. MLB could handle a few more slots, and now they have them. Moreover, the one-game playoffs will be fantastic, and not extend the playoffs into November. Two thumbs up for the playoff expansion.

No More Type A and B Free Agents

The way of ranking free agents had to change. It was odd and antiquated, and teams have valued draft picks much more highly the past couple years. Orlando Hudson had some issues getting work, thanks to his Type A free agent tag a few seasons ago. Teams valued him, but not enough to give up their first round pick.

The new system eliminates the Elias rankings, and is based purely on whether or not a team offers a pending free agent a qualifying offer equal to the average of the top 125 players in baseball. This is a brilliant solution. It will always be responsive to the free agent market in any given year. A player also has to be on a given team for the entire season to be eligible, closing a loophole where teams would trade for players really just to get the compensatory draft picks (supposedly earmarked for teams losing valuable players).

I was curious to see how the new CBA would deal with free agent compensation, because it had to change. This is a tremendous solution that guarantees compensatory picks go to teams that should legitimately receive compensation for lost players.

More Super Two Players

A subtle change that will make a big difference is the expansion of super two status. A certain number of players hit arbitration a season early, if they have accumulated a bunch more time in the majors, relative to their peers.

More players will hit arbitration early, which means more will also hit free agency a year earlier. This, combined with the new way free agent compensation works, will alter the free agent market noticeably. Over time, there should be more players in the open market, and fewer should result in a loss of draft picks. With more supply, and similar demand, the price tags on free agents may sink a little.

Massive Draft Changes

The biggest, and most controversial, changes are in the draft. We'll start with some of the less controversial edits:

The signing deadline will be somewhere between July 12-18, depending on the day of the All-Star Game: If I'm interpreting this right, the deadline will be the day after the All-Star game, which makes so much sense. It's one of the deadest days on the sports calendar, so the deadline should get more coverage with this arrangement. More importantly, players cannot be traded in their first year as a professional. With a mid-July deadline, every drafted player will be eligible for deadline deals the following year, eliminating one of the bigger needs for "players to be named later" to be included in deals. Under the new agreement, guys like Drew Pomeranz and Chance Ruffin can be announced in trades immediately.
Prospects can only be signed to minor league deals: This is another common-sense change. It makes negotiating much simpler, as the only thing in question will be the signing bonus. Gone are the days where Dustin Ackley and Danny Hultzen get MLB deals straight out the draft - which by the way, boots somebody else off of a team's 40-man roster, in the middle of a season. This was a necessary change for the more controversial point...
Teams will only be allowed to spend so much on the draft: This is a change getting seriously criticized (two links), and to a degree with good reasons. Teams will only have so much money to spend on signing bonuses from now on, and the amount they can spend will be dependent on how many premium draft picks they have. In other words, teams with high picks will have more money to spend than ones in the latter half of the first round. There will be no limits on how much a team can spend on an individual player, but the sum of signing bonuses will not exceed a predetermined amount. In recent year, the top draft spenders have been low revenue teams, and that's why people are up in arms. It seems like the cap on spending hinders the only chance that low revenue teams have to compete. However, I disagree. The teams spending the most on the draft are the ones with the top picks (shocking), and they will still be the ones spending more than everybody else. I'm excited to see how this change plays out.
Competitive balance picks have been added: Now, instead of low-revenue teams looking for ways to beat the system to get more draft picks, they will simply get more picks based on their economic context, and how well they've performed on the field. This is another reason that I don't think the draft cap will hinder low revenue teams like many think it will. Even more interestingly, teams will be allowed to trade these picks - the first draft picks baseball teams have ever been allowed to trade. Only low revenue teams will have access to this unique resource. Depending on how many other teams covet the picks in trades, this may be an opening to all draft picks being tradeable in the next CBA.

Massive Changes to International Free Agency

For the first time ever, there are restrictions on how teams can spend their money internationally. There will be caps on how much money teams can spend acquiring young players abroad, based on their winning percentage the previous year (bad teams have more money to spend). This will hurt the Mariners the most, since they have been the most aggressive team in baseball signing international free agents.

Still, I'm glad to see Major League Baseball trying to be a little bit forward-thinking. I'm ambivalent about the changes, but something had to happen. With restrictions in amateur draft spending, it seemed obvious to me that the rich teams would pour money where they can - which would have been in international free agents if it had remained completely unregulated.

However, there is more to signing young players abroad than the money. Discovering them is still a bit of an art form. Teams that are serious about acquiring international talent have their own baseball academies. The new spending limits do not apply to these academies at all.

Also, many of the countries that baseball is popular in, particularly in Latin America, have huge gaps between the wealthy and poor. I worry that the limits on signing bonuses will stimulate corrupt systems in the long run. What's stopping a local agent of sorts of strong-arming local talents to trust him with their baseball careers, and then directing players to different baseball team academies for a fee? Those costs wouldn't count towards the MLB spending cap. We just saw Wilson Ramos get kidnapped in Venezuela, and it's somewhat common for baseball players to face burglary and kidnappings, thanks to their wealth. There are some interesting stories about the people that help players defect from Cuba too. Middle men hunting for pay days aren't that far away from international baseball with the way things were, and I worry that the new system might allow these type of people more access to wealth, perhaps directly from MLB organizations.

Social Media

I can't believe this hasn't got more attention, but MLB will be cracking down on social media to some degree. One new provision is that "All Players will be subject to a policy governing the use of Social Media." Who knows what that looks like, but tweets from players are bound to look different than they do right now. With as prevalent as Twitter is these days, this is a little sentence that will change how fans interact with the game.

There are other changes too, notably to drug testing, future games in new countries, batting helmets, and the visibility of tobacco use.

Overall, the new CBA is truly a new agreement. It has tons of changes. I'm a fan of almost all of them, and there are only a few (like the new international free agent system) that I'm skeptical of. MLB is going to look different in the coming years, but I welcome most of the changes. The league was in good shape, and positioned itself for further growth the next five years. It's a good time to be a baseball fan - though I guess there's never been a time where it hasn't been good to be a baseball fan.

Halman Tragically Passes

2011-11-21T13:50:00.001-08:00

The news that Greg Halman was stabbed to death is painfully hard to take - even for someone like me, who is barely connected to the guy. I never knew him, or talked to him. All I did was root for him because he was a Seattle Mariner.

I won't attempt to paint a portrait of the person that Greg Halman was. I hope people do, because he seems like he was a great guy (which makes today's news even tougher). As a player, he might have been the best athlete in the system. Halman was very "toolsy," but still raw. He was progressing though. Now we'll never no how good he would have been.

It's too early to talk about the roster implications too. It simply feels insensitive, and rather unimportant at the moment. A topic that popped up from time to time was what the Mariners would do with their glut of younger outfielders, but this most certainly was the farthest thing from a solution that anyone wanted. I think everyone wishes that the picture was more crowded right about now.

All that's left to talk about is Halman's passing itself.

Sadly, baseball has seen something like this before. In 2003, Dernell Stenson was murdered, and the conditions were eerily similar. He was 25 years old at the time, and played in 37 games for the Reds that season, his first ever action in the big leagues. Halman was 24, and had played in 44 games so far in the majors. These were different ballplayers in different years, but in oddly similar spots in their respective careers.

Stenson was robbed in the Phoenix area, and when he tried to flee, he was shot multiple times, drug over 1,000 feet, and ultimately run over - all with his own car. The man found guilty is currently serving a life sentence in prison^. Stenson's death was tragic, and seemed so incredibly senseless.

Halman's doesn't make much more sense, and I doubt it ever will.

The Netherlands seems like a safe place to live, and there is some data to back that up. Based on data from a UN study of homicides, the intentional homicide rate in the Netherlands is roughly 1 per 100,000 citizens, whereas in the US the rate is 5 per 100,000. For a bit more context, the same study found that Venezuela has a rate of 49, and the Dominican Republic had a rate of 24. To a degree, it seems like Halman would have been in much more danger playing winter ball in the usual baseball winter leagues. Food for thought.

On a more personal level, Halman was born almost exactly 7 months after me (only a day off from exact). I'm at an age where death doesn't seem all that imminent, so it's jarring whenever someone younger perishes...particularly so suddenly and quickly. I'm yet to feel like I've been close to dying, and I'm thankful for that every day - but I also doubt Greg Halman thought much about death. He wasn't in an environment where death was much of a concern, but it still came swiftly. I know he's a professional baseball player from halfway across the world, but it still feels like I'm in about as much danger as him to get stabbed. That's a powerful reminder of how precious life is.

I don't know about all of you, but a baseball field tends to be an idyllic pasture for me. To a degree, it mimics real life, and that's part of its draw. A manager nominally has control of his team, but ultimately when the players are at bat, on the mound, or running around the bases, the game is completely in their hands. Doesn't that feel a bit like the level of control we have in all of our lives? So many of the games are rather unmemorable too, in all honesty. Some are more enjoyable than others, but for the most part, the truly memorable moments come suddenly, and at times where they aren't predicted, often from people that nobody expects...and as a general rule, most of those moments are a big deal for a few days, and then gently fade back into the thick tapestry of day-to-day baseball. Again, at least for me, that's how life works much more often than not.

One thing that's completely detached from real life is how I view ballplayers. I understand that they are people, but not fully. They are characters in this big, entertaining game. Players are borderline heroes to me, even as a young adult. They all have special powers, and most also have major flaws. Watching them deteriorate as they age is humanizing, but even that just fits the "real life" motif (all good things must come to end, no?)

My construct of how I understand baseball, both from an analytical perspective, and also from the more social perspective I just shared, has no room for death at all. Aging curves don't estimate the odds of suddenly disappearing. Heroes ride off into the sunset - often not on their own terms, but sometimes. The point is that they are phased out.

I guess I tend to forget that baseball is not some metaphor for real life - it is real life, for thousands of people across the world. Baseball people have families. They get sick. They might even get tired on occasion, for whatever reason. They're happy, sad, angry, apathetic, and every other emotion that makes human beings who we are.

They die too. Rest in peace, Greg Halman, with the hundreds (if not thousands) of others who suffered a similar, incomprehensible fate as you today.

Baseball In Living Color

2011-11-19T09:42:00.001-08:00

It's been a busy week in baseball history. The Astros are moving from the NL Central to the AL West. Each league is getting an additional playoff team. A new CBA is all but agreed upon, lacking only some formal pomp and circumstance to complete the deal.*

*By the way, NFL - and especially NBA - MLB just proved it is possible to, you know, negotiate these things in good faith. The deadline was December 11. Why do pro sports leagues feel a need to go on so long, and lockout/strike - especially you, NBA, where your season is perilously close to being flushed down the toilet?

There are plenty of things to talk about in baseball this week as major changes are clearly afoot. You know what caught my eye more than anything this week though?

Uniforms.

In the past week and one day, five different teams have announced uniform changes. If you crave in-depth analysis on a regular basis about what teams wear, Uni Watch is the unquestioned authority. Still, I've got my two cents to add, because an emerging trend has become the new fashion statement. Bright is back in style in baseball.

Let's look at the new uniforms, starting with the Miami Marlins:

Old:

New:

This is one of the bigger changes in recent memory, especially given the switch from "Florida Marlins" to "Miami Marlins." The addition of orange is quite noticeable too. I liked the old Marlins unis quite a bit, to be honest, but they never fit the vibrant Miami area all that well. The orange fixes that. I'm curious to see how much the Marlins where their new orange alternate. My hunch is that the black will still be featured more prominently. Overall, the colors are brighter than before.

Next up are the San Diego Padres.

Old:

New:

These are the textbook definition of uniform tweaks. I think they improved, but I never really liked their latest set of uniforms in the first place. They are not following the trend towards brighter uniforms, which seems to break my theory. However, based on reactions around the internet, people wish the Padres would have done much more. The message is loud and clear - brighter is better these days.

The Mets got the message with their uniform tweaks:

Old:

New:

Quite simply, the black is gone. Again, a shift from darker to lighter. Really, this is a return to what the Mets looked like about 15 years ago.

Speaking of retro looks, the Baltimore Orioles brought an old logo back with the changes they announced this week:

Old:

New:

Along with the cartoon bird coming back, a multi-colored hat is in use in MLB for the first time in years. Also, the Orioles will sport an orange alternate jersey for the first time since 1992. While some of these tweaks were clearly inspired by a retro movement, they also played up the orange and white, which in turn downplayed the black in their colors.

Much like Baltimore, the Toronto Blue Jays brightened up their color scheme by going wit a retro look themselves:

Old:

New:

Yet again, the shift from darker to lighter is obvious. I hated the Jays uni design for years, so this change is an extremely welcome one by me. The maple leaf pops, and everything in general looks real sharp on their new duds.

Shifts don't happen overnight, and these teams did not make their changes in a vacuum. The Giants debuted orange uniforms in their 2010 championship season. The Mariners brought back their teal jerseys in 2011, after they proved to be popular in a 2010 throwback game. The Athletics featured an athletic gold alternate last year, which certainly brought back memories of some of their glory days. The Rangers started wearing their red caps more often, over their blue ones. The Angels have been sticking an overdose of red in our faces for approaching a decade.

Color is popular once again in baseball. It's been coming back, but the tide turned for good this past week. You're on the clock, Pirates.

Papelbon's the Choice

2011-11-12T08:45:00.000-08:00

The Phillies signed RHP Jonathan Papelbon to a 4 year, $50 million deal after a reported 4 year, $44 million agreement with RHP Ryan Madson fell through. Madson was the Phillies closer last year, and it is interesting that things did not work out for whatever reason. It will be even more interesting if Madson ends up with another NL East team, like the Nationals, who are rumored to be a suitor for his services.

I'm not sure if either Papelbon or Madson are worth long-term contracts at the price tags they demand, but I'm not about to chastise the Phillies. Their window of opportunity is right now, and their roster isn't getting any younger. They are a better team right now with a guy like Papelbon closing for them. This is a team worth buying talent for right now, even if it means dealing with some unsavory consequences later.

Plus, signing Papelbon instead of Madson is clearly a better decision.

It's easy to see the risk in signing Papelbon to a big contract. He's a 31-year-old reliever that has already closed out a ton of games. Relievers are the most volatile asset in baseball, and on top of that, Jonathan is at that point in his career where many players leave their primes. Plus, even if Papelbon stays as good as he has been over the years, he is a fly ball pitcher, and Citizens Bank Park is a bit of a band box. His home run rate is bound to go up, particularly since his HR/FB was an unsustainably low 4.8% in 2011 (his career rate is 6.6%). Papelbon also posted the second-best strikeout rate of his career, and his lowest walk rate ever in 2011. Given Jonathan's age, and all sorts of stats that seem unsustainably beyond his career rates, it would be very surprising if his production matched what got him $50 million over 4 years.

However, it also would have been risky to sign Ryan Madson to a big contract as well. He's a 31-year-old reliever too, even though he has closed out much fewer games. I know I made the mistake of assuming Madson was younger than Papelbon, because he's been a late-inning reliever for less time. That's simply not true. In fact, Madson made his MLB debut two years before Papelbon.

Similar to Papelbon, Madson had an unsustainably good year. While his strikeout and walk rates were around his production level in recent years, his home run rate plummeted - all the way down to 3.7% HR/FB (and his career average is 10.4%). It would be smart to assume that Madson will give up double, if not triple, the amount of home runs he did in 2011. Home runs are probably the easiest way to blow saves.

As overly simple as this sounds, Jonathan Papelbon is simply better than Madson, and by quite a bit. In 2011, Madson posted a 1.7 WAR, which is great for a reliever, and a new career high. Papelbon accumulated 3.0 WAR though, which is phenomenal. In fact, over the last 6 seasons, Papelbon has only had 1 season below a 1.7 WAR. Not surprisingly, Papelbon's career WAR (15.1) dwarfs Madson's (8.8).

On top of that, Papelbon likely has more life left in his arm. He has thrown 6,930 pitches in his MLB career, whereas Madson has thrown 9,930. Madson has thrown exactly 3,000 more pitches than Papelbon in his career, which is nearly 50% more. That's slightly misleading, because Madson has logged two more years in the majors, and it's not like Papelbon threw no pitches in those seasons (he simply threw them in the minors). Still, even if we throw out Madson's first two seasons, that's only 1,230 pitches. The difference is still noteworthy - 1,770 pitches. For perspective, Papelbon threw 1,002 pitches last year, and Madson 966. 1,770 pitches is the equivalent of a season and a half to two seasons.*

*The gap can mainly be attributed to 17 starts Madson made in 2006. Starters don't put maximum effort in all their pitches, so even the 1,770-pitch gap is misleading, especially because Papelbon started in the minor leagues while Madson relieved in the majors. Maybe their arms are equally worn after all, but I still think the gap is worth noting.

So, to recap, Papelbon and Madson are the same age, but Papelbon has much more experience closing, a sustained higher level of success, and maybe even less mileage on his arm. I'm not sure that Papelbon is worth the big money that he just got, but I'd certainly be willing to pay him $6 million more over 4 years than Madson.

11 Awareness Day

2011-11-11T09:51:00.001-08:00

With a day off from work, I definitely want to write today. However, it's surprisingly tough to write about baseball right now. I've always got ideas, but there is just so much going on outside of baseball at the moment. For starters, the stunning Penn State scandal is still setting in. Today is Veteran's Day too, and honoring the military is important. This isn't the best day to focus on baseball.

However, it is also 11/11/11, so what better day to take a quick break from reality to remember Edgar Martinez?

It's not as if I have some novel insight about Edgar to share with the world at this point. He was my favorite baseball player growing up though, so an excuse to look at his numbers is always welcome. Just for fun, to remember how amazing of a hitter 'Gar was, let's compare his career averages with what we just saw out of the 2011 Mariners offense. Where would Edgar stack up amongst the best of the 2011 M's?

Batting Average

Edgar Martinez: .312

Mike Carp*: .276

On-Base Percentage
Edgar Martinez: .418
Dustin Ackley*: .348

Slugging Percentage
Edgar Martinez: .515
Mike Carp*: .466

*Did not have enough plate appearances to be listed among qualified league leaders. In fact, only two mariners had enough PAs to qualify, Ichiro and Miguel Olivo. That says quite a bit about how well the Mariners offense "performed" last year. I lowered the requirement to 200 plate appearances.

All the following stats are 162-game averages:

Walks
Edgar Martinez: 101 (with 95 strikeouts)
Jack Cust: 106 (with 210 strikeouts)

Hits
Edgar Martinez: 177
Ichiro: 184

Doubles
Edgar Martinez: 41
Kyle Seager: 40

Home Runs
Edgar Martinez: 24
Mike Carp: 25

You know, I think a hitter like Edgar Martinez would be a difference maker for the Mariners right now. I miss Edgar.

Trade Targets Via Free Agency

2011-11-03T10:07:00.000-07:00

With free agency kicking off in earnest today, this is a good time to talk about what the Mariners could do in free agency, and whom they should go after.

The answer is so boring though. Given how bad they have been, this isn't exactly a franchise that many quality veterans will line up to play for. Plus, with the youth movement underway, it's not the greatest idea for player development to keep young players from playing. It all adds up to the M's being far away from any juicy free agent action, in all likelihood.

Interestingly enough though, the M's have money to spend. They have roughly $30 million, if they keep the same payroll that they had this season. That's enough to talk to anyone, even Albert Pujols and Prince Fielder, but again - would any of the premium free agents really look at Seattle as a great fit for them?

Instead, the Mariners might be able to indirectly benefit from the most expensive free agents. They are in a position to take on salary, which could make them a good trade partner.

For instance, what if the Dodgers really want to sign Pujols or Fielder? They might have to go over budget to get the job done. Maybe then they would look at their roster, and make someone like Andre Ethier available. The Mariners could offer one of their glut of outfield prospects (Michael Saunders perhaps), and maybe a little something else. They wouldn't have to pay fair market value in the trade, because taking on the financial burden would add value in itself.

Maybe the Mariners could think even bigger though. I really wonder if the Cardinals can afford both Pujols and Matt Holliday. Granted, there might be a sound argument that Holliday's deal will look bad by the end of it, but still, the Mariners can afford to think big. This is the kind of deal that might make sense for both teams, depending on how free agency plays out.

Nobody knows where the big-time free agents will wind up, but wherever they go, they will get paid. The Mariners might be able to acquire some talent for cheaper than they should, simply because they can take on money, and other teams might find themselves in positions where they really want to dump $5-$10 million to clear space for someone else. Free agency could play out this way, and few teams (if any) would be in better position than the Mariners to take on a good player with a significant salary.

2011 All Former Mariners FAs

2011-11-01T10:10:00.000-07:00

Conveniently, there are exactly 25 unrestricted free agents that have played for the Mariners. What would that roster look like? Let's find out!

STARTING LINEUP

Endy Chavez, CF
Casey Kotchman, 1B
David Ortiz, DH
Raul Ibanez, LF
Wily Mo Pena, RF
Greg Dobbs, 3B
Yuniesky Betancourt, SS
Jason Varitek, C
Jose Lopez, 2B

BENCH

C Josh Bard
1B Russell Branyan
INF Adam Kennedy
INF Carlos Guillen
INF Ramon Santiago
INF Omar Vizquel
INF Jack Wilson

STARTING ROTATION

Joel Pineiro
Erik Bedard
Freddy Garcia
Horacio Ramirez
Miguel Batista

BULLPEN

Jamey Wright
Damaso Marte
Arthur Rhodes
George Sherrill

Of course, this team has its holes. It's not a contender. It's not good at all. The back end of the rotation is horrific, and Endy Chavez would be run ragged with a couple statues on either side of him in the outfield. The lineup significantly lacks depth as well, though at least the mix of lefties and righties is good, which at least doesn't make them highly susceptible to platoon splits.

You know what's scary though? Sub out a couple infielders for some relievers, and the team's construction is exactly what you want. Somehow, a shockingly complete roster of former Mariners is available in the 2011 free agent market. Also, it scares me how Adam Kennedy would be on the bench of this all-free-agent team, and he started a bunch of games for the real Mariners this year. Food for thought...

I'm not promoting that any team should pursue a Mariners reunion this offseason. I just highly doubt that any other team could build a rather complete roster out of free agents that have played for them. Is this residue from being so bad at so many positions the past couple seasons? Is it a freaky coincidence? I don't know what it is, outside of a fact.