MeiZhongTai

Signing Off

2006-03-22T19:08:00.000-05:00

MeiZhongTai is officially signing off. I hope you have enjoyed my 160 posts over the last 9 months. I have certainly enjoyed writing them. I'd like to thank all the bloggers on my blogroll and all my commenters for making this an enjoyable ride. My e-mail address will still work for anyone interested in keeping in touch.

Those mourning the loss of this source of info are encouraged to head to the other blogs in the blogroll to fill their needs.

Taiwan's MND on China's Missiles

2006-03-15T09:18:00.000-05:00

Considering the recent discussion between Dylan and I, a Taipei Times article offers some interesting new insight.

"China was producing around 50 Dong Feng [DF] series ballistic missiles annually, but ... our intelligence has found it is now increasing by 75 to 100 ballistic missiles annually," said Lieutentant Colonel Chen Chang-hwa, an intelligence analyst specializing in the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) missile development, at a press conference held by the [Ministry of National Defense] yesterday.

I can't help but wonder if the "intelligence" the colonel is referring to is the Pentagon's 2005 China report which reached this same conclusion last July.*

Chen said if cruise missiles are included, China now has more than 800 missiles aimed at Taiwan

Using last year's Pentagon estimate (650-730 missiles) and predicted annual increase (75-120 missiles), China should have 725-850 missiles in a few months when the annual count is released. I'm not convinced that China reaching 800 now indicates any increase in production.

The PLA's ballistic missiles are now also more precise, according to Chen. They used to have a 600m margin of error, but that has been reduced to 50m, giving China the capability to more accurately hit Taiwan's power stations, radar bases, airstrips and military, economic and political nerve centers.

I said in my last post that I wasn't aware of anyone attributing the reduced circular error probability (margin of error) of 50 meters to the entire missile force. I stand corrected. Either the colonel has just made this claim or the reporter extrapolated the characteristics of the most accurate missiles to the whole force carelessly. I'm not ruling out the former, but also recognize the possibility of the latter.

*The Pentagon report was actually slightly more generous, saying the increase was 75-120 per annum.

Overestimating the Missile Threat

2006-03-03T10:54:00.000-05:00

Rowan Callick wrote an article entitled "China's Missile Threat 'Unstoppable'" in yesterday's The Australian claiming

The balance of terror across the Taiwan strait[...] gives China the capacity to pulverise and close down the island but not yet to invade it.

Readers of this blog (especially this post) know that China's ability to "pulverize" Taiwan is often overestimated, as it is in this article. I do, however, agree with his characterization of China's inability to invade.

Let us examine his supporting evidence:

China is capable of deploying several hundred transportable short- to medium-range ballistic missiles within a few days

With the caveat that the number of missiles deployed does not equal the number of missiles hitting their targets, I would agree.

...which could take less than five minutes to reach targets in Taiwan...

True, but not particularly relevant unless he is trying to claim that the launch sites are too close to Taiwan for Taiwan to mount an effective missile defense, an unlikely claim since it would take days to deploy them by his own estimate.

...each destroying an area of about half a city block.

If you will pardon a Clintonian moment: That depends on what your definition of "destroy" is. Or "city block" for that matter. I won't quibble, but rather clarify this point. He assumes, as I did in my own analysis of China's missile threat, that a missile will destroy all within its blast radius--a reasonable assumption if the buildings are not hardened to protect against such a blast (as many military installations surely are) and partial destruction is good enough. The lethal radius of a CSS-6 or CSS-7 is approximately 60 meters if a conventional high-explosive warhead is used, as it likely would be if the target is an urban area (a nuclear blast would obviously be a completely different situation). A radius of 60m would cover an area of 11,309m (2.79 acres). According to Wikipedia, a city block can vary from one acre to ten, so it seems his assertion, if caveated with some reasonable assumptions, is certainly reasonable.

Leading strategic expert Hugh White, a professor at the Australian National University, said yesterday that China had overtly built up its capacity to between 600 and 700 missiles to make a political point - that it would not tolerate any move by Taiwan to declare itself independent.

Reading political points into military build-ups isn't always safe, but I find this reasonable.

No missile defence system could stop them, because the numbers were so great, Professor White said. "And missile defence is a raw numbers game."

The professor is correct that Taiwan will be not be able to stop every missile, especially since at present only the northern half of the island is protected by Patriot missiles (to the best of my knowledge). Taiwan can use its Patriots to attrit those incoming missiles, reducing their destructive capacity. Lets play the "raw numbers game." My calculations of the subject tell me that accounting for mechanical malfunctions (a modest 10%), missile defenses (50% as a ball park estimate, until Taiwan runs out of missiles), and strategic reserves (1/3 seems to be the rule), about 320 missiles will hit their targets.

"The number of Chinese missiles gives Beijing a lot of political and strategic flexibility," Professor White said. "It could, for instance, fire off 20 missiles and say, 'What do you think of that?' - leaving a lot of rounds in its locker.

The problem with this is one of accuracy that is further elucidated in the following sentence:

And if China did decide it wanted to take even stronger action, it could target power stations and airstrips and ports and army barracks, and could stop Taiwan functioning for awhile."

Taiwan probably wouldn't be overly intimidated by attempts to hit specific buildings, because they would either miss the target or be so inefficient as to demonstrate the missiles' impotence. With a circular error probability of 200-280 meters, it would take 44 CSS-6s or 23 CSS-7s to destroy a target with 75% certainty, which doesn't seem to be particularly intimidating to me. Using between one out of every 30 of your missiles (or 1/15 with the less accurate missiles) to have a three-in-four chance of destroying one building won't scare anyone into submission. If China has upgraded all of its missiles with GPS-guidance systems, a technology China is rumored to be deploying on its most advanced missiles (NOT all of them), China could reasonably expect to destroy 240 non-hardened targets with its 320 missiles that reach their targets or 461 targets if no missiles were held in reserve. Once again, not particularly devastating and certainly not enough to "stop Taiwan functioning."

The author, or the professor guiding him, seems to believe that every missile China launches will hit its target. That is not a reasonable assumption. Let's hope that China is not as prone to miscalculation.

China Reports Taiwan to UN

2006-03-02T15:58:00.000-05:00

Forbes reports:

China has expressed its concerns directly to United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan about Taiwan's scrapping of a unification council with the mainland, Xinhua news agency reported.

China's Ambassador to the UN, Wang Guangya, told the UN's leadership that Taiwan was threatening to destablize the "current peaceful situation."

Forbes notes the irony:

China's direct approach to Annan and the United Nations comes despite its repeated insistence that the Taiwan issue is an internal affair and that it tolerates no interference from outside forces.

Foreign Currency Reserves

2006-02-27T22:15:00.000-05:00

An International Herald Tribune article informs us that this isn't the first time China has amassed vast foreign currency reserves by trade imbalances. (Hat tip: Economist's View)

China will soon release statistics showing that it has passed Japan as the biggest holder of foreign currency the world has ever seen. Its reserves already exceed $800 billion and are on track to reach $1 trillion by the end of the year, up from just under $4 billion in 1989. But China has held a similar position before.

Lest one should start to panic, remember that America receives more gain than pain from its trade with China.

National Unification Council

2006-02-27T19:38:00.000-05:00

There isn't anything to say about the National Unification Council that hasn't already been said by the numerous commentators around the Sinosphere:

Jerome Keating's "Inane Flap Over an Outdated and Inept National Unification Council"
Some called it a bombshell but it was only the bursting of a bubble. Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian has recently caused quite a stir among the biased and uninformed by proposing to abolish the country's ineffective National Unification Council (NUC). The continued flap over the NUC and its guidelines highlights that most people know nothing about this outdated and ineffective organization, how the guidelines themselves contradict reality, and how the council comes from an era when the Kuomintang (KMT) wished to substitute its personal agenda for that of the people of Taiwan.

Michael Turton's "NUC Scrapped"

[Taiwan] got rid of a US$32 budget item, and managed to piss off the two most powerful nations in the world. What do have for it? Anything concrete? Maybe for an encore, Chen can personally call the heads of the Hong Kong triads and tell them their wives are ugly and their children are stupid too.

David's (Jujuflop) "The NUC 'Ceases to Function'"

So does ‘cease to function’ mean that it’s been abolished? Or did it cease to function back in 2000? The answer to both these contradictary questions is probably ‘yes’. Perhaps Chen has decided that if the US is going to base their Taiwan-China policies on ’strategic ambiguity’, then there’s no reason why Taiwan can’t either.

Angry Chinese Blogger's "Independence or Bust: Brinksmanship Across the Taiwan Strait"

Under The Four Noes and One Without, Chen pledged that, so long as China did not use military force against the island, he would not[...] Nullify either the National Reunification Council or the The Guidelines for National Reunification.

Update:

Asiapundit links to assessments by Ranc and Taiwan's Other Side.
Mad Minerva is disappointed in President Chen.
China Confidential sees the situation as a failure of diplomacy.
Outside of the blogosphere, BBC has reactions from around Taiwan.
Jujuflop weighs in again.
ESWN offers the feelings of Hong Kongers.
John Tkacik indicates the Bush administration may approve of Chen's moves. (Hat Tip: Michael Turton)
ACB has a poll where you can vote on when you think President Chen will declare independence. Sadly, "Taiwan is already independent" isn't an option.

Tour of the Sinosphere

2006-02-20T14:44:00.000-05:00

The blogosphere has had an abundance of must-read articles as of late. Here are some of my favorites with a brief excerpt of each.

Jujuflop explains the friction in Taipei-Washington relations since 2000.
The majority of diplomats and Taiwan-experts in the US had regular contact with senior KMT officials and built up their relationship with the KMT. When the DPP took over power in 2000, the US suddenly found that their contacts weren’t in control, and they had to develop a whole new set of relationships.
China Confidential asks if China has a Wal-Mart problem.
China Confidential has learned that certain officials in Beijing are concerned about the ways in which Wal-Mart affects China's international image, especially in the United States, where the company has become synonymous with products--and, in the eyes of millions of Americans and many of their elected representatives--unemployment--made in China.
Michael Turton and Jerome Keating look at the Ma Ying-jeou shuffle. Michael also looks inside the KMT.

There have also been quite a few articles in the mainstream media worth a perusal.

A book review (sub. req.) of a new work by Oxford's Steve Tsang entitled If China Attacks Taiwan in the Wall Street Journal (hat tip: Michael Turton). Tsang examines the possibilities of a decapitation strike and looks at the effect a war would have on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and Asia as a whole.

Bill Gertz breaks the story of China's underground submarine facilities.

Willy Lam writes on America's role in Sino-Japanese relations. (similar to this post)

Defense News thinks America isn't being honest about its offer of submarines to Taiwan.

The National Security Council is having a tough time finding an Asia director.

Secretary Rice says Taiwan isn't doing enough to modernize its military. (hat tip: Michael Turton

Nicholas Kristof calls Yahoo, MSN, Google, and Cisco the "Gang of Four." (The Economist's View and Peking Duck have the text, the former also has humorous graphics)

Pirates Attack Great Firewall

2006-02-15T09:57:00.000-05:00

According to an article in The Guardian (also in the Taipei Times), the Chinese government is losing their battle to control information flow into China. Many previous discussions on controlling information flow, both here and around the blogosphere, have focused on the internet. This article entitled "Pirates and Bloggers Beat China's Great Wall of Propaganda" focuses primarily on movie pirates.

Pirate DVD shops might not normally be considered outposts of free expression, but they are among the many gaps in the great wall of propaganda, which is being breached by a motley crew of bloggers, copyright dodgers and curious consumers.

It seems that the Chinese are learning a lesson about trying to control markets.

The motivation is purely business, but the effect is partly political. Much of the material for sale is officially prohibited because it contradicts the government line. Among many banned items on sale is Seven Years in Tibet, in which Brad Pitt plays a character sympathetic to the Dalai Lama; Devils at the Doorstep, a film about Japanese troops in a Chinese village that won the 2000 Grand Jury prize at Cannes; and Stanley Kwan's Lan Yu, set around the 1989 Tiananmen Square democracy movement.

When there is demand, there will be supply. Markets will always arise. You could argue that the Chinese government isn't really trying that hard to stamp out these controversial pirated DVDs (after all, the article cites the piracy police themselves buying pirated discs), but that doesn't really matter since all they can really hope to do is make the disc slightly more expensive, not wipe out its sale.

All in all, this article is worth a look just because it is a much more optimistic (from the perspective of freedom and the consumer) take on censorship than most other articles on the subject.

Updates:

The American State Department aims to make the work of China's internet censors just a little bit harder with the creation of its Global Internet Freedom Task Force.
Imagethief looks at the Chinese response from a PR perspective.

Sheep in Wolf's Clothing

2006-02-14T17:05:00.000-05:00

Kuomintang (KMT) chairman Ma Ying-jeou gave a speech in London last weekend that has shaken up the KMT line on China.

China must agree to discuss dismantling its missiles pointing at Taiwan before talks can be held, Kuomintang Chairman Ma Ying-jeou said in comments aired Saturday by Taiwan's ETTV Station.

Michael Turton has been covering the original comments and the backtracking since.

My question is: Was Ma just hoping to portray himself as a centrist to get elected President in 2008 or is he actually moving in that direction? As odd as it may seem, the idea that China should stop openly threatening the existance of Taiwan is a pretty controversial stance for a KMT politician.

A comment by David of Jujuflop on Michael's first post is worth repeating here:

Some of the statements that Ma has been making would be impossible for CSB to make without getting accused of trying to block talks with China (Ma has also said that PRC would have to admit to and apologise for Tiananmen before any talks about unification).

This is certainly an interesting situation and worth keeping an eye on.

How to Misunderstand Your Neighbor

2006-02-14T16:07:00.000-05:00

Monday, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) hosted a talk entitled "How to Misunderstand Your Neighbor" in its beautiful Wohlstetter Conference Center in Northwest Washington (it was advertised under the title "Troubled Ties"). The presenter was Akira Chiba, assistant press secretary for the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who has recently authored a book by the same name on Sino-Japanese relations.* Mr. Chiba served six years in Japan's embassy in Beijing in various posts and is fluent in Chinese (in addition to English, Russian, French, Spanish, German, and obviously Japanese).

AEI invited Bojiang Yang (Brookings) and Randall Schriver (Armitage International, CSIS) as discussants for the Chinese and American perspective respectively. Dan Blumenthal of AEI served as the moderator.

Chiba's presentation was quite similar to a series of letters between he and Lanxin Xiang (Professor, Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva) on Sino-Japanese relations published in the journal Survival (Summer, 2005). That fifteen page exchange does a far better job summing up the issue than I could hope to do here, so if you have access to Survival, give that a read.

Akira Chiba
Chiba's PowerPoint presentation began with a discussion of the history and strength of the relationship between China and Japan. Japan and China currently have the largest bilateral trade of any two countries in the region. Japan is the largest source of official development aid (ODA) to China. The numbers of foreign direct investment, exchange students, and sister city relationships are also impressive and expanding.

Second, he addressed Japan's role in World War II and its contrition in the years since. Japan paid for its aggression with lives (those executed or imprisoned for life as a result of the war crimes trials) and with its checkbook (Japan paid close to 20 billion USD in reparations). Japan, as a country, has apologized numerous times, most importantly the 15 August 1995 statement of then-Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama. Mr. Chiba also spoke of Prime Minster Junichiro Koizumi's 2001 visit to the Marco Polo Bridge Anti-War Museum (I'm not sure of the museum's exact name), where he bowed deeply.

Third, Chiba spoke to Chinese perception of Japan. He cited a recent survey showing that roughly 75% of Chinese people admitted to a negative perception of Japan. He pointed out that 71% of the same didn't know Japan provided ODA to China and many didn't even know that Japan is a democracy.

To clarify this point he spoke to what he calls "one-way mirrors," the reasons that China and Japan have a hard time understanding one another and often speak past each other. Most important of those "one-way mirrors" is the Chinese tendency to think in terms of dialectics, while Japanese tend to thing in idealistic terms. Additionally, China maintains "politics in command" (a rally cry from the Cultural Revolution), while Japanese, on the other hand, are "order freaks" who never run red lights. Additionally, Chinese tend to be atheists while Japanese tend to be pantheists (Shinto) and the Chinese prefer a linear outlook of history while the Japanese history books favor a cyclical outlook.

Fourth, he spoke about historical discrepancies (like the number of Japanese soldiers killed in the World War II battle of Taierzhuang), differences in how Japanese and Chinese people treat historical figures viewed as traitors, and different notions of the meaning of some Hanzi/Kanji characters and the resulting disagreements on translations (relevant because of disagreements over words like "apology" and "soothing the souls," which is the rationale for visiting the Yasukuni Shrine).

Perhaps most controversially, he pointed out that foreign protest over visits by Japanese leaders to the Yasukuni Shrine only began in 1985, even though the burial of Class A war criminals there had been revealed in 1979 and the Prime Minister visited numerous times in the interim. He found no correlation between visits by the leadership to the shrine and militarism (which he measured by Japanese defense expenditures) over the years.

In conclusion, he said that small gestures (like a well dedication that he attended in China because it was funded with Japanese ODA) are a good starting point to build a better relationship between China and Japan.

Bojiang Yang
Mr. Yang agreed with Chiba on the importance of the relationship between their two countries and that the nations were often divided by their common written language (he offered an example of a word which is read as "writing a letter" in one language and "toilet paper" in the other).

He opined that it has taken thirty years for normalization to occur between the two countries and it will take thirty more years for normalization to occur between the two societies.

Yang rebutted Chiba's attempts to explain the Yasukuni Shrine controversy as a misunderstanding of Shintoism. He pointed out that the shrine was used before World War II to mobilize the people for war.

Due to differing international situations, he said comparisons between the visits of Prime Ministers Yasuhiro Nakasone and Koizumi to the Yasukuni Shrine were inappropriate. This seems to support the notion that the shrine visits (and the resulting protests) are a symptom or symbol of the problem, not the cause itself--an assertion Yang himself made later in the discussion.

He then concluded with three key points:

Sino-Japanese relations must be viewed in the strategic context of a growing China. Just over a decade ago China's economy was one-tenth the size of Japans. Today it is closer to one-third. Due to China's relative growth and the expanding interests of both countries, friction is inevitable.

Domestic political agents must be considered when hoping for a breakthrough in relations between the two countries. Yang said he was especially hopeful after September of this year. While he did not explain his rationale for increased hope after September, there is little doubt that he was referring to Koizumi's planned retirement that month.

The United States has a role in Sino-Japanese relations. The size of the Japanese economy, importation of foreign rice, and American policies have played a role in each of the three waves of Japanese nationalism (early 1960s, early 1980s, and current).

Randall Schriver
Mr. Schriver began by thanking the moderator for arranging for him to speak last because this is an issue for Japan and China to work out, not America's problem. Having said that, he admitted that America always meddles and therefore offered his thoughts as to what role America should play.

First, Schriver countered the arguments one sometimes hears that Sino-Japanese tension is good for America. It keeps China occupied and Japan on its toes, the argument goes. Schriver said for for that "logic train" to work, one had to believe that the American foreign policy apparatus is deft enough to maintain just the right amount of tension (as war is in no one's interest) and he wasn't sure that was the case.

Second, America should not try to maintain neutrality in the issue or treat both sides equally. There is no reason for America to be apologetic about the close nature of its relationship with Japan. America should work to strengthen that alliance and to convey the message:

We have full faith and confidence in our friends in Japan.

Third, America should try to disaggregate the problems. On one hand, America should stay away from historical issues because of their sensitive and emotional nature. America wouldn't appreciate other countries meddling in the writing of its own history, after all. On the other hand, America has a clear role to play in working with Japan to improve crisis management and thus reducing the risk of unnecessary escalation.

Audience Q&A
Two particularly interesting questions were asked. The first came from the moderator, who asked about the common perception in Japan that Japan is a Chinese scapegoat. No matter what Japan does, the harassment from China will not cease, the logic goes, because China will continue to need an outlet for the people's frustration. Chiba, who had addressed the issue in a previous article, said that the view is common but that he does not necessarily share that belief himself. Yang countered that the argument implies that the legitimacy of the governing Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is in doubt. In fact, he argued, the CCP has significantly widened its constituent base and thus is stable enough that it would have no need for a whipping boy.

The second question came from Chris Nelson, whose affiliation I did not catch. He spoke to a recent discussion between the editors of the the Asahi Shimbun and Yomiuri Shimbun. They concluded that the government should construct a depoliticized war site that the Prime Minister and others could visit without raising the ire of the victims of past Japanese militarism. Mr. Nelson asked the speakers their thoughts on the proposal. Chiba replied that it was unworkable because the government cannot tell the shrine what to do. Government interference in religious affairs had created trouble in the past and should thus be avoided. Schriver stated his belief that Japan could best work through its history and have a thoughtful debate (such as the one that occured between the editors) on the subject without outside interference.

Related News from China Confidential:

*Mr. Chiba's book is available in Japanese or Chinese, but not in English.

PLAN a Factor for USN Planning

2006-02-08T00:08:00.000-05:00

The Congressional Research Service's Ronald O'Rourke wrote "China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities" (pdf) last November in response to widespread concern on Capitol Hill and elsewhere in the U.S. government. O'Rourke has written widely on American defense requirements, especially as it relates to the Navy, making this report well-worth a read.

China has come up repeatedly in congressional debate over the size of the Navy. The 288-ship fleet of today is half the size it was three decades ago. "You never want to broadcast to the world that something’s insufficient," [Senator John] Warner says, "but clearly China poses a challenge to the sizing of the U.S. Navy." [1]

I won't seek to summarize this lengthy and detail-packed report, but rather will offer a few hand-picked facts that I found to be of particular interest:

China appears to be developing short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) with maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRV) capabilities that would potentially allow them to target naval vessels. (I previously posted on China's SRBMs as relevant to land-attack missions but did not include a naval analysis.)

China may have advanced Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAMs) that are somewhat effective against "stealthy" aircraft. (I previously posted on China's ability to detect American stealth aircraft, but didn't analyze the kill capability that is needed to operationalize that information.)

China's submarine acquisition will soon surpass the previous average of one per annum.
China will have a net gain of 35 submarines over the next 15 years. [9]

John Tkacik of Heritage is cited offering a new translation of ShaShouJian: "Poisoned Arrow" (9). I would argue it isn't a particularly accurate translation, see here for more.

O'Rourke quotes heavily from a fascinating article in Signal:
It is unlikely that Russian advisers would be onboard [Russian-made Sovremnyi and Kilos] during actual combat operations against Taiwan and U.S. Navy air, surface and subsurface threats. PLAN officers and crew are not expected to be able to handle operations when under fire, sustaining hits and suffering system degradation or loss. [21]
I hadn't yet seen this argued. Provocative thought worthy of further study. That same article addresses China's "Aegis-like" systems.

In terms of what all this means for the US Navy:

A key potential issue for Congress in assessing the adequacy of the Navy’s ship force structure plan is whether it includes enough ships to address potential challenges posed by China’s naval modernization while also meeting other responsibilities, including maintaining forward deployments of Navy ships in the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean region and the Mediterranean Sea and conducting less-frequent operations in other parts of the world, such as the Caribbean, the waters around South America, and the waters off West Africa. If increased numbers of Navy ships are needed to address potential challenges posed by China’s naval modernization, fewer ships might be available for meeting other responsibilities. [40]

He also addresses how many carriers, submarines, etc. the USN needs and how many of those should be forward-deployed in the Pacific.

The Science Threat

2006-02-06T23:18:00.000-05:00

Washington Post columnist Sebastian Mallaby writes of "The Fake Science Threat" (mirrored by French, hat tip to SimonWorld). He argues that worries of competitiveness with China in math and science is misdirected.

The science lobby should also stop pretending that countries compete the same way companies do. Firms such as Toyota and Ford really do go head-to-head against each other; if Toyota has superior technology, it will steal Ford's customers -- and Ford may even disappear. But if China produces Nobel-quality science, it won't put the United States out of business; rather, Chinese discoveries will help American scientists discover more, too. Equally, Toyota doesn't sell cars to Ford workers, so there's no benefit to Ford's people if Toyota's quality advances. But China does sell to Americans, so whatever makes it more productive has some upside for the United States as well.

Hollow Threat
Science needn't always be a competition. Mallaby is correct that international economics differs from economics of corporations. International economics is not a zero-sum game and therefore an advancement in one country can bring about advancements for all. In addition to economic considerations, the same argument works for medicine. If a cure for AIDS is discovered it won't matter one iota where it was first discovered.

The type of scientific discovery that wins Nobel prizes and is discussed by Mallaby involves publishing in academic journals. That type of advance quickly spreads beyond national boundaries. The economic growth brought about by such scientific advances results more from the diffusion of the advance than the discovery itself. America needn't fear this type of competition. No matter where the advance occurs, America is well-prepared to take maximum advantage.

But...
There are more ways than one to apply scientific advances. Not all science is intended to spawn economic growth. One other pursuit that is heavily dependent on scientific advances is military weaponry. The research, development, and acquisition of new weapon systems is heavily dependent on scientists and a technological edge can make the difference between victory and defeat. Unlike medical or commercial technologies, scientific progress with likely military application is not usually published in open-source journals. Much military research is secret and therefore relying on foreigners to conduct the research might not be possible/advisable, thus in large part negating the oft-proposed immigration solution.

If America loses its edge in science and engineering education, its military edge is likely to follow. I'll leave it to Thomas Friedman and William Odom to debate whether or not we are losing our high-technology edge, but to argue that such an erosion is not potentially threatening is to not consider the issue fully.

QDR Reviewed

2006-02-06T16:39:00.000-05:00

The Quadrennial Defense Review has been reviewed in its entirety by numerous experts and writers (DefenseTech.org has a roundup). Bloggers have also been busy on the subject (Blog Search). Due to the narrow focus of this blog, I only seek to review the document's conclusions that are relevant to China or Taiwan, much in the way China Confidential has done:

A major policy document published by the United States Defense Department on Friday identifies China as the emerging world power most likely to threaten US status as the world's only superpower. More important, perhaps, the document calls for several steps to counter that potential threat.

Especially relevant to China watchers are pages 27-31 of the report. That section focuses on the third of four priorities listed in the document: "Shaping the choices of countries at strategic crossroads." While the rest of the document focuses largely on the new stragegic environment where threats come from "decentralized network threats from non-state enemies" and asymmetric threats, this section deals with deterrence, including that tailored for "near-peer competitors" (I guess using such obvious, yet indirect wording to refer to China is really no different than China and Russia using the supposedly generic title of "hegemon" to refer circuitously to the United States).

And how does the United States hope to influence Chinese decision-making?

U.S. policy seeks to encourage China to choose a path of peaceful economic growth and political liberalization, rather than military threat and intimidation. The United States’ goal is for China to continue as an economic partner and emerge as a responsible stakeholder and force for good in the world. (29)

Such a goal should come as a surprise to noone. America's desire to shape Chinese decision-making faces a great challenge, it would appear:

The outside world has little knowledge of Chinese motivations and decision-making or of key capabilities supporting its military modernization.

Strengthening America's ability to deter (and if that should fail, to win) conflicts involves strengthening partnerships with allies, altering its basing in accordance with the Global Defense Posture Review (explained here), and "prompt and high-volume global strike" capabilities (presumably long-range bombers, SSGNs, etc.). Also mentioned is an increase in language training, further explained on pages 78-79 of the report, including Mandarin Chinese.

Conclusion
There is really nothing new in this report, at least nothing that is relevant to China. For someone who hasn't followed the U.S. military and needs to be brought up to speed, this document might be useful. For someone who watches the news regularly and pays attention to the acquisitions and reforms underway in the Defense Department, this report is just more of the same. Forthcoming "follow-on roadmaps" will further explain some aspects of the report, including irregular warfare and intelligence, may offer new insight into those fields.

For an alternate view of what the Quadrennial Defense Review should say, see the Center for American Progress's report (pdf). They are much more pessimistic about Iraq and Afghanistan and declare the Raptor, Virginia-class submarine, DD(X) Destroyer, and some other weapon systems unnecessary. On the subject of China:

Ultimately, China will pursue its own strategic interests with or without U.S. support, and the United States will need to be prepared for conflict with China if necessary. (15)

New Reports

2006-02-03T16:00:00.000-05:00

The Department of Defense has released the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Rumors have been floating around for days that the report would focus more on China than the Global War on Terror or the Iraq War.

Another report recently released and no doubt of interest to this blog's target audience is from RAND, who bring a can-do attitude and see "A New Direction for China’s Defense Industry (pdf)." (Hat Tip: Michael Turton).

A little older, but also of interest is a report by the Congressional Research Service's Ronald O'Rourke's "China Naval Modernization: Implication for U.S. Naval Capability (pdf)."

I hope to find time to read and comment on at least the first of these reports. Due to computer problems, I have not yet been able to do so.

Nothing to Fear But...

2006-01-29T00:34:00.000-05:00

Long time readers of MeiZhongTai will remember the attempts of the ROC Army and Air Force to sink a wounded South Korean freighter that was leaking benzene. My take on the situation was that it was in some ways a better display of ROC military proficiency than the scripted exercises performed for the press. SimonWorld brings us news from the other side of the Taiwan Strait that can be seen as comparable.

In a post titled "Fear Not the Red Dragon,"Simon brings us this from the unlinkable South China Morning Post:

the Red Army troops were defeated because the army commander forgot to call in air support.

The obvious conclusion here is that PLA commanders are incompetent. Forgetting to call in air support is a pretty bonehead move, after all. A possible alternate explanation is that the PLA is moving toward more authentic training, which is resulting in bonehead moves being exposed (and presumably corrected) instead of hidden, where they are likely to be repeated.

I'm guessing that none of the commanders in the ROC's most recent Han Kuang exercise forgot to call air support... because no phone call was required. It was decided in advance that the air support would arrive at a set time. In the long run, which country is going to end up with a more potent fighting force, the country who allows their officers to fail under more authentic circumstances and then motivates (humiliates) them to improve or the one that scripts everything so that problems are never exposed in the first place? While it is embarassing that this officer made such a blatant mistake, the fact that the mistake was caught shows some commitment to improving. I hope the ROC military is taking note of this. I for one would welcome more failure in the next Han Kuang exercise. That exercise would benefit Taiwan the most if it would just lose the exercise honestly.

[China] [Taiwan]

Taiwan's Defense Needs

2006-01-28T23:53:00.000-05:00

There has long been talk of exactly what weaponry Taiwan needs for its self-defense. Some outsiders view the Taiwanese government as one entity who isn't taking its own defense seriously, e.g., Ted Galen Carpenter. Others look deeper into the politics and weapon systems for explanation.

Party Politics
While observers disagree as to the rationale, the Blues clearly are obstructing the purchase of the arms offered Taiwan by the United States. The old refrain was that unless the (Green-led) government was planning to provoke China by declaring independence, only minimal defensive arms would be needed to defend the island because China isn't particularly threatening. Eventually this line of reasoning faded, and the Blues began to debate about the specific weapons.

The Arms Package
In 2001 the Bush administration offered to Taiwan diesel submarines, anti-submarine patrol aircraft, and Patriot missile batteries in response to a request from the earlier (KMT) Taiwanese leadership. Most controversial of the three pieces has been the submarines, as the United States doesn't have eight diesel submarines to offer or the facilities to produce such craft. Equally troubling, all three pieces of the arms package appear to be significantly overpriced. Due to international political constraints, Taiwan is prevented from much in the way of comparison shopping.

Are these weapons appropriate for Taiwan's needs or is Taiwan only considering their purchase as part of a protection scheme? The answer seems to be that the submarines would be nice if Taiwan had unlimited funds for defense but the money could be much more efficiently and effectively spent elsewhere (this argument has been made by Michael Turton with Admiral Eric McVadon and anonymous PACOM officers singing backup (after quite a bit of debate, I even came around to agree with the experts).

While naval mines and other weapons have been mentioned, the most common weapon system cited as a more productive use of Taiwanese defense dollars has been fighter aircraft. The blogosphere has been aflutter with news on this front in the last few days. Particularly interesting have been posts by Michael and Jason about Taiwan's stated interest in the Joint Strike Fighter or other aircraft with Vertical Takeoff and Landing (VTOL) capability.

Conclusion
Whatever becomes of this arms package, it is important to not judge the ROC military or the commitment of Taiwan to its own defense solely by this one package. As Gary Schmitt and Dan Blumenthal have pointed out, not wanting some overpriced submarines is not the same as free-riding or lacking commitment to one's own self-defense. The government is doing its best to whip up support for arms acquisitions after all even if it does seem to be taking a page from the duct-tape-as-a-defense-against-terrorism school of defense with proposals for a strategic quick-drying cement stockpile.

[China] [Taiwan]

America's Coming War With China

2006-01-26T19:56:00.000-05:00

The much blogged about (1, 2, 3) CATO book talk to mark the release of Ted Galen Carpenter's America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course Over Taiwan took place Wednesday at the CATO offices in Washington D.C.

Joining Mr. Carpenter on the stage were moderator Chris Preble (CATO) and China experts Richard Bush (Brookings) and Clyde Prestowitz (Economic Strategy Institute) with the latter two offering comments on Mr. Carpenter's book. The roster of attendees reads like a who's who of China and national security scholars as well as policy and defense practitioners. For those who were unable to attend and don't wish to watch the video in its entirety, a summary and discussion of the points raised follows. It needs stating that these comments are based on the notes I took during the talk and I am unable to double-check their veracity against the video due to a slow internet connection.

Carpenter
After a brief introduction by Chris Preble, Carpenter explained the conclusions outlined in his book. If the United States, the People's Republic of China, and Taiwan all continue on their present courses, war is almost certain within the next decade.

Taiwanese public opinion is shifting in favor of independence as demonstrated by the oft-cited public opinion polls on self-identification and feelings toward reunification, independence, and the status quo. China is becoming increasingly impatient in its wait for reunification and less satisfied with the status quo as shown by China's 2000 Defense White Paper and the 2005 Anti-Secession Law. Finally America's Taiwan Strait policy of strategic ambiguity relies on convincing China we would defend Taiwan were it attacked and convincing Taiwan that we would not (to oversimplify the matter criminally) could potentially be read the exact opposite way. Due to these trends a costly war is likely and ten years down the road the balance of power may have shifted to the extent that American victory would not be assured, Carpenter asserts.

As the United States has limited control over Chinese or Taiwanese foreign policy, averting conflict can only occur by shifting American policy in Carpenter's view. Therefore, he recommends that the American policymakers view Taiwan as but a peripheral issue to the United States, not the vital concern it is often characterized as. As such, America should continue selling defensive arms to Taiwan to allow it to defend itself but explicitly rescind any American security guarantee to the island. To put it simply, we care about Taiwan enough to sell them arms but not enough to put American sons and daughters in harm's way.

Bush
Richard Bush, author of At Cross Purposes and Untying the Knot, offered three comments in response to Carpenter's book and talk. First, Bush agrees that there is a significant danger of war due to miscalculation in spite of the growing economic interdependence between the three economies. He feels that any miscalculation is more likely to result from a failure of the leaders in Taipei or Beijing to understand the decision-making of the other capital's leaders than from any ambiguity related to American foreign policy.

Second, having been a representative of American foreign policy in Taiwan, Mr. Bush contended that American policy hasn't been nearly as ambiguous as Carpenter suggests. He cautioned Carpenter that American policy can not be interpreted solely based on public pronouncements, rather one must realize that much of the communication occurs in private consultations with senior leaders on both sides. To illustrate his points, Bush pointed out that Chinese defense acquisitions indicate that China believes the United States would intervene in a conflict. Additionally, in his talks with senior defense and policy leaders in Taiwan, he noticed little confusion as to American policy.

Third, Bush offered some policy concerns in the form of questions.

Can Taiwan afford the weapon systems necessary to defend itself against a Chinese attack?
Would Taiwan have time to build up its defense capabilities before being abandoned by the United States?
Is there American public or policymakers support for such a shift in foreign policy?
If the US abandoned Taiwan, would that cause Taiwan to seek nuclear weapons? How would the United States respond if Taiwan were to acquire nukes?
Would abandoning Taiwan cause Taipei to sue for peace immediately?
Shouldn't we include Taiwan and the Taiwanese people in the decision-making process?
How would such a move effect American security?

Prestowitz
Avoiding a war with China (either hot or cold) and bringing China completely into the global system is a vital national interest of the United States, pointed out Clyde Prestowitz, the author of Three Billion New Capitalists. Is defense of Taiwan as vital a national interest? When deciding whether or not to extend a security guarantee to Taiwan, America must consider the relative importance of these goals and decide what America is willing to sacrifice in defense of Taiwan. Prestowitz used an uninhabited Hawaiian island as an analogy to point out that Taiwan means a lot more to China than it does to America.

In closing, Prestowitz recommended that if America truly wants to engage China and include it fully in the globalized interconnected world, America should strengthen its commitment to globalization. During the question and answer session, Prestowitz further elaborated on this point saying,

If you want democracy in China, uncensor Google.

Rebuttal
In response to the comments offered by Bush and Prestowitz, Carpenter offered three points. He replied to Bush's question about Taiwan's ability to defend itself by admitting he didn't know if Taiwan was capable or not but argued that the Taiwanese legislature would act more "responsibly" if it lacked an American security guarantee. In reply to Bush's question as to the political support within the US for such a move, Carpenter admitted a policy change was unlikely, especially because of Taiwan's democratization, but argued it is too dangerous for the United States to fight China over the island. Finally, in response to Prestowitz's comments/question as to the relative importance of Taiwan to China and the United States, Carpenter agreed that Taiwan was vastly more important to China, pointing out that when a security guarantee is offered one must consider not only the balance of power, but also the balance of fervor, by which he means the intensity of commitment to the cause being fought for.

Q & A Session
Questions were offered by Mark Stokes, Eric McVadon, and Parris Chang among others. One of the more interesting questions came from a representative of the Formosan Association for Public Affairs, who pointed out the strategic importance of Taiwan due to its proximity to sea lanes vital to South Korea and Japan. The answer came that if the waterways are important to those countries, let them defend it. In response to a similar question that followed, Mr. Bush commented that adopting Carpenter's advice would likely profoundly effect the alliance between the US and Japan. Mr. Prestowitz countered that the Japanese have never understood the American commitment to Taiwan, pointing out that they would much prefer America focusing its defensive efforts on their island.

In a query sure to warm the hearts of Michael Turton and others, Eric McVadon of the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis asked if the oft-discussed offer of arms to Taiwan in 2001 (diesel submarines, anti-submarine patrol aircraft, and missile defense batteries) represented the best package of weapons for Taiwanese defense needs. Carpenter responded that while diesel submarines might not be the best use of defense dollars, the KMT has not accepted a downsized package either but seems content to simply stonewall the entire package.

Parris Chang accused Carpenter of unfairly placing blame for the friction between China and the US at the feet of Taiwan, asking if the panelists felt that all disagreements between the two powers would disappear in Taiwan's absence. He also commented that Taiwan was not the provocateur in the matter as it is China pointing 800 missiles at Taiwan, not the other way around. Because his sentiments were worded as statements more than questions, his concerns went largely unanswered by the panelists.

Analysis
Carpenter's conclusion that America should abandon its security guarantee to Taiwan is not surprising considering his position as the Vice President for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, a libertarian think tank. Libertarians tend to favor cutting of security guarantees and adopting a foreign policy of "restraint," which is to say a military retrenchment like the one advocated in Dr. Eugene Gholz's "Come Home America" (International Security, Spring 1997). The problem with this policy is the same today as when George McGovern first proposed it, the American people will not accept an amoral foreign policy. From a purely Realist position, accommodating the rising superpower might be wise and offering up Taiwan would be accommodation par excellance. There is little support in the American collective heart, however, for giving up on the 23 million free people of Taiwan. America claims to stand for the promotion of democracy and liberal institutions. While sometimes America has retreated from its vanguard position in the name of Realpolitik, surrendering Taiwan to a rising China would be a bridge too far. As long as there is support in America for a foreign policy based on more than pure self-interest, there will be support for assisting Taiwan in its defense.

Update:

Dignified Rant views Taiwan as a "canary in the coal mine."

I argue in the comments that if you add up those who feel we should support Taiwan because of past promises, those who think we should support Taiwan because it is a liberal democracy facing threat from a country who is not, and those who think we should defend Taiwan lest it become an hor d'oeuvres to the growing apetite of China, we will have reached the critical mass of popular support necessary to require action by the US government.

[China] [Taiwan]

2006: Same as 2005

2006-01-13T11:20:00.000-05:00

The Economist has released its Big Mac Index for 2006. The Chinese yuan is 59% undervalued compared to the dollar. This is the same estimate as last year, so I will refrain from interpretting it, opting instead to point you to last year's analysis. So much for China's famed 2% revaluing of the yuan.

Other highlights of the 2006 Big Mac Index:

The Swiss Franc is once again the most overvalued currency against the dollar. (57% this year versus 65% in 2005)

The New Taiwan Dollar is undervalued by 25% (versus 21% in 2005).

The Euro is overvalued by 11% (down from 17%).

For those interested in the Chinese economy, The New Economist offers a roundup of must-read articles.

[China] [Big Mac Index]

Marquand on Arms

2006-01-10T11:07:00.000-05:00

Robert Marquand of the Christian Science Monitor has a piece in today's paper on Taiwan's proposed arms purchase.

In a bid to rally Taiwan's flagging independence forces, President Chen Shui-bian's New Year's resolution seems to be provoking mainland China with a push announced this week to buy US arms, including eight submarines and a dozen sub-hunting aircraft.

A couple of questions come to mind:

Are "indepence forces" really flagging?
If it is a New Year's resolution, shouldn't it be somehow different from what he did last year?

While I liked some of his previous work, Marquand really starts off this article on the wrong foot. He then continues by discussing China's arms build-up (obviously aimed at Taiwan). Since when is defending one's country against a growing threat a provocation? I understand the idea of the security dilemma as well as the next guy, but this is ridiculous. Having a 55 submarine force (China) is okay, but trying to acquire eight submarines is a provocation? Can someone explain this to me?

He spends the rest of the article offering alternatives to the current arms deal of submarines, sub-hunting aircraft, and missile defense batteries.

Instead of spending huge sums on a diesel-electric sub that would take at least a decade to deploy, for example, they point to other measures that could be taken, including hardening airfields, buying antiaircraft missiles, and protecting electronic systems needed in a fight. Instead of procuring expensive and vulnerable warships, Taiwan could buy mines that would deny the Chinese Army an easy landing on island beaches.

While he makes some good recommendations (many of which have been made here before by commenters) I guess my concern is that after his opening, I'm not convinced he has Taiwan's best interests at heart.
His finale:

Another reason the Pentagon now balks at advanced weapons to Taiwan: Worry that they would slip into the hands of China's Army.

I notice Marquand has no attribution attached to that sentence. I'd be curious as to the origin of that sentence. Is it Marquand's own editorializing?

[China] [Taiwan]

Military News

2006-01-09T11:02:00.000-05:00

Some interesting stories on Chinese and Taiwanese military forces in the news as of late. Troops, submarines, and missiles. A little something for everyone.

The People's Liberation Army continues to decrease in size relative to its sister services. This is a vital part of modernizing Chinese armed forces. The downside for the government is that it increases already high unemployment.
At the end of 2005, China completed the task of trimming the ranks of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) by 200,000, bringing its total number of troops to 2.3 million. [Xinhua]

The KMT is characterizing the eight diesel submarines offered Taiwan by the United States as offensive weapons, and thus inappropriate for the ROC military. [Taipei Times]
KMT:
Taiwan should boost its defensive capabilities and aim to survive a `first strike' during a Chinese military attack. It is not necessary to spend huge amounts of money on offensive submarines.

DPP:
[B]ecause of China's sparse anti-submarine warfare capabilities, Beijing would have to spend around eight times the amount spent on Taiwan's submarine force to build up adequate capabilities, including procuring anti-submarine aircraft, minesweepers, mine-sweeping helicopters, anti-submarine missiles and destroyers. Therefore, the move would distract China from concentrating on its offensive capabilities.

The supposedly non-partisan editor of Taiwan Defense Review:
The KMT wants Taiwan to take a beating from China

Speaking of offensive weapons, Jane's Defense Weekly reports Taiwan will soon begin deploying Hsiung Feng IIE cruise missiles capable of striking China's east coast. Earlier, I was unclear whether the HS-IIE was a land attack or anti-ship cruise missile. After further consideration, it is likely both, since there is only minimal difference between them, much like the Exocet and Harpoon can be launched from numerous platforms.

Update: Brian Dunn critiques a piece on the above-mentioned missiles that has earned the title "most twisted analysis yet."

[China] [Taiwan]

Heritage Rankings

2006-01-08T14:05:00.000-05:00

The Heritage Foundation recently released its rankings of economic freedom. Of some relevance to this blog: Hong Kong ranked number one (most free economy), Taiwan ranked 37, and China tied Zambia at 111 out of 157 economies graded. The blogosphere has been abuzz since the rankings were released.

Firing the first shot was Sun Bin, who noted that Taiwan has dropped in the rankings since President Chen Shui-bian took office and that Hong Kong has not dropped since the island reverted to PRC control. Specifically, he faults Chen for attempting "active management" of the economy (which results in a low rank for government intervention in the Heritage rankings).

Asiapundit followed-up on Sun Bin's post with a discussion of who, if anyone, deserves the title "communist" out of the CCP, KMT, and DPP.

Michael Turton fired back with a history lesson and charges of an ideological slant.

Heritage's ideas of what constitutes "intervention" are strongly value-laden... In sum, the report's methodology is highly slanted, selective, and obviously right-wing.

Finally, Simon World brings us an article by Jake van der Kamp pointint out that Hong Kong is not the world's freest economy, Somalia is.

We [Hong Kong] have our rating, largely thanks to the approach the foundation has taken, which, whether deliberately or not, happens to emphasise foreign trade and foreign investment over domestic economic considerations. We fit that cookie cutter perfectly.

[Heritage] [Hong Kong] [Taiwan]

New Year in Politics

2006-01-03T17:35:00.000-05:00

China's President Hu Jintao marked the arrival of the new year with a speech reemphasizing his commitment to the One China policy. Taiwan's President Chen Shui-bian replied with his thoughts on his island's relationship with China.

President Chen Shui-bian said Sunday that Taiwan needed to increase its weapons purchases and warned against greater economic ties to the mainland.

The market responded negatively to Chen's speech.

Michael Turton of The View From Taiwan highlights some particularly good reporting on Taiwan as of late, including the International Herald Tribune article linked above. Especially noteworthy is the portion of the IHT article noting that Chen's policies have not changed. For that matter neither have Hu's.

One thing that has changed is the arms available to Taiwan. This could potentially unfreeze the stalled arms purchase bill and result in a better mix of weapons available to the ROC armed forces.

Update: It now appears there has been no change in the arms sale.

[China] [Taiwan]

Anti-Censorship

2006-01-03T16:41:00.000-05:00

News broke a few days ago that Michael Anti's blogs (Chinese and English) have disappeared from the blogosphere. He had recently taken up the cause of the reporters and editors at the Beijing Daily News. Rebecca MacKinnon has concluded that it was his blog service provider, Microsoft's MSN Spaces, not the Great Firewall of China that killed his blog. Anti has now returned to Blog City (English, Chinese) which is blocked throughout China, likely because of Anti's blog previously hosted there.

In a similar line of thought, John Pasden of Sinosplice wonders why the prominent bridge blog EastSouthWestNorth has never been blocked inside China. A dialogue between Pasden and Roland Soong of ESWN is here with additional comments from Soong here. It is an interesting case study of who gets blocked and who doesn't and guesses as to why.

[Censorship] [China]

China's New Great Leap

2005-12-30T15:39:00.000-05:00

Angry Chinese Blogger has reviewed the Hudson Institute's report "China's New Great Leap Forward" (PDF). I normally like to review reports like this, as I did with 2005 reports by the Pentagon and the China Commission, but ACB has done so well that another recap and/or deconstruction isn't needed.
Excerpt:

Delivering its 95 page report, titled: “China's New Great Leap Forward: High Technology and Military Power in the Next Half-Century”, the Hudson Institute warned Washington that the 'comfort zone' of technological and strategic superiority that has always existed between China's large, but unsophisticated, military, and America's own armed forces, is not only far smaller than previously thought, but that is shrinking at an alarming rate due to the rapid modernization of both China's military strategies, and its domestic R&D capabilities.

[China] [Taiwan]

New Sub Supporter

2005-12-29T19:03:00.000-05:00

Some of you may remember that one month ago, I changed my position on Taiwan's purchase of eight diesel submarines from the United States. Having previously defended the purchase as necessary for security, I switched sides due to cost ineffectiveness. Brian Dunn of the Dignified Rant is now assuming the mantle of leadership in defense of the submarines.

[MeiZhongTai's] analysis ignores the fact that China's subs are on average, quite poor and poorly trained as well. They rarely put to sea and usually do so with the company of surface ships just in case. I sincerely doubt that the PLAN could put 16 effective attack submarines to sea to sink the 8 proposed Taiwanese boats under debate.

Dunn then goes on to ponder how plausible deniability might fit in to undersea warfare in the Taiwan Strait. Give it a read and since Dignified Rant doesn't appear to have comments enabled, feel free to discuss the merits of the various positions in the comments section of this post.