Mexican Drug Cartels

Mexican Drug War Annual Death Toll Numbers Still Confusing, but Late 2011 Total Toll Numbers Remain Consistent at near 50K

2012-01-27T06:36:00.001-05:00

Source: http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/01/26/zetas-now-mexicos-biggest-cartel-report-says/

As of 26Jan12, FOXNEWs/STRATFOR numbers stated the Mexican government reported 12,903 people were killed in 2011, for a total of "47,515" killed beginning in 2006.

However, multiple sources indicate the numbers for 2011 may be significantly higher, but with the overall total remaining the same as noted here: http://www.mexdrugcartels.com/2012/01/mexican-drug-cartel-situation-report_26.html .

This is based on the following source information:

Sources:

McCaffrey, Barry. After Action Report – General Barry R McCaffrey USA (Ret) VISIT MEXICO – 507 DECEMBER 2008. 29Dec08.http://www.mccaffreyassociates.com/pdfs/Mexico_AAR_-_December_2008.pdf; Accessed 25Jan12

Finklea, Kristin, William Krouse and Mark Randol. Congressional Research Service: Southwest Border Violence: Issues in Identifying and Measuring Spillover Violence. 25Jan11. http://opencrs.com/document/R41075/. Accessed 25Jan12.

Smith, Phillip. Mexico 2010 Death Toll Higher Than Afghanistan. 3Jan11.http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/2011/jan/03/mexico_2010_death_toll_higher_af. Accessed 25Jan12.

Cave, Damien. Mexico Updates Death Toll in Drug War to 47,515, but Critics Dispute the Data. 11Jan12.http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2012/01/mexico-updates-death-toll-in-drug-war.html. Accessed 25Jan12

Mexico's DTO's Areas of Operation/Influence Morphing

2012-01-27T06:24:00.001-05:00

Source: http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/01/26/zetas-now-mexicos-biggest-cartel-report-says/

FOXNEWs/STRATFOR report the following:

-"Drug-related" murders declined in Ciudad Juarez, but increased in Monterrey, Durango, Matamoros and Veracruz.

-STRATFOR's 2012 assessment sees Mexican cartel influence increasing in Australia, Europe and the Carribean because of unspecified challenges bringing product into the US.

STRATFOR reports Los Zetas is now the largest Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) in Mexico.

2012-01-27T06:12:00.001-05:00

SOURCE: http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2012/01/26/zetas-now-mexicos-biggest-cartel-report-says/

STRATFOR reported Los Zetas is now the largest Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) in Mexico.

-By end 2011 Los Zetas functioned in over 1/2 of the states making up Mexico.

-Their modus operandi tends more towards violence, vice bribery

-STRATFOR's assessment was reportedly based on "a report by organized crime prosectors.

Mexican Drug Cartel Situation Report (SITREP) - Mexican Drug War Death Toll Numbers from December 2006 to December 2011.

2012-01-26T06:20:00.001-05:00

Mexican Drug Cartel Situation Report (SITREP) - Mexican Drug War Death Toll Numbers from December 2006 to December 2011.

It can be difficult to find death toll numbers if you do not know where to look and because of media and/or political bias. The numbers below come from government sources/government related sources except for the very last set of numbers which came from media sources (New York Times and Borderland Beat) that cited Mexican government numbers. The takeaway from this chart that is the death toll numbers per year continue to increase as of late December 2011.

Mexican Death Toll Numbers:

December 2006 to December 2008 - 7000

2009 - 14300 (7300 for 2009 alone).

2010 - 27000 (13000 alone for 2010)

2011 – 47,515 (20,515 for 2011 alone)

Sources:

McCaffrey, Barry. After Action Report – General Barry R McCaffrey USA (Ret) VISIT MEXICO – 507 DECEMBER 2008. 29Dec08. http://www.mccaffreyassociates.com/pdfs/Mexico_AAR_-_December_2008.pdf; Accessed 25Jan12

Smith, Phillip. Mexico 2010 Death Toll Higher Than Afghanistan. 3Jan11. http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/2011/jan/03/mexico_2010_death_toll_higher_af. Accessed 25Jan12.

Cave, Damien. Mexico Updates Death Toll in Drug War to 47,515, but Critics Dispute the Data. 11Jan12. http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2012/01/mexico-updates-death-toll-in-drug-war.html. Accessed 25Jan12

Mexican Drug Cartel Organizations – Current List and Backgrounds as of January 2012

2012-01-26T06:13:00.001-05:00

Comment: The piece below came from the January 2012 edition of the CTC Sentinel produced by the US Military Academy West Point.

Profiles of Mexico’s Seven Major Drug Trafficking Organizations

Jan 18, 2012
Author: Peter Chalk

Drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) in Mexico have emerged with alarming speed during the last several years, plunging the country’s northern border states into a virtual war zone as they compete for lucrative smuggling routes into the United States.[1] Although Mexican President Felipe Calderon has moved to decisively dislodge the cartels’ power base since taking office in 2006, several prominent organizations continue to exist, benefiting from pervasive corruption that has extended to the highest echelons of Mexico’s law enforcement bureaucracy.
While DTOs have obvious ramifications for Mexican stability, their activities have also directly impinged on U.S. security, with high-level criminality north of the border frequently “migrating” south. This has been particularly evident in Arizona, which currently has among the highest rates of drug-related kidnappings in the United States. Another state experiencing difficulties is Texas, where merchants and wealthy families in frontier towns periodically face extortion threats and which occasionally witnesses narco-murders.[2] On a wider level, syndicates have directly contributed to a growing problem of inner-city gang violence; Los Angeles, Chicago, New York, Dallas and San Francisco are all cases in point.[3] DTOs have also become actively involved in the American people smuggling “business.” It is now a common practice for cartels to assist migrants looking to enter the United States illegally on condition that they carry cocaine packs with them.[4] Finally, there is some concern about a possible nexus emerging between the Mexican drug trade and terrorism. According to U.S. officials, Lebanese Hizb Allah has already secured a highly lucrative source of financing by helping to launder cocaine profits for groups such as the Los Zetas through a range of Shi`a-owned businesses in West Africa.[5]
This article provides brief background information on the seven DTOs that remain at the forefront of the cocaine trade in Mexico: the Gulf Cartel, Los Zetas, La Familia, the Sinaloa Cartel, the Beltran Leyva Organization, the Carrillo Fuentes Syndicate (Juarez Cartel), and the Arellano Felix Organization (Tijuana Cartel).
The Gulf Cartel
The Gulf Cartel is based out of Matamoros in Tamaulipas State, just across the border from Brownsville, Texas. The group’s origins date back to bootlegging in the 1970s, with the move to cocaine trafficking occurring during the 1980s and 1990s. For many years, the Gulf Cartel was considered the most powerful of the Mexican DTOs, enforcing its control through a highly feared paramilitary arm known as the Los Zetas. Since 2007, however, the prominence of the group has begun to wither, both as a result of the elimination of much of its leadership—including the syndicate’s longtime godfather, Osiel Cardenas Guillen, and his brother, Antonio Ezequiel Cardenas Guillen[6]—and due to the defection of the Los Zetas in 2009, which now act as an independent organization. The group’s current leader is Jorge Eduardo Costilla Sanchez (“El Coss”) who is desperately trying to prevent the Zetas from making in-roads into its northern Tamaulipas trafficking corridor, which runs between Matamoros and Nuevo Laredo on the Texan border.[7] As part of this effort, the Gulf Cartel has developed and deployed “narco-tanks”—trucks fitted with air conditioning and steel plates that can only be breached with anti-tank grenades—to patrol its smuggling routes. Four of these vehicles were seized from a garage in Camargo in June 2011.[8]
Los Zetas
The Los Zetas were founded by former members of the Grupos Aeromoviles de Fuerzas Especiales (GAFE), an elite special forces unit that deserted from the Mexican military between 1996 and 2000.[9] It acted as the paramilitary arm of the Gulf Cartel, but in 2009 it emerged as an increasingly significant DTO in its own right. The organization is currently competing with the Gulf Cartel for control over trafficking routes in Tamaulipas State, although it has also expanded its presence to Zacatecas, Veracruz, Tabasco, Campache, the capital territory, Quintana Roo and Chiapas. The group has also worked with the Beltran Leyva Organization in an effort to extend influence into Cuidad Juarez—the locus of one of the main trafficking routes into the United States. Although the Los Zetas have been described as one of the most violent DTOs in Mexico, its ability to consolidate control over the country’s northern border provinces has been curtailed by the arrest of several top commanders since 2008. Prominent in this regard are Mateo Lopez (“Comandante Mateo”), Efrain Teodoro Torres (“Z-14”), Daniel Perez (“El Cachetes”), Manuel Perez Izquierdo (“El Siete Latas”), Marco Garza de Leon Quiroga (“El Chabelo”) and Jaime Gonzalez Duran (“El Hummer”). The first five were all high-ranking members in the group’s overall leadership structure, while the sixth was responsible for coordinating and overseeing cocaine imports from Central America.[10] One of the group’s founders and long-term leaders, Heriberto Lazcano (“El Lazca”), remains at large, along with his number two, Trevino Morales (“Z-40”).[11]
La Familia
La Familia emerged as an independent group in 2006 with the purported dual aim of “defending citizens, merchants, businesses and farmers” from all forms of crime, and filling the security void left by the central government. Its founder, Nazario Moreno Gonzalez (“El Mas Loco,” or the “Craziest One”), required all members to carry a “spiritual manual” that contained references to pseudo-Christian aphorisms for self-improvement, which gave the organization overtones as a religious cult. Since its creation, however, La Familia has systematically morphed into a DTO, becoming especially notorious for what it refers to as “social work”—the ruthless execution (usually by beheading) of those who do not conform to the parameters of its self-defined “law enforcement” code. The group has a confirmed presence in 77 cities across the state of Michoacan (its main base), Queretaro, Guanajuanto, Jalisco, Colima, Aguascalientes and Guerro, as well as the Federal district.[12] Despite this wide geographic “footprint,” La Familia has suffered considerably from both leadership decapitations and desertions. In December 2010, its founder Gonzalez was killed during a shoot-out with security forces; this setback was followed six months later when his successor, Jose de Jesus Mendez Vargas (“El Chango,” or “The Monkey”), was captured in the city of Aguascalientes, roughly 265 miles southeast of Mexico City. Compounding the group’s problems has been internal hemorrhaging, with growing numbers of members leaving to join a splinter group known as Caballeros Templarios (Knight’s Templar). Enrique Plancarte Solis and Servando Gomez Martinez established the latter entity in March 2011 as an alternative vehicle for achieving “public justice,” and the group now poses a serious challenge to La Familia’s continued organizational cohesion, if not existence.[13]
The Sinaloa Cartel
The Sinaloa Cartel was established as La Alizana de Sangre in the mid-1990s. After its founder, Hector Luis Palma Salazar (“El Guero”), was arrested in 1995, Joaquin Guzman (“El Chapo,” or “Shorty”) took control and remains the current leader. He is the most wanted drug lord in Mexico and is thought to have a personal fortune of $1 billion.[14] The Sinaloa Cartel controls most of the state by the same name and retains important bases in Baja California, Durango (where Guzman is believed to be hiding), Sonora, Jalisco and Chihuahua. The group is known to have established distribution cells across the United States, sending cocaine shipments via tunnels dug below the southern U.S. border. It is also thought to have set up additional Andean hubs to facilitate the transshipment of Peruvian and Colombian cocaine through West Africa to Europe. Although the Sinaloa Cartel has witnessed the arrests of high-ranking members, including the infamous Teodoro Garcia Simental (“El Teo,” who was behind much of the drug-related violence that plagued the border provinces in 2008 and 2009)[15] and Ovidio Limon Sanchez (who managed Sinaloan cocaine movements bound for the American market), it remains the most powerful and influential DTO in Mexico.[16] The group has been battling for control of two key trafficking routes that respectively abut New Mexico and California, each of which it is now thought to largely dominate: one in Cuidad Juarez, where it has been competing with the Carrillo Fuentes Syndicate, Beltran Leyva Organization—both former allies—and the Los Zetas; and one in Tijuana, which is also contested by the Arellano Felix Organization.[17]
The Beltran Leyva Organization
The Beltran Leyva Organization was largely the product of four brothers who were born in the state of Sinaloa in the 1960s: Marcus Arturo (“El Barbas”), Carlos (“El jefe de jefes”), Alfredo (“El Mochomo”) and Hector (“El Ingeniero”). The quartet was originally closely allied with the Sinaloa Cartel, but broke with the group in 2008 after Alfredo was arrested following an alleged Sinaloan betrayal. Initially, the organization proved capable of resisting competition from its parent syndicate as well as infiltrating counternarcotic units and assassinating some of their most senior officers.[18] The Beltrans’ influence, however, has diminished due to the loss of some of its most prominent members. The first major setback occurred in December 2009 when its leader at the time, Arturo, was killed. This was followed by a string of apprehensions in 2010 that netted Carlos Beltran in January, Gerardo Alvarez-Vasquez (“El Indio”) in April, Edgar Valdez Villarreal (“La Barbie”) in August and Sergio Villarreal Barragan (“El Grande”) in September. Another senior lieutenant, Oscar Osvaldo Garcia Montoya (“El Compayito”), was detained in April 2011.[19] His capture has been described as eliminating the “last Beltran-Leyva link of any importance.”[20] This would appear to be an overstatement. The group has forged alliances of convenience with the Carrillo Fuentes Syndicate and the Los Zetas and continues to engage the Sinaloans for control of territory in Cuidad Juarez.[21] It also retains at least a residual leadership structure that is overseen by Hector, one of the original founding brothers.
Carrillo Fuentes Syndicate (Juarez Cartel)
The Carrillo Fuentes Syndicate is based in the northern city of Cuidad Juarez in Chihuahua State, just across the border from El Paso, Texas. The organization is led by Vincente Carrillo Fuentes (“El Viceroy”),[22] has a standing alliance with the Beltran Leyva Organization and is similarly fighting the Sinaloans for control of Juarez. It maintains a highly brutal enforcement wing known as La Linea that is composed of corrupt police officers. The unit’s long-time commander, Jose Antonio Acosta Hernandez (“El Diego”), was captured in August 2011. He has admitted to personally ordering 1,500 killings and is also thought to be the mastermind behind the 2010 killings of a U.S. Consulate employee, her husband and another worker at the U.S. mission in Cuidad Juarez.[23] At its height, the Carrillo Fuentes Syndicate was assumed to be responsible for about half of all the illegal drugs that pass through Mexico to the United States by using a street gang, Barrio Azteca, to coordinate sales, distribution and, when necessary, contract killings in cities such as Austin, Dallas and El Paso.[24] According to some American sources, these activities earned the organization as much as $200 million per week.[25] Although the syndicate’s control over trafficking routes through Chihuahua has been significantly dented by Sinaloan competition, it continues to be an important player in the overall Mexican drug scene. The group’s members also retain a reputation for extreme violence; for example, they were implicated in the infamous Cuidad Juarez serial-murder site that was first reported in 2004 and which has since been dubbed the “House of Death.”[26]
Arellano Felix Organization (Tijuana Cartel)
The Arellano Felix Organization, which operates primarily in the state of Baja California but also has an important presence in Zacatecas and Sinaloa, was at one time one of the largest and most violent DTOs in Mexico. It was initially organized around five brothers and four sisters who inherited the organization from Miguel Angel Felix Gallardo after he was arrested in 1989 for complicity in the murder of a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) official.[27] Four of the main siblings as well as other senior lieutenants have since been arrested or killed, including Benjamin Arellano Felix (the cartel’s principal drug lord), Eduardo Arellano Felix, Ramon Eduardo Arellano Felix, Francisco Javier Arellano Felix, Francisco Sillas Rocha and Armado Villareal Heredia.[28] These losses have dramatically curtailed the organization’s penetration and reach, with competitors such as the Sinaloans increasingly muscling into its home turf and taking control over some of its key smuggling routes.[29] That said, the cartel continues to operate in Baja California, retains a presence, albeit a declining one, in 15 other states and still controls important street-level trafficking cells in the United States. The current leader is thought to be Luis Fernando Sanchez, the nephew of Enedina Arellano Felix (one of the sisters who originally inherited the cartel from Gallardo).[30] He reportedly works closely with Edgardo Leyva Escandon, a trained sniper who has been tied to the assassinations of several drug kingpins and who is also wanted on weapons and ammunition smuggling charges. The United States has posted rewards of $2 million apiece for information leading to the arrests or convictions of the two men.[31]
Conclusion
These seven organizations can essentially be split into two main competing blocs: the Sinaloa Cartel, the Gulf Cartel and La Familia, which formed a cooperative union known as the New Federation in February 2010; and a loose pattern of shifting coalitions among the remaining four syndicates. This alliance structure appears to have some longevity built into it, given bonds of beneficial business relationships and, just as importantly, vendettas and unpaid blood debts.
Given ongoing demand for cocaine in North America and Western Europe, pervasive corruption in Mexico and the enormous profits that can be made from the illegal drug trade, the problems associated with DTO competition and violence south of the U.S. border are unlikely to disappear anytime soon. While alliances may fluctuate—and despite the loss of several prominent narco “kingpins”—there is no indication that any of the seven organizations are about to collapse, disband or voluntarily cease their activity. This has serious implications for the United States, which remains the world’s number one consumer of Andean-sourced narcotics.
Thus far, the United States has tended to emphasize supply interdiction in its overall counternarcotics efforts. This policy has clearly not worked, which is reflected by the endemic instability that now besets Mexico—the corridor for roughly 95% of the cocaine flowing out of Colombia, Bolivia and Peru. In looking to the future, it is evident that the United States will need to develop a more balanced approach that both bolsters support to the Calderon government while simultaneously addressing the demand-side—that is, the American side—of the drug equation.
Dr. Peter Chalk is a Senior Policy Analyst with the RAND Corporation, Santa Monica, California. He has worked on a range of projects examining transnational security threats in Latin America, Africa and Asia. He is Associate Editor of Studies in Conflict and Terrorism—one of the foremost journals in the international security field—and serves as an Adjunct Professor with the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
[1] An estimated 47,515 people have died in Mexico drug-related violence since 2006. See “Mexico Drug War Deaths over Five Years Now Total 47,515,” BBC, January 12, 2012.
[2] Brian Ross, Richard Esposito and Asa Eslocker, “Kidnapping Capital of USA,” ABC News, February 11, 2009; Fred Burton and Scott Stewart, “The Long Arm of the Lawless,” Stratfor, February 25, 2009; Randal Archibold, “Wave of Drug Violence Creeping into Arizona from Mexico, Officials Say,” New York Times, February 23, 2009; David Danelo, “Space Invaders: Mexican Illegal Aliens and the US,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, October 29, 2008.
[3] The Carrillo Fuentes group frequently uses Barrio Azteca to carry out contract killings in Texas and New Mexico. Another organization generating concern is the Mexican La Eme, which has expanded into the barrios of eastern Los Angeles where it works as a freelance debt collector and enforcer for cartels seeking to extend local market control. See, for instance, Jay Albanese, “Prison Break: Mexican Gang Moves Operations Outside US Jails,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, December 4, 2008; Adam Elkus, “Gangs, Terrorists and Trade,” Foreign Policy in Focus, April 17, 2007; John P. Sullivan and Adam Elkus, “State of Siege: Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency,” Small Wars Journal, 2008; Clare Ribando, Gangs in Central America (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2005).
[4] Tim Padgett, “People Smugglers Inc.,” Time Magazine, August 12, 2003; Heather MacDonald, “The Illegal-Alien Crime Wave,” City Journal, Winter 2004; Jameson Taylor, “Illegal Immigration: Drugs, Gangs and Crime,” Civitas Institute, November 2007; “National Drug Threat Assessment 2010,” National Drug Intelligence Center, U.S. Department of Justice, February 2010.
[5] Jo Becker, “Beirut Bank Seen as a Hub of Hezbollah’s Financing,” New York Times, December 13, 2011. Gunmen from Los Zetas were also alleged to have been involved in Iran’s purported recent plot to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to Washington. If true, it is not unreasonable to assume that Hizb Allah acted as the go-between for the plan given its close relations with Tehran and suspected ties to the Mexican syndicate. For more on the supposed plot, see Charlie Savage and Scott Shane, “Iranians Accused of Plot to Kill Saudi’s U.S. Envoy,” New York Times, October 11, 2011.
[6] Cardenas was arrested in 2003 but continued to run the Gulf Cartel from prison. He was extradited to the United States in January 2007.
[7] Fred Burton and Stephen Meiners, “Mexico and the War Against the Drug Cartels in 2008,” Stratfor, December 9, 2008; Sylvia Longmire, “Mexico’s Drug War: TCO 101: The Gulf Cartel,” www.borderviolenceanalysis.typepad.com, accessed December 12, 2011; George Grayson, “Mexico and the Drug Cartels,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, August 2007; Jo Tuckman, “Body Count Mounts as Drug Cartels Battle Each Other – and the Police,” Guardian, May 27, 2008; “5630 Execution Murders in 2008: Mexican Drug Cartels,” Right Side News, January 1, 2009.
[8] “Mexican Army Destroys Drug Cartel ‘Narco-Subs,’” BBC News, June 6, 2011.
[9] According to Mexican authorities, as many as 1,000 members of GAFE have defected from the army since the late 1990s. Those critical to the formation of Los Zetas included Arturo Guzman Decena (“Z-1,” now dead), Maximino Ortiz, Víctor Hernandez Barron, Augustin Hernandez Martinez, Juan Carlos Tovar, Pedro Cervantes Marquez, Ramiro Rangel and Samuel Flores (all arrested).
[10] George Grayson, “Los Zetas: The Ruthless Army Spawned by a Mexican Drug Cartel,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 2008; Oscar Becerra, “A to Z of Crime: Mexico’s Zetas Expand Operations,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, January 27, 2009; Burton and Meiners; Sullivan and Elkus; Tuckman; “Mexican Police Capture Regional Leader of Violent Drug Cartel,” Latin American Herald Tribune, June 6, 2011; “‘Zetas Drug-Cartel Boss’ Captured in Mexico,” al-Jazira, October 17, 2011.
[11] “Mexico Security Memo: A Zetas Challenge to the Mexican Government,” Stratfor, December 8, 2011.
[12] Oscar Becerra, “Family Business: La Familia: Mexico’s Most Violent Criminals,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, October 7, 2009; George Grayson, “La Familia: Another Deadly Mexican Syndicate,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, February 2009.
[13] Randal Archibold, “Mexican Police Arrest Leader of Crime Gang,” New York Times, June 22, 2011; Randal Archibold, “Politics Enables Mexican Fugitive To Defang Law,” New York Times, December 15, 2010; “Falling Kingpins, Rising Violence,” Economist, December 18, 2010; “A Leader of Mexico’s Caballeros Templarios Arrested,” Borderland Beat, November 10, 2011; “Mexico Police Raid ‘La Familia Drug Cartel,’ Killing 11,” BBC News, May 28, 2001.
[14] In 2009, Forbes included Guzman on its list of the world’s richest men (701 out of 739).
[15] Simental’s trademark was to boil rivals and enemies in barrels of lye–a practice that became known as pozole after the name for Mexican stew.
[16] The U.S. intelligence community has gone further, describing the cartel as the “most powerful drug trafficking organization in the world.”
[17] Burton and Meiners; Tuckman; Richard Marosi and Ken Ellingwood, “Mexican Drug Lord Teodoro Garcia Simental, Known for his Savagery, is Captured,” Los Angeles Times, January 13, 2010; Marc Lacey, “Top Mexican Drug Suspect Arrested,” International Herald Tribune, January 14, 2011; “Mexico Arrests High-Ranking Sinaloa Cartel Operator,” Latin American Herald Tribune, November 14, 2011; “US Intelligence Says Sinaloa Cartel Has Won the Battle for Cuidad Juarez Drug Routes,” CNS.com, April 9, 2010.
[18] One of the most senior members killed by the Beltrans was Edgar Millan Gomez–the Federal Police director. He was assassinated in May 2008.
[19] “Mexico Captures Brother of Slain Cartel Boss,” New York Times, January 3, 2010; “Alleged Top Drug Trafficker Caught Near Mexico City,” USA Today, April 22, 2010; Randall Archibold, “Mexican Police Arrest Man Believed to Be Drug Kingpin,” New York Times, August 31, 2010; “Mexico Arrests Suspected Drug Kingpin,” BBC News, September 12, 2011; “Falling Kingpins, Rising Violence”; “Mexico Arrests Trafficker Accused of 900 Murders,” Daily Telegraph, August 12, 2011.
[20] Angelo Velasco, “Cae el líder de La Mano con Ojas; lo vinculan con 600 homicidos,” Excelsior, August 12, 2011.
[21] See, for instance, Samuel Logan, “Beltran Leyvas Down But Not Out,” ISN Security Watch, January 8, 2010.
[22] The United States has posted a $5 million reward for information leading to the arrest or conviction of Vincente Carrillo Fuentes.
[23] “Mexican Drug Cartel Enforcer Who ‘Ordered’ 1500 Killings is Captured After US Tip Off,” Mail Online, August 1, 2011.
[24] “Barrio Azteca Gang Behind Juarez Drug Violence,” Drug Crime, April 12, 2010; Marc Lacey and Ginger Thompson, “Drug Slayings in Mexico Rock U.S. Consulate,” New York Times, March 14, 2010; Marc Lacey, “Raids Aim to Find Killers of 3 in Mexico,” New York Times, March 18, 2010.
[25] Howard La Franchi, “A Look Inside a Giant Drug Cartel,” Christian Science Monitor, December 6, 1999.
[26] David Rose, “House of Death,” Observer, December 3, 2006; Alfredo Corchado, “‘Drug Wars’ Long Shadow,” Dallas Morning News, December 13, 2008; Radley Balko, “The House of Death,” Reason, September 30, 2008.
[27] Tim Steller, “Mexican Drug Runners May Have Used C-130 from Arizona,” Arizona Daily Star, April 15, 1998.
[28] The fifth Felix brother, Francisco Rafeel, was arrested in 1993 and after serving a 10-year sentence was extradited to the United States; he was released from prison in El Paso on February 2, 2008 and returned to Cuidad Juarez. There are two other brothers, Carlos Alberto and Luis Fernando, neither of whom are wanted by the authorities.
[29] See, for instance, Elizabeth Diaz, “Analysis: Mexico’s Tijuana Cartel Weaker as Ex-Boss Comes Home,” Reuters, March 14, 2008; Tuckman; “Mexican Drug Lord Is Arrested,” Reuters, October 26, 2008; “Mexico Seizes Top Drug Suspect,” BBC News, October 27, 2008.
[30] “New Arellano Félix Cartel Leaders,” Justice In Mexico Project, December 4, 2010; “Mexico Seizes Top Drug Suspect.” Enedina is also suspected of playing a role in the cartel’s current activities and as a businesswoman has allegedly facilitated its money laundering operations.
[31] “Edgardo Leyva Escandon,” NarcoticNews.com, accessed December 13, 2011; Anna Cearley, “DEA Man Seeking Man Linked to Arellano Boat,” San Diego Tribune, September 6, 2006.

Mexican Drug Cartel Situation Report (SITREP) - Mexican Drug War Death Toll Numbers from December 2006 to December 2011.

2012-01-25T20:21:00.001-05:00

Mexican Drug Cartel Situation Report (SITREP) - Mexican Drug War Death Toll Numbers from December 2006 to December 2011.

It can be difficult to find death toll numbers if you do not know where to look and because of media and/or political bias. The numbers below come from government sources/government related sources except for the very last set of numbers which came from a well trusted media sources (New York Times and Borderland Beat) that cited Mexican government numbers. The takeaway from this chart that is the death toll numbers per year continue to increase as of late December 2011.

Mexican Death Toll Numbers:

December 2006 to December 2008 - 7000

2009 - 14300 (7300 for 2009 alone).

2010 - 27000 (13000 alone for 2010)

2011 – 47,515 (20,515 for 2011 alone)

Sources:

McCaffrey, Barry. After Action Report – General Barry R McCaffrey USA (Ret) VISIT MEXICO – 507 DECEMBER 2008. 29Dec08. http://www.mccaffreyassociates.com/pdfs/Mexico_AAR_-_December_2008.pdf; Accessed 25Jan12

Smith, Phillip. Mexico 2010 Death Toll Higher Than Afghanistan. 3Jan11. http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/2011/jan/03/mexico_2010_death_toll_higher_af. Accessed 25Jan12.

Combating Terrorism – January 2012 Issue of CTC Sentinel Posted – Addresses Terrorism Recruitment, Bioterrorism, Jihadists in Europe and Mexican Drug Cartels

2012-01-25T07:43:00.001-05:00

Excerpt:

CTC Sentinel | Volume 5, Issue 1 (January 2012)

Published by Combating Terrorism Center

COVER STORY OVERVIEW

The U.S.-Pakistan Relationship in the Year Ahead
By Ahmed Rashid
In the past six months, a series of major incidents between the United States and Pakistan has brought their relationship to a new low. Although all of Pakistan’s international relationships are important, it is the one with the United States that is most critical to its future stability as well as the maintenance of peace in South Asia. A key question for the year 2012 will be whether the United States and Pakistan can rebuild a much abused relationship. This article will review the primary incidents that led to the worsening of relations in 2011, identify some U.S. missteps, warn of a number of flashpoints that could occur in 2012, and finally offer critical suggestions for how the U.S.-Pakistan relationship can be resuscitated in the months ahead.
IN THIS ISSUE

Al-Shabab’s Western Recruitment Strategy
Alexander Meleagrou-Hitchens
Bioterrorism: Still a Threat to the United States
Leonard A. Cole
Individual Jihadist Operations in Europe: Patterns and Challenges
Petter Nesser
Profiles of Mexico’s Seven Major Drug Trafficking Organizations
Peter Chalk

You Are Being Watched - Are you a Drug Trafficker and Not Know It? See Why and How

2012-01-24T23:17:00.000-05:00

Excerpt from CNN article posted 25Jan12. Source link at the bottom.

"How the scam works

Drug cartels were well aware of the SENTRI pass system and concocted a plan to take advantage of it. Jesus Chavez and Carlos Alberto Gomez, both Mexican citizens living in Texas, were recently accused in a 20-page criminal complaint of doing just that.

Jesus Chavez was arrested for allegedly targeting innocent drivers to ferry drugs into Mexico.

According to the complaint, Chavez and Gomez allegedly paid lookouts to monitor SENTRI pass drivers -- noting the time of day, as well as the make, model and color of their cars -- as they drove over the bridge.

The lookouts targeted students and professionals who typically have consistent routines.

Once they identified a possible target, they followed the car as it returned to the Mexican side of the border. Then, they approached the car at night, copied the vehicle identification number (VIN) off the dashboard and gave the number to Chavez and Gomez.

They also planted GPS tracking devices on the car so they could monitor its movements between Juarez and El Paso.

The complaint alleges that Chavez and Gomez took the VIN to a Texas-based locksmith who had access to key code sources for the vehicles. With that information, the locksmith made two keys for each vehicle -- one for Chavez and Gomez, and the other for Juarez-based accomplices.

The co-conspirators allegedly used their copy of the key to unlock the trunk of the target vehicle at night and place two duffel bags inside. The bags contained about 60 pounds of marijuana each and were both secured with zip ties.

The unsuspecting driver transported the drugs across the border unknowingly, and according to the complaint, Chavez and Gomez retrieved the drugs using their key once the driver was in the United States.

It was a simple, effective plan. But there was one problem: All the cases had striking similarities. And that caught the eye of a judge -- but not until after innocent people, like Andres, had been convicted of smuggling drugs."

See how cartels target and select unwitting traffickers http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2011/images/12/14/blind.mules,.fbi.affidavit,.july.2011.pdf

Source: http://edition.cnn.com/2012/01/23/world/americas/mexico-blind-drug-mules/?hpt=wo_mid

The American Backyard.NET: Clean Cut Texas Kid Ran Drugs for Sinaloa – Key Ob...

2012-01-13T22:42:00.000-05:00

The American Backyard.NET: Clean Cut Texas Kid Ran Drugs for Sinaloa – Key Ob...: Texas Kid Ran Drugs for Sinaloa Cartel – Key Observations and Video Key Points: · Motivation – Easy money, pride and perception of an easy l...

2012 Mexican Drug War- Where are We? What We Can Do? A Second Source Says 50,000 Dead from Dec 2006 to Dec 2011

2012-01-07T08:08:00.001-05:00

2012 Mexican Drug War- Where are We? What We Can Do? A Second Source Says 50,000 Dead from Dec 2006 to Dec 2011

Below is a video from al Jazeera which wraps up what was summarized in a few recent posts regarding the death tolls in Mexico. The key points of the video are this:

-Mexican media, and at least one political scientist, see the death toll somewhere in the neighborhood of 50,000. The reason for this confusion in death toll numbers is because many incidences go unreported and/or missing people are not considered casualties. It’s also because members of the media face limitation due to cartel violence, torture and coercion. Of note, the al Jazeera video stated the Mexican government will come out with their numbers later in January 2012. We will get a chance to see what the public perception says, versus the government perception. Perception rules in low intensity conflict environments.

-Right now, the two dominant cartels are the Sinaloa (aka Pacific) and Los Zetas Cartels. Note in the prior posts listed under ‘other references’ the Mexican Drug War Death Toll from December 2006 to December 2012 is 50,000 NOT 38,000 - See 2012 Trends notes the Sinaloa is more strategic thinking, while Los Zetas tend to be more like local thugs.

-One of the cartels major targets are reporters/media folks. Why? The media brings worldwide attention to the problem; they attempt to expose entities contributing to the problem; and, their reports shape the public’s view of the problem. No press, no problem…no problem…governments, to include the US, ignore the issue. Have press, one cannot ignore the problem…including the US. ***NOTE*** REMEMBER, WHOEVER DOMINATES THE PSYCHOLOGICAL BATTLEFIELD, DOMINATES THE FIGHT. MEXICO NEEDS MORE MEDIA COVERAGE TO EXPOSE THE ACTIONS/ACTIVITIES OF CORRUPT POLICE, CITY OFFICIALS, LOCALS COLLUDING WITH THE CARTELS. YOU CAN LEARN MORE ABOUT THIS DYNAMIC BELOW BY READING Bottom Line Up Front: Dominate Psychological Environment – Notes of a Counterinsurgent

-Last, Calderon’s time is up. Mexican Presidents can only serve one six-year term. To Calderon’s credit he’s increased emphasis on cleaning up the police forces throughout Mexico…a very hard task. Calderon is also credited for helping to lessen violence in major drug corridors, such a Ciudad Juarez.

See Video Now

Other references:

-Mexican Drug War Death Toll from December 2006 to December 2012 is 50,000 NOT 38,000 - See 2012 Trends

-2012 and the Mexican Drug War - 38,000 Killed and Counting

-Bottom Line Up Front: Dominate Psychological Environment – Notes of a Counterinsurgent

Prison Sentences for Tijuana Cartel Leader

2012-01-05T06:39:00.001-05:00

On 5 Jan 12, the New York Times reported Benjamin Arellano Felix, 58, will not be sentenced no more than 25 years under a plea agreement. After he serves his time in the US, he will then serve the remainder of his time in Mexico for crimes committed there.

Additional Excerpts:

"Francisco Javier Arellano Felix, a younger brother who led the cartel after Benjamin was arrested in Mexico in 2002, was sentenced in San Diego to life in prison in 2007, a year after he was captured by U.S. authorities in international waters off Mexico's Baja California coast."

"Jesus Labra Aviles, a lieutenant under Benjamin Arellano Felix, was sentenced in San Diego to 40 years in prison in 2010."

Full article link: http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2012/01/05/us/AP-US-Drug-War-Arellano-Felix.html?ref=news&pagewanted=print

Mexican Drug War Death Toll from December 2006 to December 2012 is 50,000 NOT 38,000 - See 2012 Trends

2012-01-05T06:05:00.000-05:00

On 1 Jan 12, Borderland Beat posted an article that should be considered a baseline read for assessing change in 2012.
The Article, Mexico's Drugs War: Lessons and Challenges cited some interesting observations from "Mexican political scientist Eduardo Guerrero Gutierrez".
Gutierrez made the following notable statements that he believes may shape the upcoming Presidential elections in July 12:
-Since 2006 the Mexican military was deployed to various locations in Mexico to blunt cartel efforts, most of it focused against fighting organizes crime...implying they are affecting police actions in lieu of effective police.
-The death toll in the Mexican Drug War is assessed to be 50,000; just under 17,000 for 2011 alone...an increase of nearly 10% from 2010. Despite this jump, article noted the "level of violence has stabilized" when compared to the 2009-2010 jump which was 60%.
-There were some positive gains that are noted in the source link listed below.
-The two dominant gangs in Mexico are the Sinaloa Cartel and Los Zetas. The source article noted Sinaloa's focus of effort appears to be more on the business side of trafficking. Los Zetas is less sophisticated and tends to run as thugs in local communities through "extortion rackets".
-The creation of a hydra is a concern. As the Mexican government gains ground by taking down key leaders within the cartels, their actions are contributing to a natural consequence of splintering. Gutierrez seems to imply that without leadership, the cartels are going more localized in their efforts and focus...creating their own independent cells as they lack credibility and effectiveness to act on the level of a major transnational criminal organization. The threat therefore is more to local communities...hence this makes sense why Calderon is increasing his effort to improve/vet police forces providing security and stability in various communities.
Gutierrez's assessment makes sense as the US seemed to experience similar issues when al Qaida in Iraq started to weaken in late 2006-2009. Al Qaida in Iraq functioned very much like the drug cartels in terms of violence, criminal activity, coercion and extortion-the Jihad concept was really an excuse for many to be criminals under the banner of ideology. Actually, the cartels were more physically brutal and less considerate of the indigenous population than al Qaida in Iraq.
Link to last post: http://www.mexdrugcartels.com/2012/01/fw-2012-and-mexican-drug-war-38000.html
Source: Mexico's Drugs War: Lessons and Challenges http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2012/01/mexicos-drugs-war-lessons-and.html

FW: 2012 and the Mexican Drug War - 38,000 Killed and Counting

2012-01-03T22:37:00.001-05:00

2012 and the Mexican Drug War - 38,000 Killed and Counting

3Jan12, freelance reporter Larry Kaplow noted the following points in his piece for The Daily Beast, "2012 Will Be a Decisive Year in Mexico's Deadly Drug War".

* Mexican newspaper "Reforma <http://www.reforma.com/> " has a graphic on their site that records the casualty numbers for the Drug War. The graphic is called the "Executionmeter" or "Ejecutometro". The year 2011 ended with 12,359 killings; an increase of almost 7% from the previous year. Beheadings rose from just under 400 to just fewer than 600. Unspecified sources also purport drug related organizations influence governance is over "71% of the country's municipalities." Reforma claimed the total death toll as a result of the drug war to be about 38,000, while other unnamed sources claim the death toll is higher.

* The article did note some parts of Mexico did clean up, but also noted cartel activity did spread to other areas...so no real change.

* Many Mexicans still support the use of military force and other security related activities to disrupt narco-cartel influence, but about "a third" want to "negotiate with the cartels or legalize drugs". Only 18% of Mexicans reportedly believe the government is winning the war against the cartels.

* Cartels retain the ability to leverage corrupt political and police officials.

* The government is taking several approaches to mitigate the cartel's grip on the population on multiple levels from addressing social conditions that may contribute to cartel growth and development such as poverty, education, disrupting police and political corruption at the local community levels.

Full Article: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/01/03/2012-will-be-a-decisive-year-in-mexico-s-deadly-drug-war.html

Part 2 – US Targets Money Laundering Activity for the Cartels

2011-12-31T17:52:00.001-05:00

Refer to Post: http://www.mexdrugcartels.com/2011/12/us-targets-money-laundering-activity.html… 29Dec11, Associated Press reported the US levied sanctions against two "Lebanese-Colombian Nationals Jorge Fadlallah Cheaitelly and Mohamad Zouheir El Khansa" for moving money for Colombian and Mexican drug cartels. The effort aslo targeted nine other unspecified personalities as well as almost 30 "entities" in China, Lebanon, Panama and Colombia.

Click on Graphic to access actual PDF of link chart.

Graphic Source: http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Documents/Chart%20of%20Cheaitelly%20and%20Khansa%20Affiliates.pdf

Mexican Police Official Gets 10 Years In Prison

2011-12-30T23:00:00.001-05:00

Borderland Beat reported on 30 Dec 11 that former Federal Police regional security coordinator Javier Herrera Valles was sentenced to 10 years in prison. Herrera Valles used his position to assist Sinaloa drug cartel operations. He received 70,000 dollars a month for his services.

Javier was also reported to have his own illegal operations in the Mexican state of Guerrero.

Source: http://www.borderlandbeat.com/2011/12/ex-police-chief-gets-10-years-for.html

Comment and some Background Information: Collusion between members of the Federal Police of Mexico and the drug cartels is not new. The seeds to the current Mexican Drug War were sown in the 70s...YES, I said that right...the 1970s.

The relationship between narcos and Mexican authorities existed since at least the 70s when Colombian cartels started figuring ways to use Mexico as a transit point for their product into the US. Miguel Ángel Félix Gallardo, a former Sinaloa Governor bodyguard, and trained Mexican Judicial Federal Police agent, prostituted his relationships (access to corrupt police and legal officials) and skills to Colombian Drug Lords.

Gallardo was the first Mexican Narco leader. He founded the Guadalajara cartel. 1989, Gallardo was arrested for his direct involvement in the early 1985 murder of a former US Marine/DEA Agent Enrique "Kiki" Camarena. While in prison, Gallardo’s Guadalajara cartel broke into the now known Tijuana and Sinaloa Cartels.

Head of 'Blondies' cartel arrested in Mexico City

2011-12-29T22:39:00.001-05:00

28Dec11, Mexico City, Mexico. Mexican authorties reported Luis Rodriguez Olivera aka "Whitey" was arrested at the Mexico City airport. Olivera's gang, "The Blondies" formed short-term alliances with larger Mexican drug cartels to smuggle drugs and conduct other criminal activities.

Source: http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/12/28/20111228mexico-drug-cartel-blondies-arrest.html?

US targets money laundering activity for cartels

2011-12-29T22:30:00.001-05:00

29Dec11, Associated Press reported the US levied sanctions against two "Lebanese-Colombian Nationals Jorge Fadlallah Cheaitelly and Mohamad Zouheir El Khansa" for moving money for Colombian and Mexican drug cartels. The effort aslo targeted nine other unspecified personalities as well as almost 30 "entities" in China, Lebanon, Panama and Colombia.

Source: http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/U/US_US_DRUG_CARTELS?SECTION=HOME&SITE=AP&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT

Bill Summary & Status - 112th Congress (2011 - 2012) - H.R.3401 - THOMAS (Library of Congress)

2011-11-14T18:56:00.001-05:00

Comment: This bill is worth monitoring. What you are seeing are nascent efforts by the US political leadership to actively engage the “terrorist insurgency” in Mexico. A fight appears to be brewing.

Bill Summary & Status
112th Congress (2011 - 2012)
H.R.3401

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H.R.3401
Latest Title: To apply counterinsurgency tactics under a coordinated and targeted strategy to combat the terrorist insurgency in Mexico waged by transnational criminal organizations, and for other purposes.
Sponsor: Rep Mack, Connie [FL-14] (introduced 11/10/2011) Cosponsors (None)
Latest Major Action: 11/10/2011 Referred to House committee. Status: Referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committees on Homeland Security, and the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned.

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Bill Summary & Status - 112th Congress (2011 - 2012) - H.R.3401 - THOMAS (Library of Congress)

Shanty Towns, Slums and Drug Gangs – Mexico’s Reality, The US Future – A Brazilian Example

2011-11-13T08:28:00.001-05:00

Shanty Towns, Slum and Drug Gangs – Mexico’s Reality, The US Future – A Brazilian Example

Comment: Below are excerpts worth noting before reading the actual source article linked below. The article shows how the unpopular ‘counterinsurgency’ (COIN) remains a valid concept in areas plagued by violence, criminal activity, poverty as well as corrupt local officials. COIN is unpopular because it means slogging to peace; COIN means house cleaning; it means hard work and a dedicated focus; COIN is about constantly remaining in touch with the people, society and their needs or risk widespread social unrest.

Add the bad world economy, growing unemployment rate and you have desperate people trying to find ways to survive at the expense of law, order, self-respect and faith- moral relativism replaces ideals as survival for the fittest steps in. People, with a social Darwinistic ideal, become a majority and chaos ensues. Add the growing world population and we, human beings, find our own selves being the great plague against mankind.

Mexico already has a number of these areas existing already. There are no clear indications the drug problem in Mexico is improving…there are no indications the situation is stabilizing…instead, it appears the drug war is simply a part of the culture and way of life in Mexico. If America is not careful, she will have the same problems too.

There are a couple of things readers may want to take away:

-Not addressing local drug problems contribute to chronic ungovernable regions where other crimes can fester.

-Brazil’s gangs are often made up of “rogue off-duty police and firefighters”. In other words, when law and governance fail, so does social stability.

-Slums and shanty towns contain a silent population who hope for law and instability and are will to go public if they have a sense of security. However, when legal authorities are as brutal as the local thugs, people remain fearful.

-The authorities in Brazil are using counterinsurgency tactics to address the local problem…yes, counterinsurgency insights are applicable to counter-gang and counter-organized criminal activities. The Brazilian authorities are running “pacification” activities in slums in the form of “community relations”. Security forces are temporarily filling in the governance void until effective civilian authorities can take over. They will hopefully ensure the people have electricity, health and other basic necessities addressed to they can be brought into “the formal economy”.

-Last, this effort is part of a campaign plan for change that’s intended to reach “all of the remaining major gang strongholds by 2014”

Reuters and The Associated Press contributed to this report.

Read Article: Brazilian commandos occupy Rio's biggest slum

Hacker Fight? Anonymous message to Zeta cartel and to the Mexican Government

2011-11-01T23:20:00.001-04:00

Comment: It appears the hacker fight is on as

Anonymous message to Zetacartel<http://anonopsibero.blogspot.com/2011/11/anonymous-message-to-zeta-cartel.html>

01:59 ANONYMOUS IBEROAMERICA 12 COMMENTS Y 193 REACTIONS<http://anonopsibero.blogspot.com/2011/11/anonymous-message-to-zeta-cartel.html#disqus_thread>

To los Zetas and other drug cartels and criminal organizations:

THIS IS NOW INTERNATIONAL. THIS IS GLOBAL. YOU CAN TRY TO STOP ANONS IN MEXICO, CENTRAL AMERICA, AND PERHAPS THE UNITED STATES, BUT YOU CAN'T STOP ANONYMOUS AS IT IS A WORLDWIDE IDEA, A GLOBAL SPIRIT IMPOSSIBLE TO SHOT, IMPOSSIBLE TO BURN IN ACID. STOP YOUR REGIME OF TERROR.WE KNOW WE ARE RISKING OUR LIVES, BUT WE PREFER TO DIE STANDING THAN TO LIVE A WHOLE LIFE ON OUR KNEES. WE DON'T KNOW WHO OR WHAT IS REALLY BEHIND YOU. BUT BELIEVE US, WE WILL FIND OUT. WE RARELY FAIL.

To our fellow citizens of the world, and especially the Mexican People:

THIS IS THE TIME WHEN YOU CAN TAKE THE CHANCE TO ACT ON YOUR OWN BEHALF. THIS IS YOUR OPPORTUNITY TO SHOW THE WORLD HOW CORRUPT YOUR GOVERNMENT IS, HOW IT IS NOT JUST UNABLE TO PROVIDE SAFETY FOR YOU AND YOUR FAMILIES, BUT ALSO IS AN ALLY OF THE CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS THAT THREATEN EVERY SINGLE ASPECT OF YOUR LIFE. AREN'T YOU TIRED? AREN'T YOU FED UP OF ALL THESE DEATHS? THIS IS THE CHANCE TO SHOW BOTH CRIMINALS AND GOVERNMENT WHO IS REALLY IN CHARGE. PEOPLE OF THE WORLD, THIS IS A CALL TO GLOBAL REVOLUTION. THE TIME IS NOW. THE INFORMATION IS YOUR WEAPON. THE RESISTANCE IS YOUR MOTIVATION. YOU CAN COUNT ON US, WE'LL NEVER LEAVE YOU ALONE. AND WE ARE COUNTING ON YOU. WE KNOW SOME OF YOU KNOW THINGS THAT HAPPEN IN YOUR COMMUNITY. SHARE THESE THINGS WITH US AND HELP STOPTHE CORRUPTION.

To the Mexican Government:

WE HAVE WATCHED PATIENTLY HOW SOME OF YOUR MEMBERS OPENLY MAKE DEALS WITH THE CRIMINAL GROUPS INSTEAD OF PROSECUTING THEM. WE HAVE WATCHED HOW YOU'VE BEEN LYING TO YOUR PEOPLE, MANTAINING A WAR ON DRUGS ACTING AS IF YOU WERE REALLY INTERESTED IN PUBLIC HEALTH. THIS IS AN HIPOCRISY FROM YOU. YOU DON'T CARE ABOUT YOUR PEOPLE. YOU ONLY WANT TO KEEP MAKING MONEY FROM THE BIG DRUG BUSINESS. YOU HAVE GIVEN THEM MORE POWER THAN PABLO ESCOBAR COULD ONLY HAVE DREAMED OF. AND THIS IS THE TIME WHEN YOU SHOULDSTART DOING SOME CLEANING UP IN YOUR HOUSE. YOU MUST STOP LYING TO YOUR PEOPLE, OR ELSE YOUR LIES WILL BE EXPOSED IN THE MOST DISHONORABLE MANNER. MR. FELIPE CALDERÓN, PLEASE RECONSIDER THIS WAR ON DRUGS. DON'T ATTACK THE SYMPTOMS; ATTACK THE CAUSE. YOU ARE BEING DENOUNCED TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, LONG BEFORE YOUR OFFICE TERM EXPIRES. DOESN'T IT RING ANY BELLS? DOESN'T IT TELL YOU HOW TIRED IS YOUR PEOPLE OF THIS BLOODBATH? WE WOULDN'T TARGET CRIMINAL GROUPS, BUT, UNFORTUNATELY, YOUR PEOPLE IS CRYING FOR HELP AND IT ONLY FALLS ON DEAF EARS. DOESN'T IT HURT YOU? DO YOU FEEL GOOD ABOUT IT? WE DON'T, AND WE WILL DEFEND THE PEOPLE WHO, SADLY, YOU SHOULD BE DEFENDING INSTEAD OF SPENDING YOUR TIME TRYING TO SELL THE WORLD THE BIG LIE THAT MEXICO IS A PARADISE. A LIE THAT NO ONE, BY THE WAY, BELIEVES ANYMORE. AND ONE LAST THING: DON'T BOTHER YOURSELF TRYING TO DELETE THIS BLOG AS YOU DID WITH THE LAST ONE<http://anonhispano.foroweb.org/t656-google-nos-ha-cerrado-el-blog-de-anonymous-hispano> ON SEPTEMBER 15TH, 2011. IT'S BACKED UP AND WE CAN REUPLOAD IT IN 20 MINUTES. STOP CORRUPTION AND CENSORSHIP. WE STILL WANT TO BELIEVE THAT YOU THINK AT LEAST 5 MINUTES A DAY IN THE WELFARE OF YOUR FELLOW CITIZENS. THANKS FOR YOUR ATTENTION.

Source: http://anonopsibero.blogspot.com/2011/11/anonymous-message-to-zeta-cartel.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+AnonymousIberoamerica+%28Anonymous+Iberoam%C3%A9rica%29

Targeting Opportunity - Disrupt Insurgent Psycholo.

Bottom Line Up Front: Dominate Psychological Envir...

Soldiers dismantle telecom network used by Mexican traffickers

2011-10-31T23:02:00.001-04:00

Comment: Hopefully this is the lead into a major operation to put the cartels on the run. Over the weekend, a group of hackers threatened to expose cartel members, as well as local and authorities colluding with cartel activities.

Excerpt:

Soldiers dismantle telecom network used by Mexican traffickers

Published October 31, 2011

Mexico City - Soldiers seized communications equipment being used by drug traffickers in Reynosa, a border city in the northeastern Mexican state of Tamaulipas, the army said.
The telecommunications gear was seized on Oct. 11 and Oct. 25 by army patrols, the 4th Military Region command said, without identifying the criminal organization operating the network.

A total of 21 antennas, 22 repeaters, 18 duplexers, eight filters and three transceivers were seized.

The telecom network was dismantled as part of the government's "Operation Northeast" targeting drug traffickers and other organized crime groups, the army said.

Marines dismantled an encrypted communications network last month being used by the Los Zetas drug cartel in 10 cities in the Gulf state of Veracruz.

The network employed 12 antennas, computers, radio transmitters, scanners, thousands of feet of cable, cell phones, decoders and solar panels.

The Gulf cartel and Los Zetas have been waging a brutal turf war in Tamaulipas that has left hundreds of people dead since last year.

The two drug trafficking organizations are trying to gain control of smuggling routes into the United States.

...

A total of 15,270 people died in drug-related violence in Mexico last year, and more than 40,000 people have died since President Felipe Calderon declared war on the country's cartels shortly after taking office in December 2006.

Source:
http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/news/2011/10/31/soldiers-dismantle-telecom-network-used-by-mexican-traffickers/

Targeting Opportunity - Disrupt Insurgent Psychological Dominance – Notes of a Counterinsurgent

2011-10-29T19:31:00.000-04:00

Comment: Disrupting the cartels will require a holistic effort focused on keeping the cartels on the run. Either government security forces or local watch groups need to implement an overt and persistent security presence that will limit cartel freedom of movement. The intent of this effort is for physical security, but even more for perceptual reasons so the population can begin trusting a local legitimate security force. Legitimate may be legal, but legal could also be termed as commonly acceptable when the interests of the people are assured. Such efforts will hopefully force cartel activities underground and thus possibly mitigate their psychological grip on the population.

Note, however, such an overt force may not be safe enough to surface. Therefore another simultaneous action may need to occur; that is for the government and/or locally accepted security forces to run high op-tempo lethal and non-lethal measures to disrupt the physical and psychological grip the cartels may have on the local population. By ramping up the tempo, the cartels will find themselves in react mode, unable to rest, clearly think, unable to trust each other…tensions can run high within the local cartel movement.

Again, while the other above two actions are occurring, the third element needs to be affected; infiltrating the cartel network either directly or through their close associates, friends and/or families. The triad is an interwoven cyclic effort that can be used to put pressure on the cartels from myriad directions. However, all of this will be for naught if an effective form of governance is not established in order to exploit the social void. If the void is left open, then the cycle of violence…tit versus tat will only continue and the legitimacy of the government will be in question.

At the bottom of this post you will see how Mexicans can launch such an attack against the cartels. In the below real-life vignette just posted today by the Houston Chronicle, an on-line hacker group threatens to expose the identities and locations of cartel members if the cartels do not release one of their compadres who was abducted by the cartels.

What if US and Mexican Law Enforcement were able to get the hackers to cooperate and provide that information to both governments?

Note, there is a lot of opportunity Mexicans can exploit here so they can target the cartel using the model posted below. If on-line activism can cause the Arab Spring which toppled and/or shook the governments of at least five nations, then surely online hackers and activists can attack the cartels and expose information that can allow government forces to target them.

Disrupt Insurgent Psychological Dominance

Three, sustained, fundamental activities HAVE TO OCCUR (COIN Triad) for insurgent influence to wane and/or dissipate long enough so governance can be established.
· Cocoon the population
· Run a high op-tempo lethal and non-lethal targeting effort
· Most important, create, mobilize and sustain an overt and surreptitious cell of locals to subvert the insurgent movement. This effort constitutes a TRIAD.
All lethal, non-lethal, intelligence, intelligence operations and collection efforts, civil affairs, political, humanitarian activities must follow along these lines of operation in order to serve as a catalyst for a small minority to become the tipping point for a populace driven counterinsurgency movement.
The British did this in the 50s and 60s in Malaysia and Africa via pseudo gangs and Special Branch where the Brits infiltrated gangs or created fake gangs in order to subvert other gangs. The Sunni Iraqis and US did this in 2006 through the Awakening Movement and “Desert Protection Force”; some elements of the Afghan population initiated similar efforts in 2008/2009.

Figure 1 Graphic illustrates the "three prong" approach to disrupting insurgent psychological dominance of the battle space. Conventional forces stabilize; Special Operations and Targeting forces keep the enemy on the run on the surface and in the underground; Unconventional forces exploit the dissonance caused by targeting operations to penetrate the underground, exploit societal seams and subvert the insurgency from the inside out.

Here is a potential real-life vignette and OPPORTUNITY where Mexicans and the Government of Mexico can coordinate with this reported hacker group and attack the cartel. If the people, governments of Mexico and the US can unite with these hackers, then maybe they can gain access into the names, locations and whereabouts that can facilitate the targeting of the cartel members mentioned in the video and article below.

The following piece represents

extraordinary opportunity

if exploited.

Online hackers threaten to expose cartel's secrets

Group called Anonymous demands release of one of their own who was kidnapped

By DANE SCHILLER, HOUSTON CHRONICLE

Updated 04:09 p.m., Saturday, October 29, 2011

An international group of online hackers is warning a Mexican drug cartel to release one of its members, kidnapped from a street protest, or it will publish the identities and addresses of the syndicate's associates, from corrupt police to taxi drivers, as well as reveal the syndicates' businesses.
The vow is a bizarre cyber twist to Mexico's ongoing drug war, as a group that has no guns is squaring off against the Zetas, a cartel blamed for thousands of deaths as well as introducing beheadings and other frightening brutality.
"You made a huge mistake by taking one of us. Release him," says a masked man in a video posted online on behalf of the group, Anonymous.
"We cannot defend ourselves with a weapon … but we can do this with their cars, homes, bars, brothels and everything else in their possession," says the man, who is wearing a suit and tie.
"It won't be difficult; we all know who they are and where they are located," says the man, who underlines the group's international ties by speaking Spanish with the accent of a Spaniard while using Mexican slang.
He also implies that the group will expose mainstream journalists who are somehow in cahoots with the Zetas by writing negative articles about the military, the country's biggest fist in the drug war.
"We demand his release," says the Anonymous spokesman, who is wearing a mask like the one worn by the shadowy revolutionary character in the movie V for Vendetta, which came out in 2006. "If anything happens to him, you sons of (expletive) will always remember this upcoming November 5."
The person reportedly kidnapped is not named, and the video does not share information about the kidnapping other than that it occurred in the Mexican state of Veracruz during a street protest.
Anonymous draws its roots from an online forum dedicated to bringing sensitive government documents and other material to light.
If Anonymous can make good on its threats to publish names, it will "most certainly" lead to more deaths and could leave bloggers and others open to reprisal attacks by the cartel, contends Stratfor, an Austin-based global intelligence company.
"In this viral world on the Internet, it shows how much damage could be done with just one statement on the Web," said Fred Burton of Stratfor, which published a report Friday that probes the implications of the cartel drawing the activists' ire.
Mike Vigil, the retired head of international operations for the Drug Enforcement Administration, said the Zetas must take Anonymous seriously.
"It is a gutsy move," Vigil said. "By publishing the names, they identify them to rivals, and trust me, they will go after them."
dane.schiller@chron.com

Article source: Online hackers threaten to expose cartel's secrets

Bottom Line Up Front: Dominate Psychological Environment – Notes of a Counterinsurgent

2011-10-28T22:37:00.001-04:00

Comment: Again, the following piece is insurgency/counterinsurgency focused, but still very relevant to the cartel problem in Mexico. The cartels are using violence in order to pit the population between the cartels and the government. Additionally, the cartels are better able to reinforce their control because they will simply kill you, whereas the government will try to detain you and has no death penalty- this enhances the cartels ability to have the stronger voice in controlling the population. Ergo, the population is the security blanket. Until the population realizes this, they will continue to be played. It is for this very reason why vigilante groups, while potentially dangerous, can be used to effectively disrupt the cartel’s psychological grip on the population.

Whoever Dominates the Psychological Environment controls the fight. Therefore, one may seriously need to consider fighting back, or risk being a pawn in the drug war game.

Bottom Line Up Front: Dominate Psychological Environment

“In war the moral is to the material three to one”
-Napoleon
Whoever dominates the psychological terrain controls the fight. Counterinsurgent (COIN) forces want to dominate this terrain-it influences the population to choose a side - the insurgent or counterinsurgent.
Winning and security is based more on perception vice reality. Enemies of western powers understand national power is really more of an image in that the full might of military power is restricted from being fully implemented due to internal and international pressures-this gives insurgents the will to prevail.
From a “SO WHAT” perspective, enemies of western powers understand they can win by draining resolve to continue the fight. Western powers have large, obese and lethargic bureaucratic processes that render them quite useless- this makes time an insurgent weapon. Western powers have internal competing agendas to fund/support a war, or not. Insurgents will exploit the political seams via propaganda and other informational/perceptual means to foment internal political dissonance and indecisiveness- the insurgent isolates deployed COIN forces from his people and government. Additionally, western powers have big expensive sticks insurgents know they will not use- this make Rules of Engagement (ROE) an insurgent weapon.
Insurgents will shape the perceptual domain to ensure the indigenous population sees the insurgents as omnipotent and omniscient, and that there will be hell to pay afterwards if the population does not support them in their fight against the counterinsurgent.
Disenfranchised Sunnis initially led the Iraqi resistance in 2003 due to the US uprooting their infrastructure and undermining what order that was preexisting in the country rather than try to preserve infrastructure. Backed into a corner, along with an uncertain future, they began to fight. The lack of cohesiveness of the movement gave way to the insurgent/terrorist organization al Qaida in Iraq who successfully led a campaign of terrorist attacks against the U.S. for roughly three years. Their effectiveness in terms of gaining popular support to fight the US, along with successful media-backed international recruitment efforts, culminated with the perception in 2005 that Iraq was unwinnable to US forces. The perception the US was out to destroy the Sunni, mostly due to the Coalition Provisional Authorities de-Ba’athification effort, gave birth to the Iraqi Sunni resistance- there was no fully functioning constituted Iraqi government at the time. The Sunni were trying to push out an occupation force.
Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) terrorists waged campaigns of violence against those cooperating with counterinsurgent forces in Iraq. This prevented the local population from speaking out. AQI penetrated social infrastructure, economic and security mechanisms. Iraqis felt the psychological pressure of being watched from every direction and often preferred to collude with AQI to survive, knowing the counterinsurgent was not likely going to hurt them without cause. Iraqi fears of AQI became amplified when locals realized they were being released from prison due to lack of evidence only to come back and seek vengeance against those who reported them in the first place- Iraqi’s felt working with COIN forces was a futile effort. This gave AQI, at minimum, a tacit support structure to sustain operations.
Mexico 2008-2009. Press reports government of Mexico is failing in its ability to manage the narco-terrorist problem in their country that resulted in the deaths approximately 7000 people for 2008 alone; ~1000 within the first three months of 2009. Although the killings are mainly directed at competing cartel members, cartel members are killing, co-opting and bribing local officials. Cartel members are also targeting family members of competing cartel members to draw out competitors…killing the innocent and widening the death toll. These actions have so undermined the perception of security and stability in many areas of Mexico that locals are afraid of reporting illicit activities for fear of being killed. The impacts of the cartels activities resonated from being a local problem to an international problem and concern. The cartels have more money and better weapons than government agencies. Honest policemen are being threatened to cooperate with the cartels or they/their families will be tortured and killed. United States government officials, and some agencies, see the localized instability is causing a potential strategic problem. Some see Mexico as a failing state because the narco-terrorists are able to conduct operations with impunity. Mexicans do not trust local law enforcement because of perceptions of corruption…social chaos remains. This problem continues to fester. The cartel’s psychological dominance of their battle space allows them to continue operations with little resistance.
Al Qaeda’s terrorists, Osama Bin Laden and Ayman Zawahiri survived numerous attacks while able to change the way of life in the U.S. in 2001; a country with over a ¼ billion people at the time. They changed US laws; undermined the US stock market, forced the creation of multiple new agencies- all done by 19 people. Some see al Qaeda as leading a global resistance movement to disrupt US influence. The psychological impact of the 9/11 attacks show what impacts 19 people can have on the world’s last superpower.
Hezbollah’s Stand against Israel from within Lebanon. Hezbollah infiltrated and penetrated Lebanese society so Israel had to attack them by attacking innocent Lebanese. Overt military force served as blowback against the Israelis; bad media; no military gains; became a political failure. The Arab world recognized Israel’s weakness and believes Israel’s image of invincibility no longer exists.
Iran conducts covert activities via Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps with impunity in Iraq, Lebanon, Latin America, Africa, the Palestinian territories and a number of other locations. Iran is effectively engaging US military forces by proxy.
Proxy wars allow Iran to fight the US without direct attribution, to subvert US objectives without going to full-scale war for which it know it will lose. Proxy wars are economy of force operations both in terms of people and material. Proxy wars have the impact of a good sniper. One good sniper can hold back a company (~100 men) or battalion (~500 men) under the right conditions; two snipers can instill fear in a city of millions, shut down highways and impact the economy and security such as the Washington DC snipers of 2002; proxy wars can have a similar impact but in an unconventional sense. Iran has an image of a nation that cannot be stopped because the international community is unwilling to do anything against it.
Iran continues to pursue a nuclear weapons program, Iran supports and participates in proxy wars, Iran circumvents US and international sanctions, Iran successfully conducts political and psychological warfare without being punished. Iran understands that power and influence is more related to perception than reality.
To disrupt insurgent psychological dominance; COIN forces should find and exploit opportunities to unravel the insurgents’ ability to be effective as an organization. This first begins by severing/subverting his relationship with society. This creates the necessary foundation for stability and security to follow.
COIN forces can use direct and indirect means to disrupt the insurgents’ psychological dominance over the indigenous population in his area of operation. Direct means may be in the form of large presence patrols or other overt means. Indirect means may involve information operations or the use of proxies; meaning any efforts that are not overt.
Late 2008/early 2009, Israel used both overt and surreptitious means to attack Hamas in the Palestinian territories. In conjunction with surreptitious collaboration (infiltration) with some Palestinians, overt overwhelming military force was used against the populace-embedded Hamas. Media coverage and international condemnations coincided with the Israeli offensive. However, Israel knows the international body (United Nations) and other western nations do not truly hold any real power- if the international body cannot stop terrorists or non-state actors, they really cannot do much against nation-states like Israel. Israel recognized sanctions do not work; North Korea, Iraq and Iran were all under/remain under sanctions, but it never stopped any of them from achieving their goals or pressing forward their agendas. Knowing this, Israel persisted and punched through the enemy media/information operations barrier in a manner metaphorically comparable to the “Wizard of Oz”; of Toto going behind the curtain to reveal the Wizard who was manipulating the perceptions of the world for self-gain. Israel was able to undermine and discredit the effectiveness of Hamas before the world by maintaining their resolve and focus. A number of press reports following the conflict also noted how some locals hated Hamas for their abuse of locals. Israel achieved some success in splitting Hamas from its popular support base, which was often coerced. Note however, that despite this success, Israel’s job is not yet finished if they or the United Nations do not replace the Hamas void with some type of sustainable governance that is good for everyone. If this is ignored, Hamas will simply regenerate, with new lessons learned, and come back to fight another day. In this case, Israel did not lose focus of their mission and intent; neither did Israel dither too much with policies or unproductive sentiment. Israel ignored the inept United Nations and international community by following the Royal Bank of Scotland’s slogan ‘Make it Happen’.
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One More Thing – Regarding Notes of a Counterinsurgent

2011-10-27T23:33:00.001-04:00

Comment: The following excerpt from Notes of a Counterinsurgent is to finally set the stage for understanding this piece as a whole. Understand the following:

-The piece is a primer

-Countering subversives is a thinking man’s game.

-Countering subversives often involves out-maneuvering, not out-killing

-Perceptions are just important as reality; shaping them or understanding how they are shaped is important to know and understand

-Limitations and challenges to countering subversion

One More Thing

Notes of a Counterinsurgent is just that, notes. Each insurgency is different, but certain patterns remain constant. This small guide focuses on such patterns; it is designed to be a primer, or a reference, for the counterinsurgent or counter-subversive. If a reader wants to go in more detail, references will be noted in following postings that address key principles noted in this small guide.
There are a number of guides/books today that address the issue of insurgency, counterinsurgency, subversion and counter-subversion. Some books address enemy tactics, techniques and procedures. Other books address advancements in warfare. The constant, however, is that the best weapon of the insurgent and counterinsurgent has comes free and weighs a few pounds- it’s called a brain.
Decisions and actions are based on perceptions, it is the counterinsurgents job to influence, control, manipulate and embed perceptions favorable to his intent. Failure to do so leaves the insurgent to do this against you…he is weak, but if the counterinsurgent ignores the perception issue he will be defeated regardless.
This guide intends to focus mostly on nonphysical issues pertaining to insurgency and insurgent type environments. When we address insurgency in this guide we are also including terrorism, a subset of insurgency, as well as other environments where ambush, surprise and hiding in society is the primary modus operandi.
This guide will focus on mental and moral aspects of both the insurgent and counterinsurgent. The guide highlights important principles realized over many years that remain applicable today, despite changes in technology.
Ultimate mission success in counterinsurgency requires an interagency approach and involvement of the local population, an approach way beyond the tactical operator or analyst to affect. Therefore, the focus of this book mostly on the military/security aspect of the fight in order to help the tactical operator cause shock in a movement and establish initial momentum/dominance. It’s important to know that if the other interagency and population buy-in pieces take too long to follow suit, gains will be blunted and the battle will be prolonged. You will be in a quagmire.
Policy, laws, rules of engagement will impact your ability to affect actions on the ground. It’s important for the counterinsurgent to recognize this, to report these challenges to senior commanders and politicians so organizational adaptation remains fluid, symbiotic and effective. Failure to adapt equates to losing.
This piece closes off with a small observation regarding “US Vulnerability to Strategic Surprise in the 21^st Century”. Despite the title, it is relevant to the Marine, Soldier, SEAL or Ranger on the ground. The counterinsurgent cannot simply worry about being an operator, operations type, intelligence person, politician, logistics person or lawyer…the counterinsurgent must be familiar with all of these spheres, and much more. Thus Situational Awareness trumps what data/insights intelligence or operational reporting may provide you. Perceptions on the ground are more important than reality because reality is shaped by perceptions. What the population believes as reality is more important than what the counterinsurgent knows as fact because the population, via the media, reacts to it.

Developing a Subversion/Counter-subversion Mentality – “The Approach” from Notes of a Counterinsurgent

2011-10-27T00:05:00.001-04:00

Comment: The take-away from this piece of Notes of a Counterinsurgent is that the most important tool in assessing and fighting against a seemingly formless, seditious/subversive threat is ones ability to develop an intuitive feel for the environment they are dealing with- in other words, your mind and instincts are your most important tool. Intuitive feel refers to a combination of knowledge, instinct, the willingness to adapt to an ever-changing environment, and the willingness to act decisively when making a timely decision is more important than making the perfect decision. Hence, this is exactly why I use the linebacker metaphor below.

Also note that while I used the term insurgency and counterinsurgency frequently, just understand what I’m really talking about is subversion and counter-subversion. The latter of the two perspectives is less militarily and politically motivated; subversion/counter-subversion applies across the spectrum of threats from state actors, non-state actors, to criminals, etc.

One needs to understand that realization is based upon understanding the nature of the threat, its modus operandi, etc. For example, pardon the crudeness, if a gent wants to take a lady to bed he’s not likely going to be successful in getting her to bed if he does not first seem to take an interest in her and is willing to wine her and dine her. Doing this allows him to soften the playing field in order to set the conditions for him to achieve his objective. He does this indirectly.

The Mexican drug trafficking organizations will be no different when they are not in a strong position to readily take over, or control, a town to meet their objectives. They may try to first woo the people to their favor so as not to risk alienating what may develop into a friendly/cooperative support base. This perspective can be applied to other scenarios as well. Over time however, once the relationship is consummated, then the relationship may change when one is no longer wooed, but dominated and/or controlled.

This may be one reason why the cartel problem that began in Mexico in the 80s was not disrupted then. Police and government officials were bought and paid for long enough until the cartels then decided to change the conditions of the relationship and their freedom of influence and movement expanded. Now the cartels dictate how the government runs in some parts of Mexico. Folks, this is subversion…learn to recognize it…learn how to mitigate it.

Approach

This intent of this piece is to provide the reader immediate patterns to cue on in order to begin taking action…to achieve effects.
Counterinsurgency (COIN), hybrid threat, environments require the mind of a linebacker. It is paramount that linebackers maintain situational awareness, an intuitive feel for their areas of operation. Linebackers cue on anomalies and attempt to engage the threat while it remains subtle. Failure to engage threats while they remain subtle often results in a situation escaping bounds of control/influence, one becomes reactive vice proactive- one becomes susceptible to ambush.
There is no time to review history during the conduct of COIN, you have to act based upon the moment with what’s available. Your enemy will ALWAYS fight you from the shadows; the enemy will never allow a true picture of himself to be revealed [deception]; the enemy will create situations to force you to overreact and exploit your own pattern of mistakes to undermine your efforts. This allows insurgents to leverage your energy against yourself by allowing you to isolate yourself from the population. The counterinsurgent is fighting a system, not individual parts. Counterinsurgents must find the seams that weave these parts together and rip them wide open, by proxy when possible, in order to undermine the social fabric that supports the insurgent/terrorist by force or subtle approaches. From there the counterinsurgent can go on the offensive. The intent of this small, direct, guide is to get the reader thinking and operating in this direction.

Mexican Drug Cartels

Mexican Drug War Annual Death Toll Numbers Still Confusing, but Late 2011 Total Toll Numbers Remain Consistent at near 50K

Mexico's DTO's Areas of Operation/Influence Morphing

STRATFOR reports Los Zetas is now the largest Drug Trafficking Organization (DTO) in Mexico.

Mexican Drug Cartel Situation Report (SITREP) - Mexican Drug War Death Toll Numbers from December 2006 to December 2011.

Mexican Drug Cartel Organizations – Current List and Backgrounds as of January 2012

Comment: The piece below came from the January 2012 edition of the CTC Sentinel produced by the US Military Academy West Point.

Profiles of Mexico’s Seven Major Drug Trafficking Organizations

Jan 18, 2012 Author: Peter Chalk

Mexican Drug Cartel Situation Report (SITREP) - Mexican Drug War Death Toll Numbers from December 2006 to December 2011.

Combating Terrorism – January 2012 Issue of CTC Sentinel Posted – Addresses Terrorism Recruitment, Bioterrorism, Jihadists in Europe and Mexican Drug Cartels

Excerpt:

CTC Sentinel | Volume 5, Issue 1 (January 2012)

Published by Combating Terrorism Center

COVER STORY OVERVIEW

IN THIS ISSUE

You Are Being Watched - Are you a Drug Trafficker and Not Know It? See Why and How

The American Backyard.NET: Clean Cut Texas Kid Ran Drugs for Sinaloa – Key Ob...

2012 Mexican Drug War- Where are We? What We Can Do? A Second Source Says 50,000 Dead from Dec 2006 to Dec 2011

Prison Sentences for Tijuana Cartel Leader

Mexican Drug War Death Toll from December 2006 to December 2012 is 50,000 NOT 38,000 - See 2012 Trends

FW: 2012 and the Mexican Drug War - 38,000 Killed and Counting

Part 2 – US Targets Money Laundering Activity for the Cartels

Mexican Police Official Gets 10 Years In Prison

Head of 'Blondies' cartel arrested in Mexico City

US targets money laundering activity for cartels

Bill Summary & Status - 112th Congress (2011 - 2012) - H.R.3401 - THOMAS (Library of Congress)

Bill Summary & Status 112th Congress (2011 - 2012) H.R.3401

Stay Connected with the Library All ways to connect »

Shanty Towns, Slums and Drug Gangs – Mexico’s Reality, The US Future – A Brazilian Example

Hacker Fight? Anonymous message to Zeta cartel and to the Mexican Government

Soldiers dismantle telecom network used by Mexican traffickers

Targeting Opportunity - Disrupt Insurgent Psychological Dominance – Notes of a Counterinsurgent

The following piece represents

extraordinary opportunity

if exploited.

Online hackers threaten to expose cartel's secrets

Group called Anonymous demands release of one of their own who was kidnapped

By DANE SCHILLER, HOUSTON CHRONICLE

Updated 04:09 p.m., Saturday, October 29, 2011

Bottom Line Up Front: Dominate Psychological Environment – Notes of a Counterinsurgent

One More Thing – Regarding Notes of a Counterinsurgent

Developing a Subversion/Counter-subversion Mentality – “The Approach” from Notes of a Counterinsurgent

Jan 18, 2012
Author: Peter Chalk

Bill Summary & Status
112th Congress (2011 - 2012)
H.R.3401