No one could go to work today, because Snowpocalypse 2: Snoverkill was going to start at noon.

But it didn’t.

Sound familiar?

The Wife and I walked to our nearest Giant last night, and along the way saw this:

The fake roof/awning thing that used to be over the doorway into one of the apartment buildings we passed, but is now lying on the ground a few yards away.

Today, when I went to take out the trash, I noticed this:

The snow, looming off the roof, ready to impale unwary passersby with its icicles.

And up close, it looked like this:

The snow does not sleep. It waits.

It was scary.

When it’s coming, and you know it’s coming, it’s not funny.  It’s frightening.

(It would be like making a campy zombie movie in Hollywood while real live [I mean, undead] zombies were invading America via the East Coast, and had just overrun New York City or something.)

[UPDATE (02/08/10, 12:42pm): Note David Roberts' take on the add over at Grist.  He's right about one thing: what the add says is that the Green Police are correct, and here's a way to cooperate with them -- buy an Audi.  And that just makes the add even more frightening.  Furthermore, it's an attempted satire that actually agrees with what it's satirizing (i.e., it's deeply confused and frightening.) (h/t Drudge)]

[UPDATE 2 (02/09/10; 1:48pm]: Note Jackson West’s take on San Fran Mayor Gavin Newsom’s reaction to the commercial.  And, according to Mr. West, we have Venables Bell & Partners to thank for the horribly confused and frightening Audi advert.  The zombie invasion is happening on the West Coast, evidently, not the East Coast, and has overrun San Francisco, not New York. (h/t Drudge again)]

The front of our car.

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The back of our car.

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The whole car.

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Snow piled up against our car.

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Looking down the street from behind our car.

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Looking back toward the building, along the little path I dug.

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The front hood and windshield of our car, as I was cleaning it off.

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Something went wrong here, evidently.

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The “sidewalk.”

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One of the neighborhood’s interestingly-painted houses (there are many in the neighborhood).

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We live in the arctic tundra.

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Same tundra, more depth.

Here are some pictures I’ve taken from the safety of the third floor of our apartment building.

Looking up the street toward DC. The park you see in just inside the DC border.

The front porch of the apartment building adjacent to ours.

A crazy driver is being crazy by driving, while a lone Grounds and Maintenance Crew member waits.

Trying to get the heavy snowblower machine thing up the steps.

After getting the snowblower machine thing up the steps, they head across the street to (re)clear the sidewalks over there.

Brave members of the Grounds and Maintence Crew had already been out earlier, trying to keep the sidewalks passable.

But it isn’t, and hasn’t been.

I was supposed to give my students their Descartes Exam today. . . .  But no.  Campus is closed because of all the snow.

But there is no snow.

It’d better start snowing soon and hard, or I am going to be very put out.

(What movie!? What movie!?)

^{[UPDATE:  It's 12:15, and I should be giving my first class their exam.  It is snowing now.  No accumulation, however.]}

^{[UPDATE 2: It's 1:12, and I should be giving my second class their exam.  It continues to snow.  No accumulation, however. *sigh*]}

^{[Update 3: It's 2:36, and I should have finished giving my second class their exam 36 minutes ago.  It continues to snow.  The grass and cars are now dusted, but the roads and sidewalks remain clear.  Weather forecast/School closing FAIL.]}

^{[Update 4: It's now 4:06, and I'm on my way out the door to drive over to campus and pick up The Wife.  She takes the Metro to CUA's stop.  I trust the irony of the fact that I'm driving to campus, when campus is closed because you supposedly can't drive to it, is not lost on you.]}

^{[Update 5: It's now 4:46, and we're home.  And we shall remain home for the next couple days, I imagine.]}

You may recall my recent discussions of the “Bizarre Ontology” that makes individuals responsible for things other people in their “group” do — even when they disagree with what those other people are doing — because it treats groups as the primary reality of which individuals are mere appendages or manifestations.

You also may recall my discussion of whether corporations can talk.

That was the one where I reacted to the Supreme Court decision [PDF] to strike down some restrictions on corporate funding of political “speech.”

Well, today brings us a report from Adam Liptak at the NYTimes, about some statements by Justice Clarence Thomas.

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Evidently “the first legislation in the United States prohibiting monetary contribution to national political campaigns by corporations” was “The Tillman Act of 1907.”

The bill was “[n]amed for its sponsor, [Democratic] Senator Benjamin Tillman of South Carolina” (Wikipedia).

Ironic, eh?

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Now, Liptak quotes Justice Thomas as follows:

“Tillman was from South Carolina, and as I hear the story he was concerned that the corporations, Republican corporations, were favorable toward blacks and he felt that there was a need to regulate them.”

And this is not surprising.  Evidently, “Pitchfork Ben” Tillman was “[c]ombative, vitriolic, and openly racist” (Wikipedia).

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According to the Bizarre Ontology, all Democrats would be responsible for Tillman’s liftetime of reprehensible actions, all Tillmans would be responsible for Tillman’s liftetime of reprehensible actions, all South Carolinians would be responsible for Tillman’s liftetime of reprehensible actions, etc.

After all, Pitchfork Ben was — like every other Democrat, according to the Bizarre Ontology — a mere appendage or manifestation through which the group “Democrats” acted.

It wouldn’t matter to the Bizarre Ontology that today’s Democrats are, for the most part, not racists like Pitchfork Ben.

Likewise, Pitchfork Ben was — like every other Tillman, according to the Bizarre Ontology — a mere appendage or manifestation through which the group “Tillmans” acted.

It wouldn’t matter to the Bizarre Ontology that I — who am a Tillman — fundamentally disagree with everything Pitchfork Ben stood for.

Additionally, Pitchfork Ben was — like every other South Carolinian, according to the Bizarre Ontology — a mere appendage or manifestation through which the group “South Carolinians” acted.

It wouldn’t matter to the Bizarre Ontology that more South Carolinians have voted for the Republican presidential candidate in every election since 1980, than voted for the Demcratic candidate.

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No.  For the Bizarre Ontology, it’s all about “corporate,” “collective,” and “shared responsibility.”

Besides, if your shoes are making that much noise, there’s probably something wrong.

For instance, if your shoes are going “click, click, click” or “clop, clop, clop,” it’s probably because they have hard heels, and you’re walking on a hard floor.  This can’t be good for your feet, or knees, or back even.

On the other hand, if your shoes are going, “scuff, scuff, scuff” or “slap, slap, slap,” it’s probably because you’re wearing flip-flops in public.  And that makes you look lazy, which, for some reason, is annoying to other people.

So, be kind to yourself, and your fellow pedestrians.

That concludes this session of, “Fashion Tips from a Philosopher.”

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First Proof

The first argument goes basically like this.

The idea of God is the idea of an infinite substance (i.e., the idea of a thing that is completely unbounded and unlimited, completely perfect, omnipotent, omniscient, etc.).

The question is, “Where does the idea of infinite substance come from?”

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Descartes thinks either someone made it up, or it was caused in someone’s mind.

That is, either someone invented the idea (like when an author invents a new character), or something that someone experienced created the idea in the person’s mind (like when you first learn what a dog is as a child, by watching a bunch of dogs frolicking in a field or something).

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Descartes’ argument is twofold:

First, he argues that you couldn’t invent the idea of infinite substance (i.e., of God).

Second, he claims that only an infinite substance could cause the idea of an infinite substance in anyone’s mind.

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To invent the idea of infinite substance, you’d have to start with the idea of a finite substance, and then imagine expanding or augmenting the attributes (e.g., knowledge, power) of that substance forever.

But that just means you can only invent the idea of an infinite substance by imagining turning a finite substance into an infinite substance.  And that means you already have to know what an infinite substance is.

(You have to say things like, “If I kept gaining knowledge forever. . .” or “If I always got just a little bit more powerful . . .,” or “If I kept gaining knowledge, and never stopped . . .,” etc.  But words like “forever,” “always,” and “never,” are just different ways of talking about infinity.)

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So, if you can’t invent the idea of an infinite substance, then it must have been caused in your mind.

Descartes argues that nothing, besides an infinite substance, would have enough reality to cause the idea of an infinite substance in your mind.

Just like seeing red wouldn’t create the idea Mars in your mind, nor would seeing fastness create the idea of a cheetah in your mind, neither a “mode” (like red, fast, sharp, loud, etc.) nor a finite substance (like Mars, a cheatah, a tree, a book) could create the idea of an infinite substance.

(Red might be able to remind you of Mars, but not create the idea of Mars in your head.  You’d already have to have the idea of Mars to be reminded of it by seeing red.  Same goes for fastness and cheetah.)

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Therefore, the only thing that can create the idea of infinite substance is an infinite substance.  And since Descartes has the idea of infinite substance, an infinite substance must have caused that idea.  And therefore an infinite substance must exist.

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Second Proof

Descartes’ second argument for God’s existence goes like this.

Anything that has infinite power, and the idea of infinite substance, would turn itself into an infinite substance.

Descartes has the idea of infinite substance, but has not turned himself into an infinite substance.

Therefore, Descartes must not have infinite power.

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If Descartes does not have infinite power, then he could not have created himself out of nothing.  Creating yourself out of nothing is impossible, and only something infinitely powerful could even come close to doing the impossible.

Therefore, either Descartes has always existed, or something with infinite power created him.

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If Descartes has always existed, then something is keeping him in existence (i.e., something is “sustaining” him).  This would require infinite power, because “sustaining” a thing is the same thing as recreating it in each new instant.

Time is a series of discreet, disconnected moments, and the only way to get from one moment to the next is to be recreated in each new moment.  If you’re not recreated in each new moment, then you will disappear when the present moment disappears.

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Therefore, the fact that Descartes exists proves that something is constantly recreating him out of nothing in each new instant.  But this would require infinite power on the part of whatever is “sustaining” him.

Furthermore, it would require that whatever is “sustaining” him also either be an infinite substance (and thus be able to recreate the idea of infinite substance in his mind at each new moment), or at least have the idea of infinite substance (and thus be able to implant it in Descartes’ mind at each new moment).

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However, if the thing that is continually recreating Descartes has infinite power, which it must, and the idea of infinite substance, which it must, then it would have already made itself into an infinite substance.

Therefore, the fact that Descartes exists, and has the idea of infinite substance, proves that an infinite substance exists.

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Evaluation

I like the first proof a lot.  I think it is fundamentally correct.  It needs more working out than Descartes gives it — specifically with regard to the premise that only an infinite substance could cause the idea of an infinite substance — but I think he’s onto something important.

The second proof depends on two premises that one might question.  First, there’s the claim that if a thing had infinite power and the idea of an infinite substance, it would make itself into an infinite substance.

This sounds right, but I’m not sure how certain it is.

Second, there’s the claim that time is a discrete series of points, and thus that everything must be created anew out of nothing at each new moment.  This is a fascinating view of time, but I wonder if it is correct.

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Table of Contents

I. Quintads

II. Active and Passive, Fore and Aft

A. Active and Passive Rights

B. Fore and Aft Quintads

C. Active and Passive Duties

III. Transferable Duties

IV. The Coherence of Quintads

A. Two Kinds of Coherence

B. Digression on the Definition of Rights by Quintads

C. The “Same” Right Defined by Coherent and Incoherent Quintads

D. Roles and the Coherence of Quintads

V. Health Care as a Political Right

A. A Governmental Duty

B. A Duty to “the People”

C. A Duty to “Everyone”

D. The Face of the Other

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I. Quintads

Rights belong to “quintads.”

The basic structure of the quintad is as follows:

holder / right / action / duty /obliged

Every right is someone’s right, and every duty is someone’s duty.  The person who has the right is the “holder”; the person who has the duty is the “obliged.”

Every right entails a duty, and every right/duty pair centers around the performance of an action (either by the holder or the obliged).

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II. Active and Passive, Fore and Aft

A. Active and Passive Rights

The action at the center of any quintad can either belong to the holder or to the obliged.  If it belongs to the holder, then that quintad’s right is “active.”  The right is the holder’s right to perform some action.

If, on the other hand, the action belongs to the obliged, then that quintad’s right is “passive.”  It is the holder’s right to have someone perform some action “for her/him.”

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B. Fore and Aft Quintads

So, there are two kinds of quintads.

If the quintad’s right is active, then the action belongs more closely to the holder and right than to the obliged and duty:

holder/right/action // duty/obliged

If the right is passive, then the action belongs more closely to the obliged and duty than to the holder and right:

holder/right // action/duty/obliged

I’m unsure what it would be best to call the two kinds of quintads.  But for now I’ll call them “fore” quintads and “aft” quintads.

When the right is active, the first three members of the quintad “bunch together,” as it were.  The quintad is “front-heavy,” one might say.  It is a “fore” quintad.

When the right is passive, the last three members of the quintad “bunch together.”  The quintad is “back-heavy,” as it were.  It is a “aft” quintad.

Thus, active rights belong to “fore quintads,” and passive rights belong to “aft quintads.”

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C. Active and Passive Duties

The duties entailed by active rights are passive.

The duties entailed by passive rights are active.

That is, to have an active right is to have the right to perform some action, which places a duty on someone else to allow you to perform that action.  Allowing someone to perform an action is passive.  Thus, the duty to allow someone to perform an action is a “passive duty.”

To have a passive right is to have the right to have someone perform some action for you, which places a duty on someone else to perform that action for you.  To perform an action is active.  Thus, the duty to perform an action is an “active duty.”

Passive duties belong to fore quintads, and active duties belong to aft quintads.

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III. Transferable Duties

Some active duties are transferable.  That is, the action they involved need not necessarily be performed by the obliged, but can be performed for the obliged by someone else.

Thus, some aft quintads can become hexads (or “expanded quintads”):

holder/right // action/duty/obliged/proxy

For example, every child has the right to an education.  The person obliged by this right is the parent of the child.  The parent, however, may hire a proxy to educated the child in her stead (e.g., a professional teacher).

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The obliged/proxy relationship is actually itself a quintad in which the obliged is given a passive right (by agreement with the proxy) to have the proxy perform the action that the obliged owes the holder.

The proxy’s duty is to the obliged, not to the holder.

If the proxy fails to fulfill her or his duty to the obliged, however, this means that the obliged fails to fulfill her or his duty to the holder.  That is, when the proxy fails the obliged, the obliged automatically fails the holder.  But the proxy does not fail the holder.

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Quintads that involve transferable duties, I shall call “expandable” quintads, and quintads in which the duty has been transferred I shall call either “expanded” quintads, or “hexads.”

To say a quintad is expandable implies that it is a aft quintad (i.e., it involves a passive right and an active duty).  Not all aft quintads are expandable, however.

For example, the quintad describing a wife’s right to be loved by her husband (in the full marital sense of “loving”) is an aft quintad (since the right is passive, and the duty active).

[ holder/right // action/duty/obliged ]

wife/”To Be Loved” // loving/”To Love”/husband

However, the duty is not transferable.  It would be absurd to expand the quintad in any way.  For example, the following expanded quintad is, one might say, adulterous:

[ holder/right // action/duty/obliged/proxy ]

wife/”To Be Loved” // loving/”To Love”/husband/stranger

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IV. The Coherence of Quintads

A. Two Kinds of Coherence

The question of which quintads are expandable, and which are not, brings us to the topic of the coherence of quintads.  For a right to be legitimate, it must belong to a morally and ontologically coherent quintad.

That is, it must be morally permissible for the person who is to perform the quintad’s action to perform that action, and it must be ontologically possible for the person who is to perform the quintad’s action to perform that action.

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For example, no right can be legitimate if its quintad’s central action is “murder.”  Such a quintad would be morally incoherent.  Murder cannot belong to any person either as a right or a duty.  That would simply make no moral sense.

Also, no right can be legitimate if its quintad’s central action is “turning yourself inside out twice.”  That action is impossible, and thus any quintad centered around it would be incoherent.  “Turning yourself inside out twice” cannot belong to any person either as a right or a duty, since “ought” implies “can,” and no one can turn her- or himself inside out twice.”

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B. Digression on the Definition of Rights by Quintads

That a proposed quintad is either morally or ontologically incoherent is enough to show that the proposed right involved in the quintad is not a legitimate right.

This is because a right is defined by the quintad to which it belongs.  No matter how similar one right is to another, if they belong to different quintads, they are different rights.

For example, the child’s right to privacy is not the same as the US citizen’s right privacy.

Child / “To Privacy” // Keeping Facts About Child Hidden from Parents / “To Not Invade Privacy” / Parents

US Citizen / “To Privacy” // Keeping Facts About Citizen Hidden from Government / “To Not Invade Privacy” / US Government

The persons involved in the quintads differ, and thus the rights differ.

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Furthermore, even though the name of the actions involved are very similar — both are essentially, “keeping facts about the holder hidden from the obliged” — the actions themselves differ.

For example, a very young child has the right to keep only a very limited number things about himself or herself hidden from his or her parents.  An older child has the right to keep more things hidden.  A grown child has the right to keep many things hidden.

A US Citizen, on the other hand, has the right to keep just about everything hidden from the US Government, no matter how old or young she/he his.

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C. The “Same” Right, Defined by Coherent and Incoherent Quintads

Each right is defined by its quintad, and thus different quintads define different rights, and incoherent quintads define no rights at all.

This does not mean, however, that the right defined by an incoherent quintad might not be similar in some ways to another right defined by a coherent quintad.

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For example, the right to an attorney, if defined as follows, is incoherent:

Accused US Citizen / “To an Attorney” // Representing in Court / “To Represent in Court” / Baby Squirrel

This quintad is ontologically incoherent.  A baby squirrel could never represent anyone in court, and therefore could never have the duty to do so.  Thus, any right that entailed such a duty would be illegitimate.

Nevertheless, there is a similar “Right to an Attorney” whose defining quintad is coherent, and therefore which can be legitimate.  The fact that the Right to an Attorney defined by the one quintad is illegitimate does not mean that the Right to an Attorney defined by the other quintad is illegitimate too.

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D. Roles and the Coherence of Quintads

Most quintads would seem to define the holder and the obliged by roles.  That is, people seem to have rights and duties, in many cases, only insofar as they have certain roles.

A wife, for example, only has the right to be loved by her husband because she has the role of wife, and the husband only has the duty to love his wife because he has the role of husband.

Thus, any test of the moral or ontological coherence of a quintad must take into account whether it is morally permissible, or ontologically possible, for a person who has the role specified by the quintad to perform the action specified by the quintad.

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A quintad that presents a certain right as entailing a duty upon mechanics to fix cars, for instance, would be coherent.  Likewise, a quintad that presents a certain right as entailing a duty upon heart surgeons to perform heart surgery would also be coherent.

However, a quintad that presents a certain right as entailing a duty upon mechanics to perform heart surgery, or upon heart surgeons to fix cars, would be ontologically incoherent.

There’s nothing about the role of mechanic that would enable a person to perform heart surgery.  Nor is there anything about the role of heart surgeon that would enable a person to fix cars.

Therefore, a person cannot take on a duty as a heart surgeon to fix cars, nor can a person take on a duty as an auto mechanic to perform heart surgery.  Ought implies can, and heart surgeons are not trained to fix cars, nor are auto mechanics trained to do heart surgery.

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It may just so happen that a person who has the role of heart surgeon may have also learned to fix cars, and thus may be called on to fix a car in some emergency situation.  But the duty to fix a car will not be brought upon her because of her role as a heart surgeon.  It will be her duty because of her role as an auto mechanic.

Likewise, it may just so happen that a person who has the role of auto mechanic has also gone to med school and learned to be a heart surgeon.  Therefore, it may so happen that he is called on in some emergency situation to perform heart surgery.  However, that duty will not apply to him as an auto mechanic, but as a heart surgeon.

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V. Health Care as a Political Right

A. A Governmental Duty

What I would want to argue is that claiming there is a political right to health care is like claiming that there is an automotive right to heart surgery.

US Citizen / “To Health Care” // Providing Health Care / “To Provide Health Care” / US Lawmakers

Nothing about the role of lawmaker equips one to act as a doctor or nurse.  Nothing about working in a legislature makes one capable of working in an ER.

Therefore, any quintad that linked a duty to provide health care to the role of lawmaker would be incoherent.

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The only way to get around this incoherence is to claim that the activity of “providing health care” is not the activity performed by doctors and nurses, but is the activity of paying doctors and nurses to perform their activities.

US Citizen / “To Health Care” // Paying Doctors and Nurses to Provide Health Care / “To Pay Doctors and Nurses to Provide Health Care” / US Lawmakers

But then one would have to ask two questions:

(1) If the activity in the quintad is paying for doctors and nurses to do what doctors and nurses do, then isn’t the right in the quintad not the right to have doctors and nurses do what doctors and nurses do for you, but rather the right to have someone pay doctors and nurses to do what doctors and nurses do for you?

In other words, the only duty that doctors and nurses would have — if the right is a right to have the government pay doctors and nurses to do what they do — is a duty to whoever is paying them.  The doctors’ and nurses’ duties would be to the government, not to the patient.

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(2) What is it about the role of making laws that obliges one to also pay doctors and nurses to perform their activities?

There’s no contradiction in the claim that the role of lawmaker and the activity of paying doctors and nurses are connected by a duty, it’s just there’s no obvious connection between the role and the activity.  And if the connection between the obliged and the duty isn’t obvious, the claim that there is a right that entails the duty can only be something less than convincing.

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B. A Duty to “the People”

To make the right seem more legitimate, I think one would have to claim that the relevant quintad is not . . .

[ holder / right // activity / duty / obliged ]

Citizen/ “To Have Health Care Paid For” // Paying for Health Care / “To Pay for Health Care” / Government

. . . but is rather . . .

[ holder / right // activity / duty / obliged / proxy ]

Citizen / “To Have Health Care Paid For” // Paying for Health Care / “To Pay for Health Care” / Other Citizens / Government

That is, to make the right seem more legitimate, one might try to portray the act of paying for health care as something that we all as fellow citizens owe each other, but which we transfer to our government.

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In response to this, I would point out that we can ask the same first question as we asked above:

If the activity in the quintad is paying for doctors and nurses to do what doctors and nurses do, then isn’t the right in the quintad not the right to have doctors and nurses do what doctors and nurses do for you, but rather the right to have someone pay doctors and nurses to do what doctors and nurses do for you?

In other words, if we understand the right in terms of paying for health care, then we understand the doctors’ and nurses’ duty as being to all those who pay the doctors and nurses.  And since “The People” would be paying the doctors and nurses, and doctors’ and nurses’ duties would be to “The People,” not to the patient lying on the gurney in front of them.

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In other words, if you (a) claim a right to health care, (b) frame that right in terms not of actually providing health care, but of paying doctors and nurses to provide health care, and (c) make “The People” the ones who pay the doctors and nurses, then (d) you insert “The People” between the doctors/nurses and the patient.  Their duty is to an abstract collective entity, not to the concrete person who actually needs their help.

Furthermore, the doctors and nurses aren’t paid by “The People” to provide care for the patient whom the doctors and nurses have in front of them.  They’re paid by “The People” to provide care for “The People.”  Their job is to use the money they’re given so as to provide the best total care that they can for “The People”  — even if that means not taking care of the person in front of them (because, e.g., “The People’s” money would be better spent on other patients).

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C. A Duty to “Everyone”

And even if you thought not of “The People” as paying the doctors and nurses, but of “every citizen” as paying the doctors and nurses, then the doctors and nurses still have a much higher duty to everyone else than to the person in front of them.

After all, the person in front of them is only one person.  Everyone else is, for example, roughly 300,000,000 people (in the US).  Thus, 1/300,000,000th of the duty of the doctors and nurses taking care of a patient is to the person in front of them, and 299,999,999/300,000,000th of their duty is to everyone else.

After all, they’re primarily spending everyone else’s money on this patient, not the patient’s money.

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Imagine, for instance, that a patient needs a $1,000 procedure.  In the ideal case that everyone pays for everyone equally, the patient would be contributing 0.00000333. . . of a dollar to his own procedure.  That’s 0.000333. . . of a cent.  That’s a tad more than three ten-thousandths of a cent.

And if you truly thought that having your health care paid for was a universal human right, then in the ideal case everyone would be paying for everyone else’s health care, and thus 1/6,700,000,000th of the duty of the doctors and nurses taking care of a patient is to the person in front of them, and 6,699,999,999/6,700,000,000th of their duty is to everyone else.

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D. The Face of the Other

I don’t think that those who propose a right to health care would want to look at things this way.  But I think it’s unavoidable.

What it teaches us, I think, is that for rights and duties to have weight, they must be immediate and personal.  To funnel them through groups is to dilute them.  To funnel them through groups beyond a certain size is, for all intents and purposes, to eliminate them.

To borrow Levinas’ terms, rights and duties must be grounded in the face of the Other, if they are to have any practical meaning.

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