Michael Yon - Online Magazine

17 Members of Congress Want Answers on MEDEVAC

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Mon, 06 Feb 2012 17:27:38 +0000

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Contempt of and for Congress?

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Sun, 05 Feb 2012 02:30:22 +0000

US Military Forges Ahead with Deadly Deceptions

Dhaka, Bangladesh
05 February 2012

The US military is toying with American lawmakers.

Based on two key documents submitted to individual Members of Congress and the House Armed Services Committee, by both the Joint Chiefs of Staff and US Army, it’s clear that a concerted, organized attempt to deceive Congress is coming from DoD brass. Repeated deceptions regarding MEDEVAC failures in Afghanistan continue to be perpetrated in writing by certain leadership elements within DoD. Rebuttal to an egregious JCS letter is published here.

Subsequent the JCS missive to Congress, the Army also began circulating a statement to Senators and Representatives after CBS aired a story revealing some of the MEDEVAC shortcomings.

As with the JCS missive, the Army statement is a conspicuous attempt to mislead Congress. It really is that bad. The deceptions from both JCS and the Army are so egregious, so obvious, and so demonstrable, that the Congress should consider identifying the flag officers responsible to hold them accountable. The absurdity of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Army submitting unsigned communiqués packed with sleight-of-hand and outright falsehoods, in response to direct, official inquiry, is stunning. Not only does this demonstrate terrible judgment and dangerous “leadership,” they treat Members of Congress as fools to be played.

Members of Congress have requested truthful information from the Army and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and in return have received contempt. A minor error can be overlooked, but the calculation involved in repeatedly putting forth the same misleading arguments and falsehoods cannot be seen as a minor mistake. It’s strategic.

Some top officers do not take seriously the ability of elected officials to see through their clumsy smokescreen. Senior military officials are testing the will of Congress, doubting the determination of many offices on the Hill to drive forward with investigation—and to uncover the ground-truth we all know is hampering our Dustoff crews in doing the jobs they’re demanding to do.

The anonymous Army statement below is an orphan of unfit parents. We should hope that Members of Congress are not duped into embarrassing situations by responding to their constituents on-the-record with this issue by relying on unsigned spin like the document below, and the earlier JCS document. As the issue unfolds at an accelerating pace, and media inquiries to me increase, this fiasco has the potential to damage the credibility of any office defending or avoiding it.

The continuing, unacceptable MEDEVAC failures in Afghanistan are of pressing consequence for troops in harm’s way. These policies, too, will leave more orphans of war, if not changed.

Yet this demonstrated contempt of and for Congress is a separate matter. Flag officers should be called before the Congress to explain these communiqués, and their roles in disseminating false information to Senators Kyl, Grassley, Hutchison, and Webb. These Senators and others have been deceived.

Please read this Army statement:

The orphaned Army statement above is refuted along with the JCS statement.

It's time to lay down the law.

The Army MEDEVAC Scandal: Report of Conspiracy

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Thu, 02 Feb 2012 13:32:56 +0000

02 February 2012

An Army officer writes:

The Army is not resisting Dustoff policy change because our leadership honestly believes the current policy is superior, but rather because of AMEDD's [Army Medical Department] protectionist attitude toward "their" Dustoff MEDEVAC helicopters. I'm an active duty infantry officer, and I've been following the Dustoff issue since you first brought attention to it. More importantly, I have a lot of contacts within the Medical Service branch. While we have discussed this issue "around the watercooler" at work, Medical Service officers have been receiving briefings from senior members of their branch about a selectively edited account of SPC Clark's MEDEVAC mission, and what their message should be if anyone asks about it.

My contacts have highlighted that AMEDD's number one priority is protecting their "ownership" of the helicopters in question. They are concerned that removing the Red Cross from AMEDD's birds will result in those helicopters being assigned general purpose tasks, outside of the Medical Service Corp's control. In other words, their top priority is NOT providing the best possible care for our Soldiers and partners, but rather protecting their own fiefdoms. AMEDD is choosing to put Soldiers' lives in danger rather than chance losing "their" birds. Never mind that our sister services, special operations forces and allies are all able to field armed, dedicated CASEVAC/MEDEVAC helicopters! Somehow, despite all the evidence to the contrary, this is still the irrational argument AMEDD is sticking to, and directing its officers to spread. I'm concerned that in the dust-up over policy recommendations, comparisons with Pedro, and rebutting the JCS letter that we may be losing sight of the real obstacle in our path to reform. Sincere thanks for all you do, and keep up the fire!

Important Letter from Gold Star Mother

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Tue, 31 Jan 2012 13:19:31 +0000

31 January 2012

A Gold Star Mother is one who lost a child in service of the United States. Ms. Keyko Clark-Davis is a recent Gold Star Mother. I was present when her son Chazray was mortally wounded. We have communicated many times. Chazray’s mother is strong and inspirational. She sends this letter in hopes that other Americans will take a few minutes to absorb her message.

The letter from Chazray’s Mother:

U.S. Army Evacuation Policy Change Request Letter from the Mother of a fallen soldier:

Hello to all American Citizens at home and abroad. My name is Keyko Clark-Davis and I am a military parent whose first-born son, Army SPC Chazray Clark was killed in Kandahar, Afghanistan on 18 Sept 2011.

The fact that my son decided to risk his own life to protect the basic freedoms so many of us take for granted makes me extremely proud in spite of the devastation and sadness that his untimely death has caused us as a family. Chazray was only 24 years old. He and I had a long discussion prior to his decision to enlist; and like the majority of mothers I reluctantly agreed and reassured him that I supported his decision 100%. I even went with him to be sworn in after signing up.

I am having a very difficult time dealing with his death and as are his four siblings. Although this is not the sole content of our conversations, my maternal instincts causes me to feel their pain; just as they can feel mine even in the absence of words. My difficulty in coping is compounded by the fact that the US Army has failed to provide me with honest, full disclosure of ALL the facts that caused the death of my son. Although not the official next –of-kin on behalf of my daughter—in law I have requested a complete copy of the Army investigation, autopsy reports, photos, etc., which at the time of this letter I have not yet received.

Thus, after several failed attempts to obtain honest official answers to my many questions from the US Army, I began conducting my own research into the circumstances surrounding my son's death. My grief began to give way to anger when I viewed video footage shot by a reporter named Mr. Michael Yon, who was there at the time my son was injured. Casualty Assistance Officers advised us initially to not believe possible rumors or media propaganda which we might be exposed to prior to us having any knowledge of Mr. Yon. When I thought about that, it actually raised even more unresolved questions with regard to the US Army's "Golden Hour" and "9-line" evacuation policies involving rescue missions. Mr. Yon's footage makes him an eyewitness to what happened to my son, and not just a media person spreading rumors.

It has come to my attention that there was a PEDRO that was operational and could have responded to the 9-line call the day my son was injured; thereby alleviating the 59minutes that my son had to wait for a MEDEVAC. However, due to policies and/or politics within the US Army with respect to other branches operating under CENTCOM the MEDEVAC was delayed.

The loss of my son has become the most life-altering event that my entire family has ever experienced. I feel that the United States Army, has an obligation to every soldier, every family and every US citizen to re-evaluate current protocol and implement WHATEVER CHANGES are needed to save the lives of wounded soldiers by whatever means necessary.

The Army’s contention that they are following protocol of the Geneva Convention is fallacious and without substance. Not only are the Taliban not signatories to the Geneva Convention but the Geneva Convention does not mandate that a MEDEVAC transport identify itself with a Red Cross.

I do not want another family to feel excruciating pain and suffering from the devastating loss of a loved one while policy makers and high ranking officers continue to turn a blind eye to the inherent failures in existing policies. With vivid images of my son's final moments of life FOREVER BURNED into my mind, closure can only be made possible by doing everything in my power to bring about these much needed changes in current policy.

In the name of my fallen hero, SPC Chazray Clark, I am making a personal appeal to ALL United States Citizens who enjoy the freedoms for which he unselfishly gave his life, to join me in this crusade to bring about an immediate change to an Army Policy that requires alerting the enemy the MEDEVACs are unarmed.

God bless you all and thanks in advance for your prayers and support.

Respectfully,

Keyko Clark-Davis

Red Air: America’s Medevac Failure

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Wed, 12 Oct 2011 02:20:40 +0000

4-4 Cav waiting to board helicopters for an air assault.

12 October 2011
Afghanistan

Most of our troops in Afghanistan never see combat. The closest they get might be the occasional rocket attacks on bases. A relatively small number will be in so many fights that the war becomes a jumble. For those who see fighting daily, their mental time markers are often when they or their buddies were hurt or died, or when some other serious event occurred.

The troops in 4-4 Cav have seen a great deal of fighting. Their courage seems bottomless and for two-and-a-half months I was an eyewitness to their professionalism and courage.

This mission would be dangerous. The Female Engagement Team was left behind and the only female Soldier to come was a medic because, as she would tell me, “I’m the badass medic.”

We sat in the morning darkness behind the helicopters waiting for them to start. A few Soldiers were sleeping on the rocks, while others murmured about this or that. A bomb dog looked at me, then plopped her head on the stomach of her handler, leaving her nose pointing to the sky due to the bulk of the handler’s body armor. The air was still and cool at about 0230 when the helicopters cranked engines under the waning gibbous moon. Illumination was enough for an RPG shot on the landing which could take us all down in a ball of fire.

The helium-filled aerostat balloon tugged at its tether in the background, and light years farther in the background was Orion, pointing north. Remarkably, all of the fighting done by 4-4 Cav has occurred within just a few miles of this base.

CH-47 lifting off on a 4-4 Cav air assault. This image was made from a previous mission. All other images in this dispatch are from the mission described herein.

The CH-47 engines were roaring under the spinning rotors as crew members inspected the aircraft with flashlights looking for any signs of trouble. Thick, hot fumes washed over us as we boarded. Troops filled every seat and all the space on the floor. The helicopters lifted off and soon the wheels touched down on the landing zone in tilled fields. We rushed away from the back ramp and the helicopters flew off into morning darkness leaving us among marijuana fields and the Taliban. The mission into the deadly village of Leyadira had begun.

Through night vision, the Operations Sergeant Major Gregg Larson--a fine NCO--could be seen flipping open his Army compass and checking the azimuth.

On the landing zone.

Soldiers ahead of us searched for bombs using special gear such as metal detectors and other more secret stuff, but that only works to a point. And it only covers the area where a trooper has used the gear. I don’t trust it. The dogs are okay, but they get blown up, too. Often the first person to find a bomb is far back down the line and he finds it by getting killed. Keeping your distance from the person in front is crucial. Being too close to any other man doubles the chance of both getting hit.

The village of Leyadira was full of booby-traps waiting for us--trip wires, pressure plates, and who knows what else--but we didn’t know that yet. As best I can tell, Specialist Chazray Clark was at least number eighteen down the line. The village was vacant other than the enemy. The commander, Lieutenant Colonel Mike Katona, expected a big fight. The moon was so bright that it cast shadows. We were maybe two hundred meters into Leyadira when the first explosion happened.

BOOM!!! Off to front right there was a tremendous blast. Seconds later, debris began raining down and could be heard coming through the trees on the right. The ANA Soldier looked at me startled (image above) and started to run for cover, but there was none to be found. I just stood still, waiting to be hit because it was better to be still in a place now known to have bombs. We were not in small arms contact. He saw me stand still and he did the same.

4-4 Cav Soldier working

Specialist Chazray Clark had stepped on a bomb. Some Afghan Soldiers had strayed off the cleared path and Chazray was following them because they were in front of his section. Sergeant Edward Wooden had been close to Chazray but not wounded. Wooden was proving yet again to be solid under pressure. He had been wounded during a previous mission but now was good to go. Sergeant Carroll was so close to this explosion that he was stone deaf. Chazray was terribly wounded and had been thrown and landed on his face. The platoon was staggered by the blast yet kept their bearing. They were amazingly calm.

Minutes after the blast, Lieutenant Flores is working the situation by making a “9-line” communication.

In my location, the air was clear, but closer to the blast area the dust was thick. The night vision devices were useless for those in the immediate area of the blast. Sergeant Wooden called out the names of his men in the darkness, taking head count. Near the detonation, nobody could see each other.

A Soldier moves toward the scene of the blast while clearing his steps. No visible lights are being used.

Sergeant Wooden called, “Clark!” Chazray was facedown. One arm and both his legs were gone, and yet this man had the strength and presence to call out from the dust and darkness. Chazray answered, “I’m okay. ” Sergeant Wooden said Chazray’s voice sounded completely normal. Chazray was carrying a good deal of explosives when he stepped on the bomb, including det-cord and caps. Luckily, they didn’t detonate.

Although Chazray had answered that he was okay, everyone here knows that when someone calls out “I’m okay,” the sound of their voice only means they are still alive. Fellow Soldiers located Chazray in the dark, and quickly put on tourniquets and unfolded a stretcher. I was not in the dust-filled area, but I could see brave men come out of it, carrying Chazray back over dangerous ground. I heard Chazray say his arm tourniquet was too tight. He was in great pain. Through night vision I saw an Afghan Soldier rush in to help carry Chazray.

Specialist Chazray was fully conscious and talking the entire time while being medically treated and moved.

The Soldiers took Chazray back to the landing zone where we had just come in.

We waited.

And waited. Some Afghans slipped off to pray in the dark despite that the surrounding areas were not “cleared.” (The next day during this mission, an ANA Soldier stepped into an uncleared area and was killed instantly.)

Sergeant Carroll taking a knee and surveying the surround area.

Sergeant Carroll was so deaf from the bomb blast that he didn’t seem to hear anything, but he stayed alert and on his job pulling security. At one point, an officer tried to talk with him, and a buddy of his said something like, “Sir, he can’t hear. He’s deaf.” And that’s how it went. When someone wanted to communicate with Sergeant Carroll, they had to grab him and speak loudly in his face.

Signaling the helicopter

The medevac was very late. It took us about 20 minutes to get back to the Landing Zone (LZ). Based on my significant experience down here in southern Afghanistan, I know that the helicopter could and should have already been on orbit waiting for us. Chazray was dying but fully conscious and talking the entire time. We waited, and waited. Finally a radio call came that the medevac was “wheels up” from KAF. It was unbelievable to us that the medevac was just taking off from Kandahar Airfield, twenty-five miles away.

The problem was that this was an Army Dustoff medevac, and Army medevacs don’t carry machine guns because they have red crosses emblazoned on the sides and front. When our helicopters sport the red crosses, they can’t carry offensive weapons. This is meaningless anyway because they are accompanied by an Apache attack helicopter, which is fully loaded with a cannon and missiles.

And so while Chazray was dying, his Dustoff medevac was sitting idly on the runway down at Kandahar Airfield. Since there was no available Apache, the Dustoff was not cleared to depart. The Air Force Pedros have no red crosses marking their helicopters. Instead, they have .50-caliber machine guns. The Pedro helicopter teams are parked right there on the same runway and they could have been dispatched, but for some extremely sorry reason the Pedros are not allowed to come into 4-4 Cav battlespace unless there is “red air.” Red air means the weather is too bad for Army helicopters to come. From my experience Dustoffs are not averse to extreme danger, but there are conditions during which they are not allowed to fly during which Pedros will go.

And so the armed Pedros, which could have flown to us in about 13 minutes, sat on the runaway twenty-five miles away, doing nothing. I know first-hand the skill of the Pedros having flown with them in 2009.

Specialist Chazray Clark was dying due to politics, and the Army and Air Force pilots are very angry about this. Chazray’s is not the only such case. Army medevac helicopters fall under the Medical Services Corps, who mark medevacs with red crosses. Officers will tell you face-to-face that the Medical Corps does not want to give up its helicopters because senior officers want their own helicopters to shuttle them from here to there.

It is important to be absolutely clear--this is not about the Dustoff pilots and crews, who are incredibly courageous. They have earned enormous respect. They’ll fly into hell to get one of our wounded troopers. This is about politics getting in the way of saving lives.

Yet despite everyone here knowing we are perpetually short on helicopters in Afghanistan, and while Pedros would have had Chazray to the hospital less than 35 minutes after the blast, Chazray lay dying. There is no doubt in my mind—after seeing Pedros in action many times—that Chazray would have been at the trauma center in less than 35 minutes if the Pedros team had been scrambled. Instead, it took 65 minutes for Chazray to get to the hospital. Chazray was fully conscious when he was finally put on the bird. But he died at Kandahar Airfield. The General in charge of this fiasco needs to be fired.

Unarmed Army medevac helicopters are not even allowed to go into certain combat areas because they may get shot up and have no way of defending themselves. And so if the air is too dangerous due to bullets or bad weather, Air Force Pedros are sent because they fly in all weather and they shoot back with .50-caliber machine guns.

I asked Colonel Patrick Frank, the 4-4 Cav brigade commander, and Lieutenant Colonel Mike Katona, the squadron commander, if they have any discretion about which birds are called. Can we request Pedros instead of Army Dustoff? No. The answer is simple, clear and ultimately disastrous: There is no discretion.

Marking the landing zone. Chazray is fully conscious and talking in the darkness waiting for an Apache escort.

Finally a courageous Army Dustoff crew lands.

Because of his proximity to the bomb blast, Sergeant Carroll was stone deaf. He was put on the bird with Chazray.

The Apache is orbiting in the darkness.

Chazray is loaded.

Now loaded with the two casualties, the Dustoff medevac heads to Kandahar Airfield. The Dustoff is wheels down at the hospital approximately 65 minutes after the blast. Specialist Chazray Clark died at the hospital while we continued the mission.

This is not the only time that medevacs have been delayed in responding to 4-4 Cav requests, or had to switch landing zones due to heavy enemy fire. If the Pedros were dispatched they would come right in because they can shoot back.

After ten years of war, the Army has had every opportunity to fix this problem. If the Army intended to right this wrong it would have been improved years ago. Clearly, the Army lacks the will to address this issue. We need courageous leadership. This issue should be elevated to the level of the Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, who needs to shake the Army’s political tree and fix our medevac issue before more troops die.

We continued the mission. There was another KIA the next day from another IED. No helicopter was called this time because the Afghan Soldier was killed instantly. He was zipped up in a body bag and carried out that night.

13 Military Pilots Rebuke the Joint Chiefs of Staff

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Sun, 29 Jan 2012 19:48:07 +0000

An overview of harmful Army medical evacuation practices not endorsed by other service branches, and a response to official arguments defending this policy provided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC).

30 January 2012

Introduction

Michael Yon is a combat writer, and a former member of the US Army Special Forces. The New York Times noted in 2008 that he’d spent more time embedded with combat units than any other journalist in Iraq, and the reporting on his blog won the Weblog Award in 2005, 2007, and 2008. It is probable that he has also spent more time with combat troops in Afghanistan than any writer, photographer, or journalist of any sort. He is widely respected inside the military and beyond for the quality of his journalism, and his pursuit of the truth alongside US and allied combat personnel in the most dangerous theaters of operation.

On 18 September 2011, Mr. Yon accompanied an element of the US Army’s 1st Infantry Division, the 4-4 Cav, on a nighttime combat operation in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. During this mission the unit was attacked with an Improvised Explosive Device, deafening one soldier, and amputating both legs and one arm of a second—Specialist Chazray Clark. Specialist Clark was conscious and communicating up until the time he was evacuated.

US and allied forces have two primary helicopter medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) assets in Kandahar: US Army “Dustoff” flights, and US Air Force “Pedro” flights. Unlike Army Dustoff flights, the Pedro flights—as well as British, Dutch, US Marines, Navy, and US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) medical flights—do not bear the Red Cross. The core reasons for this difference involve rapid reaction and maximum flexibility with limited air assets.

While Pedro, SOCOM, and Marine rescue flights can launch and insert quickly due to being armed, US Army Dustoff flights—following Geneva Conventions requirements for bearing the Red Cross—are unarmed, with Army policy requiring armed escort before they are allowed to launch their rescue missions. Consequently, unlike other MEDEVAC/CASEVAC flights, Army Dustoff flights are regularly delayed while they await escort gunships, often from other areas. There is no obligation under the Geneva Conventions to wear the Red Cross.

Specialist Clark and others probably died because of this delay.

During the incident in question, a Dustoff helicopter was approximately three minutes away, parked at Forward Operating Base Pasab. Both Dustoff and Pedro aircrews report being able to be airborne within roughly six minutes of receipt of orders.

However, because there were no Apache gunships available, the Dustoff flight for Specialist Clark was delayed. Official records state that he was delivered to hospital facilities 59 minutes after the MEDEVAC flight was requested by his unit—one minute from falling outside DoD standards, and within the “Golden Hour” from the moment of injury. But the military deceives here. Their fictitious Golden Hour does not begin at the moment of injury, but from the time the 9-line casualty report is received. This deadly deception was revealed in Golden Seconds.

Pedro helicopters also sitting at Kandahar Airfield could have completed this mission in less than 35 minutes. If Pedro or armed Dustoff had been stationed at Pasab, Chazray Clark could have been delivered to the trauma center in roughly 24 minutes.

The official record states that it took 59 minutes to deliver Chazray Clark to the combat support hospital. Video shot by Michael Yon provides conclusive proof that the military has deceived the Congress. Patient delivery took about 66 minutes from the time of injury, and about 65 minutes from the time of first report. There is no argument on this point. This clear deception brings in question all other military statements on this issue.

The death of Specialist Clark attributed to these delays is not an isolated incident.

The purpose of the Red Cross on Dustoff aircraft is to officially designate non-combatant status, granting immunity from hostile fire. Like many 20th Century rules of war, they are simply not recognized by any hostile elements the US is currently in conflict with. Even if they were recognized, the Red Cross is hard to see at night or during limited visibility. Helicopters do get hit with fire at night. For instance, a CH-47 was shot down at night last August, killing all 38 aboard.

According to the Geneva Conventions, "If there is no agreement, belligerents will only be able to use medical aircraft at their own risk and peril."

The reality is that helicopters bearing the Red Cross receive no protections, they are banned from participating in other high-need combat missions, and they have been delayed in their official duties to the point of permitting the deaths of US personnel.

It is also worth noting that because Geneva protections were not being afforded to clearly designated US Army Medics, they were ordered to cease wearing the Red Cross-marked armbands and helmets and to start carrying weapons—back in Vietnam. They have not worn them since.

Air Force, SOCOM, Marines, Navy, British and Dutch aircraft have foregone the Red Cross and its legal restrictions, resulting in vastly more flexible MEDEVAC capacity. In addition to being better positioned to save lives, it is notable that these units also maximize the dollar-value to DoD and the US taxpayer by maximizing the utility of the airframes and aircrews involved.

The senseless additional trauma inflicted upon Specialist Clark after the IED by faulty Army MEDEVAC policy was witnessed by Mr. Yon, and in further researching and reporting on the incident, the full scope of the poor judgment involved in these MEDEVAC policies came forth. Many seasoned professionals of all walks, including dozens of aircrew members of different service branches, reached out to him to provide further insight. Dustoff crews, in particular, expressed deep frustration with these policies.

Of additional tremendous concern coming to light is that current Army Dustoff policies actually violate Chapter VI of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, to which the US is a signatory:

“Article 36. Medical aircraft, that is to say, aircraft exclusively employed for the removal of wounded and sick and for the transport of medical personnel and equipment, shall not be attacked, but shall be respected by the belligerents, while flying at heights, times and on routes specifically agreed upon between the belligerents concerned.

They shall bear, clearly marked, the distinctive emblem prescribed in Article 38, together with their national colours on their lower, upper and lateral surfaces. They shall be provided with any other markings or means of identification that may be agreed upon between the belligerents upon the outbreak or during the course of hostilities”

Unless agreed otherwise, flights over enemy or enemy-occupied territory are prohibited.

Medical aircraft shall obey every summons to land. In the event of a landing thus imposed, the aircraft with its occupants may continue its flight after examination, if any.” (Underscore emphasis added)

The reporting of this incident and calls for a change in Army MEDEVAC policy resulted in significant pushback from Army authorities in-theater. Congressional interest and inquiry resulted only in further resistance from military authorities, including at CENTCOM, all the way to the highest levels of Pentagon military leadership—the Secretary of the Army and the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

It is the opinion of Mr. Yon and many of his readers who are subject matter experts, that documentation provided to Members of Congress and the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) regarding Army MEDEVAC policy contains falsehoods and is obfuscatory in nature.

In particular, the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided HASC an unsigned document with neither title page nor date, which was riddled with egregious errors and deceptions. With this document, JCS deceived Congress. While the author is unknown, and may have come from lower commands, the document was provided to HASC by JCS under the color of their authority, without caveat.

The remaining portion of this article addresses this document, and sheds light on the reality on the ground as our troops experience it. Of particular note, thirteen active duty helicopter pilots contributed to this analysis of the JCS document—five Army Dustoff, five Air Force Pedro, and three additional non-Dustoff Army. All have completed at least one tour in Afghanistan, or are there now. Many have also completed combat tours in Iraq. In total, these 13 pilots have roughly 25 combat tours between them, and thousands of missions. More than twenty subject matter experts contributed to this analysis.

A copy of the JCS document is published here. JCS Bogus report to Congress

Commentary and Analysis

The JCS document begins:

“The information below details the circumstances surrounding the event in question as first reported by Michael Yon in his blog titled ‘Red Air’ and followed up by an open letter to Secretary Panetta and President Obama.

After examining the facts and circumstances of this particular incident and compiling data regarding all MEDEVAC/CASEVAC missions in theater, we have found no merit to Mr. Yon's claims that any change in MEDEVAC policy or procedures would provide any improvement in current casualty survival rates.”

Mr. Yon: Both the White House and Pentagon were offered copies of the original, unedited video of the attack in which Specialist Chazray Clark was wounded, described in “RED AIR”, which extended over an hour and included the long delay of the Dustoff arrival. Neither the Pentagon nor the White House accepted the video, nor have they accepted argument from MEDEVAC crews, and aircrews from other services regarding the speed and effectiveness with which they can conduct rescue operations without the Red Cross designation. The edited, public version of the video may be found here.

According to JCS:

“Below are definitions that are useful and commonly used when discussing MEDEVAC procedures:

MEDEVAC- Unarmed, specifically designated (Red Cross), US Army UH-60s
CASEVAC- Any evacuation asset other than MEDEVAC (CH-47, UH-1, UH-60, etc.), may be armed or unarmed.
PEDRO- Air Force HH-60 armed with.50 caliber guns on both doors; primary mission is personnel recovery/CSAR; in RC-South, only located at KAF”

Mr. Yon: Pedro units are stationed not only at KAF (Kandahar Airfield), but at Bastion and Bagram as well. (In other Regional Commands.) More importantly, however, while their primary mission might be stated as “personnel recovery/CSAR”, the reality is that they are doing MEDEVAC/CASEVAC daily, and even patient transfers in other areas. Argument has been made that Pedro assets are limited strictly to special operations-types of rescues. This is not the reality of their employment in-theater.

JCS:

“THUNDER- Unit designation for the Army MEDEVACs in RC-South
CHASE- accompanying helicopter, generally "slick" Blackhawk (.240 caliber door weapons, no external tanks/rockets)”

Mr. Yon: No “.240 caliber” weapons exist in the US inventory. This is such a conspicuous error that the author simply cannot have had any experience with combat units. Within a combat unit, this is as glaring as saying, “The Houston Red Sox won the Super Bowl. It was a great soccer match.” Perhaps the author was interpreting this from the M240 machine gun, chambered for the 7.62mm cartridge. Further discrediting the author was a note I received from a Dustoff pilot currently in Afghanistan, stating that most Chase flights in Afghanistan are “MED on MED chase,” and are thus unarmed.

JCS:

“ESCORT- accompanying, full armed helicopter (Apache, Kiowa, Cobra, etc.); specifically not a PEDRO or lightly armed UH-60”

Mr. Yon: This is false—Pedro aircraft do perform escort. Pedros are well armed with two .50 caliber machine guns per aircraft. It is suspected that this duplicitous definition is an attempt to discredit or minimize the policy of other services to provide medical flights that are self-escorted, as Pedro flights are.

JCS:

“Category A (Cat A) - urgent case requiring evacuation within 60 minutes
Category B (Cat B) - evacuation required within 4 hours
Category C (Cat C) - evacuation required within 24 hours
First Up (1st up)- Primary flight asset with responsibility to be first to respond; generally assumed to have 15 minute "run up" time
Second up (2nd up)- Back up flight asset generally responding only after 1" 1 up is unavailable (on mission, mechanical failure, etc)
Run up -The time it takes to prepare an aircraft to fly; generally considered 15 minutes (some aircraft/crew take less time, some take more)”
9 line MEDEVAC Request- 9 lines of information requesting the evacuation (location, number and severity of injuries, condition of landing zone etc...)”

Mr. Yon: The assertion of 15-minute run-up times is inaccurate, and is likely being used to pad “acceptable” time into the delayed response in Specialist Clark’s MEDEVAC, and others. Pedro and Dustoff crews need about six minutes to be airborne. British MERT uses a larger helicopter and brings a surgical team and can take fifteen minutes during daytime, but up to thirty minutes at night.

JCS:

“Summary of events in response to ‘Red Air’.

The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) 82 decision matrix on MEDEVAC asset allocation is similar to that of the previous battlespace owner, CJTF-10, in that a dividing line exists whereby those missions falling to the west would be assigned to the MEDEVAC assets based at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Pasab and those falling to the east would be assigned to the assets based at Kandahar Air Field (KAF). While similar decision points exist for the MEDEVAC assets at FOB Sakari Karez, Tarin Kowt, and Wolverine, only the previously described line was relevant as the casualty of reference was between Pasab and KAF. The Patient Evacuation Coordination Cell (PECC) in RC-South has the decision lines plotted to assist with rapid evaluation in assigning the evacuation to the location with the most expedient route to the appropriate military treatment facility (MTF).

Based on run-up times and distance from the appropriate MTF's, CJTF-82 determined that the MEDEVAC is the only appropriate asset for any Category A casualty found west of the dividing line; Pedro, from KAF, will only be used for the much less urgent Category B (if PEDRO is first up) or Category C (if Thunder is first up). Those casualties to the east of the dividing line will be assigned to MEDEVAC or PEDRO based on which unit is first up and which is second up; the designation of which is alternated each Monday at 1300.”

Mr. Yon: The tone of this passage seems designed to appeal to authority and dazzle with vocabulary, but consistently, Pedro and Dustoff pilots report slow, weak, or poor decision-making processes coming from PECC. Reports indicate this is a major problem with the medical evacuation system in Afghanistan. A common complaint from pilots is that PECC will task aircrews in a way that makes little or no sense, including having a Dustoff or Pedro flight sitting “hot cocked” (ready to go), only to task a unit needing far longer to spin up, such as the excellent but slower British MERT (Medical Emergency Response Team).

Army and Air Force pilots insist the decision on who to send is often tactically senseless. The worst examples involve using Pedro units—possessing the highest and most advanced rescue capability—on routine Cat-B or Cat-C patient transfers. Mr. Yon accompanied such missions with Pedro. It is fairly mindboggling to witness a Pedro flight used for routine medical transfers—it’s the equivalent of using a SWAT team to write parking tickets, being taken out of availability along with the most advanced gear. Pedro HH-60G Pave Hawks are capable of entering very hot Landing Zones on the most dangerous or technically difficult of missions and terrain, on missions that may involve the most severe weather, heavy enemy forces, or require scuba (our vehicles are sometimes blown into rivers), or requirements where the medics may have to climb or parachute to patients. Dustoff cannot perform all Pedro missions, but Pedro can perform all Dustoff missions, and more. Pedro should be reserved for Cat A and very dangerous or technical work. Had this policy been in place for Specialist Clark, he may have lived.

As one Pedro pilot noted: “[This is a] serious problem—our aircraft were never intended to fly as much as they have had to. It is like owning a car with over 400,000 miles that you have to use as a daily driver. Our maintenance folks are killing themselves trying to keep them flying.”

A second Pedro pilot noted: “Pedro is limited in performance due to weight from mission equipment on high altitude missions in hot temps. We have HC-130s [Fixed-wing aircraft] in country and can still do a Jump Mission with the PJs to get medical care to them within the Golden Hour then call a Chinook for extraction. Which the PECC would probably never think of.

This is the critical problem with the entire system. ISAF PECC Qualifications are inadequate for the Medical Evacuation Personnel assigned. They make the recommendations on which asset to use to the officer in charge of the JOC [Joint Operations Center] who then authorizes it. The personnel who fill these positions try hard but are simply not qualified. Many are Non-U.S. Forces and come from other ISAF Nations. The only folks running Medical Evacuations in Afghanistan are American and British. Last time I was there and went to the PECC at Kandahar to see for myself who was making these decisions I was surprised to see for myself that it was a Medical NCO with clinical but no evacuation experience. Medical personnel run system not Personnel Recovery folks. They simply don’t know anything about tactical operations. They spend a lot of time thinking about what is the right thing to do rather than instinctively knowing what to do immediately.

This position should be filled by a Guardian Angel Combat Rescue Officer or Pararescueman, Pedro, Dustoff, or MERT pilot or crewmember that has completed at least one operational tour. We need someone making the recommendations to the officer in charge that actually knows what he is talking about.”

According to the JCS document:

“MEDEVAC's will require an ESCORT if the casualty is in a area designated high risk landing zone, "hot LZ" by the 9 line request. This is accomplished by the PECC alerting the supporting aviation brigade who then scans the airspace to locate the closest appropriate asset able to divert and provide coverage in to the high risk area. In most cases, an appropriate asset is already in the air and can quickly divert to cover the mission; however, if no flying asset is readily available due to mission necessity, an ESCORT will need to be requested from KAF. The latter is the least preferred as it will take more time to scramble the crew and "run up" the aircraft.”

Mr. Yon: This entire passage would be made largely irrelevant were Dustoff MEDEVACs armed. In all but the most extreme cases—where Pedro units would be best tasked—Dustoffs simply would not need escort if they had their own weapons. Pedro is armed and requires no additional escort. Escort requirements cause delays, and further stress already stretched rotary assets.

JCS:

“The incident in question involved a casualty at approximately 0450 on 18 September 2011 in the TF Spartan AOR in RC-South. Since the near entirety of TF Spartan's battlespace is west of the dividing line, the appropriate aircraft for any CAT A casualty in this AO is a MEDEVAC. In this case, because the western LZ was considered high-risk the MEDEVAC required an armed escort. Because none of the airborne assets were able to leave their mission to provide coverage an AH-64 was requested from KAF. The crew was scrambled and the aircraft was "run up" and launched toward Pasab; the MEDEVAC from Pasab then joined the ESCORT in the air as it approached the objective.

Timeline:

a. 04:50 – 9-line request placed by unit in field
b. 04:52 – Time of PECC authorization (and begin tasking for ESCORT)
c. 05:24 – Wheels up for MEDEVAC from Pasab
d. 05:37 – Wheels down for MEDEVAC at Casualty
e. 05:39 – Wheels up with Casualty
f. 05:49 – Wheels down at MTF (KAF)”

Mr. Yon: Had the Dustoff stationed at Pasab been armed, the seven-minute run-up time and roughly three minute flight time from Pasab to the Landing Zone (LZ), plus a combat-realistic 2 – 3 minute loading time, would have meant Specialist Clark would have been airborne to the Combat Support Hospital at Kandahar Airfield within fifteen minutes of his unit calling in the 9-line request.

Instead, roughly half an hour was wasted in waiting for an escort, along with additional minutes in linking up with the AH-64 escort.

According to JCS:

“The only stated time goal for MEDEVAC is the 60 minute "golden hour" from time of 9- line request to wheels down at the MTF. This mission was documented at 59 minutes. The 60 minutes is derived from a combination of assuming it takes 15 minutes to "run up" the aircraft, 40 minutes to fly from the base-point of injury-MTF, and 5 minutes for casualty load time; however, this breakdown is only based on estimates and there is no rule that each specific subset must be met.”

Mr. Yon: This passage is a stunning argument for mediocrity, and shamelessly uses poor policy to provide cover for poor decision-making. Given the circumstances and available assets, Specialist Clark should have been at the hospital within half an hour, maximum. This letter argues a fictitious 59-minute timeline, in addition to ignoring the minutes it took Specialist Clark’s leadership to determine, in the dark in a combat environment, the nature of the blast and casualties, and to call in the proper information in the required 9-line format.

JCS:

“The extenuating circumstances in this case were the need for an ESCORT and the atypical situation where an ESCORT capable of diverting from its current mission could not be found. This circumstance delayed the MEDEVAC from departing Pasab and required an AH-64 ESCORT to be alerted from KAF. While it would appear that 32 minutes from the PECC notification to wheels up for the MEDEVAC is excessive, the delay was due to the need to confirm that none of the ESCORTs in the air were able to leave their present mission and then to notify an AH-64 crew to move out to their aircraft, run it up, and fly to meet the MEDEVAC.

Mr. Yon's allegation is that the PEDRO would have been more appropriate in this situation. There is no substantiating evidence for this claim. In hindsight, it might have been possible to transport this casualty to the MTF more quickly if the PEDRO would have been launched at the exact time of notification for this mission but that would only have been possible with the foreknowledge of no available local ESCORT.”

Mr. Yon: The mendacity (or ignorance) of this argument is made clear by this Pedro pilot: “Does not make sense. Why would there be no operational knowledge of which tactical assets were available for tasking? Pedro was either first up or second up. If Dustoff was first up but had no escort, immediately send the second up, Pedro. Pedro goes either way. [This is a] leadership failure— there is a system in place, and they should know which assets are available. I knew when I was in Command of the Pedros who else was available besides us; there is no excuse for this.”

JCS:

“However, once the time had been taken to ascertain no active local ESCORTs were available, turning to the KAF-based PEDROs would not have decreased the mission time as the AH-64 and PEDRO would have similar preparation and flight times due to distance from the casualty.”

Mr. Yon: Again, the entirety of this argument would be irrelevant were the Red Cross removed, and Army MEDEVAC flights made by armed helicopters. Mission time would have been less than half of what it was. Critically, changing this policy also keeps those AH-64 Apaches on-station, on the combat missions they’re intended for, and protecting ground units.

JCS:

“If it is alleged that waiting for an armed ESCORT is an excessive delay it must be considered that to date, there have been only five escorted MEDEVACs that have encountered surface to air fire resulting in degraded operations, two of which were PEDRO helicopters.”

Mr. Yon: In light of the many counterfactual statements above, these numbers should be looked at with suspicion, especially considering that medical flights are not all qualitatively equal. It should be kept in mind that in August 2011, an ESCORTED helicopter was shot down during a combat operation, with 38 people being lost, including 22 Navy SEALs. This JCS red herring is discussed in detail in “Golden Seconds” . Importantly, Pedro units are far more frequently sent into far more dangerous situations than are Dustoff. Per capita, Pedro takes more fire.

JCS:

“Based on all the facts regarding this incident it is ISAF's contention that the MEDEVAC assets were properly managed according to well established protocol. Based on the information provided, the timeline appears reasonable for the conditions on the ground. The well established PECC procedures appear to have been followed and the casualty arrived at the MTF within the established 60 minute goal in spite of being injured at a high risk location requiring an ESCORT aircraft.”

Mr. Yon: Medical professionals know that the Golden Hour starts ticking at the moment of injury, and adding in the requirements of assessment and reporting for Specialist Clark’s unit, the overall time was well over the “Golden Hour.” Importantly, we were taking no ground fire on the LZ. A more courageous and sensible decision by PECC would have been to launch Dustoff and let the pilot and ground commander decide on whether to complete extraction, or to wait for escort. Pedro and Dustoff pilots complain that PECC tends to be risk averse to the point that troops die.

A pilot with a tour in Iraq and a recent tour in Afghanistan was livid with the JCS document: “This ‘Golden Hour’ thing is, as you have pointed out, a flawed way of thinking about it. Why not make it a ‘Golden Half Hour,’ or a ‘Golden as soon as possible’? It is just a statistical construct. Each wounded American soldier must be looked at and cared for individually in terms of what is best for them. In most cases, that means getting them there fast. It makes a big difference. Believe me, if the leadership had their own sons in harm’s way as I have [his son is also a combat veteran], they would think much differently, and become totally committed as I have to fly as many as possible to the hospital as fast as possible.”

JCS:

“Theater-wide MEDEVAC Statistics

For the period May to Oct 11 there were 1209 Coalition Forces (ISAF and USFOR-A) CAT A missions of which 95 CAT A missions were Out of Standard (OOS), meaning they exceeded the 60 minute Golden Hour planning factor. This equates to 7.86% of CAT A MEDEVAC missions that were OOS. There are several factors that can cause a mission to become OOS, including weather, mechanical, distance, enemy situation and waiting for air weapons team (AWT). Of the 95 OOS CAT A missions from May-Oct 11, seven were categorized as being a result of waiting for an AWT and none of these seven OOS missions had a clinical impact on the casualty.”

Mr. Yon: Considering Specialist Clark was alert and talking up until the point of being evacuated, but succumbed shortly thereafter, it’s fairly outrageous to read a claim that says nobody experienced “clinical impact” from these delays. This short timeframe and the attempt at wielding statistics to cover poor policy and judgment only adds to this outrage. Essentially, this document argues for a Military Golden Hour to be treated as a “pass all.” By self-scoring, if no more than 59 minutes of the debatable Golden Hour are used, they get a 100%. How many more wounded veterans would have died if evacuations were delayed by an additional forty minutes? According to iCasualties.org, 46,542 US troops (not to mention contractors and allies) have been wounded in Iraq and Afghanistan. If an additional 40 minutes were added to each before they reached a hospital, how many more would have died? One percent? Two percent? That’s anywhere from 465 – 931 additional dead.

“The overall trend line for OOS missions is decreasing over time. In 2010, 11.8% of the total CAT A missions were OOS compared to 7.86% OOS from year to date.

In the last six months, there have been a total of 57 surface to air fire events involving MEDEVAC aircraft. Of the 57, none resulted in aircraft being shot down. Five resulted in hits which degraded operations, including one British ‘Tricky’ CH-47, two US Army ‘Dustoff'HH-60s, and two US Air Force ‘Pedro’ HH-60s.”

Mr. Yon: Is this for the entirety of Afghanistan, or just Regional Command South? Importantly, the JCS admit here that the Red Crosses do not stop the enemy from shooting at Dustoff. We’ve seen too many faulty numbers and statements in the JCS document. None of the numbers can be trusted.

JCS:

“Summary

The MEDEVAC circumstances surrounding the specific incident highlighted in Michael Yon's ‘Red Air’ did not contribute to the untimely death of a brave Soldier who suffered a triple amputation due to an IED strike. Removing Red Cross from Army ‘Dustoff' helicopters will not improve the exceptional MEDEVAC capability already in place. Not only is there a policy implication with making such a decision but more importantly an operational impact which actually may degrade current MEDEVAC capability.”

Mr. Yon: This note from a former Ranger and Green Beret, who is also a combat veteran, clarifies the obfuscation: "Not one point that they have made in their letter supports the above contentions. They have written a letter and included arguments and made points, but not for the ‘conclusions’ above. It is as though the Chiefs wrote a different letter and then omitted all discussion of the Red Cross, not to mention ‘policy implications’ (and what does that mean?), not to mention their reference to ‘an operational impact.’ The Chiefs have not explained their nebulous ‘policy implications’ or their reference to potential ‘degraded capabilities’ or their reference to ‘operational impact,’ whatever that actually means. More artful public affairs sleight of hand. The Chiefs obviously think that we are stupid."

JCS:

“The primary mission of Pedro helicopters are for Personnel Recovery and Combat Search and Rescue. Pedro's in the Afghanistan theater are routinely integrated into the MEDEVAC rotation to maintain crew and medic proficiency. Because of advanced avionics and other organic armament and weaponry, the Pedro is rated as being able to only carry two litters at a time, compared to the Army Dustoff which is rated as being able to carry four litters at a time. The extreme altitude and often unpredictable weather conditions in Afghanistan make the weight of a helicopter a critical planning factor in being able to conduct flight operations.

Mr. Yon: A Dustoff pilot currently in Afghanistan disagrees. JCS states that four litters can go, but according to the Dustoff pilot, the Dustoff can carry four litters only “if carousel litter carriers are installed, in which case we would be power limited because the stupid things weigh over 500 pounds and make it impossible to work on any part of a casualty but their head or feet. We don’t use carousels in Afghanistan. We strap litters to the floor, and three will fit but two will be ignored.

The Dustoff pilot says two patients will be ignored. Experienced combat medics will say that no matter how great the medic, he or she cannot work on three Cat A patients simultaneously. Dustoff carries one medic and so more than a single Cat A will just be strapped down for the flight.

A flight of one Dustoff and one Apache can treat just one Cat A patient.

By comparison, Pedro escorts Pedro. Each of the two Pedro HH-60G Pave Hawks carries two or three pararescue “PJ”s. (Often a total of five PJs between the two birds.) And so a normal flight of two Pedro Pave Hawks can work five Cat A patients. (There is some nuance depending on types of wounds, etc.)

As medics, PJs are well trained. They also receive rigorous combat training and can parachute to patients, mountaineer, and scuba dive, all of which can be needed in Afghanistan. PJs are trained to fight. In the case that a Special Forces (Green Beret) team medic is wounded in Afghanistan, at least one Pedro unit planned to leave a PJ or two behind to cover for the team while another medic could be found. When patients are trapped in twisted wreckage of armored vehicles, PJs have gear and training to cut into the vehicles. PJs are something of mixture (for argument’s sake) between Rangers and highly trained medical personnel. And so with a Dustoff flight, you get one medic whose mission often must wait for launch authority. Pedro brings four .50 caliber machineguns with dedicated gunners, along with five commandos (PJs) who can get off the birds. Dustoff is an air ambulance: Pedro is more of a special operations force.

Pedro pilots dismiss the weight argument. As one highly experienced Pedro pilot noted: “…I've had three litters back there…and if the survivors can sit up (ambulatory) you can quite literally pile them in. I haven't limited the aircraft yet over there. The considerations are patient care, time en route, aircraft performance (do I have the power to take off) and the ground threat…if I don't take the survivor now does he have the time to wait for the next trip? As a Flight Lead, I'll weigh all available info, and lean on the Pararescue Team Lead to determine how many. If it’s a mass casualty event, we'll triage the survivors and take the Cat A’s first and return for the B’s and C’s and lastly the Heroes [KIA]. But yesterday here at [training] I put 9 people in the back of one aircraft, and 9 in another, total of 18 bodies in two aircraft. They were all ambulatory and the ground threat was high so comfort went out the window. It was about getting their asses out.”

JCS:

“Arming a Dustoff helicopter, whose primary mission is MEDEVAC, would require approximately an extra 600 lbs. This is based on two door gunners, 200 lbs each; two .50 cal machine guns, 841bs each; plus conservatively estimating 100 lbs of ammunition. This extra weight would have a severe impact on lift capability and also limit the ability to evacuate four litters vs. two. This trade-off of lift to armament is unacceptable and would result in severely degrading MEDEVAC operations.

Mr. Yon: Combat experienced Dustoff and Pedro pilots address this:

Dustoff pilot: “The weight argument is crap. My platoon flies UH-60A+ aircraft (Alpha slicks with Lima model engines) chased by UH-60L with [M-240 machine guns] mounted. Our chase birds outweigh us by about 1000lbs. The HH-60L and M models weigh significantly more but still much less than the Pedros' birds.”

Pedro pilot: “Remember that arming 2 x Dustoff helicopters means no chase aircraft and allows you to use both aircraft as evacuation platforms. You have a greater capability not less.”

Dustoff pilot: “…The notion that 600 extra pounds would exclude us from carrying 4 litter patients is wrong. We have a ‘PPC’ (performance planning card) that we use to tell us exactly how much we can carry…I can guarantee the Lima and Alpha+ models can handle that no problem...in RC S/SW. In east and north the altitude starts to get much higher so I can't speak for that region as we do not fly there. Second carrying 4 Cat A litter patients would most likely mean there was a mass casualty, of which my unit has responded to at least [stricken for anonymity] and to my knowledge they were all local nationals …Apart from that my medics generally put one Cat A on board because they can only efficiently work on ONE patient at a time, especially in the Clark case, with a triple amputation that medic has his hands full. That's not to say we leave anybody behind but the most critical are treated first. Which is why we spread the patient load. The example of 4 Cat A just sounds like deflection when the real point of all of this is not to increase patient capacity but to get the wounded off the battlefield in the quickest manner possible. If need be we can take as many patients as will fit inside, but as one of my medics told me, it comes down to who he thinks has a chance as to who gets treated on the flight as the majority of our flights are less than 30 min. Like I said above if one aircraft HAS to take 4 litters there have already been calls made and at least three more hawks will be en route.”

Pedro Pilot: “The DUSTOFF aircraft I escorted as a Pedro [were faster than] me; they were much lighter than I was and had a large power reserve that I did not possess because of my extra weight in armaments. That being said, the Pedros record on being able to still execute the CASEVAC goes without question.”

Mr. Yon: These pilots find no merit in the weight argument.

JCS:

“In conclusion, the MEDEVAC system currently in place is truly a success story. This level of capability has never been delivered before and demonstrates the degree of commitment that is expended in supporting our US, NATO, ISAF and Afghan forces. While it is not a perfect system it is truly unprecedented and we should ensure any changes to the system is carefully examined and only done after a thorough evaluation in order to ensure our service members receive only the best care available.”

Former Ranger and Green Beret: “I am really tired of the Chiefs [congratulating] themselves over a ‘level of capability that has never been delivered before.’ So what? [They] send the best men in the nation to war, who go willingly, who volunteer. They deserve the best. They are not receiving the best now, and worse, they are not receiving the best now due to bureaucracy and parochialism and the egotistical protection of fiefdoms. The JCS should be ashamed of themselves.”

MEDEVAC Links

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Fri, 27 Jan 2012 14:05:07 +0000

27 January 2012

The MEDEVAC issue continues to grow. There have been many articles and it's becoming difficult to keep up. The Joint Chiefs of Staff is preparing something for Congress. My guess based on conversations is that JCS will try deflection and will not solve the issue. SecDef has done nothing, to my knowledge. And so this is set to become an election issue.

This list below is not comprehensive but can be a helpful resource.

Please listen to my interview with Dennis Miller.

LINKS
Op-eds by James Simpson

American Thinker
http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/01/incomprehensibly_stupid_army_regulation_killing_americans_in_afghanistan.html

http://www.americanthinker.com/2012/02/no_sex_many_lies_one_videotape_and_a_soldiers_unnecessary_death.html

Breitbart Big Peace
http://bigpeace.com/jmsimpson/2012/01/09/incomprehensibly-stupid-army-regulation-killing-americans-in-afghanistan/

Examiner.com—D.C. Examiner
http://www.examiner.com/independent-in-washington-dc/incomprehensibly-stupid-army-regulation-killing-americans-afghanistan?cid=PROD-redesign-right-next

Washington Times
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/jan/16/bureaucracy-killing-us-troops-in-afghanistan/

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Army Times
Article in the Army Times about Congressman Todd Akin's (R-MI) letter to Sec Def Panetta:
http://www.armytimes.com/news/2012/01/military-lawmaker-arm-medevac-helos-to-save-more-lives-011712/

Navy Times
Article in the Navy Times about Congressman Todd Akin's (R-MI) letter to Sec Def Panetta
http://www.navytimes.com/mobile/index.php?storyUrl=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.navytimes.com%2Fnews%2F2012%2F01%2Fmilitary-lawmaker-arm-medevac-helos-to-save-more-lives-011712%2F

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Dispatches by Michael Yon
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/

05 Feb 2012
Contempt of and for Congress?
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/contempt-of-and-for-congress.htm

03 Feb 2012
Crucifixion of Common Sense
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/crucifixion-of-common-sense.htm

02 Feb 2012
The Army MEDEVAC Scandal: Report of Conspiracy
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/the-army-medevac-scandal-report-of-conspiracy.htm

31 Jan 2012
Important Letter from Gold Star Mother
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/important-letter-from-gold-star-mother.htm

30 Jan 2012
13 Military Pilots Rebuke the Joint Chiefs of Staff
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/13-military-pilots-rebuke-the-joint-chiefs-of-staff.htm

28 Jan 2012
British Army Officer on US Army Medevac
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/british-army-officer-on-us-army-medevac.htm

26 Jan 2012
Comments by Dustoff pilots
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/thoughts-from-a-dustoff-pilot.htm

23 Jan 2012
E-mail exchange with JCS concerning document from Joint Chiefs of Staff
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/messages-from-joint-chiefs-of-staff.htm

20 Jan 2012
CBS interview with LTG John F. Campbell
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/cbs-video-of-medevac-issue.htm

19 Jan 2012
Contact with staffer at Congressman Todd Akin’s office
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/jcs-curiouser-and-curiouser.htm

19 Jan 2012
JCS letter to the House Armed Services Committee (HASC)
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/joint-chiefs-of-staff-bogus-report-to-congress.htm

17 Jan 2012
Congressman Todd Akin’s (R-MI) letter to SEC DEF Leon Panetta about the JCS document and RED AIR
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/congressman-akin-medevac-letter-to-secdef.htm

17 Jan 2012
Danger For Senators and Representatives Army Deceptions May Cause Embarrassment
Letter to Senator Jon Kyle (R-AZ) regarding RED AIR dispatch of 12 Oct 2011
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/danger-for-senators-and-representatives.htm

16 Jan 2012
Progress on Removing Dustoff Red Crosses
Posting of an Alaska Op-ed on RED AIR
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/progress-on-removing-dustoff-red-crosses.htm

10 Jan 2011 (sic)
MEDEVAC/CASEVAC links
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/medevac/casevac-links.htm

9 Jan 2012
Take me to your Leader (if you have one); CENTCOM passes buck back to Army
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/take-me-to-your-leader-if-you-have-one.htm

9 Jan 2012
Link to Breitbart Big Peace Blog, piece by Bill Tuttle: A Pilot’s Perspective on Michael Yon’s Medevac Debate
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/delta-force-commander-former-on-dustoff-medevac.htm

3 Jan 2012
Passing the MEDEVAC Buck to CENTCOM, response by SEC of the Army John McHugh to Senator Charles Grassley (R-IA)
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/passing-the-medevac-buck.htm

30 Dec 2011
DELTA Force Commander (Former) on DUSTOFF MEDEVAC
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/delta-force-commander-former-on-dustoff-medevac.htm

09 Dec 2011
Embarrassed Army
https://www.michaelyon-online.com/embarrassed-army.htm

23 Nov 2011
Crusader Copters
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/crusadercopters.htm

22 Nov 2011
Mark of the Beast: Evil Symbols in Afghanistan
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/mark-of-the-beast-evil-symbols-in-afghanistan.htm

14 Nov 2011
Marked for Destruction
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/marked-for-destruction.htm

10 Nov 2011
Leadership: More than a Word
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/leadership-more-than-a-word.htm

8 Nov 2011
Question for Congressman Pompeo: What is your Position?
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/question-for-congressman-pompeo-what-is-your-position.htm

7 nov 2011
Report to Congress: Army called to Report on MEDEVAC Failure in Afghanistan
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/congressional-report.htm

6 Nov 2011
Fool’s Gold & Troop’s Blood
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/fools-gold-troops-blood.htm

27 Oct 2011
Dustoff Traction
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/dustoff-traction.htm

26 Oct 2011
Machine Guns on Dustoffs
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/machine-guns-on-dustoffs.htm

24 Oct 2011
Golden Seconds: Open Letter to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and President Barack Obama
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/golden-seconds.htm

12 Oct 2011
RED AIR—America’s medevac Failure
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/red-air-americas-medevac-failure.htm

14 Sept 2009
Pedros, USAF SAR in Afghanistan
http://www.michaelyon-online.com/pedros.htm

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CBS NEWS
CBS News interview with LTG John F. Campbell regarding RED AIR and the Army's policy:
http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18563_162-57362374/did-military-rules-cost-a-soldier-his-life/?tag=mncol%3Blst%3B1

MEDEVAC Photo Essay by Nicole Sobreki
Photographs by Nicole Sobecki of an Army medevac unit in Afghanistan. Photo 3 shows the interior of a UH60A medevac helicopter. The gunners would sit in the two seats behind the sitting Marine that face outward toward the windows just behind the pilots. This configuration belies the Army's argument that he UH60 would suffer degraded performance and cause the removal of two litters from the helo were two .50 caliber machine guns to be mounted on the fuselage.
http://www.nicholesobecki.com/#/dustoff--us-army-medevac/NS_AF_113010_Medevac14_002

U.S. Army
The U.S. Army's Public Affairs Office response to the criticism of the Army's medevac policy:
http://www.army.mil/article/72250/Army_statement_on_MEDEVAC_issue/

Larry Wood
14 Jan 2012
Frontiersman (Wasilla, Alaska) Medevac policy is costing lives
http://www.frontiersman.com/opinions/columnists/medevac-policy-is-costing-lives/article_3bf39468-3f52-11e1-8999-0019bb2963f4.html

24 Jan 2012
Examiner.com, Is Army medevac policy killing our wounded troops?
http://www.examiner.com/alaska-gubernatorial-in-anchorage/is-army-medevac-policy-killing-our-wounded-troops

Stars and Stripes
26 Jan 2012
Controversial debate brewing: Should Army medevacs be armed?
http://www.stripes.com/news/army/controversial-debate-brewing-should-army-medevacs-be-armed-1.166840

New York Post
01 Feb 2012
Hurry, wait ... and die Army rules stalling Medevacs
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/opinion/opedcolumnists/hurry_wait_and_die_wyLvNsCxiZKASR4ePF3VyK

Thoughts from a Dustoff Pilot

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Dustoff pilot) — Thu, 26 Jan 2012 05:21:12 +0000

26 January 2012

I am a Dustoff pilot (Instructor pilot) with over 1000 hours of combat time, and over 300+ combat medevac missions under my belt. In 2004 (Iraq) we flew single ship, responding to thousands of medevac 9-line calls. Not one helo shot down, but we sure got shot at a lot. On a few occasions, we had to ask armed helos, who were out on missions, to divert and escort us into some hot areas. On a few other occasions, we had the Air Force Pedros request to go along with us on missions. We responded quickly and efficiently. When we got the call, we went.

When there were multiple casualties, we as crews made the call to launch more than one medevac bird to accommodate the number of patients. No bureaucracy on launch authority or escorts.

Now, all medevac calls must go through channels, must be approved by commanders at battalion level or higher, must be escorted etc etc. This is what slows us down.

Some facts as I see it:

1. With only 1 medic on the helo, we will NEVER take more than 2 critical patients. More than that will overload the medic’s ability to treat the patients. So arming medevac will NOT lower the ability of the Blackhawk helicopter to carry patients due to weight. (Hawks in medevac configurations, typically launch at about 16K lbs, but have a max of 22k, so are they saying that guns and ammo weigh 5000+ pounds? Ridiculous.

2. Medevac can launch within 3-5 minutes of a call. Pedros always took at least 10 to get spooled up. [Note from Michael Yon: Pedro can go in about 6 mins.] Apaches and Kiowas must sight in their systems and take at least 15 minutes to get up, assuming they are fully armed, fueled and ready to go. So escorts always keep us waiting.

However, the biggest problem we face in combat today is not waiting for escort (though they are slow), it is not the Dustoff crews, it is the current command. Commanders and their representatives (usually battle Captains on duty) are so worried about their careers being effected by enemy action, they will take any Dustoff call and send it so high up the chain of command (cover your ass) that it takes 30-45 minutes to just get launch approval. This usually has little to do with our escorts. We sometimes are all (medevac and escorts) ready to fly, but sit for 20 minutes for launch approval, because someone has to wake the general, brief him or her and then get approval for the mission.

So taking off the red cross, arming the medevac bird is a great thing, but will only solve half the problem. We need commanders willing to allow the Dustoff crews to do their job, without multiple layers of approval for every mission. We need to solve the problem of every commander having to fear for his career (or worse) over making decisions on the battlefield. We need to empower the lower levels of command again instead of waiting for the generals to micromanage the entire war.

====END====

Separately, this comment was found under a dispatch:

RE: MEDEVAC Issue — Dustoffer

I'm a Dustoff pilot that returned from Afghanistan in April 2011. There is a launch criteria that we have to be off the ground within 15 minutes of the 9-line call. The problem is, we have to be approved by our battalion commander or the battle captain on duty to launch. There were several times we were sitting on the ground at REDCON 1 (100%) waiting to be told that we could launch. I actually launched my bird early once and proceeded to get an ass chewing once we returned via telephone. I honestly believe if I were closer to the flag pole, they would have relieved me of my position. I was about 6 hours away by air. Oh, and I launched at 15 minutes and some change.

To add injury to insult, approx. 70% of the missions I flew were MEDEVAC on MEDEVAC coverage. Meaning we had no gunship escort to the pickup site (one MEDEVAC aircraft covering another MEDEVAC aircraft).

There was more than one occasion that if we would have had mounted M249's or M240's we could have laid suppressive fire and/or engaged the threat. That is my personal and professional opinion. Unfortunately, my opinion doesn't matter.

This comment was found here.

And I strongly disagree with “my opinion doesn’t matter.” The opinions of Dustoff and Pedro people are extremely important. Dustoff and Pedro opinions carry the overwhelming weight of this fight. The force behind all this is the Dustoff and Pedro communities. Every morning they crack the whip. I am only the public face. My website is your website. This is your microphone.

Time to Leave Afghanistan

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Sat, 21 Jan 2012 14:42:18 +0000

21 January 2012

This war is going to turn out badly. We are wasting lives and resources while the United States decays and other threats emerge. We led the horse to water.

Importantly, there is no value in pretending that Pakistan is an ally. We should wish the best of luck to the Afghans, and the many peaceful Pakistanis, and accelerate our withdrawal of our main battle force. The US never has been serious about Afghanistan. Under General Petraeus we were starting to gain ground, but the current trajectory will land us in the mud.

The enemies will never beat us in Afghanistan. Force on force, the Taliban are weak by comparison. Yet this is their home. There is only so much we can do at this extreme cost for the many good Afghan people. We must reduce our main effort and concentrate on other matters. Time to come home.

Sincerely,

Michael Yon

British Officer Slams US Army on Growing MEDEVAC Debacle

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Sat, 28 Jan 2012 13:14:06 +0000

28 January 2012

While reading traffic in a closed forum between current and former military officers, I stumbled across this message from a British officer. I’ve known him since the Iraq days, and he’s also served in Afghanistan. He’s an honest and very smart officer, and so I pay close attention to him. With his permission, I reprint:

Message from British officer

I've been following Michael's work for years and I watched that painful video some while ago.

Michael makes a perfectly valid, arguably indisputable point that, in some circumstances, US Army MEDEVAC policy can delay the movement of casualties to hospital. The fact that the Golden Hour can still be met in most cases is immaterial. If we could make it work, we'd want a Platinum 30 Minutes as we all know that a few minutes can make the difference between life and death. Accordingly, there should be a continuous effort to shave extra minutes off of the time it takes to reach the wounded and what is proposed by Michael will often do just that.

The arguments presented by the US Army for why a change is not necessary are unconvincing, in fact in parts they seem somewhat fictive. I just hope there aren't people out there telling their boss what they think he wants to hear when they know differently in their hearts.

Therefore - and as a British Army officer I do think carefully about criticizing an organization I admire in many ways - my opinion is that there should be a quick meal of humble pie at the upper levels of the US Army and a change to match the USAF and RAF methods which do not mark MEDEVAC aircraft and do arm them. Saying "We were wrong" need bring no shame, it would be a fine example of leadership that would be respected within the Army itself and wider - and it'll likely save a few lives.

CBS Video of MEDEVAC Issue

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Fri, 20 Jan 2012 02:35:52 +0000

20 January 2012

What do you think of Lieutenant General John F. Campbell's remarks in this video?

Please click to view.

Congressman Akin MEDEVAC Letter to SecDef

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Wed, 18 Jan 2012 03:42:08 +0000

You can download a pdf version here.

Fool’s Gold & Troops’ Blood

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Sun, 06 Nov 2011 12:50:40 +0000

America's Medevac Failure

06 November 2011

This combat video was made in September 2011 in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. A bomb was planted in our path. A young, highly-liked Soldier named Chazray Clark triggered the blast. Chazray lost an arm and both legs. Despite great pain, Chazray was awake and lucid the entire time.

A tragedy was unfolding. The US military, at the direction of former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, strives to get our wounded to hospitals within the “Golden Hour.” The military mostly accomplishes this with incredible speed, often under direct enemy fire. They could do much better.

After casualties are sustained, the medical evacuation helicopters typically will not launch until a “9-line” report is transmitted from the field. During this mission, due to the calm discipline of the Soldiers of 4-4 Cav, the 9-line was transmitted in only six minutes. That’s fast.

Bold accounting magic has been used to redefine the Golden Hour. The true starting gun for the biological Golden Hour begins at the moment of injury. The military Golden Hour begins after the 9-line is received. If combat or other circumstance delays the 9-line by 20 minutes, the military Golden Hour becomes 80 minutes. But when we hear a military spokesmen saying that average MEDEVAC times are 50 minutes, what they are really saying is 50 minutes plus the 9-line time, and they won’t mention that 9-line buffer. This audacious deception angers many military people who know about it.

I reported that 65 minutes were used to get Chazray Clark to the hospital. The military rebuked my initial report, saying it took only 59. They took the Golden Hour tax deduction, deceived the public, and did so in writing.

It took 65 minutes. It should have taken 25. There are several reasons why Chazray suffered the additional 40 minutes.

The first reason is the 9-line. Pilots in Afghanistan say there is no need to wait. They should launch immediately upon notification of serious wounds. They can pick up the 9-line in flight.

The bigger reason is a longstanding Army policy to wear Red Crosses on their helicopters. The Army will say that in accordance with the Geneva Conventions they must wear the Red Crosses, and therefore cannot carry machine guns on the helicopters. This is false: neither the Air Force, nor the Marines, nor British wear the Red Crosses, and they go armed. The enemies in Afghanistan do not adhere to the Geneva Conventions. Is the Army saying that the Air Force, Marines and British are in violation of Geneva Conventions by not wearing the Red Crosses? Of course not. But the Army wears the Red Crosses as crucifixes to avoid uncomfortable change.

The helicopters are clearly visible on most nights while the Red Crosses are not. An Afghan said that Taliban would likely consider the Red Cross a sign of Christianity, not MEDEVAC. The enemy constantly tries to shoot down Army Dustoffs, Red Cross and all. By contrast, the Air Force and Marines play smarter games and will come in guns blazing and help kill enemy around the landing zones.

While Chazray lay dying, an unarmed Dustoff helicopter was parked about 2 – 3 minutes away at Forward Operating Base Pasab. After a call, it can take about 7 minutes to launch a Dustoff. And so, 7 minutes plus 3 minutes’ flight could have had Chazray on the bird in just over 10 minutes. The hospital was at Kandahar Airfield (KAF) about 13 minutes away. So 10 minutes to arrive to the LZ, 2 minutes to load Chazray and take off, then 13 minutes to the hospital. This would have put Chazray at the hospital in 25 minutes. Alternatively, armed Air Force Pedro rescue birds were parked farther away at KAF and could have flown the longer distance, picked up Chazray, and had him back in about 35 minutes. Had Pedros or armed Dustoffs been at FOB Pasab, they could have done the job in 25 minutes.

Instead, since the Dustoffs do not have machine guns, the Dustoff waited for the Apache helicopter top cover. Forty minutes were lost due to 9-line procedures and waiting for the Apache. This delay allowed the life to drain out of Chazray. It also allowed the enemy a great amount of time to prepare to attack the unarmed Dustoff helicopter on the open landing zone, along with the Soldiers who were there in the open working hard to save Chazray. (In this case, no attack occurred during LZ operations.)

The military spent much energy refuting my claims in RED AIR and GOLDEN SECONDS. They apparently did not realize I made video. For instance, they tried to undercut the credibility of my reports by saying the Dustoff did not come from Kandahar Airfield, but from FOB Pasab. The video clearly shows on numerous occasions that the Dustoff was coming from KAF. Nevertheless, allowing for battlefield errors, if the Dustoff actually came from Pasab, this does not help their case, but damages it outright. KAF is about 13 minutes away; Pasab only about 3, and so what they accidentally said by trying to undermine my reports was that Chazray could have been to the hospital 10 minutes faster. That is, if the Dustoffs were armed and could depart without gunship cover.

The 9-line procedure must be changed, and Dustoffs must be armed. The “Military Golden Hour” must become a thing of the past. There is only one Golden Hour. All else is Fool’s Gold. This Fool’s Gold is expensive; it’s costing lives of our service members in Afghanistan.

Please watch this important video of the attack and MEDEVAC of Chazray Clark.

Golden Seconds

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Mon, 24 Oct 2011 02:47:36 +0000

Golden Seconds

Open Letter to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta
and President Barack Obama

US Air Force "Pedro" helicopter

24 October 2011

Gentlemen,

For the last seven years I have written about the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. I have covered the US Army, Marines, Air Force and Navy. I’ve also covered the British, Lithuanian, Afghan and Iraqi forces, among others, in places ranging from Iraq to the Philippines and beyond. My most recent embed in Afghanistan was at personal invitation from then-General David Petraeus. It is said that I have spent more time with American combat forces than any writer in US history. I do not know if this is true, but it’s got to be close. I’ve written three books and probably a thousand articles. My work is known worldwide.

On 12 October, I published a dispatch called “Red Air,” detailing policy shortcomings with US Army Dustoff MEDEVAC procedures. The kernel of the matter is that under the Geneva Conventions, when our Army “Dustoff” MEDEVAC helicopters wear red crosses, they are forbidden to be armed. If they do not wear red crosses, they can be armed.

The Taliban and other enemies in Afghanistan regularly fire upon and hit our helicopters. In Afghanistan, a red cross means “Shoot me; I’m defenseless.” We’d have a better chance warding off vampires with crucifixes.

This battlefield reality causes commanders to send Apache attack helicopters as top cover for the Army Dustoff MEDEVAC helicopters. Yet with perpetual shortages of helicopters in Afghanistan, this leads to delays in evacuating terribly wounded troopers. Importantly, US Air Force, Marines, and the British flying in the same areas do not wear red crosses and are armed. Only the US Army, not the Geneva Conventions, is preventing Dustoffs from using machine guns. Meanwhile, we require yet more helicopters to perform top cover, adding to helicopter stresses, causing delays, and pulling the Apaches away from other fights.

When I exposed this travesty in “Red Air,” military HQ in Kabul responded with a statement addressing alleged discrepancies in my work, requesting that I publish their letter. Sadly for them, they must not have realized that I made high-resolution video/audio of a recent MEDEVAC failure. The reply from HQ was anonymous, and so I responded to the ISAF HQ Press Office: “Put a General's name on this and I'll publish ASAP.”

If the Army, in particular, believes in the veracity of its position, a high-ranking person should stand behind the assertions and allegations. Otherwise, as one Air Force Pedro pilot with 420 missions in Afghanistan would write to me a few days ago, it’s just “chaff.”

With nobody supporting the statement, let’s forget about the bulk of the orphaned missive and go straight to the salient points:

“Yon's point that the Army should arm and remove the red cross from its MEDEVAC aircraft fails to acknowledge larger issues. Doing so would place the US outside its commitment to conducting MEDEVACs under the guidelines of the Geneva Conventions and moral norm for how Western nations identify their aircraft dedicated to medical evacuation.”

The so-called “moral norm” has nothing to do with the realities of our decade-long war in Afghanistan. This statement is prima facie asinine and demonstrates a complete break with realities in Afghanistan.

Key point: Army medics do not wear red crosses. They carry rifles. Separately, we have military medical staff in Kabul who are wearing weapons while in the operating rooms. None wear crosses. Down in Kandahar Province, I recently sat alone on guard duty with a medic in an excellent unit known as 4-4 Cav. There were several machine guns in front of him. This inconsistency alone is enough to unravel the Army argument.

Army policy makers are not upholding the Geneva Conventions, but hiding behind them. There is a power struggle within the Army about who controls those helicopters. The red crosses are being used as crucifixes to ward off change.

As mentioned, the US Air Force, Marines, and British all fly without the red crosses, and nothing precludes the US Army—in this helicopter-deprived war—from removing its crosses. In the event that we go to war with a more reasonable country, such as Canada, we can repaint the crosses, though there is no obligation. In Afghanistan, the Marines perform helicopter evacuations with assets available. Guaranteed they will have machine guns. Likewise, Air Force helicopters come in with hot guns. Nothing is stopping the Army but the Army itself, and the internal politics of who controls the Dustoff helicopters. Secondarily, those who sell or control Apache helicopters have a vested interest in keeping Dustoffs unarmed.

Former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates told me personally that he instituted a 60-minute time limit to get wounded troopers from the battlefield to a hospital. It is noteworthy that the military required a directive from Secretary Gates before meeting these standards. One might erroneously assume that the US military would act in the best interest of its own troops without being ordered. This was not the case.

Remember Walter Reed

Major cover-ups are too numerous to track. Earlier in the war, gross negligence at Army medical facilities was revealed by the press, leading to a purge of leadership, including the resignation of Army Secretary Francis J. Harvey.

Many people will remember the cover-ups revolving around Pat Tillman, Jessica Lynch, and Abu Ghraib. We should not expect a more honest Army when it comes to Dustoffs. To admit the mistake now would be to admit the mistake was not corrected for ten years.

On the whole, the military has met Secretary Gates’ MEDEVAC directive with exemplary performance, yet a small number of informed observers can sense hocus pocus with the numbers.

For instance, after an attack requiring medical evacuation, the unit in combat must transmit a “9-line” report to HQ. Only then does the clock start running for the 60-minute directive. If fire departments waited for specific details for every call, their response times would look more impressive, but many people would die.

In combat, actions on the ground can be stressful, causing a delay in the 9-line even though the unit in contact may have immediately radioed that there is a triple amputation. We also have extreme issues with communications at times. I’ve watched people attempt for hours to establish comms with elements just a few miles away. But that’s another story. There should be no need to wait for paperwork to launch distant helicopters when it’s already confirmed that a 9-line is forthcoming. During the attack described herein, to which I was witness, the 9-line went up quickly due to the calm and quick actions of men of 4-4 Cav, and in particular one Lieutenant Jonathan Flores who did an excellent job. Flores transmitted the 9-line in about six minutes. In reality, the helicopters could have been dispatched immediately upon confirmation of the nature of the wounds. Our location was known. Other times, 9-lines can take much longer due to firefights or other distractions, and so the helicopters will sit on the runway “hot cocked” and ready to spin up. The clock is not yet ticking because the 9-line has not arrived.

Golden Seconds

The enemies in Afghanistan often conduct “complex attacks” with multiple, simultaneous raids or ambushes. When the enemy senses they have created Coalition casualties—often easy to observe with IED strikes—they try to predict where our helicopters will land. For years now, they have tried to predict and prepare the landing zones before the attack unfolds.

During the IED ambush in which Chazray Clark was wounded (see Red Air), the enemy could easily have predicted and then positively ascertained our LZ by simple observation. We had arrived under darkness via helicopters, then moved into the village where Chazray triggered the first bomb. The loud explosion would have been audible for miles.

The enemy is courageous, tactically nimble, and skilled at developing and exploiting advantages. They understand our tactics and we understand theirs. After our helicopter insertion and the bomb strike on Chazray, the enemy would be operating in a heightened state of alert.

The Golden Hour is crucial to survival of the seriously wounded. There also are Golden Minutes. The already-bleeding wounded are not the only ones in danger. The casualties provide a golden opportunity for the enemy to shoot down a helicopter and attack the preoccupied ground force. For the incoming helicopters, and ground forces in combat, minutes are crucial. Delay provides opportunity for the enemy to prepare to attack the helicopter, or in the case of Chazray Clark, ground forces waited on an open LZ for close to half an hour believing the helicopter would arrive quickly.

In that area, known as Zhari District, the enemy employs numerous weapons that can take down a helicopter. The powerful 82mm recoilless rifles regularly destroy our heavily armored vehicles. One shot from an 82 and the helicopter is finished. The far-less-powerful RPG will also do the job.

The failure I videotaped occurred in September 2011. The month before, 38 people including a SEAL team died when an RPG downed their helicopter. The investigation led by Brigadier General Jeffrey Colt would conclude, “The shoot down was not the result of a baited ambush, but rather the result of the enemy being at a heightened state of alert…”

In regard to MEDEVAC, the Army contends that top cover from Apache attack helicopters can replace, or are superior to, machine guns on Dustoffs. Veterans of ground combat will scoff at the notion. Furthermore, putting machine guns on Dustoffs does not exclude piling on Apache top cover. But waiting for that top cover can prove lethal to the patients, Dustoff crews, and ground forces in contact.

Apache helicopters and other assets were providing top cover when the shoot down occurred that killed 38 people. The enemy can fire from cover or concealment that an Apache, UAV, AC-130, or jets cannot see or even hit. Even when the enemy is visible to the Apache, there will be endless tactical variants when the pilot cannot possibly react quickly enough to provide preemptive or interruptive covering fire. Other times, the enemy may be too close (or at a bad angle) to the landing helicopter for response from top cover. Dustoffs have landed in towns, cities, or in depressed areas such as valleys where the enemy can fire down or peer-to-peer in such a way that Apache cover can be mitigated or irrelevant. The enemy often comes from holes, such as a karez entrance, or from under foliage where they are invisible even to our superior optics until the moment they use hot weapons. When they fire machine guns or grenades from inside of buildings, they may remain invisible from above even while firing. The helicopter roaring in for a landing will often be in a dueling situation with a hidden enemy wherein the result may bear true the maxim: “There are the quick, and the dead.”

When a helicopter is coming into a hot LZ, the idea of Golden Hours or Golden Minutes as measurement would be like using miles and hours to measure the distance and duration of a cobra strike. The strike will be close with sudden results. A man in the bush would not wear a crucifix to fend off cobras, and he would not use Apache helicopters to defend against the fangs; he would carry a shotgun. The cobra is drawn to the red cross. He knows that if he can stay hidden, he will get at least one strike – probably more – before the Apache can fire.

As the helicopter lands on a hot LZ, it’s literally down to the speed of the trigger fingers, the skills of the fighters, and luck. The enemy often uses PKM machine guns—every wasted second can mean roughly ten enemy bullets from a single machine gun.

According to the investigation into the August shoot down,

“…as [the helicopter] neared the landing zone from the northwest. A previously undetected group of suspected Taliban fired two or three RPGs in rapid succession from the tower of a two story mud-brick building approximately 220 meters south of the CH-47D. The first RPG missed the helicopter, but the second RPG struck one of the blades of the aft rotor assembly and exploded…” The report continues: “The destruction of the CH-47D rotor system from the rocket propelled grenade until the helicopter crash into the creek bed, likely lasted less than 5 seconds.”

And that was it: Mission failure. 38 people dead. Helicopter destroyed.

Neither the AC-130, the surveillance aircraft, the Apaches, or machine guns on the destroyed aircraft were able to prevent the RPG shots. The enemy got off at least two rocket shots, possibly three, and the Apache did not fire until everyone was down in flames. With burning wreckage on the deck, an Apache comes into action. According to the investigation:

“Fire support and surveillance assets immediately shifted focus to the crash site, and one AH-64 Apache helicopter fired 30mm rounds just west of the suspected RPG point of origin to suppress any potential enemy activity in the vicinity of the crash site.”

The idea that crosses and Apaches can protect Dustoffs is a US Army-manufactured fallacy. This policy grinds down our battle tempo and creates a need for more helicopters. Of course, those people who sell helicopters and helicopter parts, or who get to command all those extra forces and assets, will be tempted to proselytize the need for crosses. Purists who only want to win battles will be called heretics.

Combat troops vociferously complain about the delay between the casualty, the 9-line, and wheels-down at the LZ. Meanwhile, the Army haggles over accounting, and advertises 60 minutes as a success. Any minute longer than the minimum required to land and get out is one minute tempting fate with an enemy who moves fast, and in Zhari District the enemy also shoots straight. During one ambush on 4-4 Cav, the enemy took out three armored vehicles in about thirty seconds using recoilless rifles.

While waiting on a Dustoff to pick up Chazray Clark, an officer can be heard on my video asking about the bird, saying it’s been 45 minutes since the first call. A lieutenant next to me said this is the second time this has happened.

In Zhari, the enemy often fires grenades, and after they know the LZ, every minute we waited there was an invitation for grenades to begin falling. In addition to the reality that Chazray was wide awake and dying, and that the enemy could be preparing to attack the helicopter, they were using the time to prepare to attack us as we left the LZ. Later in the morning, I would photograph what was almost certainly an IED position that the enemy did not quite get into place in time. Our EOD and other troops found myriad bombs in the abandoned village. Chazray died at Kandahar Airfield, landing approximately 65 minutes after the attack. Pedros or armed Dustoffs could have had Chazray to the hospital in about 35 minutes, which also would have unlocked the unit from the LZ to wrestle initiative back from the enemy.

The Army’s next fallback will be that arming the Dustoffs reduces their load capacity. This is true. But again, experienced pilots with hundreds of combat missions will say—and I know from being there—that loads are not the problem. Speed and machine guns are the problem.

After the Dustoff picked up Chazray, we headed into the village. It was rigged so fully with bombs that we didn’t get far. There were minor small-arms fights. Though we never made it far from the LZ due to all the bombs, the next afternoon there was another BOOM. An Afghan Soldier tripped another bomb that took off an arm and his head. No helicopter was needed and so he was taken out in a body bag that night when other helicopters picked us up.

The points made by the Army that Geneva Conventions obligations exist for the Army—but not for the Air Force and Marines or British—are so silly that they do not need to be explained, merely exposed. One must wonder if we’ve lost Dustoff helicopters or crewmembers because Golden Minutes were wasted, or when they came under direct fire they were defenseless.

An accurate appraisal of the situation can be obtained by bypassing the Army Generals. Better to anonymously poll the pilots and crews who collectively have flown thousands of evacuation missions in Afghanistan.

The Army has demonstrated a lack of institutional will and common sense. After ten years they have not fixed the problem.

The Secretary of Defense or the President of the United States should intervene. I will provide my unedited video of the MEDEVAC failure to the Pentagon and White House upon request. I prefer to keep the unedited video “in house” due to the graphic nature. I kindly request that this video be safeguarded from release.

Thank you for your time and consideration in this matter.

Sincerely,

Michael Yon

Mark of the Beast: Evil Symbols in Afghanistan

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Tue, 22 Nov 2011 12:25:27 +0000

22 November 2011

US Army MEDEVAC helicopters in Afghanistan are marked with Red Crosses. Helicopters sporting a Red Cross are not allowed to be armed. The enemy knows this. The enemy tries to shoot down these unarmed helicopters with the added advantage that our people cannot shoot back. And so, we push people into combat while advertising to the enemy that our people are unarmed. The best that can be said for this policy is that it’s wrong. The worst that can be said might be that it borders on criminal.

We like to think that after a decade of counterinsurgency, we have learned something. Have we? What does a cross on a helicopter mean? For some Afghans, it’s a mark of the beast. The poster above was hanging on a wall in eastern Afghanistan.

Of the approximate fifty evil symbols, most are crosses. Even the shape of an anchor is seen as unholy.

An Afghan friend translates:

*Destroying the cross is an Islamic obligation*

1. Christians want to publish and spread their unholy and cursed religious logos and signs in different shapes and appearances in clean and holy Muslim society.

2. These Christianity signs (Crosses) have affected our Islamic society too

– even our mosques and our Menbers are not safe from those Christianity signs (Crosses).

(Further note from my Afghan friend explaining “menber”: When you enter a mosque, the menber is a chair in the most forward point. After the prayer is done, a mullah sits on that chair and enlightens people. Talking rubbish about how to be a good muslim or other nonsense. That chair is higher than the regular ones in terms of height. It’s higher in order to enable the mullah to see all the folks and the folks seeing mullah – even the ones sitting far away. Menber is the written name of it.)

3. The respected Ulemas agree over the fact that destroying these crosses is an Islamic obligation and on whatever object or surface where there is a cross, praying is a sin.

4. —– had a gold cross in his neck and prophet Mohammad told him to remove that ‘idol’ from himself and is narrated from Aisha that prophet Mohammad never allowed anything in his house with a cross on it and used to destroy or throw it away.

6. For further explanations, refer to …. / …. / …. (Names of references given)

*Some of the names on the crosses:*

1. Cross of George

2. Cross of Andrew

3. Cross of Lauren

4. Cross of Jerusalem

5. Cross of Anthony

6. Cross in shape of the Nazi logo

7. Catholic Cross

===End of Translation===

The US Army will defend the Red Crosses on the helicopters by falsely bringing the Geneva Conventions into the conversation. They will say, “According to the Geneva Conventions…”

Nothing in the Geneva Conventions forces us to put Red Crosses on medics or helicopters. I’ve never seen a medic in Iraq, Afghanistan, or the Philippines who was wearing a Red Cross. I don’t recall ever having seen an American service member wearing a Red Cross. Importantly, the US Air Force, Marines, and the British do not put Red Crosses on their helicopters.

This puts the Army’s argument about Geneva Conventions into an interesting light. By bringing the Geneva Conventions into the discussion, the US Army implies that the Marines, Air Force and the British all are violating the Geneva Conventions. They are not violating the Geneva Conventions. Meanwhile, the Army is shamelessly hiding behind those conventions to forward an internal political fight about who controls those helicopters.

The Army has not a single valid reason for sporting the Red Crosses. Army leadership should hang its head in shame for willfully endangering troops and the mission by sending unarmed troops into combat, signaling to the enemy that they are unarmed, all while elegantly marking our helicopter with what to many Afghans is a mark of the beast.

If the Army insists on sending unarmed troops into combat, it should at least remove the crosses that alert the enemy that the helicopter is unarmed, all while inflaming local passion to shoot it down.

CrusaderCopters

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Wed, 23 Nov 2011 12:57:59 +0000

Afghanistan: Army Medic helps to bag up an Afghan Soldier who was just blown up. Our medics do not wear Red Crosses. They carry rifles.

23 November 2011

Army Dustoff MEDEVAC helicopter crews have been performing stellar work in Afghanistan. When troops are wounded, the Dustoffs go into hostile territory often while taking ground fire. Most interesting: they go in unarmed.

The helicopters are emblazoned with the Red Cross, and so according to the Geneva Conventions they are not allowed to carry offensive weapons. Just what constitutes an offensive weapon is another line of discussion, but the bottom line is that Dustoffs do not carry machine guns.

More interesting is that the Red Cross is one of the symbols used in the Crusades. After years of throwing around the COIN acronym while pretending we have learned something about Counterinsurgency, we still fly around Afghanistan in CrusaderCopters.

The Air Force Pedro rescue helicopters are not burdened with the Red Cross, and so they carry two .50 caliber machine guns. The U.S. Marines and British Army also don’t burden themselves with the Red Cross, nor are there the World War II-type scenes with medics wearing crosses on their sleeves. The medics are armed. In fact, some medical crews working in Kabul are armed even while in the operating room.

The Taliban and other enemies in Afghanistan do not subscribe to the Geneva Conventions. They try to shoot down any and all helicopters, and sometimes they succeed. If you ask an Afghan what the Red Cross means, he’ll likely say it’s a symbol of Christianity — and in that regard, it might actually draw fire. This poster describing evil symbols was found hanging on a wall in an Afghan village. Most of the symbols are crosses.

There are numerous reasons why the Dustoffs should remove the Red Cross. We’ve been plagued with helicopter shortages in Afghanistan since the beginning of the war. When Dustoffs perform rescue missions, they must have armed top cover, often in the form of an Apache helicopter. By comparison, the Air Force Pedro rescue helicopters do not need top cover because they carry machine guns. And so in addition to adding more stresses to our helicopter fleet, the necessity to have top cover can lead to delays in MEDEVAC.

In September, I videotaped such a delay after an IED strike. The most wounded soldier was a triple amputee. Another soldier was deaf from the blast. A Dustoff crew was stationed probably two to three minutes away at Forward Operating Base Pasab. You can sometimes see the crews at Pasab running to start up a Dustoff helicopter. The Dustoff was parked about 200 meters from my tent. If it takes the Dustoff seven minutes to launch and three minutes to get to the LZ, they could have picked up the patients in about 10 minutes.

The hospital at Kandahar Airfield was about 13 minutes away, and so this means the patients could have been at the hospital in about 25 minutes. Instead, it took 65 minutes.

The Army claims it took 59 minutes, but they don’t start the clock until after a “9-line” casualty report has been called up. The Golden Hour doesn’t start when the 9-line goes up; it starts when the bomb explodes. In any case, 59 minutes is a lot longer than 25, and this delay was caused because the Dustoff needed Apache top cover.

The triple amputee was very much alive and talking, but you could hear him fading as the minutes ticked by. His buddies were saying he was going to live. The commander said to me that he was going to live, but as the minutes dragged by the soldiers became frustrated with the delay. We were sitting on a landing zone vulnerable to enemy fire, and there was little doubt the enemy knew where we were. In addition to endangering the wounded with delays, the delay also provided the enemy time to prepare to shoot down a rescue helicopter, or to attack troops who would be in the open on the LZ.

An Air Force Pedro pilot with 420 combat missions worth of experience read this article for accuracy and he responded:

“Pedros fly in a two ship formation for several reasons, mutual support, both with fires and mission management, and added capacity. In a dynamic and inaccurate threat environment we may launch on one Cat A, and arrive to discover additional survivors (or, God forbid, Heroes). This happened often, but as an example one of my missions in the “Cat Triangle” SE of Bastion, I was launched to rescue a Brit double amputee. 30 sec from the zone a second IED detonated and rendered a second Brit as a double amputee. Both Pedro’s effectively split and worked individual rescues while maintaining each others “back” — we minimized the time in the zone and got the survivors back as rapidly as possible. In my opinion two armed Dustoffs are better for the fight than one unarmed Dustoff and an Apache.”

If the Dustoffs were armed, there would have been no delay. So why does the Army hide behind Geneva Conventions when the Air Force, Marines, and British do not? It’s not about Geneva, but about who controls the Dustoff helicopters. It’s not about the “moral high ground.” The crosses have been used as a crucifix to ward off change within the military.

Some Army officers will attempt to confuse laymen by slapping the “Geneva Conventions” card on the table. There are two categories of people who will say we are legally or morally obligated to sport Red Crosses on our helicopters. The first category is the uninformed. This dispatch is written for the uninformed yet smart-minded people who, when presented with the evidence, will make a good decision. The second category consists mostly of a small number of Army officers who are lying. They have a political dog in this fight and they are willing to sacrifice combat readiness and troops’ lives to maintain the status quo. These people are disgraceful and I make no effort not to offend them. They should be discharged from the Army.

To be sure, it will be difficult to find senior NCOs or officers from the combat arms who will say that it’s a good idea to send unarmed troops into combat while marking them as defenseless.

Let’s number the problems, any one of which is enough to take off the crosses:

1)   Sending unarmed troops into combat is unwise
2)   Marking them as unarmed is tantamount criminal
3)   Delays in MEDEVAC leave wounded troops bleeding on battlefields
4)   Creates additional stresses on overstretched helicopters
5)   CrusaderCopters create a “COIN fail”

If the Army insists on sending defenseless CrusaderCopters into combat, it should use common sense by not alerting the enemy that the helicopter is unarmed.

Marked for Destruction

admin.michael.yon@gmail.com (Michael Yon) — Mon, 14 Nov 2011 13:08:38 +0000

14 November 2011

Camouflage is a combat imperative. Instruction in the use of camouflage begins in basic training. The Red Cross on the bright white background is meant to break up camouflage and to be seen.

While there might seem little chance in hiding a roaring helicopter, the contrasting colors and sharp shapes of the Red Cross create a significant difference when aiming shots. Many or most of the enemies in Afghanistan are bad shots. Others are good. They make successful long shots onto FOB Pasab, for instance, with explosive weapons, such as recoilless rifles and rockets. They have no problems hitting moving armored vehicles with recoilless rifles. One shot can easily destroy a helicopter.

Combat Medic in 4-4 Cav: Not Wearing Red Cross

The Red Cross specifically means that the wearer is unarmed. Only non-combatants are to display the symbol. There is no security violation in saying that our helicopters sporting Red Crosses all are unarmed. That is exactly what we are trying to advertise.

The enemies in Afghanistan will shoot down any helicopter. And so, if the Army insists on using unarmed helicopters for MEDEVAC missions, it makes doubly no sense to advertise that the helicopter is defenseless, all while literally helping the enemy to aim.

4-4 Cav Soldiers firing mortar during minor firefight

It must border on criminal negligence to order our people to advertise that they are unarmed while knowing that the enemy will fire upon them. At minimum, the US Army is displaying incompetence and a lack of sense. The Marines, Air Force, and British do not so encumber their helicopters. After ten years of war we know that the enemy shoots at all helicopters. We know that forcing our warriors to advertise themselves as unarmed welcomes attack. We know that the Red Cross literally makes an easier target for aiming. After ten years of war, the Army has not adapted to this obvious reality.

If the Army insists on pushing unarmed Soldiers into combat, it should at minimum remove the advertisement that notifies the enemy of an easy target. With the Red Cross, our people cannot even bluff that they might have weapons. Pushing unarmed Soldiers into combat while forcing them to advertise they are defenseless is wrong.