This is a guest post by CFR military fellow, Colonel Chad T. Manske, U.S. Air Force.

This weekend is a time to honor and reflect on the sacrifices of our veterans, particular those who made the ultimate sacrifice in defense of the freedoms we hold so dear.

The first official observance of Memorial Day occurred in 1868, on the order of General John Alexander Logan, the leader of a veterans’ group called the Grand Army of the Republic.  Logan designated May 30 as a day for “strewing with flowers, or otherwise decorating the graves of comrades who died in defense of their country.”  On May 30 of that year, war orphans and veterans placed flowers on the graves of the more than 20,000 Civil War dead in Arlington National Cemetery in Arlington, Virginia, across the Potomac River from Washington, D.C.  In 1966, President Lyndon B. Johnson signed a proclamation that declared Waterloo, New York, the birthplace of Memorial Day.  The U.S. Congress declared Memorial Day a national holiday in 1971, and changed the date of observance from May 30 to the last Monday in May to give workers a three-day weekend.

To many people, Memorial Day is a time of festive celebration, outdoor Bar-B-Qs, and marks the unofficial beginning of summer. To others, Memorial Day is a time of reflection and remembrance of men and women who forged a nation under the ideals of liberty and equality.

Likewise, to me, a 22-year active duty Air Force officer, I will forever be reminded of Memorial Day by where I spent this weekend a year ago. While the Commander of the 100^th Air Refueling Wing and installation at RAF Mildenhall, England, I traveled to Normandy, France.  I was not there specifically to pay tribute to those Americans who lost their lives on D-Day.  Rather, I went to run my first marathon at Mont St Michel.  Yet upon arriving a couple days before the race I took full advantage of the opportunity to pay tribute to America’s fallen heroes who perished on the beaches of Normandy, to walk in their footsteps and to pay respects to those laid to rest at the Normandy American Cemetery and Memorial.  Of the 57,500 Americans who landed upon Omaha and Utah Beaches, 4,050 became casualties.

Normandy stirs the memory of the greatest generation today through ceremonies, television documentaries and movies.  One of the most famous of those movies in our time was Saving Private Ryan.  The movie storyline is based on the lives of the four Niland brothers, of which two—Preston and Robert—died at Normandy within a day of each other and are buried in the cemetery.  To walk the beaches as I did a year ago is to feel the pangs of loss for this family and of so many others.

The Normandy invasion itself produced untold bravery on the part of a dozen courageous Americans who were awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor.  A handful of those dozen–of the 9,387 buried at the Normandy Cemetery–stand out.  Among them is Brigadier General Theodore Roosevelt, Jr., son of our long-ago president and one of the highest ranking officers to ever receive this award.  The information on the normally plain white gravestone cross at Normandy is specially outlined in gold with a gold star adorning the top of the cross.  And his story, like those of his caliber, is a remarkable one filled with unreal bravery and courage.

Outside the cemetery and near the beachheads, one is taken back 68 years where the evidence of German fortifications and pillboxes remain for today’s generations to see.  Near one of those fortifications is the site of one of the fiercest struggles ever by American soldiers at Pointe du Hoc.  It is the site where three Army Ranger Groups—about 225 infantrymen–scaled a 100-foot high rock face assigned to take out German guns atop these strategic cliffs.  At the end of the mission, 135 of those Rangers would lose their lives, yet five German field guns would be destroyed and silenced, and a strategic location would be secured in the process.

Yes, for me, Memorial Day will forever hold special meaning.

Thousands of young men and women have given their lives in the cause for freedom, and we add their names, with great sorrow, to the stacks of ledgers that record the names of every lost Airman, Soldier, Sailor, Marine, Coast Guardsman, civil servant, and Department of Defense contractor.  These courageous individuals stood toe to toe with our adversaries, offering themselves as shields for America to keep war from reaching our front door.  Each of them knew what their duty was, but surely, each of them also dreamed of coming home to the people they loved and the lives they cherished.  Every loss is a loss to our nation, a loss to our military, and, most importantly, a loss to the families who grieve.  As we gather to honor the memories of the fallen, a piece of us struggles to understand the meaning of such sacrifice and loss.  We are forever in their debt for putting themselves in harm’s way, so that we may live in peace.

On this Memorial Day, at 3 p.m., wherever you are, please be sure to pause and participate in the National Moment of Remembrance established by Congress.  This is a moment of reflection and an opportunity to demonstrate your gratitude for those who died for us.  Let us continue to make sure these heroes are never forgotten–on this day and every day as we honor those who have given “their last full measure of devotion” in service to our Nation, let us renew our commitment to military family survivors, as well as to our wounded warriors and their families.

To all of our Armed Forces, whether serving at home or abroad, please know your sacrifices do not go unnoticed. We are grateful for your service and are privileged to stand with you, by you, and for you.  Thank you and God Bless America!

2011 Human Rights Report: Yemen, U.S. Department of State, May 24, 2012.

The government also employed air strikes against rebellious tribes in Nihm and Arhab. Human rights observers and local residents accused the government of targeting villages of these tribesmen in both areas with aerial bombardment, leading to significant noncombatant casualties. The government also employed air strikes against AQAP and affiliated insurgents in Abyan, with some strikes hitting civilian areas. Although some accused the government of intentionally striking civilians in Abyan, most if not all noncombatant casualties from these bombardments were attributed to a lack of air force training and technical capability.

(3PA: For my response to this description of what could have been CIA or JSOC air strikes, see here.)

Iona Craig, “U.S. Drone Blitz on Yemen Swells al-Qaeda’s Ranks,” The Times of London, May 24, 2012.

Iona Craig, “Resistance Battles Al-Qaeda-Linked Fighters in Yemen,” USA Today, May 24, 2012.

From a nearby military base, Jamal Naser al-Aqel, the provincial governor, said the support of the tribesmen and residents is vital in the offensive to crush the insurgency. Long-term success is likely to depend on improving the impoverished lives of the people here. “We have a lot of problems here. The greatest problem here in Abyan is poverty,” al-Aqel said. “Al-Qaeda is here because of the poverty. What we need from America is economic help.”

Phil Stewart and Mark Hosenball, “Bin Laden Film Got No Special Ops Help: U.S. Admiral,” Reuters, May 24, 2012.

[U.S. Special Operations Command chief, Adm.] McRaven played down the sensitivity of the mechanics of the raid itself.

“There was nothing frankly overly sensitive about the raid. We did 11 other raids much like that in Afghanistan that night,” McRaven said.

“From a military standpoint, this was a standard raid and really not very sexy.”

Jim Garamone, “Defense, State Leaders Urge Senate to Ratify Law of the Sea Treaty,” American Forces Press Service, May 23, 2012.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Martin Dempsey: “But, the force of arms does not have to be — and should not be — our only national security instrument.”

Suzan Fraser, “Turkey Says U.S. Favorable to Sale of Armed Drones,” Associated Press, May 22, 2012.

Washington, which is providing technical and intelligence to Ankara in its fight against autonomy-seeking Kurdish rebels, deployed four Predator drones from Iraq to Turkey last year. NATO-ally Turkey is now trying to acquire armed drones — the kind the U.S. has used to target militants in places like Yemen and the border region between Afghanistan and Pakistan.

But analysts say some Congress members may oppose the sale of armed Predator drones to Turkey due to its tense relations with Israel, a close U.S. ally. A botched Turkish military airstrike in December aimed at the rebels of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party that killed 34 civilians is also likely to further complicate any sale.

Kimberly Dozier, “Who Will Drones Target? Who in the U.S. Will Decide?” ABC News, May 21, 2012.

White House counterterror chief John Brennan has seized the lead in choosing which terrorists will be targeted for drone attacks or raids, establishing a new procedure for both military and CIA targets.

The effort concentrates power over the use of lethal U.S. force outside war zones within one small team at the White House.

Walter Pincus, “House Puts Squeeze on Military’s Musical Arsenal,” Washington Post, May 18, 2012.

In a statement placed in the Congressional Record, McCollum said: “Over the past four years, taxpayers have spent $1.55 billion for the Pentagon’s 150 military bands and more than 5,000 full-time, professional military musicians…. At a time of fiscal crisis the Pentagon will have to get by spending only $200 million for their musical arsenal.”

The military has plans to spend $388 million on military bands in fiscal 2013 — roughly $10 million less than this year.

(CPA: By way of comparison, while the U.S. military has 5,000 full-time musicians, the authorized total workforce for the U.S. Agency for International Development is 6,400 people.)

“Assessing the Representativeness of Public Opinion Surveys,” Pew Research Center, May 15, 2012.

It has become increasingly difficult to contact potential respondents and to persuade them to participate. The percentage of households in a sample that are successfully interviewed – the response rate – has fallen dramatically. At Pew Research, the response rate of a typical telephone survey was 36% in 1997 and is just 9% today.

Today—eighty-nine days past its legal deadline—the State Department released its annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011. The new, user-friendly interface allows you to find and read individual country chapters much more quickly and easily (and might explain the delay). For all its flaws, the report remains a must-read for its reporting and candor. It serves as a generally honest counter to the rosier assessments of U.S. partners and allies’ human rights practices.

From my vantage point of trying to understand the Obama administration’s policies and practices of target killings, the report is also notable for what it does not include; namely, any mention of U.S. involvement in or responsibility for such operations.

The chapter on Yemen, for instance, has an entire section dedicated to “killings:”

The government also employed air strikes against AQAP and affiliated insurgents in Abyan, with some strikes hitting civilian areas. Although some accused the government of intentionally striking civilians in Abyan, most if not all noncombatant casualties from these bombardments were attributed to a lack of air force training and technical capability.

First, because U.S. targeted killings in Yemen are “covert,” the State Department cannot acknowledge American complicity or collusion. But it stands to reason that some, if not a majority, of these air strikes were carried out by CIA or Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) drones, or even U.S. Navy assets offshore. Even the most careful, discriminate, and “surgical” uses of force can unintentionally kill civilians. According to three Yemeni officials, for instance, two drone strikes earlier this month killed seven suspected AQAP militants and eight civilians.

Second, given the CIA’s request to “broaden the aperature” by conducting “signature strikes” against anonymous AQAP militants based on “patterns of suspicious behavior,” the number of civilian casualties will only continue to increase. Today, Iona Craig reported meeting a farmer in Abyan, Yemen, who witnessed two separate air attacks that killed twenty-six people. According to the farmer, “They were all local people, many of them friends of mine.”

Third, although some of these strikes could have been carried out by Yemeni forces, civilians on the ground are hardly able to distinguish among Yemeni, CIA, and JSOC missiles. It would be difficult to devise a counterterrorism strategy that did a better job at creating a common enemy among victims or neutral third parties.

Fourth, the State Department report implies that additional “air force training and technical capability” (presumably funded by U.S. taxpayers) would prevent civilian casualties in the future. The United States gave $326 million in (overt) security assistance to Yemen between 2007 and 2011, which has had negligible impact on the government’s ability to combat AQAP. In that same time period, AQAP has tripled in size and expanded its geographic reach and influence. According to Air Force General Ali Abdullah Saleh Al Haymi, “U.S. assistance was used to kill Yemeni people, not to kill al-Qaeda.”

Beyond Yemen, the chapter on Turkey includes the section “Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life,” which notes two unfortunate incidents:

On December 28, military aircraft killed 34 civilians near the town of Uludere in an airstrike intended to kill members of the PKK. The government’s investigation was underway at year’s end…

On several occasions throughout the year, the government used military aircraft to attack areas where the PKK terrorist organization was active in northern Iraq. According to press reports, fire from Turkish aircraft killed seven civilians in Iraq on August 21.

Since November 2007, when the combined intelligence fusion cell opened in Ankara, the United States provides targeting information from manned and (more recently) unmanned aircraft to guide Turkish air strikes against suspected PKK members. Reportedly, a U.S. Predator drone provided the initial video imagery that led to a Turkish airstrike against a caravan of men, who turned out not to be PKK militants, but civilians.

Every single State Department Human Rights report—2007, 2008, 2009, and 2010—since the U.S.-Turkey cell targeting opened warned of civilians killed in counterterrorism operations where the PKK was the intended target. Does the United States have a role in or responsibility for these unintentional civilian deaths that have persisted year after year?

But the most remarkable and hypocritical aspect of U.S. unwillingness to acknowledge its role in civilians killed during counterterrorism operations, is that it reports other air strikes with collateral damage. The chapter on Somalia, for example, contains this finding:

On October 30, a Kenyan military airstrike in the town of Jilib, Middle Juba, reportedly hit an IDP camp. According to Doctors Without Borders, its clinic received five dead and 45 wounded, mostly women and children, from the incident. The Kenyan military spokesperson dismissed reports of civilian casualties and instead claimed the aerial bombs had hit al-Shabaab targets who used the IDPs as human shields.

Finally, the Pakistan chapter reveals, “During the year there were reports of civilian casualties and extrajudicial killings committed by government security forces during operations against militants.” There were also at least seventy CIA drone strikes in Pakistan over the same time period, at least some of which accidentally killed civilians and tribal police members. But you won’t read about that in this report.

One year ago today, with no strategy and no working knowledge of the blogosphere, I started this blog: Politics, Power, and Preventive Action. As I reread my first post, I was heartened to see that I characterized myself as “someone who is massively curious about foreign affairs” and concluded, “This should be fun!” Reflecting on this past year, blogging has been tremendously fun—although much more work than I had anticipated.

A few thoughts on the life of a blogger:

1)      Even if you spend a long time researching and writing, blog posts are ephemeral. Even if you post in anticipation or reaction to a highly-publicized event, it has a shelf life of perhaps twenty-four hours. The only posts that do endure are informative, such as reading lists.

2)      We have compiled 152 posts in 365 days (you do the math), and I’ve learned that there is no way to predict what people will find interesting, open, and—presumably—read. I’ve listed below the top five most-read posts, with “Airpower Turns 100” topping the charts by a factor of five over the runner-up.

3)      Writing (or compiling) three posts per week requires a lot of writing, but also forecasting near-term news pegs as well as collecting the required research—all before actually sitting down and typing.

4)      For me, the most rewarding aspect of blogging is aggregating and promoting the research and analysis of others. I have created several platforms with this in mind: “Ten Whats With…;” “Ask the Experts” that surveys smart people on important issues; the weekly roundup “You Might Have Missed;” and guest posts.

5)      Without the help of interns and research associates to research and edit the posts—not to mention CFR’s communications team to help promote them—blogging would be tedious, less read, and less impactful (if that’s possible).

6)      Since I spend most my time doing primary research and interviews, I read few blogs regularly. I am often impressed, however, by the analytical and informative quality of those that I do come across (I’ve listed some on my blogroll). Compared to ten years ago, it is a great time to be interested in foreign policy and national security issues. Given all of the great content available, I am grateful that you chose to read this blog as well. Thank you.

Most Read

1)      “Airpower Turns 100” (November 2, 2011)
2)      “How to Attend a Talk: Etiquette for Students, Wonks, and Speakers” (December 5, 2011)
3)      “Iran’s Nuclear Program: What Intelligence Would Suffice?” (January 9, 2012)
4)      “How Risky Was the Osama bin Laden Raid?” (April 30, 2012)
5)      “U.S. National Security Strategy: Rhetoric and Reality” (August 15, 2011)

Oldies But Goodies

“Israel’s Nuclear Weapons Program and Lessons for Iran” (March 5, 2012)
“When America Attacked Syria” (February 13, 2012)
“Predicting Future War: What H.G. Wells Got Right and Wrong” (December 27, 2012)

Unanswered Questions

“Ask the Experts: Will America ‘Win’ in Afghanistan?” (April 3, 2012)
“Ask the Experts: Where Are the Women in Foreign Policy?” (March 8, 2012)
“Ask the Experts: What Would Iran Do With a Bomb?” (February 21, 2012)
“Iran’s Nuclear Program: What Intelligence Would Suffice?” (January 9, 2012)
“Who Can’t America Kill?” (September 6, 2011)

My Personal Favorites

“On Memorial Day” (May 29, 2011)
“How We Die” (September 27, 2011)
“America is a Safe Place” (February 24, 2012)

In his memoir Decision Points, President George W. Bush described his frustration after reading intelligence reports about a growing Taliban sanctuary in Pakistan in the summer of 2008. Bush recalls an encounter with a Navy Seal in Afghanistan in 2006, who said: “Mr. President, we need permission to go kick some ass inside Pakistan.”

Concerned that the Pakistani government would reject U.S. special operations raids into their country—“No democracy can tolerate violations of its sovereignty,” according to Bush—the president writes:

I looked for other ways to reach into the tribal areas. The Predator, an unmanned aerial vehicle, was capable of conducting video surveillance and firing laser-guided bombs. I authorized the intelligence community turn up the pressure on the extremists. Many of the details of our actions remain classified. But soon after I gave the order, the press started reporting more Predator strikes.

This marked the beginning of “signature strikes” against suspected Taliban or al-Qaeda militants in Pakistan. As David Sanger wrote in The Inheritance, “For the first time the CIA no longer had to identify its target by name; now the ‘signature’ of a typical al Qaeda motorcade, or of a group entering a known al-Qaeda safe house, was enough to authorize a strike.”

Also noteworthy is Bush’s understanding of what does—and does not—constitute a violation of sovereign rights; specifically, U.S. boots on the ground versus CIA drones targeting anonymous militants within a country. However, this conception of ground, but not air, sovereignty is flawed. The foundational treaty regulating air travel, the 1944 Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, unequivocally states in Article I: “Every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory.”

In a prescient warning of the use of drones outside of traditional battlefields, Article VIII of the Chicago Convention, “Pilotless Aircraft,” even declares that “No aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot shall be flown without a pilot over the territory of a contracting State without special authorization by that State and in accordance with the terms of such authorization.”

Although Pakistani military leaders tolerated—albeit reluctantly—t he expansion of CIA drone strikes from 2004 to 2011, resentment among Pakistani citizens festered. Ultimately, the Pakistani parliamentary committee’s “Guidelines for Revised Terms of Engagement with USA” in April 2012 demanded an “immediate cessation of drone attacks inside the territorial borders of Pakistan.” In response, the Obama administration has slowed, but not stopped CIA drone strikes in Pakistan. Just yesterday, President Asif Ali Zardari raised the issue with Obama at the NATO summit. Zardari’s spokesperson noted, “The president said that Pakistan wanted to find a permanent solution to the drone issue as it not only violated our sovereignty but also inflamed public sentiments.”

Beyond Pakistan, the delicate issue of sovereignty has constrained U.S. foreign policy objectives in ways that civilian and military planners neither imagined nor anticipated.

In Iraq, for instance, Tim Arango revealed that plans for sending 350 U.S. law enforcement officers to train the Iraqi police was pared back to 190, then 100, and more recently to 50: “It reflects a costly miscalculation on the part of American officials, who did not count on the Iraqi government to assert its sovereignty so aggressively.” Although the U.S. government initially planned to have 16,000 employees and contractors in Iraq beyond 2011, according to Arango: “The State Department quickly reversed course this year—partly because of Iraqi objections to the expanded operation—and is now cutting back from the slightly more than 12,000 people presently in Iraq.”

Moreover, while the Pentagon originally sought to maintain 15,000 to 16,000 U.S. troops in Iraq, a paltry 500 are currently in the country to oversee weapons sales and train Iraqi military forces. And for all of the policymakers and pundits who envisioned Iraq as a launching pad for counterterrorism raids into Iran, there is only one U.S. special operations adviser in Iraq.

Finally, during the eight-plus years U.S. forces were in Iraq, they detained over 90,000 suspected insurgents and terrorists, and handed over 200 of the most dangerous detainees to the Iraqi government in December. Earlier this month, it was reported that the last remaining detainee, Ali Musa Daqduq (a Hezbollah operative who confessed to orchestrating attacks on U.S. troops), would soon be released. The Obama administration had hoped to extradite Daqduq to the United States to face a military tribunal, but, as Jack Healy and Charlie Savage wrote, “Ultimately, Iraqi leaders asserted their sovereignty in the high-profile case and took control of Mr. Daqduq.”

In Afghanistan, as I hypothesized two months ago, “Night raids enrage Afghans, and Karzai faces political pressure to significantly reduce their occurrence and frequency.” Afghanistan’s top officer, General Sher Mohammed Karimi, recently stated, “In the last two months, 14 to 16 [night] operations have been rejected by the Afghans.” A U.S. official added: “The Afghans are the ones who give final say on whether or not the mission gets conducted. That’s how the process works now.”

In addition, in September 2012 the United States will complete the transition of control over Parwan Detention Facility to the Afghan government, which currently holds between 1,700 and 3,200 detainees (perhaps 50 non-Afghans) captured by U.S. and ISAF troops. Despite spending upwards of $60 million building Parwan, a recent Pentagon inspector general report found a slight problem: the locks are “incapable of locking either manually or electronically” and the complex itself is “not up to the standard suitable for a detention facility.”

As a result, within the next four months, suspected militants who attacked U.S. soldiers or threatened the government in Kabul could be freed. U.S. officials claim that they will retain veto power over which detainees can be released, but the U.S.-Afghan Memorandum of Understanding on “Transfer of U.S. Detention Facilities in Afghan Territory to Afghanistan” explicitly states that “Afghanistan affirms that it is to consult with the United States before the release” and merely “consider favorably such [U.S.] assessment” of any detainee.

One of the enduring lessons of military occupations is that most people are angry you intervened in their country, some that you stay too long, and the rest that you leave too soon. Yesterday, while reflecting on the U.S. experience in Afghanistan, President Obama noted, “Ten years in a country that’s very different, that’s a strain not only on our folks but also on that country, which at a point is going to be very sensitive about its own sovereignty.”

Obama also stated that the United States will “stay focused on the counterterrorism issue, to work with the government.” As the NATO summit maps the handover of security to Afghan forces, U.S. policymakers should recognize that state sovereignty extends to both counterinsurgency and counterterrorism missions. Just because intelligence operations or military policies in foreign countries are characterized by American officials as a “light footprint,” or “limited,” “discriminate,” and “surgical,” does not make it so. The Strategic Partnership Agreement framework for U.S. operations in Afghanistan declares, “The United States emphasizes its full respect for the sovereignty and independence of Afghanistan,” and “pledges not to use Afghan territory or facilities as a launching point for attacks against other countries.” Don’t be surprised when Karzai and his successor actually enforce this commitment. Ultimately, democratically elected leaders have a responsibility to their citizens to defend their borders and sovereign rights.

Iona Craig, “Toll Climbs in Yemen’s Fight Against al-Qaeda,” USA Today, May 18, 2012.

Julian E. Barnes, “U.S. Rethinks Secrecy on Drone Program,” Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2012.

The policy changes under consideration could include specifying which extremist groups associated with al Qaeda can be targeted by the Pentagon under the 2001 congressional authorization for the use of military force against perpetrators of the Sept. 11 attacks, according to U.S. officials.

Dianne Feinstein, “Letters: Senator Feinstein on Drone Strikes,” Los Angeles Times, May 17, 2012.

The Senate Intelligence Committee, which I chair, has devoted significant time and attention to the drone program. We receive notification with key details shortly after every strike, and we hold regular briefings and hearings on these operations. Committee staff has held 28 monthly in-depth oversight meetings to review strike records and question every aspect of the program including legality, effectiveness, precision, foreign policy implications and the care taken to minimize noncombatant casualties.

The White House, Executive Order—Blocking Property of Persons Threatening the Peace, Security, or Stability of Yemen, May 16, 2012.

I, BARACK OBAMA, President of the United States of America, find that the actions and policies of certain members of the Government of Yemen and others threaten Yemen’s peace, security, and stability, including by obstructing the implementation of the agreement of November 23, 2011, between the Government of Yemen and those in opposition to it, which provides for a peaceful transition of power that meets the legitimate demands and aspirations of the Yemeni people for change, and by obstructing the political process in Yemen. I further find that these actions constitute an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and foreign policy of the United States, and I hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.

(3PA: According to the Los Angeles Times, the order is “meant to discourage political meddling by those still loyal to the nation’s former dictator.” For a description of the executive order, read this comprehensive Salon article.)

U.S. Department of State Daily Press Briefing, May 16, 2012.

QUESTION: Is it your view that there are people who are attempting to block this, or is this [executive order] just purely a preventative or an anticipatory measure, that there are going to be people who are going to try and block it – for example, the former president?

NULAND: Well, obviously, I’m not going to name names, but we’ve had concerns about spoilers. We’ve had concerns about foot-draggers. We’ve had concerns about actual opposition from various different groups. And so this is a new tool that we can use to make our views known if that continues.

QUESTION: In the note to Congress that accompanies the President’s executive order, it specifically states that it is aimed at members of the Yemeni Government who may seek to disrupt the stability et cetera, and in particular to interfere with or prevent – obstruct the implementation of the November 23^rd agreement. Who are those members of the government that you are so worried about?

NULAND: I think the document speaks of those within the government and outside the government. So this is a big umbrella set of authorities that can be used as necessary. Again, I’m not going to name names here because we haven’t designated anybody yet. But it is definitely meant today as a message to those who are trying to block a transition that we have this tool to use against them and that they should think again about the policies that they are pursuing.

Hakim Almasmari, “Two Suspected U.S. Drone Strikes Reported in Yemen,” CNN, May 15, 2012.

Two suspected U.S. drone strikes killed seven al Qaeda militants and eight civilians in the southern part of Yemen on Tuesday, three Yemeni security officials said.

(3PA: Yesterday, Jake Tapper asked National Security Adviser Donilon if the United States compensates families of civilians killed by U.S. military operations outside of Afghanistan. Donilon replied: “There are a lot of possibilities in that question, including instances like occurred on the cross-border incident in the end of November in Pakistan, where it would be appropriate to talk about compensation issues. I don’t know if compensation was ultimately paid in that case. That was — those were Pakistani soldiers who were killed. With respect to other examples, Jake, I’m just not going to go there.”)

Jeremy Scahill, “Washington’s War in Yemen Backfires,” The Nation, February 14, 2012.

Government Accountability Office, “Uncertain Political and Security Situation Challenges U.S. Efforts to Implement a Comprehensive Strategy in Yemen,” February 29, 2012.

Since fiscal year 2007, U.S. agencies have allocated more than $642 million in securityand civilian assistance to Yemen. Specifically, DOD, State, and USAID have allocated approximately $326 million for security assistance and more than $316 million for civilian assistance. Allocations reached their peak in fiscal year 2010, after a failed bomb attack on a U.S.-bound airline by a Yemeni-trained Nigerian citizen in December 2009. In fiscal year 2011, however, allocations declined sharply due primarily to the political turmoil in Yemen and the difficulty of implementing training and equipping programs in such an environment, according to U.S. officials.

U.S. assistance strategy and activities support the U.S. goal of a stable and secure Yemen. In 2009, the U.S. government undertook a comprehensive review of its policy toward Yemen. The result was an integrated strategy that emphasizes both security and civilian assistance. According to State officials, this assistance strategy is twofold as follows:

• Strengthen Yemen’s ability to promote security and minimize threats. DOD security assistance activities have been focused on building Yemeni counterterrorism capacity. According to DOD officials, DOD’s activities have helped its Yemeni counterparts take direct counterterrorism action, increase their border security, and build both airlift and maritime capacity. However, they also said that in 2011 DOD suspended the majority of its security-related activities due to the deteriorating security situation. For example, DOD officials told us they had to stop the large training component of their assistance, because it was no longer safe to keep the trainers in Yemen.

• Mitigate economic crisis and governance deficiencies. USAID has led the implementation of civilian assistance activities. Prior to 2010, USAID activities focused on sector-based development interventions, such as separate programs for health or education, in five remote, impoverished, rural governorates. Given the deteriorating security context and the escalating development challenges, USAID determined that a new stabilization approach was necessary, transitioning to more integrated activities addressing the key grievances and drivers of instability in targeted, disadvantaged communities. Under this strategy, for example, the Community Livelihoods Program brings programs for health, education, and poverty reduction together under one implementation mechanism. In addition, USAID shifted the geographic focus of its programs. According to USAID officials, the deteriorating security situation denied program implementers access to certain areas, and they could not travel or establish a long-term presence in more remote locales. As a result, USAID began to focus assistance activities on large urban areas, which were more secure and accessible. Officials added that the collapse of government services, decline in economic activity, and other drivers of instability were also greatest in these areas, providing USAID the greatest potential for maximizing the impact of its interventions.

Given Yemen’s ongoing political unrest and security situation, U.S. officials told us they are monitoring developments as they relate to future assistance activities. State and USAID officials said that the overall twofold U.S. assistance strategy continues to guide their planning, but that under a directive from the National Security Council, they have also recently begun a new interagency strategic development process. They expect this process to last several months and will allow agencies to react to the situation on the ground following the recent February 2012 presidential elections. DOD officials also said that once DOD is able to fully resume security assistance activities in Yemen, it will continue to work toward its goal of building Yemeni counterterrorism capacity. However, both State and DOD officials expressed some concerns about future security assistance activities, including identifying who will be the key U.S. partners in the Yemeni security forces. Until 2011, the United States trained and equipped specialized security forces focused on counterterrorism that members of the Saleh family led.

Useful sources:

• The Bureau of Investigative Journalism, “The Covert War on Terror—The Data.”
• The Long War Journal, “Charting the Data for U.S. Air Strikes in Yemen, 2002-2012.”

The Obama administration’s strategy against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), as articulated by White House counterterrorism czar John Brennan, is to assure that it is “destroyed and is eliminated.” In January 2010, Brennan warned: “We’ve seen over the past several years in Yemen is increasing strengthening of Al Qaida forces in Yemen. There are several hundred Al Qaida members there.”

In response, then-commander of U.S. Central Command, General David Petraeus, developed a comprehensive strategy, which he termed Preventive Counterinsurgency Operations: “Our efforts not only help develop key security forces in Yemen, they also contribute to the overall effort to help Yemen deal with challenges that could become much more significant if not dealt with early on.”

Shortly thereafter, the State Department’s coordinator for counterterrorism, Daniel Benjamin, emphasized: “The Obama administration has made the issue of radicalization a centerpiece of its concern, and we are eager to ensure that whatever policies we pursue do not result in one terrorist being taken off the street while ten more are galvanized to take action.”

At the time, there had been a total of four U.S. airstrikes in Yemen. Since then, the U.S. military and CIA have conducted between forty-five and one hundred additional airstrikes against suspected AQAP members, both prominent and anonymous.

Last month, in a speech at the New York Police Department, Brennan stated that AQAP’s ranks had swelled to “more than a thousand members in Yemen.” By Brennan’s own accounts, since the implementation of Patraeus’s strategy, as well as an exponential increase in naval and air strikes, AQAP has more than tripled in size.

Obviously, Yemen faces a number of challenges on its own: sustained political turmoil that deposed the former president and installed the nascent Hadi regime; armed insurgent groups that seek independence from the central government; and a worsening humanitarian crisis (with the UN humanitarian response plan funded at only 20 percent). Nevertheless, AQAP’s expansion should throw serious doubt on the efficacy of the Obama administration’s current strategy, and on the logic of dropping even more bombs and deploying more special operations forces.

America’s Third War is escalating quickly in the skies over Yemen. Despite previous rebuffs from the White House, last month the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and the CIA—which both run parallel drone campaigns in Yemen—were granted broad authority to conduct “signature strikes” against anonymous suspected militants, who are determined to support al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) based on the observed “patterns of suspicious behavior” from multiple intelligence sources.

A senior Obama administration official described the enlarged scope of targets as “broadening the aperture” for JSOC and CIA drones. By one estimate, there have been more drone strikes in the past month (seventeen, including two on Saturday) than in the preceding nine years, since the first strike on November 3, 2002. Meanwhile, there have been between ten and fifty other U.S. attacks on militants in Yemen using manned aircraft or naval platforms.

It is difficult to understand the scope of the campaign, as Yemeni officials claim to conduct the vast majority of the strikes. This is highly unlikely, however, given that many its pilots have been intermittently on strike since January, and Yemen’s Air Force capabilities are dismal—despite receiving $326 million in (overt) U.S. security assistance between 2007 and 2011, when a large chunk of military aid was suspended in response to the government’s violent crackdown against unarmed civilian protestors. As Air Force General Ali Abdullah Saleh Al Haymi told journalist Sharon Weinberger in March, “U.S. assistance was used to kill Yemeni people, not to kill al-Qaeda.”

Several smart pieces were recently published warning of the increased likelihood of blowback, as AQAP will undoubtedly redouble recruiting efforts in response to the expanded air campaign. A few additional points to consider:

First, it is not clear who are the targets of these airstrikes. Three months ago, Eric Schmitt wrote that the Obama administration’s “two-pronged strategy calls for the United States and Yemen to work together to kill or capture about two dozen of al-Qaeda’s most dangerous operatives, who are focused on attacking America and its interests.” Less than two months later, John Brennan, the senior White House counterterrorism adviser, stated that AQAP has “more than a thousand members”—a big leap from the aforementioned twenty-four. He continued by framing the U.S. mission and goal: “We’re not going to rest until Al Qaida the organization is destroyed and is eliminated from areas in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Africa and other areas.”

This statement—among others—raises a few red flags. If the goal is to kill or capture (let’s be honest, to kill) only twenty-four AQAP militants, shouldn’t the JSOC and CIA campaigns be nearly finished? There are over 950 more suspected militants to target and kill—assuming there are no additional recruits—if we are to destroy and eliminate AQAP, to borrow Brennan’s words.

Second, there are several tribal groups fighting to capture substantive autonomy from the central government of President Abd Rabuh Mansur Hadi, who has been in power for less than three months. At the same time, elements of AQAP are engaged in brutal insurgent attacks against the Hadi regime. According to U.S. officials, there is no daylight between armed militants seeking to overthrow Hadi, and terrorists working to strike the American homeland: “AQAP’s antigovernment insurgency and its terrorist plotting against the West are two sides of the same coin.” Excellent reporting by Ghaith Abdul-Ahad from southern Yemen finds that secessionist rebels are divided between receiving weapons from Iran with strings attached, and aligning with AQAP against the regime. One Yemeni activist tells Abdul-Ahad: “If young men lose hope in our cause they will be looking for an alternative. And our hopeless young men are joining al-Qaida.”

The likelihood that U.S. air power will target only those (anonymous) individuals who aspire to attack the United States, while sparing Yemeni rebels, is low. Perhaps more importantly, drone strikes could ultimately unite these disparate groups behind a common banner that opposes both the Hadi regime and its partner in crime, the United States. It would be easy for the U.S. military and CIA to become a Yemeni counterinsurgency air force for the Hadi regime.

Third, the average Yemeni will eventually come to resent a foreign military that repeatedly attacks its territory. If there is one lesson to be learned from the three hundred CIA drone strikes in Pakistan, it is that the fervent and impassioned opposition to drones is more pronounced where the strikes do not occur. One distinction between Pakistan and Yemen is that, in the latter, U.S. drone strikes are geographically distributed throughout the country. This poses a particular difficult problem for the Obama administration, which, until two weeks ago, claimed that drone strikes were “covert,” and thus failed to counter the myths and misinformation proliferating in Pakistan.

Fourth, the United States has collected intelligence and targeted individuals in Yemen since April 10, 2002 (at least), when the country was officially designated a combat zone. Among the suite of manned and unmanned surveillance aircraft, National Security Agency listening facilities, and Yemeni government and tribal officials on the CIA payroll, there should have been some early warning of AQAP’s increasing strength, as well as a platform for in-country policies to prevent and mitigate AQAP’s reach.

Given the marked increase in AQAP’s size, scope, and influence, the steady accretion of U.S. intelligence collection and strike capabilities have failed to reduce the threat of terrorist plots from Yemen. The current eliminationist, uncompromising counterterrorism mission in Yemen is not delivering results, but it is unlikely that the Obama administration, in alliance with the Hadi regime, will change course anytime soon. In the words of President Hadi, the “hunting of terrorists is irreversible.”

Nick Paumgarten, “The World of Surveillance,” The New Yorker, May 14, 2012.

Patrick Egan, president of the Silicon Valley chapter of the Association for Unmanned Systems International: “The first time a drone Tases the wrong dude at a Phish concert, you’re going to have problems.”

(3PA: This is a breezy and industry-friendly look at the increase of domestic drones.)

Jay Solomon, “Mideast Nuclear Meeting in Doubt,” Wall Street Journal, May 10, 2012.

Plans for a United Nations-backed conference aimed at ridding the Middle East of nuclear weapons are unraveling because of political upheaval in the region and diplomatic sparring over suspected nuclear-weapons programs in Iran and Israel, said officials involved in the event’s preparations.

The conference, tentatively set for December in Helsinki, would mark the first meeting of Mideast states solely focused on establishing a nuclear-weapons-free zone in the region.

(3PA: In 2010, all 189 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) signatories agreed to hold this conference by the end of 2012. India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan are not signatories to the NPT.)

Anshel Pfeffer, “Israel’s New Submarines Geared at Tackling Rising MidEast Threats from the Sea,” Haaretz, May 10, 2012.

(3PA: Along with the test of Israel’s Jericho III ballistic missile, which is believed to be nuclear capable and have a range of 3-4,000 miles (reaching all of Iran), these new submarines further expand Israel’s nuclear weapons capability.)

Jim Michaels, “U.S. Military Snipers Are Changing Warfare,” USA Today, May 9, 2012.

Snipers have quietly emerged as one of the most effective but least understood weapons in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Advancements in technology and training have made them deadlier than in any previous generation. Their ability to deliver accurate shots minimizes collateral damage—a key factor in counterinsurgency—and they are often more effective than much ballyhooed drones at secretly collecting intelligence.

Julian E. Barnes and Adam Entous, “U.S. Seeks Faster Deployment,” Wall Street Journal, May 7, 2012.

U.S. military leaders have developed new proposals to speed the deployment of elite American special-operations forces to a growing number of the world’s trouble spots, advancing the Obama administration’s emerging approach to armed involvement abroad.

Under the new military plan, U.S. special-operations forces would be deployed either as strike groups or trainers for local armed forces. The proposal fits with a new Pentagon military strategy put in place by President Barack Obama in January that advocates greater use of special-operations forces.

In addition to their flexibility, special units are attractive because they cost less than conventional forces and carry fewer risks of long-term entanglements. The new military strategy also emphasizes other small-force approaches to global conflicts, including unmanned aircraft and partnerships with host countries.

Secretary Panetta Interview with Judy Woodruff at the Pentagon, May 3, 2012.

MS. WOODRUFF:  Pakistan.  It was acknowledged this week that the drone strikes have been underway for some time against targets in Pakistan.  Are those going to continue no matter what the government of Pakistan desires and wants in that regard?

SEC. PANETTA:  Well, you know, without referring to those specific operations because they still remain covert operations –

MS. WOODRUFF:  But they were acknowledged.  John Brennan.

SEC. PANETTA:  There was some acknowledgement of the fact that, you know, that they’re used but the basic operations remain sensitive and they remain classified.  But let me just say this.  We were attacked.  The United States was attacked on 9/11.  And we know who attacked us, we know that al-Qaida was behind it, and we are going to do everything we can, use whatever operations we have to, in order to make sure that we protect this country and make sure that that kind of attack never happens again.

MS. WOODRUFF:  It sounds like you’re saying they’ll continue.

SEC. PANETTA:  The United States is going to defend itself under any circumstances.

Transcript of “Hard Measures: Ex-CIA Head Defends Post-9/11 Tactics,” CBS News 60 Minutes, April 29, 2012.

Lesley Stahl: Did the psychologist, did he tell you how long it was going to take, if you use these techniques, to break Abu Zubaydah and anybody else that you might capture?

Jose Rodriguez [Director of the CIA Counter Terrorism Center]: You know, he had speculated that within 30 days we would probably be able to get the information that we wanted, yes.

But before moving forward, Jose Rodriguez got his superiors, right up to the president – to sign off on a set of those techniques, including waterboarding.

Jose Rodriguez: We needed to get everybody in government to put their big boy pants on and provide the authorities that we needed.

Lesley Stahl: Their big boy pants on–

Jose Rodriguez: Big boy pants. Let me tell you, I had had a lot of experience in the agency where we had been left to hold the bag. And I was not about to let that happen for the people that work for me.

Lesley Stahl: There wasn’t gonna be any deniability on this one?

Jose Rodriguez: There was not gonna be any deniability. And I tell you something. In August of 2002, I felt I had all the authorities that I needed, all the approvals that I needed. The atmosphere in the country was different. Everybody wanted us to save American lives.

The authorities came from the Justice Department in an opinion, later dubbed one of “the torture memos” – that detailed what was permissible.

(3PA: On Saturday, after Rodriguez’s “big boy pants” line was used in 60 Minutes commercials, five suspects in the 9/11 terrorist plot were arraigned at a military tribunal in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  At one point during the hearing, as Air Force Captain Michael Schwartz—an attorney for Walid Bin Attash—explained why his client refused to wear headphones for court translations, military officials censored Schwartz’s comments with a white-noise button that lasted forty seconds. Four days later, the Pentagon released the portion of Capt. Schwartz’s blocked comments: “The reason for that is the torture that my client was subjected to by the men and women wearing the big-boy pants down at the CIA, it makes it impossible…”)

Naci H. Mocan, Colin Cannonier, “Empowering Women Through Education: Evidence from Sierra Leone,” The National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2012.

In this section we investigate the extent to which the increase in educational attainment due to the FPE program has impacted men’s attitudes regarding women’s well–being. Table 6 displays the descriptive statistics for men. A comparison between men and women reveals an interesting and surprising picture. For example, while 56 percent of women indicated that a wife would be justified in refusing sex when she is tired (see Table 1), 68 percent of men believe that such a refusal is justified. Similarly, the proportion who thinks that a wife is justified in refusing sex if the husband has an STD is higher among men than women. Along the same lines, the proportion of men who think that wife beating is justified is lower than the proportion of women who think the same (0.23 vs. 0.36), and the proportion of individuals who think that female genital mutilation should be discontinued is higher among men than women (0.38 vs. 0.30). These are surprising findings because one would expect that the rate of support for the statements in favor of women’s well-being would be higher among women. (pg. 20-21)

We find that an increase in education changes women’s preferences. Specifically, an additional year of schooling makes women more likely to declare that a wife is justified in refusing sex when she is tired or when the husband has a sexually transmitted disease. The same increase in schooling makes women more likely to disagree with the statement that wife beating is justified and more likely to declare that the practice of female genital mutilation should be stopped. These results indicate that education empowers women because an increase in education makes women more intolerant of practices that conflict with their well-being. An increase in education also reduces the number of desired children and increases the propensity to use modern contraception and to be tested for AIDS. (pg. 23-24)

As I’ve written previously, policymakers and pundits have some pretty silly proposals for the use of military force. Whether it’s President Clinton,“[It would] scare the shit out of al Qaeda if suddenly a bunch of black ninjas rappelled out of helicopters into the middle of their camp,” or uberconservative Pat Robertson, “We really ought to go ahead and [assassinate Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez]…It’s a whole lot cheaper than starting a war,” such harebrained schemes lack a basic understanding of military strategy, geography, and logistics, not to mention international law.

There is a political purpose driving every aspect of military force. According to Prussian general and strategist Carl von Clausewitz in his oft-quoted dictum, “War is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means.” Whether you are a policymaker, pundit, think tanker, or the Wall Street Journal editorial page, it is essential to clearly define your political objectives before dropping bombs or embarking on open-ended nation-building campaigns.

In the 1950s and 1960s, economist Thomas Schelling put forth a game theory approach that expanded and popularized the archetypal labels for the political goals behind military power. Schelling envisioned the threat or use of force as part of an ongoing bargaining relationship between two adversaries “in which communication is incomplete, or impossible.” Schelling believed that, in order to influence an adversary’s behavior, “violence is most purposive and most successful when it is threatened and not used.”

Deterrence and compellence, popularly referred to as coercive diplomacy, are the two political purposes of force developed by Schelling that are most relevant for current discussions about, say, threatening to bomb Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons facilities or attacking Syrian armed forces. Even Secretary of State Hilary Clinton is a fan: “I believe in coercive diplomacy. I think that you try to figure out how to move bad actors in a direction that you prefer in order to avoid more dire consequences.”

Deterrence is the strategy of persuading a state to refrain from taking a certain action by threatening something of value. Successfully employed, deterrence convinces a state that the costs of change outweigh the costs of enduring the status quo.

Deterrence fails when an adversary does what it was warned not to do. For example, in October 2006, President Bush told North Korea, “The transfer of nuclear weapons or material by North Korea to states or non-state entities would be considered a grave threat to the United States, and we would hold North Korea fully accountable.” Despite U.S. warnings, North Korea clandestinely transferred engineering and design know-how to Syria for what the IAEA called “very likely a nuclear reactor.” Bush’s threat failed to stop North Korea’s nuclear transfer, thus, deterrence failed.

Compellence, or coercive diplomacy, is a three-pronged strategy. First, a specific demand is made to an adversary. Second, a specific deadline or sense of urgency to comply is communicated. Third, a credible threat of military punishment is issued. Compellence fails when the threat’s target refuses to comply, or when the only means of acquiescence is through overwhelming military power.

With that in mind, the next time you hear about a policymaker proposing to bomb someone or something, consider whether the political purpose is deterrence, compellence, or simply destruction. To get you started, I’ve put together a list of recommended readings. (For my earlier primer on air power, click here.)

General

Daniel Ellsberg, “The Theory and Practice of Blackmail,” Lecture at Lowell Institute, March 10, 1959.

Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1960).

Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1966).

Robert J. Art, “To What Ends Military Power?” International Security 4(4) 1980: pp. 3–35.

Ward Thomas, The Ethics of Destruction: Norms and Force in International Relations (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).

Daniel Byman and Matthew Waxman, The Dynamics of Coercion: American Foreign Policy and the Limits of Military Might (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

James David Meernik, The Political Use of Military Force in U.S. Foreign Policy (Aldershot, UK: Asghate Publishing, 2004).

Martha Finnemore, The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004).

General Rupert Smith, The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World (New York, NY Alfred A. Knopf/ Random House, Inc. 2005).

Risa Brooks, Shaping Strategy: The Civil-Military Politics of Strategic Assessment (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008).

Robert J. Art and Kenneth Waltz (eds.), The Use of Force: Military Power and International Politics (Rowman + Littlefield, 2009).

Richard K. Betts, American Force: Dangers, Delusions, and Dilemmas in National Security (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2011).

Compellence/Coercive Diplomacy

Alexander L. George, David K. Hall, and William R. Simons, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy: Laos, Cuba, Vietnam (Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Company, 1971).

James T. Tedeschi et al., “A Paradigm for the Study of Coercive Power,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 15, No. 2 (June, 1971).

Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (Washington, D.C. The Brookings Institution, 1978).

Richard K. Betts, Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1987).

Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, D.C. United States Institute of Peace Press, 1991).

Kenneth Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

Robert J. Art, “Coercive Diplomacy—What Do We Know?” The United States and Coercive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2003), pp. 359-420.

Todd S. Sechser, Winning Without a Fight: Power, Reputation and Compellent Threats in International Crises (Stanford University, 2007).

Kyle Beardsley and Victor Asal, “Winning With the Bomb,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53(2) 2009: pp. 278–301.

Deterrence

Thomas W. Milburn, “What Constitutes Effective Deterrence?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 3, No. 2, (June, 1959).

Richard A. Brody, “Deterrence Strategies: An Annotated Bibliography,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 4, No.4, (December, 1960) .

Glenn H. Snyder, “Deterrence and Power,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 4, No. 2 (June, 1960).

“Force, Order and Justice,” Report of panel discussion at International Studies Association annual meeting, Kenneth Waltz, chair, April 1967, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 11, No. 3 (September, 1968).

R. Harrison Wagner, “Deterrence and Bargaining,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 36, No. 2 (June 1982).

John J. Mearshimer, Conventional Deterrence (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983).

Paul Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press 1988).

Barry Nalebuff, “Rational Deterrence in an Imperfect World” World Politics 43(3) 1991: pp. 313–335.

Patrick Morgan, Deterrence Now (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

Gary Schaub, “Deterrence, Compellence, and Prospect Theory,” Political Psychology 25(3) 2004: pp. 389–411.

Amir Lupovici, “The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory—Toward a New Research Agenda,” International Studies Quarterly, 54 (3) 2010, pp. 705-732.

What did we miss? Post a comment with your suggestions for our next reading list.