NAVAL DRONES

CATCH OF THE DAY: REFLECTIONS ON THE CHINESE SEIZURE OF A U.S. OCEAN GLIDER

2016-12-18T11:05:00.000-08:00

By Heiko Borchert

On 15 December 2016, China seized an Ocean Glider, an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV), used by the U.S. Navy to conduct oceanographic tasks in international waters about 50-100 nautical miles northwest of the Subic Bay port on the Philippines. Available information suggests that the glider had been deployed from USNS Bowditch and was captured by Chinese sailors that came alongside the glider and grabbed it “despite the radioed protest from the Bowditch that it was U.S. property in international waters,” as the Guardian reported. The U.S. has “called upon China to return the UUV immediately.” On 17 December 2016 a spokesman of the Chinese Defense Ministry said China would return the UUV to the “United States in an appropriate manner.”

Initial legal assessments by U.S. scholars like James Kraska and Paul Pedrozo suggest the capture is violating the law of the sea, as the unmanned glider can be defined as a vessel in international maritime law that enjoys U.S. sovereign immunity. China, by contrast, justifies the capture with reference to its national security. According to Senior Colonel Zhao Xiaozhuo of the PLA Academy of Military Science, the glider “could have threatened the interests of China’s islands, or China’s ships and submarines. It must have damaged Chinese interest that caused the seizure.”

As this incident evolves and more information will become available, it might be useful to start thinking about some of the more long-term consequences of this UUV seizure. Building on a previous analysis of the impact on UUV in the Asia-Pacific region, I would like to suggest three observations for further consideration:

Unmanned Assets are Attractive Targets that Challenge Strategic Communication

This is not the first time an unmanned asset has been captured. Defense News reported that “an ‘unknown vessel’ grabbed another underwater vehicle operated by a U.S. ship near Vietnamese waters, but the vehicle was recovered.” In 2011, Iran seemed to have downed a RQ-170 Sentinel unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) by jamming its radar system in order to force the UAV to land in an area it was not supposed to land.

In line with these incidents, the most recent UUV capture reinforces the message that unmanned assets that have been designed with benign operating environments in mind and are attractive targets that can be easily captured or attacked. This is a prime challenge for strategic communications.

Seizing a U.S. UUV during the transition phase of the U.S. administration is a first rate headline grabbing media event, which might explain why it occurred now. It illustrates, as a Chinese scholar quoted by the South China Morning Post said, “the power of the Chinese army.” However, a UUV that hovers at the surface can be more or less easily captured. This time no one shot a picture of the “catch”, but this could be different next time. This might prompt a rethink of the media-related cost-benefit analysis of deploying UUVs in hotspots, which leads to the second thought.

Ready to Catch and Ready to Lose?

Testing the U.S. response certainly was a motive in the UUV capture. As Michael S. Chase et. al. have shown, China closely follows the U.S. use of unmanned assets also in view of justifying its own action and developing its own policies and concepts. The incident underlined China’s growing self-confidence and readiness to seize UUVs. But what about the U.S.?

At first sight, the U.S. response was measured and adequate by prompting China to return the captured asset to comply with international law. ‘We play by the rules, you don’t’ – this was the U.S. message. Apart from the question, if you can deter someone who just broke the rule by reminding him not to do so, there is a more trenchant issue at play.

Unmanned systems are attractive because they are easy pickings, but the emphasis on the need to return the U.S. UUV could undermine this very key advantage. In this case the UUV is treated like a manned asset because the overall message is about norm compliance. However, if you want the other side to hand back a relatively low-cost glider, can you credibly convey the message you would be ready to lose a much more sophisticated Large Displacement UUV?

This is the policy question the new U.S. administration and other governments using unmanned assets will need to work on, because a similar incident could occur in the Arabian Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, or the Baltic Sea.

Catch Me If You Can: Thinking About More Nuanced Counter-Responses

Emerging powers have had enough time to study the use of unmanned assets in particular by the U.S. Their first line of defense focused around mimicking U.S. practice in order to catch up. The second line of defense evolves around counter-measures. The seizure of the U.S. glider clearly signals that UUVs need to be prepared to fend off counter-measures as well. Thus more nuanced responses will be needed.

First, more thought needs to be given to when and where to deploy UUV in a non-benign naval environment. The current incident clearly shows that the tactical and strategic benefits of UUVs can quickly turn into a strategic liability if other actors are not willing to back down on their own policy line. Second, this incident should accelerate the development of swarms of Extra Small UUV (XSUUV) that would be radically smaller than current gliders and more difficult to track and trace.

Third, the XSUUV swarm could also help deconflict the policy dilemma. XSUUVs would hardly qualify as vessels enjoying sovereign immunity. Other forms of countering XSUUV notwithstanding, the risk of losing them would be much lower, which could make it far less attractive to catch them.

Fourth, self-protection will become more important in particular for more sophisticated UUVs that execute different missions at the same time. However, solutions should keep the above policy dilemma in mind: if measures to protect the UUV from adversarial interference become too demanding and thus might outstrip the benefits of using UUV, something is probably wrong about the operational concept guiding the respective UUV use.

Dr Heiko Borchert runs Borchert Consulting & Research AG, a strategic affairs consultancy.

Reprinted with permission from the Center for International Maritime Security.

CHINA SEIZES U.S. NAVY UNDERWATER DRONE

2016-12-17T14:12:00.004-08:00

On December 15th 2016, the Chinese Navy seized an American unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) operating in international waters off the Western coast of the Philippines. The USNS Bowditch, an unarmed T-AGS class hydro-graphic survey ship, was being shadowed by a People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) salvage vessel identified as a Dalang-III class (ASR-510).

Graphic by: CIMSEC Member Louis MV

The UUV had surfaced as part of a pre-programmed instruction, and sent a radio signal marking it’s position for pick-up. As the Bowditch was preparing to recover the drone from the water, a small boat crew from the Dalang III raced in and plucked the unmanned vessel. The incident occurred approximately 50 nautical miles northwest of Subic, Luzon.

While the exact type of drone is unknown, there have been several instances of U.S. Navy Slocum Gliders snagged in local fishermens’ nets or washed ashore on beaches in the Philippines. This type of drone is not weaponized, and is used to collect a variety of environmental readings such as water temperature and salinity, to improve forecasting accuracy of extreme weather such as typhoons. The UUV uses wave movement to propel itself without any on-board engines, with an endurance time of months. The Department of Defense estimates the seized drone’s value to be around $150,000.

The crew of the Bowditch immediately contacted the PLAN vessel on bridge-to-bridge radio asking for the return of the drone. The PLAN vessel reportedly acknowledged the message, but then stopped responding and sailed away with the UUV. On Friday the 16th, the U.S. State Department issued a formal protest, or demarche, with the Chinese Department of Foreign Affairs, demanding an immediate return of the drone. At the time of this article’s publication, the Chinese government has not responded.

Purpose

Motivations behind the seizure are unclear, but tensions between the two nations have recently increased over President-Elect Donald Trump’s conversation with Taiwan President Tsai Ing-wen in what Beijing considers a blatant disregard of the standing One-China Policy. It could also have been a quick riposte to undermine Head of Pacific Command U.S. Navy Admiral Harry Harris’ recent comments that the US is “ready to confront [China] when we must.”

Notably, the Philippines has chosen to remain silent over the incident. While traditionally a U.S. ally, the election of President Rodrigo Duterte has brought a deterioration of relations between Manila and Washington. Thanks in no small part to Duterte’s bloody prosecution of an Anti-Drug war punctuated by high civilian casualties and accusations of extra-judicial killings, a large multi-million dollar U.S aid package was just withdrawn this week – prompting the volatile President to threaten abrogation of the Visiting Forces Agreement. The Philippine Department of National Defense indicates they had no idea that the incident was ongoing; highlighting the enormous capability gap the Philippines has regarding Maritime Domain Awareness. The Philippine government became aware via communications from the U.S. State Department to their embassy in Washington D.C.

Coupled with Duterte’s increasingly close orbit of China following last month’s visit to Beijing, the United States could potentially find itself without bases that would ease the mission of maintaining a robust presence in the South China Sea. Recent analysis shows China has expanded militarization of their Spratly Island outposts by placing what appear to be defensive anti-aircraft and close-in weapon systems on Hughes and Gaven reefs, while fortifications have sprouted on Fiery Cross, Mischief and Subi reefs; the latter group are in close proximity to other claimant outposts in the region.

Taken together, China appears to be using it’s famous “Salami-slicing” techniques to slowly ratchet up its presence and capabilities within the region without crossing any significant “bright lines” leading to a military confrontation. The UUV seizure is consistent with opportunistic interference of U. .Navy operations while striking propoganda points with regional states. Notably, the unresponsiveness of Philippines to an international incident within their EEZ tells a tale that the U.S. cannot count upon its traditional ally going forward to assist in the presence mission.

Armando J. Heredia is a civilian observer of naval affairs. He is an IT Risk and Information Security practitioner, with a background in the defense and financial services industries. The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author, and do not necessarily represent the views of, and should not be attributed to, any particular nation’s government or related agency.

Published with permission from the Center for International Maritime Security

Unmanned-Centric Force Structure

2016-10-04T20:18:00.000-07:00

By Javier Gonzalez

The U.S. Navy is currently working on a new Fleet Structure Assessment, the results of which will eventually help inform the long-term force structure goals of the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan. This ongoing analysis was generated due to the realization that some of the assumptions used to develop the current goal of 308 ships have changed significantly since its proposal in 2014. The Russian resurgence and China’s rapid military buildup defied expectations, and a review of the Navy’s force structure was absolutely warranted. The conundrum and implied assumption, with this or similar future force structure analyses, is that the Navy must have at least a vague understanding of an uncertain future. However, there is a better way to build a superior and more capable fleet—by continuing to build manned ships based on current and available capabilities while also fully embracing optionality (aka flexibility and adaptability) in unmanned systems. Additionally, and perhaps the better argument is that a new, unmanned-centric fleet can be more affordable while maintaining its relevance over the expected service life.

Optionality

A relevant fleet is one that is robust, flexible, and adaptable—one that embraces optionality to anticipate uncertain and changing requirements. The author Nassim Taleb describes optionality as “the property of asymmetric upside with correspondingly limited downside.” The implication here is to clearly identify which options will provide the best ability to achieve this “asymmetric upside.” Systems such as the vertical launch system provide a certain degree of flexibility by allowing for the rapid fielding of any weapons that fit inside a missile. In addition, the concepts of modularity (Littoral Combat Ship program), modular hulls, containers interfaces, flexible infrastructures, and electronic modular enclosures are other examples of the Navy’s explicit efforts to add flexibility and adaptability into the Fleet. The upsides of adding flexibility are self-evident—by having options added early in the design process, the Navy can quickly and affordably react to new geo-political situations and adjust to technological innovations. However, adding optionality is not an easy proposition, especially because today’s capabilities fielding process values optimization, affordability, and a discernible return on investment over adaptability and flexibility.

Optimization is contrary to optionality, but it is a main factor in today’s ship design. For instance, space optimization is intuitive—the better optimized a space, given today’s capabilities, the smaller the ship needs to be and, consequently, the more affordable it should be. However, this approach infers a level of certainty and inflexibility to change, contrary to optionality. The reality is that optimization is at times necessary on a manned warship. However, new unmanned system designs can provide a canvas to shift this focus to one that values optionality and takes advantage of uncertainty. The suggestion is to make the long-term investment on the unmanned “bus,” not the capabilities. These new unmanned buses must be designed to maximize power generation, cooling, and space availability. The design also needs a robust command and control system to enable the employment of multiple unmanned systems in a cooperative environment.

Affordable Fleet

The affordability of the fleet is not simply a function of budget availability. In 2014, the Chief of Naval Operations, Adm. Jonathan Greenert, testified to Congress that the Navy needed a 450 ship Navy to meet the global demands by the Combatant Commanders. This 450 ship number is likely better equipped to meet future Combatant Commanders’ needs than the current proposal of a 308 ship Navy. At a minimum, a 450 ship Navy provides more options to fulfill future requirements. However, the current and expected future fiscal environment suggests that building more ships is not an option unless a radical change occurs. Also, the enemy has a crucial vote on the affordability of the fleet. The fall of the USSR can be traced back to the U.S. strategy, in the 1970s and 1980s, to impose great costs on the Soviets by making investments to render their war-fighting systems obsolete. This seemed obsolescence created an incentive for the Soviets to make costly investments in an attempt to match the technology introductions by the United States. This strategy’s success was achieved in great part due to the U.S. apparent technological advantage over the Soviets. Today, the United States finds itself in a similar predicament as the Soviets in the Cold War, where technology is leaping in new and unexpected ways and China, in particular, is fielding systems that make many U.S. systems obsolete. The rapid fielding of “game changing” technology by China, such as the first quantum communications satellite or the DF-21D missile, results in a predictable reaction by the DoD to invest in more capable and expensive advancements to counter their efforts. If the Soviets are any indication of the dangers of this strategy, especially if the United States acknowledges that the technological edge over near competitors in the 20th century will no longer be assured, then the United States needs to shift its competitive model to one flexible enough to rapidly and affordably adjust to unforeseen challenges.

Sea Hunter, an entirely new class of unmanned ocean-going vessel gets underway on the Willamette River following a christening ceremony in Portland, Oregon. (U.S. Navy photo by John F. Williams/Released)

Additionally, long-term shipbuilding is inherently expensive and dependent on current and mature capabilities. Trying to build a ship with immature technologies can result in unacceptable acquisition blunders. For instance, the Navy’s next-generation nuclear carrier, Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78), has resulted in massive cost overruns due in great part to the risk incurred in trying to include new and immature technologies into the shipbuilding plan. An unmanned-centric fleet provides the flexibility to value building manned ships based on current and available capabilities while also fully embracing optionality in unmanned systems. An added benefit of having optionality combined with unmanned systems is that it allows for prospective capabilities to be more rapidly prototyped while offering a robust means for experimentation both for technology and future concept of operations development. Unmanned systems could function similarly to a smartphone and its many applications. The benefit of this approach is that it provides an environment with stressors that will allow new technology to fail early and facilitate rapid change, evolution, and dramatically quicken the research and capabilities fielding cycles. The next Fleet Structure Assessment should also embrace optionality by finding the optimal mix of manned and unmanned vessels that will yield an asymmetric upside.

Unmanned-Centric

An unmanned-centric force structure will be dramatically different than today’s Navy, and it will require a departure from the 450 ship manned Navy ideal or the current 308 ship goal. The right mix of manned versus unmanned systems can be derived from a concept of operations that promotes judicious force structure discussions. The basis of this new concept is a fleet with more unmanned systems than manned systems where these platforms are fully integrated. For instance, instead of having a Surface Action Group (SAG) comprised of three manned ships, new SAGs could be comprised of a manned ship and at least two unmanned surface vehicles. Incorporating vehicles like DARPA’s ASW Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel or General Dynamics’ Fleet-class unmanned surface vessel could add capabilities that will immediately increase lethality and adaptability. In the amphibious realm, the Navy could leverage unmanned platforms as resupply distribution systems for Marines on the beach. This could be of particular importance in a contested environment while supporting multiple fronts in an archipelago-like scenario. Further in the future, instead of having eleven 100,000-ton aircraft carriers, a mix of eight traditional carriers with eight to ten smaller (~40,000 ton) all-unmanned combat air vehicle carriers will provide the flexibility and presence that all Combatant Commanders are desperately seeking.

Presence is about having the right capability, in the right place, at the right time. To accomplish this the Navy will essentially need more assets. A plausible solution could be a force structure where the main employment of unmanned systems will be around unmanned-centric Surface Action Groups as the smallest force package to fulfill theater needs. The current 308 ship Navy plan is structured as follows:

CVN	LSC	SSC	SSN	SSGN	SSBN	AWS	CLF	SUPT	TOTAL
11	88	52	48	0	12	34	29	34	308

CVN – Carrier, LSC – Large Surface Combatants, SSC – Small Surface Combatants, SSN – Fast attack submarines, SSBN – Ballistics Submarines, AWS – Amphibious Warfare Ships, CLF – Combat Logistic Force, Supt – Support vessels.

A future force structure could start with trading large and small surface combatants for a new fleet of Unmanned Vessels. The affordability comes from the added presence afforded by the nature of an unmanned autonomous system and the need for fewer personnel to support their operations. The added capability comes from the introduction of 19 capable Surface Action Groups comprised of a manned ship with two unmanned vessels as depicted below and further explained in table I:

CVN	LSC	SSC	USV	SSN	SSBN	AWS	CLF	SUPT	TOTAL
11	84	50	38	48	12	34	29	34	340

CVN – Carrier, LSC – Large Surface Combatants, SSC – Small Surface Combatants, USV – Unmanned Surface Vessel, SSN – Fast attack submarines, SSBN – Ballistics Submarines, AWS – Amphibious Warfare Ships, CLF – Combat Logistic Force, Supt – Support vessels.

– Rule of thumb used: 3 ships at home for every one deployed (for repairs, maintenance, training, and other requirements).

-Out of the 140 surface combatants (large and small) proposed in current 308 ship plan, 35 could be deployed at any time (based on rule of thumb). Assuming 4 carriers deployed with an escort composition of three manned surface combatants per deployed carrier – the Navy could have 23 manned surface combatants available for tasking.

-Based on GAO yearly operational costs of a DDG ($70k per day) and assumed cost of DARPA’s ACTUV ($15-20k per day) then one DDG is equivalent to 12 USVs (no personnel = affordability). Force structure was determined by trading 4 DDGs to provide 38 USVs. Four less DDGs = 19 very capable Surface Action Groups (a manned ship and two unmanned vessels).

Conclusion

The most important attributes for future force structures are relevance and affordability. This goal can be achieved by pivoting from the traditional to place the emphasis on developing unmanned capable buses that can accommodate all current technologies and have the capacity to flex and adapt to future technologies. Optionality to ship-building and unmanned systems integration can provide the flexibility and adaptability the Navy requires to remain relevant in an uncertain future. The result is a force structure that is more capable and conceptually more affordable. All great plans start with the end in mind – the upcoming Fleet Structure Assessment needs to showcase what the end of the Navy’s 30-year vision looks like. The suggestion is an unmanned-centric, man-led fleet.

Commander Javier Gonzalez is a Navy Federal Executive Fellow at the John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory and a career Surface Warfare Officer. These are his personal views and do not reflect those of John Hopkins University or the Department of the Navy.

Featured Image: An artist’s concept of ACTUV (DARPA)

Reprinted with permission from the Center for International Maritime Security.

After Distributed Lethality - Unmanned Netted Lethality

2016-09-07T04:51:00.000-07:00

By Javier Gonzalez

Distributed lethality was introduced to the fleet in January 2015 as a response to the development of very capable anti-access area-denial (A2/AD) weapons and sensors specifically designed to deny access to a contested area. The main goal is to complicate the environment for our adversaries by increasing surface-force lethality—particularly with our offensive weapons—and transform the concept of operations for surface action groups (SAGs), thus shifting the enemy’s focus from capital ships to every ship in the fleet. Rear Admiral Fanta said it best: “If it floats, it fights.” The real challenge is to accomplish this with no major funding increase, no increase in the number of ships, and no major technology introductions. The Navy has successfully implemented this concept by repurposing existing technology and actively pursuing long-range anti-ship weapons for every platform. An illustrative example of the results of these efforts is the current initiative to once again repurpose Tomahawk missiles, currently used for land strikes, as anti-ship missiles. The next step in the evolution of distributed lethality will be to deploy similar force packages and introduce new technology. The introduction of Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) technology is the kind of technological advancement that enhances distributed lethality. NIFC-CA combines multiple kill chains into a single kill web agnostic of sensors or platforms. In the near future, hunter-killer SAGs will deploy with these very capable networks and bring powerful and credible capability into the A2/AD environment.

The first hunter-killer SAG deployed earlier this year. It was comprised of three destroyers and a command element. This recent SAG mirrors the World War II “wolf pack” concept—not just a disaggregated group of destroyers in theater under a different fleet commander, but a group of ships sailing together with an embarked command element. The embarked command element is key because, coupled with the concept of “mission command,” it allows the hunter-killer SAG the autonomy required to fully realize effects in a command and control denied environment.

While there is no argument that distributed lethality is a sound short-term strategy, the enemy has a vote and will adjust. The real challenge for the Navy then is to continue finding ways to innovate and rapidly incorporate new technologies such as unmanned systems to ensure that distributed lethality does not yield to distributed attrition. The best way to prevent distributed attrition is to fully integrate unmanned technologies into the fleet to ultimately transform distributed lethality into a new concept, hereby referred to as Unmanned Netted Lethality.

Evolving Distributed Lethality

In the near future, a hunter-killer SAG will bring a more powerful and lethal force package into the fight with the partial integration of unmanned systems. A near-future force package could include a NIFC-CA capable DDG with an MH-60R detachment, littoral combat ships with scan eagle unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and an anti-submarine warfare continuous trail unmanned vessel (ACTUV)- DARPA’s latest unmanned vessel built with a sensor package optimized to track submarines. These new capabilities bring unprecedented flexibility to warfighters, and commanders in theater will have additional options to tailor adaptive force packages based on the perceived threat or mission.

The next step in the evolution of distributed lethality will be to add more advanced weapons to every ship—from energy weapons to the rail gun—and fully incorporate unmanned systems into future force packages. The ultimate vision is hunter-killer SAGs comprised of unmanned underwater vehicles, unmanned surface vehicles, and UAVs under the command of a single manned ship. These unmanned platforms will create a massive constellation of sensors and weapons that will transform every ship in the Navy into a lethal, flexible, and fully distributed force to reckon with—the Unmanned Netted Lethality concept.

It is evident that the Unmanned Netted Lethality concept relies on the aggressive development and integration of unmanned, and eventually fully autonomous, systems into the fleet.. Controlled autonomy is fundamental for the Unmanned Netted Lethality concept to be effective. While autonomy brings many benefits, there are concerns as well—unintended loss of control, compromise by adversaries, accountability, liability, and trust, to name a few. The solution to mitigate these concerns is to manage the level of autonomy with a manned ship as an extension of the commanding officer’s combat system. Employing various levels of autonomy control, from completely manual to completely autonomous, gives the power to the decision makers to set the level of autonomy based on the prevailing circumstance and allows unmanned system utilization in any environment.

SOUTH CHINA SEA (Feb. 19, 2015) – Sailors assigned to Helicopter Maritime Strike Squadron (HSM) 35, Detachment 2, prepare an MQ-8B Fire Scout unmanned autonomous helicopter for flight operations aboard the littoral combat ship USS Fort Worth (LCS 3). (U.S. Navy photo by Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Conor Minto)

The mission will drive the level of autonomy. For instance, 20 years from now, during the first Unmanned Netted Lethality hunter-killer SAG deployment and while transiting in safe waters, the command ship will control the operations of an unmanned vessel until it is in restricted waters. Then, the commanding officer will change the level of autonomy into a cooperative mode in which the unmanned systems quickly create a constellation of passive and active sensors to increase overall maritime awareness. Once a crisis transitions into combat operations, the commanding officer will place the unmanned systems into a fully autonomous status with two primary missions: sense and destroy enemy forces while protecting the manned ship by creating a lethal cluster around it. This layered approach to autonomy increases overall trust in unmanned systems in a responsible and palatable way for decision makers who are unquestionably accountable for the performance of these unmanned systems.

Cooperative independence is also an important feature, in which unmanned systems will perform complex tasks, both individually and in groups under the supervision of a commanding officer. Not one unmanned system should rely on another; if a system is destroyed or is taken off-line, each system should be able to continue with the mission independently but cooperatively with remaining systems.

Without a doubt and due in great part to the proliferation of unmanned systems, interoperability remains the hardest challenge to overcome. The bottom line is that these systems need to be developed with common and open software architecture to minimize interoperability challenges and maximize employment opportunities. The need to convey these requirements early in the acquisition process is fundamental so that new unmanned systems are designed with three primary characteristics: controlled autonomy, cooperative but independent functionality, and complete interoperability.

A Roadmap to Guide Change

Distributed lethality’s initial charter was to increase performance with no technology leaps, significant funding increase, or number of ship increases while having immediate to near-future effects. In the short term, this goal is achievable. However, in the near to long-term future, the Navy should continue to follow former General Electric’s CEO Jack Welch’s advice “Change before you have to.” The Unmanned Netted Lethality concept provides the Navy with a vision and a roadmap to guide the evolution of distributed lethality into the future. Incorporating unmanned systems into an Unmanned Netted Lethality concept will transform every manned ship in the Navy into a force package with a credible conflict changing capability.

Commander Javier Gonzalez is a Navy Federal Executive Fellow at the John Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory and a career Surface Warfare Officer. These are his personal views and do not reflect those of John Hopkins University or the Department of the Navy.

Reprinted with permission from the Center for International Maritime Security.

Unmanned Systems: A New Era for the U.S. Navy?

2016-07-18T04:42:00.001-07:00

By Marjorie Greene

The U.S. Navy’s Unmanned Systems Directorate, or N99, was formally stood up this past September with the focused mission of quickly assessing emerging technologies and applying them to unmanned platforms. The Director of Unmanned Warfare Systems is Rear Adm. Robert Girrier, who was recently interviewed by Scout Warrior, and outlined a new, evolving Navy Drone Strategy.

The idea is to capitalize upon the accelerating speed of computer processing and rapid improvements in the development of autonomy-increasing algorithms; this will allow unmanned systems to quickly operate with an improved level of autonomy, function together as part of an integrated network, and more quickly perform a wider range of functions without needing every individual task controlled by humans. “We aim to harness these technologies. In the next five years or so we are going to try to move from human operated systems to ones that are less dependent on people. Technology is going to enable increased autonomy,” Admiral Girrier told Scout Warrior.

Forward, into Autonomy

Although aerial drones have taken off a lot faster than their maritime and ground-based equivalent, there are some signs that the use of naval drones – especially underwater – is about to take a leap forward. As recently as February this year, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced that the Pentagon plans to spend $600 million over the next five years on the development of unmanned underwater systems. DARPA (the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) recently announced that the Navy’s newest risk taker is an “unmanned ship that can cross the Pacific.”

DARPA’s initial launch and testing of Sea Hunter. (Video: DARPA via YouTube)

Called the Sea Hunter, the vessel is a demonstrator version of an unmanned ship that will run autonomously for 60 – 80 days at a time. Known officially as the Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV), the program started in 2010, when the defense innovations lab decided to look at what could be done with a large unmanned surface vessel and came up with submarine tracking and trailing. “It is really a mixture of manned-unmanned fleet,” said program manager Scott Littlefield. The big challenge was not related to programming the ship for missions. Rather, it was more basic – making an automated vessel at sea capable of driving safely. DARPA had to be certain the ship would not only avoid a collision on the open seas, but obey protocol for doing so.

As further evidence of the Navy’s progress toward computer-driven drones, the Navy and General Dynamics Electric Boat are testing a prototype of a system called the Universal Launch and Recovery Module that would allow the launch and recovery of unmanned underwater vehicles from the missile tube of a cruise missile submarine. The Navy is also working with platforms designed to collect oceanographic and hydrographic information and is operating a small, hand-launched drone called “Puma” to provide over-the-horizon surveillance for surface platforms.

Both DARPA and the Office of Naval Research also continue to create more sophisticated Unmanned Aircraft Systems. DARPA recently awarded Phase 2 system integration contracts for its CODE (Collaborative Operations in Denied Environment) program to help the U.S. military’s unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) conduct dynamic, long-distance engagements against highly mobile ground and maritime targets in denied or contested electromagnetic airspace, all while reducing required communication bandwidth and cognitive burden on human supervisors.

CODE’s main objective is to develop and demonstrate the value of collective autonomy, in which UAS could perform sophisticated tasks, both individually and in teams under the supervision of a single human mission commander. The ONR LOCUST Program allows UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) to stay in formation with little human control. At a recent demonstration, a single human controller was able to operate up to 32 UAVs.

The Networked Machine…

The principle by which individual UAVs are able to stay in formation with little human control is based on a concept called “swarm intelligence,” which refers to the collective behavior of decentralized, self-organized systems, as introduced by Norbert Wiener in his book, Cybernetics. Building on behavioral models of animal cultures such as the synchronous flocking of birds, he postulated that “self-organization” is a process by which machines – and, by analogy, humans – learn by adapting to their environment.

The flock behavior, or murmuration, of starlings is an excellent demonstration of self-organization. (Video: BBC via YouTube)

Self-organization refers to the emergence of higher-level properties and behaviors of a system that originate from the collective dynamics of that system’s components but are not found in nor are directly deducible from the lower-level properties of the system. Emergent properties are properties of the whole that are not possessed by any of the individual parts making up that whole. The parts act locally on local information and global order emerges without any need for external control. In short, the whole is truly greater than the sum of its parts.

There is also a relatively new concept called “artificial swarm intelligence,” in which there have been attempts to develop human swarms using the internet to achieve a collective, synchronous wisdom that outperforms individual members of the swarm. Still in its infancy, the concept offers another approach to the increasing vulnerability of centralized command and control systems.

Perhaps more importantly, the concept may also allay increasing concerns about the potential dangers of artificial intelligence without a human in the loop. A team of Naval Postgraduate researchers are currently exploring a concept of “network optional warfare” and proposing technologies to create a “mesh network” for independent SAG tactical operations with designated command and control.

…And The Connected Human

Adm. Girrier was quick to point out that the strategy – aimed primarily at enabling submarines, surface ships, and some land-based operations to take advantage of fast-emerging computer technologies — was by no means intended to replace humans. Rather, it aims to leverage human perception and cognitive ability to operate multiple drones while functioning in a command and control capacity. In the opinion of this author, a major issue to be resolved in optimizing humans and machines working together is the obstacle of “information overload” for the human.

Rear Admiral Robert P. Girrier, Director of N99, delivers a presentation on the future of naval unmanned systems at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 29, 2016. See the presentation here. (CSIS)

Captain Wayne P. Hughes Jr, U.S. Navy (Ret.), a professor in the Department of Operations Research at the Naval Postgraduate School, has already noted the important trend in “scouting” (or ISR) effectiveness. In his opinion, processing information has become a greater challenge than collecting it. Thus, the emphasis must be shifted from the gathering and delivery of information to the fusion and interpretation of information. According to CAPT Hughes, “the current trend is a shift of emphasis from the means of scouting…to the fusion and interpretation of massive amounts of information into an essence on which commanders may decide and act.”

Leaders of the Surface Navy continue to lay the intellectual groundwork for Distributed Lethality – defined as a tactical shift to re-organize and re-equip the surface fleet by grouping ships into small Surface Action Groups (SAGs) and increasing their complement of anti-ship weapons. This may be an opportune time to introduce the concept of swarm intelligence for decentralized command and control. Technologies could still be developed to centralize the control of multiple SAGs designed to counter adversaries in an A2/AD environment. But swarm intelligence technologies could also be used in which small surface combatants would each act locally on local information, with systemic order “emerging” from their collective dynamics.

Conclusion

Yes, technology is going to enable increased autonomy, as noted by Adm. Girrier in his interview with Scout Warrior. But as he said, it will be critical to keep the human in the loop and to focus on optimizing how humans and machines can better work together. While noting that decisions about the use of lethal force with unmanned systems will, according to Pentagon doctrine, be made by human beings in a command and control capacity, we must be assured that global order will continue to emerge with humans in control.

Marjorie Greene is a Research Analyst with the Center for Naval Analyses. She has more than 25 years’ management experience in both government and commercial organizations and has recently specialized in finding S&T solutions for the U. S. Marine Corps. She earned a B.S. in mathematics from Creighton University, an M.A. in mathematics from the University of Nebraska, and completed her Ph.D. course work in Operations Research from The Johns Hopkins University. The views expressed here are her own.

Featured Image: An MQ-8B Fire Scout UAS is tested off the Coast Guard Cutter Bertholf near Los Angeles, Dec. 5 2014. The Coast Guard Research and Development Center has been testing UAS platforms consistently for the last three years. (U.S. Coast Guard)

Reprinted with permission from the Center for International Maritime Security.

The Future of Sea-Air Drones and Protecting Maritime Assets

2016-06-05T14:19:00.001-07:00

By Jack Whitacre

What are some of the ways the U.S. and other countries could defend maritime assets against swarms of Sea-Air drones? Consider a convoy system with human centered technology, algorithms from nature, and elements of gaming.

Oakland University’s Loon Copter works equally well above and below the water’s surface. Photo: Oakland University

The FAA estimated that one million drones would be sold during this 2015 holiday season. This estimate was based primarily on the proliferation of flying drones, however new domains of operation may open up soon. Premiering in 2015, the Loon Copter proves that, in time, these devices will be capable of traditional aerial flight, on-water surface operations, and sub-aquatic diving. Embedded Systems Research at Oakland University created the Loon Copter in 2014. In 2016, the design placed third in the UAE Drones for Good competition. The system works in air as well as in water because the four rotors balance and cut through air and water equally well.

A map of nations with a drone program as of 2011. Courtesy Defense One, via RAND Corporation.

According to the New America Foundation, at least 19 countries possessed or were acquiring armed drone technology as of 2015.The Washington Post and The Aviationist reported in July of 2014 that even non-state actors like Hamas have manufactured drones capable of firing rockets or missiles. At the time of reporting it was unknown whether this specific group had the ability to launch missiles, but the story does show the willingness of non-state actors to weaponize technology. The same Washington Post article describes how low-tech “suicide” drones effectively function as guided missiles. With the history of state actors increasingly acquiring armed drones and non-state actors weaponizing drones, Sea-Air drones could open new realms of battlespace.

“The profound influence of sea commerce upon the wealth and strength of countries was clearly seen long before the true principles which governed its growth and prosperity were detected.” –Alfred Thayer Mahan

Sea-Air drones are not currently available off the shelf, so their ramifications are not yet recognized. If non-state or state actors designed suicide drones with sufficient range, it would be very difficult to defend global maritime trade against these threats due to the sheer size of the oceans. The Canadian Military Journal hypothesized that it is only a matter of time before pirates use drones offensively. Articles like these contemplate an important issue, but are limited by only considering the skies. Currently, our ability to detect air drones far exceeds capabilities to detect devices beneath the surface of the ocean. Even by diving ten or fifteen meters beneath the surface, Sea-Air drones may be able to elude satellites. NASA’s Ocean surface topography site describes how the best satellites measuring ocean temperature pierce only one inch below the ocean’s surface.

Shrouded by shadowy depths, would-be aggressors could potentially take down or ransom large freight vessels and trade flows that are so essential to many countries’ survival. According to Rose George in “Ninety Percent of Everything,” nearly 90% of goods are transported by sea. The stakes are high and the arena is huge. While it’s unlikely that every inch of the sea will become a combat zone, NOAA estimates that there are nearly 321,003,271 cubic miles of water in the world’s oceans. To this end, DARPA is re-thinking distributed defense by creating small aircraft carrier cooperatives. In the face of such a large and deep strategic chessboard, what are some of the ways the U.S. and other maritime nations could defend shipping from Sea-Air Drones? One option would be to revive the convoy system. The tipping point for such a decision may have to unfortunately be a tragedy with lives lost at sea. By contemplating these scenarios now, we could build in defenses before deaths occur.

“When [the enemy] concentrates, prepare against him.” –Sun Tzu

The cost of drone technology, like other innovations, continues to decrease; beginners models are available for less than $100. As this trend is likely to also occur in the maritime arena, it would be wise to match high-value vessels with an accompanying group of friendly Sea-Air drones offering constant defensive protection. In other words, a convoy must have the ability to destroy or electronically neutralize attacking drones. A ship with a 24/7 security presence would likely be safer than standard battle group coordinated operations. This is because there are simply too many ships at sea at any given time to protect them all through traditional means. The International Chamber of Shipping estimates there are least 50,000 merchant ships plying the oceans at any given time. Having constant convoys would reduce vulnerability amidst the uncertainty of when, where, and how an enemy might attack.

These convoys could be combinations of complex programmable drones capable of truly autonomous decisions and human operated systems. The most successful formations might be inspired from millions of years of evolution and derived through phenomena like flocks of birds and schools of fish. In such swarms it would be possible to make a human operator the “lead,” balancing machine autonomy with human decision-making. To this end, P.W. Singer and August Cole’s futuristic Ghost Fleet novel describes human helicopter pilots flying missions in conjunction with drones. The video below shows many different formations that could be programmed for swarms.

In order to recruit talent, the defense community might consider incorporating crowd-sourcing and gaming to meet increasing demands, at least until convoy defense systems can function in fully automatized ways. Pilots could be given a convoy interface (like Eve Online) and point systems tied to real world rewards to incentivize behavior. With this approach, the U.S. could capitalize upon large reserves of talent to protect trade, coasts, and even fishing vessels. This is merely an opening suggestion. There would, of course, be clear difficulties with such a strategy, such as ensuring a clearance system, similar to that of the Merchant Marine, payments to operators, and contract stipulations surrounding the use of force. However, the proliferation of third-party defense contracting proves that new types of defense arrangements can be made quickly in the face of emergent threats.

Hybrid Drones - the Advantages of Operating in Multiple Domains

It may be many years before Sea-Air drones, suicide drone piracy, and other forms of maritime threats emerge in full force. However, there are already clear modes of attack and high valued targets. The future may be hard to predict but that shouldn’t it preclude it from strategic thinking.

Jack Whitacre is an entrepreneur and former boat captain who studied international security and maritime affairs at The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Reprinted with permission from the Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC).

Hybrid Drones - the Advantages of Operating in Multiple Domains

2016-03-21T02:30:00.000-07:00

Classifying unmanned maritime systems by their operating domain: air, surface, or underwater - is both convenient and intuitive. But recently, navy and industry researchers have begun to explore the advantages of platforms that can operate in two domains, muddying the nomenclature. In the past year, several prototype multi-domain unmanned vehicles have been introduced.

CRACUNS

The most popular combination of these hybrid drones is the air/sub-surface mixture - UAVs that float or swim. Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory in Laurel, Maryland introduced the Corrosion Resistant Aerial Covert Unmanned Nautical System (CRACUNS), a submersible UAV designed to operate in the littorals which can be launched from a fixed position underwater or from an unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV).

Rutger University's entry into the fray of flying/swimming drones is the Naviator, which can actually maneuver (sort of) underwater before surfacing and taking off.

Naval Postgraduate School students built the Aqua-Quad, a small quadcopter with the ability to land and drift on the ocean's surface. Singapore's ST Engineering has produced the Unmanned Hybrid Vehicle (UHV), which can fly for short ranges then move at 4-5 knots underwater. Perhaps the most advanced air/sub-surface combo vehicle is the Naval Research Laboratory's FLIMMER.

Another take on the multi-domain hybrid is American Unmanned Systems spherical Guardbot, an amphibious surveillance robot that can cross from the sea to land.

Unmanned Hybrid Vehicle (image courtesy of Shepherd Media)

Currently, these vehicles are all prototypes in the testing stage. It's not clear, which, if any, will see practical application in maritime operations. What sort of tactical advantage might these vehicles bring to naval missions? The ability to launch a fairly short-ranged UAV from a ship or a larger aircraft to rapidly and precisely deploy an unattended sensor in the water column could be important for anti-submarine warfare. For instance, deploying a hydrophone with acoustic sensors can be done directly - like when a maritime patrol aircraft dispenses a disposable sonobuoy. But a hybrid UAV could deploy, listen, then move and listen in another place, using the same vehicle, and potentially recover to a mothership. The same situation could also be used to deploy hydrographic monitoring instruments, important for ASW, but also mine warfare.

Ocean Aero, a company out of San Diego, California, is developing a combined surface/subsurface vehicle, the Submaran S10. The vehicle runs from a combination of sail and solar power, giving it extremely long endurance for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. In this case, submerging could help the vehicle to avoid detection from surface and air platforms.

Of course this versatility results in trade-offs. None of these platforms will excel performance-wise in either operating domain. The vehicles listed above have fairly short ranges compared to single purpose platforms. Flight ranges may be short, but in ASW and other applications, there is an advantage to being able to drift on or under the water and listen while consuming very little power. The Aqua-Quad is designed to do just that, with the help of photo-voltaic cells.

Though these smaller vehicles have limited range compared to say a MALE UAV, they will also be much less expensive than long-endurance vehicles, meaning they can be acquired and deployed in quantity. Operating in swarms, hybrid vehicles can become a force multiplier, distributing many sensors -- and possibly weapons -- over wider ranges. There are certainly situations in which the ability to move between the air, and on or under the water make sense.

Unmanned Systems & Strategic Futures at the Naval War College

2016-03-06T13:45:00.002-08:00

The Naval War College remains the center of the U.S. Navy's foremost strategic thinkers. Later this month, various experts from the military, academia, and policy communities will convene in Newport for a maritime strategy symposium.

Some of the presenters will focus on the impact that unmanned vehicles have produced on naval strategy. From the Naval Post-graduate School, retired Navy Captain Jeff Kline will discuss his paper on Impacts of the Robotics Age on Naval Force Structure Planning."

Captain Kline’s paper emphasizes the importance of offensive “payload over platforms,” in order to overcome impediments to enhancing future force structure. In his words,

“This package focus” first is particularly applicable in the electromagnetic and cyber realm. Inexpensive, deposable UAVs employing radar reflectors or chirp jamming may be better delivery platforms for EM “packages” than an F-18 Growler. In the offense, developing “Left of kill chain” effects against an adversary need not be expensive, but does require synchronization with the movement of actual forces.

Retired Captain Jerry Hendrix, from the Center for New American Security, argues for investing in change by introducing innovative naval capabilities. These technologies would bring future conflicts to a swift victory by targeting an enemy’s national leadership.

If the United States were to go to war again it must leverage the technologies it has, a superb intelligence-reconnaissance complex as well as a precision strike capability unlike any other nation on earth, and combine these with newly emerging capabilities; unmanned and man-machine platforms, directed energy weapons, electro-magnetic and hypersonics to identify, target and destroy the critical center of gravity within the enemy camp.

Joining Captain Hendrix on the force structure panel is Lena S. Andrews, a PhD candidate in Political Science and a member of the Security Studies Program at MIT, who recognizes that new technologies introduce new risks. In her War on the Rocks article, Ms. Andrews and her coauthor Julia Macdonald warn that the increased reliability on satellite data connections and space technologies which have enabled the unmanned intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance revolution create a cyber capability-vulnerability paradox.

In the paper “Future Maritime Forces: Unmanned, Autonomous, and Lethal,” the War College’s own William F. Bundy foresees that the combination of distributed lethality and unmanned systems will revolutionize future naval warfare. His vision is that advanced unmanned air, surface, and subsurface platforms operating off surface ships and governed by artificial intelligence will be able to conform to safety of flight and navigation and the laws of armed conflict.

Mitigating Cosite Interference in UAVs

2016-02-23T17:00:00.000-08:00

by Doug King dking(at)polezero.com

Military radios must be able to operate in severe cosite interference environments (Figure 1.1 defines cosite interference). Cosite interference is a problem faced by many RF and microwave communications platforms; including Unmanned Systems. Military radios often operate in close proximity to additional radios, giving rise to cosite interference. The following article explains the issues associated with military radios operating in close proximity to additional interferers and how Tunable Filters are utilized in real-time applications. Finally, MPG-Pole/Zero’s recent advances in mitigating cosite interference are summarized.

Issues associated with military radios operating in close proximity to additional interferers:
Multiple transmitters coupled to antennas in close proximity create a condition called reverse intermodulation, characterized by the coupling of energy from one transmitter into the antenna of another, creating a simultaneous flow of reverse and forward energy. Coupled energy mixes in the nonlinearities in the output network of the transmitter to create an infinite number of intermodulation products. The products are then re-propagated to the collocated receivers, creating products of sufficient level to preclude reception at those frequencies. Thus, a cosite transmitter’s output carrier signal can significantly degrade the performance of the receiver.

How Tunable Filters are utilized in cosite interference applications:
The use of a receive filter or filter/LNA cascade such as that introduced in the transmit chain can create “preselection” of the energy from the receive antenna and reduce the relative level of the cosite interferer to the desired signal. Under this condition, the debilitating effect of cosite interference is mitigated by the selectivity of the preselector

As in the transmit environment, nonlinear effects in the receive chain can be the source of additional cosite interference. The preselection filter serves to minimize the level of the interfering signals prior to the receive nonlinearity, thereby minimizing any resulting products created within the receiver. Pole/Zero designs and tests the filters and LNAs that comprise the cascade filter to ensure that acceptable levels of distortion occur under these conditions.

Greater isolation can effectively be achieved through the use of selective filtering at the transmitter to minimize broadband noise. Selective filtering is applied following the primary noise sources in the transmit signal chain, having the overall effect of lowering the broadband noise without necessitating an increase in antenna isolation.

For greater selectivity, multiple filters can be placed in cascade with low noise amplifiers (LNAs) for inter-filter isolation and filter loss recovery purposes, followed by a power amplifier designed for efficient operation and low noise output. Further reductions in broadband noise and improved immunity to reverse intermodulation distortion can be achieved with the addition of a high power tunable filter at the output of the PA.

Recent MPG-Pole/Zero tunable filter advances:
MPG-Pole/Zero’s recent tunable filter advances for cosite interference mitigation solutions include:
• Highly integrated filter products with significant SWaP reduction, compared to legacy filters, that maintain 5W in-band power over the entire military tactical radio tuning range in single- and dual-channel configurations;
• Miniature SMT bandpass filter options from 30 MHz to 3GHz;
• Narrowband and wideband interference cancelers, some of which do not require an interferer reference, thereby enabling cancellation of off-platform interferers;
• Deep notch filters to create communications channels in wideband, high power signals;
• Miniature, light-weight filter and power amplifier cascades for cosite interference issues inherent in UAV retransmission applications.

Reprinted with permission from CRUSER NEWS. All opinions expressed are those of the respective author or authors and do not represent the official policy or positions of the Naval Postgraduate School, the United States Navy, or any other government entity. The inclusion of these links does not represent an endorsement of the organization, service, or product.

Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Swarming Integration Testing

2016-02-22T17:19:00.000-08:00

by F. Patrick Filbert, Subject Matter Analyst-UAS, frederic.filbert.ctr(at)pacom.mil

As technology improves, so does the capacity to expand a defensive perimeter to ever increasing ranges both horizontally and vertically. Identifying ways to penetrate this perimeter with assets and capabilities that do not require ever more expensive solutions requires creative use of current and emerging technological advances. Potential adversaries understand the United States (U.S.) is extremely technologically advanced with its warfighting systems. This requires a thinking enemy to develop ways to keep America’s advanced systems outside their sphere of influence; specifically, to both deny and create an inability to gain access to specific areas of operation. In the current vernacular, this is called creating an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) environment which has, as its backbone, advanced integrated air defense systems (IADS).

A Bit of History
Being able to provide a “layered” offensive capability with manned kinetic/non-kinetic payload armed aircraft has been done for some time. One example is how a joint Army-Air Force helicopter team (Task Force Normandy: comprised of U.S. Air Force (AF) MH-53J/PAVE LOW III and Army AH-64/APACHE attack helicopters) blinded Iraqi IADS early warning radars with non-kinetic electronic attack (PAVE LOW IIIs) and destroyed the radars (APACHES) with kinetic weapon's strikes (i.e., HELLFIRE missile, HYDRA rocket, and 25mm cannon fire) in the opening minutes of Operation Desert Storm to allow follow-on USAF strike aircraft access through coverage “holes” in Iraqi IADS to attack key targets further into Iraq.1 Similarly, future use of an advanced wave of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) equipped with electronic warfare (EW) payloads leading a subsequent wave of attacking aircraft from carrier strike groups is one potential way to enter and counter a potential adversary’s A2/AD environment.

Notional Air Defense Network

However, while emerging EW payload testing on UAS is occurring, mating electronic attack (EA) payloads onto a coordinated semi- or fully-autonomous swarm of smaller unmanned aircraft (UA) is still an emergent test environment effort. However, once such capabilities mature, being able to employ them requires that a foundational concept be in place. The Joint Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Swarming Integration (JUSI) Quick Reaction Test (QRT) was directed on February 27, 2015 by the Deputy Director, Air Warfare under the authority of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Director, Operational Test and Evaluation to address such a foundational approach.

The JUSI QRT was established under the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation’s Joint Test and Evaluation Program on July 29, 2015. It is colocated with U.S. Pacific Command’s (USPACOM) J8 Resources and Assessment Directorate, Camp H.M. Smith, Oahu, Hawaii. The JUSI QRT reports to the AF Joint Test Program Office (AFJO), Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada and receives support from USPACOM J81 (Joint Innovation and Experimentation Division). The JUSI QRT will develop, test, and validate a concept of employment (CONEMP) for the integration and synchronization of swarming UA performing EA in support of the joint force against an advanced IADS. The JUSI QRT effort is focused on a 2015-2020 timeframe to research and identify previous and ongoing swarm related efforts while building a swarming UA community of interest, concurrent with CONEMP development.

Advanced Integrated Air Defenses and How to Address Them – The Problem
Modern surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems are an integral part of advanced IADS. These IADS are, in turn, integral parts of a potential adversary’s networked A2/AD environment. For the purpose of the JUSI QRT effort, IADS refers to a networked system of adversary capabilities (e.g., a series of detection and tracking radars coupled with SAMs) and not specific to one platform (i.e., an IADS on a warship by itself or a specific individual SAM such as an SA-20).

Notional Integrated Air Defense System
The joint forces do not currently have adequate ways to fully plan, integrate, or synchronize the effects delivered by UA swarms. This requires development and testing of a foundational CONEMP offering an effective planning methodology for delivering integrated effects of UA swarms against advanced IADS protecting targets with threat SAM arrays.

The joint force is currently over-reliant on standoff weapons (SOW) and 4th/5th generation strike platforms to address the A2/AD challenge. UA swarms represent a potential additional approach, complementing existing platforms and weapons systems. Despite rapid technical advances in UA swarming development and demonstrations, the joint force lacks a CONEMP for operations requiring UA swarm-delivered effects. The lack of a CONEMP or other supporting documentation hinders requirements development, A2/ AD countering, and precludes integration and synchronization with the rest of the joint force.The joint force is currently over-reliant on standoff weapons (SOW) and 4th/5th generation strike platforms to address the A2/AD challenge. UA swarms represent a potential additional approach, complementing existing platforms and weapons systems. Despite rapid technical advances in UA swarming development and demonstrations, the joint force lacks a CONEMP for operations requiring UA swarm-delivered effects. The lack of a CONEMP or other supporting documentation hinders requirements development, A2/ AD countering, and precludes integration and synchronization with the rest of the joint force.

The Approach – Addressing the Problem
Combat capable and survivable UA with the capability to perform swarming functions are a new but quickly growing aspect of modern warfare. The JUSI QRT will take the first step to characterize, develop, and evaluate a CONEMP for using multiple UA of various sizes to deliver coordinated EA to enable other weapons and platforms (i.e., various types of SOWs, decoys, jammers, and 4th/5th generation platforms) access to counter A2/AD approaches. With the short lifespan of the JUSI QRT—one year—the effort will focus on CONEMP development supported by a series of modeling and simulation (M&S) runs over the course of three test events. Integrated support by Johns Hopkins University’s Applied Physics Laboratory’s (JHU/APL) experienced M&S personnel during each of the test events will enable the QRT to gain data collection for the equivalent of hundreds of swarm flights; thus providing a cost saving aspect concurrent with data analysis to support CONEMP development. JHU/APL will provide M&S and analysis of the execution of UA with EA payloads against scenarios developed to test the UA’s ability to deliver desired effects against an advanced IADS as part of an A2/AD environment.

The resulting qualitative and empirical data, once analyzed, will enable the JUSI QRT Team to assess findings, conclusions, and recommendations to revise the CONEMP between each test event with JUSI QRT’s first test event, which wrapped up on November 20, 2015. Additionally, upon completion of each test event, a Joint Warfighter Advisory Group (JWAG) will be convened to receive test event results—the first JUSI QRT JWAG occurred on December 9, 2015. As the QRT process continues, it will lead to development of a finalized swarming UA CONEMP to provide the link to requirements development and capability integration for the joint force to have a distributed approach to complement existing solutions which focus on 4th/5th generation strike platforms and SOW.

The Way Ahead
At the end of the JUSI QRT, the resulting CONEMP will provide an effective operational context to inform requirements development, roadmaps and, eventually, tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) in several areas, including communication, automation, UA, and EA to deliver intended effects. The CONEMP will also serve to help focus future Department of Defense and industry investment. Future considerations related to swarming UA with EA payloads may include development, testing, and validation of TTP for UA with EA payloads. Such TTP would further reinforce the use of swarming UA by empowering the commander to develop standards in the areas of man- ning, equipping, training, and planning in the joint force. In the interim, the JUSI QRT developed CONEMP will provide planners, trainers, and their supporters with a start point for employment of this capability.

JUSI QRT website: https://intellipedia.intelink.gov/wiki/JUSI

The author would like to thank Lt Col Matthew “Bulldog” Nicholson, Andrew “Wooly” Wolcott, Don Murvin, Brendan “K-PED” Pederson, and Brock Schmalzel for their guidance and feedback during the writing of this article.
1 Martin, Jerome V. Lt Col, USAF, “Victory from Above: Air Power Theory and the Conduct of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm,” Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, June 1994.
2 “New Delhi could have anti-missile shield by 2014,” defencenewsofindia.blogspot.com, August 29, 2011, http://defencenewsofindia.blogspot. com/2011/08/new-delhi-could-have-anti-missile.html#!/2011/08/new-delhicould-have-anti-missile.html, accessed October 8, 2015.

Reprinted with permission from CRUSER NEWS. All opinions expressed are those of the respective author or authors and do not represent the official policy or positions of the Naval Postgraduate School, the United States Navy, or any other government entity. The inclusion of these links does not represent an endorsement of the organization, service, or product.

Flying Miniature Quad-Rotor Unmanned Aerial Systems over the Arctic Ocean

2016-01-16T07:12:00.000-08:00

by Peter Guest, NPS Faculty, pguest(at)nps.edu

This article describes meteorological measurements over the Arctic Ocean using a Miniature Quad-Rotor Unmanned Aerial System (MQRUAS). With support from the CRUSER program, the author and students have been testing the concept of using MQRUASs as platforms for measurements of temperature, humidity and pressure in the lower atmosphere using a radiosonde as a sensor. The author performed a series of tests at Camp Roberts that involved flying the InstantEye MQRUAS alongside a calibrated meteorological tower to test the accuracy of the measurements. These tests determined that such measurements were of sufficient accuracy and reliability to be used for scientific and operational studies of atmospheric structure near the surface.

Figure 1: InstantEye taking off from the fantail of the R/V Sikuliaq

An Office of Naval Research directed research initiative entitled “Sea State and Boundary Layers in the Emerging Arctic Ocean” (abbreviated as “Sea State”) provided the first opportunity for the author to use the MQRUAS to address scientific (rather than just feasibility) issues. The overall goal of the Sea State project was to understand the physics of the interaction between the atmosphere, the ocean and sea ice in the Arctic Ocean. Before about 10 years ago, the Arctic had been mostly ice-covered all year and therefore few surface waves were present. But recently, ice cover has dramatically decreased and as a result waves now exist where they did not previously and this is having significant effects on various physical processes such as ice formation, ocean mixing and shore erosion in the Arctic Ocean. The primary platform for this project was the R/V Sikuliaq, a newly-commissioned icebreaker operated by the University of Alaska, Fairbanks. The specific goals of the author in the Sea State project during the 1 October to 10 November 10, 2015 cruise was to quantify the role of the atmosphere in generating waves, creating and destroying ice and transferring heat, moisture and momentum to the surface. This was accomplished, in collaboration with other meteorologists, with a suite of measurements which included the MQRUAS/radiosonde system.

Figure 2: The author flying the InstantEye over a large ice flow in the Arctic Ocean

The MQRUAS meteorological measurements were the first of their kind in any polar region, to our knowledge. Also this was the first time the author has flown an MQRUAS from a vessel at sea and from sea ice floes. Flying in such an extreme and different environment presented several challenges. One challenge was to obtain the required interim flight clearance (IFC) for operation from vessels at sea and flying in international air space, neither of which had been performed by NPS researchers with any type of UAS. This was obtained just before the start of the Sea State cruise, not in time to perform any at sea testing before the Sea State cruise. Other challenges were operating (1) in cold conditions, (2) in potentially icing conditions and (3) where the magnetic field is nearly vertical due to proximity to the magnetic North Pole. The latter challenge was crucial because the navigation and control of the InstantEye depends on accurate compass readings.

There were three goals to the MQRUAS measurements:

Testing the feasibility of such measurements in Arctic Ocean conditions
Quantifying the fine-scale atmospheric structure of the lower atmosphere
Quantifying the amount of heat and moisture coming from leads (openings in the ice pack).

The latter accomplished by comparing profiles of temperature and humidity upwind and downwind of a lead. The author performed flights from the deck of the Sikuliaq (Figure 1) and from ice floe surfaces (Figures 2 and 3). The flights involved horizontal transects over and on both sides of leads and also vertical profiles (up to 300 meters). A total of 18 MQRUAS 10 - 15 minute flights were performed. We choose to fly in periods with relatively light winds (less than 8 kts) and temperatures ranges from -3 C to -20 C (28 F to -3 F).

Figure 3: Close up of the InstantEye,

with radiosonde instrument

package attached underneath,

over ice in the vicinity

of a lead (seen in the background).

There were some operational issues encountered. During some of the flights over open water, ice crystals formed on the MQRUAS rotors. However, these did not appear to significantly affect performance and were easily cleaned off while changing batteries between flights. The cold conditions reduced the battery life from the usual 25-30 minutes to 12 - 15 minutes, at least as indicated by the control screen; we suspect the battery life was actually more than indicated. A more serious issue was compass performance. During three of the flights, the control screen indicated “Compass Error” and the MQRUAS became hard to control. In one case, when the MQRUAS was launched from the ship fantail, control became difficult and the author had to land on some thin ice alongside the ship. As the ship moved to recover the MQRUAS, it cracked the ice and the MQRUAS was pushed off into open water and sank before it could be rescued. (We had spares.) We believe the compass errors were a result of being so close to the magnetic North Pole, resulting in almost vertical magnetic force lines. Also the magnetic field generated by the ship may have caused distortions in the magnetic field.

Despite these issues, overall the experiment was a success. The meteorological data from the MQRUAS and fixed-wing UAS flights appeared to be accurate and we were able to quantify lead heat fluxes and also the fine scale-structure of the lower atmosphere and how it varies horizontally and temporally. These results are still being analyzed and will be published in a scientific journal article. Challenges remain, but the author believes that the MQRUAS shows great potential as a platform for scientific and operational meteorological measurements and he plans to continue testing the system in various marine environments including international waters off the coast of California in 2016 and in the seas surrounding Antarctica during a 2017 cruise.

Reprinted with permission from CRUSER News. All opinions expressed are those of the respective author or authors and do not represent the official policy or positions of the Naval Postgraduate School, the United States Navy, or any other government entity. The inclusion of these links does not represent an endorsement of the organization, service, or product.

Write for Naval Drones

2016-01-07T17:30:00.001-08:00

Do you enjoy writing? Are you interested in discussing the latest in unmanned systems and how they will impact future naval warfare? Great, because we're looking for guest contributors. The range of topics we will publish here is broad, from systems and technology, to operational concepts, to the cultural changes that will be required to integrate drones into maritime warfare.

Please send your submissions to info@navaldrones.com for consideration. Short form blog posts (500-800 words) or longer articles are acceptable. International contributors are welcome. Get your ideas in front of our large and growing global audience of industry and naval professionals.

Naval Drones - What to Expect in 2016

2015-12-29T11:36:00.000-08:00

Looking Back at 2015
Our highly unscientific Twitter poll below shows what some readers thought were the most significant events in unmanned naval systems for 2015.

Most significant naval drone story of 2015?
— Naval Drones (@NavalDrones) December 28, 2015

For details on these stories, see: X-47B Refueling, Russian Kanyon Nuclear UUV, UCLASS RFP

X-47B takes on fuel

And Forward to 2016

What follows are our expectations, hunches, and just wild guesses of the major developments to watch for in naval unmanned systems industry during the coming year.

Sanity Prevails - After spending nearly a billion dollars and more than two decades developing the troubled Remote Minehunting System, the U.S. Navy will cancel the program. Lockheed's RMS, which was intended to be one of the Littoral Combat Ship's key mission packages, will be replaced by one or more of the growing number of versatile, less expensive mine-countermeasure UUVs.

Also, the Navy will finally make a decision to move forward with two different types of UCLASS aircraft - one optimized for deep penetrating strike, and the other for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.

Autonomy Tests - The Office of Naval Research’s Large Displacement Unmanned Underwater Vehicle Innovative Naval Prototype (LDUUV INP) will demonstrate navigation algorithms and sense-and-avoid technologies as it cruises from San Francisco to San Diego. Additionally, DARPA's Sea Hunter unmanned anti-submarine warfare surface vessel prototype will put to sea for the first time.

Sea Hunter ACTUV concept - DARPA Image

More Swarming Demonstrations - The development of low-cost, swarming air, surface, and sub-surface vehicles for naval warfare will continue to advance. The LOCUST UAV system should be demonstrated at sea next year.

Armed Naval Drones - Land-based UAVs, such as the MQ-1 Predator, have routinely fired weapons in combat since at least 2001. However, no armed UAVs have put to sea since the QH-50 DASH of the 1950s and 1960s carried torpedoes. This will change in next year, when the MQ-8C Fire Scout starts testing the Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System.

Industry consolidation - Large defense integrators will improve their unmanned systems portfolios by acquiring smaller upstart drone manufacturers. We saw this earlier in 2015, when Huntington Ingalls purchased Columbia Group's UUV division.

More Hybrid Vehicles - Unmanned systems that operate in more than one domain (air, surface, or sub-surface) will continue to be an interest in 2016 to naval and industry researchers. Examples such as the Naviator, Aqua-Quad, and Flimmer have begun to demonstrate the advantages of vehicles that can both swim and fly. However, it will likely be years before these types of vehicles are developed into practical operational systems.

Development and Testing of the Aqua-Quad

2015-12-15T15:42:00.003-08:00

by Dr Kevin Jones, NPS Faculty, kdjones<at>nps.edu

Under CRUSER funding, a new energy-independent, ultra-long endurance, hybrid-mobility unmanned system has been under development called the Aqua-Quad. It is a concept platform that combines an ocean drifter with a quad-rotor air vehicle, and is intended to be a “launch and forget” asset, typically deployed in small groups or flocks that work as a team to more efficiently meet mission goals. While there are many mission sets where the Aqua-Quad might be advantageous, one in particular, underwater tracking with passive acoustic sensors, was previously addressed in simulation by LT Dillard (MAE, 2014). This has led to current work by LT Cason (USW, 2015), also with contributions by LT Fauci (SE, 2015).

Flyable prototype with lower shell removed and feet attached

(image courtesy of CRUSER)

As seen in the figure, a 20-cell photovoltaic (PV) array is distributed around the four propeller disks. These monocrystalline Silicon Sun- Power E60 cells are the only source of energy that the copter has, but are the means to achieve endurances of 3 months or more. In a single day in June in the Monterey Bay, the NREL solar irradiance calculator, PVWatts, would suggest a total daily energy budget of about 0.5 kWh collected by the PV array, and this energy needs to be divided up amongst avionics, sensors, and propulsion for flight. This available daily energy budget will change depending on latitude, weather and other factors, but is representative of the energy available in a 24 hour period for all operational needs of the Aqua-Quad.

One of the most challenging aspects of the program has been identifying materials and manufacturing techniques to construct a device which is water-tight and tough enough to survive at sea, but still light enough to efficiently fly. The prototype weighs a little over 3 kg, including the water-tight enclosure and PV array, and is lifted by four water-tolerant motors spinning 360 mm diameter carbon fiber propellers. The outer ring is just over 1 m in diameter. Flight tests of a stripped down version of the prototype, with most of the water-tight enclosure and the solar array removed, demonstrated stable flight with a required power of about 340 W at full weight, indicating a maximum flight time of about 25 minutes with fully charged batteries. Flights have also been performed with the solar array support structure installed, as there were concerns regarding aerodynamic influences and possibly structural resonance – neither was a problem. The measured Figure of Merit (FOM) for the copter is pretty good, about 9 g/W, operating at roughly the same efficiency as a full size helicopter. The flying prototype with the PV array support structure installed is shown above.

Snapshots of the buoyance experiments in Monterey Bay. Upper left: John Joseph deploying the Aqua-Quad for the first time. Upper right: casually resting in calm waters. Lower left: just deployed in rougher seas. Lower right: riding down the back side of a 10 foot roller (images courtesy of CRUSER).

A test of the solar recharge sub-system was performed on the afternoon of October 18th, a fall day with mixed clouds. With the PV array aligned roughly normal to the Sunlight, a maximum power of about 63 W was measured, and with the array aligned horizontally, as it would be in use, an average power of about 35 W was recorded. PVWatts estimates values between about 30 and 45 W for that time of year and time of day, based on an archived year of data from NAF Monterey. During the test, a Genasun Maximum Power Point Tracker (MPPT) was utilized to optimize power output from the PV array and to charge the batteries. The stripped down MPPT weighed about 100g, and was relatively large, with a heavy inductor and several large electrolytic capacitors. The size and weight of the MPPT were known issues, as well as the limited lifespan of electrolytic capacitors. However, during the experiment, it was noted that the compass in the flight control system reported errors whenever the Sun was shining brightly. The running theory is that the inductor creates magnetic interference that is proportional to the current passing through the MPPT, which is proportional to the solar irradiance. The inductor is located just a few inches from the compass, and cannot easily be relocated due to the size of the Genasun MPPT. Fortunately, this last summer, LT Fauci was working with a MPPT from STMicroelectronicsfor the TaLEUAS project. It is a newer design with customizable output voltage (meaning that by swapping 4 resistors, we can tune it to act as a charge controller for the batteries). The STM board is actually purchased as a devboard, with 3 MPPT circuits either connected in series or parallel on a single board. We were able to cut the board into 3rds, obtaining 3 single-array MPPTs. The weight of the STM board is under 25g, and the cost is about 1/10th of the Genasun. While not installed yet, the inductors on the STM board are much smaller, and there are no electrolytic capacitors, so we expect a longer life, and minimal compass interference. Due to its small size, the STM board can easily be relocated further from the compass.

On November 3rd, to gather data for LT Cason’s thesis, and with the support of John Joseph, Keith Wyckoff and Tarry Rago, we headed out onto Monterey Bay to perform float tests of the Aqua-Quad in various sea states. There was a small craft advisory posted for the day, with swells expected to reach 11-14 feet at 13 seconds, so a perfect day to make sure the design would stay afloat and keep the solar array above water while floating. We started about 100 m outside the harbor where the swell was around 3 to 4 feet, and everything looked good. As a backup, the Aqua-Quad was tied off to the buoy, and to represent actual fielded use, a dummy Acousonde sensor was hanging below the Aqua-Quad on a 10 m line. It provides a stabilizing effect, like a tail on a kite. After some sounding experiments in the harbor region, we recovered the equipment and moved out to rougher seas. At the second location swells were peaking at around 10 feet, and the Aqua-Quad still behaved perfectly.

Ongoing work on the Aqua-Quad includes obtaining an interim flight clearance to allow for autonomous outdoor flights with water launch and recovery tests, new developments on a self-righting capability in case the Aqua-Quad gets tumbled in rough seas, and collaborative behaviors to support realistic mission sets. There are a variety of interesting potential thesis topics, spanning from aerodynamic performance, to flight controls, to circuit design, to complete system optimization and operational applications. There may also be topics in USW, Cyber, and METOC where the AquaQuad might be of interest.

Reprinted with permission from the Naval Postgraduate School's CRUSER News.

Unmanned Maritime Systems Operations and Maintenance Lifecycle Costs

2015-11-18T02:30:00.000-08:00

by Dr. Diana Angelis, NPS Faculty, diangeli(at) nps.edu

The Navy currently has a number of Unmanned Maritime Systems (UMS) that perform a variety of missions including mine countermeasures, maritime security, hydrographic surveying, environmental analysis, special operations, and oceanographic research. While these unmanned systems were rapidly developed and fielded to meet immediate warfighter needs, some of the systems have not been subjected to the normal cost reviews associated with programs of record and in many cases the data required to develop rigorous cost models is limited or unavailable. As a result, the total ownership cost of unmanned maritime systems is not well defined, particularly the costs associated with operations and support.

Dr. Diana Angelis and Mr. Steve Koepenick from SPAWAR have been working on a CRUSER funded project to better understand UMS lifecycle costs with an emphasis on the operations and support costs associated with unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV). The first phase of the project brought together subject matter experts from various UMS programs in a warfare innovation workshop held at NPS in March 2015. The workshop participants identified several cost drivers of UUV O&S costs including fleet size, energy requirements, availability, security requirements (including cyber security), and training and retention.

Each of the major cost drivers was further decomposed into the system attributes that influence the magnitude of the cost driver. For example, energy is a function of:

Type of mission, which drives:
• Area to be covered (which drives range)
• Time constraints (which drives speed)

Type of energy source, which drives:
• Recharge requirements and # of recharge cycles
• Safety (certification)
• Storage and disposal

An influence diagram for energy costs is shown above. This will form the basis for further research into the factors that drive energy cost for UUVs.

The next steps are to collect data and build regression models that will quantify the relationships between the factors identified in the workshop and UUV O&S cost categories. When fully developed, these models can be used by program offices to forecast UUV O&S costs in support of analysis of alternatives and budgeting decisions.

Participating in the workshop were several NPS students, including four distance learning students in Systems Engineering. These students decided to use the findings of the workshop as a basis for further research in their capstone project. The capstone project will employ an array of systems engineering methodologies to investigate the specific UUV cost drivers associated with two unique mission types and explore the effect of mission requirements on O&S costs. The team has been working with PMS 408 and PMS 406 to develop point estimates and distributions for relevant O&S cost elements of the life cycle cost model. The project is expected to be completed in March 2016.

Reprinted with permission from the Naval Postgraduate School's CRUSER News.

Multi-Domain Unmanned Systems Implementation Creates Comprehensive Maritime Situational Awareness

2015-11-16T09:33:00.000-08:00

by Morgan Stritzinger, Public Relations Specialist, Textron Systems, mstritzi(at)textronsystems.com

The collaboration of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS), unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) extends relative reach, and therefore the operational footprint. The unmanned aircraft and USV work together to extend data link ranges, and the USV can carry, deploy and recover the UUV, thereby extending its range and providing a safer environment for the host vessel. Extending mission capabilities is critical to efficient and effective maritime missions, creating situational awareness that delivers actionable data and value.

Unmanned systems are best suited for tasks too “dull, dirty or dangerous” for their manned counterparts and are a pertinent complementary system to manned asset efforts. This includes repetitive tasks that are more costly for humans to perform or represent opportunity for human error, situations in extreme weather and environmental conditions, as well as the execution of dangerous tasks such as mine warfare or mine countermeasures, keeping humans out of harm’s way. Unmanned systems allow humans to remain at a standoff distance, while monitoring and maintaining defense in areas of interest.

Today, unmanned systems can be leveraged in airborne, surface and underwater modalities to bring interoperable force multiplication to the fleet.

UAS overhead deliver real-time full-motion video. Multimission Small UAS like Aerosonde™ system carry additional sensors, delivering communications relay and electronic warfare capacity, as well as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance – simultaneously.
USVs offer flexible payload bays that can be equipped for mission sets from mine countermeasures to counter-piracy. The Common Unmanned Surface Vehicle (CUSV™) for the U.S. Navy’s Unmanned Influence Sweep System (UISS) program is an example.
The U.S. Navy intends to use the UISS as a mine countermeasure system, designed for sweeping of magnetic and acoustic mines. The CUSV will conduct this mission by towing an underwater sweep system. Small unmanned underwater vehicles, or UUVs, are emerging with various capabilities at different depths that can be easily deployed, towed and retrieved from the CUSV.

Together, these systems can provide the fleet with multi-domain situational awareness and extended reach and operational capability. Multi-platform control allows several systems to be controlled in parallel, collecting data from numerous sensors, enhancing the common operational picture, and allowing task synchronization. This data fusion at the source, rather than separate from the engagement in an intelligence cell, speeds the decision cycle.

Persistence is another critical advantage in implementing multiple unmanned systems in a maritime environment. Unmanned systems provide multi-sensor coverage over vast expanses with significant endurance.

Supplementing the fleet with unmanned systems also affords value advantages with more streamlined system footprints, logistical requirements and personnel demands.

Supporting this are interoperable command-and-control (C2) technologies, maintaining system and payload control of all unmanned systems simultaneously. Currently, Textron Systems’ Universal Ground Control Station (UGCS) is the common control station for the Shadow®, Gray Eagle® and Hunter UAS. C2 systems can form the foundation for teaming between unmanned systems in the multi-domain scenario and can also do so for digital interoperability between manned systems such as the AH-64 Apache and unmanned systems like Shadow and Gray Eagle. Finally, common C2 streamlines training, logistics and maintenance needs and costs.

Unmanned systems technology has advanced to create a significant information and capability advantage for maritime operations. This multi-domain awareness allows personnel to synchronize tasks more seamlessly and turn data into decisive action.

Reprinted with permission from the Naval Postgraduate School's CRUSER News.

UCLASS: Breaking the Analysis Paralysis

2015-10-20T01:00:00.000-07:00

As the requirements definition for the U.S. Navy's unmanned carrier aircraft (UCLASS) program to develop a long duration, carrier-based unmanned air system sits stalled awaiting an ongoing Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) ISR UAV review due sometime this fiscal year, one thing is sure: the longer the decision is delayed, the later this important capability - in whatever form it eventually may take - will hit the fleet. The aircraft's original initial operating capability has already slipped from 2017 to no earlier than 2023.

Possibly in an attempt to break the ongoing analytical logjam, informed naval analysts have begun to suggest alternatives to the binary decision of simply buying a UCLASS specialized in ISR and light strike or one that is optimized for long-range, penetrating strike.

Bryan McGrath, Deputy Director of the Center for American Seapower, came to realize the importance of a long-range, carrier-based scouting aircraft while researching the report he co-authored for the Hudson Institute on the future of aircraft carriers and supporting fleet composition. McGrath now argues that the Navy should acquire two variants of unmanned carrier aircraft, each specialized for its respective role of ISR or strike.

In another recent report by CNAS, retired Navy Captain Jerry Hendrix discusses how trade-offs in air wing mass, persistence, payload, and most recently low observability, have evolved with the carrier's aircraft complement over time. The report includes significant discussion of the role of an unmanned carrier aircraft capable of operating at stand-off distance from an adversary's anti-access networks. "Given the physiological demands of the length of the mission driven by stand-off distance and/or the need to loiter on-station to find mobile or time critical targets, the minute energy management and split second timing involved in penetrating a dense anti-air network, and the current development of technology, the research community has begun to investigate the development of an unmanned platform to accomplish this mission."

The requirement for long loiter time in order to hunt time-critical or fleeting targets has been discussed previously in this blog. Though recognizing the importance of that aspect of the unmanned carrier air mission set, Hendrix goes on to compare advocates of an ISR-centric UCLASS with battleship admirals of the 1920s and 30s who "calcified in their ways... could only envision naval aviation serving as spotters in support of battleship gunfire."

Graphic courtesy of CNAS.

In the end, Hendrix proffers three alternative air wings including various UCLASS options. This more holistic approach considers modifying other aspects of the planned air wing (especially the extremely expensive F-35C) in order to accelerate an enhanced UCLASS program (Option 2). Option 3 would acquire a mix of "six attack squadrons composed of 16 true unmanned combat aerial vehicles, 12 aircraft configured as low observable strikers, and four aircraft configured as tankers/ISR platforms (minus stealth accruements)." It should be noted that both of the aforementioned reports discuss the need for UCLASS to provide organic air wing airborne refueling.

The phasing of these different types of aircraft would be important. It's likely that the control software needed in an ISR variant would take less development time than that of a penetrating aircraft designed to strike at least semi-autonomously in a denied electromagnetic spectrum, so it would be beneficial to focus on funding and deploying the ISR aircraft first. Side benefits of a dual-variant approach to a UCLASS purchase would be to maintain the industrial base of two different aircraft manufacturers as well as affording various political trade-offs that could result from truncated F-35 buys. However, the Navy should demand common control stations, data paths, and base operating software for the ISR and strike-heavy variants of UCLASS, regardless of which company ultimately manufactures each type. This commonality would reduce life cycle costs and provide greater flexibility in operations.

One would hope these alternative ideas will break the analysis paralysis plaguing the UCLASS program, but perhaps they might just make it worse... With no shortage of ideas under consideration, only leadership and compromise - from both the Navy and Congressional sides - can move this program forward smartly.

ASW Drones - An Update

2015-09-25T06:03:00.001-07:00

One of the areas of naval warfare with the most potential for transformation by unmanned systems is submarine hunting. In general, anti-submarine warfare (or ASW) requires persistently deployed sensors at various water depths in order to detect, track, and identify submarines so that a targeting solution can be developed and weapons deployed against the subs. This detect-to-engage sequence can take weeks to develop or it can occur very rapidly. Additionally, ASW is a multi-domain discipline, meaning assets are deployed above, on the surface of, and under the sea. Currently, ASW sensors are deployed by aircraft (usually periscope detecting radars, magnetic anomaly detectors, and sonobuoys) and surface ships (hull mounted, towed array, or variable depth sonars).

As one can imagine, coordinating these assets is a very complicated activity. At some point in the future, increased levels of autonomy in unmanned systems will reduce to a degree the human coordination required in ASW. In the near term, probably the most important factor that unmanned systems will bring to the fight is their sheer number and persistence.

MQ-9B Launches Sonobuoys (artist concept by General Atomics)

A single mission platform for hunting hard to detect diesel boats, DARPA's Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Continuous Trail Unmanned Vessel (ACTUV) program, or "Sea Hunter" prototype continues its development. The major challenge for USVs is autonomous navigation and obstacle avoidance. And though they offer long dwell time for ASW and the ability to tow acoustic detection arrays at various depths of the water column, their speed is limited.

The plug and play nature of today's unmanned system will facilitate the introduction of many types of sensors in greater quantities on the ASW battlefield. In 2014, Ultra Electronics USSI announced the integration of its Sentinel Passive Acoustic Sensor into Liquid Robotics Wave Glider unmanned surface vessel. According to a press release from the company, the "sensor/software suite is designed to acoustically detect, track and form contact reports on waterborne targets that are transmitted to a command and control node on shore, ship or aircraft platform."

General Atomics, maker of the Predator and Reaper UAVs that proliferate today's battlefields, has recently introduced capabilities that could makes this versatile aircraft a viable ASW platform. A maritime version of the MQ-9B, the Guardian, already offers extended range and a multi-mode active electronically scanned radar which could be useful in detecting a submarine cruising at periscope depth. Now, General Atomics has proposed a Guardian-variant to complement the Royal Navy's manned ASW maritime patrol aircraft. The UAV will be capable of deploying sonobuoys produced by Ultra Electronics and sending their data back to a control station via satellite link. Ground-based sonobuoy-launching UAVs will augment ASW assets deployed at sea and give naval commanders greater flexibility in deploying submarine-detecting sensors at long distances from their operating bases.

What is an autonomous system? Are we talking about the same things?

2015-09-17T09:52:00.001-07:00

by Curtis Blais, NPS Faculty Associate Research, clblais(at)nps.edu

I enjoy reading the monthly articles in the CRUSER Newsletter. We are challenged intellectually by new ideas and even by the different terms used in talking about robotic systems. For example, in the January 2015 issue, Paul Scharre (“The Coming Swarm”) spoke of human-inhabited and uninhabited systems, with the statement that incorporation of increasing automation in uninhabited systems helps them become “true robotic systems.” Such concepts make one wonder how to classify the emerging “driverless” automobiles that transport humans and allow human override, or autonomous medical evacuation aircraft transporting human casualties – are those “true robotic systems”?

Clearly, a challenge in new fields of research and technology is reaching common agreement and use of terminology. In the Department of Defense, the robotics field has emerged rapidly as a revolution in warfighting, potentially reshaping the future battlefield in ways that we are only beginning to discover. In 2008, the National Institute of Standards and Technology issued Special Publication 1011-I-2.0 titled “Autonomy Levels for Unmanned Systems (ALFUS) Framework, Volume 1: Terminology,” in an attempt to standardize terminology for this field. In this report, we find the following definitions that can help focus CRUSER concerns:

Unmanned Systems (UMS): A powered physical system, with no human operator aboard the principal components, which acts in the physical world to accomplish assigned tasks. It may be mobile or stationary. It can include any and all associated supporting components such as OCUs [Operator Control Units, the computer(s), accessories, and data link equipment that an operator uses to control, communicate with, receive data and information from, and plan missions for one or more UMSs]. Examples include unmanned ground vehicles (UGV), unmanned aerial vehicles/systems (UAV/ UAS), unmanned maritime vehicles (UMV) —whether unmanned underwater vehicles (UUV) or unmanned water surface borne vehicles (USV)—unattended munitions (UM), and unattended ground sensors (UGS). Missiles, rockets, and their submunitions, and artillery are not considered the principal components of UMSs.

Autonomy: A UMS’s own ability of integrated sensing, perceiving, analyzing, communicating, planning, decision-making, and acting/executing, to achieve its goals as assigned by its human operator(s) through designed Human-Robot Interface (HRI) or by another system that the UMS communicates with. UMS’s Autonomy is characterized into levels from the perspective of Human Independence (HI), the inverse of HRI. Autonomy is further characterized in terms of Contextual Autonomous Capability (CAC). A UMS’s CAC is characterized by the missions that the system is capable of performing, the environments within which the missions are performed, and human independence that can be allowed in the performance of the missions.

Autonomous: Operations of a UMS wherein the UMS receives its mission from either the operator who is off the UMS or another system that the UMS interacts with and accomplishes that mission with or without further human-robot interaction.

Fully autonomous: A mode of UMS operation wherein the UMS accomplishes it assigned mission, within a defined scope, without human intervention while adapting to operational and environmental conditions.

Semi-autonomous: A mode of UMS operation wherein the human operator and/or the UMS plan(s) and conduct(s) a mission and requires various levels of HRI. The UMS is capable of autonomous operation in between the human interactions.

Remote control: A mode of UMS operation wherein the human operator controls the UMS on a continuous basis, from a location off the UMS via only her/his direct observation. In this mode, the UMS takes no initiative and relies on continuous or nearly continuous input from the human operator.

Teleoperation: A mode of UMS operation wherein the human operator, using sensory feedback, either directly controls the actuators or assigns incremental goals on a continuous basis, from a location off the UMS.

Under CRUSER auspices, the author of the present article is investigating how behaviors and effects of human and unmanned systems can be distinguished in simulation models (see the January 2015 issue of CRUSER News). From the above definitions, we could ask a fundamental question, “Should human warfighters be considered as fully autonomous or semi-autonomous entities?” We probably are quick to consider human warfighters (soldier, sailor, Marine, airman, etc.) as fully autonomous entities, even though they report to some higher command and their actions can be overridden by modified orders from higher command (and, those orders are subject to interpretation, which may or may not correctly align with the commander’s intent, and even so are not guaranteed to be obeyed). Suffice to say, we are in the early stages of a fascinating era of research and development that will bring about greater precision in our concepts and terminology relating to unmanned systems, while possibly redefining our notions of manned systems as well.

Reprinted with permission from the Consortium for Robotics and Unmanned Systems Education and Research (CRUSER).

What's the Buzz? Ship-based Unmanned Aviation and its Influence on Littoral Navies During Combat Operations.

2015-09-15T04:18:00.004-07:00

By Ben Ho Wan Beng

Introduction

“Unmanned aviation” has been a buzzword in the airpower community during recent years with the growing prevalence of unmanned systems to complement and in some cases replace peopled ones in key roles like intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR). Insofar as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are increasingly used for strike, their dominant mission is still ISR because of the fledging state of pilotless technology. This is especially the case for sea-based drones, which are generally less capable than their brethren ashore. That said, several littoral navies have jumped on the shipborne UAV bandwagon owing to its relative utility and cost-effectiveness.[1] And with access to such platforms, how would these entities be effected during combat?

For littoral nations without an aerial maritime ISR capability in the form of maritime patrol aircraft (or only having a limited MPA capability), the sea-based drone can make up for this lacuna and improve battlespace/domain awareness. On the other hand, for littoral nations with a decent maritime ISR capability, the shipborne UAV can still play a valuable, albeit, complementary role. The naval drone also offers the prospect of coastal forces amassing more lethality as it refines the target-acquisition process, enabling its mother ship to attack the adversary more accurately.

The littoral combat environment

Littoral operations are likely to be highly complex affairs. As esteemed naval commentator Geoffrey Till said: “The littoral is a congested place, full of neutral and allied shipping, oil-rigs, buoys, coastline clutter, islands, reefs and shallows, and complicated underwater profiles.”[2] One key reason behind the labyrinthine nature of littoral warfare is that it involves clutter not only at sea, but also on land and in the air. Especially troublesome is the presence of numerous ships in the littorals. To illustrate, almost 78,000 ships transited the Malacca Strait, one of the world’s busiest waterways, in 2013.[3]

Fire Scout onboard a Littoral Combat Ship (US Navy Photo)

Such a complex operating milieu would place a premium on the importance of battlespace awareness, which could make or break a campaign. As fabled ancient Chinese military philosopher Sun Tzu asserted: “With advance information, costly mistakes can be avoided, destruction averted, and the way to lasting victory made clear.” This statement was made over 2,000 years ago and is still as relevant as before today, especially when considered against the intricacies of littoral combat that hinders sensor usage. Indeed, shipborne radar performance during littoral operations can be significantly degraded by land clutter. For instance, the 1982 Falklands conflict manifested the problems sea-based sensors had in detecting and identifying low-flying aircraft with land clutter in the background.[4] Campaigning in congested coastal waters would also necessitate the detection and identification of hostile units in the midst of numerous other sea craft, which is by no means an easy task. All in all, the clutter common to littoral operations presents a confusing tactical picture to naval commanders, and the side with a better view of the situation – read greater battlespace awareness – would have a distinct edge over its adversary. Sea-based UAVs can provide multispectral disambiguation of threat contacts from commercial shipping by virtue of onboard sensor suites, yielding enhanced situational awareness to the warfare commander.

Improved battlespace awareness

Traditional manned maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) would be the platform of choice to perform maritime ISR that helps in raising battlespace awareness in a littoral campaign. However, not all coastal states own such assets, which can be relatively expensive[5], or have enough of them to maintain a persistent ISR over the battlespace, a condition critical to the outcome of a littoral operation. This is where the sea-based drone would come in handy. Unmanned aviation has a distinct advantage over its manned equivalent, as UAVs can stay airborne much longer than piloted aircraft. To illustrate, the ScanEagle naval drone, which is in service with littoral navies such as Singapore and Tunisia and commonly used for ISR, can remain on station for some 28 hours.[6] In stark contrast, the corresponding figure for the P-3 Orion MPA is 14.[7]The sensor capabilities of some of the naval drones currently in service also make them credible aerial maritime ISR platforms. Indeed, they are equipped with such sophisticated sensor technologies as electro-optical, infrared and synthetic aperture radar (SAR) systems.

To be sure, the shipborne UAV is incomparable to the MPA vis-à-vis most performance attributes, and the two platforms definitely cannot be used interchangeably. The utility of the naval drone lies in the fact that it can complement the MPA by taking over some of the latter’s routine, less demanding surveillance duties. This would then free up the MPA to concentrate on other, more combat-intensive missions during a littoral campaign, such as attacking enemy ships. And for a littoral nation without MPAs, the shipborne UAV would be especially valuable as it can perform aerial ISR duties for a prolonged period.

The naval drone can contribute to information dominance in another way. In combat involving two littoral navies, the side with organic airpower tends to have better domain awareness over the other, ceteris paribus. However rudimentary it may be, the shipborne drone constitutes a form of organic sea-based airpower that extends the “eyes” of its mother platform. The curvature of Earth limits the range of surface radars, but having an “eye in the sky” circumvents this and improves coverage significantly. Being able to “see” from altitude allows one to attain the naval equivalent of “high ground,” that key advantage so prized by land-based forces. Indeed, the ScanEagle can operate at an altitude of almost 5,000 meters (m).[8] In the same vein, the Picador unmanned helicopter has a not inconsiderable service ceiling of over 3,600m.[9] In essence, the UAV allows its mother ship to detect threats that the latter would generally be unable to using its own sensors.

All in all, shipborne drones enable littoral fleets to have a clearer tactical picture, translating to improved survivability by virtue of the greater cognizance of emerging threats that they offer to surface platforms. Having greater battlespace awareness also means that the naval force in question would be in a superior position to dish out punishment on its adversary.

Increased lethality

Sea-based UAVs would enable a littoral navy to target the opposing side more accurately as they can carry out target acquisition, hence increasing their side’s lethality. In this sense, the drone is reprising the role carried out by floatplanes deployed on battleships and cruisers in World War Two. During that conflict, these catapult-launched aircraft acted as spotters by directing fire for their mother ships during surface engagements. In more recent times, during Operation Desert Storm, Pioneer UAVs from the American battlewagon Wisconsin guided gunfire for their mother ship. Several current UAVs can fulfill this role. For instance, the Eagle Eye can be used as a guidance system for naval gunfire; ditto the Picador with its target-acquisition capabilities. There is also talk of drones carrying out over-the-horizon targeting so as to facilitate anti-ship missile strikes from the mother platforms.[10]

And though land-based UAVs are increasingly taking up strike missions, the same cannot be said for their sea-based counterparts as very few of the latter are even in service today in the first place, due to their complexity and cost. The Fire Scout is one such armed naval UAV. This United States Navy rotorcraft can be armed with guided rockets and Hellfire air-to-surface missiles; however, with a unit cost of US$15-24 million[11], it is not a low-end platform. All in all, unarmed shipborne drones are likely to be the order of the day for littoral navies, at least in the near term, and such platforms can only carry out what they have been doing all this while, like ISR and target acquisition.

Conclusion

In summary, the sea-based drone can, to some extent, complement the maritime patrol aircraft in the aerial ISR portfolio at sea, helping to maintain the battlespace awareness of the littoral navy during a conflict. The naval UAV’s target-acquisition capability also means that it can improve its owner’s striking power to some extent. These statements, however, must be qualified as current shipborne drones can only operate in low-threat environments – in contested airspace, their survivability and viability would be severely jeopardized, as they are simply unable to evade enemy fighters and anti-aircraft fire. In the final analysis, it can perhaps be maintained that the rise of sea-based UAVs constitutes incremental progress for littoral navies, as the platform does not offer game-changing capabilities to these entities.

Going forward, ISR is likely to remain the main mission for sea-based drones in the near future. Though the armed variant seems to offer a breakthrough in this state of affairs, it must be stressed that it is neither a simple nor cheap undertaking. If and when defense industrial players were to provide lower-cost solutions to this issue in the future, however, the striking power of coastal fleets would increase considerably and with that, the nature of littoral and for that matter naval warfare in general would profoundly change. Until then, the sea UAV-littoral navy nexus would be characterized by evolution, not revolution.

Ben Ho Wan Beng is a Senior Analyst with the Military Studies Programme at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore; he received his master’s degree in strategic studies from the same institute. The ideas expressed above are his alone. He would also like to express his heartfelt gratitude to colleague Chang Jun Yan for his insightful comments on a draft of this article.

Endnotes

[1] For instance, the Scan Eagle drone has a unit cost of $100,000. See www.nytimes.com/2013/01/25/us/simple-scaneagle-drones-a-boost-for-us-military.html?_r=0.

[2] Geoffrey Till, Seapower: A Guide for the Twenty-first Century(London: Routledge, 2013), 268.

[3] Marcus Hand, “Malacca Straits transits hit all-time high in 2013, pass 2008 peak,” Seatrade Maritime News, February 10, 2014, accessed September 4, 2015, www.seatrade-maritime.com/news/asia/malacca-straits-transits-hit-all-time-high-in-2013-pass-2008-peak.html.

[4] Milan Vego, “On Littoral Warfare,” Naval War College Review68, No. 2 (Spring 2015): 41.

[5] Some of the more common MPAs include the P-3 Orion, which is in service with nations like New Zealand and Thailand which has a unit cost of US$36 million, according to the U.S. Navy. See www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=1100&tid=1400&ct=1.

[6] “ScanEagle, United States of America,” naval-technology.com, accessed September 5, 2015, www.naval-technology.com/projects/scaneagle-uav.

[7] “P-3C Orion Maritime Patrol Aircraft, Canada,” naval-technology.com, accessed September 5, 2015, www.naval-technology.com/projects/p3-orion.

[8] “ScanEagle, United States of America.”

[9] “Picador, Israel,” naval-technology.com, accessed September 5, 2015, www.naval-technology.com/projects/picador-vtol-uav.

[10] Martin Van Creveld, The Age of Airpower (New York: Public Affairs, 2012), 274.

[11] United States Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions: Assessment of Selected Weapons Program, March 2015, 117.

Reprinted with permission from the Center for International Maritime Security.

UAVs Compete for Dominance in the Arctic

2015-08-24T11:46:00.000-07:00

The Arctic Circle is a complex environment of harsh climate, shifting ice flows, and remote, barren wastelands. Much ado has been made of late of the region's potential for alternative shipping routes, resource extraction, and of course, the expanded military presence usually associated with those activities. The vast distances and unforgiving temperatures of Arctic air and waters make unmanned aerial vehicles ideal for military reconnaissance there. Practically all of the countries which border Arctic seas have some sort of UAV programs underway.

One of the primary goals of Canada's troubled Joint Uninhabited Surveillance and Target Acquisition System (JUSTAS) project was to conduct Northern Patrols over the country's Arctic territory. In addition to surveilling the area, the yet to be determined type of JUSTAS UAVs will be required to drop search and rescue kits to distressed mariners. The program's delays have been largely due to competing requirements between the need for maritime and Arctic patrol and more traditional overland persistent surveillance and targeting mission. In 2012, a version of Northrop's RQ-4B Global Hawk Block 30 named "Polar Hawk" was proposed for the mission. The Polar Hawk was to have employed the deicing and engine anti-icing capability from the U.S. Navy's Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) Program and an enhanced communications package capable of operating within the Arctic's spotty satellite coverage. The system was determined to be too expensive for Canada's requirements. More recently, General Atomics has offered that its jet-powered Predator variant Avenger could meet the JUSTAS requirement.

The U.S. Coast Guard has completed a series of UAV tests from its icebreaker USCGC Healy (WAGB-20), but has also yet to settle on a program of record for its drone surveillance requirements. Both Aerovironment's hand-launched PUMA (see above video) and Insitu's longer ranged catapult-launched ScanEagle were demonstrated. Unmanned air systems may be considered by DARPA for its Future Arctic Sensing Technologies (FAST) research. The FAST solicitation, released in February 2015, is intended to develop "low-cost, rapidly-deployable, environmentally friendly, unmanned sensor systems, including deployment and data reach-back from above the Arctic Circle that can detect, track and identify air, surface and subsurface targets."

Russia has staked aggressive claims to the Arctic and conducted a series of military exercises in the region. The country is building a string of 13 airfields and ten air-defense radar stations and 16 deepwater ports on its Arctic territory. One of the aircraft flying from these sites on reconnaissance missions is the Orlan-10. The catapult launched UAV is deployed from the Eastern Military District and capable of operating for up to 15 hours.

Russian Orlan 10

Scandinavian countries will not be left out of the Arctic drone race. In 2013, the Danish Defense Ministry updated its military strategies to place a greater importance on the acquisition of extreme climate UAVs to enhance patrol of its vast Arctic claims. Denmark's own Sky-Watch is developing the hybrid Muninn VX1 platform which will operate from ships for cold weather research and surveillance. The Northern Research Institute in Norway (NORUT) flew CryoWing, a UAV especially designed for extreme Arctic temperatures. The Norwegian Coast Guard and Coastal Agency also tested Swedish manufacturer's CybAero Apid 60 unmanned helicopter over the Arctic ocean in 2011-12.

Advancing Autonomous Systems: Rough Seas Ahead for Command & Control

2015-08-19T06:07:00.000-07:00

by Prof Mark Nissen, NPS, mnissen(at)nps.edu

Command & control (C2)[1] is quintessentially important to military endeavors. As Joint Publication 6-0[2] elaborates authoritatively (I-1): “Effective C2 is vital for proper integration and employment of capabilities.” Further, our contemporary and informed understanding of C2 indicates that it applies to much more than just the technologic underpinnings of command and control systems. As Naval Doctrine Publication 6[3] reinforces: “… technology has broadened the scope and increased the complexity of command and control, but its [C2] foundations remain constant: professional leadership, competence born of a high level of training, flexibility in organization and equipment, and cohesive doctrine.”

Joint Publication 6-0 expounds (I-2): “Although families of hardware are often referred to as systems, the C2 system is more than simply equipment. High-quality equipment and advanced technology do not guarantee adequate communications or effective C2. Both start with well-trained and qualified people supported by an effective guiding philosophy and procedures.” Indeed, the first element of C2 is people: “Human beings—from the senior commander framing a strategic concept to a junior Service member calling in a situation report—are integral components of the C2 system and not merely users.” This concept is embedded deeply within our research, engineering, leadership, command, control and operation of manned systems (e.g., airplanes, ships, networks), forces and operations.

In contrast, however, a great many researchers, engineers, leaders, commanders, controllers and operators of autonomous systems (e.g., unmanned vehicles, robots, cyber applications) concentrate principally—if not exclusively—on technology, paying scant attention to the people, processes and organizations required for command, control and mission efficacy. This leaves a dearth—if any—residual attention to C2 of autonomous systems today. Given the quintessential importance of C2, such technologic focus is problematic, particularly where large-scale, joint or coalition operations are considered.

Moreover, today’s problems portend to become tomorrow’s vulnerabilities. As our research looks five to ten years into the future, not only do we foresee ever increasing technologic advancement of autonomous systems, but we preview it combined with ever increasing integration of manned and unmanned systems. In a great many circumstances, teams of autonomous systems and people (TASP) will become the norm, with both manned and unmanned systems and operators integrating their complementary attributes and capabilities for outcomes more effective and successful than possible through either manned or unmanned alone.

Especially together, the technologic advancement of autonomous systems and the manned-unmanned integration through TASP imply rough seas ahead for C2. Using the state-of-the-art simulation system POWer [4] we see, for instance, how current C2 organizations and approaches strain already with multiple unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in common airspace. Consider a joint task force (JTF) environment today, for example, say with only two UAS launched from different ships. Who is the lowest level person in the JTF organization with authority over both unmanned aircraft? It is probably the CTG, who may not even be onboard either ship, which signals a serious issue.

Now exacerbate this issue with multiple UAS— perhaps even a swarm—from multiple ships and shore facilities, flying in common airspace. Then exacerbate it still further with multiple UAS (maybe even operated and controlled by a set of diverse coalition partners) flying in common airspace with manned systems. Far from just the physical control issues (e.g., collision avoidance), how do we integrate manned and unmanned systems and missions to leverage their complementary attributes and capabilities? How do we institute and optimize joint manned-unmanned training? How can we expect for the different people and machines from manned and unmanned squadrons to cohere seamlessly when an integrated mission begins? How, when and to which levels do we delegate TASP mission authority and control? What are the major impediments to effective TASP missions, and what should we be doing now to prepare for and overcome them? These are all important C2 questions that we will need to answer well in advance of TASP missions becoming commonplace in the coming half decade.

Through CRUSER sponsorship and guidance, our POWer[5] research is beginning to answer some of these questions. Examining UAS in use today within the CTG mission environment, as an important place to begin, we’ve identified many troublesome C2 problems already. For one instance, the C2 organization reflects a tall, functional hierarchy, with considerable centralization, substantial formalization and frequent staff rotation. This makes for relatively long information flows and decision chains, coupled with perennial battles against knowledge loss from personnel turnover and challenges with cross-functional (and even more so with joint and coalition) interaction. Many organization experts would argue that the correspondingly long decision chains, information flows and staffing turbulence militate against efficient—or even effective—C2.

As another instance, the formalization inherent within this C2 organization reflects strong dependence upon written standards, rules and procedures (e.g., SOPs, TTPs, PPRs, work standards, job qualifications). However, the continuing technological advance and integration of UAS suggests that formalization through written documents may have a hard time keeping up with rapid and local knowledge onboard various ships and across diverse crews. Although this is a knowledge management problem, as with the long decision chains, information flows and staffing turbulence noted above, many organization experts would argue here that the correspondingly high dependence upon standardization and written documentation militate against efficient—or even effective—C2.

Moreover—and perhaps somewhat counter intuitively—for many years to come, unmanned missions will likely require more planning, monitoring, intervening and like control activities than their manned counterparts. Hence greater numbers of C2 staff—or more skilled and experienced staff members—will be required for unmanned than for manned missions, and such missions will be expected to take more time, suffer from more mistakes, and generally tax the C2 organization more greatly. (Overall, many unmanned missions are still more economic, but they exact greater demands in terms of C2 coordination load.) This eventuality will exacerbate for integrated manned-unmanned events, particularly as we expand across joint and coalition operations.

As a third instance, problematic issues are highly likely to arise also in terms of different skill levels, lack of common training or co-operational experience, and very low—or no—trust between manned and unmanned aircraft operators. A great many manned and unmanned systems personnel are members of different tribes—with distinct cultures and status—that recruit, train, operate and promote separately for the most part. TASP requires manned and unmanned mission integration, flying together in common airspace, and relying integrally upon one another. Imaging telling a Fleet aviator that he or she will have an unmanned wingman!

Of course the simple solution is to keep manned and unmanned systems separate: in separate organizations, in separate airspaces, with separate skill sets, with separate procedures. Such simple solution negates the integrative power and efficacy of TASP, however. Where teams of autonomous systems and people can be more effective than either manned or unmanned systems alone, an adversary can potentially become victorious with C2 sufficiently advanced for TASP. This can be the case even where the technology of our manned and unmanned systems is superior. In other words, advances in C2 may trump superior technology.

So where do we go from here? Our ongoing research continues to employ POWer to project and analyze the comparative performance of different missions, technology degrees, levels of manned-unmanned integration, and approaches to C2 organization. We compare performance metrics across an array of measures including time for effective mission completion, mission errors and corresponding rework, C2 communication and coordination load, along with mission cost, risk and others.

We also examine UAS across a wide range of technology degrees: from operational UAS in the current inventory, through those undergoing test and evaluation today, to future systems envisioned with performance levels matching—and even surpassing—those achievable only through manned systems today. This enables us to examine a correspondingly wide array of C2 organizations and approaches, mis- sion scenarios, technology degrees and levels of manned-unmanned mission integration, from those taking place in current operations through counterparts likely five to ten years hence.

Further, POWer supports computational experiments that allow us to examine this wide array in a very systematic and precise manner. Changing the level of only one variable at a time—or analyzing suites of level changes across multiple variables simultaneously—we can ascribe resulting performance differences specifically and unambigu- ously to each such level change, and we can explain precisely how each variable—independent, dependent or control—is defined, operationalized and manipulated. This supports exceedingly high reliability and internal validity through our experiments.

Moreover, the cost of computational experiments is exceptionally low, and the speed is exceptionally high, so we can assess hundreds or thousands—even millions—of different scenarios in short periods of time, with no risk of losing valuable equipment or people (e.g., as can occur through lab and field experiments) in the process. This capability equips us to peer well into the future, to make informed decisions, and to take dominating actions, not only regarding which alternate futures to select, but also regarding how to achieve each future in a competitively advantageous way.

In light of the issues identified above, we’re looking in particular at how to address the long decision chains, information flows and staffing turbulence that militate against efficient or effective C2 at present, and we’re concentrating on managing the kinds of fast-changing local knowledge that challenges even the best efforts in terms of written standards, rules and procedures. We’re considering further how to decrease the coordination load on C2 of unmanned systems, and we continue to envision alternate approaches to the integrated recruiting, training, promotion and performance of manned and unmanned operators.

In the near future, we anticipate laying out a list of highly promising, agile approaches to adapting C2 in response to such issues, with a set of milestone markers to signal when each will likely become most appropriate, and a set of plans for how to effect each of them. The idea is to peer sufficiently far into the future so that we can provide leaders, policy makers and technologists today with the time and guidance needed for them to prepare for and navigate the rough seas ahead.

[1] The term C2 as discussed here subsumes and largely replaces the myriad extension of “Cs” (e.g., C3, C3I, C4, C4I, C4ISR, C5I).
[2] JP6-0, Joint Publication 6-0: Joint Communication System Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff (2015).
[3] NDP6, Naval Doctrine Publication 6: Naval Command and Control Washington, DC: Department of the Navy (1995).
[4] POWer derives from the VDT Group at Stanford and has been tailored and validated to simulate the qualitative and quantitative behaviors of C2 organizations, approaches, personnel and systems.
[5] See, for example, Nissen, M.E. and Place, W.D., “Computational Experimentation to Understand C2 for Teams of Autonomous Systems and People,” Technical Report NPS-14-007, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA (December 2014).

Reprinted with permission from the Naval Postgraduate School's CRUSER News. All opinions expressed are those of the respective author or authors and do not represent the official policy or positions of the Naval Postgraduate School, the United States Navy, or any other government entity.

Operating in an Era of Persistent Unmanned Aerial Surveillance

2015-08-11T07:28:00.000-07:00

By William Selby

In the year 2000, the United States military used Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs) strictly for surveillance purposes and the global commercial UAS market was nascent. Today, the combination of countries exporting complex UAS technologies and an expanding commercial UAS market advances the spread of UAS technologies outside of U.S. government control. The propagation of this technology from both the commercial and military sectors will increase the risk of sophisticated UASs becoming available to any individual or group, regardless of their intent or financial resources. Current and future adversaries, including non-state actors, are likely to acquire and integrate UASs into their operations against U.S. forces. However, U.S. forces can reduce the advantages of abundant UAS capability by limiting the massing of resources and by conducting distributed operations with smaller maneuver elements.

Leveraging the Growth in the Commercial UAS Market

While armed UAS operations are only associated with the U.S., UK, and Israel, other countries with less restrictive export controls are independently developing their own armed UAS systems. Chinese companies continue to develop reconnaissance and armed UASs for export to emerging foreign markets. Earlier this year, social media reports identified a Chinese CH-3 after it crashed in Nigeria. Reports indicate China sold the system to the Nigerian government for use against Boko Haram. Other countries including Pakistan and Iran organically developed armed UAS capabilities, with claims of varying levels of credibility. In an effort to capitalize on the international UAS market and to build relationships with allies, the U.S. eased UAS export restrictions in early 2015 while announcing the sale of armed UASs to the Netherlands. Military UAS development is expected to be relatively limited, with less than 0.5 percent of expected future global defense spending slated to buying or developing military drones. For now, long range surveillance and attack UASs are likely to remain restricted to the few wealthy and technologically advanced countries that can afford the research costs, training, and logistical support associated with such systems. However, short range military or civilian UASs are likely to be acquired by non-state actors primarily for surveillance purposes.

Still captured from an ISIS documentary with footage shot from a UAS over the Iraqi city of Fallujah(nytimes.com)

Hamas, Hezbollah, Libyan militants, and ISIS are reportedly using commercial UASs to provide surveillance support for their military operations. Current models contain onboard GPS receivers for autonomous navigation and a video transmission or recording system that allows the operators to collect live video for a few thousand dollars or less. Small UASs, similar in size to the U.S. military’s Group 1 UASs, appeal to non-state actors for several reasons. Namely, they are inexpensive to acquire, can be easily purchased in the civilian market, and are simple to maintain. Some systems can be operated with very little assembly or training, which reduces the need for substantial technical knowledge and enables non-state actors to immediately integrate them into daily operations. These UASs are capable of targeting restricted areas as evidenced by the recent UAS activity near the White House, French nuclear power plants, and the Japanese Prime Minister’s roof. The small size and agility of these UASs allow them to evade traditional air defense systems yet specific counter UAS systems are beginning to show progress beyond the prototype phase.

Economic forecasters may dispute commercial UAS sales predictions, but most agree that this market is likely to see larger growth than the military market. Countries are currently attempting to attract emerging UAS businesses by developing UAS regulations that will integrate commercial UASs into their national airspace. The increase of hobby and commercial UAS use is likely to lead to significant investments in both hardware and software for these systems. Ultimately, this will result in a wider number of platforms with an increased number of capabilities available for purchase at a lower cost. Future systems are expected to come with obstacle avoidance systems, a wider variety of modular payloads, and extensive training support systems provided by a growing user community. Hybrid systems will address the payload, range, and endurance limitations of the current platforms by combining aspects of rotor and fixed wing aerial vehicles. The dual-use nature of these commercial systems will continue to be an issue. Google and Amazon are researching package delivery systems that can potentially be repurposed to carry hazardous materials. Thermal, infrared, and multispectral cameras used for precision agriculture can also provide non-state actors night-time surveillance and the ability to peer through limited camouflage. However, non-state actors will likely primarily use hobby and commercial grade platforms in an aerial surveillance role, since current payload limitations prevent the platforms from carrying a significant amount of hazardous material.

Minimizing the Advantages of Non-State Actor’s UAS Surveillance

As these systems proliferate, even the most resource-limited adversaries are expected to have access to an aerial surveillance platform. Therefore, friendly operations must adapt in an environment of perceived ubiquitous surveillance. Despite the limited range and endurance of these small UASs, they are difficult to detect and track reliably. Therefore, one must assume the adversary is operating these systems if reporting indicates they possess them. Force protection measures and tactical level concepts of operations can be modified to limit the advantages of ever-present and multi-dimensional surveillance by the adversary. At the tactical level, utilizing smoke and terrain to mask movement and the use of camouflage nets or vegetation for concealment can be effective countermeasures. The principles of deception, stealth, and ambiguity will take on increasing importance as achieving any element of surprise will become far more difficult.

The upcoming 3DR Solo UAS will feature autonomous flight and camera control with real time video streaming for $1,000 (3drobotics.com)

At static locations such as forward operating bases or patrol bases, a high frequency of operations, including deception operations, can saturate the adversary’s intelligence collection and processing capabilities and disguise the intent of friendly movements. Additionally, massing strategic resources at static locations will incur increasing risk. In 2007 for example, insurgents used Google Earth imagery of British bases in Basra to improve the accuracy of mortar fire. The adversary will now have near real time geo-referenced video available which can be combined with GPS guided rockets, artillery, mortars and missiles to conduct rapid and accurate attacks. These attacks can be conducted with limited planning and resources, yet produce results similar to the 2012 attack at Camp Bastion which caused over $100 million in damages and resulted in the combat ineffectiveness of the AV-8B squadron.

In environments without the need for an enduring ground presence, distributed operations with smaller maneuver elements will reduce the chance of strategic losses while concurrently making it harder for the adversary to identify and track friendly forces. Interestingly, operational concepts developed by several of the services to assure access in the face of sophisticated anti-access/area denial threats can also minimalize the impact of the UAS surveillance capabilities of non-state actors. The Navy has the Distributed Lethality concept, the Air Force is testing the Rapid Raptor concept, and the Army’s is developing its Pacific Pathways concept. The Marine Corps is implementing its response, Expeditionary Force 21 (EF21), through several Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Forces.

The EF21 concept focuses on using high-speed aerial transport, such as the MV-22, to conduct dispersed operations with Company Landing Teams that are self-sufficient for up to a week. In December 2013, 160 Marines flew over 3,400 miles in KC-130s and MV-22s from their base in Spain to Uganda in order to support the embassy evacuation in South Sudan, demonstrating the EF21 concept. Utilizing high speed and long-range transport allows friendly forces to stage outside of the adversary’s ground and aerial surveillance range. This prevents the adversary from observing any patterns that could allude to the mission of the friendly force and also limits exposure to UAS surveillance. Advances in digital communications, including VTCs and mesh-networks, can reduce the footprint of the command center making these smaller forces more flexible without reducing capabilities. The small size of these units also reduces their observable signatures and limits the ability of the adversary to target massed forces and resources.

Confronting the Approaching UAS Free-Rider Dilemma

Non-state actors capitalize on the ability to rapidly acquire and implement sophisticated technologies without having to invest directly in their development. These organizations did not pay to develop the Internet or reconnaissance satellites, yet they have Internet access to high-resolution images of the entire globe. It took years for the U.S. to develop the ability to live stream video from the Predator UAS but now anyone can purchase a hobby UAS that comes with the ability to live stream HD video to YouTube for immediate world-wide distribution. As the commercial market expands, so will the capabilities of these small UAS systems, democratizing UAS technology. Systems that cannot easily be imported, such as advanced communications relays, robust training pipelines, and sophisticated logistics infrastructure can now be automated and outsourced. This process will erode the air dominance that the U.S. enjoyed since WWII, now that commercial investments allow near peers to acquire key UAS technologies that approach U.S. UAS capabilities.

The next generation of advanced fighters may be the sophisticated unmanned vehicles envisioned by Navy Secretary Ray Maybus. However, other countries could choose a different route by sacrificing survivability for cheaper, smaller, and smarter UAS swarms that will directly benefit from commercial UAS investments. Regardless of the strategic direction military UASs take, commercial and hobby systems operating in an aerial surveillance role will remain an inexpensive force multiplier for non-state actors. Fortunately, the strategic concepts developed and implemented by the services to counter the proliferation of advanced anti-air and coastal defense systems can be leveraged to minimalize the impact of unmanned aerial surveillance by the adversary. Distributed operations limit the massing of resources vulnerable to UAS assisted targeting while long-range insertions of small maneuver elements reduces the exposure of friendly forces to UAS surveillance. Nation states and non-state actors will continue to benefit from technological advances without investing resources in their development, pushing U.S. forces to continually update operational concepts to limit the increasing capabilities of the adversary.

William Selby is a Marine officer who completed studies at the US Naval Academy and MIT researching robotics and unmanned systems. He previously served with 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines and is currently stationed in Washington, DC. Follow him @wilselby or www.wilselby.com Reprinted with permission from the Center for International Maritime Security.

Where is the U.S. Navy Going To Put Them All? (Part 2)

2015-07-29T00:59:00.000-07:00

Part 2: UUVs, Fire Scouts and buoys and why the Navy needs lot’s of them.

Guest post by Jan Musil.

Sketch by Jan Musil. Hand drawn on
quarter-inch graph paper. Each
square equals twenty by twenty feet.

This article, the second of the series, lays out a suggested doctrine of use for the UUVs and Fire Scouts that have already been developed. It is an incremental strategy, primarily calling for using what the Navy already has in hand, adding use of buoys in quantity combined with appropriate doctrinal changes and vigorously applying the result to the ASW mission.

In getting this program underway the U.S. Navy can utilize existing sensors, whether for prosecuting ASW, developing sonar projections of the water below, including occasional deep diving missions and whatever else we find a need for the UUV to do. In practice though, generating useful results is far easier to accomplish if the UUV is routinely, though not exclusively, used with a tether so the data generated can easily be transmitted back aboard for analysis and use.

Utilizing tethered UUVs with a suite of frequencies to listen and broadcast on opens up some interesting opportunities for the ASW mission. By significantly expanding outward the range of ocean area being searched the U.S. Navy can realistically anticipate creating the possibility of being able to establish a rough range number to a detected target. Spread the sonar emitters out far enough and the use of parallax kicks in and if there is just a little difference in vector to the target from two widely separated hunters they now have a working range number. This range estimate will almost certainly be nothing close to accurate enough to fire on, but it will certainly indicate a distinct patch of ocean to direct any orbiting P-8s or other airframes toward. Finding a needle in haystacks is a lot easier if you have a solid clue as to which haystack you should be searching.

Particularly if the Fire Scouts are simultaneously dynamically moving dipping sonar equipped buoys around the ocean in conjunction with the UUV equipped buoys. For discussion purposes let’s say a Fire Scout starts its day by moving one UUV equipped and four dipping sonar equipped buoys, all transmitting locally to an ISR drone or ScanEagle just overhead, in relays, across the ocean. As the hours pass an enormous amount of ocean can be searched, further and further out from the task force, yet the buoys will be able to keep up with the task force as it travels, even in dash mode. With only one buoy in the air at a time, each one only being moved hundreds or a few thousands of yards at a time, there will be a constant stream of much better data generated for the ASW team than the existing use of sonobuoys can provide. And the deployed equipment will be able to reliably function on station for many more hours than a manned helicopter team can provide.

Perhaps not at a 24/7 rate nor for days and days on end, but a task force with 15 Fire Scouts and 60 buoys deployed, potentially separated by many miles, has added multiple alternatives to the ASW teams quiver.

It is suggested above that 15 Fire Scouts dynamically rotate 60 UUV or dipping sonar equipped buoys across the ocean. 15 and 60 are merely suggestions though. The real point is that to derive the greatest value out of the newly developed UUVs and Fire Scouts the Navy needs to be thinking in terms of a dozen plus helicopters and scores of buoys at a time, regardless of the particular mix of equipment and sensors dangling beneath them. Again, think and operate in quantity.

Buoys

Ultra Electronics Sonobuoys

At this point a brief description of the buoy noted above, to be deployed in scores at any given time, is in order. A set of eight hollow, segmented and honey combed for strength where necessary tubes, say one foot in diameter, made of a 21st century version of fiberglass can be configured in a square. Stacking the ends of the tubes on each other log cabin style, but deliberately leaving the space between each pair of tubes empty creates as much buoyancy as possible, but very deliberately reduces freeboard. Whether the resulting buoy is equipped with a dipping sonar or UUV, both the sensors and the equipment needed to operate the tether, reel for the line and so forth is going to get soaked anyway. Simultaneously, we want a minimum of tossing and reeling about in various sea states as the sonar or UUV does its job or as a helicopter drops down to utilize a hook to grab the buoy and gently lift it clear of the water. So if the waves and swell are moving between the pairs of tubes, this will substantially reduce the buoys unavoidable acrobatics in the water, vastly easing the helicopters task in relifting it for redeployment.

So long as the pyramid resting on top of the buoy containing the motor driving the reel and its power source has a double sealed compartment and the necessary electronics, radar lure and antenna are in a triple sealed compartment above it; both routinely riding above the waves, limited freeboard is actually an advantage. At this point all that is needed is to add an appropriately sized circle of steel for the helicopter to snag each time it moves the buoy and we have an extremely practical piece of equipment to deploy, in large numbers and at a rather low price, across the fleet.

In years to come the Navy can incrementally add the ability to transmit and receive on different frequencies to measure the difference in time back to the emitting sensors thereby creating additional ways to monitor the underwater environment, detect targets and potentially be less intrusive when operating amongst our cetacean neighbors. By doing so we can build a much more sophisticated picture of surrounding water conditions as well. Knowledge that good computerized analysis of the data and developing a doctrine of best practice to utilize this knowledge of water conditions will leave the mission commander’s CIC in a position to make much better informed decisions on where to deploy their search assets next.

Sounds great doesn’t it? But as always there is a problem or three lurking about that need to be dealt with. For now we have reached the point where we need to consider the question used as the title for the article. Where is the U.S. Navy going to put them all?

In the next article we examine two new ship classes that can be used by the fleet to go to sea with the various types of drones, UUVs, Fire Scouts and buoys suggested, in quantity, as well as the needed sailors aboard.

Jan Musil is a Vietnam era Navy veteran, disenchanted ex-corporate middle manager and long time entrepreneur currently working as an author of science fiction novels. More relevantly to CIMSEC he is also a long-standing student of navies in general, post-1930 ship construction thinking, and design hopes versus actual results and fleet composition debates of the twentieth century. Reprinted with permission from the Center for International Maritime Security.

Where is the U.S. Navy Going To Put Them All?

2015-07-28T07:10:00.001-07:00

Part 1: More Drones Please. Lot’s and Lot’s of Them!

Guest Post by Jan Musil

Sketch by Jan Musil. Hand drawn on quarter-inch
graph paper. Each square equals twenty by twenty feet.

Recent technological developments have provided the U.S. Navy with major breakthroughs in unmanned carrier landings with the X-47B. A public debate has emerged over which types of drones to acquire and how to employ them. This article suggests a solution to the issue of how to best make use of the new capabilities that unmanned aircraft and closely related developments in UUVs bring to the fleet.

The suggested solution argues for taking a broader look at what all of the new aerial and underwater unmanned vehicles can contribute, particularly en masse. And how this grouping of new equipment can augment carrier strike groups. In addition, there are significant opportunities to revive ASW hunter killer task forces, expand operational capabilities in the Arctic, supplement our South China Sea and North East Asia presence without using major fleet elements and provide the fleet with a flexible set of assets for daily contingencies.

These sorts of missions provide opportunities for five principal types of drones. Strike, ISR and refueling drones as winged aircraft to fly off fleet platforms, UUVs and the Fire Scout helicopter. So we have five candidates to be built, in quantity, for the fleet. Let’s examine each of the suggestions for what they should be built to accomplish, what sort of weapons or sensors they need to be equipped with and what doctrinal developments for their use with the fleet need to happen.

Strike drone

The current requirements are calling for long range, large payload, and the ability to aerially refuel and are to be combined with stealth construction techniques for the airframe, even if not stealth coated. These size and weight parameters mean this drone will require CATOBAR launching off an aircraft carrier’s flight deck. Which also means it will be supplementing, and to some extent replacing, the F-35C in the air wings for decades to come. The merits of how many strike drones versus F-35Cs, and the level of stealth desired for both, will be an ongoing debate for the foreseeable future.

Given that a strike drone built with these capabilities will be tasked with similar mission requirements to the F-35C, we will assume for now that the weapons and ISR equipment installed will be equivalent, if not exactly the same as the F-35C. This implies that whatever work the U.S. Navy has already done in developing doctrine for use of the long range strike capacity the F-35Cs brings to the fleet should only need to be supplemented with the addition of a strike drone.

It is worth remembering that while these drones are unmanned, since they are CATOBAR they will still require sailors on deck to move, reload and maintain them. Sailors who also need a place to eat, sleep, etc.

And the carriers are already really busy places. However welcome the strike drone winds up being, there is not going to be enough room on the carriers to be add even more equipment. Therefore each drone will be replacing something already there, both physically within the hangar bay and financially within the Navy’s budget.

ISR drone

Most of the current public discussion surrounding an ISR equipped drone is rather hazy about what sort of sensors, range and weapons, if any, are wanted. However, the philosophical debate over mission profile, including a much smaller size, localized range requirement and the presumed emphasis on ISR tasks is revealing. The key points to concentrate on for such a drone are the suggested set of missions to be conducted by an arc of ISR drones around a selected location, sensor and networking capabilities, range and durability requirements and a limited weapons payload.

The traditional use of aerial search capabilities onboard a carrier task force was over the horizon, well over the horizon thank you very much, locating of the opponents surface assets. Over the years the extended ranges of aircraft and the development of airborne ASW assets changed the nature of the search and locate mission and the assets being used to conduct it. Adding space based surveillance changed things once more. The coming improvements in networking and data processing capabilities inside a task force, a steadily rising need for over the horizon targeting information coupled with the need to function within an increasingly hostile A2AD environment has once more altered the requirements of the search and locate mission. Search and locate essentially has become search, locate, network and target.

Being able to fund as well as field large numbers of anything almost always means keeping it smaller, and deleting anything not strictly needed beyond occasional use is an excellent way to accomplish this. For the ISR drone, not arming it with anything beyond strictly self-defense weapons is an excellent way to keep size and costs down. Since the primary missions of the ISR drone will be the new search, locate, network and target paradigm, concentrating funding on those capabilities is an excellent way to limit both development and operating costs.

Particularly since putting a large number of the drones, each capable of at least 24-30 hours on station, supplemented by refueling, in an arc around a task force in the direction(s) of highest concern means that the Super Hornets of the fleet can largely be freed from the loiter and defend mission and return to being hunters.

Since I am assuming the railgun will also be joining the fleet in large numbers some discussion about the range of the search, locate, network and target arc suggested above as it relates to the railgun is in order. The publicly disclosed range of the railgun is 65 miles, so an arc of ISR drones needs to be farther out from the task force than that, quite some way beyond that to provide time to effectively network location and target data developed back to the shooters. In the anticipated A2AD environment the primary threat is very likely to be a missile, mostly subsonic but the potential for at least some of them being hypersonic exists. Therefore, the incoming missiles or aircraft will need to be located, networked information sent to the surface assets armed with railguns and the targeting information processed quickly enough that the bars of steel launched as a result will be waiting for the incoming missile at 65 miles. Precisely how far out beyond the railguns effective range the arc of ISR drones will need to be will almost certainly vary by circumstance and the nature of the opponent’s weaponry. Nevertheless, whether subsonic or hypersonic, missiles move rapidly and this means an effective arc of ISR drones will have to be a long distance out from the task force. The farther out the arc is, a higher number of drones will be needed to provide adequate coverage.

This implies a need for a minimum of 6-8 ISR drones on station, 24/7, in all kinds of weather. Since there are inevitable maintenance problems cutting into availability time, this implies a task force will need take twice that number to sea with it. Particularly if a second arc of two or three ISR drones is maintained just over the horizon, or simply overhead. This inner group can also provide local networking abilities for the ASW assets of the task force. Having at least one ISR drone close in to provide a rapid relay of information around the task force by its sub hunters should also be planned for as a doctrinal necessity.

This arc of ISR drones is a wonderful new capability to have, but…., but fifteen drones are not going to fit on a CVN. Not when an essentially equivalent number of something else needs to be removed to make room for the newcomers. Our carriers are packed as it is with needed airframes and trading out fifteen of them from the existing air wing is not going to happen.

Nor is there room elsewhere in the fleet. The CCGs and DDGs have limited space on their helo decks, but even if the new ISR drone were equipped with the modified VTOL engine from the Osprey program, there still wouldn’t be space for more than a few of them. Once more, it is a case of needing to take something out of the fleet to put the new capability in.

This means we have to build a new class, or classes, of ships to operate and house the quantities of drones desired, including operating space, hangar and maintenance space and sailor’s living spaces.

Refueling drone

A drone primarily dedicated to the refueling mission takes on another of the un-glamorous, but unending tasks involved in operating a task force. Instead of the proposed return of the S-3 Vikings as tankers, a somewhat larger drone can be designed from scratch to be a flying gas station with long range and loitering times, presumably with vastly more fuel aboard and built to only occasionally load weapons or sensors under the wings. It could have ISR capabilities or ASW weapons slung under the wings as distinctly secondary design characteristics. In understanding when to use manned versus unmanned systems obviously any extra weight and space gained by losing a cockpit allows for more fuel carried, longer loitering times and extra range. These advantages need to be balanced against the occasional need for a pilot’s skills on scene.

UUVs

As for the UUVs in development, much has been made of their ability to dive deeply and search for things as well as their ability to autonomously operate far out in front of a task force, including the possibility of submarine launched missions. While interesting a more incremental use of the roughly six feet long torpedo shaped UUV currently in use for deep diving missions might be more appropriate.

While we wait on further research developments to establish ways to effectively utilize a long range, long duration UUV reconnaissance drone, a more mundane use of what we have right now can readily be used for ASW purposes. We could equip a six-foot UUV with the sensors already in use for ASW purposes and cradle it in open sided buoy in order to hoist the UUV in and out of the water. This buoy could be used over the side, or far more usefully, launched and recovered by helicopter. Wave and say hello Fire Scouts.

Fire Scouts

Any helicopter asset that the U.S. Navy has can be used of course, but without a pilot aboard the Fire Scouts are much better suited for the long hours required to successfully prosecute ASW. Taking off with the UUV cradled inside it’s buoy, the Fire Scout can deploy the buoy, allow the tethered UUV to swim to the thermocline or other desired depth, hover while allowing the UUV to transmit or simply silently listen, wait for the resulting data that is collected to be reported via the tether and broadcast by an antenna on the buoy and then once the UUV has swum back into it’s cradle within the buoy, drop back down and relift the buoy and move it to the next needed position. This redeployment can be hundreds or thousands of yards away at the mission commander’s discretion. This cycle can be repeated as many times as wanted or fuel for the Fire Scout allows. A difficulty that can be resolved aboard the nearest surface ship with a helo deck, leaving the buoy drifting in place, UUV on station and transmitting as refueling takes place. Shift changes by pilots should not materially interrupt this cycle. The most likely limitation that will force the Fire Scout to lift buoy and UUV out of the water for return aboard will be the exhaustion of the power source aboard the buoy being used to operate the reel for the tether and broadcast the data collected to an overhead airframe. Which just happens to be another use for the ISR drone or a ScanEagle.

In the next article we will examine how the Navy can make profitable use of UUVs and buoys, deployed and maneuvered across the ocean by the Fire Scout helicopter, in quantity, in pursuit of the ASW mission.

Reprinted with permission from the Center for International Maritime Security.