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		<title>The Online Campaign Asking Rubio to Re-designate the MEK</title>
		<link>https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16392</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nejat Society]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 15 Nov 2026 11:14:12 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[USA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mujahedin Khalq Declining]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mujahedin Khalq in the List of terrorist Organizations]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The MEK and the Iranian People]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.nejatngo.org/en/?p=16392</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The online campaign organized by Iranian users on the X platform targeting United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio, centers on demands to re-designate the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). According to historical records and United States government archives, the core grievance raised by these social media users—that the group was &#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16392">The Online Campaign Asking Rubio to Re-designate the MEK</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en">Nejat Society</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The online campaign organized by Iranian users on the X platform targeting United States Secretary of State Marco Rubio, centers on demands to re-designate the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). According to historical records and United States government archives, the core grievance raised by these social media users—that the group was linked to the killings of American military personnel and contractors in Iran during the 1970s—is a documented part of the organization&#8217;s history.</p>
<p>To understand the context of this digital protest, it is helpful to examine the historical trajectory of the MEK, its designation and subsequent delisting by the United States, and the complex diplomatic and political debates surrounding its current status.</p>
<p>Founded in 1965 by leftist Iranian intellectuals, the MEK initially positioned itself as an Islamic-Marxist guerrilla movement dedicated to violently overthrowing the U.S.-backed regime of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. During the 1970s, the group carried out a series of urban guerrilla operations, bombings, and assassinations.</p>
<figure id="attachment_16394" aria-describedby="caption-attachment-16394" style="width: 800px" class="wp-caption aligncenter"><img fetchpriority="high" decoding="async" class="size-full wp-image-16394" src="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/wp-content/uploads/Anti-MEK-Online.jpg" alt="Anti-MEK Online Campaign on X" width="800" height="450" srcset="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/wp-content/uploads/Anti-MEK-Online.jpg 800w, https://www.nejatngo.org/en/wp-content/uploads/Anti-MEK-Online-300x169.jpg 300w, https://www.nejatngo.org/en/wp-content/uploads/Anti-MEK-Online-768x432.jpg 768w, https://www.nejatngo.org/en/wp-content/uploads/Anti-MEK-Online-585x329.jpg 585w" sizes="(max-width: 800px) 100vw, 800px" /><figcaption id="caption-attachment-16394" class="wp-caption-text">Anti-MEK Online Campaign on X</figcaption></figure>
<p>U.S. government documentation confirms that during this pre-revolutionary period, the MEK targeted American interests in Iran. Notable incidents included the assassinations of U.S. military personnel and civilian contractors, such as Lieutenant Colonel Lewis Hawkins, Colonel Paul Schaeffer, and civilian defense contractors Donald Smith and Robert Krongard, who were working with the Electronic Data Systems corporation in Tehran. These actions cemented the group&#8217;s early reputation in Washington as a hostile, anti-American entity.</p>
<p>Following the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the MEK experienced a violent falling out with the newly established clerical government, leading to the eventual exile of the group&#8217;s leadership to France and later to Iraq, where they aligned with Saddam Hussein during the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988).</p>
<p>Due to its violent campaign, ongoing military activities, and historical actions, the United States Department of State formally designated the MEK as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in October 1997 under Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.</p>
<p>For the next decade and a half, the group remained on the FTO list. However, beginning in the late 2000s, the MEK launched an extensive, high-profile legal and public relations campaign in the United States and Europe. Backed by numerous prominent former U.S. officials, lawmakers, and retired military generals from both major political parties, the organization argued that it had renounced violence, closed its military wing, and cooperated with Western intelligence.</p>
<p>On September 28, 2012, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton officially revoked the MEK&#8217;s terrorist designation. The decision was praised by the group&#8217;s supporters as a necessary correction, but it drew sharp criticism from human rights monitors and various Iranian diaspora groups who pointed to the organization&#8217;s past violence, authoritarian internal structure, and history of alignment with Saddam Hussein.</p>
<p>The opposition of Iranian social media users to MEK is deeply rooted in historical conflicts, political controversies, and a profound national trauma stemming from the Iran-Iraq War.</p>
<p>The recent social media mobilization on X reflects deep divisions within the broader Iranian opposition and population regarding the future of Iran. While the MEK actively promotes itself as a viable democratic alternative to the Islamic Republic, its critics view the organization with intense skepticism and resentment.</p>
<p>Many Iranian internet users argue that the group lacks genuine domestic popularity inside Iran due to its wartime alliance with Iraq and its radical history. The demand for Secretary of State Marco Rubio—known for his hawkish stance on the Iranian government—to re-designate the MEK stems from a desire by these critics to hold the organization accountable for its historical acts of terrorism against both Iranian civilians and American nationals, while signaling opposition to foreign-backed regime change actors perceived as lacking legitimate grassroots backing.</p>
<p>Mazda Parsi</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16392">The Online Campaign Asking Rubio to Re-designate the MEK</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en">Nejat Society</a>.</p>
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		<title>On the occasion of his birthday, after 40 years of separation</title>
		<link>https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16391</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nejat Society]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 10 Nov 2026 06:27:14 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Members of the MEK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Families and Members]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Families of the MEK hostages denied of their rights]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Family]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.nejatngo.org/en/?p=16391</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>In the Summer of 1987, during the Iran-Iraq war, Saeed Farajollah Hosseini was a soldier who was taken prisoner by Iraqi forces. Subsequently, following a collusion between Massoud Rajavi and Saddam Hussein, he was handed over to Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK). Years later, his family learned that he was residing in the MEK’s headquarters in Iraq, &#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16391">On the occasion of his birthday, after 40 years of separation</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en">Nejat Society</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>In the Summer of 1987, during the Iran-Iraq war, Saeed Farajollah Hosseini was a soldier who was taken prisoner by Iraqi forces. Subsequently, following a collusion between Massoud Rajavi and Saddam Hussein, he was handed over to Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK). Years later, his family learned that he was residing in the MEK’s headquarters in Iraq, Camp Ashraf.</p>
<p>In 2002, Saeed’s mother, Masoumeh Rezaiee traveled to Camp Ashraf to visit her son. She was allowed to meet him for a very short time. In the next visits, Saeed turned sour to his mother and his siblings and finally he was coerced by the group authorities to reject them. He refused to meet with them. It has been 30 years now, that Masoumeh has not visited her son. Thay have had no contact for 3 decades.</p>
<div style="width: 640px;" class="wp-video"><video class="wp-video-shortcode" id="video-16391-2" width="640" height="360" preload="metadata" controls="controls"><source type="video/mp4" src="https://dla.nejatngo.org/Media/Nejat/Tehran/Farajollah-Hoseini-Saeid.mp4?_=2" /><a href="https://dla.nejatngo.org/Media/Nejat/Tehran/Farajollah-Hoseini-Saeid.mp4">https://dla.nejatngo.org/Media/Nejat/Tehran/Farajollah-Hoseini-Saeid.mp4</a></video></div>
<p>It was Saeed’s birthday a few days ago. For a mother who has spent forty years waiting for her child, her son’s birthday—a day that should be one of joy—turns into a time of tears and longing when she feels the grief of his absence. Forty years of waiting for a mother who still holds onto the belief that her son will return.</p>
<p>A day that the home should have been filled with laughter and happiness—a moment when a mother ought to have been embracing her son, kissing his face, and wishing him a happy birthday. Yet, sadly, all that remains for this mother are tears and a framed photograph—a poor substitute for the embrace of her son, Saeed.</p>
<p>Saeed, has been trapped in the Cult of Rajavi for years. His mother continues to wait, clinging to the hope that one day she will see her beloved child again.</p>
<p>Saeed Farajollah Hosseini is now banned in the MEK’s camp in Albania, Ashraf 3. His long-suffering mother was interviewed in “Mother, Love, Separation”, a documentary created by Aldo Sollulari, the then president of Nejat Society Albania. The documentary shows her genuine outpourings and the sorrow in her eyes</p>
<p>In February 2022, Saeid Farajollah Hosseini’s aunt and uncle who live in Sweden went to Albania to visit him but they were not allowed to enter the MEK’s headquarters Ashraf 3, in Manez.</p>
<p>This short video was made by Saeed’s family and was sent to Nejat Society, on the occasion of his birthday.</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16391">On the occasion of his birthday, after 40 years of separation</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en">Nejat Society</a>.</p>
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		<title>To mind Control Systems: How Do You Do That?</title>
		<link>https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16389</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nejat Society]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 08 Nov 2026 06:30:12 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Mujahedin Khalq 's Function]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Manipulation Techniques of the MEK cult leaders]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mujahedin Khalq as a Destructive Cult]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Threat of Cults]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.nejatngo.org/en/?p=16389</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Religion and ideology for destructive mind control systems essentially works for &#8220;infecting&#8221; the mind, compelling followers to commit any kind of atrocity. This has been identified as the primary threat of the third millennium. Examples of mind control systems (destructive cults) include Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, under the guise of Buddhism, the Ku Klux Klan &#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16389">To mind Control Systems: How Do You Do That?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en">Nejat Society</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Religion and ideology for destructive mind control systems essentially works for &#8220;infecting&#8221; the mind, compelling followers to commit any kind of atrocity. This has been identified as the primary threat of the third millennium. Examples of mind control systems (destructive cults) include Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, under the guise of Buddhism, the Ku Klux Klan in the United States under the guise of Christianity, Zionism under the guise of Judaism, ISIS under the guise of Islam, and the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) under the guise of Marxist Shi&#8217;ism.</p>
<p>Professor Nurit Peled-Elhanan, world justice and peace advocate, writer, educator, and community organizer, teaches language and education at The Hebrew University of Jerusalem. She is the author of “PALESTINE IN ISRAELI BOOKS &#8211; IDEOLOGY AND PROPAGANDA IN EDUCATION,” the work in which she outlines and develops the main points stated in this short video.</p>
<p>According to Professor Elhanan, it is impossible to underestimate the power not only of educational systems, but also of those who build them and the educators who work within them. What make genocides possible is not only the armies or militias, but also an entire citizenry that supports them and gets involved in them directly or indirectly. Genocides are carried out with weapons without also being promoted, encouraged, and justified by writers, educators, academics, journalists, entertainers (actors and actresses, singers, comedians…), scientists, advertisers, and one’s next neighbor, whether that neighbor is a baker or a plumber, a truck driver or a shoemaker.</p>
<div style="width: 640px;" class="wp-video"><video class="wp-video-shortcode" id="video-16389-3" width="640" height="360" preload="metadata" controls="controls"><source type="video/mp4" src="https://dla.nejatngo.org/Media/Documentary/Nurit-Peled-Elhanan.mp4?_=3" /><a href="https://dla.nejatngo.org/Media/Documentary/Nurit-Peled-Elhanan.mp4">https://dla.nejatngo.org/Media/Documentary/Nurit-Peled-Elhanan.mp4</a></video></div>
<p><strong>Text of the short video: </strong></p>
<p>How do you take nice Jewish boys and girls and turn them into monsters, killers of children when they reach 18? It takes a very long, thorough and sophisticated education to do that. And that was my question. You know, how do you do that? How come, you know? We have an organization called Breaking the Silence, where soldiers confess what they did in the West Bank. And many of these confessions, in many of these confessions, the soldiers say, I was educated to believe that whatever I do to the Palestinians will save us from another Holocaust. And only when I aimed my rifle at a little girl, I realized that I was the evil one. And then I stopped. So this education is so entrenched. It&#8217;s really you know, Richard Dawkins hated religion and he called religion mind infection. But, I think, this is mind infection. Ideologies can be mined infectors. And they are so infected with it … and the dehumanization of Palestinians especially is so strong that it&#8217;s very hard for people, especially young people, to get rid of that and to see these people as human beings.</p>
<p>Ebrahim Khodabandeh</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16389">To mind Control Systems: How Do You Do That?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en">Nejat Society</a>.</p>
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		<title>Why Neither Pahlavi nor the MEK Can Claim to Represent Iran?</title>
		<link>https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16386</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nejat Society]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 31 Oct 2026 11:55:03 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Mujahedin Khalq as an Opposition Group]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Bodies regarding the MEK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The MEK and the Iranian People]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.nejatngo.org/en/?p=16386</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>The question of who represents the Iranian people and the validity of international invitations extended to figures like Reza Pahlavi has been a subject of intense geopolitical debate, particularly surrounding his scheduled appearance at the Royal Military Academy in Belgium on November 6th 2026. The cancellation of official parliamentary receptions for Pahlavi in Brussels—alongside intense &#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16386">Why Neither Pahlavi nor the MEK Can Claim to Represent Iran?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en">Nejat Society</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The question of who represents the Iranian people and the validity of international invitations extended to figures like Reza Pahlavi has been a subject of intense geopolitical debate, particularly surrounding his scheduled appearance at the Royal Military Academy in Belgium on November 6th 2026. The cancellation of official parliamentary receptions for Pahlavi in Brussels—alongside intense scrutiny of his engagements—highlights a complex interplay between diaspora activism, opposition groups, independent civil society actors, and cautious European diplomacy.</p>
<p>At the core of the Belgian institutional pushback lies a fundamental democratic reality: neither Maryam Rajavi nor Reza Pahlavi can legitimately claim to be the representative of the Iranian people. Belgian authorities, independent legal scholars, human rights advocates, and diverse diaspora associations independently raised severe objections to Pahlavi&#8217;s visit precisely because elevating any unelected exile figure undermines the principle of popular sovereignty. For Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot and other independent critics, determining the future leadership of Iran is a choice that must belong solely to the Iranian people through a free, democratic process, rather than through foreign-conferred recognition of monarchist or formerly terrorist designated factions like the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK).</p>
<p>The controversy began when Georges-Louis Bouchez, leader of Belgium&#8217;s Francophone liberal MR party, proposed hosting Reza Pahlavi at the Belgian Chamber of Representatives. However, this proposal faced immediate institutional roadblocks. Belgian Foreign Minister Maxime Prévot publicly cautioned against treating Pahlavi as the sole or legitimate representative of the Iranian opposition. Prévot explicitly stated that deciding who should lead Iran is a choice that must belong solely to the Iranian people, emphasizing that the Iranian opposition is deeply diverse and that granting official recognition to one faction could be misinterpreted as partisan Belgian backing.</p>
<p>Following these warnings, the parliamentary Conference of Presidents failed to reach a consensus, leading to the official cancellation of the parliamentary reception. Concurrently, an attempt to shift the event to the Brussels regional Parliament also failed due to active opposition from multiple political groups who warned against providing a platform that could be used for unilateral political self-promotion.</p>
<p>While MEK networks, NCRI-related communities campaigned vigorously against the visit, a wide coalition of independent voices acted independently of any single political group to oppose Pahlavi&#8217;s elevation.</p>
<p>Belgian Academics and Jurists and political figures, and civil-society representatives—acting completely independently—separately urged authorities not to elevate Pahlavi. Their core argument rested on the premise that a democratic transition in Iran must emerge from grassroots popular sovereignty rather than foreign sponsorship of an authoritarian model like Pahlavi. However, they never consider the MEK as a popular opposition group.</p>
<p>The Belgian episode demonstrates a vital diplomatic principle: representation cannot be manufactured abroad. Because neither Pahlavi nor groups like the MEK possess a democratic mandate conferred by the Iranian population through free elections, European institutions face severe ethical and political risks when granting them unearned platforms. The resistance in Brussels was driven by the recognition that Iran&#8217;s real political struggle is not a choice between a crown and a scarf.</p>
<p>Mazda Parsi</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16386">Why Neither Pahlavi nor the MEK Can Claim to Represent Iran?</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en">Nejat Society</a>.</p>
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		<title>Tactical Links Between the MEK and Separatist Groups in Iran</title>
		<link>https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16384</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nejat Society]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 26 Oct 2026 08:19:51 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Mujahedin Khalq Organization's Propaganda System]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[MKO - Jundullah Connections]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mujahedin Khalq Terror group]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.nejatngo.org/en/?p=16384</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Regarding the claims made by the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) regarding the activities of &#8220;insurgent cells&#8221;, or “resistance units” (Kanoon-haye Shooreshi in Persian) in Iran, the group&#8217;s media outlets typically display vague or indistinct images. They attribute reports of arson attacks at various locations across Iranian cities to these cells. Yet, such activities are nowhere to &#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16384">Tactical Links Between the MEK and Separatist Groups in Iran</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en">Nejat Society</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Regarding the claims made by the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) regarding the activities of &#8220;insurgent cells&#8221;, or “resistance units” (Kanoon-haye Shooreshi in Persian) in Iran, the group&#8217;s media outlets typically display vague or indistinct images. They attribute reports of arson attacks at various locations across Iranian cities to these cells. Yet, such activities are nowhere to be found in official Persian or non-Persian language media, on social media, or in daily conversations of ordinary citizens.</p>
<p>As claimed by the MEK propaganda, most &#8220;insurgent cells&#8221; are active in the province of Sistan and Baluchestan, particularly in the city of Zahedan. This raises the question: why is the activity of these insurgent cells most concentrated in Zahedan? In other words, how do MEK operatives manage to target Baluch youth and persuade them to pose for photographs featuring slogans associated with Maryam or Massoud Rajavi? Perhaps a more precise question is: could the presence of Baluch separatist groups—such as Jaish al-Adl, now operating under the new name &#8220;Front of People&#8217;s Fighters&#8221; (Jebhe-ye Mobarezin-e Mardomi in Persain)—be the primary reason?</p>
<p>Examining the relationship between the MEK and armed Baluch separatist groups—such as Jundullah and Jaish al-Adl—constitutes a complex issue within the realms of national security of Iran. To better understand this subject, one must closely examine historical precedents, shared interests, and the geopolitical and security shifts occurring in Iran’s border regions, particularly in Sistan and Baluchestan province.</p>
<p>Following its expulsion from Iraq and subsequent relocation to a base in Tirana, Albania, the MEK sought to re-establish its presence inside Iran by forming structures known as &#8220;insurgent cells&#8221;. However, as previously noted, the coverage of these cells is largely confined to the MEK-run media outlets; there is no tangible or concrete evidence of their existence on the ground, nor are they reflected in independent media or on social networks. In this context, the concentration of many of the alleged activities—attributed to the &#8220;insurgent cells&#8221;—within Sistan and Baluchestan (specifically the city of Zahedan) stems from the group’s efforts to recruit members in volatile, peripheral border regions.</p>
<h3><strong>Historical Roots of the MEK’s Relations with Armed Groups in Iranian border provinces</strong></h3>
<p>The contemporary political history of Iran demonstrates that, over the past decades, the MEK has spared no security or military means in its efforts to strike at the ruling political structure. During the group’s presence in Iraq (in the 1980s and 1990s), it maintained extensive ties with various intelligence services and local armed groups—including Kurdish and Arab separatist factions along Iran’s western borders, as well as Baluch separatist groups along its eastern borders.</p>
<p>Following the emergence of armed Salafi groups in southeastern Iran—such as Jundullah, led by Abdolmalek Rigi, in the 2000s, and subsequently Jaish al-Adl—security analysis and documents have acknowledged the existence of communication channels between these entities. Although the MEK has clear ideological differences with the Baluch groups—ranging from its historical, eclectic &#8220;Marxist-Islamic&#8221; ideology and its current, ostensibly democratic-leaning platform, to the Jihadi-Salafism of the Baluch factions—and while a deep, formal strategic alliance between them appears unlikely, their shared objective—the overthrow of the Islamic Republic—has fostered a degree of tactical overlap and mutual exploitation.</p>
<p>There are several reasons why Sistan and Baluchestan—and specifically Zahedan—have been identified as a purported hub for the activities of the MEK mercenaries. Due to its vast area, extensive shared borders with Pakistan and Afghanistan, and the presence of human and drug trafficking networks, the province of Sistan and Baluchestan has a high degree of security vulnerability. This characteristic creates a favorable environment for concealment, the movement of armed operatives, and clandestine activities.</p>
<p>Furthermore, the MEK seeks to exploit existing social fissures and the grievances of minority groups, positioning itself as a champion of minority rights. The dissemination of biased reports regarding these regions via the group’s propaganda machine represents an attempt to co-opt local and civil protests for its own agenda.</p>
<p>Moreover, in a region continually prone to instability—owing to the presence of terrorist groups like Jaish al-Adl and frequent border clashes—the MEK attempts to attribute acts of violence or minor arson incidents to its so-called &#8220;insurgent cells”. By doing so, it leverages the prevailing climate of insecurity to exaggerate its own capabilities.</p>
<h3><strong>Structural Commonalities and Similar Background</strong></h3>
<p>Both entities—MEK and Jaish al-Adl—have histories marked by acts of violence, bombings, and armed or suicide operations targeting Iranian citizens and security forces. While Jundullah and Jaish al-Adl are rooted in Salafi ideology and ethnic separatism, and the MEK operates as a totalitarian, cult-like structure with a history of assassinating thousands of Iranians, both employ the same tactics within the broader framework of a &#8220;hybrid war&#8221; against Iran: the use of terrorism, psychological warfare, and the exaggeration of hollow achievements in the digital space.</p>
<p>Ultimately, the lack of any genuine resonance of these so-called &#8220;insurgent cells&#8221; among the general public or within independent media suggests that the MEK’s claims are primarily intended for internal consumption—aimed at strengthening the morale of members remaining at Camp Ashraf 3 in Albania and securing foreign financial support. Furthermore, the MEK’s purported connection to volatile regions like Zahedan represents an opportunistic attempt to exploit security-related tensions in that province for its own ends.</p>
<p>Mazda Parsi</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16384">Tactical Links Between the MEK and Separatist Groups in Iran</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en">Nejat Society</a>.</p>
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		<title>Echoes in an Empty Room: MEK Propaganda, Western Media Silence, and the Cuneo Case</title>
		<link>https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16382</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nejat Society]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 24 Oct 2026 10:14:15 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Mujahedin Khalq Organization's Propaganda System]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Fake News]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[MEK's propaganda machine]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.nejatngo.org/en/?p=16382</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>These days, propaganda machine the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)  is focusing on an alleged conference held by the group in a room of the City Hall of a town in Italy, called Cuneo. The event was allegedly attended by a few Italian figures who watched Maryam Rajavi’s speech via video conference. The phenomenon surrounding the MEK &#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16382">Echoes in an Empty Room: MEK Propaganda, Western Media Silence, and the Cuneo Case</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en">Nejat Society</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>These days, propaganda machine the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK)  is focusing on an alleged conference held by the group in a room of the City Hall of a town in Italy, called Cuneo. The event was allegedly attended by a few Italian figures who watched Maryam Rajavi’s speech via video conference.</p>
<p>The phenomenon surrounding the MEK and its political engagement across European municipalities, such as the reported event involving Maryam Rajavi at the City Hall of Cuneo, Italy, highlights a complex intersection of international lobbying, domestic Iranian political aspirations, and European media dynamics. While the MEK and its political umbrella, the so-called National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), actively promote these engagements through their own media channels, mainstream Western media outlets and local Italian press frequently choose to bypass or entirely ignore these events. Furthermore, the Iranian mostly do not care about the group. They actually despise the MEK.</p>
<p>Critics argue that this selective coverage—or lack thereof—illustrates a broader pattern: that the organization struggles to garner genuine, organic grassroots support among the Western public or the Iranian diaspora, relying instead on organized attendance and high-profile paid speakers. Conversely, representatives of the MEK and their parliamentary supporters in Europe claim that these conferences serve as vital platforms for advocating for a secular, democratic republic.</p>
<p>Because of its historical alignment with Saddam Hussein and past involvement in violent operations against Iranian civilians and officials, the group was designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, the European Union, and the United Kingdom. It was subsequently delisted following successful multi-million-dollar lobbying in 2012. However, it has not been successful to engage the attention of the media.</p>
<p>Today, the group&#8217;s extensive lobbying efforts—often featuring prominent retired Western politicians and parliamentarians—continue to draw sharp rebukes not only from the Iranian people, which frequently protests European hosting of MEK figures as &#8220;state sponsorship of terrorism,&#8221; but also from independent analysts and journalists who scrutinize the group&#8217;s internal practices, authoritarian legacy, disinformation campaign and opacity regarding financial backing.</p>
<p>Mazda Parsi</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16382">Echoes in an Empty Room: MEK Propaganda, Western Media Silence, and the Cuneo Case</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en">Nejat Society</a>.</p>
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		<title>Various Aspects of Massoud Rajavi’s Disappearance</title>
		<link>https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16379</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nejat Society]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 20 Oct 2026 07:24:19 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Massoud Rajavi]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[censorship in the MEK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Rajavis and Cult Leadership]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.nejatngo.org/en/?p=16379</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Recently, in an effort to keep the name of Massoud Rajavi alive, supporters of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) released a video of his last on-camera appearance, dating back 23 years. The disappearance of Massoud Rajavi, the leader of the MEK, carries various political, organizational, and security implications—a subject well worth examining. His prolonged absence—dating back &#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16379">Various Aspects of Massoud Rajavi’s Disappearance</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en">Nejat Society</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Recently, in an effort to keep the name of Massoud Rajavi alive, supporters of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) released a video of his last on-camera appearance, dating back 23 years. The disappearance of Massoud Rajavi, the leader of the MEK, carries various political, organizational, and security implications—a subject well worth examining.</p>
<p>His prolonged absence—dating back to the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, which coincided with Nowruz 1382 in Iranian calendar—has become an unspoken mystery and a source of crisis for the organization’s internal structure and external views on it. The dimensions of keeping Masoud Rajavi’s status hidden can be categorized into several key areas:</p>
<h3>The Legitimacy Crisis and the Risk of Organizational Collapse</h3>
<p>The MEK is built upon a highly hierarchical, ideological system centered around a cult of personality revolving entirely around Massoud Rajavi. In such structures, the leader serves as the pivotal unifying figure, a spiritual guide, and the absolute decision-maker. He acts as the heartbeat of the organization; all his followers and supporters are dependent upon him. Concepts such as being &#8220;connected to him&#8221; or &#8220;becoming one with him&#8221; are rituals that members are expected to undergo.</p>
<p>Among the leadership of the MEK, there is a prevalent fear that the organization could collapse entirely in the absence of Massoud Rajavi. Formally announcing his death or permanent disappearance—without an undisputed successor in place—could lead to departure of members, profound disillusionment among members, and, ultimately, the disintegration of the organization. For this reason, the remaining leaders have attempted to mask this significant void by periodically releasing old audio or video messages, or written texts, attributed to him.</p>
<p>The video recently circulated by the group’s supporters—accompanied by reverent praise—purports to be the latest footage of Massoud Rajavi, showing him in a trench in Iraq, dressed in combat outfit.</p>
<h3>Speculation Regarding his Death During the 2003 Attacks</h3>
<p>Since the onset of the U.S.-led military invasion of Iraq in the spring of 2003, the group’s camps—most notably Camp Ashraf—became targets of extensive bombardment and security threats. Reports from former members of the group and international observers suggest that Massoud Rajavi may have been killed during those initial attacks.</p>
<p>However, due to the secretive and highly secure nature of the MEK, rank-and-file members and the media were never granted clear access to medical records or visual evidence that would definitively establish his fate.</p>
<h3>The Role of American and Israeli Intelligence Services</h3>
<p>Some analysts believe that the persistent ambiguity surrounding the status of Massoud Rajavi was not merely an internal organizational decision, but rather a strategy to preserve an intelligence asset. Following the fall of Saddam Hussein, the subsequent departure from Iraq, and the relocation to Albania, the MEK—while having lost its military and operational effectiveness—attracted the attention of certain foreign governments and intelligence services due to its existing intelligence network and history of spying activities within Iran.</p>
<p>Western powers and the group’s regional backers like Israel may have deemed the preservation of this structure—even amidst the ambiguity of an absent or hidden leadership—to be useful for exerting political and intelligence-related pressure against the Islamic Republic.</p>
<p>Mazda Parsi</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16379">Various Aspects of Massoud Rajavi’s Disappearance</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en">Nejat Society</a>.</p>
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		<title>MEK agents near schools in Tirana, Albania</title>
		<link>https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16377</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nejat Society]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sat, 17 Oct 2026 08:17:55 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Albania]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Members of the MEK in Albania]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Threat of Cults]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.nejatngo.org/en/?p=16377</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Examining the potential motives behind the presence of agents of Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) near schools in Albania—ranging from possible links to &#8220;Epstein-style&#8221; child abuse centers to attempts to prevent their expulsion—the Albanian government must act before it is too late. For some time now, a group of female members of the group has been seen &#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16377">MEK agents near schools in Tirana, Albania</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en">Nejat Society</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Examining the potential motives behind the presence of agents of Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) near schools in Albania—ranging from possible links to &#8220;Epstein-style&#8221; child abuse centers to attempts to prevent their expulsion—the Albanian government must act before it is too late.</p>
<p>For some time now, a group of female members of the group has been seen driving around in specific vans near Albanian schools, sparking widespread alarm in the area where these terrorists reside.</p>
<p>According to Faraq News, Albanian analysts state: &#8220;It has been revealed globally that the terrorists known as the &#8216;People&#8217;s Mujahedin&#8217; [MEK] in Albania are operating as a branch of the Mossad. Both the state police and the media are aware that the Mossad stands behind the MEK, yet they are afraid to take action against them. These female terrorists have been targeting schools to prey on children&#8230; The abducted children are then taken to Mossad-run child abuse centers, where they are used to blackmail and manipulate Western elites—much like the network of Jeffrey Epstein.&#8221; However, the potential objectives behind the presence of this &#8220;scum&#8221; near Albanian schools may include the following:</p>
<p>– Deceiving and brainwashing adolescents at a vulnerable age</p>
<p>By exploiting the curiosity of adolescents—under the guise of activities that appear cultural, educational, or charitable—the MEK attempts to instill a terrorist ideology and covertly draw them in.</p>
<p>– Targeting children for blackmail and corruption networks</p>
<p>According to field analyses, it is possible that children who are abducted or lured in are sent to centers linked to foreign intelligence services, where they are used in networks involving child abuse, blackmail, and the manipulation of Western elites—a model similar to the network of Jeffrey Epstein.</p>
<p>– Gathering information and identifying families susceptible to exploitation</p>
<p>The suspicious presence of women from this group—in vehicles with tinted windows—may be the initial step in identifying families, mapping the routes children take, and infiltrating the social circles of adolescents.</p>
<p>&nbsp;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16377">MEK agents near schools in Tirana, Albania</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en">Nejat Society</a>.</p>
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		<title>Expectations of human rights bodies regarding censorship within the MEK</title>
		<link>https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16375</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nejat Society]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 13 Oct 2026 09:51:44 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Human Rights Abuse in the MEK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[censorship in the MEK]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mujahedin Khalq and Human Rights]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.nejatngo.org/en/?p=16375</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Global human rights standards consistently emphasize the preservation of individual autonomy, freedom of thought, free communication with the outside world, and the rejection of manipulation techniques—rights that the leadership of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) denies its members. Research into the MEK’s practices—including reports by Human Rights Watch and the RAND Corporation, as well as the &#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16375">Expectations of human rights bodies regarding censorship within the MEK</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en">Nejat Society</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Global human rights standards consistently emphasize the preservation of individual autonomy, freedom of thought, free communication with the outside world, and the rejection of manipulation techniques—rights that the leadership of the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK) denies its members.</p>
<p>Research into the MEK’s practices—including reports by Human Rights Watch and the RAND Corporation, as well as the memoirs of former members of the group—reveals that the group employs multifaceted mechanisms for mind control and member isolation. Through strict censorship and enforced isolation, the organization has successfully implemented these mechanisms, thereby gaining control over the minds and all aspects of the lives of the residents of the MEK headquarters.</p>
<p>The conduct of the MEK leaders, Massoud and Maryam Rajavi, when measured against international human rights standards, constitutes a gross violation of the rights of the residents of the isolated Camp Ashraf 3, located in the village of Manëz in northern Albania.</p>
<p>The following points summarize the violations of MEK members&#8217; rights through censorship, assessed against international human rights standards—including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted in December 1948) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted in December 1966):</p>
<ol>
<li>Total deprivation of access to independent news and forced consumption of the organization&#8217;s exclusive media.</li>
<li>Forced ideological scrutiny, psychological coercion to extract confessions, and interrogation regarding personal thoughts during meetings.</li>
<li>Imposition of severe psychological pressure, prolonged isolation, and brainwashing.</li>
<li>Deprivation of the right to independent thought, forced alteration of beliefs, and mandatory acceptance of the leadership&#8217;s ideology.</li>
</ol>
<p>In light of the systematic human rights violations within the MEK’s camps—such as those previously reported at Camp Ashraf in Iraq and subsequently at Ashraf 3 in Albania—international human rights bodies, host governments, and responsible civil society organizations are expected to take serious, practical steps. Numerous reports by Human Rights Watch and advocacy groups have emphasized the need for urgent action in this regard.</p>
<p>Key expectations of human rights bodies and governments include:</p>
<h3><strong>Conducting independent and impartial investigations:</strong></h3>
<p>International organizations, such as the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, should dispatch independent inspectors to these camps to assess the situation of trapped members, the possibility of free departure, and the status of their mental health and individual rights.</p>
<h3><strong>Guaranteeing freedom of coming and going and communication with families outside MEK bases:</strong></h3>
<p>A primary demand of human rights bodies and anxious families is to break the isolation and enable members to communicate freely with the outside world, use personal communication devices, and meet openly with their families—privileges from which they have been deprived for years.</p>
<h3><strong>Safeguarding the rights of individuals who have left:</strong></h3>
<p>Ensuring the physical safety, legal rights, and asylum status of those who manage to escape or break away from these structures—particularly in countries where the camps are located, such as Albania—is a legal obligation of the host government and asylum authorities.</p>
<h3><strong>Documenting and prosecuting human rights violations within MEK camps</strong>:</h3>
<p>Documenting instances of human rights abuses, severe physical and psychological restrictions, and cult-like pressures—treating them as violations of fundamental human rights—and striving to hold the perpetrators of such conduct accountable in international forums.</p>
<p>Mazda Parsi</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16375">Expectations of human rights bodies regarding censorship within the MEK</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en">Nejat Society</a>.</p>
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		<title>The Jamalis’ Plea for Help: Save Our Brother from the MEK!</title>
		<link>https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16372</link>
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		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Nejat Society]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Sun, 11 Oct 2026 09:52:18 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Missions of Nejat Society]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Families and Members]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Nejat Accompanying Families]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Statements from family members of the MEK victims]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.nejatngo.org/en/?p=16372</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<p>Mohammad-Ali Jamali was born in Urmia in 1968 and is currently 58 years old. In 1988, while serving as a soldier of the 77th Khorasan Division in Iran-Iraq war, he was taken as a prisoner of war in the Fakkeh operational zone during a joint operation by Iraqi forces and the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK). In &#8230;</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16372">The Jamalis’ Plea for Help: Save Our Brother from the MEK!</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en">Nejat Society</a>.</p>
]]></description>
										<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Mohammad-Ali Jamali was born in Urmia in 1968 and is currently 58 years old. In 1988, while serving as a soldier of the 77th Khorasan Division in Iran-Iraq war, he was taken as a prisoner of war in the Fakkeh operational zone during a joint operation by Iraqi forces and the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK).</p>
<p>In return for the Rajavi cult&#8217;s loyal services, Saddam Hussein handed over a number of Iranian prisoners—including Mohammad-Ali—to the MEK, subjecting them to a different form of captivity. Mohammad-Ali has been in the isolated camps of the group for 38 years. He is currently held in the Manëz camp in Albania under the control of the MEK.</p>
<p>The Jamali family has made significant efforts to establish contact with Mohammad-Ali but has not yet succeeded.</p>
<p>Recently, Mr. Mokhtar-Ali Jamali, Mohammad-Ali’s brother, visited the West Azerbaijan branch of the Nejat Society. He once again urged the office director to ensure that his family&#8217;s voice reaches Albanian officials, international bodies, human rights organizations, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.</p>
<p>The Jamalis’ phone numbers are:</p>
<p>04433458442</p>
<p>09144394249</p>
<p>The post <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en/posts/16372">The Jamalis’ Plea for Help: Save Our Brother from the MEK!</a> appeared first on <a href="https://www.nejatngo.org/en">Nejat Society</a>.</p>
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