New Atlanticist

Israel, Iran and the United States: All Options Are Bad!

Don Snow — Thu, 09 Feb 2012 09:29:19 -0600

The growing confrontation between Israel and Iran over the Iranian nuclear weapons program is spinning perilously out of hand, and it has within it the seeds of the most potentially dangerous threat to international peace since the Cold War ended over 20 years ago. What we are witnessing is a verbal run-up to a military conflict between the Middle East’s only nuclear power (Israel) and its most militant, populous state (Iran). It is a conflict that would serve no one’s interests, would only result in a worse situation–possibly catastrophically so–for all parties, and in which the extremely emotional basis of the conflict is driving all sides, including the United States, to consider essentially irresponsible acts that endanger the country’s national security interests. All of this is occurring in a presidential election year (probably no coincidence) in which cool analysis and action is undermined by hot electoral rhetoric aimed at grabbing votes at the possible endangerment of this country’s interests and safety. It needs to be stopped now, before it gets any worse.

Consider the situation in terms of three steps and their possible consequences. The steps are the pre-war confrontation, the Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities (an event which, if it happens at all, will almost surely occur before the November election in the United States), and the Iranian response. All put the United States in an untenable, negative sum situation where, regardless of what we do, we will come out on the short end of the stick.

Start with the pre-war present. There are two salient features to consider. The first are Israeli threats that demand, in essence, that Iran stop and reverse its alleged weapons program (which, of course, the Iranians deny exists) before it proceeds any closer to a weapons outcome. The Israelis argue that if the Iranians get a nuclear weapon, they will use it against Israel, making the threat a truly existential one against them. Their assessment may be right or wrong, but there can be no doubt that the Netanyahu government believes this scenario to be the case and from that perspective, a preemptive strike against Iran can make sense. That its consequences could be dire to Israel matters less from this perspective because Israel will suffer in either case. An attack is essentially taking an eye for an expected eye, and national existence is the stake. No Masada this time; the Israelis will go down swinging, if they go down.

This puts the United States, as the protector and guarantor of Israel, in a terrible position that the campaign rhetoric is only making worse. The Obama administration says it is “working” with Israel to defuse the crisis, which effectively means they are trying everything they can think of to try to keep the attack from occurring, at least partly because they recognize that if the Israelis launch a raid, all regional bets are off and that the worst case is a general Middle Eastern war that serves no one’s interests, and especially not the interests of the United States. GOP presidential contenders, on the other hand, are falling all over themselves and one another courting the Jewish vote in the United States by favoring unrestricted support for whatever Israel decides to do. The most extreme view is held by Newt Gingrich, who summons the Holocaust to argue that anything less would be immoral.

The U.S. has essentially three options if an Israeli attack decision is unavoidable. None of them is especially good. They are:

1. Full support for any attack the Israelis carry out, which can include actions of differing severity. The U.S. can participate in the raid in varying ways, such as providing air cover for the Israeli bombers heading for Iranian nuclear sites; we can provide satellite reconnaissance (which we undoubtedly already do) for the Israelis, including warnings of Iranian countermeasures; we can supply special ordnance (deep penetrating bombs) to the Israelis to penetrate underground facilities (the Israelis do not themselves have such a capability); or, at the greatest extreme, we can participate with U.S. bombers dropping bombs. The more involved we are, of course, the more we will be caught up in the wake of international reactions to the attack.

2. We can acknowledge Israeli plans, say we understand but don’t fully support their actions on any of a variety of grounds, BUT warn sternly that we will not allow a response by Iran that would endanger Israeli existence. We would still be blamed for not preventing the attacks, but the criticism would be more muted, and we would uphold our pledge to guarantee Israeli existence. Critics, however, would argue that is not enough.

3. We can tell the Israelis, very publicly, that they are on their own if they attack, although we will protect them from an existential response. This option, regardless of its merits, would be political suicide in an election year (part of why the Israelis, who realize this, will probably act before the November election).

Options 1 and 2 are the only really domestically viable options, but both of them tie the U.S. to the Israeli attack, and that has consequences. Rationalizations notwithstanding, an Israeli strike would be an act of military aggression–an act of aggressive war–that is illegal under international law and the UN Charter, which Israel signed, making the action illegal under Israeli law as well. Calling it “preemptive” does not aid legality, because acts of preemption are only justifiable under international law when a hostile act that they prevent is imminent (e.g.an enemy’s army massing on your border); the Israeli attack does not rise to that level. Thus, the United States indirectly supports violating international law by supporting the Israelis. The U.S, has, of course, done so in the past–the invasion of Iraq in 2003, for instance–but the world will at least rhetorically line up against an aggression. Moreover, the Russians and Chinese will undoubtedly co-sponsor a Security Council condemnation of the aggression, and the U.S. will be left with the unpleasant choices of supporting Israel in the face of overwhelming global disapproval or, as it did in 1956 at the time of the Suez War, of condemning the action of a close ally. Once again, electoral politics may require thumbing our noses at the world. Moreover, if the Israelis do attack, they will not be able to take out the Iranian program entirely, instead only setting it back, while Israeli attacks will take its toll in civilian casualties (collateral damage) that will only add to condemnation of the attacks. Anyone who can see some good in this for United States interests beyond some votes in the presidential election, is seeing something this observer does not.

As if that was not enough, an Israeli attack will trigger some very violent form of Iranian counterattack with equally or even more dangerous potential consequences for the U.S. and the region. Those possibilities, none of which are desirable from a U.S. viewpoint, will be the subject of the next column. All the options are bad!

Donald M. Snow, Professor Emeritus at the University of Alabama, is the author of over 40 books on foreign policy, international relations, and national security topics. This essay first appeared at his blog What After Iraq?.

Turkey-US Relations: Dark Clouds on the Horizon

Ross Wilson — Wed, 08 Feb 2012 11:54:18 -0600

Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu comes to Washington this week with more positives in US-Turkish relations than at any time in years. However, upcoming and potentially grave challenges – Syria, Iran, Egypt, and others – mean Turkey and US-Turkish ties will face many risky problems in the months ahead. Davutoğlu and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton need to think through likely dissonances and divergences and plan accordingly.

American and Turkish leaders deserve credit for turning regional negatives of mid-2010 and before into good, or at least better, pictures today.

Ankara and Washington have gotten back in sync on the Iran nuclear problem after the May 2010 uranium swap debacle and June 2010 falling out at the United Nations over sanctions.

Tough talk and teamwork on Syria has replaced the years of discord over Turkey’s cultivation of ties with the Assad regime.

Diplomats in Washington and Ankara effusively describe their regular and apparently very full consultations on other Arab Awakening countries and issues. Prime Minister Erdoğan’s September 2011 evocation in Cairo on the virtues of secularism lined him up, in this place and time, squarely on the side of transatlantic values.

The 2012 picture is not one of zero regional problems in US-Turkish relations, to be sure. The Turkish-Israeli relationship and related polemics still turn heads in Washington. The Armenian genocide issue may be seem off the agenda, but never really can be.

Against a rosier recent past, the coming months seem packed with risks that could affect both countries’ key interests. Tough choices among competing priorities lie ahead for Davutoğlu and Clinton.

Syria is Exhibit A. Ankara changed its Assad policy last summer from embrace to rejection. Turkey paid a price for this in terms of lost investments and sharply reduced trade with Syria and through it to Arab countries beyond. But the cost to Turkey so far of abandoning the Damascus regime cannot have been high.

The future looks far riskier. The Assad regime’s growing loss of control, its rising brutality, and the opposition’s increasing readiness to use arms suggest the country cannot be far from all-out civil war that will affect vital Turkish and very important American interests. Media reports of US-Turkish talks about some kind of joint intervention and heated Turkish denials, regardless of where the truth lies, reflect the increasingly difficult choices facing the United States and Turkey. Others include financial and/or material aid to the Syrian National Council and Free Syrian Army, humanitarian corridors, the problem of international legitimacy for such corridors or other forms of intervention, and countering al-Qaeda and PKK opportunists who would exploit Assad’s demise for even worse ends. Pressures that push the United States and Turkey apart on Syria will be bad for that country, Turkey, and US-Turkish relations.

More problematic if less immediate is Iran, where circumstances and recent, careful diplomacy on Davutoğlu’s part have helped to avoid choices on issues where Washington and Turkey disagree. Turkey hosted one round of negotiations in January 2011 between Iran and the five permanent Security Council members plus Germany (the P5+1 negotiating group) and promoted itself this past January as a venue for further talks. Quiet Turkish diplomacy in Tehran has urged negotiations and Iranian compliance with its International Atomic Energy Agency and Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty commitments. To back up its words, Ankara agreed to host a NATO missile defense radar site. This progress seemed difficult at the time to those involved, but was relatively painless.

The turning screws on the Iran nuclear issue suggest that 2012 and 2013 will be much harder. Iran affects vital interests of both the United States and Turkey. Leaders in Ankara are no more convinced than they were in 2010, 2008, or 2006 that sanctions will succeed, that Iran actually is on the verge of a nuclear weapons breakthrough, or that it can be stopped at any acceptable price if it is. While some in both capitals are sensitive to the other’s concerns and/or recognize that Ankara and Washington have no choice but to stay in sync on the Iran nuclear issue, the dynamics will run in different directions as tensions build.

Turkey is not part of the P5+1 group, and it will get left out.

The United States and Turkey may not share in real enough time sensitive information about Iran’s nuclear efforts or other aspects of the Iran issue.

US and especially Israeli chatter about military action against Iran is and will be heard in Turkey like the scratching of fingernails on a blackboard – not so much because people doubt whose side they should be on if push comes to shove, but because of a recognition of the cataclysmic effect such action could have on an already deeply unstable region. Perhaps naturally, it will engender a Turkish impulse to do something.

Although Turkey’s decision to break with Qadaffi put at risk billions of dollars of Turkish investment and trade, as well as tens of thousands of expatriates working there, it ended up being reasonably cost free. Turkey’s other choices in the Arab Awakening world have been even easier. Risks to Turkish interests and to US-Turkish concord have been few.

But here, too, the choices may be harder in 2012, especially in Egypt. Cairo’s developing estrangement with Washington will affect US calculations, just as Turkish-Ottoman/Egyptian enmities burden Ankara’s today. Neither country will be as influential was it was – or thinks it may still be. Egypt’s increasing politically-Islamist character may put the Turkish public and its leaders against the United States on some issues – and perhaps Egypt’s against Turkey, as well. What happens to the Camp David Accords obviously matters, too, and the effects for Turkey’s relations with Israel, the United States, and others could be dramatic.

Other regional problems loom. The developing agreement on a united Palestinian government seems more likely to divide Washington and Ankara than not. Iraq may be sliding into chaos that the United States can disregard, but Turkey cannot, and that is already producing real friction between Ankara and Baghdad of concern to the United States. Renewed Azeri-Armenian fighting over Nagorno-Karabakh, which cannot be excluded, would also expose many problematic fault lines in US-Turkish relations.

Clinton and Davutoğlu have done much to restore a healthy tonic to the bilateral relationship and made it an additive to regional stability. Upcoming problems will test that progress. While both countries can and must pursue their own interests and priorities, one of those should remain ensuring that the break that so devastated US-Turkish ties in 2003 does not recur.

Ambassador Ross Wilson is the Director of the Patriciu Eurasia Center at the Atlantic Council. As a U.S. diplomat, he served as American ambassador to Turkey in 2005-08 and to Azerbaijan in 2000-03. Photo credit: Reuters Pictures.

Italian PM Warns of European Disintegration From Mutual Resentments

James Joyner — Wed, 08 Feb 2012 11:48:09 -0600

Italian Prime Minister Mario Monti fears "backlash" stemming from "mutual resentments" between Northern and Southern Europeans spurred by the financial crisis.

Appearing on the PBS NewsHour, Monti declared, "I try to avoid that backlash by always presenting the necessary sacrifices that Italians have to go through not as an imposition from Brussels or Germany or the European Central Bank, but rather as a necessary step that Italians have to undertaking -- to undertake also at the suggestion of Europe, but basically for their own interests, for the interests of ourselves and of future generations of Italians."

While allowing that "This is precisely meant to avoid backlashes," he worries that "the euro zone crisis has indeed brought about quite a bit of misunderstandings and the re-emergence of old phantoms about prejudices between the North, the South of Europe, and a lot of mutual resentment."

Taking this to its logical conclusion, he observed, "And it is very, very important that we all take this with great attention in order to avoid that something that was meant to be the culminating point of the European construction -- namely, the single currency -- turns out to be, through psychological negative effects, a factor of disintegration of Europe."

While the populist sentiments along these lines--particularly in Germany, Greece, and Italy--have been obvious from even a casual reading of the newspapers over the last two or three years, it's a subject that national leaders have until now avoided talking about publicly. Whether his candor is a function of his long career as an academic or the fact that he was appointed to his position and doesn't have to be overly concerned about electoral consequences, it's a discussion worth having.

Further, he's right: allowing these resentments to fester puts not just the common currency but the European project as a whole in jeopardy.

That said, there are rather fundamental cultural and structural differences between North and South that have to be dealt with honestly as well.

NewsHour's Margaret Warner asked him, "Do you think that by calling for more competition in the economy, as well as budget cuts, you are asking the Italian people to really change their central character or culture?"

Again, speaking more like a doctor of philosophy than a prime minister, he answered honestly and insightfully. But he's been in politics long enough to toss in some pandering, too: "To some extent, yes. I am fully aware of this, and basically our mission and my wish is to have the Italian people value more and more some strong qualities they have in their genes and traditions -- that is, a strong entrepreneurial spirit and a sense of -- and a sense of solidarity in society." He added, "But I definitely think that Italy can become a more competitive place only if we introduce in our system much more meritocracy, which means much more competition and accountability in all decision points of corporate, as well as the public administration."

The juxtaposition of these issues presents an enormous political challenge. On the one hand, "Europe" will remain a fantasy so long as differences in cultures which have existed independently for centuries can not be accommodated. On the other, the common currency and deeper political integration can not work if Europeans don't all play by the same basic sets of rules.

James Joyner is managing editor of the Atlantic Council. Photo credit: Reuters Pictures.

Afghanistan: End Game or No Game?

Harlan Ullman — Wed, 08 Feb 2012 08:52:44 -0600

Last week was another roller coaster ride for international politics. Violence in Egypt; looming civil war in Syria; and threats and counter-threats over Iran's nuclear intentions reverberated around the international security community intensifying the gathering sense of impending disaster.

In Brussels at the NATO Defense Ministers' meeting followed by the Munich Security Conference the next day, U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta fueled this uncertainty by calling for a transfer of U.S. combat responsibility to Afghan national security forces in 2013, a year earlier than the promised 2014 withdrawal date.

Reaction was predictable from all sides of the spectrum. Supporters applauded the announcement as further signs of accelerating the withdrawal and pressuring the Karzai government in Kabul to assume its full share of the burden. Critics predictably denounced the statement as giving the enemy our timetable and quitting the field of battle before the Afghans were ready and able to defend themselves.

The tragedy remains self-evident. Despite the furor about turnover and withdrawal dates, that debate won't determine Afghanistan's future.

The U.S. and NATO Afghan strategy has rested on three foundations and the help of Pakistan. Security, governance and economic development form the three legs. Because the bulk of effort has been on the security leg -- to seize, hold and protect territory to create a safer environment for Afghans and to train Afghan forces to assume those duties -- the other legs have been neglected and won't be ready to assure Afghanistan's future for a long time to come probably well beyond 2014.

It is unknowable how long it will take, if ever, for these other two legs to take hold. Meanwhile, the overland supply route from Pakistan is still shut and relations with the United States are stalled at rock bottom.

Some observers say that should the Obama administration win a second term, withdrawal will be even faster. The good news is that a withdrawal will relieve pressure on Pakistan and as a result the insurgencies as well as widespread anti-American animosity will lessen.

Still, critics have a point -- suppose Afghanistan is unready to govern itself and provide for its people a modicum of security and prosperity including the ability to pay for its security forces. What then?

Beyond these possibly fatal weaknesses, cultural understanding has never been an American strength. We failed in Vietnam in large part because of cultural incompetence. The efforts in Central America to bring down dictatorships suffered the same short sightedness and ignorance. We launched into Afghanistan and then Iraq without learning those lessons. And we are paying the price.

Two Afghan truisms have been dismissed at our own peril. First, (virtually) all Taliban are Pashtun. But not all Pashtun are Taliban. Second, as the Soviet Union learned, its army had all the wristwatches. The mujahedin had all the time.

The lesson is that the Taliban "problem" is largely a Pashtun matter. Unless we address that as well as accommodate Pashtunwali -- the Pashtun code of conduct millennia old that rests all on honor, hospitality and revenge -- the outcome is predictable and time isn't on our side.

The only potential solution -- and one that may not work -- is a negotiated settlement. That means bringing in all parties not just from inside Afghanistan but its near and far neighbors to include China, Russia, India, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia in a major peace conference to settle Afghanistan's future because piecemeal activities and set dates to transfer responsibilities to the Afghans won't work.

Fortunately, an opportunity to accomplish such a conference can be created.

Toward the end of May, NATO will have a heads of government summit in Chicago. Planning for that summit is in process. Afghanistan will be a critical agenda item especially given the French decision for an early pullout and Panetta's statements. It is unlikely that the presidential election in France will alter that decision regardless of who wins.

Why then not tee up the idea of a major international conference on Afghanistan with the intent of finding a means to keep Afghanistan a stable and more peaceful as well as more prosperous state? That will mean including insurgents including Taliban. It also will mean engaging the Pashtun as well as other minorities. And while Pakistan remains a crucial part of any settlement, that can be done in conjunction with Afghan's neighbors.

NATO is entering its 11th year in Afghanistan. World War II, from a European perspective, lasted six years. The Cold War went on for nearly 45. If Afghanistan isn't handled properly, that war could simmer for far longer.

Harlan Ullman is senior advisor at the Atlantic Council, and chairman of the Killowen Group that advises leaders of government and business. This article was syndicated by UPI. Photo credit: France24.

Will US-Egypt Relations Rupture Over NGO Probe?

Mara Revkin — Tue, 07 Feb 2012 14:29:24 -0600

A week before Valentine’s Day, the Egyptian government’s brazen antagonism of American-funded NGOs has proven the old adage: “You can’t buy love,” not even with the 1.3 billion in annual military aid that the United States has lavished on its military.

As Steven Cooke aptly described what he predicts will be an unfriendly “breakup” between the United States and Egypt, “It seems that with the trial of 19 Americans and 16 Egyptians and 8 others affiliated with the National Democratic Institute and International Republican Institute, the Egyptians are serving divorce papers.” And on February 7, the Egyptian government made clear that it plans to bring this quarrel to court: Egyptian judges overseeing the investigation announced that the 19 Americans indicted over the weekend will be ordered to stand trial on criminal charges of violating licensing and foreign funding regulations, which could carry a penalty of up to five years in prison.

With the sharp escalation of hostilities in recent days – Egypt has vowed “to expose foreign schemes that threaten the stability of the homeland” while the U.S. warns that the investigation could jeopardize future military aid – what started as a war of words is quickly morphing into a vindictive legal battle that may do irreparable damage to the bilateral relationship. As Washington and Cairo ramp up their respective threats, the two sides are headed for mutually assured disenchantment: Egypt’s leaders – apparently deluded by their own entitlement complex and inflated sense of strategic importance – will face a rude awakening when they discover that threatened military aid cuts were not an empty bluff, and the United States is learning the hard way that a more democratic and independent Egypt won’t hesitate to bite the hand that feeds it.

In the new spending bill approved in December, Congress imposed new restrictions on future aid to the Egyptian military, now contingent on the government's compliance with three criteria: 1) progress toward a transfer of power to civilian leaders; 2) protecting human rights and basic freedoms; and 3) upholding the peace treaty with Israel. Egypt's military aid budget will be in jeopardy unless the State Department can certify its adherence to all three conditions. But Egypt's leaders seem to be banking on the flimsy assumption that the strategic value of their security cooperation with the U.S. and Israel gives them a carte blanche for bad behavior without consequences. Despite warning from Congress and the White House to the contrary, Egyptian officials are convinced that the military aid package is a sacrosanct entitlement that can't be taken back, and they insist that the US-Egypt relationship is still on solid ground "despite some differences."

Meanwhile, the fact that the current investigation is being driven by Egypt’s judiciary has allowed the interim government to claim that it neither condones the probe nor has the authority to stop it. Egyptian Foreign Minister Mohamed Amr said on February 5, "We are doing our best to contain this but ... we cannot actually exercise any influence on the investigating judges right now when it comes to the investigation." But despite their best efforts to deflect blame for the crackdown onto Egypt’s stubbornly independent judiciary, Egyptian officials are clearly reveling in the misfortune of American-funded NGOs. Minister Fayza Aboul Naga, a remnant of Hosni Mubarak’s former government and veteran antagonist of civil society groups, is widely recognized as the “mastermind” behind the probe and warned the United States not to underestimate the “government’s seriousness about discovering some of these groups’ plans to destabilize Egypt.” If Naga continues to survive successive cabinet reshuffles – as she has been doing for the post ten years – her ironically named Ministry of International Cooperation will continue to serve as a bastion of belligerence and bane of U.S. policy in Egypt.

In her efforts to justify the harassment of foreign-funded NGOs, Naga will likely claim that the current probe is consistent with Egyptian public opinion and opposition to American intervention in domestic affairs. New polling data released by Gallup this week could provide fodder for this argument: According to the survey, “74 percent of Egyptians oppose the US sending direct aid to Egyptian civil society groups and 71 percent oppose the idea of American aid to Egypt altogether.”

In a climate that is becoming increasingly toxic to international assistance of any kind, opposition to American funding for civil society groups could jeopardize other streams of international assistance including the loans and budgetary support that Egypt’s ailing economy desperately needs.

Mara Revkin is the assistant director of the Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East and editor of EgyptSource. She can be reached at mrevkin@acus.org.

Photo Credit: al-Ahram

Fixing All the World's Problems

Bernard Finel — Tue, 07 Feb 2012 12:12:16 -0600

Okay, I’m king for a day, and I am going to fix all the world’s problems. Here goes:

Syria: Arm the rebels, impose a no-fly zone, strike any government forces that try to suppress the uprising. Why? Because at this point we’re witnessing a long, drawn-out mass killing scenario, and it is only likely to get worse given the minority character of the regime. Syria is also a rogue regime. It supports transnational terrorism, has played footsie with the North Koreans on nuclear issues, and continues to destabilize Lebanon. There are good humanitarian and regional security justifications for intervention. I’m not enthusiastic about this, but as a practical matter, I don’t think inaction is better. The costs of this sort of intervention should be relatively low. Lack of UNSC authorization is no bar. We can use the Kosovo precedent to act under auspices of regional organization — but this would require Arab League approval.

Iran: Since we’re unlikely to engage in sustained military action, we should take the option off the table. Offer Iran a straight-forward quid pro quo — we commit to not use force to change their regime in return for them normalizing their international status through a new IAEA-based inspection regime of their nuclear facilities. Assuming they don’t accept — as they won’t — continue to use sabotage and assassinations to slow their progress toward nukes. And most importantly dramatically step up efforts to promote change in Iran through aggressive efforts to defeat Iranian government censorship of radio, TV, and internet. Assuming that does not work either, we need to work on promoting regional resilience so that the rest of the region doesn’t freak out about developments in Iran. Mitigation of the Iranian problem is key rather than solving it for now.

China: Look, China is our biggest economic partner. Yes, they are a rising power, and yes they will want a larger role in global rule-setting. Give it to them. As a matter of geopolitics, we have fundamental shared interests — secure sea lanes, vigorous trade, economic stability. They want what we want. The debates we’re having are over how to get it, not about a completely different international architecture. Sure, we’ll need to play hardball on trade issues. But this is NOT like the Cold War. The one issue we do need to resolve is:

Taiwan: Our ability to defend Taiwan is going to inevitably diminish. Our need to plan for its defense is already one of the largest drivers of our defense budget since it requires us to stay a generation ahead technologically of a rapidly rising power. And not only is this a costly commitment, in the final analysis it is just a bridge too far. Within a generation — at most — our ability to project power onto the Chinese coast will decline to the point where protecting Taiwan is a pure bluff. Instead, we need establish a time-line with the Taiwanese so that they understand that at some point in the very near future our commitment to them will come to an end. I am not sure what happens next. But sometimes you just need to acknowledge reality and move on. Hong Kong and long-term internal Chinese trends make me relatively sanguine, however.

Israel: I like Israel. Indeed, like many Jews, I have something of an emotional attachment to Israel. But their approach to the Palestinians is both criminal and criminally stupid, and we can no longer be on the hook for their intransigence. We need to state simply that either a two-state solution is implemented quickly, or that we’re going to have to begin treating Israel as just another country rather than a close ally and beneficiary of American aid. I hate saying this, but the reality is that at this point, we’re acting as enablers for the bizarre obsession among some Israeli with the idea of recreating Biblical Israel. I don’t see how supporting this weird goal is consistent with American interests.

Afghanistan: Transition rapidly to a Plan Colombia-style relationship: intelligence sharing, financial aid, technical assistance, and limited SOF training and direct action. Communicate directly with the existing insurgent groups about our red lines — no support for transnational terrorism, some adherence to international humanitarian norms (think Saudi standards). Encourage negotiations leading to power-sharing and/or regional autonomy agreements that will take at least some of the insurgents off the field. Or not. Who really cares? Afghanistan is an absolute strategic backwater — poor, isolated, irrelevant.

Pakistan: If we can reduce our commitment to Afghanistan and essentially give Pakistan primary responsibility for enforcing our red lines there, I think we can open the door on a more productive relationship with Islamabad. The problem right now is that our entire relationship is currently focused on those things that they either can’t or won’t do. That isn’t healthy. We’d be better off trying to build on those areas of shared interests. One of those is normalizing the status of their nuclear program. Another is in trying to ease tensions with India in a way that is consistent with Pakistani security requirements. That said, this is a dysfunctional state with many broken institutions. It is also too big to influence directly. We’ll be dealing with this one for a long time.

Mexico: I think the first step to understanding the challenge of Mexico is to realize we’re the cause of many of the problems there. We can mitigate those problems through two substantively simple, but politically impossible steps: (1) End the war on drugs. Legalize marijuana outright. Reduce criminal penalties and enforcement of harder drugs like cocaine and heroin. Get military/paramilitary organization out of domestic law enforcement. (2) Fix our immigration policies: amnesty for those in the U.S., a fence to control the border, and a dramatic increase in legal immigration. Look, we currently have fewer legal immigrants coming to the United States than we did in 1906 when our population was about one quarter of what it is today. If instead of 1 million legal immigrants a year, we were allowing 4 million, we’d have virtually no problems with illegal immigration. And legal immigrants would pay more in taxes and would be less of a drain on public services as a consequence. Would that many immigrants change the character of the United States but turning the U.S. in Mexico? No, no more than German immigration turned Pennsylvania into Prussia or Jewish immigration turned the Lower East Side into Israel. Also, by the way, more legal immigration is the answer to our entitlements “crisis” since it increases the ratio of workers to retirees. Anyway, end the drug war and end the war on immigrants, and you’ll find that many of Mexico’s problems become more manageable.

Europe: Tell the Germans to get their heads out of their collective asses. Signal a willingness to accept a sustained period of higher inflation to aid in debt deleveraging and in internal adjustments.

See. Was that so hard?

Dr. Bernard I. Finel, an Atlantic Council contributing editor, is Associate Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College. His arguments are his own and do not represent the views or opinions of the National War College, National Defense University, or the Department of Defense. This was originally posted on his personal blog BernardFinel.com.

Transatlantic Relationship Words at Odds with Deeds

James Joyner — Mon, 06 Feb 2012 14:40:48 -0600

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta said all the right things about the transatlantic relationship at the Munich Security Conference. Alas, Panetta made a mockery of them on his way there.

Panetta declared that "peace and prosperity of Europe is critically important to the United States, but because Europe remains our security partner, our security partner of choice for military operations and diplomacy around the world." Clinton joined in, saying, "Europe is and remains America's partner of first resort." She added, "Today's transatlantic community is not just a defining achievement of the century behind us. It is indispensable to the world we hope to build together in the century ahead. Here in Munich, it is not enough to reaffirm old commitments. The world around us is fast transforming, and America and Europe need a forward-leaning agenda to deal with the challenges we face." She noted that she'd traveled to Europe 27 times in her present office and President Obama himself had made ten trips.

Yet, all the talk about the importance of the Obama administration's profound respect for our transatlantic allies was belied by the fact that, on his way to the conference, Panetta casually undercut the words by summarily announcing a major change in American strategy in the Afghanistan fight without so much as a warning--much less consultation--with said allies.

Panetta claimed in his Munich remarks that "Our bottom line [in Afghanistan] is 'in together, out together.' As an alliance, we are fully committed to the Lisbon framework and transitioning to Afghan control by 2014." But that's just talk. The bottom line is that a commitment to transition responsibility for the fight to Afghan forces a year early is a complete departure from the outcomes-based approach agreed to at Lisbon.

Now, as I've argued before, the revised policy is the right one. But our NATO allies, most if not all of whom are still in Afghanistan against a tide of popular opinion at home solely because America has asked them to be there, deserved to be consulted and given time to plan their own roll-out of the announcement to their publics.

As Foreign Policy's Josh Rogin reports, "several NATO and European officials were shocked and some were even a little miffed that Panetta had made a major change in the messaging over the Afghanistan war without giving them a heads up."

Rogin quotes a "high ranking European official" saying that his government was expecting a new timeline to come at the NATO Summit. on the notion that "we can't say the same thing in Chicago as we said in Lisbon." But Panetta jumped the gun. "It was all carefully planned and now that plan is completely ruined."

The same official explains, "We said, 'Okay, if Obama needs this politically, that's fine. But please consider the bad side effects for us. This is hard to explain to our constituencies. Before today we could still say the drawdown was conditions based. Now we can't make the argument that it's anything but politically motivated."

Given that the Afghanistan mission has long since become Americanized, with European militaries providing a very small part of the fighting forces on the ground, the United States reasonably expects to have the dominant voice in major decisions governing the fight. But if we expect our allies to believe that we value their contributions and take them seriously as partners, we can't treat them as afterthoughts.

James Joyner is managing editor of the Atlantic Council. Photo credit: Getty Images.

China Pivot or Pirouette?

Arnaud de Borchgrave — Mon, 06 Feb 2012 10:20:42 -0600

Amid the gazillion blogs, tweets, Facebookies and LinkedIn aficionados, it has become even harder to find reasoned and convincing arguments for what kind of military drawdown would do least harm to the United States' global posture. Even learned think tanks are tweeting.

Retired admirals and generals, professors and journalists, everyone is weighing in with elite newsletters and gap fillers as U.S. President Barack Obama does the Asia pivot (which is code for China) to reinforce the "western Pacific and East Asia."

"We're out of money. Now we have to think," said a British general.

In Britain, that meant, among other cuts, retiring its only aircraft carrier and three destroyers. And no more out-of-theater operations.

The United States is in the same predicament after spending $1.5 trillion in 10 years on what former national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski calls two unnecessary wars, costly both in blood and treasure "that were falsely justified and totally unwinnable."

In Afghanistan, the Taliban enemy knows we are under domestic pressure to wind down the war and U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta is talking about a 2013 end to combat operations followed by a major drawdown coupled with an advisory and training mission until the end of 2014.

The Afghan army would need from $7 billion to $10 billion a year for five years in U.S. military assistance to continue to fight on its own. The chances of Congress honoring such a commitment for more than a year or two are slim to none.

A similar commitment was made to the South Vietnamese army in March 1973, when the last U.S. combat soldier left Vietnam. Congress ended all military assistance two years later -- and Saigon promptly fell to the North Vietnamese army.

China's geopolitical ambitions in the western Pacific are now the Obama administration's principal concern.

A two-war defense capability is more than exhausted by Iraq and Afghanistan and an ocean of red ink. The new defense doctrine is one war and two small missions. More realistic would be U.S. Navy SEAL-type operations coupled with recent breakthroughs in robotic warfare.

A pre-emptive Israeli strike against Iran's key nuclear installations could throw the calculus into a cocked hat. Iran's retaliatory capabilities up and down the Persian Gulf and beyond would automatically involve the United States with its Fifth Fleet headquarters in Bahrain. The Navy's mission is freedom of navigation in and out of the gulf through the Strait of Hormuz, close to Iran's principal naval base at Bandar-Abbas, the only exit route for one-fifth of the world's oil supply.

Washington's political establishment is divided between those who see China as the next geopolitical threat that requires a major naval presence in the South China Sea and those, such as Brzezinski, who are opposed to demonizing China as another Soviet Union.

China has 2,500 "Blue Helmets" serving among the United Nations' 12 peacekeeping operations, most of them in the largest one, Congo, one-third the size of the United States and a source of constant crisis since independence from Belgium 52 years ago.

There are no U.S. troops among the 100,000 plus under U.N. command as they are mandated by the U.S. Constitution to serve only under the command of the U.S. president.

Some 6,000 Chinese workers broke ground in the Bahamas last September -- 15 minutes from Nassau airport -- for the Caribbean's largest gambling casino complex, which is destined to rival Macau, the former Portuguese colony now part of China.

The African Union's new Chinese-designed, built and funded, $200 million headquarters opened in Ethiopia two weeks ago, just in time for Organization of African Unity's annual summit. Ultra-modernistic in its design, it looks like a huge spaceship

In his inaugural address, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said, "China's amazing reemergence and its commitments for a win-win partnership with Africa is one of the reasons for the beginning of the African renaissance."

Jia Qinglin led a 100-strong Chinese delegation and handed over a $94 million check. He left behind a group of Chinese technicians to ensure the smooth running of the new OAU headquarters.

He also struck the right notes for the assembled African heads of state: "We maintain that all countries, big or small, are equal and we are opposed to the big, strong and rich bullying the small, weak and poor."

China's trade with Africa hit $120 billion last year, a 12-fold increase.

Almost 6 million Chinese workers are deployed throughout what was once called the Third World, including 1 million in Africa, on a wide variety of industrial and agricultural projects, developing future markets for Chinese products and importing all manner of raw materials.

Canada's Bombardier Aircraft manufacturer now sees China as a bigger market for private aviation than all of Europe.

China also informed Canada last week that it wanted a seat at the arctic table, which means it seeks the same status as the eight countries whose territory lies within the Arctic Circle. It will be Canada's turn to chair the group in 2013.

As a warning to China about its South China Sea ambitions, the United States is transferring 200 U.S. Marines to Darwin, on the northern coast of Australia, to be reinforced by 2,300 more by 2014, drawn from the 3rd Marine Division on Okinawa to form a Marine Expeditionary Unit.

"I am making clear," Obama said on a visit to Australia last November, "that the United States is stepping up its commitment to the entire Asia-Pacific region."

Formidable though U.S. Marines are, 200 of them are unlikely to rattle too many cages. And Darwin is 2,300 miles from the capitals of South China Sea countries. China is also the largest trading partner with most of the countries in the region.

Over the next two years, the U.S. strategic moves from Europe to the western Pacific and South China Sea are likely to be more pirouette than pivot -- spinning on one foot, with the raised foot touching the knee of the supporting leg.

Arnaud de Borchgrave, a member of the Atlantic Council, is editor-at-large at UPI and the Washington Times. This column was syndicated by UPI. Photo credit: Reuters Pictures.

Can Egypt Avoid Pakistan's Fate?

Michele Dunne and Shuja Nawaz — Mon, 06 Feb 2012 09:23:44 -0600

One year after the revolution that ousted President Hosni Mubarak, the Egyptian military is closing down civil society organizations and trying to manipulate the constitution-writing process to serve its narrow interests. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, where the military has also held sway for more than half the country’s existence — for much of that time, with America’s blessing — a new civil-military crisis is brewing.

For the United States, the parallels are clear and painful. Egypt and Pakistan are populous Muslim-majority nations in conflict-ridden regions, and both have long been allies and recipients of extensive military and economic aid.

Historically, American aid tapers off in Pakistan whenever civilians come to power. And in Egypt, Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama both resisted pressure from Congress to cut aid to Mr. Mubarak despite his repression of peaceful dissidents.

It is no wonder that both Egyptians and Pakistanis express more anger than appreciation toward the United States. They have seen Washington turn a blind eye to human-rights abuses and antidemocratic practices because of a desire to pursue regional objectives — Israeli security in the case of Egypt, and fighting Al Qaeda in the case of Pakistan.

The question now is whether the United States will, a year after the Egyptian revolution, stand by and allow the Pakistani model of military dominance and a hobbled civilian government to be replicated on the Nile.

Pakistan and Egypt each have powerful intelligence and internal security agencies that have acquired extra-legal powers they will not relinquish easily. Pakistan’s history of fomenting insurgencies in neighboring countries has caused serious problems for the United States. And Egypt’s internal security forces have been accused of involvement in domestic terrorist attacks and sectarian violence. (However, Washington has long seen Egypt’s military as a stabilizing force that keeps the peace with Israel.)

The danger is that in the future, without accountability to elected civilian authorities, the Egyptian military and security services will seek to increase their power by manipulating Islamic extremist organizations in volatile and strategically sensitive areas like the Sinai Peninsula.

Despite the security forces’ constant meddling in politics, Pakistan at least has a Constitution that establishes civilian supremacy over the military. Alarmingly, Egypt’s army is seeking even greater influence than what Pakistan’s top brass now enjoys: an explicit political role, and freedom from civilian oversight enshrined in law.

Egypt’s army was once considered heroic for siding with peaceful demonstrators against Mr. Mubarak, but it has badly mishandled the country in the past year. The riot at a soccer match on Wednesday that killed around 70 people underscored the leadership’s failure to undertake badly needed police reform and restore security. The economy is teetering, peaceful demonstrators have been tried in military courts, anti-Christian violence has spiked and ministers appointed by the military have hounded civil society groups that advocate government accountability, budget transparency, human rights and free elections.

A dismayed Congress has attached conditions to future military assistance to Egypt (now $1.3 billion a year), requiring the Obama administration to certify that the military government is maintaining peace with Israel, allowing a transition to civilian rule and protecting basic freedoms — or to waive the conditions on national security grounds — if it wants to keep aid flowing.

The Egyptian military is clearly not meeting at least two of those three conditions right now. Consequently, the Obama administration should not certify compliance, nor should it invoke the national security waiver by arguing that Egyptian-Israeli peace is paramount and that Egypt’s military is the only bulwark against Islamist domination of the country — because both of these arguments are deeply flawed.

First, hardly anyone in Egypt favors war with Israel, and a freeze or suspension of American aid would not change that. Second, continuing support to an Egyptian military that is bent on hobbling a liberal civil society would only strengthen Islamist domination. Islamist groups won some 70 percent of seats in the recent parliamentary elections, but they will now face tremendous pressure to solve the deep economic and political problems that caused the revolution.

In Egypt, as in Pakistan, the ultimate solution is a peaceful transfer of power to elected, accountable civilians and the removal of the military’s overt and covert influence from the political scene. At a minimum, Egypt should establish the clear supremacy of the civilian government over the military and allow an unfettered civil society to flourish.

Washington should suspend military assistance to Egypt until those conditions are met. Taking that difficult step now could help Egypt avoid decades of the violence, terrorism and cloak-and-dagger politics that continue to plague Pakistan.

Michele Dunne, a former White House and State Department official, and Shuja Nawaz, the author of “Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within,” are the directors of the Middle East and South Asia centers, respectively, at the Atlantic Council. This article was originally published in The New York Times. Photo credit: Getty Images.

A Leaner NATO Needs a Tighter Focus

Hans Binnendijk — Fri, 03 Feb 2012 10:20:17 -0600

U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton have an opportunity this weekend as they address the Munich Security Conference to suggest ways to stabilize NATO’s ailing defense capabilities.

European nations have slashed their defense budgets to record low levels without much regard for NATO’s overall defense requirements. And last week the United States announced that it would remove two of its four Brigade Combat Teams from Europe.

Those European reductions are beginning to weaken NATO’s core military capabilities. Most European defense cuts have been across the board, creating the potential for hollow forces with low readiness and low sustainability levels. More recently key allies like the British and Dutch have eliminated entire military categories such as carrier aviation and armor.

The alliance is certainly not doomed. In 2011, Europe still had two million personnel under arms and spent about €215 billion on defense; those numbers are declining. NATO emerged victorious in Libya without losing a man; and maritime operations are having a positive impact against pirates and terrorists. The Afghanistan coalition was shaken recently with France’s decision to withdraw early, but NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has since said that the United States and its allies would step back from a combat role in Afghanistan in mid-2013.

The real long-term risk to NATO is that gaps will appear in the European force structure that the United States won’t be able to fill, and that the alliance will be unable to act in a future crisis. That risk needs to be faced squarely at the NATO summit in Chicago in May.

Panetta and Clinton might consider a five-part plan to deal with this looming problem. First, NATO needs to define more precisely what military capabilities are needed to meet its three agreed tasks: collective defense, crisis management and cooperative security. NATO’s Allied Command Transformation has been unable to design such a “must have” priority list.

The U.S. National Defense University has just completed a major study on this which might serve as a starting point for prioritization. Skilled military personnel, technology and deployable capability are more important than massed armies and large installations.

Ideally, at the Chicago summit, heads of state would pledge that as they consider their national defense budgets, they would protect these “must have” military capabilities. They might also pledge to build back beyond this minimal requirement after the economic recession has passed.

Second, NATO must take a bolder approach to Rasmussen’s concept of Smart Defense. The alliance has identified some 16 current multinational defense projects where military assets are pooled or shared by several nations. That is a good start, but it will not deal with the magnitude of this crisis. The level of specialization and cooperation needs to be raised to the mission level in order to maximize efficiency and political attractiveness. Clusters of willing nations might form what has been called “mission focus groups” that prepare for certain types of missions, such as fighting piracy, policing the air and special operations. Those nations would self-organize under the general guidance of the NATO secretary general. Rewiring the alliance around a mission focus group concept may be a bridge too far for Chicago, but the concept should considered there.

Third, the United States European Command, Eucom, needs reorientation. During the past decade, U.S. forces in Europe have followed a “lily pad” strategy by which they sit waiting to jump to another theater. Given the nature of NATO’s coming capabilities crisis and U.S. reductions, Eucom needs to work more closely with its European allies to maintain European skills and trans-Atlantic interoperability.

A recent American decision to dedicate a U.S. based Brigade Combat Team to work with the NATO Response Force is precisely the kind of close U.S.-European military interaction that is needed.

Fourth, NATO’s partners need to play enhanced roles and even consider dividing some of the labor with NATO. For example, the European Union might agree to take the lead on certain missions, such as peacekeeping in Africa. Russia might form a close cooperative arrangement with NATO on counterterrorism. Historically non-aligned European nations like Sweden and Finland might integrate even more with NATO for missions like Baltic defense. The most capable partners can be closely associated with Smart Defense efforts and take a leadership role in training and education.

Finally, to reassure our Eastern allies, NATO needs to exercise its contingency plans for so-called Article 5 missions using U.S.-based forces and to retain its current nuclear posture in Europe. With NATO’s conventional capabilities in decline, this is no time to remove the remaining handful of U.S. nuclear bombs in Europe that both reassure allies and deter potential adversaries. Any future nuclear reductions need to be part of a broad negotiation with Russia.

NATO must keep up its guard even in times of austerity. It may also need to lower its level of ambition and focus on priority missions. These five measures can maximize military efficiencies and maintain basic confidence that the Alliance will be able to deal with the uncertain challenges that lie ahead.

Hans Binnendijk is vice president for Research and Applied Learning at the National Defense University, and member of the Atlantic Council's Strategic Advisors Group. These views are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S. government. This essay originally appeared on The New York Times.