America’s aging tactical Air Force — the jets that protect ground troops and strike hard-to-reach targets — is shrinking just as the Pentagon is cutting even more planes to achieve nearly a half-trillion dollars in spending cuts.
The trend has set off alarms among retired fighter pilots, some of whom wrote to Congress last month warning that U.S. “TacAir” is in trouble.
They fear the political pressure to drive down the deficit will mean there will never be enough money to replace 1970s jets with advanced aircraft to operate against rising militaries such as China‘s, which last year unveiled its own stealth fighter, the J-20.
“With the exception of our airlift fleet, we have a geriatric Air Force,” said retired Lt. Gen. David A. Deptula, a former F-15 Eagle pilot and Operation Desert Storm war planner. “We’re flying fighters that are 30 years old. What people seem to miss is, a fighter is not like an airliner, where you take off from Point A and go to Point B. Our pilots put six to nine [gravitational forces] on these things every day.”
Gen. Deptula, who now heads the Mav6 LLC aerospace company, pointed to a 2007 event that has come to symbolize the collection of elderly fighter jets: An Air National Guard F-15C, the premier air superiority jet, broke apart in the sky during combat training. The pilot ejected safely.
The Air Force grounded the entire F-15 fleet and later attributed the breakup to a manufacturing flaw in some aircraft dating back to the 1970s.
The total number of Air Force fighters, which include the F-16 Falcons, F-15 Eagles, A-10 Thunderbolts and F-22 Raptors, has fallen by nearly 25 percent, from 2,477 in 2001 to 2,004 today, according to service figures provided to The Washington Times. In 2001, the Air Force flew an even larger fighter force in 2001, counting 52 F-117 stealth fighters that were retired in 2006.
Today, it has 372 fewer F-16s and 263 fewer F-15s than in 2001, but 179 more F-22s, which have yet to see combat.
Budget cuts will drive the total lower.
Air Force Secretary Michael B. Donley recently announced another retirement of tactical aircraft — 102 A-10s and 21 F-16s — to help meet demands of $487 billion in spending cuts over 10 years, as announced last month by Defense Secretary Leon E. Panetta.
Mr. Panetta said the Air Force would lose six, or 10 percent, of its 60 tactical air squadrons, coming on the heels of former defense chief Robert M. Gates‘ decision in 2009 to retire 255 older jet fighters.
Navy air doing better
The average age of an Air Force fighter is now 22 years, nearly double what it was in 1999, and an age at which fighter jets usually are retired. The service faces a shortfall of 100 to as many as 800 fighter jets by 2024. As a result, it is being forced to invest millions of dollars in older F-16s to extend their life spans.
“We’ve got to recapitalize our force if, in fact, we’re going to be able to provide the nation what it needs, what it’s come to expect, in terms of aerospace capability,” said Gen. Deptula, who took part in several Pentagon studies on the military’s future. “We’ve known about this for 20-plus years.”
By the numbers, the Navy, which flies a fighter fleet about half the size of the Air Force‘s, seems to be doing better.
Washington Times (http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/feb/5/fleets-fade-away-with-pentagon-budget-cuts/)
INDIANAPOLIS -- A joint color guard made of servicemembers from around Indiana practice presenting the Colors at the U.S. Army Reserve Center in Indianapolis Jan. 25. The group will present the Colors at Super Bowl XLVI Feb. 5. Pictured from left to right are Sgt. 1st Class David Warder, Staff Sgt. Austin Stoner, Sgt. 1st Class Kyle Rasmussen, Sgt. Brian Francies, Petty Officer 3rd Class Daniel Delgado, Tech. Sgt. Mark Orders-Woempner, Seaman Aaron Such and Sgt. Joshua Bishop. (U.S. Air Force photo/Master Sgt. Geoff Spaulding)
Call me crazy but there was a time when the US was a “Can do country”. Now the perception form outside nations and most importantly from our own American’s is more of a what can you do for me attitude.
America has seen a steep decline on the global scale in the past few years and trust me there are plenty of countries taking note. Not only on a global view but lets look in the mirror at our own “Americans” and their attitude. You would have to be blind to think that the rise in “hand outs” hasn’t been on the increase. Being in the military it is somewhat transparent within in the services but looking out we as a country are not the same country we were ten years ago. Not even close.
What happened to the days America was the front runner? The leader. There is an interesting term “Leader” as we need more to stand up and start kicking ass again. Our military is being shrunk, assets being reduced and military veterans with hardened combat experience told to walk and find a job in the civilian world (good luck). I’ve said it before but when you dump so many combat hardened veterans, you don’t retain that knowledge and experience within the ranks again over night.
I personally am set up to throw a nice solid forearm into the opposition as are many fellow service members. I frankly still believe America is great and land of the free. I still believe our military is the greatest force on the earth and not only because of our numbers but because of the ones wearing the uniform. The ones that have the similar attitude of those that went before us in places called Guadalcanal, Iwo Jima and the ones who stood strong after the attacks at Pear Harbor. Your warriors don’t fall into the “what can America do for me” category; they are the “doers” of America.
We as “Americans” make this country what it is. This demonstrated in many ways, one including how we support our troops and wounded. You make this country what it is. We as a military stand strong as possible to defend her.
It’s time America for us to get back to being the land of the free & brave. We can start by perhaps a “victory” parade for the Iraqi veterans. The NY Giants had a parade for their football team but we don’t have one for those dedicating all (a reflection of our times). I’m sure any random sports fan could tell me the names of the quarterbacks that played in the Super Bowl or who did the half time entertainment. However, can anyone tell me the names of the warriors that were the color guard of the Super Bowl? Let me introduce them:
Some reading this will think this is about our “troops” and such. People, it’s about so much more than that and many will never know and some won’t even care because they think this is how America should be. Frankly, myself and the above warriors are not about what America can do for us, we are more the “kick ass” can do of those of apparently a far past.
What sort are you?
Time for a CGar!
I spent last year in Afghanistan, visiting and talking with U.S. troops and their Afghan partners. My duties with the Army’s Rapid Equipping Force took me into every significant area where our soldiers engage the enemy. Over the course of 12 months, I covered more than 9,000 miles and talked, traveled and patrolled with troops in Kandahar, Kunar, Ghazni, Khost, Paktika, Kunduz, Balkh, Nangarhar and other provinces.
What I saw bore no resemblance to rosy official statements by U.S. military leaders about conditions on the ground.
Entering this deployment, I was sincerely hoping to learn that the claims were true: that conditions in Afghanistan were improving, that the local government and military were progressing toward self-sufficiency. I did not need to witness dramatic improvements to be reassured, but merely hoped to see evidence of positive trends, to see companies or battalions produce even minimal but sustainable progress.
Instead, I witnessed the absence of success on virtually every level.
My arrival in country in late 2010 marked the start of my fourth combat deployment, and my second in Afghanistan. A Regular Army officer in the Armor Branch, I served in Operation Desert Storm, in Afghanistan in 2005-06 and in Iraq in 2008-09. In the middle of my career, I spent eight years in the U.S. Army Reserve and held a number of civilian jobs — among them, legislative correspondent for defense and foreign affairs for Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, R-Texas.
As a representative for the Rapid Equipping Force, I set out to talk to our troops about their needs and their circumstances. Along the way, I conducted mounted and dismounted combat patrols, spending time with conventional and Special Forces troops. I interviewed or had conversations with more than 250 soldiers in the field, from the lowest-ranking 19-year-old private to division commanders and staff members at every echelon. I spoke at length with Afghan security officials, Afghan civilians and a few village elders.
I saw the incredible difficulties any military force would have to pacify even a single area of any of those provinces; I heard many stories of how insurgents controlled virtually every piece of land beyond eyeshot of a U.S. or International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) base.
I saw little to no evidence the local governments were able to provide for the basic needs of the people. Some of the Afghan civilians I talked with said the people didn’t want to be connected to a predatory or incapable local government.
From time to time, I observed Afghan Security forces collude with the insurgency.
From Bad to Abysmal
Much of what I saw during my deployment, let alone read or wrote in official reports, I can’t talk about; the information remains classified. But I can say that such reports — mine and others’ — serve to illuminate the gulf between conditions on the ground and official statements of progress.
And I can relate a few representative experiences, of the kind that I observed all over the country.
In January 2011, I made my first trip into the mountains of Kunar province near the Pakistan border to visit the troops of 1st Squadron, 32nd Cavalry. On a patrol to the northernmost U.S. position in eastern Afghanistan, we arrived at an Afghan National Police (ANP) station that had reported being attacked by the Taliban 2½ hours earlier.
Through the interpreter, I asked the police captain where the attack had originated, and he pointed to the side of a nearby mountain.
“What are your normal procedures in situations like these?” I asked. “Do you form up a squad and go after them? Do you periodically send out harassing patrols? What do you do?”
As the interpreter conveyed my questions, the captain’s head wheeled around, looking first at the interpreter and turning to me with an incredulous expression. Then he laughed.
“No! We don’t go after them,” he said. “That would be dangerous!”
According to the cavalry troopers, the Afghan policemen rarely leave the cover of the checkpoints. In that part of the province, the Taliban literally run free.
In June, I was in the Zharay district of Kandahar province, returning to a base from a dismounted patrol. Gunshots were audible as the Taliban attacked a U.S. checkpoint about one mile away.
As I entered the unit’s command post, the commander and his staff were watching a live video feed of the battle. Two ANP vehicles were blocking the main road leading to the site of the attack. The fire was coming from behind a haystack. We watched as two Afghan men emerged, mounted a motorcycle and began moving toward the Afghan policemen in their vehicles.
The U.S. commander turned around and told the Afghan radio operator to make sure the policemen halted the men. The radio operator shouted into the radio repeatedly, but got no answer.
On the screen, we watched as the two men slowly motored past the ANP vehicles. The policemen neither got out to stop the two men nor answered the radio — until the motorcycle was out of sight.
To a man, the U.S. officers in that unit told me they had nothing but contempt for the Afghan troops in their area — and that was before the above incident occurred.
In August, I went on a dismounted patrol with troops in the Panjwai district of Kandahar province. Several troops from the unit had recently been killed in action, one of whom was a very popular and experienced soldier. One of the unit’s senior officers rhetorically asked me, “How do I look these men in the eye and ask them to go out day after day on these missions? What’s harder: How do I look [my soldier’s] wife in the eye when I get back and tell her that her husband died for something meaningful? How do I do that?”
One of the senior enlisted leaders added, “Guys are saying, ‘I hope I live so I can at least get home to R&R leave before I get it,’ or ‘I hope I only lose a foot.’ Sometimes they even say which limb it might be: ‘Maybe it’ll only be my left foot.’ They don’t have a lot of confidence that the leadership two levels up really understands what they’re living here, what the situation really is.”
On Sept. 11, the 10th anniversary of the infamous attack on the U.S., I visited another unit in Kunar province, this one near the town of Asmar. I talked with the local official who served as the cultural adviser to the U.S. commander. Here’s how the conversation went:
Davis: “Here you have many units of the Afghan National Security Forces [ANSF]. Will they be able to hold out against the Taliban when U.S. troops leave this area?”
Adviser: “No. They are definitely not capable. Already all across this region [many elements of] the security forces have made deals with the Taliban. [The ANSF] won’t shoot at the Taliban, and the Taliban won’t shoot them.
“Also, when a Taliban member is arrested, he is soon released with no action taken against him. So when the Taliban returns [when the Americans leave after 2014], so too go the jobs, especially for everyone like me who has worked with the coalition.
“Recently, I got a cellphone call from a Talib who had captured a friend of mine. While I could hear, he began to beat him, telling me I’d better quit working for the Americans. I could hear my friend crying out in pain. [The Talib] said the next time they would kidnap my sons and do the same to them. Because of the direct threats, I’ve had to take my children out of school just to keep them safe.
“And last night, right on that mountain there [he pointed to a ridge overlooking the U.S. base, about 700 meters distant], a member of the ANP was murdered. The Taliban came and called him out, kidnapped him in front of his parents, and took him away and murdered him. He was a member of the ANP from another province and had come back to visit his parents. He was only 27 years old. The people are not safe anywhere.”
That murder took place within view of the U.S. base, a post nominally responsible for the security of an area of hundreds of square kilometers. Imagine how insecure the population is beyond visual range. And yet that conversation was representative of what I saw in many regions of Afghanistan.
In all of the places I visited, the tactical situation was bad to abysmal. If the events I have described — and many, many more I could mention — had been in the first year of war, or even the third or fourth, one might be willing to believe that Afghanistan was just a hard fight, and we should stick it out. Yet these incidents all happened in the 10th year of war.
As the numbers depicting casualties and enemy violence indicate the absence of progress, so too did my observations of the tactical situation all over Afghanistan.
Credibility Gap
I’m hardly the only one who has noted the discrepancy between official statements and the truth on the ground.
A January 2011 report by the Afghan NGO Security Office noted that public statements made by U.S. and ISAF leaders at the end of 2010 were “sharply divergent from IMF, [international military forces, NGO-speak for ISAF] ‘strategic communication’ messages suggesting improvements. We encourage [nongovernment organization personnel] to recognize that no matter how authoritative the source of any such claim, messages of the nature are solely intended to influence American and European public opinion ahead of the withdrawal, and are not intended to offer an accurate portrayal of the situation for those who live and work here.”
The following month, Anthony Cordesman, on behalf of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, wrote that ISAF and the U.S. leadership failed to report accurately on the reality of the situation in Afghanistan.
“Since June 2010, the unclassified reporting the U.S. does provide has steadily shrunk in content, effectively ‘spinning’ the road to victory by eliminating content that illustrates the full scale of the challenges ahead,” Cordesman wrote. “They also, however, were driven by political decisions to ignore or understate Taliban and insurgent gains from 2002 to 2009, to ignore the problems caused by weak and corrupt Afghan governance, to understate the risks posed by sanctuaries in Pakistan, and to ‘spin’ the value of tactical ISAF victories while ignoring the steady growth of Taliban influence and control.”
How many more men must die in support of a mission that is not succeeding and behind an array of more than seven years of optimistic statements by U.S. senior leaders in Afghanistan? No one expects our leaders to always have a successful plan. But we do expect — and the men who do the living, fighting and dying deserve — to have our leaders tell us the truth about what’s going on.
I first encountered senior-level equivocation during a 1997 division-level “experiment” that turned out to be far more setpiece than experiment. Over dinner at Fort Hood, Texas, Training and Doctrine Command leaders told me that the Advanced Warfighter Experiment (AWE) had shown that a “digital division” with fewer troops and more gear could be far more effective than current divisions. The next day, our congressional staff delegation observed the demonstration firsthand, and it didn’t take long to realize there was little substance to the claims. Virtually no legitimate experimentation was actually conducted. All parameters were carefully scripted. All events had a preordained sequence and outcome. The AWE was simply an expensive show, couched in the language of scientific experimentation and presented in glowing press releases and public statements, intended to persuade Congress to fund the Army’s preference. Citing the AWE’s “results,” Army leaders proceeded to eliminate one maneuver company per combat battalion. But the loss of fighting systems was never offset by a commensurate rise in killing capability.
A decade later, in the summer of 2007, I was assigned to the Future Combat Systems (FCS) organization at Fort Bliss, Texas. It didn’t take long to discover that the same thing the Army had done with a single division at Fort Hood in 1997 was now being done on a significantly larger scale with FCS. Year after year, the congressionally mandated reports from the Government Accountability Office revealed significant problems and warned that the system was in danger of failing. Each year, the Army’s senior leaders told members of Congress at hearings that GAO didn’t really understand the full picture and that to the contrary, the program was on schedule, on budget, and headed for success. Ultimately, of course, the program was canceled, with little but spinoffs to show for $18 billion spent.
If Americans were able to compare the public statements many of our leaders have made with classified data, this credibility gulf would be immediately observable. Naturally, I am not authorized to divulge classified material to the public. But I am legally able to share it with members of Congress. I have accordingly provided a much fuller accounting in a classified report to several members of Congress, both Democrats and Republicans, senators and House members.
A nonclassified version is available at www.afghanreport.com. [Editor’s note: At press time, Army public affairs had not yet ruled on whether Davis could post this longer version.]
Tell The Truth
When it comes to deciding what matters are worth plunging our nation into war and which are not, our senior leaders owe it to the nation and to the uniformed members to be candid — graphically, if necessary — in telling them what’s at stake and how expensive potential success is likely to be. U.S. citizens and their elected representatives can decide if the risk to blood and treasure is worth it.
Likewise when having to decide whether to continue a war, alter its aims or to close off a campaign that cannot be won at an acceptable price, our senior leaders have an obligation to tell Congress and American people the unvarnished truth and let the people decide what course of action to choose. That is the very essence of civilian control of the military. The American people deserve better than what they’ve gotten from their senior uniformed leaders over the last number of years. Simply telling the truth would be a good start. AFJ
ABOARD A U.S. MILITARY AIRCRAFT — U.S. and other international forces in Afghanistan aim to end their combat role next year and switch to training and advising Afghan forces through 2014, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said Wednesday.
By ROBERT BURNS
Panetta's remarks to reporters traveling with him to a NATO
defense ministers meeting in Brussels represented the Obama administration's most explicit portrayal of how the foreign military role in Afghanistan is expected to evolve from the current high-intensity fight against the Taliban to a support role with Afghans fully in the lead.
Afghan combat role to end; US forces still at risk
Panetta called 2013 a critical year for the Afghanistan mission that has dragged on for more than a decade with little sign that the Taliban will be decisively defeated. He noted that NATO and the Afghan government intend to begin a final phase of transitioning sections of the country to Afghan security control in mid-2013.
"Hopefully by the mid to latter part of 2013 we'll be able to make a transition from a combat role to a training, advise and assist role," he said. He added that this "doesn't mean we're not going to be combat-ready," but rather that the U.S. and other international forces will no longer be in "the formal combat role we're in now."
Pakistan, NATO officials downplay Taliban report
He said no decisions have been made about how many U.S. troops would be required to remain there once the combat role has ended. He suggested, however, that large reductions, below the 68,000 troop level projected for this September, were unlikely in the months immediately after the shift. The U.S. now has about 91,000 troops there as part of the International Security Assistance Force. The fact that much military work will remain after 2013 "demands that we have a strong presence there," he said.
Although Panetta made no mention of it, U.S. Marines in Afghanistan already are making that transition out of a combat role. They are operating in Helmand province in southwestern Afghanistan, where the Taliban have been greatly weakened, and are on track to reduce their numbers significantly this year. Panetta's remarks indicated that this switch into a support role will be applied across Afghanistan, assuming no major setbacks against the Taliban and continued progress in training Afghan forces.
Many U.S. forces already are training and advising Afghan forces.
Marine Gen. John Allen, the overall commander of international forces in Afghanistan, has been talking publicly since last fall about converting the military role from combat to what he has called "security assistance." But Panetta went further in identifying mid- to late-2013 as the target for completing this conversion countrywide.
Panetta was heading to Brussels to attend a NATO meeting at which this and other issues related to the war in Afghanistan are expected to top the agenda. The session is intended to help pave the way for key decisions to be announced at a summit meeting of NATO heads of government in Chicago in May.
All NATO members have endorsed the plan to keep forces in Afghanistan until the end of 2014. But France this week appeared to throw that plan into doubt when President Nicolas Sarkozy proposed, with Afghan President Hamid Karzai at his side and seemingly in agreement, that NATO end its mission in 2013 — one year earlier than planned.
Panetta said he hoped to hear more from the French delegation at NATO.
Panetta is gathering with his European counterparts at a delicate time for NATO, not only because of the uncertainty surrounding the military mission in Afghanistan but also because of a growing gap in military power between the U.S. and nearly all other European members of the alliance.
Slideshow: Afghanistan: Nation at a crossroads (on this page)
That chasm is not expected to narrow even as the U.S. reduces its defense budget by nearly $490 billion over the coming decade and reduces the size of the Army and Marine Corps.
The U.S. remains the leader of a 28-nation NATO, but the Obama administration has made no secret of its intention to shift focus toward Asia and the Middle East. It announced last week that it will remove two Army brigades from Europe in the next two years, leaving one in Germany and one in Italy. The alliance also is quietly discussing the possible withdrawal of American nuclear weapons from Europe in coming years. The nuclear issue is on the agenda for the Brussels meeting.
Gen. Ray Odierno, the Army chief of staff, said last week that the two brigades being removed from Europe will be eliminated rather than reassigned to U.S. bases. Both are based in Germany — the 172nd Infantry Brigade, in Grafenwoehr, and the 170th Infantry Brigade, in Baumholder. Odierno said that in the long run this change will benefit both the United States and its European partners because U.S. Army combat and support units will periodically rotate in and out of Europe for training and joint exercises that are designed to meet the needs of the European forces.
U.S. military forces helicoptered into Somalia in a nighttime raid Wednesday and freed two hostages, an American and a Dane, while killing nine pirates., U.S. officials confirm.
The Danish Refugee Council also confirmed the two aid workers, American Jessica Buchanan and Dane Poul Hagan Thisted, were freed "during an operation in Somalia."
Buchanan, 32, and Thisted, 60, had been working with a de-mining unit of the Danish Refugee Council when they were kidnapped in October.
President Obama confirmed the operation and rescue early Wednesday in a statement. He said the operation serves as yet another message to the world that the U.S. "will stand strongly against any threats to our people."
"Jessica Buchanan was selflessly serving her fellow human beings when she was taken hostage by criminals and pirates who showed no regard for her health and well-being," he said. "As Commander-in-Chief, I could not be prouder of the troops who carried out this mission, and the dedicated professionals who supported their efforts."
Defense Secretary Leon Panetta also praised the mission early Wednesday, saying the operation was a "team effort" between multiple departments.
"This successful hostage rescue, undertaken in a hostile environment, is a testament to the superb skills of courageous service members who risked their lives to save others," he said.
The president appeared to refer to the mission before his State of the Union address in Washington Tuesday night. As he entered the House chamber in the U.S. Capitol, he pointed at Defense Secretary Leon Panetta in the crowd and said, "Good job tonight."
A Western official told The Associated Press that the raid was carried out by U.S. military forces. A second official said the helicopters and the hostages flew to a U.S. military base called Camp Lemonier in the Horn of Africa nation of Djibouti. Both officials spoke on condition of anonymity because the information had not been released publicly.
Panetta visited Camp Lemonier just over a month ago, A key U.S. ally in this region, Djibouti has the only U.S. base in sub-Saharan Africa. It hosts the military's Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa.
The Danish Refugee Council said both freed hostages are unharmed "and at a safe location." The group said in a separate statement that the two "are on their way to be reunited with their families."
The two aid workers appear to have been kidnapped by criminals, sometimes referred to as pirates, and not by Somalia's Al Qaeda-linked militant group al-Shabab. As large ships at sea have increased their defenses against pirate attacks, gangs have looked for other money making opportunities like land-based kidnappings.
A pirate who gave his name as Bile Hussein said he had spoken to pirates at the scene of the raid and they reported that nine pirates had been killed. A second pirate who gave his name as Ahmed Hashi said two helicopters attacked at about 2 a.m. at the site where the hostages were being held about 12 miles north of the Somali town of Adado.
The Danish Refugee Council had earlier enlisted traditional Somali elders and members of civil society to seek the release of the two hostages. The two were seized in October from the portion of Galkayo town under the control of a government-allied clan militia. The aid agency has said that Somalis held demonstrations demanding the pair's quick release.
Their Somali colleague was detained by police on suspicion of being involved in their kidnapping.
The two hostages were working in northern Somalia for the Danish Demining Group, whose experts have been clearing mines and unexploded ordnance in conflict zones in Africa and the Middle East.
Several hostages are still being held in Somalia, including a British tourist and two Spanish doctors seized from neighboring Kenya, and an American journalist kidnapped on Saturday.
The Associated Press contributed to this report.
I was in Iraq when “Haditha” hit the fan. Actually, I wasn’t too far from the actual event. It’s interesting that after 6 plus years the Marines involved have had charges dropped. It’s interesting how the ones who have never been to war or served in the countries great military are the first to point at those that have. Remember, when you point at someone, you have three fingers point back at yourself…..
Time for a CGar
Marine Staff Sgt. Frank Wuterich agreed to plead guilty Monday to one count of negligent dereliction of duty, ending his trial on manslaughter and related charges for his role in the deaths of 24 Iraqi civilians in 2005.
"This was his decision and his decision alone," Neal Puckett, Wuterich's lead defense attorney, told the North County Times. "Staff Sergeant Wuterich believed this was the right and honorable thing to do."
Negligent dereliction of duty is a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum of 90 days in custody and a reduction or forfeiture of pay. Sentencing is scheduled for Tuesday.
The deal was announced in court early Monday morning. Afterward, Wuterich hugged his parents, who have been watching the proceedings since the trial began.
Under the plea deal, Wuterich acknowledged that he didn't maintain "adequate tactical control" of troops he was leading and made a "negligent verbal order."
In statements to the judge, Wuterich said comments he made to Marines he was leading were negligent and may have led to the "tragic" events.
"I took a team of Marines to clear houses to the south of the site (of an IED explosion) and did use the words 'shoot first, ask questions later,' or something to that effect prior to clearing or entering there," he said.
Wuterich said the Marines he was leading may have taken his words to mean they should disregard the rules of engagement and not make positive identifications before shooting.
"I think we all understood what we were doing, so I should have probably said nothing," Wuterich said. "I offered those words of advice at the time, and I shouldn't have done that."
Wuterich's parents, who sat behind their son and held hands when he submitted his guilty plea, declined to comment.
The agreement has been approved by Lt. Gen. Thomas Waldhauser.
The plea deal ends the six-year saga of eight Camp Pendleton Marines charged with criminal wrongdoing in the incident that took place in the city of Haditha, Iraq, at the height of the war.
Wuterich was accused of being responsible for 19 of the Iraqi deaths in the incident that resulted in the largest war crimes prosecution arising from the conflict.
Puckett said the resolution of the trial that started at Camp Pendleton on Jan. 9 is a "fair and just conclusion."
"No one denies that the events ... were tragic, most of all Frank Wuterich," Puckett said in exclusive comments to the newspaper. "But the fact of the matter is that he has now been totally exonerated of the homicide charges brought against him by the government and the media.
"For the last six years, he has had his name dragged through the mud. Today, we hope, is the beginning of his redemption."
Puckett said Wuterich has always taken responsibility for his actions after a roadside bombing that killed Lance Cpl. Miguel Terrazas and injured two other Marines as they were returning from a resupply mission in the Anbar province city.
Immediately after the bombing, five men who drove up in a car were shot by Wuterich and one of his Marines from the 3rd Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment squad. Wuterich said he believed those men represented a threat and were part of the attack following the bombing, which included the squad taking small-arms fire from a nearby house.
The 19 other deaths, including six children and four women, occurred in that house and two others stormed by Wuterich and his troops.
The deaths at Haditha set off a storm of controversy when they came to light several weeks later in a Time magazine report.
Outrage came from around the world and from Washington, D.C., where the late Pennsylvania Rep. John Murtha said he believed the Marines might have "killed in cold blood" and went on to say U.S. troops were overstressed.
The result was eight Marines being charged with crimes at Haditha, including four officers and four enlisted men.
Seven of those eight saw their cases resolved, some with the withdrawal of charges in exchange for their testimony, one acquitted at trial and others having charges dropped entirely.
Wuterich, 31, a Murrieta single father of three girls, had pleaded not guilty.
Prosecutors appeared ready to strike a plea deal last week after their own witnesses gave testimony largely beneficial to Wuterich's position: that he believed he and his men were under attack and responded in keeping with their training.
Puckett said his client continues to believe his actions were lawful despite the civilian deaths, which Wuterich has repeatedly said he regrets.
"He has always taken responsibility for his and his squad's actions that day," Puckett said. "Today's agreement is completely consistent with everything he has said, which is that the decisions he made that day led to an outcome that was tragic and regrettable, but they were not criminal."
Wuterich told the North County Times on the eve of his trial that he was anxious for a resolution, but believed that the testimony from Marines at Haditha that day would show there was much more to the story than him and his squad running amok and shooting everything they saw.
Military law experts had predicted that fuzzy memories, the end of the war and the failure by the government to secure any convictions against the seven other defendants portended an uphill battle.
When it became clear last week that a plea deal was being negotiated, former Marine attorney and judge Gary Solis said prosecutors must have realized the case was not playing out in their favor.
Under the military justice system, it is the prosecution that would have had to approach Wuterich and his attorneys with a plea deal.
The deal that was under discussion last week never dissolved, but it took more work over the weekend to finalize, according to sources close to the case.
The eight-member Marine jury selected to hear the case was dismissed from court shortly after it convened Monday morning and the deal was announced.
A lot could be said about the Denver quarterback. He gets hammered on the field, his coaching staff is wondering if he is the real deal and all those against his religion criticize his faith. Hmmm I thought America was built on freedom of speech.
I will give him this, he stands strong, and he has the Marines on his side so stand by.
Time for a CGar!
Ask a Marine what's so special about the Marines and the answer would be "esprit de corps", an unhelpful French phrase that means exactly what it looks like - the spirit of the Corps, but what is that spirit, and where does it come from?
The Marine Corps is the only branch of the U.S. Armed Forces that recruits people specifically to Fight. The Army emphasizes personal development (an Army of One), the Navy promises fun (let the journey begin), the Air Force offers security (it’s a great way of life). Missing from all the advertisements is the hard fact that a soldier's lot is to suffer and perhaps to die for his people, and take lives at the risk of his/her own.
Even the thematic music of the services reflects this evasion. The Army's Caisson Song describes a pleasant country outing. Over hill and dale, lacking only a picnic basket. Anchors Aweigh, the Navy's celebration of the joys of sailing, could have been penned by Jimmy Buffet. The Air Force song is a lyric poem of blue skies and engine thrust. All is joyful and invigorating, and safe. There are no land mines in the dales nor snipers behind the hills, no submarines or cruise missiles threaten the ocean jaunt, no bandits are lurking in the wild blue yonder. The Marines Hymn, by contrast, is all combat. We fight our Country's battles, First to fight for right and freedom, We have fought in every clime and place where we could take a gun, in many a strife we have fought for life and never lost our nerve.
The choice is made clear. You may join the Army to go to adventure training, or join the Navy to go to Bangkok, or join the Air Force to go to computer school.
You join the Marine Corps to go to War!
But the mere act of signing the enlistment contract confers no status in the Corps.
The Army recruit is told from his first minute in uniform that "you’re in the Army now”, soldier. The Navy and Air Force enlistees are sailors or airmen as soon as they get off bus at the training center.
The new arrival at Marine Corps boot camp is called a recruit, or worse, (a lot worse), but never a MARINE. Not yet, maybe never. He or she must earn the right to claim the title of UNITED STATES MARINE, and failure returns you to civilian life without hesitation or ceremony.
Recruit Platoon 2210 at San Diego, California trained from October through December of 1968. In Viet Nam the Marines were taking two hundred casualties a week, and the major rainy season operation Meade River, had not even begun, yet Drill Instructors had no qualms about winnowing out almost a quarter of their 112 recruits, graduating eighty one. Note that this was post - enlistment attrition; every one of those who were dropped had been passed by the recruiters as fit for service. But they failed the test of Boot Camp, not necessarily for physical reasons at least two were outstanding high school athletes for whom the calisthenics and running were child's play. The cause of their failure was not in the biceps nor the legs, but -in the spirit. Theyhad lacked the will to endure the mental and emotional strain, so they would not be Marines. Heavy commitments and high casualties not withstanding, the Corps reserves the right to pick and choose.
History classes in boot camp? Stop a soldier on the street and ask him to name a battle of World War One. Pick a sailor at random to describe the epic fight of the Bon Homme Richard. Everyone has heard of McGuire Air Force Base. So ask any airman who Major Thomes McGuire was, and why he is so commemorated. I am not carping, and there is no sheer in this criticism. All of the services have glorious traditions, but no one teaches the young soldier, sailor or airman what his uniform means and why he should be proud of it. But - ask a Marine about World War One, and you will hear of the wheat field at Belleau Wood and the courage of the Fourth Marine Brigade, fifth and sixth regiments. Faced with an enemy of superior numbers entrenched in tangled forest undergrowth, the Marines received an order to attack that even the charitable cannot call ill advised. It was insane. Artillery support was absent and air support hadn't been invented yet, so the Brigade charged German machine guns with only bayonets, grenades, and indomitable fighting spirit. A bandy legged little barrel of a gunnery sergeant, Daniel J. Daly, rallied his company with a shout, "Come on you sons a bitches, do you want to live forever"? He took out three machine guns himself, and they would give him the Medal of Honor except for a technicality, he already had two of them. French liaison officers, hardened though they were by four years of trench bound slaughter, were shocked as the Marines charged across the open wheat field under a blazing sun directly into the teeth of enemy fire. Their action was so anachronistic on the twentieth-century battlefield that they might as well have been swinging cutlasses, but the enemy was only human; they could not stand up to this. So the Marines took Belleau Wood. The Germans called them "DOGS FROM THE DEVIL"
Every Marine knows this story and dozens more. We are taught them in boot camp as a regular part of the curriculum. Every Marine will always be taught them! You can learn to don a gas mask anytime, even on the plane in route to the war zone, but before you can wear the Eagle Globe& Anchor (EG&A) and claim the title you must know about the Marines who made that emblem and title meaningful. So long as you can march and shoot and revere the legacy of the Corps you can take your place in line. And that line is unified spirit as in purpose. A soldier wears branch of service insignia on his collar, metal shoulder pins and cloth sleeve patches to identify his unit. Sailors wear a rating badge that identifies what they do for the Navy. Marines wear only the Eagle, Globe, and Anchor, together with personal ribbons and their CHERISHED marksmanship badges.
There is nothing on a Marine's uniform to indicate what he or she does, nor what unit the Marine belongs to. You cannot tell by looking at a Marine whether you are seeing a truck driver, a computer programmer, or a machine gunner. The Corps explains this as a security measure to conceal the identity and location of units, but the Marines’ penchant for publicity makes that the least likely of explanations. No, the Marine is amorphous, even anonymous, by conscious design.
Every Marine is a rifleman first and foremost, a Marine first, last and
Always! You may serve a four-year enlistment or even a twenty plus year career without seeing action, but if the word is given you'll charge across that Wheatfield! Whether a Marine has been schooled in automated supply, or automotive mechanics, or aviation electronics, is immaterial. Those things are secondary - the Corps does them because it must. The modern battle requires the technical appliances, and since the enemy has them, so do we, but no Marine boasts mastery of them. Our pride is in our marksmanship, our discipline, and our membership in a fraternity of courage and sacrifice. "For the honor of the fallen, for the glory of the dead", Edar Guest wrote of Belleau Wood, "the living line of courage kept the faith and moved ahead". They are all gone now, those Marines who made a French farmer's little Wheatfield into one of the most enduring of Marine Corps legends. Many of them did not survive the day, and eight long decades have claimed the rest. But their actions are immortal. The Corps remembers them and honors what they did, and so they live forever. Dan Daly's shouted challenge takes on its true meaning - if you lie in the trenches you may survive for now, but someday you may die and no one will care. If you charge the guns you may die in the next two minutes, but you will be one of the immortals. All Marines die in the red flash of battle or the white cold of the nursing home. In the vigor of youth or the infirmity of age all will eventually die, but the Marine Corps lives on. Every Marine who ever lived is living still, in the Marines who claim the title today. It is that sense of belonging to something that will outlive your own mortality, which gives people a light to live by and a flame to mark their passing.
Passed on to a Marine from another Marine!
SEMPER FI BROTHERS AND SISTERS!
Former Sgt. Nick Sparacino 2/9 Viet Nam 1966
D. Chief of Police Oak Forest Il.
I guess if you don’t actually have to go to do the fighting it doesn’t matter to you as much, but to those of us that do deploy, it’s pretty damn important. Like coming home or not important.
Time for a CGar
Sam LaGrone
The US Navy's fleet of amphibious assault ships may dip below the 33 hulls judged necessary by service chiefs as a result of budget constraints, a senior US Marine Corps (USMC) officer hinted in a Navy League address in Arlington, Virginia, on 18 January.
Lieutenant General Richard Mills, commander of Marine Corps Combat Development Command, indicated that the navy was considering the early retirement of a number of amphibious ships, such as landing platform docks (LPDs), to save money.
"We're going to be chasing it," Lt Gen Mills said. "Although that number [33] may not be realised, at least in the near term, we are working very close with the navy to make sure we have the amphibious lift that we need."
The USMC has long held the view that 33 amphibious ships is the minimum required to deploy two marine expeditionary brigades (MEBs) - notionally comprising about 29,000 troops - for a contested landing. The figure was approved by the then secretary of defence, Robert Gates, in late 2010; previously the marines had argued for 38 amphibious ships.
The capabilities of modern vessels such as the San Antonio-class LPDs, together with increased maintenance efficiencies, would minimise the impact of any drop below the 33-ship floor, Lt Gen Mills told reporters. However, the USMC was "still concerned that we'll have the adequate ships that we need," he added.
Jane's has previously reported that the US Navy planned to decommission three Whidbey Island-class dock landing ships as part of the proposed 2013 budget. The final amphibious force structure will probably become clear on 26 January, when all the US armed services will release their major programmatic decisions ahead of the budget roll-out on 6 February.