This is something that we will not know for a while, perhaps for years, according to Jonathan Glennie at the Guardian. The fact is, while Busan has charted new territory in its acknowledgement of the complexities and diverse nature of actors involved in the modern aid and development infrastructure, there is little in the outcome of the conference that can be counted as perceptible progress yet.

Consider the case of civil society participating in Busan. The inclusion of civil society as full and equal partners in development at Busan was a milestone- a highly significant step in acknowledging the importance of civil society organisations (CSOs) and the work they do across the world. The Busan outcome document, the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation, underscores this with mention of the need to create an enabling environment for civil society , and endorsement of the Open Forum’s Istanbul Principles and International Framework for CSO Development Effectiveness. These relate to some of the key proposals of civil society in the run-up to Busan, and their presence in the outcome document points to the more inclusive direction the High Level Fora are taking.

While these are positive developments that are very supportive of civil society’s work, much more had been expected from Busan. In the Final Civil Society Statement, CSOs had collectively asked for several key points to be addressed, including, amongst others: correcting the failure (mainly on the part of donors) to meet commitments made at Paris and Accra, particularly untying aid and improving transparency and accountability; committing to a rights-based approach to development; and ensuring private sector engagement be accountable and observe international human rights law. As many commentators, including aid expert Owen Barder, NGOs such as Oxfam, and civil society coalitions the Open Forum and BetterAid, have noted, the outcome at Busan fell largely short of any significant commitments on these points. Especially disappointing was the retreat from any time-bound commitments to ensuring the implementation of the Paris Principles, as well as pushing back the creation of a monitoring framework for overseeing implementation of the promises made at Busan to June 2012. Many also felt that a last-minute caveat that makes adherence to the Busan agreement voluntary for emerging donors, undermines the point of a global commitment to making aid more effective.

So while some of civil society’s battles were won at Busan, with significant victories such as Hillary Clinton’s endorsement of the Istanbul Principles and discussions of involving civil society formally in many UN procedures, tangible progress on the ground remains to be seen. As with so many things in the complicated world of development, only time will tell.

Ensuring transparency and accountability is crucial to guaranteeing responsiveness to the needs of a country’s population; by allowing the public to access financial information regarding such payments, citizens are better able to hold their governments to account. Through making this information publicly available, local communities, businesses, politicians and anyone else with an interest in the needs of a particular community or country, are able to assess whether they are getting their fair share of the profits which are being generated from the exploitation of their country’s natural resources.

With such considerations in mind, the European Parliament and member states will be considering a proposal to amend the EU’s Transparency and Accounting Directives over the coming months. The proposal, which was put on the table on 25th October 2011, advocates the introduction of European legislation which would require extractive companies listed in Europe to publish details of payments that are made to national governments. This proposal has taken its initiative from the US Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. The Dodd-Frank Act, which was brought into law in July 2010, requires that oil, mining and gas companies registered with the US Securities and Exchange Commission report the payments that they make to governments.

This piece of European legislation, if introduced on a sufficiently rigorous basis, could make a significant contribution to ensuring an increase in development investment for many low-income countries. It would build on the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), a voluntary initiative of which Ghana (our country case study for the Global Climate Change Governance project) is already a member. However, for the EU legislation to be effective, it must take into account both listed and non-listed firms, as well as ensuring that no exemptions are in place which would jeopardise effective reporting of payments by European firms.

Recent coverage of the situation in Colombia has helped to highlight the need for such legislation. The Colombian government demands that mining companies pay royalties in order to access the country’s natural resources; although 80% of these payments are supposed to be invested in development projects in the producing region, local communities are unable to access any information regarding the status of these payments. If rigorous legislation on reporting by EU companies were brought into law, local communities and decision-makers in developing countries could hold their governments to account over the status of such payments.

Our Global Climate Change Governance project is assessing the accountability policies and quality management systems of key global institutions, as one way of understanding how responsive they are to the needs of citizens in the face of climate change. In the same manner, the need for greater accountability and transparency concerning financial transactions between companies and governments is critical to ensuring that communities in some of the poorest countries benefit from natural resource extraction. We hope that the new EU legislation, when passed, will go some way to achieving this.

This Wednesday, The Guardian leaked the World Bank’s draft ‘Mobilising Climate Finance’ report, which is due to be presented to the G20 finance ministers in November. The report, which has been commissioned by the G20 finance ministers, explores avenues for scaling up climate adaptation and mitigation in developing countries (see http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/interactive/2011/sep/21/mobilising-climate-finance-report-g20, p.5) by outlining the Bank’s proposals for leveraging climate finance for developing countries. Given that this report is intended to provide a basis for the UN climate talks, which are due to continue in Panama next week, the proposals may prove critical in either initiating or hampering effective global action on climate change.

There are certain aspects to the report for which the Bank can be congratulated, namely the proposal for removing subsidies for fossil fuel use. Total fossil fuel subsidies for Annex II countries are estimated to lie somewhere between $40-60bn over recent years. The funding of fossil fuel projects in the name of development has long been a controversial issue at the Bank, not least because subsidising high carbon infrastructure is in stark contradiction with the Bank’s climate change objectives (an issue which we have explored in previous blogs). Moreover, in 2010, just over 20% of these subsidies went directly to oil, gas and coal companies, rather than to supporting consumers in developing countries. (See http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/interactive/2011/sep/21/mobilising-climate-finance-report-g20, p.21.) The proposal by the Bank to remove fossil fuel subsidies is therefore a surprising (and welcome) turnaround.

Yet while the Bank’s proposal to remove fossil fuel subsidies suggests a positive move away from providing finance to highly polluting industry, other features of the report are more concerning. The heavy emphasis on carbon offsetting, carbon trading, and using the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) to achieve emissions reductions, for example, suggests a worrying move towards redirecting ‘climate aid’ money (which has already been pledged to developing countries) towards private markets that have been criticised as being ineffective.

There is a firm emphasis on leveraging climate finance from the private rather than the public sector, with the report praising the role that carbon offsetting can play in ‘catalysing low carbon investments’. Yet carbon offsetting has often been criticised for failing to achieve actual emissions reductions. Likewise, the Clean Development Mechanism has been criticised for allowing rich nations to avoid meeting their emissions reductions targets as it has, in some cases, allowed rich countries to gain carbon credits by funding low carbon projects which were already in the pipeline.

The report also discusses the potential for increasing low carbon investment by stimulating carbon markets. However the reliance on the private sector and on bolstering carbon markets is a high-risk strategy. Carbon markets have consistently failed to deliver; the EU Emissions Trading Scheme for example has been largely ineffective at delivering any substantial reduction in emissions across the EU. Furthermore, even within the report there is an acknowledgement that capital flows from offsetting initiatives have so far gone to a relatively small number of middle income countries rather than developing countries. Using public funds to support carbon markets therefore risks both diverting funds away from developing countries, and failing to achieve the climate adaptation and mitigation improvements that are needed.

Therefore despite the welcomed drive away from fossil fuel subsidies, many of the proposals being forwarded by the World Bank fail to offer a low carbon development path which will integrate developmental aims. Moreover, as accountability advocates, we also need to be asking questions about which actors were involved in developing this proposal, and whether citizens and decision-makers in developing countries in particular feel that their views have been accurately reflected with regards to global climate finance issues. How to reconcile climate change mitigation and adaptation with issues of development is no easy task, and will require the balancing of conflicting stakeholder views in the quest for a fair solution.

The campaign behind Unwatchable will not be unfamiliar to those acquainted with the DRC: the production of mobile phones requires tin, tantalum and tungsten, supplies of which exist in eastern Congo. The lucrative mining trade has drawn the attention of armed gangs, who are often behind acts of extreme violence against civilians. The role minerals play in the violence afflicting the DRC has been the driving agenda in several high profile organisations, including the Enough Project and Global Witness. The film itself depicts the true story of a woman who was brutally raped and her family murdered, but changes the premises to a white family in a prosperous Western setting, presumably to make the point that we would not be so apathetic to atrocities closer to home. It then asks viewers to sign a petition calling on the EU to ensure that European companies use responsible sourcing guidelines in procuring minerals from the DRC, but the campaign is directed particularly at phone companies (the website’s tagline is ‘Is Your Phone Rape-Free?’).

Much of the criticism of the film is directed at the intensely graphic and violent nature of the video. Although the point is to create a lasting impression, commentators question whether such heavy-handed shock therapy is necessary. Criticism has also been levelled at how the story of Congo’s conflict has been represented by the campaign (see Tom Murphy’s post at A View from the Cave and AidThoughts). Unwatchable’s campaign is centred on conflict minerals, specifically armed groups fighting for control of supplies while using rape as a weapon to clear mining areas of civilians. The problem many have with this claim is that it reduces a multifaceted conflict to a simple mineral-violence link. As those who know the Congo well including Laura Seay, assistant professor of political science, and Jason Stearns, a Coordinator of the United Nations Group of Experts on the Congo, point out that the situation in the DRC is of a highly complex nature, involving disputes over land and citizenship rights, fuelled by weak institutions and state collapse. While minerals do play a large part in the conflict now, giving the impression that it is the primary driver of violence detracts from more realistic accounts that require engagement with a series of complicated underlying factors. Interestingly enough, this is briefly acknowledged by Unwatchable in their FAQ section, which states that, ‘the rape of women, persistence state of conflict, insecurity, impunity and humanitarian crisis can be considered as both cause and effect of the failure of the Congolese government,’ before immediately returning to supporting bans on the use of conflict minerals in the next section- ‘What do you want people to do?’

In the case of the DRC, advocacy on mineral issues is a particularly sensitive topic, especially given the debate surrounding the recent Dodd-Frank act, a piece of legislation that requires American companies to disclose sources of metals from the Congo. The effects of the law on the local economy have been highly detrimental, as documented by the Economist amongst others.

While the debate over the film continues, it is worthwhile to take a step back and consider what lessons the furore surrounding Unwatchable holds for advocacy more broadly. How do we distinguish good advocacy from bad? How far should we push boundaries in our attempt to grab attention, and how do we present a balanced viewpoint while doing so?

The answers may not be as far off as would appear. The use of well-defined advocacy standards could prove extremely valuable in setting guidelines for industry-wide responsible behaviour. The One World Trust’s extensive database of Civil Society Organisation (CSO) Self-Regulatory Initiatives indicates that some of the groundwork for this is already in place. For example, the ICRC’s Code of Conduct requires that victims of disasters should be portrayed as dignified human beings and not hopeless objects. The Irish Association for Non-Governmental Development Organisations also has a Code of Conduct on Images and Messages that provided guidelines regarding publicity materials on poverty issues. These include mandates such as accurately representing situations in their ‘immediate and wider context’ to inform public knowledge of the realities and complexities of development, as well as to avoid messages that can ‘stereotype, sensationalise or discriminate against people, situations, or places’.

However, it is evident that such standards need to become more prevalent to effect any serious sector-wide push for more accountable advocacy. Research on accountability in NGO advocacy by the One World Trust (Hammer et al. 2010) finds that only 32 out of over 300 self-regulatory initiatives for CSOs and NGOs address advocacy issues, and do so mostly in generic terms that are unhelpful in reviewing actual performance. Existing initiatives also have little or no provisions in certain areas that could be highly important in identifying good advocacy. For example, none of the initiatives identified requires disclosure of the full evidence base behind an advocacy campaign. On a related note, no initiative requires that CSOs disclose the evidence on the basis of which a particular cause is selected and prioritised above others (Ibid., p. 15-19). While there may be a contradiction between framing advocacy issues as simple emotive messages that grab attention and representations of complexities on the ground, access to the evidence guiding campaigns could be a way for more nuanced interpretations to be made available more widely, while creating space for informed debate on the content and quality of a campaign. As the paper points out, ‘The fullest possible publication of the evidence base for a particular advocacy campaign would be an important step in allowing the interested public to make their own judgments and or challenge findings and methods as otherwise customary in the research community’ (Ibid., p.18).

Another area that could potentially benefit from the establishment of standards is feedback and evaluation. While it is clear that there are significant challenges to comparing evaluations across varying causes and contexts, standardising the use of evaluation in advocacy campaigns would mean debates over the use of controversial material such as Unwatchable would be better informed about whether similar campaigns had worked before. Alongside, increasing usage of feedback mechanism would allow beneficiaries, policymakers and the public to respond to advocacy campaigns, thereby compelling advocates to address any concerns that stakeholders may have. While existing initiatives do not include binding commitments on instating feedback and evaluation systems (Ibid., p. 21), there are agreements that broach these issues in a non-binding fashion. An example comes from the Code of Good Practice for NGOs Responding to HIV/AIDS, whose self-assessment checklist provides a comprehensive questionnaire on how to determine if advocacy strategies are working.

Amongst the numerous opinions on Unwatchable, there is one unambiguous lesson. There is a need to establish what is good advocacy— what is accountable, what is evidence-based, what works. While advocacy standards have the potential to lead on this front, they are yet in the very early stages of development and suffer from gaps that severely limit their functionality. If we choose to leave them as such, however, we risk misrepresenting and potentially harming those we seek to support. A timely reminder of this comes from Tom Murphy, who cites an important report by VSO that follows up on public perceptions in the UK of the developing world since Live Aid. The foreword provides a sobering insight- ‘Misunderstanding on this level breeds arrogance, fear and inequality in our relationships with other cultures at home and abroad.’

The previous High Level Forum in Accra saw BetterAid, a global CSO platform, assemble 800 organisations to petition governments for inclusion of civil society representatives in discussions. Their actions led to the Accra Agenda for Action (AAA) recognising CSOs to be independent development actors of their own right. Following Accra, civil society has been preparing for HLF4, with the Open Forum for CSO Development Effectiveness conducting extensive consultations with civil society actors to create a joint CSO strategy for Busan and beyond, including developing a set of Principles for CSO Development Effectiveness. All of this signals the possibility for real progress to be made on CSO concerns in Busan.

Whether this will be borne out in reality remains to be seen. While Accra marked a critical step forward for civil society, progress on the ground has been less encouraging. For example, of the sixteen main demands made by civil society of their governments in Accra, a BetterAid review finds that six have seen no progress, nine have been partially achieved, and only one has been achieved fully. Worryingly, of the six unaddressed demands, the majority are reforms that would increase transparency and accountability of donors and governments, including removing donor conditionality, abolishing tied aid, and implementing multi-stakeholder mechanisms. Slow reform on these fronts mean they have shown up again in the current list of civil society asks for Busan. However, there is no guarantee that things will be different this time round, with some donors already pushing for watering down or even removing commitments to more transparent aid.

On the other hand, there does appear to be greater appreciation for the roles CSOs play in development, and the consequent need to ensure the means to achieve their full potential. In an especially positive development, the third draft Busan document includes requests to governments to ensure an enabling environment for CSOs, as well as acceptance of the Open Forum Principles as a means to improve CSO effectiveness.

While a milestone has been reached with the inclusion of CSOs at the negotiation table and acknowledgement of their importance in development, whether their perspective on development effectiveness will receive due attention is still not certain. For now, all eyes are on Busan, where a promise has been made to ‘forge a new global development partnership’- a promise that civil society hopes will finally be fulfilled. The One World Trust will be following developments at Busan closely with regular news updates and further posts.

Building on our 2008 report on an initial framework for accountability in policy oriented research, collaborative research with a set of research institutions across all continents, and the successful online d database of accountability tools for policy research, the One World Trust has just published two further key outputs.

1. a practical guide to the framework in its final form, and user support for accessing the database and searching for tools

2. a video guide to framework and database, which also provides background to the wider research project together with a visual walk-through of the website.

Key audiences for the project results are on the one hand researchers and research managers interested in reviewing and boosting their organisations’ ability to demonstrate up to date approaches to accountability, and realise key principles in their day to day work and projects, but also policy makers who work with the evidence produced by organisations that actively influence or just propose evidence for use in policy processes.

For more information please contact us at: apro@oneworldtrust.org.

Both the rioting and response however sound all too familiar to disguise a continuing helplessness of successive government to come to grips with some problematic social and political realities which blight the UK maybe more than any other country in western Europe. Comments that liken the problems to an issue of disease control, thrown in for instance by Matthew d’Ancona who in the Evening Standard speaks of a “[…] disorderly virus [which] is both mobile and fast […]”show as much depth of penetration of the matter as the rejection by Michael Gove on BBC Newsnight on 9/8/2011 of a connection (which is not to say a linear consequence) between economic deprivation, government policy and destructive behaviours. As an inner city MP who knows her problematic neighbourhoods Harriet Harman is right to make this case, and especially an Education Secretary should be cautious about rejecting views that, while not fitting into his policy perspective, may just about be relevant when it comes to the education of and securing a future for young people: very much HIS job.

The tragedy of the riots may eventually be that the approach to solving the underlying problems will be just the same as seen in Oldham and Bradford a decade ago in 2001: faced with an alternative proposal for how to make yourself heard and manifest a desire for greater participation and ownership to the way preferred and prescribed by formal democracy (‘why vote if I can riot’ as expressed by one of the mob leaders at the time), government will punish (a little, to placate law abiding citizens’ grievances), compensate (a little, enough to have to avoid pushing insurers too hard on their duty to pay out, after all they are part of the these days oh so much battered financial services sector), and pay (a little, just enough to ensure that looting is just a fraction less attractive than hanging around a reopened youth centre). Then it will sit, wait, and hope that the next riots will happen when the next government is in place.

So far, this has largely worked: Labour faced the crowd over broke state finances in the early 70s, the Conservatives over the impact of economic structural adjustment on people’s livelihoods during the miners’ strike, and over policing practices in Brixton and Tottenham in the 80s, Labour was challenged by ethnic conflict in Oldham and Bradford in 2001. And now it is the blue/yellow coalition that faces the challenge of arguing that significant cuts in welfare and support for those on the margins (and who find themselves there for a range of not always individually defendable reasons), are in material or psychological terms not connected with the recent events. Just because the rioters choose to manifest their anger through the illicit acquisition of consumer goods (showing also the limitations of the ‘consumer democracy’ model for defining social and political priorities), their situation does not become less relevant for a government.

After each blow-out of social conflict and, with the exception of the miners’ strike, its appeasement, government and most citizens want to move on quickly and get back to their normality (“[after the attacks the previous night] Ledbury’s could be open for lunch”). This is understandable, but it also means that none of the problems that come with what that other normality, which is the reality of many of those who are currently running riot, are ever solved, and arguably become deeper.

The difference between accountable government and what we have seen over decades as the pattern of response to social unrest is not to try to gloss over, and fob off different stakeholder groups with quick fixes, especially those on the margins. Independently of whether a government wants to appeal to individual enterprise as the driver for change in society, or use collective solidarity, both those who face their destroyed property and personal insecurity in the face of anonymous aggression, AND those who currently look at a life in which they cannot imagine opportunity, must be treated as equal stakeholders of the social model for prosperity. Maybe this is where government and society need to be really BIG.

The EU ETS which started in 2005 is a ‘cap and trade’ program that places a limit on the amount of greenhouse gas emissions emitted by factories, power plants and other installations. If a limit by a company in these sectors is exceeded, it can purchase emission credits from other companies who emit below their allocated limit, therefore still reducing emissions overall.  Companies who anticipate exceeding their limit are also encouraged to find innovate ways to reduce the emissions without trading, such as incorporating energy efficient technology into their processes.

The EU seeks to further its scope of the EU ETS to encompass the aviation sector in 2012 to further reduce emissions. It will incorporate emissions from all domestic and international flights – from or to anywhere in the world – that arrive at or depart from an EU airport into the EU ETS.

American groups such as the United Continental Holdings Inc., AMR Corp.’s American Airlines and the Air Transport Association of America (ATA) initially challenged this proposal after the UK adopted it into its national rules. It was then deferred to the ECJ.

The airlines are disputing the law as they are opposed to the regulation of American airlines when they travel to countries within the EU. A spokesman for the ATA states this nature of the regulation violates international law.

The airlines also disputed the proposal on the grounds that it violates the Convention on International Civil Aviation because this regulation is not seen as a coordinated effort, but unilateral action, thereby violating the first article of the convention establishing the sovereignty of airspace over a countries’ territory.

The EU is defending its regulation on the grounds that it takes place within a cap and trade system. The EU ETS is a pollution ceiling allowing companies the freedom to choose how they stay under that ceiling without imposing a direct tax charge or levy, expressed an EU climate spokesman.

Emissions from international aviation account for about 2-3 per cent of global greenhouse gas, which is seemingly a small amount in the larger span of things. However, airlines are one of the fastest growing industries, rising greenhouse gas emissions up 45 per cent between 1992 and 2005 within the sector, and it is projected to rise even more in the future.

This case perfectly illustrates the challenges inherent in regulating climate change, a global problem with multiple governance levels. Although the EU ETS is a coordinated effort encompassing 27 countries, it is viewed as a ‘unilateral’ action by American airlines. The desire to extend the EU ETS to encompass air transit in skies not directly above the EU highlights the limited impact climate related regulations have within territories, regardless of its deep effects domestically, a point the EU seems to recognise and attempts address.

The underlying political nature of the US airlines’ opposition to the regulation represents a common problem that prevents many climate initiatives from reaching a much needed wider scope, if it gets enacted at all. Although there is a wide consensus that we should prevent rising temperatures via lowering greenhouse gas emissions and we have an idea about how much, the difference in opinion concerning what industries should be regulated and how to do it (government, private or self) allows for political interests to enter the debate, albeit possibly under the guise of safeguarding economic growth, protecting individual/state rights or any other reason. For example, the argument that the EU ETS violates American sovereignty has been deemed valid enough to present a case to the ECJ. Or to expand, many argue that the airline industry’s relatively low present contribution to the overall atmospheric emissions merits it to become a low priority in the climate change agenda and we should concentrate on other sectors instead.

We will find out around March 2012 weather the ECJ with uphold the EU ETS expansion, which is after the 1 January 2012 date when the expansion should have come into action. Even if the regulation is allowed to go ahead, private American companies have already successfully delayed an EU level progressive policy that aims to prevent rising temperatures.

Often, the governments justify their actions by accusing CSOs of being unprofessional and ineffective, existing only for their own profit, and therefore putting the public at risk. Advocacy work is claimed to be politically motivated, and CSOs, particularly in authoritarian countries, are accused of being agents of political opposition parties or aggressive foreign powers. In many cases, government vitriol against civil society is accepted by the wider population, undermining public support for CSOs. Admittedly, some CSOs do exploit the benefits of charitable status for their own gains, and some are simply ineffective despite good intentions.  However, it is notable that the tactics used by the governments generally focus on making it difficult, or even dangerous for CSOs to operate, rather than monitoring or improving CSO activities.

Tactics used by governments to restrict civil society activities vary. In some countries civil society actors are regularly harassed and detained on flimsy charges. For example in the Philippines a group of 43 community health workers and medical practitioners (known as the Morong 43) were detained in February 2010 after they were arrested during a training exercise on medical practices. In some extreme cases the harassment of civil society actors goes as far as their disappearance or murder, as with the tragic death of Floribert Chibeya Bahizire, Executive Director of Voix des Sans Voix, an organisation working to protect the rights of prisoners in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in June 2010. Because of his advocacy work, he had been repeatedly arrested, detained and threatened by security forces for two decades before his death.

But not all government actions against civil society are this extreme. Many governments are adopting more subtle approaches to restrict the operating environment of CSOs. One common strategy is to enforce legal restrictions on CSOs, which are arbitrary and inconsistent, making it difficult for CSOs to function legally. The legal restrictions often seem logical and even in the interests of improved civil society, making them easily justifiable to the public, and external donors. Demanding that CSOs register with the government seems reasonable in a crowded and unregulated sector. However, registration can have a severe impact on CSOs ability to operate, when the process is convoluted, prohibitively expensive and allows CSOs that are not viewed favourably to be easily prevented from legally working. The Cambodian government is the latest to threaten such a process of registration on CSOs, although it is being strongly resisted by civil society.

Other “subtle” tactics include preventing CSOs from accessing foreign funding, as in Ethiopia, India or Venezuela, or introducing legislation that makes certain CSO activities illegal. For example, in July 2010 the United States Supreme Court upheld a law banning material support to designated terrorist groups, including expert advice or assistance. The decision will have a far reaching impact on peaceful dispute resolution activities of American CSOs.

Civil Society Organisations themselves are becoming deeply concerned about the rising trend of governments restricting their operating space. At the recent Open Forum for CSO Effectiveness Global Assembly in Siem Reap, Cambodia, delegates from North and South America, Africa, Asia and Europe shared their anxieties, but also their hopes for addressing such restrictions. At the OECD High Level Forum in Busan in November 2011, civil society will call on governments to commit to ensuring an enabling environment for CSOs, as an essential part of the goal to improve aid effectiveness.

However CSO representatives also called on civil society to work together to push back against the accusations of ineffectiveness and lack of accountability that governments use to justify their restrictive regulations. By coming together to develop strong accountability initiatives that improve and demonstrate the effectiveness, transparency and accountability of their members, CSOs hope that they can undermine government accusations, increase public support, and raise international awareness, thus reducing the ability of governments to continue persecuting civil society. The One World Trust has already documented examples where self-regulatory initiatives have successfully pushed back against government regulations. Hopefully many more CSOs will similarly succeed in creating a more enabling environment for their valuable work.

Christina Laybourn is a Researcher at the One World Trust. She can be contacted at claybourn@oneworldtrust.org

The article exposes both organisations’ difficulties in reconciling the sometimes competing objectives of reducing poverty and contributing to climate change adaptation and mitigation. The mission of both organisations is the former, but both have policies relating to climate change and the World Bank is playing an important and increasing role in climate finance.

DFID’s mission is to provide development assistance to further sustainable development and improve welfare. “Sustainable development” is defined as “any development that is, in the opinion of the Secretary of State, prudent having regard to the likelihood of its generating lasting benefits for the population of the country… in relation to which it is provided.” (International Development Act 2002) Thus even in DFID’s poverty reduction mission, there is a statement regarding the “lasting benefit” DFID funds should generate. Presumably, this can be interpreted to mean that funds should not cause long-term harm. Interventions such as the construction of coal-fired power stations which contribute to climate change would not fall into that category.

The World Bank, for its part, has a Development and Climate Change Strategy which recognises the negative impact of climate change on development and therefore the need of the Bank to manage the risks climate change poses to its “core” poverty reduction mission. The strategy commits the Bank to helping to facilitate the UNFCCC process, mobilising additional finance, facilitating the development of market-based financing mechanisms, leveraging private sector resources, supporting the development and deployment of new technologies and stepping up policy research and capacity-building. (Development and Climate Change Strategy)

Clearly, however, both organisations falter to a certain degree when it comes to integrating their missions with climate change objectives. In its Multilateral Aid Review, DFID assessed the organisations through which it currently channels funds against a number of criteria that it deemed important. “Ensur[ing] its activities are low carbon, climate resilient and environmentally sustainable” was only one criterion among many, and in the final weighting is not worth very much. Therefore, if an organisation performs very well against the other criteria, it is highly likely that DFID will continue to channel funding through it.

For the World Bank, problems arise primarily with regards to the funding of ‘dirty’ energy project. The World Bank has committed to limiting its financing of coal projects “to cases in which a country has no other options to respond to urgent demands for electricity, and providing several other conditions have been met and the process reviewed by an external advisory committee.” (Energy and the World Bank) (There are, of course, other questions here about why coal would ever be the only option, which I think relate to climate finance issues, but I’ll explore them another time.) Clearly, therefore, the World Bank has made a conscious decision to prioritise poverty reduction over its climate change objectives, at least in certain circumstances.

Is reconciling development and climate change objectives an impossible task? If it is not, how can organisations do it better? These are important questions that impact on the ability of organisations to be accountable to stakeholders for fulfilling various commitments. While I do not have the answers, I anticipate this will be one of the most interesting issues we explore during the course of our Global Climate Change Governance project, and I look forward to reporting back on what we find.