Americans for Peace Now

Buildings for Ultra-Orthodox Jews in Jerusalem: More to Come

2010-03-11T21:04:10Z

By Jo-Ann Mort, March 11, 2010

The announcement by Israeli Interior Minister that Israel is building 1600 more housing units in East Jerusalem made during VP Biden's visit was probably not an accident--hard to imagine otherwise. But, not simply because Eli Yishai, the Minister, wanted to embarrass the VP; also because he honestly has little interest in listening to any elected official--from his own Prime Minister to our nation's VP.

That's because, as a leader of Shas, the ultra-Orthodox party, he answers to a higher power. And, the building is for his constituents: ultra-Orthodox Jews who, ironically are not Zionists and don't consider Israel a true state until the Messiah himself (it will be a him, in their mind; not a her for sure) lands on the holy ground himself.)

That's why Yishai will continue to build--and until he is stopped, Bibi will continue to support the building. He counts Shas as a critical core constituency of his coalition, as short sighted as it is. The ultra-Orthodox community in Israel is anti-democratic, anti-state (no matter who the leader is), and threatens Israel's security and modernity as much as any external threat, if not perhaps more.

The Shas party doesn't recognize the Reform Synagogue Movement as a legitimate form of Judaism; and, that means they don't recognize the majority of American Jews as Jews since that is what we are (over 50% of affiliated American Jews are Reform)....

Their ultra-Orthodox constituents rarely serve in the army, but their actions are sending tens of thousands of Israeli young people to serve an occupation that --still--the majority of Israelis oppose. Their young people don't attend public schools, don't learn English and don't learn Math and modern technology on the whole. Indeed, the growth of the Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) sector in Jerusalem is as harmful to the divide in that city as the East-West divide there.

In reality, there are three Jerusalems: one is the small, but struggling secular Jewish community that wants to live in normalcy; they attend and support Israel's top university: Hebrew University, a thriviing cultural scene in spite of it all, and would like their own young people to have a future in Israel's capitol city. The second Jerusalem is the ultra-Orthodox Jerusalem, which has pulled the city under the poverty line, underminded public services and could likely not only erupt any future negotiations along with the settler population on the West Bank that hails from a nationalist religious background, but they will do it without every declaring loyalty to the state. Incredible~

The third sector, of course, are the Palestinian citizens of Jerusalem, disenfranchised from West Jerusalem and Israel's state and cut off from their natural partnership with the West Bank and Ramallah and Bethlehem due to the separation wall and all of the checkpoints.

In today's Hebrew paper, Yediot Achranot, the largest circulation paper in Israel, Ofer Petersburg published this helpful 'cheat sheet' of new building to come in Jerusalem as charted by Peace Now in Israel. Here is Petersburg reporting:

Yedioth Ahronoth (p. 4) by Ofer Petersburg -- Ramat Shlomo is not the only neighborhood [in which construction permits are liable to be the source of an international outcry]: An examination by Yedioth Ahronoth has found that no fewer than 19 other construction plans in East Jerusalem, in which a total of 7,038 housing units are to be built, are currently in the process of receiving authorization.

The various construction projects that are liable to become the next source of friction are all at different stages of the planning process. Some are at a very preliminary stage, after having been submitted to the Interior Ministry's Planning and Construction Committee, and are now being debated. Others are at a more advanced stage: an announcement has been made to the public about the planned construction, to allow for anyone who opposes the planned project to submit a petition. Still other construction projects are on the verge of receiving final approval.

Furthermore, there are no fewer than 2,193 housing units that have completed the necessary stages of approval, according to data that were provided by Peace Now. Construction on those housing units can begin immediately. Among these housing units are 1,083 new apartments in Ramot and other projects that have already solicited criticism of Israel, such as the project planned for the Shepherd Hotel.

"There is a tremendous shortage of housing units in the capital. Projects of this kind have to be approved, otherwise the city will stop," said a senior member of the Jerusalem District Planning and Construction Committee, which granted its approval to the Ramat Shlomo project this week. "We were stunned by the storm it raised. Everything is technical. We never regarded Ramat Shlomo as a place that is beyond the Green Line. This is a project that has been bouncing around the bureaucracy for seven years. We had no reason not to approve it. Nor are there any instructions in that vein, and that applies to every other neighborhood, either Jewish or Arab, in East Jerusalem.

Peace Now Secretary General Yariv Oppenheimer said: "It isn't a matter of timing, it's a matter of policy. The intention here is to turn Jerusalem into a bi-national city and to preempt a two-state solution. It was a miracle that only one project was approved during Biden's visit."

[the figures cited beneath appear on an aerial photograph provided by Yedioth Ahronoth, marking where each one of the following East Jerusalem sites is situated]

· Neve Yaakov: 393 housing units; Status: approved, awaiting construction.
· Pisgat Zeev: 600 housing units; Status: Being debated by committee.
· Ramat Shlomo: 2,250 housing units; Status: Being debated by committee.
· Ramat Eshkol: 267 housing units; Status: approved, awaiting construction.
· Ramot: 1,083 housing units; Status: approved, awaiting construction.
· Ramot: 320 housing units; Status: Being debated by committee.
· Sheikh Jarrah: 72 housing units; Status: Being debated by committee.
· Shepherd Hotel: 20 housing units; Status: approved, awaiting construction.
· Wholesale Market: Mall + 200 housing units; Status: Being debated by committee.
· Herod's Gate (Old City): 30 housing units; Status: Being debated by committee.
· Western Wall Plaza: Strauss House; Status: approved, awaiting construction.
· Western Wall Plaza : Mughrabi Bridge ; Status: approved, awaiting construction.
· City of David: Master plan; Status: Being debated by committee.
· Kidmat Tzion: 220 housing units; Status: Being debated by committee.
· Nof Tzion B: 30 housing units + 150 hotel rooms; Status: Being debated by committee.
· Nof Tzion: 100 housing units; Status: Being debated by committee.
· Nof Tzion: 91 housing units; Status: approved, awaiting construction.
· East Talpiot: 180 housing units; Status: approved, awaiting construction.
· Givat Hamatos: 549 housing units; Status: Objections have been aired, awaiting approval.
· Givat Hamatos: 1,100 housing units; Status: Being debated by committee
· Givat Hamatos: 3,150 housing units; Status: approved, awaiting construction.
· Har Homa B: 50 housing units; Status: Being debated by committee
· Har Homa C: 983 housing units; Status: Being debated by committee
· Gilo: 170 housing units; Status: Being debated by committee
· Gilo: 207 housing units; Status: approved, awaiting construction.
· Moradot Gilo: 844 housing units; Status: Being debated by committee

50,000 new units for East Jerusalem - Behind the Headlines (Seidemann/Friedman)

2010-03-11T17:00:23Z

(Special to APN by Daniel Seidemann and Lara Friedman)

Attention today is riveted on headlines in the Israeli press reporting Israeli plans for 50,000 residential units in East Jerusalem. Coming on the heels of the Biden visit debacle, the interest in this report is unsurprising. Here we offer some information and analysis about the facts behind the headlines and what they mean for the prospects of peace and the two-state solution.

The Reality Behind the Headlines: It is not a secret that there are a large number of plans for construction in East Jerusalem in the drawers and on the desks of Israeli planners.

These include the massive settlement schemes for E1 (in the northeast), a major new settlement scheme in Atarot (in the north) and the new settlement of Givat Yael (in the south). Most of these plans are in the very early stages - assuming no obstacles (like the kind of US opposition that has kept Israel from building in E1 since the 1990s), it would still be years before most of these could be implemented. In addition there are schemes for construction within and on the edges of existing veteran East Jerusalem settlements and within Palestinian neighborhoods.

Some of these (like Shepherd's Hotel) can be implemented at any time. Some of them (Har Homa C, East Talpiyot, Pisgat Zeev, Ramot, Neve Ya'acov, Mordot Gilo, Givat Ha'matos), are moving forward at a steady, but not break-neck, pace. Others (E1, Mufti's Grove, Herod's Gate, Kidmat Tziyon) are being worked on but are not yet imminent. Others (Atarot, Givat Yael, Mazmoriyyah) are embryonic - schemes that reflect a very real aspiration but are not yet becoming operational plans.

Adding all of these plans together, one can say - accurately - that there are current and anticipated Israeli plans to build nearly 50,000 units in East Jerusalem. But this does not reflect an operational reality. It reflects a compendium of numbers taken from various categories - a mixing of apples (plans that are genuine, imminent threats), oranges (plans that are not close to being implemented but in which serious energy is being invested), and bananas (plans that right now are pipe dreams on paper). The fact is, Israel has built a total of 50,000 units in East Jerusalem since 1967 - the idea that a similar number are suddenly going to be built in the coming months or years is not realistic.

Looking at the numbers this was is not a particularly meaningful or useful exercise in terms of measuring real threats on the ground to the political process or the viability of the two-state solution.

The Politics Behind the Headlines: It is reasonable to ask: given the fact that all of the information about settlement projects in the pipeline is generally known, why is it being highlighted today, and in such a heavy-handed way?

One answer is that following the Biden visit fiasco, interest in the Jerusalem settlement issue is high and well-known facts are now being reexamined and presented as "news." The other answer is that we are seeing a rare confluence of interests of competing agendas: those who are most worried about Jerusalem settlement activity find today an eager audience for bad news; those who want to see more settlement in Jerusalem see an opportunity to make the current tough political situation worse, and are happy to fan the flames.

Looking Ahead: As we have already seen, the announcement of any East Jerusalem settlement construction today is enormously detrimental to the political process.

Moreover, certain of the schemes in the pipeline represent a direct threat to the viability of the two-state solution. These are those that:

seek to change the borders of Jerusalem
seek to implant additional settlers in the heart of Palestinian neighborhoods, or
seek to "weld" together existing settlement with adjacent Palestinian neighborhoods, making it impossible in the future to draw a political border between Israeli Yerushalayim and Palestinian Al Quds.

Given these very real threats, the focus today should not be on numbers-generated hysteria about Israel's "no-holds-barred" aspirations in East Jerusalem, but on identifying which East Jerusalem settlement schemes are real, imminent, and dangerous. Once identified, the goal should be to target them and look at the mechanics of how they can be stopped, either through private or public intervention. Bad things are indeed happening in Jerusalem; what is required today is sober, pragmatic resolve to put an end to them.

Biden: US will Hold Israel and Palestinians Accountable

2010-03-10T19:37:56Z

Israel's Prime Minister Netanyahu and President Abbas of the Palestinian Authority are well advised to take note of Vice President Joe Biden's comments in Ramallah today.

From now on, Biden said, "As we move forward, the United States will hold both sides accountable for any statements or actions that inflame tensions or prejudice the outcome of talks, as this decision did." The decision he was referring to was Israel's decision to build 1,600 new housing units in East Jerusalem. The Obama administration's reaction was swift and harsh. If it reflects the way in which the administration will hold the parties accountable to their actions from now on, it signifies a change in Washington's role as a broker.

following is the full text of Biden's comments at the photo-op, following his meeting with President Abbas:

VICE PRESIDENT BIDEN: Mr. President, thank you very much for your hospitality and for the opportunity to be with you again. I greatly appreciate the time you've given me, you and the Palestinian Authority. I also had the pleasure of meeting earlier this morning with your Prime Minister Fayyad in -- here in Ramallah. I must say I admire the courage and conviction of the two of you, whom President Obama and I consider willing partners in the quest for a lasting peace in the region.

Our administration is fully committed to the Palestinian people and to achieving a Palestinian state that is independent, viable, and contiguous. Everyone should know -- everyone should know by now that there is no viable alternative to a two-state solution, which must be an integral part of any comprehensive peace plan. The United States considers the goal to be not only in the interest of the Palestinians and the Israelis, but in the United States' interest as well. We also believe that the divide between the Israelis and Palestinians can only be resolved by negotiations. The indirect talks being launched should lead to direct negotiations, which will necessarily reach -- which would be necessary to reach an agreement on the permanent status -- status issues which you referenced, Mr. President, such as borders, security, refugees, and Jerusalem. And the United States pledges to play an active as well as a sustained role in these talks. It's incumbent on both parties to build an atmosphere of support for negotiations and not to complicate them.

Yesterday -- yesterday, the decision by the Israeli government to advance planning for new housing units in east Jerusalem undermined that very trust, the trust that we need right now in order to begin as well as produce -- have profitable negotiations. That is why I immediately condemned the action.

As we move forward, the United States will hold both sides accountable for any statements or actions that inflame tensions or prejudice the outcome of talks, as this decision did. The United States strongly supports the Palestinian Authority's efforts to build as well as strengthen its institutions and develop the economy of a state, including Prime Minister Fayyad's two-year institution building plan.

We must find a way to improve the lives of Gazans, as well. The Palestinian Authority offers the possibility of a peaceful, independent, and more prosperous future rather than the false promises of extremists. A historic peace is going to require both the Palestinians as well as the Israelis, as well as their leaders, to be historically bold.

And I promise you, Mr. President, the United States will always stand with those who take the risk that peace requires. Again, Mr. President, I thank you very much for the courage you've shown in moving forward. I thank you for the hospitality you've extended to me and my delegation. And I look forward to seeing you many more times.

Thank you.

The Latest Jerusalem Debacle (facts/analysis from Seidemann and Friedman)

2010-03-10T16:58:43Z

(Special to APN by Daniel Seidemann and Lara Friedman)

On 3/9/10 - just in time for the visit to Israel of Vice President Biden and just a day after Special Envoy George Mitchell announced that Israel and the Palestinians had agreed to indirect talks - news broke in the Israeli press that Israel had approved the construction of 1600 new settlement units in East Jerusalem. The decision was strongly condemned by the US, the Palestinians, and the members of the international community. The Arab League, which the previous week had endorsed indirect talks, announced that it would meet March 10 to consider its reaction to the decision.

(For a map showing the location of the planned construction, click here. For complementary reporting on the plan from Peace Now Settlement Watch director Hagit Ofran - and another map - click here.)

The facts of this matter: The settlement in question in Rekhes Shuafat (aka Ramat Shlomo). The plan in question is Plan number 11085. The plan was originally for 1300-1400 units (although it erroneously appears on the Municipal computer as 650 units). The plan as approved today includes 1400 units, with another 200 tacked on for low income housing. What happened today was not/not final approval. What it was a decision to deposit the plan for public review - a significant, but not irreversible - step toward final approval. It should be emphasized that this is a government plan, not a private plan. This means that the government has 100% control over whether the plan moves forward. The government could withdraw the plan at any time, if it wanted to do so. Under similar in circumstances in 1995 this is precisely what then-Prime Minister Rabin did.

The Context: This has been reported by many as a deliberate slap in the face to Vice President Biden by the government of Israel. The facts are less clear. From what we understand it seems almost certain that Prime Minister Netanyahu did not know about the plan or have advance warning that it would be considered and approved for public review at this time. Likewise, this is not the sort of thing that comes under the authority of Mayor Barkat. If the timing of this approval/announcement was deliberate, than the culprit here is more likely Interior Minister Eli Yishai (Shas) and/or right-wing officials in the Interior Ministry bureaucracy. (For interesting reporting, see Ynet: PM demanded no surprises from Yishai during Biden visit).

Netanyahu's Responsibility: All that, of course, does not absolve Netanyahu of responsibility. One would think that given the Gilo fiasco (that preceded the announcement of the settlement freeze) and subsequent "surprises" in Jerusalem, senior officials in the Prime Minister's office would by now have demanded that, as a matter of course, they review the agendas for the planning committees in advance. Failure to do so at this stage of the game can only be viewed as gross negligence or, worse yet, a deliberate policy of preferring not to know, so as to not be expected to act.

Looking Ahead: It is tempting to view this incident as just another in a series of Jerusalem-related skirmishes between the Obama administration and Netanyahu. This is far from being the case. The approval of this plan has all of the markings of a formative "watershed" event: its publication was so humiliating to the Administration and to the Palestinians, its impact on an already struggling political process so pernicious, that it is correctly perceived as intolerable behavior not only in the international community but within Israel (Haaretz: The Slap Heard Round the World, Ynet: Defense ministry sources: East Jerusalem housing approval hurts peace talks). If left unattended the message to Israel will be clear: if the American Vice President (or President) is in Israel, don't announce new Jerusalem settlement plans. Any other time, go ahead.

It is now abundantly clear that with or without a formal declaration from Netanyahu, getting events in Jerusalem under control - which includes a de facto full-stop settlement freeze in Jerusalem - is no mere discretionary gesture but a political imperative. Failing that, this political process will be stillborn.

APN Denounces New Israeli Settlement Plans in East Jerusalem

2010-03-09T21:19:17Z

APN denounces in the sharpest terms Israel's announcement today of plans for new settlement construction in East Jerusalem. Speaking from Jerusalem, where he is part of an APN leadership delegation to Israel, APN spokesman Ori Nir commented:

"Yesterday, with the announcement of indirect talks, we heard some cautions words of optimism from both Israelis and Palestinians. Today, with these new settlement plans in the headlines, we see that optimism already fading. As we said yesterday, negotiations - including indirect talks - cannot succeed unless all sides act with good faith. Announcing plans for East Jerusalem construction is a perfect example of what Israel cannot be doing if it is acting in good faith and wants to be taken seriously as a partner in negotiations. This announcement is a slap in the face of not only the Palestinians, the Arab states, and the Obama Administration, but of the entire peace effort.

"The fact that the announcement coincided with the visit to Israel of Vice President Joseph Biden only adds insult to injury. We applaud Vice President Biden for clearly condemning the plan but we repeat what we said yesterday: if there is to be real progress, the US role must include 'heavy lifting' -- meaning real pressure on the parties to get serious about negotiations and meaning, sooner rather than later, the laying down of clear US principles on the key final status issues."

For any further inquiries, Ori can be contacted via email at: ONir@peacenow.org

APN Welcomes Indirect Israeli-Palestinian Talks

2010-03-08T21:49:09Z

Washington, DC -- APN welcomes today's announcement that Special Envoy George Mitchell will be brokering indirect talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. APN welcomes the involvement of Arab governments in the process that lead to today's announcement.

Speaking from Jerusalem, where she is taking part in an APN leadership fact-finding trip to Israel, APN President and CEO Debra DeLee commented: "We very much hope that this announcement signifies the start of a new chapter in the decades-long effort to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. But nobody should have any illusions: negotiations -- direct or indirect -- are not and never have been the goal. The goal is an agreement that will resolve all the final status issues: settlements, refugees, security, and Jerusalem, and end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Achieving such an agreement will be difficult under the best of circumstances. This current effort will bear fruit only if both Israel and the Palestinians enter into it seriously and in good faith, and if the United States is patient, tough and resolute in its role as broker."

DeLee added: "This means that Israel cannot on one hand enter negotiations while on the other hand pursuing settlement policies -- in the West Bank and Jerusalem -- that signal it is not serious about resolving all the final status issues through negotiations. Likewise, it means that the Palestinians cannot on one hand enter negotiations while on the other hand taking public positions that indicate a lack of seriousness. And it means the US cannot lose focus and stand on the sidelines when things get hard. The US role must include 'heavy lifting' -- meaning real pressure on the parties to get serious about negotiations and meaning, sooner rather than later, the laying down of clear US principles on the key final status issues."

An APN leadership delegation met today with Israel's deputy foreign minister Danny Ayalon. In the coming days the delegation will meet with other senior Israeli and Palestinian officials and policy experts to hear more about the expected resumption of the political process and to encourage both sides to talk in earnest.

APN is America's leading Jewish organization advocating for Israeli-Palestinian peace.

For more information, contact Ori Nir at onir@peacenow.org

APN Leadership Meets with Ayalon

2010-03-08T19:17:41Z

A leadership delegation of Americans for Peace Now, on a fact-finding trip to Israel, met today in Jerusalem with Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon.

APN urged Ambassador Ayalon to:

- Fully implement the settlement freeze.

- Realize the urgency of making progress toward peace and act accordingly.

Ayalon, who spoke off the record, engaged in a lively conversation. For more than an hour and a half he listened attentively to APN's concerns, agreed with some and argued with others.

"We told Deputy Minister Ayalon that the Israeli government must realize how damaging the absence of a credible peace process is to Israel and to its allies," said Debra DeLee, APN's president and CEO.

"We told him how dismayed we were by the way in which his office dealt with the congressional delegation that J Street brought to Israel last month. We told Ayalon that Israel's government does itself a disservice when it refuses to have a full and frank conversation with elected representatives of the American public," DeLee said.

"I am pleased that we were able to have a frank conversation," said DeLee.

APN has a long relationship with Ayalon. When he served as Israel's ambassador to Washington, Ayalon appeared on an APN-sponsored panel that also featured the ambassadors to Washington of Egypt, Jordan and the PLO. It was the first time that the Israeli ambassador and the PLO's chief of mission to the US appeared together in public.

The meeting with Ayalon is one of a series of meetings that APN's leadership is having this week with Israeli and Palestinian leaders, activists, pundits, pollsters and public policy experts.

More about these meetings will be posted on this blog later this week.

Ha'aretz Editorial: "Editorial / U.S. is proving it wants Mideast peace - now it's Israel's turn"

2010-03-08T18:40:35Z

"Israel is not entitled to simply shrug its shoulders at the revival of the peace process."

------------------------------

The visit to Israel this week by U.S. Vice President Joseph Biden, along with American Middle East envoy George Mitchell's meetings here, testify to the United States' readiness to not miss the opportunity to advance the peace process. The latest American diplomatic effort comes on the heels of the Arab League granting Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas qualified "permission" to conduct indirect talks with Israel - which also represents an important gesture on the part of those countries that have signed on to the Arab peace initiative.

On the other hand, a recent Israeli Foreign Ministry report indicates that the U.S. administration has no intention of expending too great an effort to achieve a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and that the Obama administration's positions are closer to those held by the Palestinians than to Israel's stance.

Israel and the Palestinians must decide which of the two perspectives they will embrace: either the view that hope is still not abandoned, or the one that dampens expectations entirely. If Israel intends to do nothing more than evade responsibility for the failure of the peace process and placate the U.S. administration until the expiration of the settlement construction freeze, it would be better not to launch the indirect talks at all. Every past diplomatic step that turned out to be nothing more than another exercise in evasion only served to push the peace process several substantial steps backward, leaving in its wake great despair and frustration that gave rise to more violence.

Israel is not entitled to simply shrug its shoulders at the revival of the peace process - not only because its standing in the world has sunk and its relations with the United States have declined to mere diplomatic correctness. All the signs in the territories point to the danger of a descent into violence and even a third intifada. The revival of the peace process is an essential step in halting this deterioration in the short run, and ending the conflict in the long term. In the four months during which the indirect talks are set to be conducted, the Israeli government must invest every effort in convincing its own citizens, first of all, that it indeed intends to refrain from its sleights of hand and to take the negotiations seriously.

Subsequently, the state must freeze construction in the settlements unequivocally and without delay. That will allow the process to advance to the stage of direct talks. There is no other channel of negotiations. The ridiculous recent public service announcements encouraging Israelis to explain the "other" Israel to the world, cannot be a substitute for a serious policy articulating hope for a breakthrough.

http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1154855.html

Hard Questions, Tough Answers with Yossi Alpher - March 8, 2010

2010-03-08T18:38:06Z

This week's questions:

It looks like Israeli-Palestinian proximity talks are about to commence. What are the circumstances? What are the chances of success?

...In view of Turkey's increasingly dynamic regional role, shouldn't Israel be interested in patching up relations and using Ankara's good offices again vis-a-vis Damascus?

How is the Arab world dealing with the elections in Iraq held yesterday?

------------------------------

Q. It looks like Israeli-Palestinian proximity talks are about to commence. What are the circumstances? What are the chances of success?

A. An Arab League monitoring committee last week voted to approve these proximity talks, limiting them to four months and conditioning direct talks after that on a comprehensive Israeli settlement freeze. The four-month limit was then endorsed by the PLO. This provides Palestinian President and PLO leader Mahmoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) with the regional and local backing he needs to forego his earlier conditions, such as extension of the settlement freeze to Jerusalem, and agree to proximity talks.

The timing is also auspicious: US peace envoy George Mitchell just returned to the region, to be followed on March 8 by Vice President Joe Biden, the highest Obama administration official to visit Israel thus far. This offers high-level American "cover" for Abbas as well.

Interestingly, Biden's visit, like many by American officials in recent months, is seen primarily as a vehicle for ensuring close US-Israeli coordination regarding Iran, not the peace process. Senate Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman John Kerry said as much on his recent visit to Israel, wherein he intimated that the US is keeping up a steady stream of high-level security visits to ensure that Israel follows the current economic sanctions script and does not take any independent military initiative regarding Iran's nuclear program.

But PM Binyamin Netanyahu knows the two issues are linked. Indeed, he told a Likud caucus several months ago that Israel's need for American cooperation on Iran required that Jerusalem be forthcoming and make concessions on the Palestinian issue.

So is all of this "coming together"--a concerted effort against Iran and an Israeli-Palestinian peace process? At least for the coming months, the prognosis is more positive regarding Iran than Israel-Palestine. True, Mitchell is likely to be a hands-on proximity facilitator, will forcefully present his own ideas, and can use the threat to point to one party or the other as being responsible for failure as an incentive toward progress. On the other hand, with the inauguration of proximity talks rather than, once again, direct negotiations, the process will seemingly have regressed considerably. Surely no one--neither the US nor Israel nor the PLO--can take credit for a step forward in the peace process when a 17-year tradition of direct talks has gone by the wayside.

Then too, proximity talks will begin in the shadow of growing tensions in Hebron, at the Temple Mount and at points along the security fence, that have led to predictions of a third intifada. Certainly, if the talks are used by the Palestinian side merely to insist on a complete and permanent settlement-construction freeze, as the Arab League decision implies, then they are likely to end after four months in stalemate.

Netanyahu, for his part, may be persuaded by Mitchell to offer Abbas alternative confidence-building measures other than expanding and extending the settlement-construction freeze. One possibility is the transfer of additional West Bank land currently under full Israeli control (area C, all told some 60 percent of the land) or Israeli security control (area B) to greater Palestinian control and usage. If this happens, Abbas will be hard put to maintain his current unyielding position. Alternatively or in parallel, Mitchell may seek to devote the proximity talks to agreement in principle on the parameters of "borders first", an option frequently discussed.

Yet it is extremely unlikely that Netanyahu and Abbas can agree on borders, particularly in the Jerusalem area. Moreover, the more extreme factions in Netanyahu's coalition will be very unhappy with any territorial move at all. Their anticipated protest points to the domestic political conflict Netanyahu faces if, against the gut feeling of most observers, he actually proves to be a peace-oriented prime minister.

Q. Apropos proximity talks, during 2008 Turkey did a reasonably good job of mediating between Syria and Israel through this mechanism. Last week you discussed growing Syria-Israel tensions and miscommunications. In view of Turkey's increasingly dynamic regional role, shouldn't Israel be interested in patching up relations and using Ankara's good offices again vis-a-vis Damascus?

A. In general, Israel should be interested in patching up its relations with Turkey regardless of the Syria issue. Four issue areas appear to be responsible for the ongoing frigid diplomatic relationship.

Before looking at them, it's significant to note that, following a recent successful visit to Turkey by Defense Minister Ehud Barak where he met primarily with the largely secular Turkish security establishment, bilateral security links are in much better shape than the overall relationship. On the other hand, the moderate Islamist government's growing crackdown on elements of the military suspected of treasonous intentions--a crackdown seemingly only partially grounded in hard facts--is increasingly neutralizing the Turkish army's political influence, which was once considered a key underpinning of the regime's positive approach toward Israel.

The first issue area of interest is regional. Israel has traditionally looked to Turkey as part of the Middle East non-Arab periphery that shares Israeli concerns over Arab nationalist aims and incursions. But Arab nationalism of the Nasser variety is a factor of the past, replaced either by lack of direction in the Arab world or by Islam. Further, Turkey's Islamist government has embarked on a dynamic foreign policy of solving conflicts on and around all its borders and is successfully exploiting its Islamist credentials to do this. Israel has been hard put to adjust to this radical change in Turkey's orientation.

The outcome of this disconnect was seemingly inevitable. When Ankara's (fruitful and productive) attempt to facilitate Israeli-Syrian proximity talks collapsed after Israel invaded Gaza in December 2008 (to punish a Hamas movement that Turkey also wanted to reconcile with Israel), Turkish PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan turned against Israel.

A second issue area is perceptual: how far, Israelis ask, is the ruling AK Party in Turkey going to go in creating tacit alliances with other, more extreme Islamists like Iran and Hamas, and with radical though secular neighbors like Syria? Are these moves merely an attempt to complement Turkey's essentially western orientation of the past 80 years or, rather, a genuine reaction to the perception of western (read: EU) rejection? The answer to this question could be critical not only for Israel.

A third issue is rhetorical and symbolic. Erdogan's attacks appear at times to deny Israel's right to self-defense and to pander to racist and religious currents among the Turkish public. Israeli officials find it much easier to talk with virtually everyone else in the Turkish establishment, especially when Turkish officials are moved to apologize for their prime minister's temper. On the other hand, Israel has recently contributed its own share of totally unnecessary slights to Turkish dignity.

Finally, there is Israel's growing concern for the Turkish Jewish community, which is feeling the brunt of those racist and religious currents.

All these considerations leave Israel with a series of policy choices. The Netanyahu government should make them wisely:

Recognize that the periphery days are over, AK Party policies enjoy widespread Turkish support, and Turkey is too big and too central for Israel to reverse those policies--beyond exercising marginal influence on issues like the Armenian genocide in the US Congress.
Keep Turkey as neutral as possible by exploiting any new opportunities to use Turkish good offices for mediation--for example, once again with Syria.
Next time around, avoid launching unilateral initiatives like the invasion of Gaza without at least taking into account their potential effect on Turkey's position.
Protest genuine insults by Erdogan and others when necessary. Most Turks, who are extremely sensitive to their own national honor, understand this.

Q. How is the Arab world dealing with the elections in Iraq held yesterday?

A. It is fascinating to read "learned" treatises on the various Iraqi political parties and analyses of the election, in the press of virtually every Arab country. Fascinating, because with the partial exception of Lebanon, none of these countries has a similarly democratic process even in its collective memory.

This begs a number of questions of broad strategic import. First, can democracy really be transplanted by a foreign power, to Iraq or anywhere else? Second, how compatible is representative democracy with Islamic and Arab culture and with Iraq's religiously and ethnically heterogeneous population? And third, if the elections do succeed in producing a stable and democratic Iraq, will this have the "democratic domino effect" on the rest of the Arab world that the Bush administration neo-conservatives intended?

Of course, a successful election ushering in a successful democracy in Iraq is by no means a foregone conclusion. Hence, alongside the undoubted interest there is Arab concern, particularly regarding the extent to which the election outcome facilitates Iranian hegemonic inroads into Iraq by means of links to pro-Iranian Shi'ite parties and candidates. Virtually every other country bordering Iraq, with the possible exception of Syria, has an interest in blocking Iranian influence there. Saudi Arabia has reportedly spent huge sums to support Sunni and moderate Shi'ite candidates; the Saudis and other Gulf emirates have also exploited their control over satellite and Iraqi TV channels to advance their candidates. But Iran has, since 2003, made the biggest effort.

In a worst-case scenario, the elections could play a role in factionalization, regionalization and a general deterioration in the cohesion of the Iraqi state as we know it. This, too, would have far-reaching consequences for Iraq's neighbors. Hence the outcome is of intense interest to the entire Middle East.

Needed: A Rational Approach to Iran

2010-03-08T16:10:35Z

APN today released new policy language to address the changing political situation in Iran.

March 2010

An Iran armed with nuclear weapons represents an alarming scenario that neither the U.S. nor Israel, nor for that matter, the world, can afford to ignore, and one that the U.S. and the international community should be exerting all efforts to avoid.

A nuclear-armed Iran represents an existential threat to Israel and is likely to trigger a nuclear arms race in the region. An unchecked Iran will likely continue to use support for terrorist groups to destabilize the region and threaten Israel and other vital U.S. interests, including in Iraq and Lebanon, and countering these activities will become more complicated and dangerous. Moreover, in the absence of an effective international strategy to deal with Iran, domestic pressure for Israel to take matters into its own hands will continue to grow.

A Rational US Policy

APN supports a US policy that deals soberly and rationally with the very serious challenges posed by Iran - a policy driven by clearly-understood and clearly-articulated goals that reflect vital US national security interests. With respect to Iran, the goals of such a policy should be to induce the Iranian regime to:

abandon any pursuit of nuclear weapons and accept stringent international oversight of its nuclear energy program.
cease its support for terrorist groups in the Middle East and beyond.
cease activities that undermine - and ideally cooperate with - US efforts to stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan.
cease belligerent rhetoric about and aimed at Israel.
respect international norms of human rights and civil liberties inside Iran.

Achieving these goals requires a wise combination of engagement and multilateral pressure. Such a policy must, by definition, be flexible and nimble, given the ongoing political turmoil in Iran and the imperative for coordinated and cooperative international efforts.

Sanctions

A rational US policy is one that recognizes that smart, targeted sanctions can be a powerful tool for putting pressure on Iran, as part of a broader strategy that in a meaningful way uses both engagement and pressure - bilateral and multilateral - to induce Iran to alter its behavior. To the extent that such sanctions make sense, they must target the Iranian regime, its security organs and its nuclear program.

Imposing "crippling" sanctions - sanctions that deliberately inflict suffering on the Iranian people by cutting off their access to fuel and paralyzing their economic life - is not rational. Causing misery to the Iranian people in an effort to compel them to put pressure on their government is morally and ethically perilous, and the efficacy of such an approach is dubious. It is far-fetched to think that a taxi driver who runs out of gas in the middle of Teheran will pound the steering wheel and curse the Iranian regime for his plight (and be moved to take action against it) - rather than curse the US and the international community.

Examples of cases where such sanctions have deliberately caused tremendous civilian suffering but failed to force a change in government policy include Iraq, Cuba, Gaza, Haiti and, in fact, Iran itself, where decades of US and international sanctions did little to weaken the Iranian regime in the eyes of its people. The present leadership's loss of legitimacy stems not from frustration over the impacts of international sanctions, but from popular outrage over the regime's efforts to manipulate and subvert the domestic political process. Indeed, under current circumstances there is a very real risk that the proposed "crippling" sanctions could spark a broad nationalist backlash, furnishing the government with a populist point around which to mobilize support, at the expense of the opposition.

For any new sanctions on Iran to be meaningful and potentially effective, the US needs strong international cooperation - something that will be directly undermined by the imposition of the proposed "crippling" US sanctions.

Iran is not South Africa. The unambiguous rationale for crippling economic sanctions against South Africa was to promote the interests and rights of disenfranchised black South Africans, who were already suffering from systematic and institutionalized discrimination at the hands of the Apartheid regime. These sanctions had clear moral legitimacy in the eyes of South African anti-Apartheid activists and in the eyes of the world. In contrast, both the justification for and the goal of "crippling sanctions" is the promotion of US foreign policy and national security goals, not support for the rights and interests of the Iranian people. Such sanctions will not have the moral legitimacy that sanctions had in the South Africa context, and cannot be expected to have the same impact.

The US should also be moving quickly to impose sanctions on those people or companies that provide the Iranian regime with the technology necessary to censor and block internet access and other forms of electronic communications among Iranians and between Iranians and the outside world. Such sanctions would signal real support for the Iranian people and could have a quick, significant impact.

Engagement

A rational US policy will couple smart pressure with determined, nimble engagement that reflects well-defined priorities and goals, consistent with vital US national security interests.

Iran's Nuclear Program: The key goal of US policy regarding Iran's nuclear program - reflecting US national security interests - is ensuring that Iran does not develop nuclear weapons. It is imperative that the US not allow itself to be distracted by other less urgent and less achievable demands. US efforts should be clearly and resolutely focused on inducing Iran - through pressure and engagement - to agree to the proposed nuclear fuel swap and to accept and cooperate with greatly enhanced international oversight and monitoring of its nuclear program.

Support for Terrorism: The US should work closely with allies inside and outside the region, in particular those countries that maintain strong ties with Iran, to convince Iran to cease support for terrorist and extremist groups. There should be clear international consensus and a clear message, including from parties that Iran views as "friends," that the world has no patience with or tolerance for such reckless, destabilizing activities.

Iraq and Afghanistan: At present Iran's role in Afghanistan and Iraq is generally viewed as negative or, at best, potentially negative. This need not be the case: Iran and the US have a shared interest in seeing a stable Iraq and a stable Afghanistan, and Iran has levers of influence in both countries that the US does not. The US should look for opportunities to engage Iran on both Afghanistan and Iraq - bilaterally or multilaterally - building on this confluence of interests. In doing so, the US has the opportunity to not only improve the situation on the ground in Iraq and Afghanistan, but also to build some confidence and credibility in the US-Iran engagement effort - confidence and credibility that could bolster efforts to promote the other key national security goals on the US agenda with Iran.

Anti-Israel belligerence: Tensions in the region are high, in no small part due to concerns over Iran's nuclear program and Iran's belligerent statements aimed at Israel. The US should make clear, and press other countries to make clear, that Iranian expressions of anti-Israel belligerence directly discredit the notion that Iran is serious about diplomatic engagement with the world or peacefully resolving the full range of issues on the Iran-US agenda. Such rhetoric reflects an antiquated world-view and a kind of irresponsible populism that would be ridiculous if it were not so dangerous. Similarly, the US should make clear that while the US understands Israel's right to signal its own military capabilities, both pre-emptive and second-strike, Israeli counter-threats and belligerent statements can unnecessarily and unhelpfully up the ante and increase tensions.

Human Rights and Civil Liberties: Promoting human rights and civil liberties in Iran should be a core component of US engagement with Iran, including carefully calibrated public statements of support for the Iranian people - including those opposing the Iranian regime - and keeping a sustained focus on the human rights situation inside Iran. The US should also be looking for ways to demonstrate tangible support for the Iranian people. For example, the US should change the policy that almost completely bars Americans from providing funds or goods to Iranians, including for hospitals, orphanages, and schools. This policy appears to be predicated on the belief that alleviating the suffering of Iranian citizens indirectly helps the regime. Such a belief is both mistaken and self-defeating. The US could send a powerful positive signal to the Iranian people by beginning the process of de-criminalizing such charitable giving to legitimate causes in Iran and establishing responsible mechanisms to permit such funding. If such funding is able to get through, it would send a signal that Americans care about the Iranian people; if such funding were blocked by the Iranian regime, the Iranian people would know that it is their own government that is responsible for the loss of assistance.

Regime Change & the Military Option

A rational US policy is one that does not cast aside clearly-defined US national security-focused goals in favor of the ill-conceived, nebulous approach that seeks regime change in Iran, either through proxies or military action.

Regime change rhetoric and a regime change-focused policy undermine the chances of advancing key US national security objectives, removing any incentive for Iran to alter its behavior. A regime-change policy would likely encourage Iran to redouble its efforts in the nuclear arena and to undertake even more destabilizing activities in the region. It would also neutralize the "leverage" represented by international sanctions, in effect closing the door to any possible diplomatic solution, and telling the Iranian regime that there is no benefit to changing its behavior, since its very existence is now under attack.

While the military option should not be taken off the table, it must be recognized as the least desirable and by no means inevitable option of last resort - with "last resort" not being synonymous with "having lost patience," "getting frustrated," or "facing extraordinary pressure from domestic constituencies." Military action is far less likely to achieve any of the key US goals regarding Iran - including stopping Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons - than resolute, determined US and international engagement and pressure. Military action would likely have serious consequences for a range of US national security interests, including regional stability, the security of US personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the security of Israel. It would also likely result in a "rally-round-the-flag" phenomenon, in effect strengthening the Iranian regime and undercutting legitimate domestic opposition.

The US must avoid and unambiguously reject casual rhetoric or threats, by any nation, about first-strike options or pre-emptive military action against Iran. Likewise, deadlines and benchmarks should be viewed as tools of diplomacy, not rigid constraints on US engagement. The US must not simply "go through the motions" of exhausting all non-military options in order to build a case for war. Rather, the US - in coordination with the international community - must resolutely explore and exploit non-military options in order to achieve well-articulated, well-understood US national security goals with respect to Iran , rejecting the analysis that views military action - and the armed conflagration and regional instability that would likely result - as inevitable, or even desirable.

The US and the "Green Movement"

A rational US policy is one that recognizes that US support for the Iranian people can exist side-by-side with US engagement with the Iranian regime. The US must take into account a complicated reality, characterized by several key considerations: (a) Iran is undergoing a period of serious domestic political turmoil, (b) it is as-yet unclear how strong the opposition to the current regime actually is or how effective it will be over the long term in impacting the behavior and politics of the Iranian regime; (c) for the foreseeable future the current regime will likely remain in power, (d) there is no evidence that the opposition in Iran, if it succeeded in changing the current political status quo, would not continue on the same course with regards to Iran's nuclear program, and (e) vital US national security goals related to Iran cannot be put on hold until the Iranian domestic political situation sorts itself out.

Any US strategy that is predicated on the belief that the Iranian domestic opposition movement will act as an arm of US foreign policy (as was the mistaken expectation in Iraq) would represent a dangerous misreading of the Iranian domestic political scene, where the domestic opposition does not view itself as a pro-West or pro-US movement, and its grievances with the Iranian regime are in no way connected to the regime's nuclear program. Such a policy is not only unlikely to succeed, but is likely to backfire, discrediting Iranian domestic opposition forces and providing the Iranian regime additional pretexts to crack down on them.

US foreign policy is not and is never a zero-sum game. The argument that the US must make a choice - engage the Iranian regime or support the Iranian people - is specious. Throughout the world the US maintains constructive diplomatic relations with governments while at the same time sharply criticizing the conduct of those governments with respect to the rights of their citizens, and maintaining a range of programs aimed at helping those populations.

Arabs and Jews refuse to be enemies

2010-03-07T20:40:43Z

I'm proud to be one of the thousands of Israelis and Palestinians who joined the demonstration on Saturday night in the East Jerusalem neighborhood of Sheikh Jarrah. The crowd, mobilized by a broad range of groups (including the Israeli Peace Now movement), is united in our opposition to settler groups who are evicting Palestinian families and moving into their homes there.

The demonstration was a powerful show of force by the Israeli peace camp. Indeed, the headline on the front page of today's Ma'ariv, which conservatively estimates the crowd at 3,000, reads: "There is a Left in Jerusalem."

Israeli and Palestinian flags waived in the evening breeze, as former Knesset Member Mossi Raz reminded us that this was the largest, shared Israeli-Palestinian demonstration in a decade.

Peace Now activists handed out flyers detailing the dangers inherent in a Jerusalem polarized by radical settler activity. The flyers included a letter from Nasser Rawi, a patriarch of one of the Palestinian families that had been evicted from their homes this summer. In the letter, addressed to his fellow Jerusalemites, Rawi declares:

"I have always believed in peace and that Jerusalem can be a shared capital for both peoples... Despite the suffering that my family is enduring, I will not give up on the opportunity to live in peace beside you in two capitals side-by-side. Sadly, in recent years, the Jerusalem Municipality has allowed extreme right-wing groups to incite tensions, to create conflict, and to turn the solution into an impossibility. Despite the effort at coexistence, right-wing forces in the city threaten to bring about another Intifada. I remain hopeful that we can put an end to the radicalization."

Rawi is right. The tension in East Jerusalem is palpable. And it could spiral out of control. As the demonstration was wrapping up, right wing activists threw stones at us. They also broke the mirrors of cars parked in the neighborhood.

But Saturday night's demonstration also proved that Israelis and Palestinians can stand up - together - against this violence and for a better future. I will forever remember the simple chant that the crowd shouted over-and-over again:

"Arabs and Jews refuse to be enemies."

It is a sentiment that we can all support.

APN Legislative Round-Up for the week ending March 5, 2010

2010-03-05T18:32:21Z

1. Bills and Resolutions
2. FY12 ForOps Season Opens - President's Budget Request
3. FY12 ForOps Season Opens - Hearings
4. SFRC Hearing: MIDDLE EAST PEACE: GROUND TRUTHS, CHALLENGES AHEAD
5. Ros-Lehtinen attacks UNRWA (again)

1. Bills and Resolutions

(IRAN) HR 2701: Introduced 6/4/09 by Rep. Reyes (D-TX), "To authorize appropriations for fiscal year 2010 for intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the United States Government, the Community Management Account, and the Central Intelligence Agency Retirement and Disability System, and for other purposes." Passed in the House 2/26/10 by a vote of 235-168. NOTE: On 2/26/10 the House adopted an amendment offered by Rep. Reyes (D-TX) to HR 2701. Among other things, the amendment added a new report requirement regarding Iran: "SEC. 364. REPORT ON MISSILE ARSENAL OF IRAN. Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence shall submit to the congressional intelligence committees a report assessing the threat posed by the missile arsenal of Iran to allies and interests of the United States in the Persian Gulf." This is in addition to two other Iran-related sections of the bill, covered in last week's edition of the Round-Up.

2. FY12 ForOps Season Opens - President's Budget Request

The following is a summary of the Middle East-related elements of the President's FY11 budget request (in the order in which they appear in the budget document, with info included to compare current request to previous year's funding level).

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Related Appropriations
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Center for Middle Eastern-Western Dialogue program: $840,000 (decrease of $35,000)
The budget document notes: "The Center for Middle Eastern-Western Dialogue was established by the Congress to further scholarship and implement programs to encourage mutual understanding. In FY 2011, the Center's permanent trust fund will provide an estimated $840,000 in interest earnings for operations of the Center."

Israel Arab Scholarship program: $375,000 (no change)
The budget document notes: "The Israeli Arab Scholarship Program fosters mutual understanding by enabling Arab citizens of Israel to study and conduct research in the United States. The program's trust fund will provide an estimated $375,000 in interest earnings in FY 2011 to support these."

National Endowment for Democracy ($105 million, a decrease of $13 million)
The budget document notes: "The FY 2011 request for NED of $105 million will allow NED to continue strong grants programs in priority countries such as China, Thailand, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Egypt, Somalia, Somaliland, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Central America."

International Broadcasting Operations ($755.143 million, an increase of $21.355 million)
The budget document notes: "The Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) is an independent Federal entity responsible for all U.S. non-military international broadcasting programs. BBG broadcasting organizations include the Voice of America (VOA), Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), Radio Free Asia (RFA), Radio and TV Marti, and the Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN) - Radio Sawa and Alhurra Television."

USAID Inspector General Operating Expenses ($46.5 million, no change from 2010)
The budget document notes: "In addition to oversight, OIG will focus its FY 2011 resources on USAID's high-priority development programs in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and West Bank/Gaza. These programs include promoting economic growth, education, health, good governance, and democracy."

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Global Health and Child Survival - USAID (GHCS-USAID)
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Yemen: $21 million (increase of $13 million)
Asia Middle East Regional: $5.5 million (no change)

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Global Health and Child Survival - State (GHCS-State)
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Asia Middle East Regional: $650,000 (no change)

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Development Assistance (DA)
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Algeria: $400,000 (decrease of $310,000)
Morocco: $24.5 million (increase of $4.954 million)
Yemen: 0 (decrease of $35 million)
Middle East Regional (OMEP): $3.595 million (decrease of $6.084 million)
Asia Middle East Regional: $25.681 million (decrease of $23.675 million)

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Economic Support Funds (ESF)
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Egypt: $250 million (no change)
Iraq: $382.950 million (increase of $450,000)
Jordan: $360 million (decrease of $3 million)
Lebanon: $109 million (no change)
Libya: 0
Morocco: $3 million (no change)
Syria: $0 (no change)
Tunisia: $0 (decrease of $2 million)
West Bank & Gaza: $400.4 million (no change)
Yemen: $34 million (increase of $29 million)
Middle East Multilaterals (MEM): $1.5 million (increase of $500,000)
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI): $86 million (increase of $21 million)
Middle East Regional Cooperation (MERC): $1.5 million (decrease of $2.5 million)
Near East Regional Democracy: $40 million (no change)
Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP): $3 million (decrease of $3 million)
USAID Middle East Regional (OMEP): 0 (decrease of $1 million)

The budget document notes:

The FY 2011 request includes funding to support democratic reform and political institution building in the Middle East, and to help address the economic despair and lack of opportunity exploited by extremists.

- West Bank and Gaza ($400.4 million): The FY 2011 request will strengthen the Palestinian Authority (PA) as a credible partner in Middle Eastern peace and continue to respond to humanitarian needs in Gaza. Assistance will provide significant resources to support the stability of the PA, economic development of the West Bank, and increase the capacity of the PA to meet the needs of its people.
- Iraq ($383.0 million): The FY 2011 request will support the President's goal of a sovereign, stable, and self-reliant Iraq. This request will support capacity-building efforts in the central and provincial governments, assist with reintegration of Iraqis returning to their communities, fund anti-corruption programs, provide technical assistance and election support, and promote broad-based economic growth and diversification, including through developing Iraq's agriculture sector and strengthening Iraq's private sector economy.
- Jordan ($360.0 million): The FY 2011 request will advance political reforms; build technical capacity of the local and national governments; and support improvements in basic education, health, youth and water, and sanitation services in Jordanian communities.
- Egypt ($250.0 million): The FY 2011 request will support development objectives in Egypt, as well as political and economic reforms. Funds will improve coverage of primary health care among underserved populations, build sustainable systems to expand and enhance education, and support Egypt's transition to a market-oriented, private-sector led economy. Funding will also support increased public participation, while promoting human rights, civic education, and administration of and access to justice.
- Lebanon ($109.0 million): The FY 2011 request supports Lebanon's democracy by fostering credible, transparent institutions at all levels; strengthening the role of an active civil society; supporting the independence and efficiency of the judicial system; and promoting tolerance and rejecting extremism. Funds will also be used to educate youth, create employment opportunities, and expand access to microfinance.

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Migration and Refugee Assistance (MRA)
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Near East: $541.4 million (a decrease of $3.1 million)
Israel (for resettlement of Jewish migrants): $25 million (no change)

The budget document notes: "Humanitarian Migrants to Israel ($25 million): This funding will maintain longstanding U.S. Government support for relocation and integration of Jewish migrants to Israel."

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U.S. Emergency Refugee & Migration Assistance (ERMA)
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Request: $45 million (no change)

The budget document notes: "The Emergency Refugee and Migration Assistance Fund (ERMA) serves as a contingency fund from which the President can draw down in order to respond effectively to humanitarian crises in an ever-changing international environment. The FY 2011 request of $45.0 million will maintain the ability of the United States to respond quickly to future urgent and unexpected refugee and migration needs. In FY 2009 $42.6 million was provided from ERMA to address various humanitarian emergencies, including assisting persons affected by conflict in Pakistan, Georgia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Gaza. Similar levels of drawdowns can be expected in FY 2010 and FY 2011."

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International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)
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Algeria: $870,000 (increase of $870,000)
Egypt: $1 million (no change)
Iraq: $314.56 million (increase of $262.56 million)
Jordan: $1,500,000 (no change)
Lebanon: $30 million (increase of $10 million)
Morocco: $3 million (increase of $2.25 million)
West Bank/Gaza: $150 million (increase of $50 million)
Yemen: $11 million (increase of $10 million)
Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP): $1.03 million (decrease of $970,000)

The budget document notes:

- Iraq ($314.6 million): In combination with funds requested in the FY 2010 Supplemental, FY 2011 funds will enable the Department of State to assume full responsibility for the Iraqi police development program at the beginning of FY 2012, currently managed by the Department of Defense. Funds will support start-up requirements such as facilities upgrades, security infrastructure, and procurement of aircraft, as well as costs associated with recruiting; hiring; training; deploying; and supporting key program, support, and security personnel. FY 2011 funds for Iraq also will support programs that continue to build the capacity of the criminal justice sector. This critical assistance will continue training, advice, and technical assistance to the Iraqi courts and judiciary; support the development of the Iraqi Corrections Service (ICS) as a professional corrections service; and transition prison operations to full ICS control. Funds will also develop programs designed to reduce the demand for narcotics and other harmful substances in Iraq through targeted, culturally appropriate initiatives.

- West Bank/Gaza ($150.0 million): Funding will support efforts to reform the security sector by training and equipping Palestinian Authority Security Forces and by providing the Ministry of Interior with technical assistance and program support to improve its ability to manage the security forces. Additional training, equipment, and technical assistance will be provided for the justice and corrections sectors to ensure their development keeps pace with the increased performance of the security forces.

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Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining, and Related Programs (NADR)
($757.613 million, an increase of $3.613 million)
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(supports a range of programs in or related to the Middle East, in particular with respect to anti-terrorism programs)

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Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) ($1.2797 billion, an increase
of $174.7 million)
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The budget document notes: "In FY 2010, MCC projects that it will sign compacts with Moldova, Jordan, and the Philippines."

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Peacekeeping Operations (PKO)
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MFO (Sinai): $26 million (no change)

The budget document notes: "The FY 2011 request includes funds to continue the U.S. contribution to the Multinational Force and Observers mission in the Sinai."

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International Military Education and Training (IMET)
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Algeria: $950,000 (no change)
Bahrain: $700,000 (no change)
Egypt: $1.4 million (decrease of $500,000)
Iraq: $2 million (no change)
Jordan: $3.7 million (decrease of $100,000)
Kuwait: $10,000 (no change)
Lebanon: $2.5 million (no change)
Libya: $350,000 (increase of $20,000)
Morocco: $1.9 million (increase of $100,000)
Oman: $1.65 million (increase of $125,000)
Qatar: $10,000 (no change)
Saudi Arabia: $10,000 (increase of $2000)
Tunisia: $2.3 million (increase of $350,000)
United Arab Emirates: $10,000 (no change)
Yemen: $1.1 million (no change)

The budget document notes: "Near East ($18.6 million): IMET programs focus on Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Oman, and Tunisia with the purpose of enhancing professionalism, providing the technical training necessary to maintain equipment of United States origin, and increasing awareness of international norms of human rights and civilian control of the military."

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Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
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Bahrain: $19.5 million (increase of $500,000)
Egypt: $1.3 billion (no change)
Israel: $3 billion* (increase of $225 million)
Jordan: $300 million (no change)
Lebanon: $100 million (no change)
Libya: $250,000 (increase of $100,000)
Morocco: $9 million (no change)
Oman: $13 million (increase of $1.152 million)
Tunisia: $4.9 million (decrease of $10.1 million)
Yemen: $35 million (increase of $22.5 million)

The budget document notes: "Near East region ($4,782 million): The majority of FMF funding will provide continued assistance to the Near East region, including increased support for Israel;
funding for Egypt to foster a modern, well-trained military; support for Jordan's force modernization, border surveillance, and counterterrorism efforts; support for Lebanon's efforts to control its territory and enhance its counterterrorism capabilities; and support for Bahrain and Oman as part of the Gulf Security Dialogue."

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Contributions for International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA)
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UNDOF (Golan): $12.99 million (increase of $2.7 million)
UNIFIL (Lebanon): $212 million (increase of $1.086 million)

3. FY12 ForOps Season Opens - Hearings

As the FY12 budget season opens, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and USAID Administrator Dr. Rajiv Shah were both on the Hill defending the President's foreign policy-related funding requests. Both responded to questions about Palestinian aid, and in particular Gaza and UNRWA.

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During a 2/25/10 hearing of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Secretary Clinton was asked about aid to Gaza and UNRWA. Webcast available here.

Excerpt:

Ellison (D-MN): "My first question has to do with the Administration's commitment to try to support UNRWA and people who are trying to make it in Gaza. Not the people who are engaged in terrorist activities but the regular folks who are just trying to survive. But some of the assistance that we've given already hasn't really made it to the people. I'd be curious to hear your thoughts as to how we might be able to actually get some of this humanitarian assistance into the hands of folks we intended to help."

Clinton: "Well, we happen to believe that UNRWA is a vital humanitarian actor that does provide critical services and assistance that would otherwise be provided by extremist groups. You know we can't have it both ways. If we're not in there supporting UNRWA in actually providing services I believe that the situation would become even more threatening to us and to Israel. So UNRWA is an indispensable counter-weight to radicalism and terrorism and particularly in Gaza and Lebanon. And in fact UNRWA's efforts are supported by the governments of Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and Jordan, and the Palestinian Authority. So that's a pretty broad cross-section of the region. And we do closely monitor what UNRWA does. We make sure it meets all of the conditions for funding under out law and the Foreign Assistance Act provisions. And we have worked to make sure that UNRWA implements measures that are designed to ensure the neutrality of its staff, including pre-employment checks, sharing the list of staff member names with host governments on an annual basis, and so much else.

"And I share your concern that we're not getting enough help into Gaza. I've raised this consistently with the Israeli government. They have made certain moves which have increased the flow of food and clean water and medicine, but I think more could be done that would not provide any threat to Israeli security and we raise that with the Israelis on a regular basis. But I think you're right that what we want to do is support the regular folks and not do anything that empowers Hamas. Much of the material that gets in to Gaza, which still comes through the tunnels - through smuggling - actually is taxed by Hamas, which then provides Hamas with the money that they use to buy arms and other material that is used against Israel. So I look at things from a real logical perspective. What can we do to undermine Hamas, to support the security of Israel, and to help the "regular folks" so that they don't turn to extremism?

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During a 3/3/10 hearing of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Dr. Shah was asked twice about oversight and vetting of US aid to the Palestinians and to Gaza. He provided a detailed response that appeared to satisfy the questioners (but didn't stop Rep. Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) from issuing a press release entitled "Ros-Lehtinen Raises Concern of Stolen Taxpayer Funds in West Bank and Gaza with USAID Administrator Shah" - which included only her question, but not Shah's response.) Webcast is available here.

Excerpt:

Rep. Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL): "...the Administration has requested over $400 million in economic support funds for West Bank and Gaza. As we have seen, there's been a lot of stealing of those funds - it's not been managed well. What kind of vetting do we have in place to ensure that the funding does not benefit violent extremists, corrupt officials and instead reaches its intended targets. What kind of metrics are we using to ensure that we can actually accomplish what we seek to do with the funding?

Shah: "...as you know we have systems for both tracking partners and vetting partners. The partner vetting system there involves specific identification of names of partners, it involves our database tracking systems and we vet that very very carefully. That system has been in place for more than two years. On the cash tracking we also have a very specific system that has been in place for more than four years where we are supporting and we authorize specific disbursements from the Palestinian Authority. The resources are transferred quite closely from a bank in Israel to a special Treasury account in the Palestinian banking system and then all flows out of that are monitored on a case-by-case basis. So there's a very strong system in place for tracking cash flows in that environment as well.

"And our budget request going forward is to really focus on doing specific work that will achieve real outcomes in infrastructure and in health and in humanitarian support in Gaza. And I'm happy to describe that some of the things we've done have been successful - building sixty kilometers of road in the West Bank, funding seven schools that are operational and effective, and promoting a broadly-based health system in that region that is reaching many many more people in need. So we'll continue to track those outcomes very closely but we have special systems for tracking how we work with partners and how we track the flow of cash."

McMahon (D-NY): ...The President's request included $400.4 million in economic assistance for the West Bank and Gaza to 'strengthen the Palestinian Authority as a credible partner in Middle Eastern peace and continue to respond to humanitarian needs in Gaza.' The request also states that this assistance will 'provide significant resources to support the stability of the Palestinian Authority, economic development of the West Bank and increase the capacity of the Palestinian Authority to meet the needs of its people.'

"Dr. Shah, I would like to reiterate the importance of vetting this funding and of course supporting Israel. Just yesterday the UN's Undersecretary for Humanitarian Affairs John Holmes dismissed Hamas' cross-border raid in 2006, the kidnapping of Staff Sergeant Gilad Schalit, and Hamas' unacceptable calls for Israel's destruction by condemning Israel. Of course, he completed neglected to mention the fact that despite Hamas' aggression, Israel allows daily shipments of food, medicine and other supplies. Given these statements...how will USAID make sure that this funding does not end up in the hands of terrorists, specifically when we are partnering with organizations like UNRWA. What sort of safeguards are in place and if you could be as specific as possible, and also if you could provide an assessment of the effectiveness of US aid to the Palestinians over the past several years. Which economic projects have been effective and which have not? Has US assistance helped increase popular support for moderate Palestinians in the West Bank - a goal which we all support - and what role has United States aid played in helping to strengthen governing institutions in the West Bank? Basically, are we making a positive impact?"

Shah: "...We do have, as I noted, a very rigorous system for vetting partners and tracking any cash disbursement all the way through to their end use. On partner vetting we have a very sophisticated system that's been in place for more than two years that tracks the names of all our partners, that clearly vets all key personnel in any partner organization against a larger database. It allows us to follow up on any positive hits that occur in that tracking system. After we get any positive hits we have an aggressive process of investigation and review before going forward. So that's a very robust system.

"The cash tracking system is similarly robust. We track any authorized disbursements, we transfer resources though an Israeli-based banking account into a special treasury account in a Palestinian bank and then we monitor all outflows from that account by every single disbursement being tracked specifically to its end use. Most of these disbursements are - nearly all of these disbursements - are used to pay off creditors, so those resources go back out to other places.

"The question with respect to how are we coordinating with other partners and what can we do to improve effectiveness, I'll just say I spoke with John Holmes before he want to make the point that you are making - that our goal is about effectiveness in that environment and that we need to look at the whole picture. It is the PRM program that is the whole picture - it is the PRM program that partners primarily with UNRWA, and not USAID, although we believe that is an important partnership going forward. So we'll continue to have those safeguards in place.

"On effectiveness, there are some areas where we believe we have been more effective than others. Health and education perhaps more effective than the full folio of infrastructure investments which are more complex to implement although there have been some success stories there as well, in the West Bank in particular. In Gaza, with a mostly humanitarian mission, it's a different operating environment."

4. SFRC Hearing: MIDDLE EAST PEACE: GROUND TRUTHS, CHALLENGES AHEAD

On 3/4/10 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee held a hearing looking at the question of how to get to Middle East Peace. Witnesses were the Honorable Daniel Kurtzer (testimony), Dr. Robert Malley (testimony), Dr. Ziad Asali (testimony), and David Makovsky (testimony). SFRC Chairman Kerry (D-MA) made a strong opening statement (text), as did ranking minority member Lugar (R-IN) (text).

The hearing, which went on 2.5 hours, included a far-ranging and important Q&A session. The hearing can be viewed in full here.

5. Ros-Lehtinen attacks UNRWA (again)

In what has become a predictable move, Rep. Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) this week circulated a Dear Colleague letter seeking cosigners on a letter to the President bashing UNRWA (predictable in the sense that Ros-Lehtinen attacks UNRWA at least once per session, often around ForeignOps season - here is an example from last February, or for an earlier example, here is Ros-Lehtinen on her soapbox in September 2005). This week's letter, which was being lobbied in the House by the ZOA, urges the president to halt a planned disbursement of funds to UNRWA and to refrain from all future obligations to UNRWA. See section 3 (above) for Secretary Clinton's comments on UNRWA.

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For more information, contact Lara Friedman, APN Director of Policy and Government Relations, at 202/728-1893, or at lfriedman@peacenow.org.

The Silwan/Bustan Drama - two new articles from the Hebrew press

2010-03-05T16:18:33Z

Earlier this week I blogged about Mayor Barkat's efforts to implement a grandiose settler-friendly development scheme in the Bustan area of Silwan (which Barkat calls the "Kings' Garden"). Today there are two important pieces in the Hebrew-language press today on Silwan/Bustan drama.

Neither a Garden nor a King
March 5, Yedioth Ahronoth (p. B3) by Nahum Barnea
(Translation by Israel News Today)

The Jerusalem municipality calls this place by the festive name "The King's Garden," despite the fact that there is nothing regal about it for the time being, and there is also no garden in it. The narrow riverbed of Nahal Kidron was paved by black and yellow interlocking paving blocks, a few stone benches and a small parking lot were built, and [the builders] went elsewhere.

White vans, the ones that drive Arab workers into Israel, park along the riverbed. The village Silwan, which is crossed by the King's Garden, is supported by this economic branch. Many workers of the municipal sanitation department, waste disposal workers, also live here. They clean up the entire city, but not their own village. Heaps of trash decorate the King's Garden, and children run between them. To their right is the slope of the City of David: a settler NPO [non-profit organization] invests many millions in excavations in the heart of the mountain. The tool is archeology. The objective is political. Opposite this, residential houses crowd together gracelessly. Some were built illegally. Others sprouted stories illegally. There is no king in the King's Garden, no law and no judge, either for Arabs or for Jews.

Jerusalem Mayor Nir Barkat announced this week that he intended to demolish 40 houses of Arabs that were built illegally along the riverbed. His announcement worried many people, both in Israel and around the world. This is all we need now--a new Intifada. Netanyahu phoned Barkat and asked him to back down. Barkat agreed.

Barkat has earned honestly all suspicions against him until today, but in this case, it is not certain that he could have acted differently. In the heart of the neighborhood, a bit above the riverbed, stands Beit Yehonatan, an eight-storey residential building that was built illegally. The court has instructed that the eight families living in it be evicted, and the house sealed up. Barkat has carried out all possible maneuvers to avoid the implementation of the order. He knows that the eviction will have a heavy political price. He will lose his most loyal supporters in a single day.

In his distress, he did what any politician would do: he brought a goat into the house [note: this is a reference to a story about a man complaining to a Rabbi that his house is too small; the rabbi tells the man to move his goats into his house. When the man complains that the house is too crowded, the rabbi tells him to remove the goats, so the man will now feel that the house is much bigger, even though it is exactly the same size as it was at the start]. When State Attorney Moshe Lador demanded adamantly that he seal up the Jewish house, Barkat asked him what to do with the 40 Arab houses. If the law is being enforced, it should be enforced all the way.

Just as the goat entered, so it left: the 40 Arab houses that were not demolished have caused people to forget the Jewish house that was not sealed up. Silwan continued to live its life, the Arabs in a state of crowding, poverty and squalor, the Jews under heavy security funded by the state.

Forty-three years have passed since the start of the occupation, and the State of Israel has still not decided how to treat East Jerusalem. Slightly over a year ago, then-prime minister Ehud Olmert offered Silwan, along with other peripheral neighborhoods, to Abu Mazen. When Netanyahu reaches the discussion on the issue of Jerusalem, in proximity talks or long-distance talks, he will face the same dilemma. If Silwan were really part of the State of Israel, it would look different, not like a Third World village; if it were part of the State of Israel, the settlers would not invest so much in it and would not hang huge flags on the houses they purchased; if it were part of the State of Israel, the state would not invest tens of millions in funding security for the Jewish settlers. In other neighborhoods in the city, Arabs and Jews live together, without joy and without security. But Silwan is not part of the State of Israel.

The Vanished Garden
March 5, Ma'ariv (p. B14) by Shalom Yerushalmi
Translation by Israel News Today

Moussa Ouda stands in the middle of his improvised courtyard, holding papers with stamps from the Jordanian government, which he shows like a kushan [certificate of registration of real estate, from Turkish law--INT] for Building No. 59 in the heart of the Al Bustan (King's Garden) neighborhood in Silwan, where he says that he has been living since 1952. Ouda is upset and annoyed. In his other hand, he holds a large key tied to a green ribbon. These two symbolic items are enough to draw in dozens of television photographers and reporters from all over the world, who came last Tuesday in order to cover Mayor Nir Barkat's rehabilitation plan for the city.

"The residents of Al Bustan will bury themselves beneath their homes together with their children, but will not be expelled," read the titles of the pamphlets that the residents distributed to reporters beforehand. Ouda, too, speaks harshly, occasionally cursing the mayor and the entire world. When he is asked to identify himself, he throws ten names, his own and those of his ancestors, out into the air in order to show that he has been on this land for many generations, "even before you came to my country in 1967."

At home, he has a pile of eviction notices and demolition orders and summonses to court and fines that have driven him only out of his mind. Sometimes, the municipality hangs the notices under the name "Unknown," with the house number, on the green iron gate. This case has been inflaming people in the village and leading the inhabitants of Al Bustan to make infuriating statements. "The Nazis also expelled people from their homes like this in Europe," says Abu Snein el-Karim, garbling history. "To them you were numbers, not human beings. Just like us."

Ouda's inner courtyard integrates very well with the planned trash dump of Silwan. One side is blocked by a heavy canvas curtain that someone removed from a restaurant by the name of Café Kumkum. On the other side, he constructed a wall of stones and concrete, and installed bathrooms adjacent to it. A broken iron bench and a fig tree that has seen better days are also there. After many months during which I have walked around Silwan and in Wadi al-Bustan, I reach the conclusion that one of the most beautiful places in the world contains the world's ugliest neighborhood with the most bitter people in the universe. Barkat's pretty plans have only added to the general ire instead of the opposite.

Barkat Is Convinced

Barkat himself also prepared public-relations material: elegant booklets on thick glossy paper under the title "Launching the King's Garden Plan," with a CD containing a slide show of the grandiose plan that he has built for the area. King's Garden is the central finger that cuts through Silwan. Close to a hundred homes and skeletons of homes, most of them illegal, have been built inside the wadi. Barkat wants to demolish several dozen such homes and move the residents to the other end of the street, where he will place them in high-rise buildings. Barkat promises that shops, restaurants, artists' workshops and stalls will be built, as befits an attractive tourist spot, and that millions of tourists will visit them.

On the land where the homes are to be evacuated, Barkat wishes to construct a large public park, once the land has been expropriated from its owners, the residents. Barkat is convinced that the residents will agree to the revolution that he has started in their lives and, instead of continuing to live in half-demolished homes, ruins, shacks and goat sheds, and all under the constant threat of eviction, they will move to the well-organized, commercial neighborhood that he has planned for them.

In his mind's eye, Barkat has always seen the Silwan neighborhood as a little Tuscany in the heart of Jerusalem, even if today he is willing to content himself with a place that resembles the thriving Abu Ghosh. In the eyes of the residents, it is, of course, a nightmare. Moussa Ouda, for example, asks how they will take him and his family and force them all upon his brother across the street, once he adds another storey to his home.

Barkat's pamphlet is euphemistic. Anyone who took it into his hands would think that this was a marketing plan for a new neighborhood between Raanana and Kfar Saba, and not the demolition of dozens of homes and the uprooting of residents in the most volatile area in the world. It contains many colorful aerial photographs, impressive sketches done by computer and drawings that make you want to want to get up and demolish your home with your own hands. The language is polished, too. The neighborhood will be "organized" and the inhabitants "shifted" to empty land. King's Garden, according to Barkat's booklet, lies precisely at the point that is called "the gate of Paradise," where the Kidron stream meets the Valley of Ben Hinnom. The garden will one day be restored to its heyday, and those who come here at that time will feel exactly as King Solomon did when he wrote the Book of Ecclesiastes among the perfumed gardens and the roses that are mentioned in the Song of Songs.

There Is No Confidence in the Municipality

The inhabitants of Al Bustan whom I spoke with have no idea where this pastoral, naïve plan came from. Decades under Israeli rule have dried up every drop of confidence that they ever had in the municipality. In order for them to agree to move one shack, dozens of layers of fear and hatred must be peeled from them, and even then they will be exposed to the influence of left-wing organizations on the one hand and members of the Islamic movement on the other, who will not let them move. The fundamentalist influence can be seen even now in every alleyway in the neighborhood. One of the many graffiti sketches depicts a weeping eye with the el-Aksa Mosque at its center. Recently, stickers showing two fingers in the V-for-victory sign were placed on the doors of the houses. "The voice of the Koran shall be heard in every home, and this shall be resistance to the bulldozers of the occupation," the caption reads.

As far as the Palestinian Authority is concerned, the neighborhood is actually occupied territory, and Israel has no right to do anything there. If the municipality insists nevertheless, it can carry out renovations, but it may not move the inhabitants from their illegally-constructed houses or even grant them permits. Regarding the park, which involves land expropriation, there is nothing to say. The inhabitants are afraid that the park will be handed over immediately to the management of the settlers from the Elad organization, which already has one-third of the neighborhood's houses in its possession and runs the archaeological park in the City of David. Two years ago, they hired an architect and drew up a plan on the basis of the existing houses. They thought it would work. "That's true, but the district committee threw them down the stairs," says Barkat.

"Barkat is using extortion methods," complains Meir Margalit, a member of the municipal council from Meretz and a member of the committee against house demolitions. "He comes and offers the people a solution, but if they won't accept it, their homes will be demolished. That's not the way to negotiate. He's using the carrot-and-stick method, but in the end, we'll be left with just the stick. If he wants to prove his good intentions, let him allow the residents to build houses and give them permits. That way, he'll rebuild trust, and after that, he can ask them to move. It's the only way."

Daoud Siyam, a taxi driver who lives in the neighborhood, has taken a lesson from the government's behavior toward the settlers who were evacuated from Gush Katif. "Look what happened to them," he says sympathetically. "They threw them out of their homes and afterwards did nothing for them, so why should they care about us? Barkat doesn't want to build. He wants to destroy. He wants to bring settlers here to replace us. Look at Beit Yehonatan. Believe me, I wouldn't mind if people like you came to live here. We'd live together, Jews and Arabs, like in Abu Tor. But they're bringing in gangs. These people only want to drive us out, to make trouble. Look at how you look to the world. Is that really worth it to you?" he asks, spreading out his hands.

Setting the Ground on Fire

Last Tuesday afternoon, Barkat held a press conference, during which he exhibited his plan. In any other place in the world, where no war or terrible natural disaster has taken place, he would have been content with a medium-size room in order to host the media. Jerusalem is another world. Barkat had to prepare the spacious auditorium of the city council for dozens of television crews and journalists who came to hear what he wanted to do.

Downstairs, members of Peace Now were already waiting with the well-known slogans and the familiar rivalries with the Jerusalem environment. "Two states for two peoples. Silwan is not for settlers," the demonstrators shouted. "Go to hell. The gentiles are giving you money," answered the passersby who came to pay their municipal taxes.

After the press conference, I go to see Barkat. There is something misleading about the mayor of Jerusalem. One cannot help but admire his stubbornness, determination, and the hard work that he has been doing day and night for nearly an entire year on the King's Garden project. On the other hand, it is hard not to be amazed at the self-confidence that he demonstrates when he comes to demolish dozens of illegally-constructed homes in the Palestinian neighborhood, five hundred meters from the Temple Mount. Even Teddy Kollek, the legendary mayor of Jerusalem, did not dare to deal with the illegal construction in the Holy Basin. He claimed that the matter was too sensitive. Kollek believed, perhaps correctly, that if he turned a blind eye to what was happening in the Arab neighborhoods, he would be able to build Jewish neighborhoods, such as Gilo and Armon Hanatziv, across the 1967 lines.

Barkat looks pleased. The press conference went well. "You're setting the ground on fire," I tell him. He gets angry. "What's the alternative? That they keep on living in illegally-constructed homes? In homes that aren't fit for human habitation?" "The whole morning that I walked around Silwan, I didn't find a single person who supports your plan," I told him.

Barkat calls to Itai Tzohar, a young project manager who is behind the plan. Tzohar says that he sat for months with the inhabitants of Wadi Al-Bustan after he went from house to house and got sweeping agreement for his plan. He has a thick book that he wrote with Yosef Jabrin, an architect who, he says, works with the residents. Entire pages are devoted to each family. "We come to the resident and tell him: now your home is worth minus two hundred thousand dollars. You have no permit. You're illegal. In a little while, you'll have a home that's worth a million dollars. They get it," Tzohar says.

Q. Who will fund the new homes for the residents, the permits, the levies?
Barkat: "They will. Maybe there will be philanthropic foundations that will assist them. They don't deserve a reward for building illegally. In the end, they'll invest the money. The deal is worthwhile for them."

I asked to speak with one of the dozens of residents who agreed to Barkat's plan, even anonymously. Tzohar promised to connect me with someone, but he did not keep his promise despite all my reminders.

Waiting for the Messiah

On Tuesday morning, Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu poured cold water on Barkat's plan. The telephone call from the Prime Minister's Bureau came after the plan had been reported for the first time in Zeman Yerushalayim [a local weekly--INT] and later on various Internet sites. Netanyahu, who never stops talking about construction in united Jerusalem, learned the hard way that there is an authority stronger than himself in the world. "The Americans are worried. Maybe we can soften the plan. Don't run so fast," he said. The mayor agreed unhappily, and was perhaps glad that someone had stopped the plan, which could not be carried out in the current situation. Barkat decided to postpone the plan and not to bring it to the local planning committee for approval, and thus aroused the ire of the right-wing members of the municipality.

And so it will go, apparently for many years, in Silwan: the inhabitants will continue to live in garbage; the municipality will continue to give out fruitless eviction orders and waste millions on empty plans; the Americans will get angry; and the plan to reconstruct the biblical garden and the charming stream that flows through it will wait for the Messianic Era, when King Solomon will rise from the grave.

A Tender Ray of Hope

2010-03-04T18:53:18Z

The graduation ceremony of the class of 2002 at Jerusalem's Anglican International School was a heartbreaking experience.

Most of the graduates, sons and daughters of Jerusalem's diplomatic and foreign community, were on their way to Europe or the US, leaving behind Israeli and Palestinian friends engulfed in raging violence, which at the time seemed endless. The school is located on Hanevi'im Street. It connects East Jerusalem with the center of West Jerusalem. During the Second Intifada, the street was known as "suicide alley." Several Palestinian suicide bombers walked up the street to downtown West Jerusalem to blow themselves up. In one case, a suicide bomber detonated the explosives he strapped to his body just outside the neighboring French School. Body parts flew over the fence into the schoolyard.
The tears and the trauma were omnipresent at the graduation ceremony. Emotions peaked when a young Palestinian-Israeli graduate, George Khoury, took the stage to speak on behalf of the senior class. Handsome and charismatic, a gifted pianist and an outstanding athlete, George spoke about the school being a sheltered island of sanity and peace in a sea of war and enmity. The strong bonds between the students and staff - mostly foreign, some Palestinian and a handful of Israeli Jews - helped them cope with the brutality that surrounded them. George depicted the school as an oasis of love within the darkness. I wept along with the crowd of hundreds that listened to his speech.

George went on to study at Jerusalem's Hebrew University. In 2004, while jogging in East Jerusalem's French Hill neighborhood, he was gunned down by Palestinian terrorists who mistook him for a Jew.

His death was more than a tragedy. Many saw it as a bitter metaphor of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict - and the senselessness of it all. George was an Israeli who lived among Palestinians, in a Palestinian neighborhood of Jerusalem. In high school he participated in interfaith projects with fellow Christians, Muslims and Jews. He was a proud Palestinian Christian who went to an Israeli university, and was murdered because fellow Palestinians thought he was a Jew.

After his death, his bereaved father Elias, a prominent lawyer, dismissed an apology by Fatah's al-Aksa Martyrs' Brigades, which carried out the attack, and rejected its offer to declare George a martyr. Elias Khoury, who lost his father, Daoud, to a Palestinian terrorist attack in downtown Jerusalem in 1975, when a booby trapped refrigerator exploded among a crowd of shoppers, lambasted both the occupation and Palestinian terrorism after his son's death.

Elias decided to commemorate his son in a special way: he funded and dedicated the Arabic translation of Amos Oz's seminal novel, A Tale of Love and Darkness, to George. Oz, a long time peace activist and one of the spiritual leaders of Israel's Peace Now movement, says he views the translation to Arabic as the most important of all 27 translations of the book.

Here is a story from Wednesday's Yedioth Ahronoth about the project. In the sea of dark and sad news from Israel and Palestine, here is a tender ray of hope:

A Tale of Love and Light

Yedioth Ahronoth, March 3

by Noam Barkan

Terror struck Elias Khoury twice. Six years ago, his son George was shot to death by terrorists who thought he was Jewish. Elias's father Daoud Khoury, George's grandfather, was murdered 35 years ago in the "refrigerator bomb" terror attack in Zion Square in Jerusalem. Despite the double tragedy suffered by his family against the backdrop of the conflict between the peoples--the family chose to commemorate its son through an attempt to bring people closer together.

   This week, an edition of Amos Oz's autobiographical book, A Tale of Love and Darkness, was published in translation to Arabic, at the family's initiative and with its funding. The book is currently being distributed in Lebanon by a European publisher. The Arabic translation will soon be distributed in Israel as well, and then in Egypt and Jordan. Meanwhile, A Tale of Love and Darkness has already received a positive review in the major Arabic newspaper Al-Hayat of London.

   In the difficult days after losing his son, Attorney Elias Khoury searched for the best way to commemorate him. His brother, Attorney Muein Khoury, suggested that he dedicate to George's memory the translation of Amos Oz's book, A Tale of Love and Darkness, into Arabic. Elias agreed immediately.

   "I thought this was a wonderful way of commemoration," he says. "Literature can truly bring people together. Only if we know each other can we reach reconciliation between the peoples. If we don't understand each other, there will always be suspicion and unbridgeable gaps. I also thought that through Oz's book, we will be able to learn how after everything it went through, the Jewish people managed to revive itself, get out of the camps and reach Israel. To be united. Through the state, we can learn what we have to do before we have a state. In order to build our nation, we have to uphold all values, first and foremost the value of human life."

   The choice of Oz, Khoury adds, is not only related to the content of A Tale of Love and Darkness. "I like him very much," he explains. "I've read a lot of the books he wrote, and heard him on many occasions, even before the tragedy. This is a story and work of art of the highest order. The way Amos Oz weaves words and paints a picture for the reader is wonderful."

   A Tale of Love and Darkness, Amos Oz's autobiographical book, was published in 2002 by Keter. The book describes Oz's childhood in Jerusalem's Kerem Avraham neighborhood, against the backdrop of the British Mandate period and the Arab-Jewish conflict. The book follows the establishment of the state and ends in the early years of the state.

   The initiative to translate his book and distribute it in the Arab world was very exciting for Amos Oz. "For me, the translation into Arabic is the most important of all 27 translations of the book," Oz says. "I believe that A Tale of Love and Darkness can build bridges. It's very touching that this is the way that George's family chose to commemorate him."

   The idea of translating Oz's book into Arabic arose a few weeks before the terror attack in which George was murdered. The person who proposed the idea was Attorney Israel Kantor, a close friend of Attorney Muein Khoury. "Kantor told me that he needed a donation for translating the book into Arabic and distributing it in the Arab world," Muein relates. "A few weeks later, the tragedy happened to us. I suggested to my brother to dedicate a page in George's memory in the translated book. My brother accepted the idea favorably and happily. He wrote a dedication for the book, and I donated the money."

   The book was translated into Arabic by writer Jamil Ghanayim. It was published by the Munasharat al-Jamil publishing house. In order to finance the translation and distribution of the book, Attorney Kantor also approached Dov Eichenwald, CEO of Yedioth Publishing. In the end, the Khoury family covered part of the translation expenses, and the other costs were covered by Yedioth Publishing.

   "The book is now in the final stages of proofreading and preparation," Eichenwald says. "In the coming Book Week, we intend to publish the Arabic edition in Israel, and distribute it in other neighboring countries such as Egypt and Jordan. This book has immense importance from a historical and cultural standpoint. This is not only a biography of the writer, it is a biography of the State of Israel and its capital Jerusalem. This is the reason that we mobilized for the project of publishing it in Arabic."

   On the day his son was murdered, a wound that had not healed was reopened in Elias Khoury's heart. His father was murdered when he was 24, a young law student, a few days before he was about to travel to England to continue his higher education. "When I was informed that my son had been murdered, it was a trauma on top of a trauma. It brought me back to that tragedy, and I asked myself what I had done to have fate strike me twice the same way. It was terrible pain." [...]

Q: Is there a political statement in the means of commemoration you chose?

"There is a political statement and a significant moral statement that we advocated before, during and after the tragedy. There is a statement that we have to respect human life and become familiar with each other in order to bridge the gaps and reach reconciliation. We were very glad to read the review published in Al-Hayat, this is one of the most widely-read and important newspapers in the Arabic press. The review was very positive. There is a political overtone in the review, because it is a book translated directly from Hebrew into Arabic, but the book itself receives very positive reviews."

Ynet (VIDEO): "Sheikh Jarrah Jews praise Baruch Goldstein on Purim"

2010-03-04T18:08:39Z

Residents of east Jerusalem neighborhood celebrate holiday with songs of praise for Cave of Patriarchs massacre. Left-wing activists plan protest

Go HERE to see Ynet's exclusive Video

(Picture: Home where "celebration" occurred. Translation of the lyrics are: "He took aim at the terrorists' heads and squeezed the trigger tight...and shot bullets and shot bullets and shot, and shot bullets." This is followed by "Dr. Goldstein, everyone loves you")

by Ronen Medzini

A video obtained by Ynet depicts Jewish residents of east Jerusalem's Sheikh Jarrah neighborhood during their Purim celebrations singing songs of praise for Baruch Goldstein, a Jewish terrorist who murdered 29 Palestinians 16 years ago at the Cave of the Patriarchs.

Tensions in east Jerusalem have peaked recently over the building plans in Silwan.

The recent documented Purim festivities were reminiscent of scenes from Hebron. The residents adopted well-known childhood songs in order to praise the massacre at the Cave of the Patriarchs carried out by Goldstein.

The video was filmed this past Monday, and shows residents singing and dancing next to their Arab neighbors: "Dr. Goldstein, there is none other like you in the world. Dr. Goldstein, we all love you... he aimed at terrorists' heads, squeezed the trigger hard, and shot bullets, and shot, and shot."

One of the leaders of the leftist campaign in the neighborhood, Assaf Sharon, described to Ynet: "The settlers are allowed to hold political activities and aggravating and offensive as could possibly be, and the neighborhood's original residents, who are still a majority there, are not allowed to do a thing. We saw them enter a house, have a party, and play very loud music."

Ynet asked the Jewish residents themselves for a response to the songs of praise for Goldstein, but they preferred not to respond.

Left-wing activists plan on holding a demonstration this upcoming Saturday night in protest of the events. "Such an event, which takes place under the watchful eye of the police, needs to make every citizen of Israel lose sleep. Such displays of violence on the part of the settlers are becoming more abundant.

"Therefore, it is important that people come and demand from the government and the Jerusalem municipality to stop the settlement enterprise in the east of the city, which is destroying the delicate fabric of life and is thwarting all possibility for a future peace accord," said Sharon.