Charles Franklin

Why Ames (Apparently) Doesn't Matter

2011-08-14T22:21:28-04:00

After yesterday's excitement over the Ames straw poll, let's take a look at the history and consequences. With Tim Pawlenty's withdrawal today, it seems Ames does indeed matter, at least for negative consequences, and Michele Bachmann's appearances on Sunday morning shows also hints at the upside for visibility and seriousness.

Yesterday, Nate Silver of the New York Times, presented his analysis of why Ames matters. His approach is to link the Ames straw poll to performance in the Iowa caucuses, and the results show that the two are certainly correlated, whether or not they are causally connected. The results convince Silver that Ames is an important signal about a candidate's likely success in the caucuses.

But the caucus is only the first event of the nomination process and so an alternative approach is to focus on the brass ring: the nomination itself. Is there any evidence that performance in the Ames straw poll has an effect on winning the GOP presidential nomination?

The short answer is "no." And the longer answer is "beware of statistical analysis with very few cases".

The chart above shows the predicted probability of winning the nomination based on national polling in the month before the Ames straw poll and whether or not the candidate won the straw poll. There is a strong and statistically significant effect of national poll standing (which is why the curves rise rapidly to near certainty for those polling well). But the estimated effect for winning Ames is not statistically significant, and in fact is estimated to have a negative effect, if any at all. That is why the black line for winners is below the red line for losers. The best conclusion is "no effect at all."

In the figure, solid dots represent nominees while open circles are those who failed to gain the nomination. Straw poll winners who went on to secure the nomination (solid black dots) are Bush '99 and Dole '95. Straw poll losers (solid red dots) who became nominees are Bush '87, Reagan '79 and McCain '07.

The straw poll winners who failed to gain the nomination are also revealing: Romney '07, Gramm '95 (who tied with Dole at the straw poll), Robertson '87 and Bush '79. The common trait is these all won the straw poll while standing below 10% support in the national polls at the time. McCain '07 with 16% poll support holds the record for lowest poll support of an eventual nominee, and he lost the straw poll.

Perhaps what is most revealing here is that the straw poll occasionally ratifies front runners, as it did with Bush in '99 and Dole in '95. But it often gives the nod to relatively weak candidates (from a national polling perspective) who command very modest public support. While attractive within the party, and effective at organizing in Iowa, these candidates had limited appeal in subsequent contests (or faced powerful opponents, as Bush '79 learned when taking his "big mo" against Reagan after Iowa).

If we plug in the current national polling numbers to the model for Michele Bachmann, Rick Perry and Mitt Romney, we see that Bachmann is given little chance at the nomination, at least according to the model. Her predicted probability of winning the nomination, based on 13% in national polls and a straw poll win is .023, or 2.3%. (She has fluctuated in polling recently and fallen from her high point of the last month, so the current 13% may or may not adequately reflect her potential support. Her current trend estimate is actually lower, at 8.7%. All candidates in the model are measured by the same standard-the most recent available national poll taken before the straw poll.)

Rick Perry has, of course, only just entered the race so his polls may be highly variable. The latest put him at 17%, yielding an probability of nomination of .114, or 11.4%. Perry's polling has been rising rapidly with a trend estimate at 16.4, essentially the same as his latest poll.

Finally, Mitt Romney remains the polling front runner with 24%, giving him an estimated .363 probability of nomination. His trend has turned down recently and now stands at 19%.

Both Perry and Romney outpace McCain '07 at this point, but stand well behind Reagan '79 or Bush '87, two other straw poll losers, and far behind Dole '95 or Bush '99 who won the straw poll while also polling near or over 50%.

It is worth point out that national polls are no guarantee of success either. Ask Giuliani '07 or Dole '87.

The simple conclusion then is that there is no evidence that straw poll success increases the likelihood of winning the GOP presidential nomination. Strong polling among Republicans nationally is far more powerful, even if certainly not a guarantee.

If there is a straw poll effect it seems more likely to be short term and tactical rather than long term and of strategic value. Pawlenty has given up. Bachmann is and will be in the spotlight for a while. But the short term effects show little evidence of carrying over to long term success in the nomination chase.

(I find a slight improvement in prospects of winning the Iowa caucus among straw poll winners, which is consistent with Silver's finding based on percentage votes. But when predicting nomination success with a model similar to the one presented here, winning the Iowa caucus has no effect on nomination probability, once national poll standing is incorporated in the model.)

Non-geeks may want to stop here.

The longer answer is to notice how poor the data are for answering the question at all. The black line for winners has no cases along it from Bachmann at 13% to Dole at 48%. In contrast, the red line for losers is pretty well populated in this range. What that means statistically is we have no information for estimating the effect of winning the straw poll for anyone between 10% and 48% national support. The black line then is estimated based on the four winners who all stood below 10% and the two winners who were over 48%. (Bachmann doesn't count because we don't know the nominee yet, obviously.) It is the mathematical shape of the curve that provides the leverage for estimating the black line between 10% and 48%, and that is thin gruel indeed. The red line in contrast enjoys several cases in this range, and while it too has substantial uncertainty in outcomes it is far better grounded in data than is the curve for straw poll winners.

Given these limitations of data which the real world has provided, the best conclusion remains that we don't have any evidence that the straw poll provides a boost in likelihood of winning the nomination, once national polls are taken into account. Anecdotally, it is revealing to ponder the division between straw poll winners who are very low in national polls and winners who are very high in poll, with no one in between. It seems dark horses have a real shot in the straw poll, but not so much at the nomination.

P.S. And Joshua Tucker cuts to the chase without making it excessively complicated with just two bars.

Support for Gay Marriage Continues to Increase

2011-03-03T15:51:54-05:00

Support for gay marriage continues to rise in a new Pew Center for the People and the Press poll, completed 2/22-3/1/2011. The latest poll shows support at 45% and opposition at 46%, the narrowest margin in the history of Pew polling on the issue. Some polls by other pollsters have found support exceeding opposition but as the chart above shows, the trend estimates have converged by not quite reached equal levels of support and opposition. The consistency of the trends since 2005, however, all but guarantee support will exceed opposition within the year.

The chart also highlights the Pew polls, which have tended to measure slightly lower levels of support than the overall trendline based on all polls. Opposition in the Pew polls has been more nearly centered on the overall trend. This suggests that pollsters other than Pew are likely to find more support than opposition in upcoming polls.

The long term trend is one of the most compelling in recent history. With the exception of 2004, following the first legalization of gay marriage in Massachusetts which provoked a brief backlash, support has steadily risen while opposition has declined since the first polls on the topic in 1985.

The question wording for the above chart is a dichotomous one, basically “do you believe gay marriage should be legal”? Actual question wording varies across pollsters but all offer only legal or not legal response options. Since 2004 several pollsters (not including Pew) have also offered a trichotomous question, offering “civil unions but not marriage” as an option. Those data and trends are plotted below through the fall of 2010, the last poll we have with this form of the question.

The striking result here is that support for marriage has moved from third to first place among these three options, while opposition to any legal recognition has fallen to near-parity with civil unions. While the civil union preference has remained flat, support for marriage actually passed opposition to any legal relationship at the very end of 2008. While we don’t have direct data on who is changing, it is plausible to imagine movement from complete opposition into civil unions and simultaneous movement out of civil unions into support for full marriage rights. The stability of the civil union group suggests that this movement has been quite evenly balanced. While this series has not been asked since September 2010, the continued trend in the first chart gives us no reason to expect a sharp change in this trend in the last 6 months.

Much has been written about the generation gap in views of gay marriage. The trends here show that opposition to gay marriage is becoming a less and less acceptable position through the public more generally. It is not merely the young who are shifting views. While individual states are certain to vary widely in the balance of public opinion, the national shift is so striking and so regular that it is hard to imagine this issue will remain in doubt for much longer. As a majority emerges in support of gay marriage, the political issue will be state by state repeal of the various “defense of marriage” amendments and referenda that passed in 2004-2006. That battle will depend much more on the more variable views in individual states.

Crossposted at Polls And Votes.

High Quality Local Poll Reporting

2010-08-11T15:00:07-04:00

Your intrepid reporter is doing field research in south-western Washington state and stumbled across a nice example of local reporters and newspapers doing serious reporting on polling.

The setting is Washington's Third congressional district, covering most of south-western Washington from Olympia in the north to Vancouver across the river from Portland OR. An open seat rated tossup by both The Cook Political Report and the Rothenberg Political Report, Dems have held the seat easily since 1998 but with the retirement of incumbent Democrat Brian Baird the seat is clearly up for grabs. Cook's Partisan Voting Index for the district is a flat zero. Obama won the district 53-45 while Bush edged Kerry 50-48. 

Two Dems and three Reps are on the August 17th primary ballot. On the GOP side, two-term State Representative Jaime Herrera faces ex-Marine David Hedrick who cites his Tea Party origins, and ex-Bush administration official David Castillo, who claims backing from Dick Armey's FreedomWorks. Neither Hedrick nor Castillo have prior electoral experience. (The Democratic candidates are not the focus of the polling article, but include five time state Representative Denny Heck and citizen activist Cheryl Crist. Independent Norma Jean Stevens also appears on the primary ballot.) Under Washington election law, all candidates appear on a single ballot with the top two vote-getters advancing to the general, regardless of party.

In an August 10 front-page story above the fold of The Columbian, reporter Kathie Durbin, reports on new poll results cited by the Hedrick campaign which show him neck-and-neck with Herrera (and both trailing Democrat Heck.) But then the story gets to the punch line:

But the source of Hedrick's information, The Washington State Political Polls, was unknown in the state until last month and has zero credibility with polling professionals.

The story goes on to trace the vague origins of the "poll", with clear and useful quotes from Seattle pollster Stuart Elway of the Elway Poll and University of Washington political science professor Matt Barreto. In the course of the lengthy 27 paragraph article, reporter Durbin manages to cover the role of random sampling and how internet polls of dubious origins fall far short of those standards. She also includes comments from the Hedrick campaign defending its use of the "poll". My favorite:  "...it's "not my job" to vet the poll."

While the WA-03 race is an important tossup, it is not at the center of national reporting. But this article is a model of local reporting on polling, vetting claims by candidates and checking polling methods with qualified professionals. And putting the story in a prominent place in the paper.

As we enter the frenzy of the fall campaign with a bevy of new pollsters appearing, using IVR and internet methods of data collection (some well, some not so well), it is especially important that reporters check the polling methods and report to readers what is at stake between scientific polling and junk. It was a pleasure to find this job done so well.

Some Perspective on Real GDP Growth

2010-07-30T16:18:04-04:00

Today's GDP numbers provide little comfort to Democrats hoping a robust "recovery summer" will aid them in November. GDP grew at an annual rate of 2.4% in the second quarter, down from 3.7% in the first quarter and 5.0% in the 4th quarter of 2009.

The GOP will point to falling growth as proof of Democratic failure, and discouraged Dems who have had a hard time selling even real gains are unlikely to successfully use this latest report to their advantage.

But as always, let's take a moment for some perspective based on the data from the four recessions since 1980.

President Reagan benefitted from very large growth rates in the four quarters following the end of his recession. Like Obama, Reagan inherited a terrible economic situation, and suffered from it throughout his first two years in office. But beginning in the fourth quarter of 1982, GDP growth rebounded very strongly. Over the next four quarters, real GDP grew an average of 5.7%. If we leave out the fourth quarter of 1982, which had a tiny +0.3% growth though technically not part of the recession quarters, then Reagan enjoyed an astonishing average GDP growth of 7.8%, providing the foundation for his "Morning again in America" reelection campaign in 1984.

The two Bush presidencies did not enjoy recoveries of anything like that of Reagan. President G. H. W. Bush suffered from just a 2.6% average growth rate in the four quarters following the 1991 recession, though the rate bumped up to over 4% more than a year after the end of the recession. That sluggish initial recovery set the narrative President Clinton used in the 1992 campaign, even through growth in 1992 was a robust 4% or more.

President George W. Bush likewise faced slow growth following the 2001 recession, with average growth of only 2.3% in the four quarters after the recession. While 9/11 undoubtedly affected the fourth quarter of 2001 (1.4% growth), the next three quarters were 3.5%, 2.1% and 2.0%, followed with a fifth quarter of just +0.1% which is not included in the average. Excluding the post 9/11 quarter and including the later quarter would lower the average growth even more.

Which brings us to President Obama. In the four quarters since the end of the recession (as defined by the end of shrinking GDP in 2009Q2), real GDP has grown an average of 3.2% each quarter. So in fact, the current recovery is a bit stronger than either of the two under Presidents Bush, though well below the extremely strong rate under President Reagan.

Even the current disappointing quarter at 2.4% is better than the average of 2.3% in 2001-2.

So a rational perspective would be that we are recovering better than in the previous two recessions, which were much less dire than the Bush-Obama recession, but well short of the energy that propelled the Reagan recovery.

For November, this rate of growth does not bode well for changing the narrative from recession to recovery, as the White House had no doubt hoped and bet on. The trend of declining growth rates over the past three quarters adds to worry that recovery will be slow or even threaten to dip back into recession. Ironically, of course, a stimulus that might enhance the macro-economy is now politically untenable as even many Democrats have accepted Republican arguments that stimulus spending didn't and doesn't work. Decades of macro-economic evidence to the contrary notwithstanding.

Research 2000, DailyKos and Transparency

2010-06-29T16:17:14-04:00

Today the polling world was rocked by claims that polls by Research2000 for DailyKos are substantially flawed:

We do not know exactly how the weekly R2K results were created, but we are confident they could not accurately describe random polls

.

Coming on the heels of recent arguments by Nate Silver at FiveThirtyEight.com that Strategic Vision faked their polling over several years, this is a new blow to the credibility of public polling.

Mark Blumenthal here at Pollster.com has lead a concerted effort over the last two years to increase the degree of disclosure expected from polling firms, an effort that paid off in new disclosure requirements from the American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) this spring. Some three dozen firms immediately signed on to the new disclosure requirements, but there are many firms that produce widely cited polls that have not yet agreed to disclose as much as required.

I've only had time for a single quick read of the Research2000 analysis by Mark Grebner, Michael Weissman, and Jonathan Weissman. It seems to be done seriously and it raises important doubts about Research2000's practices. But with my academic's hat on, I'd like to see it receive serious review by professional statisticians with polling experience. Academic journals typically reject 80-90% of articles submitted to them because on close inspection by experts, flaws are found in the theory or the analysis. These are serious charges, and they deserve to be vetted by professionals qualified to do such an evaluation. If flaws in the analysis are discovered, they can be fixed and the conclusions corrected. If the analysis is found to be sound, then the evidence is even more compelling and worrisome for its implications for the polling industry.

There is one element of disclosure that has not been pushed, but which could significantly and easily reduce the chance of "pollsters" making up their data. Every media firm, including DailyKos, should write into their contracts the requirement that the raw data and complete questionnaire be deposited within two months with the Roper Center Polling Archive at the University of Connecticut. Two months is long enough that there is little remaining news value, but rapid enough that meaningful vetting and analysis is possible. By forcing this disclosure, by contract, the sponsors of polling would gain credibility for their polls while insisting that their pollsters live up to the standards of disclosure by AAPOR as well as making the raw data available for subsequent scrutiny.

Most major media polls already deposit their raw data with the Roper Center (including, Gallup, ABC/Post, CBS/NYT, NBC/WSJ, Pew, Time, Newsweek), though not necessarily as quickly as two months. Their example should encourage others to also deposit their data.

But most importantly, it is in the interest of the sponsors of polling to protect their reputation by requiring full disclosure and deposit of the data. Such practice would enhance the value of their polls, not diminish it.

Obey (D-WI-7th) to Retire

2010-05-05T16:34:36-04:00

A bit of a parochial post but with a national figure at its center and reflecting the national midterm forces.

David Obey announced his retirement today. He has been in the House since 1969 and is currently chair of Appropriations. He was facing a challenger from Sean Duffy, a district attorney since 2002 in Ashland county (on Lake Superior). Obey has $1.4M COH while Duffy has $340K, but that is the lowest ratio of any WI Dem incumbent, at 4:1. Duffy as gotten a good bit of attention as a potential break-out challenger and recent endorsements from Palin and Pawlenty.

I'm not aware of any public polling in the 7th. We don't have any at Pollster.com and I don't know of any elsewhere either. No idea what parties or candidates may have.

Obey last faced a real challenge in 1994, the year 2010 is increasingly being compared to. He got 54% that year, 57% in 1996 and hasn't been below 60% since. Now at 71, facing the prospect of a tough reelection like that 1994 race, he must have felt he just didn't have enough to gain by fighting another battle against the prospect of leaving office by defeat. He says he is "bone tired" and that may well be. But the electoral winds are blowing hard against Dems this year, and that is making a lot of them much more "tired" than they were two years ago.

Pure speculation on my part: Obey might win a tough reelection fight (I'm sure he thinks he would win) but find himself back in the minority in the House, not as Chair of Appropriations but as ranking minority member. It wasn't any fun for him as minority member prior to 2006, and it sure would be less fun to go back to the minority after being Chair. While no one knows if the Reps will take control of the House, that had to be a consideration for Obey, and he is in a good place to read the writing on the wall. Just saying.

While the district leans Dem (Obama got 56%) in competitive races it is more of a toss up. In the 2006 Attorney General race, VanHollen (R) lost by just 7,000 votes out of 250,000 cast while winning statewide. A little worse than his statewide performance, but it shows a competitive Rep can win the district. Obey simply hasn't had competitors strong enough since the 1990s to give any sense of how far the district might go for a Rep in an open House seat race.

Dems/pundits are throwing out the obvious names: state legislators with districts in the 7th: State Senators Kreitlow (23rd), Lassa (24th), Majority Leader Decker (29th), and State Assembly members Seidel (85th) and Vruwink (70th). (Vruwink was an Obey staffer a while back.) Obviously they are doing exactly what I did: look for every elected Dem from the district and mention them! <;-) Of these, those young enough are Kreitlow (46), Lassa (40) and Vruwink (35). Decker at 57 isn't out of it, but not comparable to Duffy's 37. But Kreitlow and Decker are both up for reelection this year, making it a harder decision to go for the Congressional seat especially in a tough year for Dems.

Consider this a case study, one example of many adding to the sense that this year is moving strongly in the GOPs favor. (And I say that as one who still forecasts Dems to retain the House. But I might be wrong.)

March Unemployment in the States

2010-04-16T16:38:30-04:00

March unemployment rates for the states are out today. Some down slightly, some up or steady. Here is the lede from the BLS report:

Regional and state unemployment rates were little changed in March.

Twenty-four states recorded over-the-month unemployment rate increases,

17 states and the District of Columbia registered rate decreases, and 9

states had no rate change, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reported

today. Forty-four states and the District of Columbia recorded jobless

rate increases from a year earlier, 5 states had decreases, and 1 state

had no change.

The number of jobs rose in 33 states and declined in 17, consistent with the addition of jobs nationally in March. So while the balance of results are improving there remain a significant minority of states not yet enjoying an improved jobs situation.

The chart above shows the trends by state with national comparisons.

The chart below shows the change over the past 12 months, March 2009 to March 2010. The states are mostly above the black 45 degree line, showing the general rise in unemployment among 44 states, with only 6 decreases or no change. The blue line shows the linear relationship over the year, illustrating what we might expect in 2010 given where a state was in 2009 and the overall pattern of change in those 12 months.

Finally, we can look at which states are doing better than expected and which worse, compared to the blue linear fit line. The chart below shows the residuals for that fit against current state unemployment. Below zero means a state is doing better (has lower unemployment) than expected based on where they were a year ago. Above zero are states doing worse (higher unemployment) than expected.

The most interesting take-aways here are the two states in the top right corner: Nevada and Florida have both high current unemployment AND have higher than expected rates. And to make matters worse, both Nevada and Florida lost non-farm jobs from February to March. The electoral troubles Senator Reid and Governor Crist find themselves in might be somewhat less if their states were in happier circumstances. Not the whole story of course, but it certainly doesn't help.

Generic Ballot Trends

2010-04-12T09:23:15-04:00

Generic Ballot time. Mark has a piece at National Journal today that will soon be linked to here in his Monday post. Meanwhile here is a quick look at the underlying data.

Above, generic ballot trends since 1992. The contrast of 2010 to 2006 and 2008 is quite striking. No comment necessary.

Below, the linear trend over the last 200 days of the campaign, since 1946. See Mark's post for some discussion.

Off to teach! Have a good week.

Obama as Reagan, cont'd

2010-03-30T17:27:47-04:00

I've been pointing out the similarities between the circumstances of Presidents Obama and Reagan for a while now. See an earlier post on this here.

The short version is both come in with inherited economic troubles that don't turn around miraculously in the first 24 months. Both replace deeply unpopular predecessors, and suffer from high expectations in comparison. And both set out to dramatically change the direction of national policy. Reagan suffered substantial losses in the House in his first midterm (26 seats lost), and Obama looks headed to similar if not larger losses in 2010.

So how is the analogy holding up? In approval terms, still quite well. The two continue to track rather well. Obama has occasionally been slightly below and recently slightly above Reagan's trend, but the parallel movement remains striking. Likewise, their relative location compared to other first term post-war presidents continues to drive home the point that these have been (so far) among the lowest approval ratings in the first 24 months.

Despite the similarity, I don't think the two presidents are metaphysically linked by fate. Both suffer from the economy and their large policy goals. At the moment, the economy is looking to have turned up sooner for Obama than it did for Reagan (who suffered until the very month of the midterm before the economy bottomed out and started to recover.) Obama has a more hopeful looking GDP trend, though his unemployment trend has not yet started down. (Political science finds that GDP is consistently a better predictor of midterm outcomes than is unemployment, despite the vastly greater emphasis on unemployment in public commentary.)

So I don't think the 2010 results are yet set in stone, nor that the track of Obama's approval is necessarily going to continue following Reagan's. Rather it has been driven by similar circumstances, and those circumstances appear to be diverging on the economy at least. Whether Obama's approval responds, and with what effect on midterm outcomes, remains to be seen. The politics is yet to finish baking.

Bonus Chart: The first term presidents through midterm but in separate charts rather than overlaid. Data are Gallup polls only to provide comparability over the decades.

Recess Appointees and Time to Confirmation

2010-03-29T14:41:24-04:00

President Obama made 15 recess appointments over the weekend, the first of his presidency. The White House announced the appointments and made their case based on the long wait for Senate action in a press release here. The recess appointments have waited an "average of 214 days" according to the release (the mean in the data I analyzed is 213.6 with a median of 194 days.) The nominations and confirmations data I used is available at the White House website here. I've excluded 9 appointees who are holdovers from the Bush administration who do not require confirmation. The White House release says 217 nominees are pending though in these data I find only 207 pending, including the 15 recess appointees.

The figure above puts the delays in perspective by also showing the 550 confirmed appointees and all the wait times until final action. (At the moment, no nominee has been rejected, so the duration is days until confirmation vote or March 27 (the date of the recess appointments).

Among the confirmed nominees, the median wait time was 56 days, with 75% confirmed in 91 days and 90% confirmed in 129 days. In contrast, for the 15 recess appointees, the minimum wait was 144 days, with a median of 194 days, and a third have waited more than 249 days for a confirmation decision.

The key take-away is that 73% of nominees have been confirmed, while 27% are pending. Some of those pending are recent nominees, with 34% waiting less than the 56 day median for confirmed nominees. But there is also a considerable right tail to the distribution, with many pending nominees having waited well beyond the normal range for confirmed appointees. And the recess appointments are mostly from the right tail of the unconfirmed.

The top half of the figure shows the distribution of wait times for the confirmed and unconfirmed nominees. The red distribution for those waiting for confirmation has a much heavier right tail than the blue line for confirmed cases. The red dots show the 15 recess appointees, which are visibly to the right of the distribution of times. The lower half of the figure shows the individual wait times for the recess appointees by name and agency.

Finally, we can compare the wait times for confirmed, pending (excluding recess) and recess appointees.

The recess appointees are mostly outliers compared to those confirmed and have all waited longer than more than three-quarters of other pending nominees.

These data put the delays in confirmation in perspective. As the White House complains, the group of recess appointees have indeed waited considerably longer than is normal for eventual confirmations, and longer than a large majority of other pending appointments. But the White House also glosses over the relative speed of the 73% of nominees who have been confirmed, 90% of whom were confirmed in 129 days, or about 4 months, or less. The reason some nominees face long delays is political-- either due to the individual nominee's background or the agency to which they are nominated or holds placed by individual Senators. Those are normal political battles, and it is worth noting that the delay in decisions is not universal. That may be cold comfort to the 35 still-pending nominees who have been waiting for a vote for more than 150 days.

Addendum: University of Kansas political scientist Michael Lynch sent me and The Monkey Cage an email summarizing the results of his (and colleagues) analysis of recess appointments since 1987. The key finding is that length of delay alone is not the key determinant of who receives a recess appointment and who does not. Not too shockingly, presidents use recess appointments to further their political goals and especially so with regulatory commissions, such as NLRB and EEOC appointments among Obama's 15. The Monkey Cage has Lynch's summary of his research here. Of course, before going to a temporary recess appointment, nominees must normally have waited longer than those most easily confirmed, as my analysis above shows. Among those waiting, who gets a recess appointment and who does not certainly is a political and policy choice, as Lynch's research demonstrates. --Charles

HCR Vote Probabilities For the Undecided

2010-03-19T13:28:04-04:00

The "undecided" health care votes are mostly right where you'd expect: marginal Dem districts and among the more moderate House Democrats. There are a few outliers that may be real or may be temporary hesitations, and there are a few surprises in both directions with firm yes votes in questionable districts and puzzling no votes (though the Stupak amendment and abortion account for some of these.)

Who's up in the air, and what are their probabilities of voting no? I model this based on Obama's share of the two party vote in the district in 2008 and the member's roll call record on a liberal-conservative scale as estimated by Simon Jackman of Stanford University (Thanks!).  Other variables don't add to the model: being in trouble for re-election doesn't add anything over and above the district and ideology measures. Those in trouble are in districts you'd expect to be trouble. Retirement and seeking higher office also have no measurable effect. And the Washington Post whip feature provides health industry contributions and percent uninsured in the district. Those do nothing to explain position either.  In the end, when you are down to a game of inches like this, the statistical model can only speak to the broad tendencies, not the special circumstances that may flip a member on way or another.

These positions are taken from the Washington Post and The Hill's published counts. They were updated through noon on Friday, though positions are certain to change. 

First, the members who voted No on November 7 and who are currently undecided, with their estimated probability of voting no now.

Now the much more numerous "Yes"votes in November, who haven't taken a firm position this time:

And for some perspective, how these probabilities vary by lib-con roll call records (via Simon Jackman), and then by Obama vote in the district.

Based on the probabilities alone, the Speaker and White House still have some heavy lifting to do, despite the sense that the Democratic members are shifting towards a very narrow passage.

About "True" Unemployment

2010-03-05T18:43:37-05:00

Today's unemployment rate was announced as 9.7%. But some articles mention a "true" unemployment rate of 16.8%. How can both numbers coexist, and which is "really true"?

This is a lengthy, technical post, so here is the conclusion:

As a matter of compassion for people who would like to work more, U6 may be a more inclusive measure, but as a matter of statistical information, as a matter of understanding the economic (and political) implications of unemployment, there is no advantage in choosing anything other than the official unemployment rate, U3. Calling U6 the "true" or "real" unemployment is misleading and a disservice to readers and listeners. It is a claim of added value when in fact there is none. 

Now the details:

The Bureau of Labor Statistics produces an official unemployment statistic each month, known as U3. The BLS also produces five alternative measures of unemployment, U1, U2, U4, U5 and U6. U1 and U2 are narrower measures of long-term (over 15 weeks) and new job losses. U4-U6 are alternative measures including discouraged, marginally attached to the labor force and part-time workers who would prefer more hours. (See the BLS data here.)

As unemployment rises, the rates for marginal and part time workers also increases, and runs considerably above the official unemployment rate. The key difference is that discouraged and marginal workers are both not working and not looking for work but have looked in the last 12 months and say they would like to work. (Discouraged is a subset of marginal, with the addition that they cite a job-market related reason for not seeking work.) The part-time worker category includes currently employed people who want and are available for full time work but who have had to settle for part time employment.

Some news sources refer to U6, which includes both marginal and part-time workers as the "true" or "real" unemployment level. NPR has done so here and here and here and here. And the Washington Post's Frank Ahrens' Economy Watch Blog has had quite a bit to say about this including, here and here.

But in what sense is U6 more "true" than U5 or the official U3? One can certainly make a case that discouraged workers are unemployed, would like to work, but so disheartened they've given up. A slightly weaker case can be made for the marginal workers. But those two together only add modestly to the official unemployment rate, as you can see in the chart above. Where the big jump comes is among part-time employees, who are added to the mix in U6.

So is U6 a better measure? It certainly matters that 16.8% of potential workers would like more hours (or a job of any kind) compared to the 9.7% who are without jobs and actively looking. But if you are going to adopt U6 as your standard, you need to realize that even during the "full employment" of the late 1990s to 2000, when unemployment (i.e. U3) fell to just 3.8%, U6 still stood at 6.9%, 1.8 times higher. Of course a booming economy provides more full time job opportunities, but even the hottest economy of recent decades did not bring U6 below the 7-8 point range.

Since 1994 (when current unemployment measures were adopted) U6 has averaged 1.76 times the U3 rate. Today's ratio stands at 1.73, essentially the same as the historical average.

Today's Frank Ahren's Economy Watch entry points to the gap between U6 and U3, and links to an earlier post on that gap. Let's look at that gap, but also compare it to the ratio of U6 to U3:

Ahrens focuses on the difference, which has risen lately while ignoring the ratio which has fallen over the last year, and is down from pre-recession levels. U6 rises faster than U3, with U6 increasing by about 1.7 points for each 1 point increase in U3. That means the gap between them has to rise when U3 is large, as it certainly is today. But the relative rates of U6 and U3 are the ratio, and that has fallen recently.  If you want to make the case that unemployment is "really" worse than it looks (based on U3) then U6 and the gap make a good case. But if you want to know if U6 is abnormally large given the current official unemployment of 9.7%, then the ratio is a more reasonable measure, and by that it doesn't look unusually large, and in fact is slightly below historical expectations. 

That doesn't answer the "truthiness" question, but it does seem to say that U6 isn't really telling us much we wouldn't have expected from U3 and the historical relationship. And that is the key point. Does U6 add information not available in U3? If we adopted U6, we'd have a higher rate always, but would it tell us something different from U3? Not very much at all. In the top chart, I include the correlation between U3 and U6. It is a near perfect 0.992 since 1994. That means there is only the tiniest bit of independent variation between the two series. They move up and down in near-lock-step, as is apparent just from looking at the chart. The "truth" of U6 is never much different from what we'd expect based on U3. Since 1994, U6 has never been as much as 3/4 of a percentage point different from what we'd have predicted based on U3.  Of course it contains more people (by definition it is a super-set of the official unemployed) but it doesn't vary differently over time than does U3. In short, there is virtually no added information.

We can take another peak at alternative unemployment measures, this time at the state level annually since 2005.

For our current interest, U6 and U3 correlate each year at the state level between .95 and .96, again leaving very little room for more information to be extracted from the U6 measure.

As a matter of compassion for people who would like to work more, U6 may be a more inclusive measure, but as a matter of statistical information, as a matter of understanding the economic (and political) implications of unemployment, there is no advantage in choosing anything other than the official unemployment rate, U3. Calling U6 the "true" or "real" unemployment is misleading and a disservice to readers and listeners. It is a claim of added value when in fact there is none. 

Unemployment Holds at 9.7%

2010-03-05T12:58:21-05:00

The national unemployment rate held steady in February at 9.7%, stubbornly down from the high of 10.1% in October and stubbornly refusing to decline from January's 9.7%. The White House has stressed storms but until we see the rate move down again, such talk is convincing only to economists and geeks. (State unemployment for January will be out March 10.)

Let's note the rate since President Obama took office,

Feb 09: 8.2%

Mar 09: 8.6%

Apr 09: 8.9%

May 09: 9.4%

Jun 09: 9.5%

July 09: 9.4%

Aug 09: 9.7%

Sep 09: 9.8%

Oct 09: 10.1%

Nov 09: 10.0%

Dec 09: 10.0%

Jan 10: 9.7%

Feb 10: 9.7%

12 month change: +1.5%

 6 month change: 0.0%

4 month change: -0.4%

1 month change: 0.0%

There is enough there to argue about. 

On the bright side for the administration is the first revision of 4th quarter real GDP, which was moved up from 5.7% to 5.9% growth. That is the number to watch as a better indicator of future growth and unemployment trends. If the economy continues to expand at this rate in the 1st and 2nd quarters economic optimism is likely to rise even with a lagging and gradual decline in unemployment.  Third quarter growth was, in contrast, revised downward from initial estimates to an eventual 2.2% growth. For comparison, 1st and 2nd quarters were -6.4% and -0.7% respectively. For the year, 2009 was terrible, a decline of -2.4%, compared to +0.4% in 2008 and +2.1% in 2007. 

Now we enter the 2010 campaign year with upward GDP movement for the second half of 2009 but climbing from a deep bottom of the recession. The stage is set for a narrative of recovery, but that narrative remains obscured by a stubborn unemployment rate and a preoccupation with an unpopular health care bill.

Texas Primary: Message Success, Message Failure

2010-03-03T12:17:03-05:00

The Texas GOP primary for governor is a lesson in both message success and message failure. Gov. Rick Perry was badly behind a year ago. Last night he won by 20 points. His rise began in the spring, driven in large part by his embrace of strong anti-Washington and pro-Texas rhetoric. While outsiders found many of his comments "secessionist" and extreme, Perry showed a fine ear for his Texas Republican voters who are themselves quite anti-Washington and pro-Texas. If the rhetoric was at times overblown, it still resonated with his constituency, and what harm is there in a little secessionist talk if it stirs up your base. You know you don't mean it literally, regardless of how MSNBC interprets it.

Sen. Hutchinson faced the problem of how to "out-populist" an overblown but effective populist. She was never going to be able to out-do Gov. Perry on this dimension. (See the lesson's of Gov. George Wallace in Alabama in the 1960s.) So her only option was to find an effective critique of that populism. She never did.

The challenge is how to find an effective counter argument to a rhetoric that cannot be taken literally but which resonates with voters as populist calls to arms. Gov. Perry expressed a symbolic truth for over half of GOP primary voters last night. Sen. Hutchinson failed to convince more that 30% of them that those symbolic claims were in fact irresponsible and unrealistic. She could not find a way to play the grown up to Perry's teenager.

This has long been a democratic (small d) problem. When populist enthusiasms run hot, be it Joe McCarthy or George Wallace or Rick Perry, responsible grownups find it very hard to compete. Wallace and Perry, at least, were consummate politicians with fine ears for voters. That is what makes them so effective as candidates and what poses so difficult a problem for their opponents.

Same Data, Two Charts, Two Implications

2010-02-18T00:01:53-05:00

This chart from Organizing for American drew a lot of comment today. On its face, it is a striking and strong contrast between the Bush and Obama records on jobs.  From a purely graphical perspective it is very effective in contrasting the rate of job loss in the past two years, and from a perspective of political rhetoric it is a strong claim that Obama has done better. And it has proven very attention getting, so it has served that political purpose as well.

But let's plot the same data in an equally relevant but strikingly different way visually. Let's look at total jobs lost over the past two years. This is simply the data above, but summed to show how many jobs the economy has shed and therefore how deep the hole is we still have to climb out of.

The OfA chart gives the impression that we have "returned" to where we were in January 2008. The sharp rise since February 2009 gives the impression that what was lost in red has now been regained in blue.  But of course, that isn't right. The rate of loss has indeed slowed tremendously in the first year of the Obama administration, something the White House has every right to crow about. But that doesn't mean we've returned to previous employment levels. In fact, we've continued to sink lower throughout the last year, just at a slower and slower rate.

This second chart makes that perspective on the data more clear. It is visually clear, if less dramatic than for OfA's chart, that the rate of job loss has slowed. But my version of the chart drives home the point that we have continued to lose jobs and now stand at over 8 million jobs lost since December of 2007. That is the other "deficit" the administration must worry about. The recovery, which GDP data show has started and at 5.7% growth in the 4th quarter is quite strong, will take a very long time to regain these lost jobs.  This fact is made clear in my chart, while it is obscured in the OfA presentation.

Interestingly, my chart is also subtly deceptive. More jobs were lost in the last Bush year than were lost in the first Obama year. But the red lines look shorter and smaller than the blue Obama lines. That makes the graph appear to show that things are worse for Obama, even though his job losses are actually about 3 million compared to Bush's 5 million. 

One can think of these two charts as data displays that reveal different aspects of data, but 

also as graphical political rhetoric. The different aspects of data are the sharp reduction in the rate of job loss shown so well in the OfA chart and the terrible cumulative loss to employment in the country that has not yet started to rebound that is shown in my chart. Both of those are "true facts" about the jobs data. They use exactly the same data, so differences are entirely matters of perspective and perception rather than "apples to oranges" comparisons. But while both are true stories, their substantive interpretations are quite different-- one is a story of an administration's success is stemming the tide of recession, the other is the high water mark of that tide, which has yet to begin receding. 

The other story is graph as rhetoric. The OfA is splendid rhetoric that seems to make an utterly persuasive point with simple yet bold graphics. But it is a rhetorical answer that conducts a slight of hand away from recovery of jobs lost to reductions in rate of loss. Credit worthy to be sure, but not so positive a result as the chart suggests. The rhetoric also succeeds because it has been so widely picked up and commented upon. Even the critics pass on the message that is sent by every viewing of the image.

My chart has its own rhetorical concerns. By focusing on the status of job losses, rather than their trajectory, mine shows the depths of job loss and the lack so far of a trend back up. Mine doesn't lie, because it too shows the reduction in rate of loss, but without a hint of even the beginning of recovery of jobs, mine clearly leaves the rhetorical impression that things are not only no better but are actually quite a bit worse than when Obama took office. The added optical illusion that the red bars are shorter than the blue, even though the opposite is the case, just adds to the false impression that most of the jobs troubles are within the Obama year.

Same data, two charts, two different impressions, both fundamentally true yet also fundamentally misleading in opposite ways.  When data and politics mix beware the power of graphs to imply their own conclusions, even with the same data. And appreciate the rhetorical success of a graph that does it's creator's bidding.