Prachatai English

TLHR, iLaw sue MDES over new regulation on removing online content

eng editor 1 — Thu, 22 Oct 2026 09:11:48 +0000

TLHR, iLaw sue MDES over new regulation on removing online content

Thai Lawyers for Human Rights (TLHR) and iLaw have filed an administrative lawsuit against the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society (MDES) over a new regulation that would allow officials to block online information they deem a threat to national security or that concerns the monarchy.

The new regulation, issued on 17 July, allows officials to suspend or remove online information that would pose a threat to national security, religion, the monarchy, or good morals and public peace and order if allowed to spread.

Among the type of content that can be removed, the regulation specifically lists content that defames or makes fun of the monarchy and members of the royal family, as well as content that can cause hatred or conflict. On 14 October, TLHR and iLaw filed the lawsuit with the Central Administrative Court calling for the repeal of these sections, as well as the definition of “urgent necessity.”

TLHR and iLaw argued that, as a member of the executive branch, the Minister of Digital Economic and Society is not legally authorized to issue the regulation. Under the Computer Crimes Act, the minister can issue regulations concerning procedures, but it should be the legislature that defines what constitutes an “urgent necessity” and what kind of content violates “public peace and order or good morals”. The regulation is therefore unlawful.

It was also issued without following the proper procedure as it does not appear to have been put up for a public hearing as required by law.

The content of the regulation overlaps with previous MDES regulations on warnings and removing computer data. The two organizations argue that the measures are excessive, since the authorities should not overly limit people’s freedom. It also uses many words with ambiguous meaning or which have not been clearly defined in other legislation. This includes the term “monarchy,” which has not been defined in the Constitution or other existing regulations and it is unclear whether the monarchy refers to the current monarch and members of the royal family or if it includes past monarchs and members as well as other individuals whose work relates to the monarchy such as Privy Councillors or those who work in the royal offices. This ambiguity may allow officials to interpret the regulation in a manner that widely limits rights and freedoms, which would affect freedom of expression, academic freedom, and press freedom.

eng editor 1 Thu, 2026-10-22 - 16:11

News

Eight face criminal charges over attempt to probe barcodes on ballots

eng editor 3 — Thu, 22 Oct 2026 05:35:19 +0000

Eight face criminal charges over attempt to probe barcodes on ballots

Eight individuals, including a politician, an academic, a reporter, and ordinary citizens face criminal charges, including sedition, after they attempted to decode the barcodes printed on ballot papers to demonstrate a lack of transparency in the 2026 general election.

On Tuesday (20 October), a petition was filed with the Justice Ministry against eight individuals requesting it to refer the case to the Department of Special Investigation (DSI) for legal proceedings in a case concerning ballot barcodes, according to several news outlets.

They were charged with sedition, membership of an unlawful secret society, tampering with confidential documents, and violation of the Computer Crime Act. The Ministry revealed that the petition was under review.

The lawsuit stems from an incident on 22 February when an election was re-run in Constituency 15 in Bangkok’s Khan Na Yao District.

At the time, citizens gathered at one polling station to observe vote-counting to ensure electoral transparency. They allegedly took photos of marked ballot papers and zoomed in to display the controversial QR codes attached to the ballot papers. They also attempted to decode the barcodes in question to demonstrate that the elections lacked transparency.

Those accused include People’s Party MP Parit Wacharasindhu , former Election Commissioner of Thailand Somchai Srisutthiyakorn, photographer Songpon Ruengsamut from the media outlet Spacebar, Prinya Thaewanarumitkul of Thammasat University’s Faculty of Law, and four other citizens.

Election Commission of Thailand (ECT) Deputy Secretary-General Kanchit Charoen-in had previously revealed that the ECT decided to pursue legal proceedings over the same incident on charges including obstructing officials in the performance of their duties, importing false information into a computer system, sedition, membership of a secret society aimed at committing illegal activities, and tampering with confidential information.

Among the charges, sedition and membership of a secret society carry the most severe penalty, with a maximum sentence of seven years. To sustain the second charge, it must be proved that the accused were ‘members’ of a permanent group formed with the intent to commit unlawful acts.

Charges of sedition and membership of a secret society have historically been used against political dissidents and criminal groups considered threats to national security.

Thailand’s 2026 general elections given rise to multiple concerns over electoral transparency and the ECT itself has faced a legitimacy crisis over its competence after several abnormalities were flagged, including a high number of discrepancies between the numbers of ballot papers for constituency MPs and party list MPs.

Another serious concern was the discovery of unique barcodes and QR codes on ballot papers, potentially revealing how each voter cast their vote; this could lead to voiding the elections. The concern prompted heated debate and multiple legal challengesagainst the ECT.

Members of the general public have attempted to prove that ballot papers were traceable by decoding sample papers, and it was reportedly found that individual voters could be identified.

A dozen complaints were filed against the ECT for allegedly infringing on voters’ rights and freedoms, potentially violating ballot secrecy.

However, the Constitutional Court later ruled that there was no illegality in the use of barcodes. It concluded that the barcodes on the constituency ballot papers could not be used to identify how individual voters voted.

eng editor 3 Thu, 2026-10-22 - 12:35

News

Paul Chambers: Thai military’s influence in 2026

eng editor 3 — Mon, 19 Oct 2026 08:07:16 +0000

Paul Chambers: Thai military’s influence in 2026

US academic Dr Paul Chambers has examined the Thai military’s influence in 2026 and its relationships with the monarchy, highlighting how the military networks and institutional arrangements continue to shape Thailand’s political landscape.

The article was based on a summary of Chambers’s online lecture, originally published by 112Watch.

On 13 October 2026, Dr Paul Chambers of Oklahoma University delivered an online public lecture examining the enduring political influence of Thailand’s armed forces and their relationship with the monarchy. Entitled “Thailand’s Influential Military,” the lecture was organized jointly by the Association for Thai Democracy, Engage Thailand, Thais for Human Rights and Democracy, 112Watch, and the Southeast Asian Research Group at UW–Madison.

Central to Chambers’s presentation was the concept of a “monarchized military,” which he used to describe the close and mutually reinforcing relationship between the armed forces and the monarchy. In his analysis, the military’s political influence cannot be understood independently of the royal institution. Such a relationship has been particularly consequential since 1980.

The relationship, however, has evolved across successive reigns., In the past, the palace played a role in balancing competing military factions Under King Vajiralongkorn, Chambers argued that it has become more centralized, with the palace exercising more direct control over selected security units.

The Military’s Enduring Influence over Thai Politics

Chambers placed the contemporary relationship within the broader history of Thai political development since the end of absolute monarchy in 1932. He counted 14 overt military coups during this period, emphasizing that the armed forces have repeatedly intervened in politics and remained influential even during periods of electoral government.

Following the violent crackdown of Black May in 1992, Thailand entered what Chambers characterized as a period of “guided democracy.” Although electoral politics continued, the elite and military retained considerable influence behind the scenes. This arrangement came under growing pressure after Thaksin Shinawatra won the 2001 general election. Thaksin sought to expand his political influence within state institutions, including the police and armed forces, challenging established elite networks. Chambers identified these tensions as an important factor leading to the military coup of 2006.

The military-backed political order that followed the coup was accompanied by institutional changes that strengthened the armed forces’ autonomy. The 2008 Defence Act expanded the authority of senior military officials over officer reshuffles and established a Defence Council dominated by military personnel. These arrangements reinforced the military’s ability to manage its internal affairs and influence the appointment and promotion of its officers.

Another important development was the revival and strengthening of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) under the Internal Security Act. Chambers described ISOC as a powerful security institution with extensive responsibilities covering intelligence, counterinsurgency, and internal security. Its broad mandate, he suggested, gave the military an institutional presence that extended well beyond conventional defence functions.

The 2014 coup and the military government that followed further weakened democratic institutions. The 2017 Constitution subsequently reintroduced an appointed Senate and imposed constraints on political parties, helping preserve military influence after elections resumed. In 2019, the military-backed Palang Pracharath Party played a central role in enabling former coup leader Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha to remain prime minister. The limits of electoral competition became apparent again following the 2023 general election, when Move Forward emerged victorious but its leader, Pita Limjaroenrat, was prevented from becoming prime minister. For Chambers, this episode illustrated how electoral victories can be obstructed by Thailand’s broader political and institutional arrangements.

Anutin’s Government and the Military’s Renewed Political Standing

Turning to contemporary politics, Chambers characterized Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul as a “status quo agent” rather than a political leader seeking to strengthen civilian oversight of the armed forces. In his assessment, Anutin’s government has largely accommodated the military’s institutional interests and preserved its established privileges.

The Thai–Cambodian border conflict in 2025 represented a significant turning point in this relationship. According to Chambers, the military regained some of its public standing after its reputation had suffered during the military government of 2014–2019. He cited polling indicating that 62.5 per cent of respondents placed the greatest trust in the military to resolve the border crisis. The growth of nationalist sentiment during the conflict, he argued, also created opportunities for the armed forces to reinforce their political influence.

These developments unfolded against the backdrop of controversy surrounding former prime minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra’s telephone conversation with Cambodian former leader Hun Sen and her subsequent removal from office. Chambers argued that Anutin subsequently allowed the military considerable latitude in several important areas of national policy. These included defence spending and procurement, military influence over the National Security Council, border policy, conscription, military business interests, and the preservation of laws that protect the armed forces’ institutional autonomy, particularly the Internal Security Act.

Chambers suggested that this accommodation serves Anutin’s political interests as well as those of the military. By respecting the armed forces’ institutional prerogatives and allowing them to retain influence over security affairs, the prime minister can reduce the risk of military intervention while benefiting from the institution’s renewed public popularity. The arrangement therefore illustrates how civilian governments may rely on accommodation rather than confrontation when dealing with a politically powerful military establishment.

Military Factions, Personal Loyalties, and Patronage Networks

Chambers also devoted considerable attention to the informal networks that shape military careers and political influence. Military factions, he explained, often develop around particular units, classes of military academies, regional backgrounds, and personal relationships. These connections can influence appointments, determine promotion prospects, and help officers consolidate their positions within the military hierarchy.

One network highlighted in the lecture was Pre-Cadet Class 26, whose members occupy several senior positions in the military and security establishment. Chambers discussed the influence of Army Commander General Phana Klaewplodthuk in placing members of his class in leadership positions and developing connections with the younger Pre-Cadet Class 28. Such relationships, he argued, help strengthen internal cohesion and shape the distribution of power within the armed forces. The October 2026 military reshuffles provided a contemporary illustration of how personal networks can influence appointments even under a government that is formally civilian.

Chambers also examined the emergence of the Kor Daeng, or “Red Rim,” military faction in 2018. The group was formed in an effort to bring officers favoured by the palace together within a more unified network. Officers who were excluded from this circle became associated with the Kor Khiao, or “Green Rim,” military faction. Although the strategy initially helped consolidate palace influence over selected groups of officers, it also generated resentment among those left outside the network. Over time, these tensions contributed to shifts in the balance between competing military factions.

Geography and command structures also play an important role in determining the military’s political significance. Chambers singled out the First Army Region, which is responsible for Bangkok and central Thailand, as particularly important because of its strategic position during potential coups. He also pointed to changes in military unit structures and the designation of additional units as royal guard forces as indications of efforts to bring selected elements of the armed forces under more centralized control .

Together, these examples demonstrate how the military’s internal organization operates through a combination of formal hierarchy and informal patronage. Institutional authority, and personal loyalty, can all influence the distribution of power within the armed forces.

The Palace’s Influence over Security Institutions

The Royal Security Command featured prominently in Chambers’s account of the changing monarchy–military relationship. He described the institution as a crucial link between the palace and the armed forces, particularly following the transfer of the First and Eleventh Infantry Regiments into its organizational structure.

Chambers suggested that the broader objective was because of the capital’s strategic importance during periods of political unrest and military intervention, the reorganization of these units has implications that extend beyond ceremonial or personal security functions.

Senior officials with military backgrounds also have close ties with the palace. Chambers highlighted General Apirat Kongsompong and General Satitpong Sukvimol, as well as General Chakrapop Pudidet, who holds a senior position in the Royal Security Command. He further noted that 10 of the 20 members of the Privy Council are retired senior military officials. This composition, in his analysis, underscores the depth of the institutional connections between the two establishments.

Nevertheless, Chambers cautioned against assuming that the expansion of control over selected units means the entire armed forces have come under direct palace command. The Royal Security Command remains relatively small compared with the regular military. While the transfer of particular units represents an important consolidation of the palace, extending that level of control across the whole armed forces would constitute a considerably larger undertaking.

The distinction is significant. The two establishments involve both cooperation between institutions and efforts to centralize authority over particular elements of the security apparatus. These processes can reinforce one another, but they do not necessarily eliminate competing interests within the military.

The Future of Partnership between the Two Establishments

Chambers considered several factors that could place pressure on the existing partnership. One potential source of tension would emerge from internal disagreements. Conflicts over policy, appointments, or the exercise of authority could expose differences that are currently managed through institutional cooperation and personal networks.

Chambers also raised the possibility that the military may increasingly seek to protect its interests through political parties and electoral competition rather than through coups. Military interventions have become unpopular, making alternative strategies for retaining political influence potentially more attractive. Participation in electoral politics, whether directly or through supportive parties and political alliances, could allow the armed forces to preserve influence without assuming the full political costs of another coup.

Geopolitical competition between the United States and China represents another possible source of leverage for the military. Chambers argued that concerns about potential Chinese military bases in Laos or Cambodia could be used to justify higher defence spending and reinforce the claim that the armed forces are indispensable to national security. Whether such concerns translate into specific policy changes would depend on regional developments, but the broader point is that external security threats can strengthen the domestic political position of military institutions.

A Structural Challenge to Democratic Reform

Chambers’s lecture ultimately highlighted the extent to which the Thai military’s political influence extends beyond its formal responsibilities for national defence. Its relationship with the monarchy, internal patronage networks, control over important appointments, institutional autonomy, and ability to capitalize on nationalist sentiment combine to sustain its position within the political system.

The relationship between the two establishments is embedded in legislation, command structures, personnel networks, security organizations, and the political calculations of civilian leaders. These overlapping arrangements help explain why the return of elections has not necessarily translated into effective civilian control of the armed forces.

The central question raised by Chambers’s analysis is whether Thailand’s political institutions can move towards a system in which the military is subject to meaningful civilian oversight and the armed forces’ role is confined more clearly to their professional security responsibilities. The persistence of military influence across successive governments suggests that electoral competition alone has not resolved the underlying institutional imbalance.

The relationship between the two establishments remains central to understanding Thailand’s political trajectory. As Chambers’s lecture made clear, any serious discussion of democratic reform in Thailand must therefore consider not only the military’s direct interventions in politics, but also the networks, institutions, and relationships through which its influence continues to be reproduced.

Note: The original version of this report was composed by Engage Thailand. 112WATCH wishes to thank Engage Thailand and other partner organisations: the Association for Thai Democracy, Engage Thailand, Thais for Human Rights and Democracy, 112Watch, and the Southeast Asian Research Group at UW–Madison—for organising this important event.

eng editor 3 Mon, 2026-10-19 - 15:07

News

Assembly of the Poor-La Via Campesina march on IMF-World Bank meeting to demand food sovereignty, debt cancellation

eng editor 1 — Sat, 17 Oct 2026 19:32:19 +0000

Assembly of the Poor-La Via Campesina march on IMF-World Bank meeting to demand food sovereignty, debt cancellation

The Assembly of the Poor and La Via Campesina marched on Friday (16 October) from Lumpini Park towards Queen Sirikit National Convention Centre, the venue of the Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group, to mark the International Day of Action for Food Sovereignty and against Transnational Corporations.

Protesters occupied the Asoke Intersection for most of the afternoon, as they were met with a police blockade and were unable to continue to the Queen Sirikit National Convention Centre. Crowd control officers carrying shields were stationed on Ratchadapisek Road, while the intersection was blocked with metal fences, shipping containers, and detention trucks.

The groups called for food sovereignty and an end to economic policies that increase debt burden. They also denounce the IMF and the World Bank as part of a mechanism that undermine democracy and food sovereignty while working in favour of a neocolonialist structure that oppress the working class.

They made 6 demands to the IMF and the World Bank:

Debt cancellation for low- and middle-income countries
Allow public scrutiny of foreign debt incurred by the government
An end to subsidies for corporations and for the fund to be redirected towards supporting agroecology
Increase government revenue through corporate tax and wealth tax
Reform central banks to make them democratic, transparent, and accountable to the public
Put people and the planet at the centre of economic policymaking so there would be financial and food sovereignty.

eng editor 1 Sun, 2026-10-18 - 02:32

News

Cartoon by Stephff: IMF and World Bank are back in town

eng editor 1 — Sat, 17 Oct 2026 10:54:08 +0000

Cartoon by Stephff: IMF and World Bank are back in town

eng editor 1 Sat, 2026-10-17 - 17:54

Multimedia

Anti-World Bank and IMF protest ends with call for new Constitution

eng editor 1 — Fri, 16 Oct 2026 19:03:50 +0000

Anti-World Bank and IMF protest ends with call for new Constitution

The People’s Network Against the World Bank and IMF ended its protest on Friday afternoon (16 October) with a call for a new Constitution.

The Network is made of civil society organizations and activist groups, many of whom are members of communities at risk of losing land and livelihood due to major development projects, as well as those who are living with environmental damage caused by these projects.

The protesters marched from Sunlakakorn Intersection in Khlong Toei to Rama 4 Intersection. They originally intended to march to the Queen Sirikit National Convention Centre, where the Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group is taking place. They were met with a police blockade and decided to occupy two lanes of Ratchadapisek Road in front of the Khlong Teoi Market. They stayed overnight. Representatives of the communities that joined the Network took turn giving speeches about the impact of development projects on their communities and the environment. They also held panel discussions about community rights issues, as well as staged plays and concerts.

On Friday (16 October), protesters placed sandalwood flowers — artificial flowers used during Thai Buddhist funerals — onto pictures of Thai Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul, Chinese President Xi Jinping, World Bank Group president Ajay Banga, and Thai politician Newin Chidchob as a symbolic act of protest against policies that profit corporations but destroy the environment.

Before the end of the protest, Network representative Wisarut Srichan read a statement saying that unfair policies, laws, and development projects, whether they originate from the Thai government or from the World Bank and the IMF, turn public goods and social welfare into commodities to be profited from. Even if Thailand no longer owes substantial debts to the two organizations the way it was during the 1997 economic crisis, the ideological influence of these two organizations have led to environmental damage.

The ultimate goal of the movement is therefore a new Constitution, since Thailand would never escape the middle-income trap without first dismantling the structure of corruption and feudalism entrenched in the Thai society.

The full statement reads:

The Khlong Toei Declaration
Building Our Country with the Hands and Feet of the People

It does not matter whether unjust policies, development projects and laws originate from our own government, independently of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), or whether they originate from the World Bank and IMF, independently of our government. What matters is that they all arise from the same ideology, reinforcing and supporting one another. They seek, by every possible means, to turn public goods and social welfare provisions which the state has a duty to safeguard and provide in order to ensure people’s well-being and improve their quality of life into commodities for capitalists to profit from.

Nor does it matter that Thailand no longer owes substantial debts to these two financial institutions, or that any remaining loans are relatively small compared with those during the 1997 economic crisis. Nor should we be expected to act as gracious hosts simply to preserve the country’s image. The ideological influence of these two institutions is more coercive than having a gun pointed at one’s head and more powerful than bullets. The adoption and deep penetration of the ideas promoted by these two institutions of global governance have led the Thai state and its bureaucracy to keep our society trapped in a condition of colonial subjugation, enslaved by a system from which it cannot break free.

The air we breathe, the rivers from which we drink and sustain our livelihoods, the land on which we settle and cultivate our crops, and the forests where we gather mushrooms, bamboo shoots and medicinal plants, graze our cattle and buffaloes, forage and hunt none of these could have been destroyed at the hands of the government and its bureaucracy without the loans and ideologies implanted by the World Bank and IMF. The Thai state and bureaucracy lack the intellectual independence to free themselves from imperialist domination.

It is therefore inconceivable that, following the meetings of countries subjected to the colonial domination of the World Bank and IMF, Thailand could escape the middle-income trap and become a high-income country without first dismantling the structures of corruption and entrenched feudal power within Thai society.

The struggle against the World Bank and IMF is thus both a means and an end in itself a struggle along the path towards a greater goal: drafting a new constitution that will finally place sovereign power genuinely in the hands of the people. Standing in the way is the government of the Blue Regime, which controls the House of Representatives, the Senate and independent constitutional bodies, alongside institutions that stand above the Constitution and obstruct democratic transformation.

This is the Khlong Toei Declaration.

We pledge to one another that we will bring together the many people’s movements, weaving our struggles into a united force and undertaking the collective tasks of our shared future to transform our country and society for the better, with the hands and feet of the people themselves.

With respect,
People’s Network Against the World Bank and IMF
Khlong Toei Market, Bangkok
16 October 2026.

eng editor 1 Sat, 2026-10-17 - 02:03

News

Karen Villagers Caught Between Conservation and Deportation in Kaeng Krachan

eng editor 1 — Fri, 16 Oct 2026 09:23:55 +0000

Karen Villagers Caught Between Conservation and Deportation in Kaeng Krachan

Following a raid on 10 August, 26 Karen villagers from Ban Pa Deng village in Phetchaburi were deported and handed over to the Karen National Union (KNU).

The group included pregnant women and children. According to Transborder News, the 26 villagers were previously detained at the Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Centre in Bangkok. On 19 August,they were taken to the Phu Nam Ron immigration checkpoint in Kanchanaburi and transferred across the Thai-Myanmar border. They were then received by the KNU’s Brigade 4. The two pregnant women were admitted to a KNU-run hospital, and it was reported that the rest would later be transferred to a community along the border.

A community representative told Transborder News that most villagers were relieved to learn that the 26 villagers were received by the KNU, since they speak the same language. However, they remain concerned about a group of 10 villagers previously deported who were handed over to the Myanmar military and the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) and have lost contact with the rest of the community.

On 10 August, Thai district and forestry officials, accompanied by military personnel, raided Ban Pa Deng, an Indigenous Karen community in Kaeng Krachan National Park, targeting villagers without proof of Thai citizenship. The authorities initially arrested 28 people, including 8 children and 2 pregnant women.

According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), two were released after officials verified their residence registration record. The remaining 26 were taken to the Suan Phlu Immigration Detention Center.

Civil society groups raised concerns that the villagers would be deported to Myanmar, where they could be at risk of grave danger due to violence from the Myanmar military or forcibly conscripted.

HRW and the ASEAN Parliamentarian for Human Rights (APHR) both warned that deporting them would go against Thailand’s obligations under the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, to which Thailand is a state party, as well as the international human rights principle prohibiting the return of individuals to a place where they would face persecution or a threat to life.

According to a report published by the Democratic Voice of Burma (DVB), KNU Brigade 4 commander Saw Pho Lay said that the 26 villagers reside in the Myeik region, which is in the brigade’s territory, and can now return to their home areas. He also said he is relieved they are not handed to the junta and that he believes the outcome was likely influenced by appeals made by Thai human rights groups.

A park, a World Heritage listing and a long dispute

It remains unclear whether the villagers’ individual circumstances, family ties, citizenship claims, or protection needs were examined before they were sent over the border. And while their transfer to the KNU ended the immediate concern that they would be handed to the Myanmar military, it leaves open questions about the detention and removal of people whose families say they have lived in Kaeng Krachan National Park for generations.

Indigenous Karen communities have lived in the forests of Phetchaburi and Prachuap Khiri Khan for generations, long before Kaeng Krachan National Park was established. Following the establishment of the national park, communities face continued pressure from the Thai authorities to leave the park. Many faced violent eviction and relocation to sites unsuitable to their traditional farming method.

The tension peaked as Thailand sought World Heritage status for the Kaeng Krachan Forest Complex. In April 2020, UN special procedures sent Thailand a communication on alleged violations of Karen Indigenous peoples’ rights in the complex, including the murder of human rights defenders, lack of meaningful consultation with local communities facing land rights issues, and exclusion of Indigenous communities from forest management. In July 2021, UN experts called on the UNESCO World Heritage Committee to defer the listing, citing human rights violations against Indigenous communities in the park, including forced eviction and the burning of a village, as well as the abduction and murder of community leader Porlajee Rakchongcharoen.

On 26 July 2021, the Kaeng Krachan Forest Complex was inscribed a World Heritage site, despite the continued concerns being raised by UN experts, human rights groups, and Indigenous communities.

At first glance, the August arrests concern immigration documentation. But for communities that have lived in an area for generations, lacking modern citizenship papers does not mean lacking a relationship with the land. HRW noted that Karen people frequently travel between communities across the Thai-Myanmar border, and while th hundreds of thousands of Karen in Thailand hold coloured identification cards recognising them as a hilltribe group, more recent arrivals have no legal status. Community leaders also told HRW that Thai authorities have recently classified undocumented Karen in Kaeng Krachan, including local villagers, as “illegal immigrants”, leaving them open to arrest and deportation.

This creates a potentially dangerous cycle: conservation restrictions limit access to ancestral land, limited access undermines livelihoods and documentation, and the lack of documentation then exposes residents to immigration enforcement. Statelessness or uncertain citizenship becomes intertwined with dispossession.

eng editor 1 Fri, 2026-10-16 - 16:23

News

Supreme Court sentences former student to prison for royal defamation involving late king

eng editor 3 — Fri, 16 Oct 2026 09:01:59 +0000

Supreme Court sentences former student to prison for royal defamation involving late king

The Supreme Court has ruled against a former student over a social media post about the late King Bhumibol, asserting that the royal defamation law also protects deceased kings.

A 25-year-old Jaiko, who used the pseudonym Jai, was charged with royal defamation and violation of the Computer Crimes Act for tweeting a picture of the late King Bhumibol and the message “You don’t have to remember who I am. Just remember what I did,” along with a hashtag about the late King.

The complaint against her was filed by Aree Jiworarak, who was acting for the Ministry of Digital Economy and Society. Jaiko was indicted in November 2021, after the public prosecutor ruled that her tweet meant that King Bhumibol was a murderer, and that monarchs are a waste or should not exist in Thai society.

She was sentenced to three years in prison. However, since Jai was only 19 years old in 2020 when the tweet was made, the Court reduced her sentence to two years.

The Appeal Court later upheld the initial verdict, sentencing her to two years in prison, concluding that her actions affected the reigning King Vajiralongkorn, son of the late King.

On Thursday (15 October), the Supreme Court sentenced her to two years in prison without suspension.

The royal defamation or lèse majesté law contains only two lines beginning with “Whoever defames, insults or threatens the King, the Queen, the Heir-Apparent or the Regent, shall be punished…” However, the Supreme Court insisted that the provision does not explicitly limit its protection to only the current King.

The Court concluded that although late King Bhumibol has passed away, Jaiko’s actions also affected King Vajiralongkorn, citing the relations between the current King and his predecessor through lineage.

The Court said her two-year prison term was considered the minimum sentence. Given that she committed a serious offence, she should not receive a suspended sentence.

Following the Supreme Court ruling, Jaiko was immediately transferred to the Central Women’s Correctional Institution.

The latest ruling highlights a Supreme Court trend establishing a new standard in royal defamation cases which involve deceased kings. Last month, the Supreme Court ruled in another royal defamation case against two pro-democracy activists, saying that the law covers past kings.

How Thai courts extend royal defamation law to deceased kings

eng editor 3 Fri, 2026-10-16 - 16:01

News

Thai PBS challenges State Audit Office over leaked probe report

eng editor 3 — Fri, 16 Oct 2026 06:21:34 +0000

Thai PBS challenges State Audit Office over leaked probe report

The State Audit Office (SAO) investigation into alleged misuse of funds by Thai PBS has prompted questions from Thai PBS over the audit process after confidential documents, which are still officially incomplete, and still in draft form, have been leaked to the public.

The SAO held a press conference on Wednesday (14 October) concerning its inspection into Thai PBS funds. The SAO stated that it had received a complaint from a Thai PBS employee over alleged misuse of funds, particularly the outsourcing of guest presenters at allegedly exorbitant fees. Some Thai PBS staff also faced allegations of misusing company resources.

The Auditor General set up an investigation committee on 26 January to examine the alleged spending irregularities, operational performance, and misconduct by high-ranking staff members. Between 2 and 9 October, two audit reports concerning procurement and operational efficiency were issued, while the third report related to staff misconduct has yet to be completed.

However, the third investigation report was leaked to the public before it was delivered to Thai PBS, prompting disapproval of the SAO’s auditing standards by Thai PBS. In the documents the SAO found the director of Thai PBS and 10 other staff members guilty and demanded that they pay 85.22 million baht in compensation to the state.

The alleged liability stems from their approval of allowances for guest presenters, which the SAO considered a violation of the regulations.

Thai PBS Deputy Director Piset Chiyasak noted that the leaked documents caused reputational damage to both Thai PBS and the staff members whose names appeared in the report. He also urged the SAO to maintain professional standards when auditing other agencies, adding that Thai PBS has always welcomed the inspections by the SAO, but Thai PBS was never given an opportunity to clarify in the latest audit.

Thai PBS subsequently submitted a petition to the National Audit Committee, seeking clarification on how and why the confidential investigation reports had been leaked.

Thai PBS Deputy Director Adisak Limparungpatanakij disclosed that the SAO had submitted a letter to Thai PBS in March in which it expressed concerns over Thai PBS coverage of the anniversary of the collapse of the 33-storey Office of the Auditor General building after a powerful earthquake that struck central Myanmar last year. The SAO was concerned that the report could damage the SAO’s reputation.

At the time, the SAO urged Thai PBS to maintain neutrality in its news reporting and refrain from influencing public opinion. Adisak speculated that this might explain why the SAO intensive audit of Thai PBS.

Meanwhile, the SAO claimed that the investigation had been conducted in response to a complaint, asserting that it was a routine audit. It denied the allegation that the investigation was politically motivated.

The Thai Public Broadcasting Service, known as Thai PBS, is a Thai public television network established in 2008. Its funds come directly from revenue earmarked from liquor and tobacco taxes. Thai PBS has the authority to collect 1.5% of sin taxes to a maximum amount not exceeding 2 billion baht per fiscal year.

Coincidentally, MP Supachai Jaisamut, Chair of the ruling Bhumjaithai Party’s Legal Affairs Division, has proposed an amendment to the 2008 Thai Public Broadcasting Service Act. This came a month prior to the leak of the SAO audit documents. The public hearing period concluded on Wednesday (14 October).

The key point in the proposed amendment will change the Thai PBS funding allocation from sin taxes to the state budget. If it passes, Thai PBS funding will require annual approval by parliament.

The proposal has faced backlash from other stakeholders concerned about public media independence.

eng editor 3 Fri, 2026-10-16 - 13:21

News

Protesters marching to World Bank-IMF meeting face police blockade

eng editor 1 — Thu, 15 Oct 2026 18:01:33 +0000

Protesters marching to World Bank-IMF meeting face police blockade

The People’s Movement Against World Bank-IMF was met with a police blockade while marching to the Queen Sirikit National Convention Centre to protest at the Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank Group against development project without public participation and which caused environmental damage and public debt.

Protesters stopping at the Rama 4 Intersection after being blocked from marching to the Queen Sirikit National Convention Centre.

Among them were from communities that have lost their livelihood after the Pak Mun Dam, which was funded by a loan from the World Bank Group, was built. The dam disrupted the river’s ecosystem, affecting fish population and migration, and destroyed the livelihood of fishing communities. After 36 years, affected families have yet to receive appropriate remedies.

In a statement, they call on the World Bank to formally acknowledge and take responsibility for the impact of the Pak Mun Dam, take an active role in advancing remedies for affected communities, support the restoration of the Mun River by permanently opening the dam gates, establish an independent review of the dam’s long-term impact, and to demonstrate how the impact of the Pak Mun Dam have led to concrete changes in the World Bank’s project assessment criteria.

Police carrying shields and batons blocking the Rama4 Intersection

The march began at Sunlakakorn Intersection in Khlong Toei. At the Rama 4 Intersection, protesters were met with a police blockades. Officers were seen carrying shields and batons, and some were also stationed on the overpass above the intersection.

While at the Rama 4 Intersection, a group of protesters attempted to hang a protest banner from the overpass. However, the police charged at them and tried to seize the banner. Protesters reported being kicked and pushed to the ground and that the police attempted to use cable ties to detain them. Many received minor injuries.

Although they were able to hang the banner, the police blocked the overpass and refused to let them come down until two human rights commissioners negotiated with the police.

Police charging at protesters trying to hang a protest banner from the overpass.

Pranom Somwong, a Network representative, said that the Network notified the police of the protest as required by the Public Assembly Act, Section 19 of which states that police officers must be assigned to facilitate the protest. She said that the police told the Network that protesters are allowed to hang their banner from the overpass. Putting up a banner as an act of peaceful protest is an exercise of their constitutional right to freedom of expression, she said, noting that the police violated Section 44 of the Constitution which protects freedom of assembly. She also noted that, under the Public Assembly Act, the police must facilitate public assemblies. Moreover, under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), to which Thailand is a state party, the police must facilitate gatherings and must not use excessive force.

Pranom condemned the police’s use of force as excessive, since the protesters were peaceful and the police said they could put up the banner. She noted that the police could be violating the Public Assembly Act themselves.

She said that the protesters wanted to get as close to the Queen Sirikit National Convention Centre as possible. They do not intend to disrupt the meetings, but would like communities affected by economic policies and development projects to express their disapproval.

Pranom noted that the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) issued a statement yesterday (14 October) calling on the police to respect freedom of assembly. Andrea Bolaños Vargas, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders, also tweeted that she is concerned by report of intimidation and surveillance of human rights defenders ahead of the protest. She called on the Thai authorities to respect and facilitate peaceful assembly, prevent reprisals, and ensure that police refrain from unnecessary or excessive force. Pranom said she believes the Special Rapporteur has communicated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and that she does not understand why the MFA did not communicate with the police.

She also noted that the NHRC produced a report on the crackdown on the 2022 APEC summit protest and has communicated with the police, but the police has yet to follow the NHRC’s demands.

Network representatives said during a press conference in the afternoon that they intend to press charges against the police for using force on the protesters and are in the process of collecting evidence.

The banner hanging from the overpass says: Stop destructive capitalism, let the people decide their own future. No World Bank x IMF

As the police refused to open the intersection so they can march to the Queen Sirikit National Convention Centre, protesters occupied two lanes of Ratchadapisek Road in front of the Khlong Teoi Market, where they are staying overnight.

The Network issued a statement outlining their objective and demands. The full statement reads:

When the Streets Are No Longer Corridors for Capital, but Spaces for the People to Assert Their Power

Occupy and Resist Capital That Destroys the Planet The People Must Determine Their Own Future

15 October 2026

We are the People’s Network Against the World Bank and IMF—a nationwide movement of farmers, workers, women, the urban poor, Indigenous Peoples and ethnic communities, and communities defending human rights, nature and the environment.

Today, we have come together to occupy this space and resist a development order that creates wealth for capital and the ruling elites, while leaving the people to bear the burden of debt, environmental destruction, and losses paid for with their lives and futures.

Although our struggles take place in different parts of the country, we confront the same structures of power: neoliberalism, which places capital above people's lives, and imperialism, which allows powerful nations to dictate the rules of the global economy.

The World Bank and IMF exercise this power through loans, policy conditionalities, and ideological domination, paving the way for capital to accumulate wealth while countries of the Global South and communities bearing the consequences are denied the power to make decisions.

We are not here to accept the rules imposed by capital. We are here to reclaim our power to determine our own future, including the right to reject development that destroys lives, nature, and the environment.

The World Bank and IMF Annual Meetings in Bangkok, held from 12 to 18 October 2026, mark the return of financial institutions that have yet to take responsibility for the damage caused by their past policies and development projects.

This so-called “Financial Olympics” has become a stage where states and capital come together to determine the future of the global economy, even as ordinary people continue to pay the price for past destruction.

This is not progress. It is the reproduction of capital's wealth at the expense of people's lives and livelihoods.

International capital does not dominate this country on its own. The structures of the Thai state have taken up and actively enforced this economic order through what we call the “Blue Regime”—a system that brings together powerful business interests, entrenched political dynasties, state institutions, so-called independent bodies, and extraordinary powers to preserve economic and political control in the hands of the ruling elites.

When capital demands land, resources, and investment projects, the state readily clears the way. Yet when people rise to defend their land, rivers, and forests, and demand accountability, the state invokes “the country's image,” “national security,” and “public order” to suppress their rights and freedoms.

A regime that opens its doors for capital to plunder the country's wealth while silencing those who defend their own communities cannot claim to govern in the interests of the people. It is a regime that uses state power to serve the accumulation of capital.

Over the past several weeks, state officials have subjected people to surveillance, intimidation, and harassment at their homes and workplaces, placing pressure on families and community leaders. This intimidation forced a public forum in Patani to move online. There has also been a death threat against a human rights defender, which the state must independently investigate and ensure that those responsible are held accountable.

While the ruling elites and financial institutions sit in luxurious conference halls deciding the country's future, the people who stand up to defend their homes and communities are subjected to threats and intimidation.

The state opens its doors to welcome capital, while using its power to silence the people.

This is not the maintenance of public order. It is the use of state power to protect the interests of capital.

There can be no legitimacy whatsoever in using fear to strip the people of their rights and freedoms!

Over the past three days, amid wars, energy crises, and mounting debt, the World Bank and IMF have continued to promote economic growth as their overriding objective. Yet they fail to answer the fundamental questions: Growth for whom? And who controls the wealth it creates? Just 32 countries account for 95 percent of global economic growth, while the majority of people continue to struggle with poverty and debt.

For decades, the World Bank and IMF have exercised their domination not only through loans and policy conditionalities, but also through the power to shape economic thinking. Governments have been led to accept liberalisation, cuts to social welfare, and the expansion of opportunities for capital as the very definition of progress, with GDP serving as the measure of success. But rising GDP does not mean fair wages, access to farmland, secure housing, or the preservation of nature and the environment that sustain people's lives.

An economy that counts the profits of capital fails to recognise the care work that sustains life and keeps the economy running—particularly the low-paid and unpaid labour of women. Yet care should be a collective responsibility of the state and society. This is an economy that counts profits but fails to recognise the value of people's lives.

Under an economic order that places growth and capital accumulation above all else, rivers, forests, mountains, and seas—which have sustained people's food systems, livelihoods, cultures, and ways of life for generations—are reduced to mere “assets” to be priced, concessioned, and exploited for profit.

The construction of dams, the opening of mines, land reclamation from the sea, and the building of power plants are recorded as investment and economic growth. Yet the destruction of river ecosystems, the loss of forests, the degradation of marine environments, and the displacement of communities are never recorded as debts that investors and decision-makers must repay.

This is a development order that treats the profits of capital as progress, while turning environmental destruction and the suffering of communities into costs for which no one is held accountable.

Today, the World Bank continues to advance Private Capital Mobilisation, reporting that it mobilised as much as US$112 billion in fiscal year 2026. Yet the overwhelming share of this capital has been concentrated in upper-middle-income countries, while low-income countries received only approximately US$3 billion.

This approach exposes a fundamental contradiction at the heart of the neoliberal economic order. While proclaiming that markets and private capital should drive development, it relies on public money and resources to guarantee investments and reduce risks for private investors.

This is “neoliberalism subsidised by public money”—an arrangement that allows private capital to choose investments that generate profits, while states and ordinary people are left to bear the risks of debt, taxation, and damage to shared resources.

In other words, profits are privatised, while risks and losses are shifted onto the people.

The injustices produced by this development order are not confined to economic reports or academic critiques. They are lived as deep wounds in the lives of communities across Thailand.

The experiences of the Pak Mun Dam, Bang Lang Dam, and potash mining bear witness to a model of development that has deprived people of their land, rivers, food sources, livelihoods, and ways of life passed down through generations.

The urban poor and railway-side communities face eviction and housing insecurity to make way for urban development driven by the demands of capital. Meanwhile, communities in eastern Thailand confront both devastating floods and industrial pollution, threatening their health, food sources, and livelihoods.

This is development that creates wealth for a privileged few by stripping ordinary people of the very foundations of their lives and their access to resources.

The floodwaters may have receded, but the debts, toxic contamination, and damage to people's lives have not washed away with them.

The dams may have been completed, but the rivers and the ways of life they destroyed have yet to recover.

The mines generate profits for capital, but leave communities with degraded land and polluted water.

These damages are not the price that people must pay for progress. They are debts that the state, the World Bank, and corporate interests must take responsibility for—through ecological restoration, remedy, reparations, and compensation.

The people have already been forced to sacrifice far too much of their lives and the natural world.

The people do not owe the World Bank. It is the World Bank that owes the people a debt of justice!

The Positions and Demands of the People’s Network Against the World Bank and IMF
The People’s Network Against the World Bank and IMF hereby declares its seven positions and demands:

1. Return the Power to Determine the Future to the People, Not the State and Capital

People must have the power to make decisions and to reject policies or projects that destroy their lives and resources.

Public consultations conducted only after the state and capital have already made their decisions are not genuine participation. They are merely rituals designed to legitimise the power of those who rule.

2. Energy Must Belong to the People, Not Serve as a Source of Profits for Capital

End the use of public money to subsidise monopolistic energy corporations while passing the costs on to ordinary people through their electricity bills.

The energy transition must do more than simply replace one type of fuel with another. It must transform the structures of ownership and power, enabling people and communities to own, manage, and benefit fairly from energy resources and systems.

3. Stop Accumulating Public Debt to Create Wealth for Capital

End public borrowing and investment guarantees for projects over which people have no decision-making power. Disclose all loan agreements and their conditions. Reject the privatisation of public assets and liberalisation policies that favour corporate interests.

Debt is a new form of colonialism, through which loans are used to impose policies and shift the burden of repayment onto the people, while capital reaps the benefits.

We demand the cancellation of illegitimate debt and an end to the use of debt as an instrument for dominating the people's economic sovereignty.

4. Social Welfare Is a Right, and Care Work Is the Work That Sustains Life

The state must provide universal social protection and public services, and recognise the rights and fair compensation of both paid and unpaid care workers.

Care work is labour that creates and sustains life, nurtures society, and makes the functioning of the economy possible.

End the dismantling of social welfare to increase corporate profits, while shifting the responsibility for sustaining and caring for human life onto women and families alone.

5. Those Responsible for Destruction Must Pay, Not Leave the People to Bear the Consequences

The World Bank, IMF, governments, and corporate interests involved must be held accountable for the harm caused by their policies and development projects.

They must disclose information, submit to independent scrutiny, restore damaged natural resources and ecosystems, and provide fair remedies, reparations, and compensation to affected communities.

6. End the Intimidation of the People. The Right to Peaceful Assembly Is Not a Privilege That the State Can Grant or Revoke at Will

Immediately end surveillance, threats, intimidation, and obstruction targeting communities and human rights defenders, including restrictions on academic freedom in universities.

Peaceful assembly is a fundamental right of the people, not something the state may arbitrarily restrict at its discretion.

The state has a duty to facilitate and protect peaceful assemblies, not to invoke national security powers to silence dissent.

Those in positions of command must be held accountable for the actions of their subordinates, and the violence witnessed during the 2022 APEC protests must never be repeated.

7. Dismantle the Economic Structures That Serve Capital and Break the Monopoly of Power Under the Blue Regime

Thailand's 14th National Economic and Social Development Plan must not become another instrument enabling corporate monopolies to control the country's resources and future.

Power and wealth must be redistributed. The rights of people and communities to govern and manage their land, water, forests, seas, and energy resources must be restored.

The struggle against the Blue Regime is a struggle against the intertwined structures of state power and capital that monopolise wealth and determine the destiny of the people.

We Occupy This Space in Civil Disobedience The Streets Are the People's Parliament!

Nonviolent Direct Action Is Love Put into Action to Make Justice a Reality!

The Future Is Not Something the State and Capital Can Bestow Upon Us

It Is Ours to Create!

People’s Network Against the World Bank and IMF
15 October 2026

eng editor 1 Fri, 2026-10-16 - 01:01

News