Profound or Psychobabble?

A tale of two Daar's

2007-09-26T22:15:00.000+01:00

In the current atmosphere of "blog wars" in certain circles, the feverish blogging and counter-blogging can easily polarise views and introduce unwarranted prejudice and entrenchment of positions. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the latest debate between a prominent Islamist defector and (members of) his former Islamist group.

Although the debate had the potential to be intellectually stimulating and beneficial to all parties, it has inadvertently perhaps, managed instead to stir up a cloud of dust, obscuring what is arguably the main argument at the core of the dispute; the argument that has yet to be thoroughly explicated and thrashed out: the debate about the realm of applicability of the Shairah.

While I shall not be attempting to address this core argument here, there is merit in trying to cut through this whole Daar malarkey, not in order to resolve it, but in order to prevent it from obscuring our judgement on the more fundamental debate ... if it ever happens. I'll start by presenting a synopsis of what (in my opinion) the Daar debate is all about and the premise upon which it is based, and then explore what the possible outcomes of a successful discussion can be, and comment on the relevance of any such conclusions.

The defector is basically attempting to use Islamist reasoning and juristic principles to challenge their claim that the current Muslim regimes are (definitively) illegitimate. The aim would thus appear to be to undermine the legal basis for those Islamists claiming to work politically towards regime change instigated by the military, followed by a forced unification of neighbouring Muslim lands, as accusations of Kufr and the shedding of blood require (according to the Islamist juristic principles presented) positions that are definitive in nature. Contained within his thesis is an accusation of this particular Islamist group of (politically-motivated) theological and idelogical incoherence and manipulation.

The Islamist response is as expected: a thorough and detailed exposé of the first claim, challenging the suggestion that the group methodology is based on contested terminology and an indecisive binary division of the world. The implication, naturally, is that their methodology is entirely consistent with not only the cult's own juristic principles, but also those of the classical Islamic scholars, and as such it is justified in its claim of being the panacea for the problems of the world, or at least the vehicle for it. And as if to seal the discussion, the writer goes on to personally discredit the defector by casting doubts about his intentions, intellect, scholarly integrity and loyalty.

The counter-Islamist argument, in my opinion, founders before it even starts, on two counts:

It relies on Islamist precepts and builds upon an Islamist (as opposed to an Islamic) premise, as if the protagonist is attempting to beat the Islamists at their own game, so to speak. From the outset, given his known anti-Islamist stance, the author is vulnerable to accusations of hypocrisy and intellectual insincerity, eroding the credibility of his case before it is even presented. This is a fine example of how not to present a Trojan horse.
It attempts to dismantle the central tenet of an ideological organisation, the so-called "secret of it's very existence" no less. Cults are known to be obsessively protective about all aspects of their culture, and going for the jugular in this manner will invariably trigger multiple defense mechanisms. Amongst all the possible outcomes, to have the party allow a legalistic argument from a declared enemy to undermine and subvert its central doctrine is clearly the least plausible. This applies to members of the group just as it applies to the party itself.

The best that could possibly be achieved by this argument, assuming I was wrong on both points above, is that a number of Islamists question the group methodology, and come to one of the following conclusions:

Daar-ul-Islam already exists, and the argument for revolutionary regime change to bring about Daar-ul-Islam is unsustainable, hence the way forward is by armed insurrection against the regimes for their implmentation of Kufr laws.
Daar-ul-Islam already exists, and the laws being applied by the Muslim rulers fall short of the legal criteria for clear-cut Kufr, hence the way forward is engaging in peaceful internal political reform.
Daar-ul-Islam does not exist, however the non-definitive nature of this judgement precludes the use of force in bringing it about even via a military coup, hence the way forward is by grassroot political activism to bring about societal change that will reflect itself in regime change eventually (the original adoption of the party prior to 1961).

None of these outcomes seems particularly appealing from the point of view of a secular politician arguing for the separation of religion from ruling. With little prospect of achieving more than the above modest gains, one wonders why the debate was started in the first place.

To the casual observer, all this talk about Daar this and Daar that seems little more than a dispute over jargonistic technicalities. Many people would see these labels as simply words used to describe different aspects of something known to all by default; the only reason for defining these terms is because there are different rulings that apply in each of these lands. Daar-ul-Islam was defined by listing some of the known attributes of where the Muslims lived, and Daar-ul-Harb was simply defined as everything else, i.e. the "other" in a binary world.

In some ways its like defining what it meant to be "alive": rather than define it, biologists simply listed some characteristics of what they understood to be living things, and then defined "dead" as anything that did not posses those qualities. If the biologists were faced with the possibility that they themselves were not "alive", based on their own definition, they would naturally adapt their definition rather than accept the paradoxical situation being suggested. In a similar (but different) way, not having such a place as Daar-ul-Islam must never have occurred to the classical jurists.

The Daar debate will certainly continue for some while yet, as both parties have yet to exhaust their repository of arguments. I hope, however, that we can swiftly move on from this technicality to discuss the more important issue of the role of the Sharia in political life.

Did you say "Kufr"?

2007-09-22T14:34:00.000+01:00

In an earlier posting, it was suggested that the area of dispute between the active advocates of an Islamic state (referred to here as the Islamists) and between the mainstream Muslims (who I've called the secular majority) is in fact not as large as it might first appear. Dogma, rhetoric, exaggeration, mistrust and conflicts of interest all serve to polarise opinions and entrench positions. The disagreement is seen to boil down to 3 fundamental areas:

Should Islam be used as the reference for all actions, or are some areas not covered by the jurisdiction of the Shariah? Critically, the role of Islam in organising affairs of ruling and politics is disputed.

Does man have the right to legislate, or is legislation for Allah alone?

Can legislation be taken from "other than Islam", and is that "ruling by Kufr"?

Here, I'd like to pursue the third point, about ruling by Kufr, as this is used by some groups as a trigger to justify armed rebellion against the state, and by others as the fulcrum upon which they rest the (Islamic) validity of a ruler or state, thus taking action to bring about unrest, disobedience and a change of ruler. Whatever their differences, the Islamists are united in their conviction that this particular point is critical, and justifies the spilling of Muslim blood.

"Ruling by other than what Allah revealed" and "ruling by Kufr" are pretty much synonmous, but are by no means self-explanatory. It's almost impossible to obtain a clear statement explicating what exactly ruling by Kufr involves. Indeed, neither is it clear why "judging" is confused with "ruling", nor is it understood how Kufr can be attributed to a rule.

Given the critical nature of this matter, it's worth looking at it more closely. Note that this is a rational (as opposed to a textual) discussion. Here are some plausible interpretations of actions (carried out by a ruler) which may or may not fall under this "Kufr" category:

Inflicting unwarranted harm or suffering upon the subjects.

Passing legislation to inflict the same.

Failing to punish subjects for committing sins for which there is no Hadd (Sharia punishment).

Ordering subjects to carry out such sins, but without compulsion.

Punishing people for not carrying out such sins.

Passing legislation for the same.

Failing to implement a Hadd.

Delivering a punishment other than the Hadd for the same offence.

Passing legislation for the same.

Passing judgement in a matter not explicitly contained within the Sharia, without reference to the Sharia texts.

Passing judgement in a matter with an explicit Sharia ruling, without reference to the Sharia texts.

...(there must be others)

To give an idea about the degree of ambiguity involved, less than a third of the cases listed involve judgement, less than a third involve legislation, and less than a third involves a direct contradiction of a known Sharia ruling. None of the actions, in themselves, would cause the ruler to leave Islam, as actions alone are insufficient for this.

As for what the ruler's beliefs regarding the legitimacy of those laws which contradict explicit Sharia rules, these can only be known if explicated directly by the ruler. If the ruler were to declare unequivocally that his laws were superior to the Sharia laws, then he ruler himself - and not his laws - would be labelled a disbeliever (Kaafir), and the legitimacy of his authority would be nullified by this. As for the laws themselves, they might well be referred to as "Kufr laws", in recognition of the fact that the ruler is a Kaafir, but the laws themselves do not have the characteristic of Islam and Kufr, they're simply laws.

However, if the ruler does not make such a public statement, then he must continue to be considered a Muslim, and the above would no longer apply. His actions alone can only be described as halaal or haraam, and clearly (almost) all the actions in the list above are haraam, causing the ruler to be sinful (and in a functional state, accountable), but a sinful ruler is nevertheless a legitimate ruler, and is still owed obedience, provided he qualified for this at some point.

The details of each of these cases warrants a separate discussion; suffice here to make the general point that "ruling by other than what Allah revealed" and "ruling by Kufr" are ambiguous statements, bordering on the meaningless, and their use by the unqualified or the unscrupulous, can not only be misleading, but can have disastrous consequences. However, it is the Islamists themselves who suffer from the ambiguity of this statement, and I hope that by working together to clarify and qualify it, both sides can come to appreciate that the gulf dividing them is, in fact, not that wide after all.

Related Thought For The Day postings at tftd.ws:

The right to legislate

2007-07-30T23:19:00.000+01:00

The second bone of contention between the secular and Islamist schools, is man's right to legislate; this is reference to a previous entry where I made the claim that the difference between the two political viewpoints are not be as insurmountable as they might first appear.

Whereas the first point addressed was fairly general, and related to the perceived jurisdiction of the Islamic Shariah, the point discussed here is more specific, and potentially more problematic, as it is portrayed as being a dispute about the the sovreignty of the Creator verses that of the creation. The proponents of political Islam maintain that legislation is the exclusive right of the Creator, and any attempt to allow man to legislate is seen as a direct challenge to the Creator's sole sovreign right to legislate.

The purpose here is not to comment on the validity or consistency of either argument, but rather to caputre the essence of what each party is claiming, in an effort to understand why they differ, and how their differences could be reconciled.

Evidence is presented by the proponents of political Islam, in support of the argument that it is disebelief/Kufr to knowingly rule by other than what the Creator has revealed, or to knowingly support such a ruling system. This is because in origin the rule should be with the Creator alone, and referring to other than the Creator in any matter of ruling or judgement constitutes idolisation of the Taghoot (anything worshipped or obeyed instead of Allah), and is tantamount to disbelief/Kufr. Wahhabi literature abounds with such arguments, thoroughly supported by textual evidence from the scriptures.

How then, can such a view be reconciled with a view that maintains it is perfectly acceptable for man to judge, rule, legislate and be obeyed, without reference to the Creator or to religion? At face value, their argument is both water-tight and non-negotiable. Probing further however, reveals otherwise.

The Islamists' objection to man's ruling by other than what the Creator revealed hinges on three implicit assumptions:

that the business of ruling is one of passing legal judgement, as in a court,
that for all matters of ruling there is a known judgement revealed by the Creator, and
that these judgements are being ignored by not being explicitly referred to in ruling.

While each of these points warrants a separate discussion, it is sufficient at this point to find suitable loopholes in the above to enable the secularist argument to pass the Islamist validity test. With a little effort, a workaround can be found for each of the above pivotal points; however the second of the three points is what I shall address here.

As discussed in a previous posting, the Islamists, while insisting that all aspects of human relationships (including politics) are addressed by Divine revelation, they nevertheless concede that the bulk of these relations that relate to politics and ruling, fall under the category of permissible (Mubah) actions. In other words, for those aspects of ruling that are permissible , the ruler is permitted to pass legislation, but is under no Islamic obligation to do so. Furthermore, in passing this legislation, the ruler is permitted to adopt whatever position he sees fit, provided that such laws do not cause the public to become sinful by preventing them for carrying out their obligations or forcing them to engage in prohibited actions.

The ruler is thus at liberty to choose any such laws that are deemed to serve the public good, whether these laws are taken from Islam or elsewhere. The ruler may therefore adopt laws originally drafted by the French or the Brazilian parliament, with no reference to Islam whatsoever, provided that he is satisfied that he is permitted to legislate in this matter, and that he has not caused anyone to be sinful. The Islamists may well accuse him of "ruling by other than what Allah revealed", to which his defence would be that he had ruled in accordance to what Allah had revealed, as Allah's revelation in this matter indicated permissibility. It is imporant to note that the permissibility here refers to the act of legislating, and not to the actions themselves that are being regulated by the legislation.

Thus, even according to the Islamist argument, a secular ruler may be exonerated for adopting and implementing man-made laws, thus bridging the second of the three divides between the two schools of political thought. Man does, after all, have the right to legislate; even according to the Islamists!

Politics of permissibility

2007-07-26T00:31:00.000+01:00

In a previous entry, it was said that one of the points distinguishing the Islamists from the Muslim secularists is their attitude towards the Shariah and the jurisdiction of its rulings. In this and subsequent entries, I shall attempt to very briefly outline why I believe the two views have much more in common is at first apparent, and how the perceived incompatibility of the two political views is largely due to semantics and rhetoric.

With regards to the first point, the nature and jurisdiction of the Sharia, the secular school maintains that as a religion, Islam is mainly concerned with man's spiritual, moral and personal aspects, and has limited jurisdiction in the wider social context, and even less influence in matters of ruling. As such, they maintain that the affairs of the state, intended to organise public life, should not be influenced by religion, whose zone of influence is the individual.

The Islamists, on the other hand, argue that Islam is a complete way of life, encompassing the complete spectrum of human affairs and relationships, and cannot be divorced from the matters of the state. They go further, claiming that Islam is not only inherently political, but is also primarily concerned with achieving global superiority and dominance, and shaping the lives of all those fortunate enough to come under the influence of the single Islamic state.

Looking carefully at what each party is claiming, it is possible to construct an argument sufficiently close to each of the above positions to briefly bridge the gulf between them, allowing those in both camp open to independent thinking to engage in constructive dialogue or self-reflection.

The secularist argument, when rephrased in Islamist terms, simply states that the ruling class, like everyone else, are required by Allah to ensure their actions comply with Islamic law, i.e. that they carry out all their obligations and refrain from all prohibitions. The Muslim secularists don't generally have a problem with this, as Islam is deeply rooted in their cultural and religious heritage. To the secular ear, the Islamist argument sound something like this: the ruler is appointed by the people to implement Islamic law in public life, and the manner in which this justice is dispensed and this power manipulated must itself be according to Islamic law.

The difference between the two views seems to be in the understanding of what it means to comply with Islamic Sharia, and whether that is different from implementing it. It is generally agreed that every human action has an associated Islamic ruling, being either mandatory, rewardable, permissible, undesirable or forbidden; the differences arise when determining how these rulings are allocated.

The secularists would say that most actions, and in particular those in the public sphere, have not been addressed by the Islamic texts directly, and are therefore not covered by Islamic legislation, and are "permissible" by default. A Shariah-compliant government, from a secular point of view, is at liberty to use whatever means it sees fit to select and implement legislation to organise people's public actions within this "permissible" category. Such governance would neither legalise actions known to be prohibited in Islam, nor prohibit actions known to be obligations in Islam, and as such the Muslim secularists might be excused for wondering what all the fuss was about.

The Islamists would probably argue that no action is exempt from the all-encompassing Islamic Shariah, as the revelation deals with all aspects of human relations. To them, "permissibility by default" is akin to accusing the Creator of overlooking some actions in the revelation, and is strongly rejected. However they will concede that a large proportion of human actions does in fact fall under the "permissible" category, due to the existence of general evidences from the Islamic texts that indicate their permissibility.

The form of governance acceptable to such advocates would involve legislation being passed to organise public affairs within the this category because these actions are part of the Islamic Shariah, and hence implementation of such legislation is considered an implenentation of the Islamic Shairah. Bringing about such governance is considered an obligation (upon society) for which people should sacrifice their lives.

Notice how the difference between the two views is essentially semantic in nature: both parties agree that there is a category of Islamically-permissible human actions which have not been addressed explicitly by the Islamic texts. One party considers that sufficient to justify looking elsewhere when legislating in this area, while the other party considers permissibility to be an Islamic ruling in itself that must be adhered to when legislating in that area, in order for the legislation process itself to be permissible.

I can't see the difference between the two positions, in practice. Can you?

Examples of how these semantics are reflected in some Islamist literature will follow in subsequent entries, insha Allah.

Pedantic semantics

2007-07-23T22:33:00.000+01:00

When it comes to politics and ruling, the Muslims seem divided between two competing camps, each with distinctly different political agendas: the secular establishments representing the ruling classes, political parties and intelligentsia, and the emerging Islamist movements representing the more politicised Islamic organisations and the growing religious grass-roots. Each camp also claim the loyalty of a fair number of esteemed Muslim scholars.

On the face of it, the two schools appear diametrically opposed to each other, with each presenting a mutually-exclusive view towards politics and matters of ruling and public life. However, beyond the rhetoric and accusations, it could be that the two schools are in fact more similar than they might first appear. It may well be that the areas of contention have more to do with semantics and pedantry than substantial differences on matters of creed or ideology.

And just to be clear about that, semantics is defined as:

the language used (as in advertising or political propaganda) to achieve a desired effect on an audience especially through the use of words with novel or dual meanings.

Pedantry is similarly defined as

undue display of learning; slavish attention to rules and details; excessive concern with minute details of formalism; narrow, often ostentatious concern for book learning and formal rules.

Listening to what is being said by both sides, it would appear that the main areas of controversy can be grouped under three main (closely-related) headings:

Are all actions subject to the Shariah, including those relating to politics and ruling?

Does man have the right to legislate, or is that only for Allah?

Can legislation be taken from "other than Islam"?

While both parties appear to differ bitterly on the answers to these three questions, in the following three entries I shall examine some of the main arguments put forward, and attempt to show how bridging the gulf between the two viewpoints can often be achieved simply by listening. I believe in most cases, the difference of opinion is somewhat artificial and the debate often exaggerated, leading to unnecessary polarisation, entrenchment and animosity. If only both sides were to agree on the use of a common language, perhaps the current stalemate could be broken.

This discussion is continued in a series of entries:

Absolving responsibility

2007-07-17T23:47:00.000+01:00

By claiming that all matters should be governed and decided by Allah, the Islamists effectively absolve themselves of responsibility.

"Clash of civilisations" meme

2007-07-16T20:43:00.000+01:00

We keep hearing that the Muslim civilisation and that of the modern secular west are on an inevitable collision course, and that the re-emergence of the Islamic Caliphate will bring this clash to a confrontational head. This idea of a "clash of civilisations", isn't entirely new; the term was coined by Bernard Lewis in an essay in 1990, and later developed into a theory of global cultural conflict in a series of books in the 1990's.

This "clash of civilisations" meme (for meme is what is most certainly is) rapidly gained immense popularity, infecting academics and politicians alike in classical meme-fashion. The events of 911, coinciding with the emergence of the neoconservatives in the White House, created the ideal conditions for this meme to flourish.

The Islamists and the American neocons each trumpeted a new era of ideological battle, and it is the narrow agendas of these two cults that are inciting and sustaining the current War on Terror. Both parties rely for their ideological cover on the existence of the public perception of a fierce and formidable adversary bent on their annihilation.

As such their relationship is more one of mutually-beneficial symbiosis than mutual rivalry, as each has a stake in bolstering the image of the other. The Islamists are generally grateful for being portrayed with such a grandiose image, and the neocons appreciate the militant antagonism as it sustains their myth of an ideological battle. In many ways, this propaganda routine is reminiscent of the Cold War between the capitalist west and the Communist Soviet bloc, but unlike the very real ideological clashes of the late 20th century, the ideological battle between the West and the Islamists today hardly goes beyond the hollow rhetoric of politicians' statements and the fiery Islamist video broadcasts. It is simply self-sustaining propaganda.

Seen in the light of this meme, the War on Terror can be described as a proxy battle in a war between two mutually-sustaining symbiotic cult memes, both of which are variants of the same "they're out to get us" meme. The irony is that, unlike the Cold War, as each party relies on the other its own existence, according to the memetic rules of engagement there can be no winner in this war.

Islamist piranha cults

2007-07-13T19:51:00.000+01:00

In a previous entry, parallels were drawn between some aspects of the Islamist ideology and memetics. While the latter is by no means universally accepted model for human behaviour, the striking similarity between the two compels one to explore this further, if only to attempt to understand the mechanisms involved in what would otherwise be quite complex behavioural systems. In this entry, Islamist cults are likened to memes ... piranha memes!

A meme is defined as

Any unit of cultural information, such as a practice or idea, that is transmitted verbally or by repeated action from one mind to another.

A cult is defined as

A cohesive group of people devoted to beliefs or practices that the surrounding culture or society considers to be outside the mainstream, either due to its novel belief system, its idiosyncratic practices, or other causes.

A cult-meme is defined as

A kind of mono-culture (aka ideology), which tends to see itself as the only valid source of truth and understanding.

A piranha is defined as

An omnivorous freshwater fish known for its sharp teeth and an aggressive appetite for meat and flesh.

While a meme will, by definition, seek to replicate itself by infecting minds (particularly those minds that are either actively exploring new ideas, or are receptive to intellectual dialogue), this infection is not always done in an exclusive manner. In other words, many memes are perfectly happy coexisting with other memes, forming - you guessed it - memeplexes (aka meme complexes).

Islamist cults however, when viewed as memes, can be quite aggressive, cannibalistic even. Islamist cult memes not only infect a person's mind and then propagate like a virus, but tend also to feed on its host's cultural and intellectual stock, leeching like a parasite, and growing like a cancer.

At some point, the mind looses the ability to function indepndently of the Islamist cult meme, and takes conscious actions to block any efforts to de-contaminate it. The growth of such malignant memes continues until, wherever possible, they totally dominate their hosts' thinking and mould their relationships and behaviour. Such people then becomes active advocates and recruiters for the Islamist cause, and for all intents and purposes, they become the physical personification of the meme.

The almost unique thing about Islamist cult memes is their refusal to co-exist with other religious, ideological or political memes. The Islamist memes are monocratic, have a huge appetite for blood, and hardly ever give up; they either prevail or die in their struggle to dominate (they tend to prevail).

It is fascinating to think of the sociological change taking place during the Islamic revival as a series of bloody battles raging between opposing schools of cult-meme piranhas: the Islamist school (a far from homogeneous one) and the liberal secularist school. Other, more benign and tolerant memes, share the same waters, and feed on the scraps of this battle. This topic is worthy of further investigation.

Defined by bogeymen

2007-07-12T22:31:00.000+01:00

Successful meme-based ideologies typically define themselves by defining the "other": an alliance of invariably malicious forces bent on the destruction of Islam and the corruption of its thoughts and creed. Their identity is thus primarily formed not by the Islamic culture, but by the prejudices (see related TFTD) formed by their portrayal of the dangers and threats of the "agents of Satan".

The West, in its entirety, is portrayed an enemy of Islam, and their governments are engaged in a Crusade to annihilate the Muslims. The Jews and Zionists are like a dagger in the side of the Muslim body, with territorial, political, economic and social ambitions - the old Protocols conspiracy. Needless to say, the Muslim rulers are seen as mere puppets, acting as agents for their Western masters, and similarly the government scholars (aka "scholars for dollars") are depicted as bearded mouthpieces for the agents of the infidels.

Democracy is portrayed as a threat, as it represents the sovereignty of man over the will of the Creator, and is the Trojan horse used by the West to undermine Islam and spread corruption and mischief. Human rights and the four freedoms are the values that underpin the liberal democracy, and are seen as the lethal venom with which the body of Islam is being injected. Secular Muslim organisations are a direct threat to the very idea of Islamism, and are demonised without question.

Other Islamist and Islamic groups are considered a threat because they threaten the exclusivity of the group's ideology, and challenge the "saved sect" status of its adherents. Those "non-practicing" Muslims who do not follow Islamic traditions aren't necessarily viewed as a threat, rather they are used to boost the Islamists' moral arrogance and self-righteousness.

Furthermore, they have a tendency to be critical of their history, demonising key personalities and belittling the status and contributions of the social, religious and political movements that constitute their Islamic culture and heritage; even the established schools of thought and philosophy are not exempt from criticism, and sometimes even blamed for the current state of backwardness and intellectual decline. The exeption to this is the so-called "golden era" of the first few generations of Islam, as this is portrayed as the Islamic Utopia for which all believers should aspire. Distancing their followers from their Islamic heritage reduces the competition for religious, political and intellectual authority and superiority, thus preserving the meme.

Human nature is such that these Islamist memes will constantly create suitable bogeymen to maintain sufficient inertia to allow them to weather most conditions. They successfully cultivate a unique blend of social, political and religions xenophobia that serves to preserve and enhance the very prejudices that brought these memes into existence. Weather this mechanism is the result of evolution or "intelligent design" is still unclear however.

Islamism: a self-referential meme?

2007-07-06T18:41:00.000+01:00

In recent years, it has become fashionable amongst anthropologists and sociologists to describe almost all societal phenomena as memes - parasitic mental processes which propagate in the same manner as chain letters and computer viruses. A meme can also be defined as any self-referential belief system which contains within itself the instructions for its own propagation.

The Islamist ideology, as embodied by most Islamist groups, can be modelled as a self-perpetuating delusion. There is some merit in exploring how Islamism can be seen to function through the eyes of meme theory, and how it influences the behaviour of its adherents and opponents.

A meme carries exactly the same fear-driven psychological motivation as a chain letter - "If you propagate me then something nice will happen, if not then something horrible will happen". In order to justify themselves against attack by reason, memes place absolute reliance on faith, which is seen as being superior to reason. They also contain self-referential or circular claims to the truth such as

"This meme says it is the divine truth and can be proved by enlightened thought to be the truth. Since it is the divine truth whatever its says must be true. Therefore it must be divine truth because it says so and all competing memes must be either deviant, corrupt, or the work of the Devil".

These two types of self-referential statement "propagate me" and "I am the only truth" provide the driving force for Islamist memes to invade the minds of their hosts, and drive out all competing memes. In addition, many memes contain a strong tendency towards hatred and intolerance with instructions such as "Love and help people who believe in this meme, hate and attack people who do not". In memetics, these commands are seen as the main factor behind all religious hatred, wars, pogroms and persecutions throughout the centuries.

More detailed analysis will show that like a virus or parasitic worm, a successful meme must perform two actions:

- Ensure it takes up long-term residence in its host.
- Bring about the conditions for its spread.

According to meme theory, the Islamist ideology needs to establish itself in the mind of its host using some or all of the following mechanisms:

1. Promise heaven and salvation for its adherents.

2. Threaten punishment in hell for rejection.

These two are easily achieved by maintaining that the ideology espoused by this particular Islamic group is in fact Islam in its purest form, and hence it derives its divinity from that of the Creator, and its infallibility from that of the scriptures.

3. Boost the believers' egos by telling them they are "chosen" or superior to believers in false memes, and hence part of an elite "saved sect".

4. Disable the faculties of doubt and rejection ("immune response") by claiming that faith is superior to reason, and that the reasoning of the group's main patrons is superior to their own (ie don't bother arguing).

5. Establish itself as the One True Meme, usually by distorting some texts from the scripture containing a circular self-referential argument or justification for the exclusive validity of this group's methods (a practice known as exclusivism, see related entries here and here).

Once it has infected the mind of its host, a meme needs to propagate itself, and a successful Islamist meme will contain instructions for some or all of the following:

6. Convert, discredit, attack or neutralise all rival groups, thoughts or ideologies.

7. Intimidate and discriminate against doubters (potential rebels).

8. Enforced social isolation to "apostates"; an apostate is a host which has cured itself of the meme-infection. It is especially dangerous to the meme because it might pass on meme-resistance to others. Sympathisers with ex-Islamists often face intimidation and threats.

9. Censorship - prevent rival memes (groups, thoughts or ideologies) from reaching potential hosts (a theological doctrine known as 'Error has no rights').

Each of these points will be looked at in more detail insha Allah...

Related blog entries: Defined by bogeymen; Islanist piranha cults

Adapted from http://home.btclick.com/scimah/memes.htm

The comfort of certainty

2007-07-06T15:13:00.001+01:00

The Islamist ideology, in most of its many forms, offers a coherent and (mainly) consistent viewpoint with which to perceive the world and make judgements about others. This is particularly welcome and comforting for many new recruits, as the "world outside" is full of diversity and ambiguity, with so few certainties that it can be quite disconcerting.

Within Islamism one is given a set of clear black-and-white criteria by which to determine right from wrong, and precise dogmatic manner by which to conduct oneself. This is quite reassuring for many, as things begin to make sense and fall into place in one's mind, according to the grand Islamist scheme. Dilemmas which have perplexed the world for centuries are magically resolved by the winning formula, inspiring the new ideologue with additional trust in his adopted school of thought.

This attitude also has the tendency of lulling those who subscribe to it into a false sense of security, as the adopted ideology is often synonymous with Islam itself, and just as Islam cannot be wrong, the Islamist ideology is likewise absolved of any shortcoming or imperfection, thus confirming and entrenching the delusion.

Adherents to the Islamist ideology will also tend to become zealously defensive of their doctrine, in the belief that this is in fact a defense of Islam itself. Productive dialogue thus becomes progressively more difficult as the advocate's personality and thinking moulds itself to the Islamists tenets and dogma, becomming more and more brittle with time, eventually solidifying and fossilising in a state almost unreachable by reasonable debate.

(... to be continued, insha Allah...)

Silence the Pied Piper?

2007-07-05T10:11:00.000+01:00

The Brothers Grimm immortalised the fable of the Pied Piper, who used the mesmerising effect of his melodies to charm and enchant the children of Hamelin to follow him to an unknown destiny. While the people of Hamelin might have been justified in launching a manhunt for this colourful character, and might even have banned puplic pipe-playing, the long-term answer to the problem of their vulnerability lies within society itself.

Accepting this fact is a difficult yet necessary step along the long path of recovery, and unless the villagers are prepared to swallow this bitter pill and focus their attention inwards, they risk perpatuating the problem and remaining vulnerable to successive "attacks"

(to be continued, insha Allah)

Are they thinking what we're thinking?

2007-07-04T20:46:00.000+01:00

How does one deal with a concerted and conceited effort to undermine the basic values that bind together the components of a society? How does one address a smugly self-righteous force bent on disrupting all social norms and reversing centuries of civilisation and progress?

What vocabulary can one use, and what common language do we share? What would our terms of reference be, and indeed, what would be the objective of such a discussion? Do we understand who we are dealing with, and do we appreciate their motivations and concerns? Should that even matter at all? Isn't this a simple clash between good and evil, where good (reason) is bound to prevail over evil (fanaticism)?

Those who choose to see this as a good-evil struggle assume not only that good and evil are absolutes and are recognised universally for what they are, regardless of ideology, but also that these Islamist groups are intentionally engaging in actions they perceive as being evil, for some ideological political ideal. While one may be excused for making the first assumption, it would take a deliberate negligence of recent events to justify the second.

(to be continued insha Allah)

(Islamism) Topics to consider

2007-07-01T23:53:00.000+01:00

These are some miscellaneous points that need to be pursued; a continuation to the list started in a previous post, but more specifically focused on the Islamist mindset. Later on, common threads and themes can be deduced that cut across all these.

Is Islamism created by the Islamists, or vice versa?
What attracts would-be Islamists to this camp (see related TFTD)?
How cynical should one be in considering their recruitment tactics?
How conscious is the shift, and is there much self-reflection?
What various strands of Islamism can be identified, and what do they have in common?
How "leak-proof" is the Islamist ideology?
Isn't it just a case of Islamic memes?
What drives and motivates them as individuals, and as organisations?
To what extent are their objectives/targets fixed, and how important are they?
How successful are they at immunising themselves from any serious criticism or calls for change?
Are these groupings self-sustaining and self-fulfilling? To what extent is it all just about being an Islamist?
How do they interact between themselves? What is the general dynamic?
...
(to be continued, insha Allah...)

Insurance issue

2007-05-24T21:56:00.000+01:00

by the Chanceller himself

Insurance is of two general types - mutual co-operative insurance - a group of people agree to pay a given amount to compnsate for losses that may occur to any of tehm - this although rare today was common amongst Muslims in the past and is stil extant today and upon thsi frame many modern institutions wich to resurrect some form of modern Halal insurance schemes (see Wahbah Zuhayli's Fiqh al-Islami wa adillatuh section on invalid sales (section two of chapter 4 volume on mu-amala maliyah)

Insurance in exchange of fixed instalments to a an insurance company which is compriised of invested partners/shareholders. This guarantees up to a certain sum or an unlimited sumof monies, taht may be paid upon teh occurence of certain incidents of situation, either to specified persons. It is esential a financial guarantee where in exchange for sertain fixed sums, a financial gguarantee either limitied or unlimited amounts are secured in the event of certain specified instance which may or may not occur. The insurance compnay makes monies from teh collection and usage of the premiums that are paid.

The Hanafi jurist who is considered the final reference in hanafi fiqh ~(as his tarjihaat are taken by teh hanafi jurists) ruled that such insurance is forbidden in principle .

1. it is a guarantee of certain monioes for certain monies in which the amounts differ as such it is analagous to riba - an increase in monies without a legitimate exchange i.e. yuo are paying an amount of money for money

2. the element of mukhatara i.e. the exchange may or may not take place and this is one of teh aspects of gharar (Qurafi explains this in his Furooq - as gharar covers the transaction which teh exchange is doubtful e.g. the fish in teh water [hadith in ibn maja]. It is an inherent aspect of teh contract as it is dependent upon whether certain outcomes occur in iredr to recieve the compnsation - (Zuhayli)

3. the amounts are unspecified this is jahal, the other aspect of gharar that is forbidden [again this is established in teh prohibition of gharar and in teh type of sales forbidden wherein the product is unknown - see Qurafi's furooq)

4. Ibn Abidin also makes the point that undertaking such a contract with the free will of a non-Muslim in Muslim lands with tehir conasent is acceptabel and recieving sucha sum from them in such an event is permissible due to the absence of security in non-muslim lands for shrar based transactions and the permissibility ot undertaking such transactions outside dar ul-Islam i.e. as oong as they freely enter into the contract. Tihs would be the most appropriate ruling for the muslims living in the west (volume 3 of rad al muhtar of ibn abidin - can't remeber preciselty but can verify if required)

Come and Rise

2007-01-19T12:50:00.000+00:00

Come and rise dear brother of mine
Advance to the fore, and see the sign

Wake up from your shallow grave
Open your eyes and witness the knave

Their reign has dried the fertile land
They buried the books in the sand

They lead the zealous without respite
And the zealous cried day and night

A question presented to the chameleon
The questions treated as a rebellion

The questioner killed with ink and paper
Condemned and rendered as a traitor

Follow me for this is the truth, they sighed
The boat that rocked and then capsized

A blaze upon it, started years before
The spark that finally came to the fore

And upon its ashes we sit and wait
For the new king to rise and vacillate

And after the storm comes a cloud
Blocking the sun with its white shroud

We pray and hope for it to clear
But it lingers like our deepest fears

A thought of what may have been
A regret of which we now dream

Critical assumptions

2007-01-18T23:18:00.000+00:00

The arguments presented by those advocating a return to an Islamic caliphate, or Khilafah, contain a number of implicit assumptions that are critical to the validity of their conclusions. These assumptions relate to the nature of Islam itself and that of the world order, in addition to the existing public opinion in the Muslim countries. It is the latter category of assumption that I'd like to examine here. Basically, the arguments' main planks are:

Muslims are fed up with their current rulers and states.
Muslims would welcome an Islamic dictatorship, providing it with the mandate and the support to allow it to sustain itself.
Muslims see Islam as a political ideology with (at least) a fairly well-defined ruling system.
Muslims view their borders as artificial, imposed by the West, divisive and haraam, and would support the new state's efforts to unite with its Muslim neighbours by annexing bordering countries.

In order for the caliphate movement to generate sufficient momentum for the return of the caliphate to become a political inevitability or even a realistic scenario in the short-term, each of the above statements must be true. I would question whether any of these statements is justified, given the current social and political conditions in the Muslim world.

This (i.e. the invalidity of these assumptions) would not necessarily preclude the establishment of a viable Khilafah-style state, but acknowledging this fact would help better define the necessary daawah and political work that advocates of such a system would need to pursue.

(to be continued, insha Allah)

Some quotes on thinking

2007-01-14T10:52:00.000+00:00

“A man who does not think for himself does not think at all.” Oscar Wilde

“Think for yourselves and let others enjoy the privilege to do so, too” Voltaire

“Those who know how to think need no teachers.” Mahatma Gandhi

“Language shapes the way we think, and determines what we can think about.” Benjamin Lee Whorf

“People mistakenly assume that their thinking is done by their head; it is actually done by the heart which first dictates the conclusion, then commands the head to provide the reasoning that will defend it.” Anthony de Mello

“Clear thinking requires courage rather than intelligence.” Thomas S. Szasz

“Many people think they are thinking when they are merely rearranging their prejudices.” William James

" ... the mind works with ideas, not with information" Theodore Roszak

"...it doesn't matter how beautiful your theory is, it doesn't matter how smart you are-- if it doesn't agree with experiment it's wrong." R.P. Feynman

Views toward the Shariah

2007-01-13T22:26:00.000+00:00

Most people view Islam, just like any religion, as consisting of a set of thoughts, values and instructions on how best to conduct oneself in accordance to the Will of the Creator; these instructions are what are referred to as the divine rulings or the ahkam shariah - the Shariah for short. The main driving force keeping these thoughts, values and behaviours alive and in circulation is largely inherent, as abiding the Will of the Creator is directly linked in Islam to (a very individual concept of) reward and punishment in the Hereafter. Put simply, if you don't follow the Shariah, you're in trouble. So by and large, Muslims through the centuries have stuck to the Shariah, abiding by its commands, and avoiding its prohibitions. The ruling executive and the jurispudence has in the past generally reflected this by being Shariah-compliant in those matters perceived by the public to be governed by clear Shariah rulings.

But those who also view Islam as a political ideology will see the Shariah differently. Any ideology is seen as comprising a Thought and a Method, with the latter consisting of the manner in which the Shariah rulings are executed, in addition to the manner in which the creed is preserved and the ideology propagated. Such a model necessitates the existence of an executive political entity to carry out and administer the Method, and considers this entity a fundamental part of the Method, and hence of the ideology itself. Consequently, great importance is attached to bringing about this executive authority in a quest to resume the "Islamic way of life" (disrupted by the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate in the early 20th century).

This is in contrast to the "religious" model above, which considers the political executive entity a natural and inevitable development, as its existence and functioning is itself, like most other matters, governed (to some extent) by the Shariah. While the "ideological" view recognises the fact that any political entity will ultimately reflect the thoughts prevalent in society, they address this by attempting to "politicise" thinking amongst the public so that the establishment of a totally Shariah-compliant state would enjoy broad popular support.

Naturally, the propnents of each view will prioritise their daawah activities according to their outlooks, and their measures of success will reflect this. Despite the differences however, fundamentally, all groups are carrying out what they perceive to be the obligation upon them. Those whose work is focussed on encouraging Muslims to abide by the Shariah, do so out of a belief that this daawah is itself part of the Shariah, and hence worthy of reward. Similarly, those who work to raise awareness of the necessity for an Islamic state only do so out of a sense of Shariah obligation. And those in authority in the Islamic state would rule according to the Shariah, as this would be an obligation upon them, i.e. that would be how they would abide by the Shariah.

But the issue that deserves some more thought here is this: does the obligation upon the ruler to implement the Shariah extend, in his absence, to the Muslim public, making it an obligation upon them to bring such a ruler into existence? By not having the Shariah implemented upon them, are the Muslim masses sinful, even if they abide by the Shariah in other matters?

"Abide by" or "implement" the Shariah?

2007-01-13T00:00:00.000+00:00

In the context of ruling and politics, is the Shariah something to "abide by" or to "implement" ?

implement (verb): To fulfill; perform; carry out. To put into effect
according to or by means of a definite plan or procedure.
"implement." Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1). Random House, Inc. 11 Jan. 2007. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/implement>

abide by (verb): To act in accord with. To submit to;
agree to. To remain steadfast or faithful to;
"abide." Dictionary.com Unabridged (v 1.1). Random House, Inc. 11 Jan. 2007. http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/abide>

A few quotes: clarity

2007-01-11T18:20:00.000+00:00

"Nothing is ever as easy as it seems to be except in made-up realities (like math), and we'll always be slaves to our discourse." Anon

"Most people make the mistake of saying that they understand things when they simply know the words. To really grasp a subject you have to be able to feel the truth in it. Intuitively." Anon

from this sig

Topics to consider

2007-01-07T18:47:00.000+00:00

So what are the things we need to look at? Let's make a short unstructured list of issues and topics; perhaps one can structure and prioritise them later:

Islam: political ideology or religion with some political aspects?
Khilafah system: is there such a thing? Mirage, fantasy or divine promise?
Shariah: implemented or abided by (even in ruling context)?
Democracy: is it really a problem or could it hold the key to the solution?
Resuming the Islamic way of life: but did it ever stop?
Islamic state: do people really want one?
Islamic state: why do I want one?
What exactly would be "Islamic" about an Islamic state?
Why did the Ottoman empire collapse?
Isn't freedom of religious belief essential for accountability/reward?
...
Rizq: aqeedah or just fact of life?
Shukr/Hamd: is it just saying "thank you" to Allah?

(to be continued, insha Allah)

Islam and sudoku

2007-01-07T13:11:00.000+00:00

There are so many things I'd like to explore ... where does one start? So many unanswered questions, thoughts, dilemmas, challenges, prejudices, assumptions, judgements, inhibitions and pet theories that need untangling. So many complex issues that have been over-simplified, and simple matters over-complicated. So many questions ignored or overlooked, and so much rhetoric taken for granted.

I now think its less important to understand everything correctly than to have an appreciation of their complexity and to have a (fairly) consistent view about them. Indeed, it may not even be possible to understand all aspects of the Deen "correctly" and consistently, as Islam itself may not be the perfectly consistent monolith its sometimes portrayed as.

The attempts, by the various schools of thought and revival movements, to somehow formulate Islam into such a structure, have always run into difficulties as they venture beyond their original remits, flagging up inconsistencies and contradictions. Rather than triggering a revision of the original assertions, predicates and scope of the school, these incosistencies tended to be conveniently overlooked and neglected, or reconiled using elaborate (and sometimes quite convoluted) logic and reasoning.

This is somewhat similar to the common sudoku problem: solving an individual 3x3 matrix is not the same as solving the entire 9x9 matrix, and unless one is prepared to constantly redo each 3x3, the correct solution(s) will never be found. But perhaps the multi-dimension soduko puzzle of Islam has no solution after all. Perhaps we just have to accept that there is no consistent and correct set of answers to the matters of the Deen. Perhaps by our insistence on making the Deen conform to the pre-conceived sudoku model in our heads we are actually "unsolving" the correct parts instead. The axiom "if its not broken, don't fix it" comes to mind.

Nevertheless, I believe as a bare minimum, one should at least scrutinise the thoughts one holds, as they are, in a reflective stock-taking exercise to compile an intellectual inventory of oneself. Assumptions, prejudices and inhibitions can then be exposed and challenged, on a personal and individual level, allowing one to filter and fine-tune one's thoughts accordingly. These thoughts, after all, define who we are.

Perhaps the hardest part is mustering the courage, not to question the thoughts of others, but to reflect upon the validity of our own.

The logical song

2007-01-06T19:50:00.000+00:00

When I was young
It seemed that life was so wonderful
A miracle, oh it was beautiful, magical
And all the birds in the trees
Well they´d be singing so happily
Oh joyfully, oh playfully watching me
But then they sent me away
To teach me how to be sensible
Logical, oh responsible, practical
And they showed me a world
Where I could be so dependable
Oh clinical, oh intellectual, cynical

There are times when all the world´s asleep
The questions run too deep
For such a simple man
Won´t you please, please tell me what we´ve learned
I know it sounds absurd
But please tell me who i am

Now watch what you say
Or they´ll be calling you a radical
A liberal, oh fanatical, criminal
Oh won´t you sign up your name
We´d like to feel you´re
Acceptable, respectable, oh presentable, a vegetable!

At night when all the world´s asleep
The questions run too deep
For such a simple man
Won´t you please, please tell me what we've learned
I know it sounds absurd
But please tell me who I am, who I am, who I am.

Bismillah...

2007-01-06T17:39:00.001+00:00

Ok, so where does one start? The idea (for me at least) is to use sms to write this, so this may end up a bit minimalist (no sms abbreviations though, if I can help it).

Is there any way of adding some structure to these blogs? The whole idea is to "map out" the thoughts in my head, so just compiling a growing pile of ad-hoc thoughts won't necessarily help untangle the individual strands, although these 'labels' might help. Perhaps its too early to tell; we'll see insha Allah.