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	<title>ProMarket</title>
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	<link>https://www.promarket.org/</link>
	<description>The publication of the Stigler Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business</description>
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	<title>ProMarket</title>
	<link>https://www.promarket.org/</link>
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	<item>
		<title>How Newspaper Competition Fueled Quebec’s 1837 Rebellion</title>
		<link>https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/31/how-newspaper-competition-fueled-quebecs-1837-rebellion/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Patrick Crawford]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 31 Jul 2026 10:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Cultural Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Economic History]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Information Economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[canada]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Cooperation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[government transparency]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Newspapers]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.promarket.org/?p=46124</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<a href="https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/31/how-newspaper-competition-fueled-quebecs-1837-rebellion/" data-wpel-link="internal"><img width="300" height="169" src="https://www.promarket.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/08/GettyImages-2153990080-300x169.jpg" alt="How Newspaper Competition Fueled Quebec’s 1837 Rebellion" align="left" style="margin: 0 20px 20px 0;max-width:100%" /></a><p>In new research, Patrick Crawford and Vincent Geloso find that areas in Lower Canada with more newspaper competition were more likely to rebel in Quebec’s 1837 Rebellion. Irrespective of political leaning, newspapers in more competitive markets helped citizens to share grievances and coordinate their actions.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/31/how-newspaper-competition-fueled-quebecs-1837-rebellion/" rel="nofollow" data-wpel-link="internal">Read it at ProMarket &gt;&gt;</a></p>
]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<item>
		<title>The G7 Is Failing To Address Global Imbalances</title>
		<link>https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/30/the-g7-is-failing-to-address-global-imbalances/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joshua Banerjee]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 30 Jul 2026 10:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[International Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Monetary Policy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[China Shock 2.0]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[G7]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trade]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Trade War]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.promarket.org/?p=46089</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<a href="https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/30/the-g7-is-failing-to-address-global-imbalances/" data-wpel-link="internal"><img width="300" height="170" src="https://www.promarket.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Banerjee-300x170.jpg" alt="The G7 Is Failing To Address Global Imbalances" align="left" style="margin: 0 20px 20px 0;max-width:100%" /></a><p>The global economy is in the early stages of a second China shock as the Chinese economy moves up the manufacturing value chain to produce advanced technology for export. China’s advantage lies in government subsidies and an artificially suppressed exchange rate. If advanced economies in the West are to avoid the repetition of job loss and continued trade deficits witnessed over the last two decades, or the pyrrhic policies like tariffs implemented to address these harms, they must pursue institutional change, writes Joshua Banerjee.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/30/the-g7-is-failing-to-address-global-imbalances/" rel="nofollow" data-wpel-link="internal">Read it at ProMarket &gt;&gt;</a></p>
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		<title>Property Rights Provide an Exit From Social Institutions</title>
		<link>https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/29/property-rights-provide-an-exit-from-social-institutions/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Pablo Balán]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 29 Jul 2026 10:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[property rights]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.promarket.org/?p=46036</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<a href="https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/29/property-rights-provide-an-exit-from-social-institutions/" data-wpel-link="internal"><img width="300" height="169" src="https://www.promarket.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Balan-300x169.jpg" alt="Property Rights Provide an Exit From Social Institutions" align="left" style="margin: 0 20px 20px 0;max-width:100%" /></a><p>In new research, evidence from a land titling campaign in the Democratic Republic of Congo shows that formal property rights can do more than secure land: they can give citizens an exit from costly informal obligations, writes Pablo Balán.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/29/property-rights-provide-an-exit-from-social-institutions/" rel="nofollow" data-wpel-link="internal">Read it at ProMarket &gt;&gt;</a></p>
]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>Fears of “Anticompetitive Acquiescence” in AI Copyright Do Not Survive Empiricism</title>
		<link>https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/28/fears-of-anticompetitive-acquiescence-in-ai-copyright-do-not-survive-empiricism/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Shishene Jing]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 28 Jul 2026 10:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Antitrust and Competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Big Tech]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AI Content Licensing]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Anticompetitive Acquiescence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[antitrust and competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Artificial Intelligence]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Digital Economy]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.promarket.org/?p=46050</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<a href="https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/28/fears-of-anticompetitive-acquiescence-in-ai-copyright-do-not-survive-empiricism/" data-wpel-link="internal"><img width="300" height="170" src="https://www.promarket.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Jing-AA-300x170.jpg" alt="Fears of “Anticompetitive Acquiescence” in AI Copyright Do Not Survive Empiricism" align="left" style="margin: 0 20px 20px 0;max-width:100%" /></a><p>Responding to Mark Lemley and Jacob Noti-Victor, Shishene Jing argues that licensing deals struck by incumbent artificial intelligence firms with content owners will not disadvantage smaller AI rivals. Even if such deals establish a legal precedent requiring licenses, content owners have little incentive to actually sue small, cash-poor AI startups, making the precedent toothless in practice.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/28/fears-of-anticompetitive-acquiescence-in-ai-copyright-do-not-survive-empiricism/" rel="nofollow" data-wpel-link="internal">Read it at ProMarket &gt;&gt;</a></p>
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		<item>
		<title>America&#8217;s Most Effective Birth Control Wasn&#8217;t a Policy. It Was a Phone.</title>
		<link>https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/27/americas-most-effective-birth-control-wasnt-a-policy-it-was-a-phone/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ezekiel (Zeke) Hooper]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 27 Jul 2026 10:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Cultural Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Digital Economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[birth control]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Digital platforms]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political Economy of Fertility]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[smartphone]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.promarket.org/?p=46113</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<a href="https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/27/americas-most-effective-birth-control-wasnt-a-policy-it-was-a-phone/" data-wpel-link="internal"><img width="300" height="169" src="https://www.promarket.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-1464183053-e1784633286702-300x169.jpg" alt="America&#8217;s Most Effective Birth Control Wasn&#8217;t a Policy. It Was a Phone." align="left" style="margin: 0 20px 20px 0;max-width:100%" /></a><p>In new research, Cailtin K. Myers and Ezekiel Hooper find that birth rates in the United States have declined as a result of the introduction of the iPhone. They theorize that the smartphone is crowding out the market for attention, offering a device to fill users’ time that replaces forming in-person relationships that typically create children. </p>
<p><a href="https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/27/americas-most-effective-birth-control-wasnt-a-policy-it-was-a-phone/" rel="nofollow" data-wpel-link="internal">Read it at ProMarket &gt;&gt;</a></p>
]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<item>
		<title>When Competitors Share Owners, They Automate More and Hire Less</title>
		<link>https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/24/when-competitors-share-owners-they-automate-more-and-hire-less/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Joseph Emmens, Dennis C. Hutschenreiter, Stefano Manfredonia, Felix Noth and Tommaso Santini]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 24 Jul 2026 10:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Antitrust and Competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Labor]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[antitrust and competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Common Ownership]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Innovation]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.promarket.org/?p=46106</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<a href="https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/24/when-competitors-share-owners-they-automate-more-and-hire-less/" data-wpel-link="internal"><img width="300" height="169" src="https://www.promarket.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2282222227-300x169.jpg" alt="When Competitors Share Owners, They Automate More and Hire Less" align="left" style="margin: 0 20px 20px 0;max-width:100%" /></a><p>In a new paper, Joseph Emmens, Dennis C. Hutschenreiter, Stefano Manfredonia, Felix Noth, and Tommaso Santini find that when competitors for the same pool of workers share investors, they increase their innovation to automate tasks and slow down hiring.    </p>
<p><a href="https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/24/when-competitors-share-owners-they-automate-more-and-hire-less/" rel="nofollow" data-wpel-link="internal">Read it at ProMarket &gt;&gt;</a></p>
]]></description>
		
		
		
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		<title>Faculty Campaign Contributions Reveal a Homogeneous Academic Marketplace of Ideas</title>
		<link>https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/23/faculty-campaign-contributions-reveal-a-homogeneous-academic-marketplace-of-ideas/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[David Primo]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 23 Jul 2026 10:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Cultural Economics]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Information Economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Academic Job Market]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[democratic party]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[political connections]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Republican Party]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[universities]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.promarket.org/?p=46076</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<a href="https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/23/faculty-campaign-contributions-reveal-a-homogeneous-academic-marketplace-of-ideas/" data-wpel-link="internal"><img width="300" height="169" src="https://www.promarket.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-2198316637-e1784478567463-300x169.jpg" alt="Faculty Campaign Contributions Reveal a Homogeneous Academic Marketplace of Ideas" align="left" style="margin: 0 20px 20px 0;max-width:100%" /></a><p>In new research for the Foundation for Individual Rights and Expression, David M. Primo uses campaign contribution data to show that professors at leading universities are more politically active than the average American and skew heavily to the left politically, raising concerns about the diversity of perspectives on college campuses.    </p>
<p><a href="https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/23/faculty-campaign-contributions-reveal-a-homogeneous-academic-marketplace-of-ideas/" rel="nofollow" data-wpel-link="internal">Read it at ProMarket &gt;&gt;</a></p>
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		<item>
		<title>If Venture Capital Believes Merger Control Stymies Growth, They Have the Resources To Prove It</title>
		<link>https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/22/if-venture-capital-believes-merger-control-stymies-growth-they-have-the-resources-to-prove-it/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Shishene Jing]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Wed, 22 Jul 2026 10:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Antitrust and Competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Adobe-Figma]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[antitrust and competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Merger Review]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Venture Capital]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.promarket.org/?p=46056</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<a href="https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/22/if-venture-capital-believes-merger-control-stymies-growth-they-have-the-resources-to-prove-it/" data-wpel-link="internal"><img width="300" height="169" src="https://www.promarket.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Jing-Figma-300x169.jpg" alt="If Venture Capital Believes Merger Control Stymies Growth, They Have the Resources To Prove It" align="left" style="margin: 0 20px 20px 0;max-width:100%" /></a><p>Supporters of more robust antitrust policy have pointed to the subsequent success of Figma after authorities blocked Adobe’s acquisition of it. Skeptics, including venture capitalists, have argued that the one case reveals nothing systematic about the benefits of stronger merger review. Venture capitalists happen to be the one party with the data and resources to fund the studies to show any systematic correlation one way or the other. They should do so, writes Shishene Jing.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/22/if-venture-capital-believes-merger-control-stymies-growth-they-have-the-resources-to-prove-it/" rel="nofollow" data-wpel-link="internal">Read it at ProMarket &gt;&gt;</a></p>
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		<item>
		<title>AICOA II Is America’s Reverse Industrial Policy Initiative</title>
		<link>https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/21/aicoa-ii-is-americas-reverse-industrial-policy-initiative/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Herbert Hovenkamp]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Tue, 21 Jul 2026 10:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Antitrust and Competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Commentary]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regulation]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[The Digital Economy]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[AICOA]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Innovation and Choice Online Act]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[American Innovation and Choice Online Act II]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[antitrust and competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[big tech]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.promarket.org/?p=46059</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<a href="https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/21/aicoa-ii-is-americas-reverse-industrial-policy-initiative/" data-wpel-link="internal"><img width="300" height="171" src="https://www.promarket.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/Hovenkamp--300x171.jpg" alt="AICOA II Is America’s Reverse Industrial Policy Initiative" align="left" style="margin: 0 20px 20px 0;max-width:100%" /></a><p style="font-size:15px">The revived American Innovation Choice Online Act singles out a handful of Big Tech giants for unique, antitrust-like restrictions, but without the standard methodological rationale of antitrust analysis. The bill risks harming one of America’s most innovative sectors, writes Herb Hovenkamp.</p>
<p class="has-drop-cap">The American Innovation Choice Online Act (AICOA), which Senators Amy Klobuchar (D) and Charles Grassley (R) originally proposed in 2021, died a quiet death.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/21/aicoa-ii-is-americas-reverse-industrial-policy-initiative/" rel="nofollow" data-wpel-link="internal">Read it at ProMarket &gt;&gt;</a></p>
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		<title>Firm Coordination Creates Unstable Merger Waves </title>
		<link>https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/20/firm-coordination-creates-unstable-merger-waves/</link>
		
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Semih Uslu and Flavien Moreau]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Mon, 20 Jul 2026 10:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
				<category><![CDATA[Antitrust and Competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Research]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Acquisitions]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[antitrust and competition]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[merger waves]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Mergers]]></category>
		<category><![CDATA[Regulation]]></category>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.promarket.org/?p=46032</guid>

					<description><![CDATA[<a href="https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/20/firm-coordination-creates-unstable-merger-waves/" data-wpel-link="internal"><img width="300" height="169" src="https://www.promarket.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/07/GettyImages-988063276-e1784031413696-300x169.jpg" alt="Firm Coordination Creates Unstable Merger Waves " align="left" style="margin: 0 20px 20px 0;max-width:100%" /></a><p>In new research, Semih Üslü and Flavien Moreau argue that waves of mergers and acquisition, which are typically unstable and ultimately crash, are not driven by changes in economic conditions, but by self-reinforcing appetite for mergers among firms when others are also engaging in M&#038;A. Policies that drive stable, low-merger conditions can lead to better outcomes for consumers.</p>
<p><a href="https://www.promarket.org/2026/07/20/firm-coordination-creates-unstable-merger-waves/" rel="nofollow" data-wpel-link="internal">Read it at ProMarket &gt;&gt;</a></p>
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