Is civet coffee kosher?

Question #2: Elephants?

Is Black Ivory coffee kosher?

Question #3: Tza’ar ba’alei chayim

Is it permitted to catch these species in order to use them for coffee production?

Question #4: Birds?

What is the difference between “bird coffee” and “bird friendly coffee?”

Introduction

Among the non-kosher smaller mammals that Noach brought into his teivah was a southeast Asian creature called a civet that has been described as looking like a cross between a cat and a mongoose. Our article will discuss the kashrus issues involved in several new varieties of gourmet coffee that involve civets, elephants and other non-kosher animals.

Foreword

Hailed as “the most exotic beverage on the planet,” civet coffee, also known as kopi luwak, is a delicacy, a unique coffee made from coffee cherries (also called “berries”) that pass through the gut of the civet before being brewed. It is described as smooth and chocolaty, with a subtle taste of caramel. One of the most pronounced characteristics of kopi luwak beans is their natural lack of acid bitterness. They have been discovered to be low in both tannin and acid. Furthermore, it is claimed that they contain a plethora of other health advantages not found in other coffees.

Kopi is the word for “coffee” and luwak is the name for the civet in the local Indonesian language where this “delicacy” was discovered.

The civet loves coffee berries, but cannot digest the beans, which emerge whole. When the civets eat ripe coffee cherries, the beans pass through their digestive system, undergoing a natural fermentation process. The beans are collected, cleaned, dried, and roasted to produce the final coffee. Yes, you are very correct, it sounds gross. And there are several halachic issues that require addressing.

Black Ivory Coffee

Once mankind discovered that predigesting whole coffee beans might tenderize the bitterness in coffee and add flavor profiles, people experimented with using the digestive systems of other animals. “Black Ivory Coffee” was developed by a Canadian businessman in 2012 and involves coffee beans refined by elephants. Perhaps one advantage to this brew over kopi luwak is that elephants are readily available in captivity, both in Africa and in India, which makes it easier to produce and harvest the product “in bulk,” and, as we will soon see, might resolve one of the halachic problems involved in kopi luwak. The founder of the company that produces this specialty brew contends that the fermentation in the elephant’s gut strips the coffee bean of its bitterness and adds notes of chocolate, cacao nibs, light peach, malt, tamarind, spice and black tea, flavored in part by whatever else is in the herbivore’s stomach. The company producing “Black Ivory Coffee” also claims that their product has major health benefits because the coffee is rich in antioxidants and minerals.

Potentially, different varieties of this product can be made by varying the diet of the elephants. At one point, there might be an “Apricot Flavored Black Ivory Coffee,” one with “Natural Vanilla Flavor,” a “cashew infused” selection, “lemon and mint,” perhaps even an “esrog-hadas-date” flavor in honor of Sukkos — as many varieties as at Baskin-Robbins. Can’t you just see the wide selection available in the Pesach aisle of your upscale local kosher supermarket? The choices are endless – but is the coffee kosher?

Bird coffee

Another type of specialty beverage is made from coffee cherries eaten by a variety of wild bird, the jacu. Jacu is the Portuguese name for one variety of birds, usually called guan, that are large tree-dwelling birds predominantly of tropical South American rainforests. It is claimed that this beverage is sweet, full-bodied, and smooth, with unique tasting notes of cinnamon, maple syrup, aniseed, and even hints of brown bread.

The history of kopi luwak

First imported from Indonesia in the 1990s, kopi luwak aficionados contend that acids and enzymes in the civet’s gut alter the protein content of the beans. It is also possible that the flavor is influenced by the civets’ preference for certain types of berries over others. As we will soon see, this factor may vary significantly by the type of kopi luwak drunk. They are roasted very lightly to preserve their complex flavors.

It is important to note that not everyone is convinced that the differences in flavor, if they even exist, are an improvement. It hasn’t fared well in expert tasting tests either. In the words of one coffee industry expert, kopi luwak is “a gimmick, a fairy tale fabricated to sell gullible consumers bad coffee at extraordinarily inflated prices.”

The cost of wild kopi luwak fluctuates between $20 and $100 per cup. To increase availability and bring down the price of this specialty beverage, an industry of farmed kopi luwak has developed in which the civets have been trapped, bred and fed coffee (and, presumably, other nutrients, since man, civets and even students in finals week cannot live on coffee alone). For those who want to buy kopi luwak by the bag (in bulk, no pun intended), wild kopi luwak costs significantly more, since it tastes better and is an ethical alternative to farmed kopi luwak.

Of course, when there is money to be made, there will be scandals. A BBC investigation discovered that “wild” kopi luwak being sold in Britain was in fact produced by civets being held in tiny cages in Sumatra, one of the larger islands of Indonesia. The gentleman who first imported kopi luwak to the West now regrets his involvement in what he describes as a “hideous trade.”

Our article is not a review of coffee variants, even if caffeine is the most common addicting substance in the western world. Our articles are about halacha, and we will discuss several halachic issues to determine whether this delicacy is kosher or not.

Potential halachic issues

What halachic issues must be clarified to determine whether these coffees are kosher? There are several:

1. Yotzei min hatamei

Since civets and elephants have neither split hooves nor chew their cud, they are not kosher. Do the enzymes and other digestive processes that the coffee bean absorbs in their guts render it yotzei min hatamei, something emanating from a non-kosher animal, like the milk or eggs of non-kosher species?

Similarly, we will have the same question regarding the jacu specialty. Since there is no

mesorah that the jacu or guan is a kosher bird, we must assume that it is not. In other words, since elephant and civet milk and jacu eggs are not kosher, must we assume that the coffee beans that they have digested are also not kosher?

2. Bal teshaktsu

Based on a pasuk (Vayikra 20:25), the Gemara prohibits eating something that people find repulsive (Shabbos 90b; Makkos 16b).

3. Tza’ar ba’alei chayim

Is there a halachic concern of tza’ar ba’alei chayim because an animal that naturally roams is being kept in small boxes and fed an artificial diet?

We will discuss these issues one at a time.

Yotzei min hatamei

According to all opinions, honey produced by bees is kosher, notwithstanding that it is very obvious that the bees do something to the nectar that they intake to make it into honey. The tanna’im dispute why is bee honey kosher.

The majority opinion, that of the Chachamim, is that the processing of nectar into honey is not significant enough to be considered yotzei min hatamei. Borrowing terminology of the Gemara, we could describe this as “sugar in, sugar out.” A minority opinion, that of Rabbi Yaakov, rules that honey of bees is kosher because of a gezeiras hakasuv, a halachic derivation from a verse, and this will include only the honey of bees (Bechoros 7b, as explained by Rabbeinu Tam in Sefer Hayashar #529-531, and many others).

The Gemara (Bechoros 7b) teaches that there is a practical halachic difference resulting from the dispute between these tanna’im: What is the kashrus status of honey-like substances that come from insects other than bees? According to the Chachamim, honey manufactured by wasps or the honeydew made by aphids is kosher. Notwithstanding that there are changes because of the input of these insects, the resultant product remains kosher. This is also the opinion of the Mishnah (Machshirim 6:4), which quotes no disputing view.

How do we rule?

The Rambam and Rabbeinu Tam rule according to the Mishnah and the majority opinion among the tanna’im that wasp honey and aphid honeydew are fully kosher. Because of a Talmudic inference (in Bechoros 7b), the Ramban and the Rosh (in their respective halachic compendia in Bechoros) rule like Rabbi Yaakov that these products are non-kosher. The Shulchan Aruch cites both opinions, but considers the lenient opinion to be the primary one (Yoreh Deah 81:9).

Let us now compare the coffee that has passed through the digestive tract of a civet, elephant or bird to wasp honey or aphid honeydew. According to the Chachamim, this coffee should certainly be permitted since the change rendered by the digestion of these creatures is far less noticeable than the change that wasps and aphids (or bees for that matter) do to nectar to make it honey. Honey neither looks nor tastes like nectar, nor does it have the same viscosity, but no visible difference appears in coffee beans after their passing through the digestive tract of these non-kosher animals. The differences in taste are extremely subtle and should be included under the heter of the Chachamim (see also Shu”t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 2:24).

The question is whether Rabbi Yaakov agrees. In his opinion, honey is considered a different substance from the nectar that was ingested, and therefore only bee honey is kosher. However, there is a very strong logic to argue that even Rabbi Yaakov permits kopi luwak, Black Ivory and jacu coffee since the coffee bean appears unchanged after its digestion.

There is another reason to permit these specialty coffees even according to Rabbi Yaakov. The Mishnah (Bechoros 7b) teaches that when a non-kosher fish swallows a kosher fish, the kosher fish remains kosher, and the Gemara (Bechoros 7b) says this is true even after it has passed through the entire digestive tract of the non-kosher fish. Many rishonim contend that something that passes through whole, or that remains hard when it is finished being digested (see Menachos 69b; Rash, Ohalos 11:7; Tosafos, Bechoros 7b), is considered no different halachically from what it was prior to digestion. According to this approach, Rabbi Yaakov would permit these varieties of coffee.

Bal teshaktsu

Based on a pasuk (Vayikra 20:25), the Gemara prohibits eating something that people consider repulsive (Shabbos 90b; Makkos 16b). This prohibition is called bal teshaktsu. Our question is whether I may eat something that I do not consider vile, but other people do. The Pri Chadash (Yoreh Deah 84:3) rallies much proof that individuals who are not revolted by a particular food may eat it, even when most people are. This author is unaware of any other halachic authorities who discuss this question. Although the Be’er Heiteiv refers to this Pri Chadash, he does not discuss or analyze it. According to this Pri Chadash, someone not disgusted by the past history of this expensive brew in front of him may drink it. There is also no reason to mention the background of the beverage to someone who is oblivious to its history.

There is other evidence that these beverages should not be prohibited because of bal teshaktsu. While discussing the rules of food being susceptible to tumah, the Tosefta (Taharos Chapter 9) and the Gemara (Menachos 69a) rule that wheat and barley kernels removed from cattle, donkey or camel manure are considered food if an individual decides that he would eat them. This implies that there is no prohibition of bal teshaktsu.

Tza’ar ba’alei chayim

At this point, I refer to the third of our opening questions: Is it permitted to catch civets in order to use them for coffee production?

The question relates probably only to farmed kopi luwak, since the captured civets are now caged and this is a species that usually lives in the wild.

One may use an animal to service people, even when doing so inflicts pain on the animal (Terumas Hadeshen 2:105; Rema, Even Ha’ezer 5:14; these authorities base their rulings on Talmudic sources — see Shabbos 154b, Avodah Zarah 13b). The rationale provided is that animals and the rest of creation were created in order to service mankind (Terumas Hadeshen, based on Kiddushin 82a).

On the other hand, all authorities prohibit causing animals to suffer unnecessarily, such as to strike an animal out of anger or frustration (Sefer Chassidim #666). If an animal that is normally well-behaved and responsive to its vocation refuses to work one day, one should not beat it to get it to cooperate – rather, one should consider the possibility that it might be ill (Sefer Chassidim #668). Animals do get sick and, as we see from the story of Bilaam, they may have difficulty expressing themselves.

More specifically, it is prohibited to raise livestock in an inhumane way, such as by feeding them an unusual diet or depriving them of proper ventilation or exercise. However, although farmers may violate tza’ar ba’alei chayim when they raise their livestock, I am unaware of any authority who prohibits using a product that resulted from tza’ar ba’alei chayim. The prohibition is on the one who raises the livestock. In practice, many animals that we shecht and eat are raised in less than optimal circumstances, yet poskim have not ruled that we should avoid using such animals, or that we are required to inspect how these animals are handled prior to our purchasing meat that comes from them.

One can ask this question relative to many modern techniques of fur and fish farming and animals used for research. The question is whether the techniques used are indispensable for mankind to gain the benefits. For example, research testing on animals to see whether beneficial drugs are safe for mankind is certainly permitted, provided that no unnecessary pain is inflicted upon the animals. This is far less obvious when we are researching the safety of cosmetic items, particularly when others are readily available. In the case of kopi luwak, does this coffee really taste so much better that there is a necessity to keep civets in cages? And, why can’t those who really want this specific brew purchase wild kopi luwak.

I will also note that civets are farmed already for use as a flavor enhancer in food production. They are one of the reasons why products containing “natural flavors” must have a proper kosher certification. I am unaware of the conditions in which civets are raised for these purposes, but these are not within the parameters of this article.

Bird friendly

At this point, let us examine the last of our opening questions:

What is the difference between “bird coffee” and “bird friendly coffee?”

Bird Friendly® coffee has nothing to do with jacus or the digestion of coffee beans by a mammal. Coffee growing is a massive industry and requires tropical and subtropical areas for production. Unfortunately, coffee farms usually destroy natural habitat that was previously used by birds, either migratory or regional. Bird Friendly® farms provide a shade cover for habitat for both migratory and resident birds in their tropical landscapes. The term Bird Friendly® is a registered trademark of the Smithsonian Institute used to endorse farmers who qualify for its certification and research program.

Conclusion

Shelomoh Hamelech teaches (in Mishlei 12:10) Rachamei re’sha’im achzari,the compassion of the evil is cruelty. What does this mean, particularly since the context of the pasuk implies that it is discussing the care one takes of his animals? The example chosen by the Sefer Chassidim (#669) is of an evil person who feeds his animal well, but then expects it to perform beyond its capabilities – after all, he treated it so nicely. When the owner’s expectations are not realized, he beats the animal mercilessly. It turns out that his initial compassion causes him to be cruel.

To quote the Tosefta (Bava Kama, end of Chapter 9): Rabbi Yehudah said in the name of Rabban Gamliel, “Recognize this: As long as you act with mercy, Hashem will have mercy on you.” Sefer Chassidim #666 notes: If we are merciful to our animals, Hashem and others will be merciful to us. We should always hope and pray that the food we eat fulfills all the halachos that the Torah commands us.

Question #2: How is kosher cheese made differently from non-kosher cheese?

Question #3: I was once told by someone knowledgeable that one who is careful about chalav Yisrael is permitted to use a product containing whey, even though the product does not say that it is chalav Yisrael. Is this true?

Before discussing the halachic issues involved in manufacturing cheese, we need to explain the basics of cheesemaking. Hashem made cow’s milk contain all the nutrients necessary for a newborn calf to grow big and strong until it is ready to be self-supportive by mowing the lawn. The major components of milk are lactose, or milk sugar, which provides the carbohydrates a young calf needs; casein and other proteins; cream (which is the fat component); various other nutrients including calcium for healthy bones; and about 90% water, which keeps the other ingredients in suspension or solution.

To make cheese, one causes the casein to precipitate (separate) out of the fluid milk, which causes the casein to coagulate. (The word casein has the same cognate source as the word “cheese” — the Latin word for cheese, caseus.) This precipitation, or setting, can be allowed to happen naturally by allowing milk to curdle (thus producing the “delicacy” that Little Miss Muffet ate as “curds and whey”) or, can be facilitated by adding acid or an enzyme (such as rennet) to the milk. The coagulated part of the milk, called the curd, separates from the rest, which is the whey. In the case of a “hard” cheese, the curd is pressed, molded, flavored and aged to become the variety of cheese desired. The names of most cheeses (Roquefort, Swiss, Muenster, Gouda, Cheddar etc.) reflect the geographic location where these cheeses were developed.

What is the prohibition called gevinas akum, and why did Chazal prohibit it?

The origins of the rabbinic prohibition banning non-Jewish cheese are mentioned by the Mishnah, which records an interesting conversation:

“While the two of them were traveling together, Rabbi Yishmael asked Rabbi Yehoshua: ‘Why is the cheese of gentiles prohibited?’ He answered: ‘Because they set it using the stomach of a calf that had been slaughtered in a non-kosher way.” Rabbi Yishmael noted legal reasons why he felt that this could not be the reason for the prohibition, upon which Rabbi Yehoshua explained that the prohibition is “because the gentiles set the cheese with the stomach of a calf that had been offered for idol worship.” Rabbi Yishmael denied that this could be the reason, because if it was, one should not be permitted even to benefit from gentile cheese. At this point, Rabbi Yehoshua changed the subject, signifying that he would not discuss the matter further (Avodah Zarah 29b).

As we see, Rabbi Yehoshua evaded explaining why the Sages prohibited cheese. This is very curious, particularly when compared to the prohibition of chalav akum¸which the Gemara explicitly states is because of concern that non-kosher milk might be added.

In addition to the two explanations that Rabbi Yehoshua cited, the Gemara (Avodah Zarah 35) mentions five additional reasons why Chazal prohibited consumption of gevinas akum:

(1) Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi: The milk may have been left in a place that snakes could poison it with their venom.

(2) Rabbi Chanina: The milk may have been adulterated with milk of a non-kosher species. Although most non-kosher species do not allow themselves to be milked, camels, donkeys, and mares (female horses) can all be milked and produce a palatable product. It is because of concern that these milks may have been added to milk from a kosher species that Chazal created a different prohibition, consuming milk when a Jew did not observe the milking (chalav akum). Although milk from non-kosher species contains very little casein and thus cannot be made into cheese, if such milk was mixed with kosher milk before it was processed into cheese, some fluid remains in the cheese that could contain non-kosher milk.

(3) Rav Ada bar Ahavah: The surface of the cheese may be coated with lard.

(4) Rav Chisda: Non-kosher wine vinegar may have been used to set the cheese.

(5) Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak: Sap of an orlah fruit may have been used to set the cheese. The Torah (Vayikra 19:23) prohibits eating or benefiting from fruit grown on a tree during its first three years. Those fruits are called orlah and the prohibition of the Torah applies whether the tree was planted by a Jew or a gentile, and whether it grew in Eretz Yisroel or in chutz la’Aretz.

The Rambam in his discussion of these laws mentions setting cheese with the sap of figs. Presumably, he is referring to the juice of figs from which today we extract the enzyme known as ficain (or ficin) which is used to make certain varieties of cheese.

As we will soon see, the Rishonim dispute whether these five opinions are in dispute – meaning that each holds his reasons to the exclusion of the others, or that they are each citing a different reason for the prohibition, and that the cheese was prohibited because of any of the reasons.

I want to share with you a curiosity: While researching information for this article, I discovered a sixty-year-old article describing how one manufactures cheddar cheese (also a name of geographic origin since it was originally developed in Cheddar, England). The article reports that the cheese was made by adding calf stomach rennet to the milk to make it curd, heating the curd, going through several processes to carefully remove “every scrap” of whey, pressing the curd, plunging it into hot water briefly to form a thin rind and then greasing the rind with pure lard to thicken the rind. Thus, three of the reasons mentioned by the Gemara to prohibit cheese were used to make this cheese – the use of non-kosher rennet; the use of lard; and the remaining uncurded milk in the cheese which could contain adulterated milk were it not deliberately removed.

Why did Rabbi Yehoshua hide the reason?

Although we now have some background why Chazal prohibited gentile cheese, we have no idea why Rabbi Yehoshua was reticent to explain the origin of the prohibition. However, the Gemara (Avodah Zarah 35a) does explain his concern, in the following passage: “Why did he not reveal the true reason? As Ula explained: When the scholars of Eretz Yisrael decreed a new prohibition, they did not reveal the reason for twelve months — lest someone dispute their reason and be lax in its observance.” Thus, we see that even when the prohibition began, no reason was given out of concern that this would affect whether the takanah would be properly observed.

In the times of the Rishonim, there were areas of Europe, particularly in Italy and parts of southern France, where there was a long-established practice to be lenient regarding the consumption of the local cheese of non-Jews. The lenience was based on the fact that the Jews knew the recipe that the gentile cheesemakers used, and that none of the concerns mentioned by the Gemara were germane. The cheese was set with “flowers,” some variety of plant-based enzyme. I am told that, to this day, there are cheeses in some parts of Europe that are made with an enzyme found naturally in a variety of thistle. Perhaps, this was the type of cheese that these communities used.

In any event, this leniency was common in certain areas and found halachic backing (several Rishonim in the name of the Geonei Narvona). Tosafos quotes Rabbeinu Tam as saying “that we do not find an obvious reason to prohibit gevinas akum.” Rabbeinu Tam felt that the different opinions quoted in the Gemara are in dispute and that the authoritative position for the gezeirah of gevinas akum is that of Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi — that the cheese may be contaminated with snake venom. Rabbeinu Tam then opines that, according to Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi, the prohibition of gevinas akum was never instituted in a place where snakes do not flourish.

However, most Rishonim reject this reasoning, some because they feel that the different reasons mentioned by the Gemara do not necessarily disagree, and others contending that the prohibition against gentile cheese exists even when none of the original reasons apply. They maintain that the prohibition has a halachic status of davar she’beminyan, a rabbinic injunction that remains binding until a larger and more authoritative body declares the original injunction invalid, even when the reason the takanah was introduced no longer applies. Since a more authoritative beis din never rescinded the prohibition on gentile cheese, it remains even when none of the reasons apply (Rambam, Maachalos Asuros 3:4; Rashba, Toras HaBayis page 90b; Semag, Mitzvah 223; Tur, Yoreh Deah 115; For an explanation of how the Geonei Narvona resolved this issue, see Chazon Ish, Yoreh Deah 40). Others even argued that Rabbeinu Tam himself never permitted gevinas akum; his comments were meant to be theoretical, not definitive (Semag; Semak).

The Shulchan Aruch rules that there is no halachic basis to allow the practice of those communities that permitted use of the local gentile cheese, even when one has ascertained that they contain no non-kosher ingredients. The Rema follows a moderately more lenient view, permitting use of gentile cheese only in a place where one can ascertain that there was a long established custom to permit it. Thus, today no one would be able to use gentile cheese, with the possible exception of an Italian community that can prove that they have such a tradition going back several hundred years.

How is kosher cheese made differently from non-kosher cheese?

Having established that almost universal opinion contends that the prohibition against gentile cheese is alive and well even when none of the concerns apply, we need to clarify: Is any cheese produced by a gentile halachically non-kosher? Can a Jewish cheesemaker hire non-Jewish workers? Is there a way to have a gentile manufacture cheese and it is still kosher?

Regarding these issues, we find a dispute between two major halachic authorities, the Rema (Yoreh Deah 215:2) and the Shach. The Rema contends that when a Jew observes the production the cheese is gevinas Yisrael and fully kosher, even though the milk and curding agents are all owned by a gentile, and gentiles perform every step and process. Thus, the Rema understands the prohibition of gevinas akum to be structured similarly to chalav akum – if a Jew supervised the production, it is kosher.

The Shach takes issue with this approach, contending that if a gentile owns the milk, the acid, and the enzyme, and places the acid or enzyme into the milk; the resultant cheese is prohibited as gevinas akum, even if an observant Jew supervised the entire production! The Shach rallies support for his position from the wording of the Mishnah, which, when describing the prohibition against chalav akum, prohibits milk “milked by a gentile without a Jew watching,” whereas in discussing gevinas akum, the Mishnah simply prohibits “the cheese of gentiles,” omitting the proviso that a supervising Jew is sufficient to remove the prohibition. According to the Shach, the only “whey” to avoid gevinas akum is to have a Jew place the curding agent into the milk, or to have a Jew own the milk or the cheese. In these instances, the cheese is now considered “Jewish” cheese, because it was either owned or manufactured by a Jew.

The Shabbos problem

Those who followed the Shach’s approach, occasionally ran into the following practical problem. In order to have kosher cheese, they needed to have a gentile make it for them, and they could easily arrange that a Jew add the enzyme or acid to the milk. The gentiles were willing to accommodate Jewish needs if the price was right; the gentile ordinarily used non-kosher rennet, the Jew used his own kosher rennet. However, what was one to do when the gentile decided that the best day to set the cheese was on Shabbos? A Jew may not put rennet into milk on Shabbos – and, according to the Shach, if he does not, there is a problem of gevinas akum.

This entire problem does not exist according to the Rema. In his opinion, there is no gevinas akum problem here. The Jew can simply oversee the work that the non-Jew is performing, even on Shabbos. The Jew himself is performing no melacha, and the non-Jew does not have to keep Shabbos.

The Pri Chadash, who agrees with the Shach’s analysis as to what makes a cheese “Jewish,” discusses this issue and concludes the following:

If the Jew orders a certain quantity of cheese, that is sufficient to permit the cheese as gevinas Yisrael. Since this cheese is being specifically made for the Jew, the Jew is considered the owner of this cheese as soon as it is manufactured, thus eliminating the prohibition of gevinas akum, even if the Jew did not participate in the manufacture.

Hard and soft cheese; butter

Halachically, there is much discussion among authorities whether the prohibition of gevinas akum applies to butter and to certain soft cheeses like cottage cheese and cream cheese. This topic is explained in a different article, “The Great Cottage Cheese Controversy.” Searching for the word “cottage cheese” on the website should be sufficient.

The milky whey

Whey is a byproduct of the cheese industry. When milk curds, the leftover is the whey, which, although a byproduct, may have much commercial use if made from certain cheeses.

The first question we need to resolve: Is whey prohibited because of gevinas akum? Many halachic authorities accept that the prohibition of gevinas akum applies only to the cheese, but not to the whey. However, many varieties of whey may still be non-kosher for an interesting reason: Some types of cheese are produced by heating the milk to temperatures hot enough that the whey absorbs from the non-kosher cheese. Other cheeses, although produced at lower temperatures, have hot water added to the finished cheese that becomes part to the whey. The result is that this whey is non-kosher because it contains admixture of non-kosher cheese (Darkei Teshuvah 115:30).

However,we should note that Rav Moshe Feinstein contends that the whey that results from cheesemaking remains kosher since the cheese at the time of production is still owned by the gentile. Only when a Jew purchases the cheese does it become non-kosher, and therefore the whey is not considered to contain any taste from non-kosher cheese (Shu”t Igros Moshe, Yoreh Deah 3:17). In addition, he argues that Chazal did not prohibit whey from cheese production under any circumstances.

According to all opinions, whey is exempt from the prohibition of chalav akum. This is a topic to which we will need to return when we discuss butter and soft cheeses.

“Kosher Cheese?!?”

Before we close our discussion, I want to share with you a personal anecdote that demonstrates not only concerns about gevinas akum but also shows why one should not use a product when one does not know who stands behind its kashrus supervision. I was once driving through a small town in Western New York when I noticed a small cheese factory on the opposite side of the street. Being the curious type, I decided to drop in on the facility to learn more about the production processes. Since I am not shy, I asked the receptionist whether the owner or manager was in, and that I was a rabbi involved in kosher certification and interested in increasing my knowledge of food production. I was pleasantly surprised at the friendly reception I received from the owner, Vince, who indeed showed me through the facility and answered all my questions very cordially, as if he had all the time in the world. Obviously, the cheese was not kosher because of gevinas akum, and I therefore made no attempt to ascertain what type of rennet the company used.

After the tour, I was very surprised by the conversation that ensued, considering that this was a completely spontaneous visit and Vince did not even know me. He asked me whether I was an Orthodox rabbi, and whether I would be interested to provide his plant with a letter that it is a kosher facility. I was quite surprised by the question, and asked him whether he had ever entertained kosher certification before.

“Oh, we have been kosher for many years, but we have been unable to contact our rabbi to renew his letter.”

Further inquiry revealed that for many years the company had been paying an annual fee to a “rabbi” who in exchange provided them with a letter that the cheese was kosher. I was never able to ascertain whether this individual was a completely unlearned “rabbi” who was oblivious to the prohibition of gevinas akum, or someone not observant or concerned of the halacha. But it really makes no difference. As we have learned, obtaining a “kosher” letter is not a sufficient procedure with which to kosherize cheese.

Yaakov, a relative newcomer to Yiddishkeit, visited a new community and davened each prayer at a different shul. He noticed that in each shul, the responses to Kaddish were different, which he found surprising. His rabbi explained to him the background.

When hearing Kaddish, we say “Amen” at several places, in addition to saying the very important “Amen, ye’hei shemei rabba mevorach le’olam ul’almei almaya.” (The poskim dispute whether one should also add “yisbarach”to this sentence, the Shulchan Aruch [Orach Chayim 56:3] ruling that one should, and the Gr”a ruling that one should not.) In addition, Ashkenazim respond to the words, shemei dekudsha berich hu, His holy name, blessed is He, by repeating the Chazan’s words berich hu. (Nusach Sefard and Sefardim say Amen at this point.) However, most people do not realize how late this response of berich hu came into practice. People are also not familiar with the halachos regarding this response; depending on where one is up to in davening it may be forbidden to recite this response as it constitutes an interruption. The goal of this article is to explain both the historical background of berich hu, and when we should and should not recite it. We will also discuss when one is allowed to recite other responses of the Kaddish.

The Gemara (Berachos 3a; Sotah 49a) mentions Kaddish and lays special emphasis on responding Amen, ye’hei shmei rabba mevorach le’olam ule’almei almaya with fervent feeling. The poskim accentuate the importance of not talking while Kaddish is recited. One should pay careful attention to the recital of the Kaddish and know to which praise of Hashem one is responding (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 56:1).

CHRONICLE OF A RESPONSE

What exactly is berich hu?

The words berich hu, are Aramaic for “blessed be He,” and are a repetition of two of the words of the Kaddish just said by the chazzan at that point: veyis’halal shemei dekudsha berich hu le’eila min kal birchasa ve’shirasa…, exalted be the name of the Holy One, blessed be He Who shall be praised beyond all blessing and song.

When did responding berich hu become a standard part of davening? Surprising as this may seem, no early poskim mention a custom of responding with just these two words. The custom started about four hundred years ago when it was not unusual to find people responding at this point of Kaddish with a refrain similar to the one we recite. The Taz (Orach Chayim 56:3) reports a practice to accentuate the praise of Hashem by joining the chazzan at the point when he reaches the words shmei dekudsha, His holy name, by accompanying him when he recites the three words berich hu le’eila, which means that the congregation recited words that translate as Blessed is He above. The Taz condemns this practice harshly since these three words may imply an unintended blasphemous statement — that Hashem is blessed only above, but not below. Therefore, the Taz rules that one should continue by reciting the subsequent three words, thus resulting in the following praise, berich hu le’eila min kal birchasa, which translates as Blessed is He above all blessing. This clarifies one’s intent and removes any concern about blasphemy. However, contemporary Ashkenazic practice does not recite this elongated response, but instead reduces the response to the two words, berich hu, blessed be He, which also accomplishes praising Hashem with no hint of blasphemy. Some Hassidic circles indeed follow the advice of the Taz and recite berich hu le’eila min kal birchasa.

This explains the origin of the custom to recite berich hu to Kaddish. What we still do not know is when we may not recite it. Explaining these halachos requires some introduction.

BARUCH HU UVARUCH SHEMO

The response berich hu is similar to our response Baruch Hu uvaruch shemo, blessed is He and blessed is His name, which we recite upon hearing Hashem’s name articulated as part of a beracha. The first halachic authority to mention this practice is the Rosh, about 800 years ago. The Tur (Orach Chayim 124) states, “I heard from my father [the Rosh] that every time he heard a beracha he would say Baruch Hu uvaruch shemo. He based this practice on the pasuk that states, “When I call Hashem’s name, bring forth greatness to our G-d” (Devorim 32:3); thus, upon hearing Hashem’s name, one should add a praise of one’s own. The Rosh added another halachic source for this practice based on the following translation of the pasuk, “Remember a tzadik for blessing” (Mishlei 10:7). This verse teaches that even when mentioning the name of a righteous human being one should bless him; if so, one should certainly bless Hashem when mentioning His name.

Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 124:5) rules that one should respond Baruch Hu uvaruch shemo whenever one hears a beracha. Nevertheless, one may not answer this refrain during birchos keri’as shema or during Pesukei Dezimra (Magen Avraham 124:9; Mishnah Berurah 124:21). Why not?

WHAT RESPONSES ARE PERMITTED WHILE RECITING THE BIRCHOS KERI’AS SHEMA?

The part of davening following Borchu until the Shemoneh esrei is called the birchos keri’as shema, because it consists of the berachos established by the Anshei Keneses HaGedolah (the leaders of the Jewish people in the era of Ezra, Mordechai and Esther, during the period prior to and the beginning of the second Beis HaMikdash) before and after reciting Shema. The Mishnah (Berachos 13a) teaches that although usually one may not interrupt these berachos, there are some exceptional circumstances.

However, there is one place during this part of the davening that is so important that one should not interrupt unless it is a life-threatening emergency. This is while saying the pesukim of Shema Yisroel and Baruch shem kovod malchuso le’olam va’ed (Shulchan Aruch 66:1).

It is not clear cut what the halacha is regarding communal responses while one is davening. The Rishonim dispute whether one may respond to Borchu, to Kedusha, and Amen yehei shemei rabba during birchos keri’as shema. Those who prohibited this practice contended that one may not interrupt the berachos of keri’as shema for the sake of a different praise, such as responding to Kaddish or Kedusha. The Rosh (Berachos 2:5) disputes the opinion of his rebbe, the Maharam Rotenberg, who prohibited this practice. The Rosh holds that responding appropriately to Hashem’s praises is no worse than responding to the greeting of a person, which is permitted under certain circumstances, as mentioned above.

The poskim conclude that one may answer the following responses while reciting the birchos keri’as shema:

A. “Amen, ye’hei shmei rabba mevorach le’olam ule’almei almaya” in Kaddish.

B. “Amen” to the chazzan’s da’amiran be’alma in Kaddish, but not to other places in Kaddish (Chayei Odom 20:4).

C. “Boruch Hashem hamevorach la’olam va’ed” to Borchu, whether the Borchu before birchos keri’as shema or the one that precedes an aliyah (Magen Avraham 66:6).

D. “Kodosh kodosh…” and “Boruch kevod Hashem mimkomo” in Kedusha. However one should not respond to the other parts of Kedusha we traditionally say, even the sentence beginning Yimloch (Ateres Zekeinim).

E. “Amen” to the berachos of Ha’Keil Hakadosh and to Shema Koleinu (Rama 66:3).

F. The words “Modim anachnu Loch” recited in response to the chazzan’s saying Modim in the repetition of Shemoneh Esrei (Rabbeinu Yonah, Berachos 7b; Mishnah Berurah 66:20).

HALLEL AND MEGILLAH

The Gemara (Berachos 14a) discusses whether the same rules that apply to interrupting the birchos keri’as shema also apply to the full Hallel and to the recital of the Megillah. The Gemara questions why the rules governing the birchos keri’as shema should be stricter than those for Hallel and Megillah, since the requirement to recite keri’as shema is min haTorah, whereas the mitzvos of Hallel and Megillah are only rabbinic in origin. Alternatively, the Gemara suggests that since both Hallel and Megillah publicize miraculous events, perhaps the rules of interrupting them should be stricter. The Gemara concludes that we should treat the rules of birchos keri’as shema, Hallel and Megillah the same. Thus, all the responses listed above are recited when one is in the middle of birchos keri’as shema, Hallel, or hearing the Megillah.

AN ALIYAH

The poskim debate whether someone in the middle of the birchos keri’as shema may respond Amen when he hears someone recite the berachos before or after an aliyah. The Magen Avraham (66:6) rules that one should recite Amen to these berachos, whereas the Pri Megadim questions this practice. The Mishnah Berurah (66:18) concludes that he may recite Amen if he is between two of the berachos, such as he has just completed “Yotzeir HaMeoros” or “HaMaariv Aravim.”

This dispute is based on an interesting story. Someone was once delayed in davening, and was in the middle of the birchos keri’as shema when he was called up to the Torah for an aliyah. May he recite the berachos on the Torah even though it is an interruption in the middle of birchos keri’as shema?

The Sefer HaManhig ruled that he should accept the aliyah and recite the berachos (Tur 66). Not accepting an aliyah when one is called to the Torah is an insult to Hashem’s honor, and certainly Hashem deserves at least as much honor as the individual discussed earlier. Therefore reciting the berachos has the same status as greeting a person and may be recited during the birchos keri’as shema. The Magen Avraham apparently holds that answering Amen to the berachos of an aliyah has the same halachic status as the Sefer HaManhig’s aliyah case and therefore one should recite this Amen even in the middle of birchos keri’as shema. The Pri Megadim disputes the Magen Avraham’s view, suggestingh that this Amen is no different from Amen to any other beracha.

However, the Rashba (Shu”t HaRashba 1:185) disagrees with the Sefer HaManhig’s conclusion, ruling that someone in the middle of this part of davening who is called to the Torah should not go up, but someone else should take his aliyah instead (Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 66). The Shulchan Aruch (66:4) follows the latter opinion, whereas most other opinions rule that he should take the aliyah and recite the berachos, but be careful not to interrupt in any other way (Magen Avraham 66:8).

The poskim dispute whether one may recite Amen to a any other beracha that one hears when he is between two berachos of birchos keri’as shema. Some contend that he may recite Amen after hearing any beracha, since he is currently between berachos (Pri Megadim, Eishel Avraham 66:7). Others contend that he may recite Amen only to the beracha that he just recited, such as he heard the end of the beracha from the chazzan or from a different individual (Chayei Odom 20:4).

A THUNDERING BERACHA

The poskim also dispute whether one may recite the beracha on thunder while in the middle of birchos keri’as shema. Magen Avraham 66:5 rules that he should, whereas the Bechor Shor (Berachos 13a) disagrees, contending that one should not interrupt one praise of Hashem, the Shema, with another, the beracha on thunder. The Chayei Odom reaches a compromise, ruling that one should recite the beracha if he is between the berachos of keri’as shema, but not in the middle of a beracha. This last dispute remains unresolved (Mishnah Berurah 66:19). Thus, if someone hears thunder while reciting Hallel or the birchos keri’as shema, or reading or hearing the Megillah, it is his choice whether to recite the beracha or not.

ASHER YATZAR

Although usually one should recite the beracha Asher Yatzar immediately after washing one’s hands when leaving the lavatory (see Shulchan Aruch 165:1), one should not recite it during birchos keri’as shema but should postpone its recital until after Shemoneh Esrei (Mishnah Berurah 66:23). The same policy should be followed during Hallel or Megillah: he should wait to recite Asher Yatzar until after Hallel and Megillah and their concluding berachos are completed.

TALIS AND TEFILLIN

What if someone did not have talis and tefillin available before davening, and they became available during birchos keri’as shema? May he recite a beracha prior to donning them or does the beracha constitute a hefsek during the berachos?

The Rishonim debate this issue. Rashi’s rebbi, Rabbi Yitzchak the son of Rabbi Yehudah, indeed recited the beracha before donning both his talis and his tefillin, and brought proof to his actions from the Gemara (Berachos 14b):

The great Amora Rav once began reciting keri’as shema and its berachos without having tefillin. Right after he completed Shema, his messenger brought him tefillin, so Rav immediately donned the tefillin prior to reciting Shemoneh Esrei,. Rabbi Yitzchak, Rashi’s rebbi, presumes that Rav recited the beracha before putting on the tefillin even though he was in the middle of the birchos keri’as shema.

Similarly, Rabbi Yitzchak the son of Rabbi Yehudah reasoned that in a similar situation when one first receives his talis immediately before Shemoneh Esrei, he should recite the beracha before donning either one. Tosafos (ad loc.), however, disagrees with Rabbi Yitzchak the son of Rabbi Yehudah, reasoning that one is required to wear tefillin while davening and therefore donning them is a requirement of the tefillah. As such the beracha on the tefillin also is not an interruption. However, one is not required to wear a talis during davening, and therefore the beracha before donning it should not preempt the laws of hefsek.

How do we conclude?

The Shulchan Aruch (66:2) rules like Rabbi Yitzchak the son of Rabbi Yehudah that he should recite both the beracha on the talis and the beracha on the tefillin; this is the practice of the Sefardim. The Rema rules like Tosafos that he should only recite the beracha on the tefillin but not on the talis.

WHAT RESPONSES ARE PERMITTED DURING PESUKEI DEZIMRA?

The Anshei Keneses HaGedolah established that one should recite daily, at the beginning of davening, praises written by Dovid HaMelech (Zohar, Parshas Terumah). We introduce these passages of praise, Pesukei Dezimra, with the beracha of Baruch She’amar and conclude them with the beracha of Yishtabach. The beracha of Yishtabach does not begin with a beracha because it is linked directly to the beracha of Baruch She’amar. Since these two berachos are linked, one may not interrupt between them for anything that is not part of the davening. For this reason, it is strictly forbidden to talk during Pesukei Dezimra (Tosafos, Berachos 46a s.v. kol; Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 51:4). Similarly, it is forbidden to answer Baruch Hu uvaruch shemo during this part of davening (Magen Avraham 124:9; Mishnah Berurah 124:21). Although it is appropriate to praise Hashem this way when His name is mentioned, one does not interrupt when one is praising Him already in order to do so.

Some poskim contend that interrupting Pesukei Dezimra is halachically equivalent to interrupting the birchos keri’as shema. According to this opinion, one may not answer Amen to a beracha that one hears during Pesukei Dezimra (Shu”t Mishkenos Yaakov, Orach Chayim #68). Other poskim contend that one may answer Amen to any beracha while in the middle of Pesukei Dezimra, and even while in the middle of the beracha of Baruch She’amar (Magen Avraham 51:3). The consensus is that, although it is clearly forbidden to talk during the Pesukei Dezimra, answering Amen to any beracha is permitted. Furthermore, someone who needs to recite Asher Yatzar, or to recite the beracha on thunder or lightning, may do so during Pesukei Dezimra. One may certainly answer during this part of davening the responses listed above of Kaddish, Borchu and Kedusha (Mishnah Berurah 51:8. The Chayei Odom [20:3] rules that one should not recite Asher Yatzar until after Shemoneh Esrei.) However, reciting berich hu during Pesukei Dezimra is similar to reciting Baruch Hu uvaruch shemo and constitutes an interruption during Pesukei Dezimra.

Thus, although many people are unaware of this halacha, someone in the middle of Pesukei Dezimra when the chazzan begins reciting the Kaddish before Borchu may not answer berich hu to the Kaddish. On the other hand, he should answer Amen, ye’hei shmei rabba mevorach le’olam ule’almei almaya and the Amen at da’amiran be’alma. He may also answer Amen to the beracha of Yishtabach. However, since the Amen after “Yisgadal veyiskadash shmei rabba” (and in Nusach Sfard after “meshichei”) is only custom, he should not recite these either while in the middle of Pesukei Dezimra and certainly not while in the middle of birchos keri’as shema.

AFTER YISHTABACH

One may not interrupt between completing Yishtabach and beginning the next part of the tefillah (Shulchan Aruch Orach Chayim 51:4), although if one needs to recite a beracha it is better to do so after completing Yishtabach before answering (or saying) Borchu than during the Pesukei Dezimra. For this reason, if someone did not have tzitzis or tefillin available before davening, and they become available during davening (or if he must begin davening when it is too early to recite a beracha on them) he should put them on immediately after Yishtabach and then recite the berachos on them. Better to recite these berachos between Yishtabach and Borchu than to do so afterwards.

APPRECIATING KADDISH

For the many years Reb Zalman Estolin spent as a slave laborer in Soviet Siberia, he obviously had no minyan, nor any opportunity to answer Amen, ye’hei shmei rabba. Upon his redemption from the Soviet Union, he moved to Eretz Yisroel as an old, ill man. The very first morning in Eretz Yisroel, he arose early to walk to shul on his crutches, full with the excitement that he would be davening with a minyan for the first time in decades!

Two hours after davening should have been over, Reb Zalman had not yet returned to his host’s home. The concerned family sent someone to look for the old man, and discovered him sitting in the shul. When asked why he was still there, Reb Zalman answered, “When my minyan ended, another began. And then another. I just could not bear to miss the opportunity to recite Amen, ye’hei shmei rabba one more time” (Just One Word by Esther Stern).

We should always be zocheh to recite Amen, ye’hei shmei rabba with this type of enthusiasm!

Does the International Dateline have any halachic ramifications?

Question #2: Date

Can you change your date?

Question #3: Line

Did the Torah create a line where, if you crossed it, you could mysteriously leave Shabbos and then cross it back and return to Shabbos?

The International Dateline follows a path near the 180° longitude but deviates to accommodate national borders.

In part 1 of this article, I presented the first half of this article on the concept of whether there is a halachic international dateline, and if there is, where is it located. As I explained, two people starting from the same point anywhere on earth, one traveling eastward and the other westward, wherever they meet again on the globe, they will be observing different days of the week. The reason is that one has been observing sunset later each day as he moves west, whereas the other has been observing it earlier each day as he moves east. Eventually, the combined differences of their travels add up to a full day.

In the nineteenth century, nations decided to establish an accepted demarcation line, east of which would be considered the day earlier, and west of which would be the day later. This line is the International Date Line (IDL) and it runs from the North Pole to the South Pole, approximately halfway around the world from the prime meridian (0°  longitude), which runs through Greenwich, UK. However, the IDL is not straight, but curves around landmasses and national borders.

Our question is whether and where is the halachic dateline? Although halachic authorities have wrestled with this question for almost a thousand years, its relevance to practical halacha began in the nineteenth century, when Jews began populating Alaska, Australia, China, Hawaii, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Siberia and similar areas. Literally, dozens of books and essays have analyzed the topic, and many different conclusions have been reached.

By the 1870’s, so many articles had been written on the subject of the dateline that seforim were published to anthologize the opinions. At least a dozen different shitos were presented concerning the halachic dateline, but they can be grouped into six major approaches:

Ninety degrees east of Yerushalayim

1. For the purpose of the laws of Shabbos and Yomim Tovim, the dateline follows what is written in the Kuzari, discussed in last week’s article, and follows a north-south line 90 degrees east of Yerushalayim.

Ninety degrees, with a twist

2. The Chazon Ish (Orach Chayim, Chapter 64) interprets the halacha similar to this approach, although he adds a very original and individualistic twist. In his opinion, when the imaginery line 90 degrees east of Yerushalayim goes through a landmass, the section of the landmass east of the 90-degree marker is treated as if it is west of it. In other words, in Eurasia and Australia, where the 90-degree marker runs through northeastern China, the extreme eastern part of Siberia, and western Australia, the halachic dateline border is the point at which the eastern border of these landmasses (Eurasia and Australia) touch the sea. Islands in the seas and oceans east of these landmasses date themselves as if they are the western part of the Americas.

Thus, in the Chazon Ish’s opinion, Sydney and Melbourne follow Asia, although the islands near them, including much of Indonesia, New Guinea, New Zealand and Tasmania observe Shabbos on Sunday, not Saturday. Take a boatride off most of the Australian eastern coast on a Sunday and you may be traveling into Shabbos.

A bit more than ninety

3. Aside from the Yesod Olam, numerous other authorities place the halachic dateline at different points “slightly” farther east than did Rav A. M. Lapidus (mentioned in last week’s article). Among those who wrote their opinions in the twentieth century, we can include Shu’t Benei Tziyon by Rav Dovid Shapiro, and Rav Shelomoh Goren.

Bering Strait

4. Some authorities place the halachic dateline at the easternmost point on the Eurasian landmass, which is the Bering Strait (Rav Yonah Merzbach in Noam volume 14; Atzei Sadeh). One practical advantage of this opinion is that this halachic dateline does not cross any landmass in which there is any notable Jewish population. Another practical advantage is that it does not vary significantly from the international dateline.

One hundred and eighty degrees

5. Rav Yechiel Michal Tukachinsky (Hayomam Bekadur Ha’aretz) holds that the halachic dateline is 180 degrees east of Yerushalayim and travels in an unbroken imaginary line from north to south. A disadvantage of this approach is that Hawaii, most of the Aleutian Islands and probably most of Alaska must keep Shabbos on their Friday.

First come, first served

6. Although in practical halacha this opinion is not too dissimilar from opinion #4, conceptually, it disputes completely the idea that there is any halachic dateline. This approach, which probably has the most rabbinic scholars following it, contends that the Torah never established a line, but that each individual, when traveling, counts six days from his last Shabbos and observes Shabbos on the seventh day. In theory, two individuals who started at the same place and arrived at the same destination could observe Shabbos on two different days, because one traveled eastward and the other westward. When a community is established in any new place, Shabbos is determined by the community’s count of seven days. Once a community established its Shabbos, anyone visiting observes Shabbos on the day that the community does, regardless of his individual seven-day count. Among the many luminaries who followed this approach, we can count the Radbaz (Shu’t Haradbaz 1:76), Rav Yaakov Emden (Mor Uketziyah, 344), the Sefas Emes and his son the Imrei Emes (the second and third Gerer Rebbes), Rav Yosef Shaul Natanson (Shu’t Sho’eil Umeishiv, Volume IV, Mahdura IV #2:154), Rav Shmuel Mohliver and Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank (Shu’t Har Tzvi, Orach Chayim #138).

International

At this point, let us address our opening question: Does the International Dateline have any halachic ramifications?

As we just noted, this will depend on which opinion we follow. Let us assume, for a moment, that someone concludes that there isn’t any way he can decide among these great authorities – therefore, he will follow all of the opinions in their strictest conclusions. He would need to consider fully 25% of the earth’s surface to be a safek as to which day it is and would need to observe two consecutive days of Shabbos when in 25% of the world. Fortunately for him, there are Jewish communities in only a few cities that are in that 25% section, but he still would be forced to observe two days of Shabbos in Melbourne, Sydney and in all of Alaska, Hawaii, New Zealand and virtually anywhere else in the Pacific.

The shaylah becomes practical

By the beginning of the 20^th century, there already were Jews and communities in the areas under question. Harbin, a city in China, had a frum community that grew until it numbered about 15,000 Jews and had a well-respected rav and posek, Rav Aharon Moshe Kisilav. He was also viewed as the posek for all the Jews who lived in the Far East, and, by this time, small Jewish communities were scattered throughout the area. The accepted ruling was to follow the local dating for Shabbos and Yomim Tovim. This situation continued with the increase of the Jewish community in Japan and China that developed during the First World War and then, in the 1930’s, as Jews fled Nazi Germany.

When the Mir Yeshiva escaped Europe during its miraculous flight from Poland through Lithuania, via the Trans-Siberian railroad to Vladivostok and then to Kobe, Japan, they were concerned when they should observe Yom Kippur. Among them were significant talmidei chachamim aware of the writings of the Kuzari and the Ba’al Hama’or that imply that they were now east of the halachic dateline. They were also presumably aware of the controversy among the more recent poskim whether one should observe Shabbos in Japan on the same day that was considered Friday night and Saturday on the local calendar (the opinion of the Radbaz, Rav Yaakov Emden [Mor Uketzi’ah, 344], Rav Shmuel Mohliver and many others) or a day later, which would follow the more obvious understanding of the Kuzari and the Ba’al Hama’or, and was the conclusion of Rav Alexander Moshe Lapidus. That year, Yom Kippur was on a Wednesday everywhere, and the question was whether they should observe Yom Kippur on the day that was considered Wednesday in Japan, or on the following day, which would synchronize the date with that observed in the United States. Among those in Kobe was Rav Dovid Kronglas, eventually to be the mashgiach and a reish mesivta in Yeshivas Ner Yisrael, who ruled that Jews in Japan should observe their date as if they were part of the United States, which was east of them, rather than according to mainland Asia, which was west of them. This position was different from that accepted by most authorities, but agreed with the psak of the Chazon Ish and the Brisker Rav, who contended that the halachic dateline is 90 degrees east of Yerushalayim.

Some of those in Japan sent a telegram to Eretz Yisrael asking what to do. Bear in mind that, by this time, the vast majority of halachic authorities had concluded that all parts of Asia and Oceania (Australia and other island nations of the western Pacific) should observe all dates as done in mainland Asia.

The Chazon Ish answered their telegram with his own, instructing them to eat on Wednesday – that it was Erev Yom Kippur, and that Wednesday night local time was when Yom Kippur commences. This was against the accepted psak halacha. Rav Herzog, then the Chief Rabbi of Eretz Yisrael, called a meeting to which he invited the Chazon Ish, all the major poskim and gedolim of Eretz Yisrael and those rabbanim who had published written opinions on the subject. The meeting was attended by over twenty rabbanim, including: Rav Tzvi Pesach Frank, the rav of Yerushalayim and the recognized posek hador; Rav Isser Zalman Meltzer, the recognizedgadol roshei yeshivos; Rav Yechiel Michel Tukachinsky, then considered the supreme authority on halachos involving calendars and astronomy; the Gerrer Rebbe, Rav Yonah Merzbach, Rav Menachem Kasher, Rav Dovid Shapiro, author of Benei Tziyon, and Rav Shelomoh Goren; the latter two had already published halachic articles on the topic. The Chazon Ish did not attend the meeting, but instead sent Rav Chayim Ze’ev Finkel, son of Rav Lazer Yudel Finkel, the rosh yeshiva of Mir in Yerushalayim, as his representative to present his position.

All the rabbonim at the meeting were intimately familiar with the entire halachic topic and all of them (I presume with the exception of Rav Finkel) agreed that Japan should observe Yom Kippur on Wednesday. Rav Herzog, who sent their collective response telegram to Japan, added, in a hint, that on Thursday they should eat less than the minimal shiur throughout the day. After all, this might be the opinion of the Kuzari, and one who is able should try to be machmir. Apparently, a total of over thirty rabbonim signed off on the psak that Japan should follow Asia.

Subsequent to this event, several of those who met at this conference wrote up the basis for their halachic conclusions.

A monumental work on the topic, entitled Agan Hasahar (the title is based on a pasuk in Shir Hashirim 7:3), was authored by Rav Chaim Zimmerman, at one point therosh yeshiva of Beis Medrash LaTorah in Skokie, Illinois. Rav Zimmerman noted a major discrepancy between the opinion of the Yesod Olam and how the Chazon Ish understood it. The Chazon Ish’s analysis is based on quotations of the Yesod Olam that he found in Hayomam Bekadur Ha’aretz (authored by Rav Yechiel Michal Tukachinsky), but he never saw the actual lengthy full text of the Yesod Olam. Rav Zimmerman himself, aside from acknowledging the approaches of the Kuzari and the Yesod Olam, suggests that the halachic dateline might be at the eastern edge of Siberia, where it touches the Bering Strait. Based on their understanding of the opinions of the Kuzari and the Yesod Olam, and in light of what we know today about the borders of the Eurasian landmass, others have also agreed with this border (Rav Yonah Mertzbach in Noam #14; Atzei Sadeh). Aside from the advantages that this approach has from a cohesive, logical approach to the sugya and the rishonim, it also is fairly close to the IDL, allowing that all major landmasses and virtually all islands observe Shabbos according to the accepted calendar days of Friday and Saturday.

A talmid chacham that I know well was offered to work for a few months in Japan doing kashrus work. He went to ask Rav Elyashiv, zt”l, whether he should take the job – is this an opportunity or a nisayon? – and if he did, what he should do for Shabbos. Rav Elyashiv told him that he could take the job. As far as Shabbos goes, Rav Elyashiv told him to keep Friday night and Saturday local time as Shabbos in regard to davening and seudos, and to be machmir not to perform melachos min haTorah on Saturday night and Sunday. This way, he would be stringent like the position of the Kuzari and those who follow his approach regarding Shabbos. When I showed this talmid chacham this article and asked him whether I had quoted Rav Elyashiv correctly, he responded, “Exactly.”

Halacha instructs us what to do when confronted by a situation in which there is no universally accepted ruling. Explaining the details that govern this arena is its own complicated topic that we will need to deal with at a different time.

Conclusion

The issue of the halachic dateline is perhaps the most original of any shaylos that have occurred in the modern era. According to most authorities, this is a question with no sources in Chazal. Therefore, we build our analysis on passages of Gemara based on people who became lost and did not know which day is Shabbos. Yet, there are others who contend that the rishonim had a mesorah that governs the halacha here. Certainly, an area in which we must accept the decisions of our rabbonim.

Does the International Dateline have any halachic ramifications?

Question #2: Date

Can you change your date?

Question #3: Line

Did the Torah create a line where, if you crossed it, you could mysteriously leave Shabbos and then cross it back and return to Shabbos?

The International Dateline follows a path near the 180° longitude but deviates to accommodate national borders.

Foreword

Where, what and why is the International Dateline (IDL)?

From virtually every place on earth you can move east or west. If two people start from the same point, one traveling eastward and the other westward, wherever they meet again on the globe, they will be observing different days of the week. The reason is that one has been observing sunset later each day as he moves west, whereas the other has been observing it earlier each day as he moves east. Eventually, the combined differences of their travels add up to a full day.

There is no such thing as the easternmost “beginning” of world time or the “last” place to observe Shabbos, unless one establishes a point, line or boundary to be the beginning. When mankind began traversing the globe in the sixteenth century, the European colonizers usually established the day of the week according to which way they had traversed the globe and not with any regard to the location of the colony. Thus, Indonesia, which the Dutch colonized by circumnagiating Africa, followed the day of the week as it was observed in Europe, whereas the Spanish who colonized the Phillipines on their travels westward from the Americas used the next day. If you look at a map, you will see that the Phillipines lie due north of Indonesia.

In the nineteenth century, nations decided that it was a good idea to establish an accepted demarcation line, east of which would be considered as far as you can go west on the day later, and west of which is as far as you can go east and is on the day earlier. Once you cross that line eastward, you have “gained” a calendar day, and you repeat the calendar day you just lived through. Crossing it westward, you skip 24 hours ahead, i.e., you lose a calendar day. This line is the International Date Line (IDL). The IDL runs from the North Pole to the South Pole and is at the 180^th meridian, i.e., halfway around the world from the prime meridian (0° longitude), which runs through Greenwich, UK. The IDL is not straight, but curves around landmasses and national borders. It tilts east around Siberia at the Bering Strait, westward around the Aleutian Islands, and eastward in the central Pacific to allow countries that are composed of islands to keep the entire nation on the same date. The 180^th  meridian was selected as the basis for the International Dateline because it runs mostly through a very sparsely populatedarea in the vast middle of the Pacific Ocean.

Introduction

Since the time of the rishonim, there has been halachic discussion that revolves around the following: Except for the flat earthers (which no rishonim accept), all halachic authorities recognized the observable proofs that the earth is basically round and that, therefore, from virtually every place on earth you can move east or west.

As described above, an international dateline was established in the nineteenth century,  which follows 180 degrees from Greenwich Mean Time, with certain exceptions. The IDL passes almost exclusively through water – predominantly the Arctic, Pacific and Antarctic Oceans, going over land only in Antarctica, which affects only a few penguins and researchers.

Our question is whether and where is the halachic dateline? Although halachic authorities have wrestled with this question for almost a thousand years, its relevance to practical halacha began in the nineteenth century, when Jews began populating Australia, Siberia, China, Japan, the Philippines, Alaska, Hawaii, Korea, New Zealand and similar areas, as we will soon see. Literally, dozens of books and essays have analyzed the topic, and many different conclusions have been reached. As always, this article is to provide background, and any individual who intends to travel in the areas that will be discussed here should ask their rav or posek what to do.

Stopover in the Far East

I am going to pose a very curious shaylah that I was recently asked which most people would not even realize involves this issue. Someone who lives in Eretz Yisrael had a family emergency on the Pacific coast of the United States and quickly booked a ticket to leave Israel on Thursday and arrive at their destination on Friday morning. They were so appreciative of finding a connection that had them arriving before Shabbos that they did not realize that they had any shaylah until they settled in on their flight. Their flight connection was through Seoul, South Korea, but they could just as easily have made a booking that connected through Tokyo. As we will see in the course of our discussion, either of these stopovers might create a serious halachic shaylah.

Opinions of halachic authorities

Perhaps the earliest authority who discusses the ramification of where halacha might place a dateline was the Kuzari (Book 2, Section 20). This work is devoted to hashkafah and the beauty and importance of Torah, Jewish thought and values and it is not usually considered a halachic work. Yet, based on his explanation of a passage of Gemara (Rosh Hashanah 20b), the Kuzari concludes that halacha recognizes a dateline that is 90 degrees east and 270 degrees west of Yerushalayim. Any point east of this line follows the date of the Americas, and any point west of this line starts its day earlier than Yerushalayim.

The Kuzari’s approach to understanding both the topic and the passage of Gemara is followed by the Ba’al Hama’or in his commentary to the Rif’s Halachos on Rosh Hashanah. However, this is only one approach to explaining the passage of that Gemara. For example, according to Rashi’s approach, which is explained brilliantly by the Ben Aryeh (to Rosh Hashanah 20b) and Rav Henkin (Lev Ivra, pages 51-60), this passage of Gemara has nothing to do with the concept of a halachic dateline.

A disciple of the Rosh named Rav Yitzchak Yisraeli authored a work on astronomy entitled Yesod Olam, in which he discusses the contributions of the Kuzari and the Ba’al Hama’or on the subject and objects very strongly to their conclusions. Among the concerns that he raises is that their calculations assume that Yerushalayim is on the east-west midpoint of the Eurasian landmass and that the distance eastward from the easternmost point of the Eurasian landmass to its westernmost point is approximately the same as the east-west distance of Eurasia. He notes that neither of these calculations is at all accurate. He further notes that, according to the opinion of the Kuzari, two people could stand together and be observing two different days of Shabbos, because the imaginary line 90 degrees east of Yerushalayim stands between them. He objects to this possibility. He understands that the proper place of the halachic dateline should not be 90 degrees of Yerushalayim, but should be at the east-west midpoint of the Eurasian landmass, which is considerably to the east of Yerushalayim.

The Yesod Olam, himself, locates the halachic dateline 23.5 degrees further east than do the Kuzari and the Ba’al Hama’or. This places it east of most of Japan, although it still runs through Australia, placing both Sydney and Melbourne on the “wrong” side of the dateline, although the Yesod Olam would have had no way to know that. It is possible that, if the Yesod Olam had the geographic information that we currently have, he would have determined the line to be farther east, off the eastern coast of Siberia, and this is the conclusion of the Atzei Hasadeh (page 66) and several other authorities.

In the early 16^th century, the Radbaz (Shu’t Haradbaz 1:76), probably the greatest halachic authority of his era, also weighed in on the subject, concluding that there is no halachic date line. In his opinion, each individual should continue his count of the days of the week from where he left. When a community is established, it will determine when its Shabbos is, based on the starting point of most of its membership. The community will then have an established day for Shabbos that will be binding on all its members and visitors. Should two nearby communities be established, one of people who traveled from the east and the other of people who traveled from the west, we could indeed have the phenomenon of two nearby communities that observe Shabbos on different days. However, each community, and all members of that community, will always observe Shabbos on the same day each week, seven days after they did the previous week, which is seven days after the week before, going back to when their community first established itself.

Date

The second of our opening questions was: “Can you change your date?” What this question means is — can the date in a certain place be changed to a day earlier or a day later?

Indeed, I am aware of at least two times that this happened:

The first “westerners” to visit Alaska were fur trappers from Russia. Thus, Russia was the first state to place a claim on possessing Alaska.  When this claim was made by the czar of Russia, the date in Alaska was observed according to eastern Asia, as the earliest point – the easternmost point — of the world. When Alaska was sold to the United States in 1867, its date was changed so that it became the last time zone of the United States, that is, the westernmost point of the Americas, rather than the easternmost point of Asia. Suddenly, what had been considered Friday night and Saturday now became Thursday night and Friday.

A second place where this happened was the Philippines. Although these are islands off the eastern coast of mainland Asia, they were colonized by Spain who governed them as a sub-colony of Mexico, very far to the east. When the Spaniards did this, they counted the days in the Philippines as the westernmost point of the Americas, rather than part of the Far East. This is indeed strange, since Taiwan, Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand, all island nations lying far to the east of the Philippines, kept their days the same as mainland Asia. Thus, someone traveling from any nearby country to the Philippines found themselves a day in the week earlier.

During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Holland and Spain were frequently at war in the Far East. At the time, Holland controlled many east Asian islands that eventually became Taiwan and Indonesia. The Dutch repeatedly attempted to wrest the Philippines from Spain by attacking either Manila Harbor or the Spanish navy. Although the Dutch did not succeed in colonizing the Philippines, they did at times capture Spanish prisoners of war, who discovered that, not only were they now slaves, but they also had to change their days of the week to accomodate their new masters!

This situation existed in the Philippines from the sixteenth century until the 1820’s when Spain lost Mexico and almost all of its new world colonies. Once Spain no longer governed the Philippines from Mexico, they eventually changed its date to the same as the rest of the east Asian world.

There apparently was no Jewish community in the Philippines when this change occurred. Had there been one, they would have had to ask a shaylah whether they are now to observe Shabbos on Friday!

The Mid-19^th Century

Slightly past the middle of the 19^th century, such great luminaries as Rav Shemuel Mohliver and Rav Alexander Moshe Lapidus wrote works on the topic of the halachic dateline. They were well aware of the contributions on the subject by the Kuzari and the other rishonim that we have quoted. Most of these scholars contended that, notwithstanding that the Kuzari appears to be the only rishon who provided an opinion on the subject of the dateline, his approach was not accepted by the majority of rishonim and early halachic opinion. In addition, Rav Shemuel Mohliver noted that neither the Kuzari nor the Ba’al Hama’or ever expressly stated that they were ruling that there is a halachic dateline to determine when Shabbos begins. However, Rav Lapidus concluded that the dateline is 90 degrees east of Yerushalayim. Thus, he ruled that Japan, Korea, Kamchatka, Harbin, Melbourne, Sydney, New Zealand and eastern Indonesia should observe Shabbos, Yom Kippur and other Jewish laws as if they are part of the Americas, a day later than mainland Asia.

See part 2 of this article for the continuation of this discussion.

A peculiarity of the Mishnah is that there is no maseches devoted to discussing the laws of Chanukah, as opposed to other mitzvos derabbanan, such as Purim and Eruvin. There are several mishnayos that mention Chanukah, all tangentially, and in only one of these does it refer to the Chanukah lamp. A Mishnah in Bikkurim (1:6) states that the last time for bringing bikkurim to the Beis Hamikdash every year is on Chanukah. A Mishnah in Rosh Hashanah (1:3) states that beis din sent out messengers to advise people which day was Rosh Chodesh so that they could observe the holidays on the correct day. The Mishnah teaches that these messengers informed people when Rosh Chodesh Kislev was so that they could observe Chanukah on the correct day.

Another instance is a Mishnah in Bava Kama (6:6) that states that someone who placed a lamp outside his house is obligated to pay damages should an animal knock over the lamp and start a fire. However, Rabbi Yehudah states that if the lamp was someone’s neir Chanukah, he is exempt from paying damages since he had permission to place the lamp this low. It should be noted that only this last Mishnah is making any reference to the mitzvah of kindling the Chanukah lights.

The Gemara (Shabbos 21b) discusses whether this latter Mishnah proves that it is a mitzvah to place the Chanukah light near the ground. A subsequent passage of Gemara (Shabbos 22a) concludes that the neir Chanukah cannot be placed more than 20 amos above street level. If the menorah is placed more than 20 amos above street level, people will not notice the neir Chanukah, and publicizing the miracle will not be achieved.

Maseches Shabbos

Notwithstanding the lack of a maseches devoted to the laws of Chanukah, there is extensive discussion about it in the Gemara. The second chapter of Maseches Shabbos,Bameh Madlikin, which discusses the kindling of the Shabbos lights, discusses the laws of Chanukah. The Mishnah there explains which wicks and oils may be used for the Shabbos lights, and the Gemara states that the same wicks and oils may be used to kindle the Chanukah lights. Interestingly, when the Rif begins discussing the laws of Chanukah in his halachos to Maseches Shabbos, he has a subheading about neir Chanukah, something very unusual for him.

Using the Chanukah lights

Although sometimes the laws governing the Shabbos lights and those regarding the Chanukah lights are identical, there are many applications for which the laws are very different. For example, halacha requires that we use the Shabbos lights and that there should be light everywhere in the house that someone walks on Shabbos. However, the amora’im dispute whether one may use the Chanukah lights. Rav Huna and Rav Chisda permit using the neir Chanukah, whereas Rav prohibits it. Rava (Shabbos 21b) adds, that according to Rav’s opinion, one is required to have a lamp near the Chanukah lights, which we call the shamash. Rava rules that if a significant fire, such as an active fireplace, is near the Chanukah lights, there is no need to also have a shamash since the light of the fire is sufficient. Even so, for a prominent person, who would not use a bonfire or fireplace as his source of light, a shamash should be lit, notwithstanding that there is a bonfire.

Among the rishonim we find several opinions as to why it is forbidden to use the Chanukah lights. Some explain that this is because of a concept called bizuy mitzvah, treating a mitzvah object in a contemptuous manner. The source from a pasuk teaches that it is forbidden to perform the mitzvah of kisuy hadam by pushing the earth with your foot. The mitzvah should be done by picking up the earth with your hand and placing it atop the blood.

Another situation that violates this rule is to dispose of an object that was used for a mitzvah, such as worn-out sechach or tzitzis, by putting them in the regular trash. There is no requirement to place these items in sheimos (genizah), because they have no sanctity, but they should not be treated with disdain (Shabbos 21a-b); placing them in the regular garbage is demeaning for an object that was once used to perform a mitzvah.

Returning to the laws of neir Chanukah, the Ba’al Hamaor explains that it is prohibited to use them because of the law of bizuy mitzvah, and then explains that this is true only if one uses them for his own benefit. In his opinion, it is permitted to perform a mitzvah using the light of the neir Chanukah.

The Rosh seems to hold an approach similar to that of the Ba’al Hamaor. He rules that one may not use the light of the menorah to perform a permanent job or other work that he considers inappropriate. It is permitted to do something temporary when does not give the impression that he is treating the mitzvah disdainfully.

All halachic authorities agree that (1) there is a concept called bizuy mitzvah and (2) that it is probably prohibited min haTorah. However other rishonim do not consider this an adequate reason to explain why someone cannot benefit from the neiros Chanukah. Covering the blood of shechitah by kicking the soil rather than using your hand to perform the mitzvah demonstrates disdain for a mitzvah. But why is it disdainful to use the Chanukah lamp light to read or to perform a mitzvah? Even using this light to eat dinner does not seem to be treating these lamps with scorn! Thus, it is understandable that other rishonim propose other reasons to explain the prohibition against using the Chanukah lights.

Rashi (Shabbos 21b) explains that the reason we cannot use the Chanukah lamp is so that it is obvious that it was kindled to fulfill a mitzvah.

Yet another approach is that, since the neiros Chanukah are kindled to represent the lights kindled in the Beis Hamikdash, just as those lights may not be used for personal benefit, so, too, the lights of the menorah should not be used (Ran).

Differences in halacha

Are there any halachic differences among these various opinions? The Beis Halevi (commentary to the Torah, page 56) explains that there are. In his opinion, Rashi holds that the prohibition not to use the Chanukah lights is limited to the members of the household who kindled them for the mitzvah, whereas according to the Ran (and certainly those who prohibit its use because of bizuy mitzvah) no one may use the light of the Chanukah lamps.

Rav Ya’akov Molcho (Shu’t Ya’akov Molcho #49, quoted by Birkei Yosef 673:5) permits using the light of the neiros Chanukah to look up a halachic question about the neiros Chanukah themselves. Since this is a Chanukah need, it is permitted. It would seem that this opinion could hold like Rashi that we want it demonstrated that these lamps are designated for a mitzvah — using them to research a question about their observance does not take away from that acknowledgement. Alternatively, Rav Molcho could hold like those rishonim who prohibit using the lights because of bizuy mitzvah, and using them to research a Chanukah question is not a bizuy mitzvah. However, according to the approach of the Ran that it is because the Chanukah lights should be treated like the lights of the menorah in the Beis Hamikdash, one would not be allowed to use the Chanukah lights to research a halachic inquiry just as it is forbidden to use the Beis Hamikdash menorah lights for this purpose.

If they went out

The Gemara (Shabbos 21a-b) discusses the following question: If the Chanukah lights were all set up properly with the correct wicks and oil such that they should burn just fine, but for some reason they went out anyway before the required time that they should be lit, is one halachically required to rekindle the lights? This is referred to as kavsah zakuk la, if it becomes extinguished, he is obligated to rekindle it (Rav Huna) or kavsah ein zakuk la, if it becomes extinguished, he is not obligated to rekindle it (Rav and Rav Chisda). The halacha is kavsah ein zakuk la (Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 673:2).

In a responsum related to this issue, the Rashba was asked: After reciting his berachos and kindling his Chanukah light, someone was trying to have it burn clearer. While doing this, he extinguished his lamp. Is he required to rekindle it, and, if he does, does he recite the berachos again? The Rashba rules that he is not required to rekindle his lamps, and, should he choose to rekindle them, he should not recite any berachos (Shu’t Harashba 1:539, quoted by Ran).

When to light?

The Gemara (21b) also states that the mitzvah is to kindle the lights from “sunset” until people are no longer walking in the marketplace. In earlier days, after it got dark, people basically remained home – there were no street lights. The Gemara states that there was an ethnic group, called the Tarmudai, who would remain in the streets selling people kindling wood. Someone who discovered that he was short of kindling wood to start his home hearth would go out in the street to purchase kindling wood from the Tarmudai. The Tarmudai were the last people on the unlit streets; when they disappeared, there was no longer any mitzvah to kindle the Chanukah lights, since no one was outdoors for whom to publicize the miracle. Thus, someone who neglected to kindle the Chanukah lights after the Tarmudai went home did not fulfill any mitzvah; if they recited a beracha, it would be a beracha in vain.

The halachic authorities note that since today people do go outdoors much later at night, there is a mitzvah to kindle Chanukah lights later in the evening, should one be unable to kindle them as it gets dark.

How many?

The Gemara presents a lengthy discussion regarding how many lights one should kindle oneach night of Chanukah. In halachic conclusion, the rule is that the mitzvah requires that one kindle only one light each night. However, the Gemara also presents mehadrin methods of fulfilling the mitzvah. In practice, there are two approaches:

Ashkenazim — each individual kindles the number of lights corresponding to the night of Chanukah.

Sephardim — the household as a whole kindles only one menorah, again with the number of lights corresponding to the night of the festival.

Public kindling

The Gemara (21b) states that it is a mitzvah to kindle the Chanukah lights outside. In general, this approach is observed today only in Eretz Yisrael, whereas in chutz la’aretz the accepted practice is to kindle the Chanukah lights in a window that can be seen from the public area. The poskim explain that, at the time of the Gemara the primary pirsumei nisa was for those outside. In chutz la’aretz today, the primary pirsumei nisa is for the members of one’s household (see Rema, Orach Chayim 672:2 and commentaries thereon). A consequence of this is that, in our generation, should one return home late at night, when no one is in the street but his household members are awake, he may kindle his Chanukah lights then.

What berachos?

What berachos does one recite prior to kindling neir Chanukah? The Gemara (23a) states that, on the first night of Chanukah, one recites three berachos, Lehadlik neir shel Chanukah, She’asah Nissim and Shehecheyanu. On the other nights, we recite only the first two. The Gemara teaches that someone who is not kindling the lights and is not fulfilling the mitzvah by having someone kindle the lights for him, recites the second and third beracha (on the first night) upon seeing the lights in someone else’s home. After the first night of Chanukah, someone who is not kindling his own menorah recites the beracha of She’asah Nissim upon seeing someone else’s lights burning.

The Gemara proceeds to ask how we can recite a beracha on neiros Chanukah that states that You Hashem commanded us concerning this mitzvah, when the mitzvah to kindle neiros Chanukah is a rabbinic requirement, not a Torah mitzvah. How can we say vetzivanu when Hashem did not command us? The Gemara concludes that, since the Torah commanded us to observe what Chazal teach us, when they command us to keep a mitzvah this is equivalent to the Torah commanding us – hence the wording vetzivanu is fully appropriate.

I saw an interesting question raised by Rav Meir Mazuz, the late rosh yeshiva and posek of the Tunisian community in Eretz Yisrael. As we learned at the very beginning of our article, the entire discussion of the laws of neir Chanukah is a tangential discussion in the second chapter of maseches Shabbos, whose focus is on the details of the mitzvah of lighting lamps for Shabbos. Since kindling Shabbos lights is also a mitzvah miderabbanan, Rav Mazuz asked: why does the Gemara (Shabbos 23a) discuss the wording of the beracha on a mitzvah derabbanan when discussing the mitzvah of kindling neir Chanukah? Why not ask the identical question about the beracha recited when kindling the Shabbos lights? This question should be asked first, since the entire chapter of mishnayos discusses kindling Shabbos lights, whereas kindling Chanukah lights is a side point discussed in the Gemara that is not mentioned in the Mishnah?

Rav Mazuz suggests that, at the time of the Gemara, no beracha at all was recited on kindling Shabbos lights – this practice developed later, during the era of the geonim.

House and two courtyards

The Gemara discusses a case of a house that opens onto two different courtyards, each of which has a separate entrance to the street. This passage of Gemara is based on what is called mar’is ayin, raising suspicion that one violated halacha. Another way of describing this is: “Oh, my goodness, what will the neighbors say?”

As mentioned above, in the time of the Gemara, kindling Chanukah lights was primarily to publicize the miracle of Chanukah to those outside the house. Every house and every courtyard had a lamp kindled that could be seen from the street. The Gemara rules that someone whose house opened on two different courtyards is required to kindle a menorah in both places. If he kindled only one, the people in the street that passes the other courtyard might think that he neglected to observe the mitzvah of kindling Chanukah lights, which is a violation of mar’is ayin.

Based on this passage, the Beis Halevi questions a ruling that we quoted above, in which it was concluded that kavsah ein zakuk lah – if the lamp went out after being properly prepared, halacha does not require you to rekindle it. The Beis Halevi questions why he is not required to kindle it because of mar’is ayin, the neighbors will think that he did not kindle a light?

Actually, this question is recorded earlier (Sha’arei Teshuvah 673:7, quoting Shu’t Shevus Yaakov 3:48) who answers that should the lamp go out early, he must leave the oil and the wick in place until the required time is passed. This way, those who see that no lamp is burning will also, upon inspection, see that there was a lamp set up, and realize that this was a case of kavsah, and that he indeed fulfilled his halachic requirement. (The Beis Halevi himself provides a different answer to this question, requiring that you rekindle the lamp because of mar’is ayin, notwithstanding that kavsah ein zakuk lah. He notes that his position is at odds with what is written in the halachic authorities, all of whom imply that, since we paskin kavsah ein zakuk lah, there is no obligation to rekindle a lamp if it was burning properly and then subsequently went out before a half hour transpired.)

Mixing lights

Some authorities contend that you should not kindle some of your lights from wax and others from oil on the same night, because people will think that this is two different people lighting (Shu’t Shaar Efrayim #39). However, the Birkei Yosef (673:2) disagrees, noting that there is no mar’is ayin since you are not required to kindle more than one light.

Women and neir Chanukah

The Gemara rules that women are obligated in neir Chanukah, because of the reason that they were also included in the miracle. Nevertheless, several prominent authorities rule that a married woman should not light if her husband is home and kindles the menorah (Mishnah Berurah 671:9); others contend that even single women should not kindle the menorah if there are men kindling in the house (Chasam Sofer, commentary to Maseches Shabbos 21b s. v. Vehamehadrin; however, cf. Shu’t Sha’ar Efrayim #42).

Conclusion

The Gemara (Shabbos 23b) states that someone ragil beneir will merit sons who are Torah scholars. Rashi explains that this refers both to the lights of Shabbos and those of Chanukah, whereas the Rosh mentions only those of Chanukah. The Gra says that the Rosh also meant the Shabbos lights, whereas the Maharitz Chayes disagrees.

Some authorities contend that ragil beneir includes having a nice menorah (Birkei Yosef 673:7, quoting earlier poskim).

Reuven asks: May I use perfume for havdalah?

Question #2: Hadasim

Freidel queries: If I use hadasim for havdalah, what beracha should I recite prior to smelling them?

Question #3: Fragrantly Distant

Yael ponders: If someone is distant from the besamim at the time that havdalah is recited, what should they do?

Question #4: No Smell

Yehudah questions: I have no sense of smell. Does that mean that someone else in the family must recite havdalah?

Question #5: No Fragrance

Zevulun asks: I am on the high seas and have no besamim with me. Does that mean that I cannot recite havdalah until I locate some fragrance?

Introduction

In a different article, I discussed the order of the four berachos that we recite weekly when we make havdalah. In that article, I mentioned that we smell fragrances on motza’ei Shabbos to console our souls over the loss of the neshamah yeseirah — the extra aspect of the neshamah that we receive when Shabbos arrives that helps us appreciate the cholent, the kugel and the other Shabbos delicacies — that departs when Shabbos ends. This article will emphasize the halachos regarding the fragrances that we smell as part of the havdalah procedure.

I. Which fragrances warrant a beracha?

In general, when we smell pleasant fragrances, we are required to recite a beracha before smelling them. However, we do not recite a beracha on just anything that has a pleasant smell. Pleasant fragrances upon which one may not recite a beracha fall under four general categories:

A. Forbidden fragrances, such as that used in idol worship or sorcery, or the perfume of an ervah (Rambam, Hilchos Berachos 9:7, based on Berachos 53a). Even if a small amount of a forbidden fragrance is mixed into a potpourri of other fragrances, one does not recite a beracha before smelling the blend (Biur Halacha 217:8).

B. Fragrances whose purpose is not for pleasurable smelling (Berachos 53a; Shulchan Aruch, Orach Chayim 217:2 and 297:2). These include: Deodorizers and other fragrances meant to neutralize bad odors; fragrances not meant for their aroma, but for other purpose, such as to add taste to food; items with only subtle fragrance that most people do not appreciate; items that most people do not consider fragrances, such as shampoos, essential oils, lotions or even fresh bread.

C. Fragrances whose source no longer exists, such as when you can still smell the residual aroma in the air or when you enjoy the smell of an empty besamim or esrog box.

D. Some recent authorities suggest that we should not recite a beracha on a synthetically created fragrance (Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, quoted in Shemiras Shabbos Kehilchasah, Vol. 2, Pg. 263 note 32). Synthetic fragrances are very common in perfumes, colognes, aftershave lotions etc., since synthetic aromas are frequently less expensive and their scent is more predictable than natural perfumes.

However, other authorities dispute this ruling, contending that fragrance should not be different from “synthetic food” made from a non-food substance, such as alcohol, vinegar, candies or flavoring whose source is petrochemical — which is very common today.

Perfume

Our opening question, from Reuven, was: May I use perfume for havdalah? I presume that Reuven was asking whether it could be used for the besamim of havdalah. (If he meant to ask if perfume can be used instead of wine, then the answer will have to wait for a future article that I am planning to write.) As we have seen, there may be several reasons why perfume should not be used:

1. It might be included under perfumes of ervah.
2. According to Rav Shlomo Zalman Auerbach, it does not warrant a beracha since the flavor component might be synthetic.

II. Hadasim

Several early sources, both halachic and kabbalistic, mention a preference to use hadasim as the fragrance for havdalah (Zohar; Tur, Orach Chayim 297). The various reasons cited also relate to the hashkafic reasons and lessons attached to the role of hadasim on Sukkos. The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 297:4) rules that it is customary to use hadasim as besamim for havdalah. However, this sometimes created two difficulties, one, halachic, and the other, practical.

First, the halachic issue: The Gemara and halachic authorities note that there is not just one beracha to recite on pleasant smelling fragrances, but five different berachos, just as there are six different berachos recited on different types of food: hamotzi, mezonos, hagafen, ha’eitz, ha’adamah and shehakol. The five “fragrant berachos” are:

1. Borei shemen areiv, “Who creates pleasant oil,” is recited only before smelling the oil of the balsam tree (see Mishnah Berurah 216:22).

2. Hanosein (or, according to many opinions, Asher nasan) rei’ach tov ba’peiros, “Who bestows (or bestowed) pleasant fragrances in fruits,” is recited before smelling edible fruits and other foods (Shulchan Aruch 216:2; Rema 216:14). In the context of this beracha, peiros means not only what we usually call “fruit,” but anything usually considered edible. We will explain this a bit more shortly.

3. Borei atzei besamim, “Who creates fragrant wood (or fragrant trees).” One recites this beracha before smelling fragrant woody plants and trees or their leaves, seeds, flowers, wood, or oils. Hadasim are certainly in this category, since they grow on a woody branch and bush.

4. Borei isvei besamim, “Who creates fragrant grasses.” We recite this beracha before smelling non-woody plants, their parts and extracts. We will shortly note a point regarding whether a particular plant is called “woody” or “non-woody.” (The technical term for “non-woody” is “herbaceous.”)

5. Borei minei besamim, “Who creates different types of fragrances.” This is the “catch-all” beracha for all fragrances, the equivalent of reciting a shehakol on food. Sometimes, it is the preferred beracha, such as when the fragrance is not of any of the above sources, such as musk, which is of an animal source. It is also used when smelling a blend of several pleasant-smelling substances that have different berachos, such as, if someone mixed hadasim with esrogim. Other times, it is the beracha used to resolve uncertain cases, as we will see shortly. However, since it can be used successfully on any fragrance, if someone, in error or without knowing, recited it before smelling balsam oil, esrogim,  hadasim or mint, they will have fulfilled the beracha requirement and should not go back and recite the correct beracha.

Hadasim

At this point, let us address Freidel’s question, the second of those beginning our article: “If I use hadasim for havdalah, what beracha should I recite prior to smelling them?”

As mentioned above, the beracha before reciting hadasim is borei atzei besamim. However, the Shelah rules that, when reciting havdalah, one should always recite borei minei besamim because not everyone knows the halachos of what berachos to recite on fragrances, and yet everyone is required to recite havdalah. On the other hand, there are other early authorities who clearly do not hold like the Shelah, and contend that lechatchilah one is always required to recite the correct beracha when smelling a fragrance, even for havdalah, just as one is always required to recite the correct beracha when eating. In their opinion, when smelling hadasim for havdalah, one should recite borei atzei besamim (Rabbeinu Yerucham, quoted by Magen Avraham, introduction to 297). The Mishnah Berurah (297:1) quotes the Shelah’s opinion as the primary one, but recommends avoiding the shaylah by using for havdalah something upon which the beracha is borei minei besamim. Among the possible choices is using a blend of fragrances that each alone requires a different bracha, or an item upon which there is a safek as to what its beracha is. The result of this discussion is that, according to the Mishnah Berurah, it is not ideal to use exclusively hadasim for besamim in havdalah, but it is preferred to mix hadasim with something that requires a beracha other than borei atzei besamim.

Above, I mentioned that some halachic and kabbalistic sources express a preference to use hadasim as the fragrance for havdalah (Zohar, Tur, Orach Chayim 297). Aside from the halachic issue just explained, there was also a practical problem in that the hadas, called myrtle in English, does not grow in cold climates. Jews in central and eastern Europe were able to get hadasim for Sukkos only with tremendous difficulty, and they were often dried out and without fragrance by the time they arrived. Although crushing the dried hadasim releases some of the fragrance, they were certainly not as fragrant as fresh hadasim or as other varieties of fragrance that were available. For this reason, there is discussion, already in the rishonim, whether to use hadasim for besamim. The conclusion of the Rema (Orach Chayim 297:4) is to take fragrant items available in the area and add some dried hadasim to them. The common practice in Ashkenaz was to use cloves as the fragrance for havdalah, presumably because they have a pleasant odor when dried and were readily available. A clove is the dried flower bud that grows on a tree. The clove is consumed only as a spice, but is not eaten on its own. Among the halachic authorities, we find four opinions which beracha to recite before smelling cloves:

A. Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros

The Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 216:2) rules that Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros is the correct beracha to say before smelling cloves, contending that this beracha is recited on anything that is consumed, even if only as a seasoning.

B. Borei atzei besamim

Many authorities rule that we recite Hanosein rei’ach tov ba’peiros only on items that are eaten on their own, but not if they are solely a flavoring. Cloves are, therefore, discounted as a food item and treated exclusively as a fragrance. Since the clove grows on a woody stem, these authorities rule that we should recite Borei atzei besamim before smelling cloves (Yalkut Yosef 216:4).

C. Borei isvei besamim

Some contend that Borei atzei besamim is recited only on a fragrance that grows on what is considered a tree for all other halachos. The stem of a clove tree is hollow, which, according to some opinions, precludes it from being considered a tree. Therefore, some consider it an herbaceous plant, upon which the correct beracha is Borei isvei besamim. Apparently, this is the common custom among Yemenite Jews(Ohr Zion Vol. 2 pg. 136; Vezos Haberacha, pg. 174).

D. Borei minei besamim

Because of the disputes quoted above, many rule that one should recite Borei minei besamim on cloves, to avoid any halachic issues (Elyah Rabbah 216:9; Mishnah Berurah 216:16). This is the accepted practice among Ashkenazim and by many Sefardic poskim (Birkei Yosef 216:5; Kaf Hachayim 216:34; Ohr Zion Vol. 2 pg. 136).

In accordance with the custom cited by the Rema and to avoid any shaylos, this author makes a mixture of cloves, cinnamon and dried hadasim for havdalah and crushes the hadasim prior to reciting havdalah, to release their fragrance of the hadasim.

III. Take time to smell the cloves!

Yael asked: What should someone do if he is distant from the besamim at the time that the havdalah is recited?

It happens that not every individual has an opportunity to smell the besamim at the time the beracha on them is recited. In such situations, they should not smell the besamim while the other berachos are recited, but should wait until after the havdalah wine is drunk and then they may recite a beracha and smell the besamim.

IV. No sense of smell

At this point, let us analyze the fourth of our opening questions: “I cannot smell. Does that mean that someone else in the family must recite havdalah?”

In general, someone cannot recite a beracha of benefit, such as a beracha on food or beverage, for another person, unless the person reciting the beracha is also benefiting from the food or beverage and is required to recite a beracha before he may partake in the food or beverage. The exception to this rule is when the beracha is required in order to fulfill a mitzvah. For example, someone who has already fulfilled the mitzvah of kiddush may recite kiddush for someone who has, as yet, not fulfilled the mitzvah. Similarly, someone who has already fulfilled the mitzvah of havdalah may recite havdalah for someone who has, as yet, not heard havdalah.

Why is wine different?

In both of these instances, the person reciting kiddush or havdalah may recite the beracha of hagafen, even though he will not be drinking the wine and someone else will. Why can he recite a beracha on the wine, when he is not partaking from it? The answer is that, in these instances, the beracha on the wine is also considered a birkas hamitzvah, a beracha recited upon performing a mitzvah, and not merely a beracha of benefit. When assisting someone else to perform a mitzvah, I can recite a beracha on the other person’s behalf, and that includes even the beracha recited on the wine as part of performing the mitzvah.

There is one other exception to this rule: I may recite a beracha of benefit to teach my child how to recite it (for the purpose of chinuch), notwithstanding that I am not benefiting at the moment and would otherwise be unable to recite the beracha.

As we will see shortly, reciting a beracha on fragrances is not a requirement on motza’ei Shabbos, but simply a consolation to the neshamah yeseirah. As such, if I cannot smell the fragrances, I cannot recite the beracha on them. If I have children who are old enough to be responsible to recite berachos but are not yet halachically adults, I can recite the beracha on besamim for them and have them smell the fragrances. Otherwise, someone who cannot smell fragrances may not recite the beracha of besamim.

V. No fragrance

At this point, let us analyze the last of our opening questions: Zevulun asks, “I am on the high seas and have no besamim with me. Does that mean that I cannot recite havdalah until I locate some fragrance?”

Regarding the beracha recited on a flame as part of havdalah, the Gemara states, “We do not search to find a flame as we search to observe a mitzvah (Berachos 53b), meaning that there is no requirement to hunt for a flame in order to recite the beracha of borei me’orei ha’eish. Regarding someone who has no fragrance available, the Rosh reasons that the same law applies, since the rationale for the beracha on a flame on motza’ei Shabbos is stronger than that for reciting a beracha on fragrances. Therefore, once the Gemara rules that there is no requirement to search for a flame, there is certainly no requirement to look for fragrances; thus, it is better to recite havdalah when all are assembled than to delay. This ruling is accepted by the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 297:1) and all later authorities.

Conclusion

In a monumental essay, Rav Hirsch (Bereishis 8:21) explains that the expression rei’ach nicho’ach, usually translated as “a pleasant fragrance,” should more accurately be rendered, “an expression of compliance.” He demonstrates that the word nicho’ach means “giving satisfaction” and the concept of rei’ach is used because fragrance implies receiving a very slight impression of something that is distant. Thus, when a korban is offered as a rei’ach nicho’ach, it means that it shows a small expression of our fulfilling Hashem’s will. Similarly, our observing all the details of the laws of Shabbos, down to the minutia of the halachos on fragrances, demonstrates our praising Hashem for even His small kindnesses.

The rebbe himself was the attraction of the shul. There was no community to speak of at this stage. The shul had a few gabba’im to make sure that the daily minyan was somewhat organized. There wasn’t much of what we would call an organization. All of that would happen later.

The rebbe was an incredibly warm and caring individual. And he was also very, very astute. He understood people, understood what their concerns and fears, where they needed their confidence bolstered, when and how you could push them to accomplish more of themselves, and when (and for whom) it was best to say nothing. He was very accepting of who you were and what you were doing. It was never his role to judge, to indoctrinate or to demand. And it made no difference whether you were looking for a chassidish approach to Yiddishkeit, were a stubborn ba’al habayis or a classic misnageid. He was there to help and share with you of his vast understanding and erudition.

And he was extremely honest in his evaluations. He never whitewashed a situation to pretend that a problem did not exist. On the contrary, he amplified it. He made sure that you knew full well what you were up against. He was not going to convince you that everything would be easy and rosy. He explained to you what problems you were going to face and told you how to navigate them. And he gave you very straight answers. Answers that were built on the love he had for everyone.

Although the shul was officially a rebbe’s shtiebel, the “chassidus” as such was hardly existent. There was a hodgepodge of various frum baalei batim with a wide range of minhagim, personal observance levels, styles of dress and Torah knowledge. Some were various “survivors” from Europe, most were American. Some were professionals, others were manual laborers. There was also a handful of students (most of them graduate students at Harvard or MIT) who enjoyed the rebbe. This latter group probably became the most famous of the rebbe’s later chassidim. At this time, aside from the rebbe, I do not remember a single shtreimel – perhaps there was one or two.

Later, the rebbe’s different chesed projects would grow into various organizations, perhaps the best known was a large medical referral service (now called ROFEH), but at that time, this “organization” was the rebbe, his persona, and his contacts. Because of the incredible warmth and caring that he exhibited for everyone, when the rebbe asked a physician he knew for a favor, the doctor was hard pressed to turn him down. It  would be a rare instance that a doctor would want to turn the rebbe down. By the nature of who was calling him (and the rebbe always found the time to take care of everything himself – no one to this day knows how), they were all eager to help – regardless of whether they professed any religious beliefs or interest and regardless of their ethnic origin.

We might say that the rebbe was charismatic – but most charismatic people I have met are artificial. Although the charisma can create a vast following – think of Napoleon – it is a self-interest whose purpose is to create power for its possessor. The rebbe had no interest in himself on any level. His single job was to serve Hashem, and his interest in loving people and helping them was one manifestation of this. When he called to ask for assistance in any matter, it was clear to whomever he called that he was offering them to help someone. And it was clear that he had no other motivation; no vested interest; no personal agenda. This came across so clearly that it was virtually axiomatic that they would help the rebbe – meaning help the person on whose behalf the rebbe had called.

With time, the rebbe’s programs, communities, shullen expanded. They now included large communities on both sides of the Atlantic, numerous organizations, shullen, activities and programs.

Once, when we still lived in Baltimore, my wife and I were visiting Israel when a personal matter needed immediate attention. Someone aware of our predicament recommended we go discuss the matter with the rebbe. I was not aware that the rebbe was in Eretz Yisrael at the time, nor did I have the slightest idea how one could possibly gain an audience with him. I knew that innumerable individuals clamored for a few seconds of the rebbe’s precious time and that the rebbe was no youngster anymore. My friend arranged that my wife and I could go talk to the rebbe together. Yes, you read that correctly: an admor who sat on both moatzos gedolei Hatorah of Agudas Yisrael – the American one, which predominantly reflects the Litvishe yeshiva world, and the one in Eretz Yisrael, which is exclusively rebbes of very large chassidiyus –was willing and available to meet with a married couple of American litvaks who happened to be visiting and represented no political group and were not noted askanim in anything. The rebbe met with us, gave us all the time in the world to hear us out, and explained to us how to deal with the issue involved, and why it was nothing that we should be shaken up over or afraid of. He did not whitewash any problems, but explained, presented and encouraged. To this I will always be grateful. Yehi zichro baruch.

“Is keeping kosher more than one mitzvah?”

Question #2: Food for thought

“Am I required to eat each of the kosher species?”

Question #3: Check your scales

“Must I check fish for scales each time I purchase one?”

Introduction:

The Torah says (in parshas Shemini), Zos hachayah asher tocheilu, “These are the living things from which you may eat,” which the midrashei halacha and the Rambam count as mitzvos aseih. The Rambam considers these as lav haba miklal aseih, a prohibition verbalized as a mitzvas aseih, which is sometimes called an issur aseih. We noted that the Rambam counts four different mitzvos aseih, one to eat only kosher animals, one to eat only kosher fish, one to eat only kosher fowl, and one to eat only kosher grasshoppers. We also learned that the Rambam explains that he wrote the Sefer Hamitzvos to explain the rules that govern what is included in the listing of the 613 mitzvos. We now continue with part two of our article.

What type of positive mitzvah?

The first half of Sefer Hamitzvos consists of fourteen rules, called sherashim, that the Rambam established to determine whether something is counted as one of the 613 mitzvos. In the sixth shoresh, the Rambam rules that if a mitzvah is commanded in the Torah both as a positive commandment and as a negative prohibition, then it is counted as two of the 613 mitzvos — both as a mitzvas aseih and as a mitzvas lo sa’aseih. The Rambam explains that there are three types of mitzvos aseih in which this occurs.

1. In some instances, there is a positive mitzvah that is a flipside of the negative prohibition. For example, someone who observes Shabbos or Yom Tov fulfills a positive mitzvah (Pesachim 84a). There is also a negative prohibition which one violates by performing prohibited activity on Shabbos or Yom Tov.

Similarly, there is a positive mitzvah to observe shemittah, and negative ones involving performing prohibited activity during shemittah. Another example is fasting on Yom Kippur, which involves both a positive mitzvah of afflicting oneself and a lo sa’aseh.

2. A second type of positive mitzvah that accompanies a lo sa’aseh is what is called a lav shekadmo aseih — there is a mitzvah to do something, but one who violates the intent of the positive mitzvah will, at that time, also violate a lo sa’aseh. Two examples of this rule are the cases of the oneis and the motzi shem ra, both of whom are required by a mitzvas aseih to marry and remain married to the wronged woman (should she agree). Should he subsequently divorce her, he will violate a lo sa’aseh, in addition to violating the asei to remain married to her.

3. A third type of positive mitzvah that accompanies a lo sa’aseh is called lav hanitak le’aseih, in which the mitzvas aseih is the instruction that the Torah provides if someone violates the lo sa’aseh. Here are two examples of this situation: The mitzvas lo sa’aseh of nosar is to make sure not to leave over edible parts of a korban past the time that the Torah established for that particular korban. One who does leave over and violates the lo sa’aseh now becomes commanded to observe a mitzvah aseih of burning the leftovers.

A second example is the mitzvah of shiluach hakein, in which one is prohibited from taking the mother bird while she is fulfilling her motherly duties to her eggs or young. One who violates this prohibition by seizing the mother bird is now required to observe the positive mitzvah of setting her free.

We are now faced with a question: If the word tocheilu is a positive mitzvah, what is the Torah commanding us to do? It certainly does not fit the second or third of the three categories mentioned above. The second category would mean that there is a positive mitzvah that one is required to perform whose result one now wishes to abrogate. The mitzvah of tocheilu certainly does not fit this category. Similarly, tocheilu cannot fit the third category, because this mitzvah is not correcting an error.  

If tocheilu is included in the first category, it would mean that one who eats non-kosher violates an aseih, also. Whether we can look at the mitzvah this way appears to be the point of departure between the Rambam and the Ramban. The Ramban wrote the earliest commentary to the Rambam’s Sefer Hamitzvos, with a goal of explaining the Behag’s approach and answering the questions that the Rambam asks on the Behag. At times, the Ramban takes issue with some of the Rambam’s 14 rules. However, the Ramban accepts the Rambam’s sixth rule that a mitzvah, such as Shabbos or Yom Tov, when expressed by the Torah both in a positive way and a negative one, is counted twice, both as a mitzvas aseih and as a mitzvas lo sa’aseh. However,  the Ramban disagrees with the Rambam regarding these four mitzvos of identifying kosher species.

To quote the Ramban, “I see in this matter a major dispute (between the Behag and the Rambam) and, without any question, one of the opinions is erroneous. There are instances in which there is both a lo sa’aseh and an aseih in the same topic; however, both are not counted as mitzvos. An example is the permitted and forbidden animals, fish and fowl, where the Torah includes a positive statement, ‘this is the animal that you may eat,’ and Chazal interpret this to be a mitzvas aseih. Similarly, when it says, ‘you may eat any pure bird,’ this is counted as a positive mitzvah. And again, when it says, ‘this you may eat, from whatever is in the water.’ It is obvious that the intent of the Torah is not to say that when one eats an animal or a fish with the proper kosher signs that one fulfills a mitzvah, and that someone who traps them and then does not eat them is in violation of his observance of a positive mitzvah. The intent, clearly, is that one may eat only these species and not the non-kosher ones. This is called a lo sa’aseh that is derived from a positive statement (in Hebrew, this is called a lav haba miklal aseih), whose purpose is to establish that someone who violates the lo sa’aseh also violates an aseih.”

The Ramban then notes that in all of these instances, the Rambam counts as positive mitzvos that one check whether a species of animal, bird, fish or grasshopper is kosher. However, concludes the Ramban, “The Behag did not count them, because they do not include a positive activity, whereas avoiding eating the prohibited is already included in the lo sa’aseh. Consequently, referring to the prohibition in a positive way does not add to the mitzvah count in these instances, just as repeating the lo sa’aseh several times does not add an extra lo sa’aseh to the mitzvah count.”

The last point raised by the Ramban is mentioned by the Rambam and others. The Torah often repeats a prohibition many times. When the additional pasuk does not add any new halachic information, the additional reference does not constitute an additional mitzvah.

Be positive!

Many authorities rally to address the final point of the Ramban, that the Rambam’s inclusion of these four positive mitzvos must include some additional component or ruling to the halacha. Support for this approach can be brought from the way the Rambam, himself, mentions these mitzvos. In all four instances, the Rambam writes that we are commanded to check for the signs that the particular species is kosher. And he writes this in two places, once in the Mishneh Torah and another time in the Sefer Hamitzvos. There is also one time in the Mishneh Torah where the Rambam writes that the mitzvah is to “know” the kosher signs. What exactly does this mitzvah of checking or knowing entail?

What does a mitzvah add?

Many approaches are suggested to explain what the positive mitzvah might be including, according to the Rambam. Some understand that the mitzvah requires that one be completely familiar with the simanim of the kosher species and have hands-on experience. Book knowledge that split hooves and chewing cud are kosher signs, without knowing what these two terms mean, does not fulfill the mitzvah (Darchei Teshuvah 79:1, quoting Korban Aharon and Yad David).

A second approach is that someone who consumes food from a certain species, not knowing if it is kosher or not, who then discovers that he indeed ate a kosher animal, violates the mitzvas aseih for not checking the indicative factors first (Sefer Hachinuch; Pri To’ar, Yoreh Deah 79:1; Kinas Sofrim; see also Darchei Teshuvah 79:1). To quote the Sefer Hachinuch (Mitzvah #153) “One who violates this mitzvah because he checked only one siman and relied on that without checking for the other siman, even though it turns out that he ate from a kosher species, has neglected his observance of this mitzvah of checking simanim.”

What’s in a horn?

When the Sefer Hachinuch mentions this approach to explain the Rambam’s position, he adds a further comment that appears somewhat strange. He writes that there is also a requirement to know the simanim that identify whether a particular species is a beheimah or whether it is a chayah. There are several laws that are affected by this distinction, and the Gemara provides criteria, depending on the appearance of the animal’s horns, whereby one can identify whether a particular kosher species is a beheimah or a chayah.

However, this comment of the Sefer Hachinuch is very surprising. The Torah, as explained by the above-quoted comments of the Sifrei and the Sifra, includes a mitzvah that we identify whether a species is kosher or not. No matter how we understand this mitzvah of the Torah — and I will soon provide several other approaches — the mitzvah applies only to places where the Torah states that we may eat a certain variety of creature and then provides a defining characteristic or nomenclature. However, where do we see any mitzvah requiring one to identify whether a specific kosher species is a beheimah or a chayah?

The Minchas Chinuch answers that, in fact, horns do function as a secondary siman to determine whether a beheimah is kosher, although they do not function as a siman to determine whether a chayah is kosher. In other words, there are no non-kosher beheimos that bear horns, although there are non-kosher chayos that do. Thus, a beheimah having horns can be used to determine whether a species is kosher.

This explanation of the Minchas Chinuch is also a novel interpretation. The Torah provides two criteria to determine whether a mammal is of a kosher species: does it ruminate, and does it have completely split hooves. Granted that horns are a secondary characteristic, but where do we see that this is included in the Torah’s mitzvah?

More positive attitudes

There are also numerous technical answers why the Rambam counted tocheilu as separate mitzvos. Some authorities explain that one who checks the simanim of an unfamiliar species that he would like to eat, to see if it is kosher, fulfills a mitzvas aseih. This author is inclined to think that, according to this opinion, he should recite a brocha before checking, because that is what the Torah commanded one to do. We do not recite a brocha because of the machlokes haposkim as to whether this act indeed fulfills a mitzvas aseih.

We should note that the halachic authorities accept that once one recognizes a particular species as kosher, there is no further requirement to continue checking the kosher signs of this species (Minchas Chinuch 153; Darchei Teshuvah 79:1). Thus, there is no mitzvah to check for the scales of an obviously identifiable salmon.

Other positive approaches

Still others explain that the meaning of the Rambam’s mitzvas aseih is that one may not rely on the fact that a specific species is probably kosher. In general, there is a halacha that one may rely on rov. Upon this basis, someone not knowing whether a certain variety of bird or fish is kosher could rely on the fact that most fishes with a certain appearance are kosher, or that most birds are kosher. Although, in general, the halachic rule is that one may assume that what is before you is from the majority that are kosher, one may not consume an unfamiliar species, based on the information that there is a rov that this species is kosher (Shu”t HaRivosh #192).

There are other technical ways to explain the Rambam’s position. Some explain that one violates the mitzvas aseih by eating less than a kezayis, even though this is too small an amount to be culpable for violating the lo sa’aseh (Pri Megadim, quoted by Minchas Chinuch, Mitzvah #470 and by Maharam Shik, Mitzvah #154). The Minchas Chinuch (ad loc.), himself, suggests an alternative approach: Although one who consumes a non-kosher species in an unusual manner does not violate a lo sa’aseh, he will violate the mitzvas aseih min haTorah if he eats something that is not normally edible. This would be a novel and stringent idea in halacha, which has ramifications regarding the consumption of medicines and vitamins, a topic we have discussed in the past.

Conclusion

We see that there are halachic ramifications to the dispute between the Rambam and the Ramban as to whether there is a positive mitzvah to keep kosher, or at least, to eat only from kosher species. We should always hope and pray that the food we eat fulfills all the halachos that the Torah commands us.

When praying or making a mishebeirach for a geir, how should we refer to him?

Question #2: Vows

If someone vowed not to benefit from the descendants of Avraham, is he permitted to benefit from a geir, who is not descended from Avraham?

Question #3: Shemoneh Esrei

Can a geir refer to Hashem as the G-d of our forefathers?

Foreword

In parshas Lech Lecha, Hashem told Avraham Avinu that his name was being changed to Avraham because He has appointed him the spiritual father of all nations (Bereishis 17:5). As the Gemara (Yerushalmi Bikkurim 1:4) expresses it, when he was called Avram, he was the “father” of the Arameans, interpreting Avram as a contraction of av Aram. When he was promoted to Avraham, he became the av hamon goyim, the “father” of all the many nations.

This name change is not merely an added title or an intangible tribute, but it incorporates a status that contains halachic ramifications, which is the subject of today’s article. Among the shaylos we will discuss is whether a geir is able to refer to Hashem as the G-d of our forefathers, when Avraham was not his biological father, nor was Yitzchak or Ya’akov.

Names

At this point, let us examine our opening question: “When praying or making a mishebeirach for a geir, how should we refer to him?” May we use his given, non-Jewish name? Should we use his biological mother’s name? Should we pray for a geir as the son/daughter of Avraham Avinu or as the son/daughter of Sarah Imeinu?

When providing the names of geirim in documents, such as kesubos and gittin, we refer to them as the son (or daughter) of Avraham. To quote the Beis Yosef (Even Ha’ezer 66): “In kesubos, the custom is to identify geirim as ploni ben Avraham.” In a get, the halacha is to write “ploni ben Avraham Avinu” (Even Ha’ezer 129:20). The Beis Shemuel explains that we should not write simply ben Avraham because this might create confusion that his biological father’s name is Avraham; a get must be written with precise identification. The Beis Shemuel suggests an alternative approach, to state in the get that he is a geir.

The universal practice when praying for a geir or a geyores for a refuah sheleimah or similar request, or upon reciting a mishebeirach is to refer to them as ben (or bas) Avraham. Similarly, a geir is called up to the Torah as ben Avraham. I am aware of people who pray for geirim or recite a mishebeirach for them as ben/bas Sarah. I am unaware of any halachic source for this practice, and I believe that it is based on an error. People make  the assumption that since we usually pray for people by their mother’s name, we should use Sarah’s name instead of Avraham’s. However, I am unaware of anywhere in Tanach or Chazal that says that Sarah should be treated as the mother of the nations. The special status of being considered the “father” of all the nations was granted to Avraham Avinu only.

I will point out that Rav Moshe Feinstein had the following practice regarding the name used in a get for a geir. If the geir tzedek was halachically observant, then Rav Moshe referred to him or her in the get as ben Avraham Avinu or bas Avraham Avinu. If the person who “converted” to Judaism was never observant or is no longer observant, Rav Moshe referred to them in the get as giyura or giyurta, a term that is not disparaging and is used frequently in the Gemara as a highly respectful term to refer to geirim (Kiddushin 76b; Bava Basra 149a; Avodah Zarah 70a). Rav Moshe considered it a special honor to refer to a geir as ben or bas Avraham Avinu and he did not feel it proper to associate Avraham Avinu with someone who is not halachically observant, even if they once were. My experience is that this approach was followed by Rav Moshe’s talmidim and is followed today by their talmidim.

Vows

If someone vowed not to benefit from the descendants of Avraham, is he permitted to benefit from a geir, who is not descended from Avraham? The answer is that he may not (Rosh, Nedarim 31a; Tur and Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 217:40). The Rosh explains that geirim are included in this term because of the pasuk of av hamon goyim and also because Avraham Avinu is considered the first convert, and therefore anyone who observes the mitzvos is considered his (spiritual) progeny.

Shemoneh Esrei

At this point, we can discuss another of our opening questions: “Can a geir refer to Hashem as the G-d of our forefathers?”

We find a dispute among tana’im and rishonim regarding this question. Explaining these disputes will require an extensive introduction. We must first discuss a seemingly unrelated mitzvah, that of bringing the bikkurim. Each year, a property owner in Eretz Yisrael brings the first produce of the seven species grown in his land to the Beis Hamikdash.There, he presents his produce to the kohein and makes what we will refer to as a pilgrim’s declaration, thanking Hashem for His many salvations and gifts (Devarim 26:1-11). The Mishnah (Bikkurim 1:1) teaches that there are three levels of requirement to observe this mitzvah, depending on the extent of possession that the owner has of his parcel of land:

1. Meivi vekorei – Bring and read

The highest level is when the owner has two mitzvos, one of bringing the bikkurim and a second of reciting the pilgrim’s declaration, called mikra bikkurim by the Mishnah (Sotah 32a). This is performed when the fruit grew completely on land owned by one of the Benei Yisrael.

2. Meivi ve’eino korei – Bring but cannot read

The secondary level is when the owner brings the bikkurim to the Beis Hamikdash but may not recite the pilgrim’s declaration. One example of this is when the fruit grew in a way that it was not completely nourished by land owned by the pilgrim, but by land owned by someone else – even when the pilgrim has permission to use it (Mishnah Bikkurim 1:1 and Yerushalmi ad loc.). Another example is when the pilgrim sold his land before he brought the bikkurim to the Beis Hamikdash (Bikkurim 1:7). The author of the Mishnah places a geir into this category because, in that tanna’s opinion, a geir cannot declare that Hashem promised this land to his forefathers (Bikkurim 1:4).

3. Eino Meivi – May not bring

There is a lower level in which there is no mitzvah of bikkurim and therefore there is no sanctity on the fruits. An example of this is someone who owned the trees on which the new fruit grew, but does not own the land on which the trees grow (Bikkurim 1:6). Since his fruit are not the produce of land that Hashem gave him, he is excluded from the Torah’s definition of someone obligated to bring bikkurim.

From bikkurim to bensching

As I mentioned above, the Mishnah contends that a geir cannot declare that he received Eretz Yisrael as the land that Hashem gave to “us,” meaning the Jewish people, when neither the geir nor his ancestors received land when the Jewish people entered Eretz Yisrael. This tanna also holds that a geir must recite a modified form of the shemoneh esrei:since he is not a biological descendant of Avraham Avinu, he cannot recite the words Elokei avoseinu, “the G-d of our fathers,” at the beginning of the shemoneh esrei. The Mishnah implies that a son of  parents who are both geirim also cannot recite Elokei avoseinu in the shemoneh esrei.

Some rishonim therefore rule that a geir may not be a chazzan or ba’al tefillah, which requires him to state Elokei avoseinu in order to be motzi someone who doesn’t know how to recite shemoneh esrei. The Mordechai (Mordechai, Megillah 786) mentions that, in his day (13^th century), the city of Würzburg (in Bavaria) did not permit a geir to be the chazzan.

On the other hand, the Talmud Yerushalmi quotes Rabbi Yehudah, who disputes the conclusion of the Mishnah and these other rulings, contending that since Avraham Avinu is called the father of all the nations, a geir may and should recite the bikkurim declaration. The Yerushalmi then quotes both Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi and Rabbi Avahu, who rule according to Rabbi Yehudah, against the Mishnah. This ruling is quoted by the Rambam, the Rash and Rav Ovadyah of Bartenura in their commentaries and by many other rishonim (Sefer Yere’im; Ramban; Semag; Sefer Hachinuch; Mordechai, Megillah 786). From this it would appear that a geir may recite the declaration on the bikkurim and should recite the shemoneh esrei as any other Jew would. This approach disagrees with the Würzburg custom that I cited above.

Nevertheless, the Tosefta (Bikkurim 1:3) appears to have understood Rabbi Yehudah’s opinion differently, stating that although Rabbi Yehudah rules that most geirim bring bikkurim, they do not recite mikra bikkurim, since they cannot state “the land that You, Hashem, gave me” (Devarim 26:10). However, geirim who are descended from Yisro do recite mikra bikkurim.

Why is Yisro different from all other gentiles?

Since Yisro and his descendants received land in Eretz Yisrael, as implied by the pasuk in Bamidbar (10:32) and stated there in the Sifrei and by Rashi (see also Rashi, Shoftim 16:1), they can declare “the land that You, Hashem, gave me.”

Rabbeinu Tam’s opinion

In general, the opinion of Rabbeinu Tam carries much weight among the rishonim and the poskim, as is manifest in a long list of halachic practices where his approach is accepted over the rishonim who preceded him. (I am deliberately not listing any of these rulings so as not to take us off our topic.) Rabbeinu Tam (quoted by Tosafos, Bava Basra 81a s.v. Li’me’utei) questions how any geir could recite mikra bikkurim. This bikkurim passage states Arami oveid avi, vayeired Mitzrayma “my father was a lost Aramean, who then descended to Egypt;” according to Chazal, this refers to Ya’akov Avinu. Furthermore, the pilgrim refers to the travails of the Jewish people as the experiences of his own family. Rabbeinu Tam concludes that the Tosefta which permits a descendant of Yisro to recite mikra bikkurim refers to someone whose father’s side of his family is descended from Yisro and his mother’s side descended from Ya’akov Avinu. Rabbeinu Tam’s reasoning is that this person descended from geirim can recite mikra bikkurim on the basis of his mother’s side of the family. However, mikra bikkurim also states “the land that you gave me,” which is inaccurate for someone whose father is a geir even if his mother is from a Jewish family. Therefore, someone of this status cannot declare mikra bikkurim. Nevertheless, since Yisro’s descendants received land in Eretz Yisrael, a geir whose father’s side is descended from Yisro and his mother’s side includes descendants from Ya’akov Avinu may bring bikkurim and recite the parsha.

Based on this Tosefta, and on a passage in the Talmud Bavli (Makkos 19a) that quotes the Mishnah in Bikkurim without the disputing opinion of Rabbi Yehudah, Rabbeinu Tam concludes that a geir cannot recite any prayers or declarations that refers to our ancestors receiving the land or being descended from the avos. Rabbeinu Tam even bans someone descended from geirim from reciting these passages unless he also has antecedents born from the avos. Thus, Rabbeinu Tam rejects the opinion of the Yerushalmi, even suggesting that our text of this passage of Yerushalmi is erroneous and should be expunged. Following this approach, a geir may also not lead services; his approach was implemented by the community of Würzburg, as I cited above.

Bensching

Tosafos (Bava Basra 81a s.v. Li’me’utei) and the Tur (Orach Chayim 199) record a dispute among the rishonim how a geir recites bensching. Rabbeinu Tam and the Behag contend that a geir cannot recite the words she’hinchalta la’avoseinu, “that You bequeathed [Eretz Yisrael] to our fathers.” In their opinion, he cannot recite the exact same text of the bensching that Jews descended from Avraham Avinu do.

Leading a zimun

The next factor requires a bit of an introduction. In earlier generations, the person leading the zimun recited the entire bensching for the others, who fulfilled their mitzvah by listening to his bensching. This is the practice we follow for fulfilling the mitzvos of kiddush and havdalah, which we perform by listening to what is recited by the head of the household. Thus, Rabbeinu Tam rules that a geir cannot lead a zimun for bensching. The reason for this is that Rabbeinu Tam holds that a geir cannot be motzi someone else in bensching since it requires stating that we received from Hashem the wonderful land of Eretz Yisrael (see Devarim 8:7-10; and also Berachos 20b, Rashi s.v. Oh Derabbanan and Tosafos s.v. Nashim).

This opinion of Rabbeinu Tam is recorded by the Tur (Orach Chayim 199), along with the disputing position of Rabbeinu Tam’s disciple (and nephew), Rabbeinu Yitzchak, usually called simply the R’Y.

How do we paskin?

The consensus of the rishonim rejects Rabbeinu Tam’s approach, ruling like the R’Y that Avraham Avinu’s status as the av hamon goyim allowsa geir to recite the same version of birkas hamazon and shemoneh esrei that everyone else does, to be motzi others in birkas hamazon and shemoneh esrei, and to lead the services (Rambam, Hilchos Bikkurim 4:3; Tosafos, Bava Basra 81a s.v. Li’meutei; Ramban, Rashba and Ran in their respective commentaries to Bava Basra; Hagahos Maimoniyos, Hilchos Tefillah 8:20; Bartenura, Bikkurim 1:4; Beis Yosef, Orach Chayim 53). Uncharacteristically, the Shulchan Aruch (Orach Chayim 53:19) makes a very strong statement rejecting Rabbeinu Tam’s approach: “There are those who refuse to allow a geir to be the chazzan, but their opinion is rejected.”

There is an important conclusion to be brought from the fact that the Shulchan Aruch writes this in such a strong way. The Gemara states that a guest who refuses to lead the bensching when requested to by the host causes himself great harm (Berachos 55a). This is because Avraham Avinu was given a beracha that those who bless him would always be blessed. But, the opposite is also true – those that deny blessing Avraham Avinu or his descendants are cursed. This does not bode well for someone who has the opportunity to bless the benefactor of the se’udah and turns down the opportunity. Thus, since we conclude unlike Rabbeinu Tam, a geir should not turn down the opportunity to lead the bensching, an opportunity he would be unable to take advantage of  according to Rabbeinu Tam.

Technically, the ill effect of declining to lead the bensching may apply only when the others do not recite birkas hamazon on their own. If they do recite birkas hamazon,including the blessing that the guest gives to the host, turning down the honor of leading the birkas hamazon may not have such dire consequences.

The Rambam’s rulings

Not all our questions are fully resolved, because we have an apparent contradiction in the rulings of the Rambam. Whereas he concludes that a geir brings bikkurim and recites the mikra bikkurim (Hilchos Bikkurim 4:3), he rules that a geir does not recite what is called viduy ma’asros (Hilchos Ma’aser Sheini 11:17). This is the declaration that a farm owner in Eretz Yisrael recites after the three year ma’aser cycle (two consecutive years of ma’aser sheini, which have sanctity and must be eaten in Yerushalayim, followed by a year in which ma’aser ani to be distributed to the poor is separated instead) that he has properly separated all that he is required to and has dealt with them all appropriately (Devarim 26:12-15). In the viduy ma’asros, we request from Hashem to “bless Your people, Yisrael, and the land that you swore that you would give us.” Because of this statement, the Rambam rules that a geir does not recite viduy ma’asros, even though he rules that a geir does recite the mikrah bikkurim, which also refers to the land given to our forefathers.

This question is asked by several early acharonim, who propose a variety of answers (Kapos Temarim, Sukkah 38; Bach, Yoreh Deah; Shu’t Sha’ar Efrayim #14; Magen Giborim; Birkei Yosef). I will share the answer provided by the Mahari Kurkus: The last Mishnah in Mesechta Ma’aser Sheini rules that a geir cannot recite the viduy of ma’aser sheini and there is no mention there of a dispute. Ma’aser Sheini should be treated differently from all the other laws mentioned because there the declaration states, “the land that you swore that you would give us.” Although a geir is considered the progeny of Avraham Avinu, he cannot say that Hashem swore to him that He would give him the holy land.

Conclusion

Once his name has been changed, the Gemara forbids calling Avraham by his earlier name, Avram. The question is asked that we do not find such a prohibition of calling Ya’akov by this name, even after his name was change to Yisrael. Quite the contrary, the pasuk itself refers to him as Ya’akov.

The Seforno (Bereishis 17:5) explains that the name Yisrael represents the goal of the world situation. Ultimately, the world will recognize his mission as Yisrael, but at the moment it does not. This is different from Avraham, who, from the moment his name is changed has a new role in the world – and, as we have seen, this role includes many halachic ramifications.