The claimant filed a C-3 (Employee Claim) on January 8, 2025, setting forth that she suffered an exacerbation of severe mental illness due to exposure of a racially insensitive wooden item in another staffer's office on January 25, 2023….

At a hearing on March 7, 2025, the claimant testified that she was employed as a property manager on January 25, 2023 and was out of work at the time because in July 2021 there was a shooting at one of the units where a 3-year-old child was killed and she felt responsible for the death.

She stated that on January 25, 2023 she came to work and was sitting in the office, and she was told that a Mammy doll which depicts slavery was in the garage of the building where they worked. She indicated that the Mammy doll was not removed from the garage and she asked to go see it in the garage so she could remove it.

She stated that when she saw the doll she was overcome with emotions because it was so humiliating. She stated that she could not control her emotions and could not think clearly. She stated that the garage was the entryway to the building and was usually open and is often used as an entranceway from where an employee parks and comes into the building.

On cross-examination, the claimant testified that her office was not located in the garage which was used for storage and lockers for the maintenance people. She stated that her job was to inspect apartment units and serve as a liaison between the tenants and her employer. On redirect, the claimant testified that the Mammy doll at work indicated that her employer allows discrimination and hatred….

At the hearing on March 7, 2025, Tamara Van Wey, director of management, testified that she was told that the claimant saw a Mammy doll on January 25, 2023 in the garage and that it was leaning on the window of the garage. She stated that she did not see the Mammy doll herself so she does not know if there was other nicknacks on the windows of the garage….

The administrative law judge had "found that the claimant sustained an exacerbation of adjustment disorder and depression due to a work-related incident," but the Board disagreed:

The SIF [State Insurance Fund] contends that the claimant has not demonstrated a work-related injury involving stress. The SIF argues that the claimant was exposed to a wooden mammy plaque in her employer's garage. However, this level of offense does not rise to a compensable claim since the claimant should be expected to deal with minor stresses and offenses that a similarly situated person is expected to handle. The SIF also agues that the medical evidence is inconsistent in the claimant's reporting of the incident….

In a claim for a psychological injury based on a diagnosis other than post-traumatic stress disorder, acute stress disorder, and/or major depressive disorder, there must be evidence to show that "'the stress that caused the injury was greater than that which other similarly situated workers experienced in the normal work environment.'"

"It [i]s claimant's burden to establish a causal relationship between his employment and his disability by competent medical evidence. To this end, a medical opinion on the issue of causation must signify 'a probability as to the underlying cause' of the claimant's injury which is supported by a rational basis. '[M]ere surmise, or general expressions of possibility, are not enough to support a finding of causal relationship.'"

Here, we find that the claim is disallowed based on the insufficient evidence supporting causal relationship and the inconsistent reporting of the mechanism of injury by the claimant. While we agree that racist imagery does not belong in the workplace, and exposure to it can be the cause for anxiety, we do not find that the evidence supports causal relationship.

{The file contains a medical report from January 26, 2023, that noted that the claimant presented with increased anxiety, stress and depressed mood. It was also noted that the claimant reported that she recently saw a derogatory remark that was directed at her in a room at her place of employment. It was indicated that the claimant was very insulted and that she is depressed and anxious because of a very stressful work environment.

Dr. Campana, the claimant's treating physician, evaluated the claimant on January 30, 2023, and the assessment was adjustment disorder with anxiety and depressed mood.

On March 24, 2023, Dr. Campana examined the claimant indicating that the claimant reported that she was targeted at work which exacerbated her anxiety.

In a notice of decision filed January 14, 2025, the WCLJ found prima facie medical evidence for an exacerbation of pre-existing mental health conditions of adjustment disorder with depression and anxiety per the January 26, 2023 of Dr. Campana.

Dr. Joseph, the carrier's consultant, examined the claimant on February 28, 2025, and noted that the claimant reported that she was racially harassed at work to the point of being emotionally overwrought and had to leave her position. Upon evaluation, he diagnosed the claimant with adjustment disorder with anxiety and severe depression. He noted that the claimant's psychiatric symptoms are causally related to her work environment which caused distress to the point where she was unable to work. He stated that the work environment certainly exacerbated her existing mental health.}

Most importantly, the claimant saw Dr. Campana the very next day after the alleged incident in question and there is no mention of any incident like the claimant is alleging. Further, the report of that examination notes anxiety going back an entire year before the alleged incident, which renders the claimant's testimony not credible.

Further, the claimant offers no persuasive evidence of other racist treatment at work. It is apparent from the reports that Dr. Campana was not informed of any exposure of a Mammy doll, which the claimant now maintains is the basis of her stress.

Further, Dr. Joseph found causal relationship but what the claimant reported was also inconsistent as she reported that she was harassed and yelled at by her employer but made no reference to a Mammy Doll, which again contradicts her testimony. Therefore, like Dr. Campana, Dr. Joseph's opinion on causal relationship is not persuasive as it is based on the claimant's version of events, which lacks credibility. Based on the totality of the evidence, we find that the claim is disallowed due to the lack of persuasive evidence supporting causal relationship….

The post Workers' Comp Claim for "Exacerbation of Severe Mental Illness Due to Exposure of a Racially Insensitive Wooden Item" appeared first on Reason.com.

An excerpt from the long Skertich v. Luffman, decided last week by the Illinois Appellate Court (Justice Michael McHaney, joined by Justices Mark Boie and Mark Clarke):

Mark B. Skertich (Petitioner) … filed a verified petition for stalking no contact order (petition), against the Respondent on behalf of Petitioner and two other protected parties: Laura Bauer and Brad Hyre…. In an attachment to the petition, Petitioner alleged that Respondent had "engaged in escalating and repeated harassing communication and videos towards" Petitioner, Bauer, and Hyre, all of whom were employees of Collinsville CUSD No. 10 (school district), with Petitioner serving as Superintendent, Bauer serving as Principal, and Hyre serving as Assistant Superintendent….

The attachment alleged that Respondent's behavior "caus[ed] extreme concern for [the] safety" of the protected parties and caused "emotional distress." The attachment alleged that on December 16, 2024, Respondent was barred from school district property "for aggressive, intimidating and harassing behavior towards" the protected parties. The attachment specified "aggressive and harassing language" found in "at least 75 emails" sent by Respondent to the protected parties, and detailed the language allegedly used by Respondent in a phone call with Bauer.

The attachment alleged Respondent had "sent repeated harassing and threatening emails totaling 1465 email exchanges on 262 threads to" the protected parties. The attachment further alleged Respondent had (1) sent "repeated emails to multiple federal and state agencies filing complaints with unsupported and outlandish allegations;" (2) sent multiple "emails with harassing allegations" to school district legal counsel, "smearing the name[s]" of the protected parties "and causing significant distress;" and (3) sent copies of the emails to media outlets, elected officials, and others…. The attachment alleged Respondent had received two citations from Collinsville police, one "for online harassment through electronic communications," and one for trespassing on school district property after Respondent was barred from being present on that property.

The attachment alleged Respondent posted "multiple videos" on YouTube and Instagram "asserting the same harassing allegations" and using "threatening language." … The attachment alleged that the language in the videos demonstrated Respondent was "not contacting [the protected parties] in good faith as a parent or community member," but was instead "clearly sending communications to harass them." …

[T]he circuit court entered a plenary [two-year] stalking no contact order …. The order listed the names of all three protected parties, and found Respondent had been properly served with process and with notice of the hearing and was "in default." The order stated … that "[u]pon examination of the Verified Petition, Petitioner under oath, and other evidence, Petitioner is a victim of two or more acts of following, monitoring, observing, surveilling, threatening, communicating or interfering or damaging property or pets by Respondent."

The order {(1) prohibited Respondent "from threatening to commit or committing stalking personally or through third party;" (2) stated that Respondent could not contact the protected parties "in any way, directly, indirectly or through third parties including but not limited to, phone, written notes, mail, email, or fax[,]" … (3) required Respondent "to stay at least 100 feet away from" the protected parties "residence, school daycare, employment and any other specified place," including all school district property and all school district events "wherever located[,]"} [4] "prohibited [Respondent] from contacting [the protected parties] on work or personal phones, email, or other communication platforms," and … [5] "prohibited [Respondent] from naming [the protected parties] in social media and emails to third parties." …

The court upheld the order, including the "no naming" condition:

Petitioner is correct that this court has upheld a circuit court ruling that online postings that are part of a course of unlawful conduct of stalking under the Act are not protected free speech, and that in such situations, prohibitions on future online postings are permissible. In Piester v. Escobar (Ill. App. 2015), the plenary stalking no contact order prohibited the respondent from, inter alia, posting anything on social media about the petitioner. In the appeal that followed, one of the claims of the respondent was that the order violated her free speech rights.  When evaluating the respondent's free speech challenge, this court first noted that "[a] party's exercise of free speech is expressly excluded from the [Act] and may provide a defense."

We added, however, that the Act "prohibits speech that includes threats of violence or intimidation, which are not constitutionally protected," and that "[w]ords concerning surveilling, interfering, or harassing a person are not entitled to protection as free speech."  We concluded that the "social media postings and other online comments" at issue in that case "were part of a course of conduct of stalking" because they included "threatening and harassing comments about [the petitioner]."  Accordingly, the social media postings and other online comments were "not protected under the first amendment," and the circuit court's order—including its prohibition against the respondent posting anything on social media about the petitioner—was upheld.

Likewise, in McNally v. Bredemann (Ill. App. 2015), this court noted that although the Act is civil in nature, the Act itself recognizes that "'[s]talking is a serious crime'" for which victims need an adequate remedy. We noted that [w]hile stalking does contain an element of speech, that speech does not fall within the protections of the first amendment" if it is comprised of "words surrounding surveilling, interfering, or harassing a person to intimidate," because such words "are not constitutionally protected."  We held that the online postings in question in McNally "were a transparent part of [the] stalking conduct," and we reiterated a longstanding holding of the Illinois Supreme Court that "'[w]here speech is an integral part of unlawful conduct, it has no constitutional protection.'" Id. (quoting People v. Bailey (Ill. 1995)); see e.g., Wright v. County of DuPage (Ill. App. 2000) (because activities occurring at massage spas did not constitute expression protected under the first amendment, court did not need to consider spas' claim that ordinance governing spas was unconstitutional as overly restrictive and a prior restraint on freedom of speech); Same Condition, LLC v. Codal, Inc. (Ill. App. 2021) (the post-adjudication remedy of prior restraint of unprotected speech has been approved by multiple courts where the purpose of the remedy was to prevent additional unlawful conduct by the restrained party).

In this case, as described in detail above, the allegations in the petition and its attachment, and the findings in the order, were comprised in part of social media postings that the circuit court determined were part of Respondent's course of unlawful conduct of stalking. Accordingly, the section of the order that prohibited Respondent "from naming [the protected parties] in social media" was consistent with this court's ruling in Piester, as well as with the general principles about unprotected speech found in McNally, Bailey, Wright, and Codal.

Nevertheless, it is certainly true, as Respondent contends, that as a general rule content-based prior restraints on protected speech "are highly disfavored, subject to strict scrutiny, and must be narrowly tailored to serve compelling state interests." A content-based restriction is one that regulates "speech based on 'the topic discussed or the idea or message expressed.'"

In this case, even if we were to assume, arguendo, that the speech in question is protected speech, there is no content-based restriction in the order, because the order does not prohibit Respondent from posting on social media about any topic Respondent chooses, and does not prohibit Respondent from expressing any idea or message Respondent chooses. To the contrary, the order simply prohibits Respondent "from naming [the protected parties] in social media."

Moreover, even if we were to further assume, again arguendo, that the order does contain a content-based restriction on protected speech, we would conclude under a strict scrutiny analysis that the order is narrowly tailored, and uses the least restrictive means possible, with regard to its curtailment of Respondent's social media speech, prohibiting only the naming of the protected parties in social media, and that it serves a compelling state interest, which is the prevention of additional violations of the Act by the Respondent against the protected parties via Respondent's social media posts. See, e.g., In re R.H. (Ill. App. 2017) (state had compelling interest in restricting minor probationer's social media activity that was closely related to minor's crimes, as a means of preventing minor from engaging in additional criminal acts)….

Seems wrong to me, for the reasons I discussed in my Overbroad Injunctions Against Speech (Especially in Libel and Harassment Cases). Among other things, an injunction forbidding naming a particular person is content-based. A total ban on naming them (not just on threats) seems not to be "narrowly tailored" to any concern about forbidding such threats. And the fact that speech restrictions can be imposed as part of a sentence following the conviction of a crime doesn't mean that such restrictions can be imposed following a civil stalking order proceeding—where there's no trial by jury, no requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and no provision of a public defender (to oversimplify slightly).

Still, as my Overbroad Injunctions observed, lots of trial courts have issued such "stop talking about plaintiffs" orders; and while most appellate courts have reversed them, when the matter has gone up on appeal, some appellate courts, such as this one, seem to approve of such orders.

The post Court Upholds Order Barring Man from Naming Three School Officials in Social Media Posts appeared first on Reason.com.

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In her temporary restraining order application in Doe v. OpenAI (see also the complaint), plaintiff asked that OpenAI cut off ChatGPT access by a user:

Plaintiff Jane Doe is in immediate danger. Driven by a ChatGPT-fueled delusional spiral, her ex-boyfriend (the "User") stalked and harassed her for months—generating dozens of fake psychological reports about her via ChatGPT and distributing them to her family, friends, and colleagues, which escalated to leaving her voicemails threatening her physical safety.

His campaign culminated in encoding a death threat through ChatGPT and sending it to her family, just before he was arrested on four felony counts, including communicating a bomb threat and assault with a deadly weapon in January 2026. The criminal court deemed him incompetent and ordered him committed to a mental health facility, but—just two days ago—ordered his release due to a procedural failure by the state (a delay in transferring him from jail to the facility)….

Before he was arrested, the User was in constant communication with ChatGPT, which affirmed his delusions that he had cured sleep apnea, that the medical industry was out to get him, and that his ex-girlfriend was the problem. As he became more unhinged, it also began consulting on violent plans against third parties: in addition to helping him harass and threaten Plaintiff, his account contains conversations titled "Violence list expansion" and "Fetal suffocation calculation." [My read of the exhibits to the TRO application suggests that "fetal suffocation calculation" likely refers to the user's theories that maternal sleep apnea causes fetal asphyxiation, not to plans by the user to violently suffocate fetuses, though I appreciate that is guesswork on my part. -EV]

With the User now ordered to be freed for procedural reasons, he will be further emboldened in his belief that his worldview was exactly right. It is a certainty that he will immediately attempt to turn back to ChatGPT—again spinning out his delusions and planning violence on the platform….

[So far], OpenAI [has] agreed only to "suspend" his accounts—the same action the company took and dangerously reversed with respect to the User already.

OpenAI's conduct is unacceptable: it has known for months the User was dangerous. Well before he was arrested for calling in a bomb threat, Defendants' own safety systems flagged his account for "Mass Casualty Weapons" activity and banned it. OpenAI initially upheld that determination on appeal after a careful review. The next day, it reversed itself, restored the User's access, and apologized to him for the inconvenience. That reinstatement had the effect of validating his delusions that he was right and everyone else was wrong.

After that, Plaintiff herself had to beg OpenAI for help: she submitted a detailed Notice of Abuse identifying the User as her stalker and describing exactly how ChatGPT was encouraging and assisting his harassment, OpenAI acknowledged the report was "extremely serious and troubling," promised "appropriate action," and did nothing….

Plaintiff sued OpenAI for negligent entrustment, negligence, product design defect, failure to warn, and unlicensed psychological counseling, and asked for a TRO:

The harm to Plaintiff if the Court does not act is severe and ongoing. The User subjected Plaintiff to months of AI-assisted stalking and harassment, generating dozens of defamatory psychological reports about her through ChatGPT and distributing them to her family, friends, colleagues, and clients. He spoofed her company email, contacted former employers, threatened to damage her reputation and finances, disclosed private medical information, and attempted to isolate her from her support network. He left her voicemails threatening her physical safety, used ChatGPT to encode and transmit a death threat to her family, and texted her: "Who is going to kill you?"

Plaintiff was forced to alter every aspect of her daily routine, suffered panic attacks and ongoing psychological distress, obtained an Emergency Protective Order, and twice considered taking her own life. In addition to the four felony counts on which the User was ultimately arrested, a separate arrest warrant was issued for the User for misdemeanor electronic harassment and stalking….

And today California (S.F.) Superior Court Judge Harold Kahn agreed, ordering that the user's "accounts will remain suspended until the [preliminary injunction] hearing on May 6." I couldn't attend the hearing or listen to it (I had a meeting this late morning), but my research assistant did, and she reported to me about that order.

As I understand it, there was no discussion by the court of how this affected the First Amendment rights of the user. But OpenAI did mention that the injunction may implicate the user's First Amendment rights. To quote my assistant, the argument was roughly, "Supreme Court case that is controlling—Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98—issue was whether you could enjoin or restrain an individual from accessing internet platform, court held that is too broad because it implicates constitutional protections (speech). Here as well. Example: if John Roe using ChatGPT for obtaining information, and restraint seeking is to block him from using platform for any purpose …, that would be way too overbroad and would violate protections." And I agree that this procedure raises serious First Amendment concerns.

Of course, there wouldn't be a First Amendment problem with OpenAI itself choosing to cut off the user's access. But I take it that a court order requiring OpenAI to do so would implicate the First Amendment (see NRA v. Vullo; Bantam Books v. Sullivan), just as the federal government's recent demands that private universities limit students' pro-Palestinian and allegedly anti-Semitic speech implicate the First Amendment (cf. Gartenberg v. Cooper Union (S.D.N.Y.) for a court's analysis of an analogous situation to that).

The matter is complicated by the user's allegedly illegal conduct, which has led to an arrest and an order of mental health commitment: When someone is jailed or committed, his speech can indeed be restricted incident to the other restrictions on his liberty. But it's not clear to me that such restrictions can be imposed via a TRO in a separate proceeding, at which the person whose access to communications technology isn't even heard.

Perhaps some such emergency "no ChatGPT for you" order is justifiable, again especially when there's a finding in some court proceeding (even before some other court) that the person has committed a crime and is seriously mentally unwell. But I think it's important to note the First Amendment problems this procedure might raise.

The post Court Orders OpenAI to Cut off (for 3 Weeks) ChatGPT Access by Mentally Ill and Dangerous User appeared first on Reason.com.

Plaintiff is a naturalized citizen who has resided in the United States for over four decades since fleeing Iran. He, along with his family, was allegedly targeted by the Islamic Republic of Iran because of his father's role as a high-ranking official in the previous regime. He brings this action [under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act] against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the Ministry of Intelligence and Security of the Islamic Republic of Iran (MOIS), and officials and agents of both groups, alleging that Defendants tortured him during his imprisonment in Iran and have continued to subject him to "an ongoing campaign of harassment, surveillance, and physical attacks." …

Fearful that disclosure of his identity would subject him and his family to "physical harm, retaliation, and threats to personal safety," he moved to proceed pseudonymously. The Court denied Plaintiff's initial Motion as it did not explain why pseudonymity was warranted where the risk of retaliatory harm stemmed only from Defendants, who would have access to his identity. Plaintiff has now renewed his Motion, elaborating on the harm from others that could arise if his identity were publicly disclosed in connection with this lawsuit. The Court will grant the Motion, subject to any further consideration by the United States District Judge to whom this case is randomly assigned….

Generally, a complaint must identify the plaintiffs. This identification requirement reflects the "presumption in favor of disclosure [of litigants' identities], which stems from the 'general public interest in the openness of governmental processes,' and, more specifically, from the tradition of open judicial proceedings." …

At this initial stage, Plaintiff has met his burden to show that his privacy and safety interests outweigh the public's presumptive and substantial interest in learning his identity.

First, as the Complaint makes clear, Plaintiff does not seek to proceed under a pseudonym "merely to avoid the annoyance and criticism that may attend any litigation," but rather to "preserve privacy in a matter of [a] sensitive and highly personal nature." Relevant here, privacy can include "maintaining [his] and [his] family members' safety." In his Complaint, Plaintiff describes the violence and harassment he and his family have faced over the past few decades and could continue to face if his identity were made public. Plaintiff also alleges that his siblings were arrested and tortured, and that his father was targeted for extrajudicial killing.

He further explains that this risk of harm is not just from Defendants, but also from third-party proxies, who have a history of attempting to carry out Defendants' aims on American soil. To be fair, many instances Plaintiff highlights concern third parties' acting at the specific direction of Defendants, who will know Plaintiff's identity through this litigation. That same pattern could play out here.

Plaintiff, however, also demonstrates that there is a potential risk from sleeper cells, lone wolves, or other third-party criminal proxies, who might seek to harm Plaintiff on their own accord. The pleadings thus demonstrate—at this initial stage—that Plaintiff's interest is not in merely avoiding annoyance or criticism, but rather in preserving privacy to protect his and his family's safety from third-party proxies….

"[A]nonymous litigation is [also] more acceptable when the defendant is a governmental body because government defendants do not share the concerns about reputation that private individuals have when they are publicly charged with wrongdoing." Here, Plaintiff has sued foreign governmental actors, not private litigants. Furthermore, Plaintiff has filed this case "seek[ing] to vindicate [his] rights[,] … and anonymity appears to be necessary to provide [him] the opportunity to do so." Finally, "there is nothing about the nature of these proceedings that creates any need for transparency with respect to the plaintiff['s] identit[y] or address[]." …

{Defendants [also] do not face a risk of unfairness.} Plaintiff has offered to disclose "[his] identity through counsel and discovery, subject to appropriate protective orders," if Defendants show up to litigate. In addition, Defendants remain free to request any further information they deem necessary to the full and fair defense of this case or ask the Court to reconsider this decision.

Finally, the Court highlights that this an initial decision to permit Plaintiff to proceed pseudonymously. In the (unlikely) scenario where Defendants appear to defend this suit, the balance of factors might tip the other way. See John Doe I, John Doe II, & John Doe III v. Sabeti (M.D. Fla. 2025) (reconsidering initial grant to proceed pseudonymously in Torture Victim Protection Act case upon defendant appearance)….

Note that the "Do" in the caption of the case appears to be a typo for "Doe," but I expect that the citation for the opinion will indeed be Do v. … rather than Doe v. ….

The post Iran, Pseudonymity, and Risk of Harm appeared first on Reason.com.

On January 15, 2025, Palazzolo emailed White House Press Secretary Karoline Leavitt advising her that Dow Jones intended to publish an article (the "Article") about a letter that President Trump purportedly sent to Epstein (the "Letter"). President Trump, through counsel, denied writing the Letter and warned Dow Jones not to publish the story. Two days later, the WSJ online edition published the Article.

The title of the Article—"Jeffrey Epstein's Friends Sent Him Bawdy Letters for a 50th Birthday Album. One was from Donald Trump"—is in bold print, with a subtitle below reading "[t]he leather-bound book was compiled by Ghislaine Maxwell. The president says the letter 'is a fake thing.'" …

The Complaint sets forth claims for defamation … alleges that the following statements from the Article are per se defamatory:

The letter bearing Trump's name, which was reviewed by the Journal, is bawdy—like others in the album. It contains several lines of typewritten text framed by the outline of a naked woman, which appears to be hand-drawn with a heavy marker. A pair of small arcs denotes the woman's breasts, and the future president's signature is a squiggly "Donald" below her waist, mimicking pubic hair.

It isn't clear how the letter with Trump's signature was prepared. Inside the outline of the naked woman was a typewritten note styled as an imaginary conversation between Trump and Epstein, written in the third person.

Voice Over: There must be more to life than having everything, the note began. Donald: Yes, there is, but I won't tell you what it is. Jeffrey: Nor will I, since I also know what it is. Donald: We have certain things in common, Jeffrey. Jeffrey: Yes, we do, come to think of it. Donald: Enigmas never age, have you noticed that? Jeffrey: As  a matter of fact, it was clear to me the last time I saw you. Donald: A pal is a wonderful thing. Happy Birthday — and may every day be another wonderful secret.

The Complaint also contends that the following statements from the Article are implicitly defamatory:

Jeffrey Epstein's Friends Sent Him Bawdy Letters for a 50th Birthday Album. One Was From Donald Trump.

It was Jeffrey Epstein's 50th birthday, and Ghislaine Maxwell was preparing a special gift to mark the occasion. She turned to Epstein's family and friends. One of them was Donald Trump."

The album had poems, photos and greetings from businesspeople, academics, Epstein's former girlfriends and childhood pals, according to the documents reviewed by the Journal and people familiar with them.

When he turned 50, Epstein was already wealthy from managing Wexner's fortune and was socializing with Trump, Clinton and other powerful people. He often entertained at his Manhattan townhouse, Palm Beach, Fla., home and private Caribbean island….

On August 25, 2025, after President Trump filed this action, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the United States House of Representatives (the "Committee") subpoenaed the Epstein Estate for documents (the "Subpoena"). The Subpoena included a request to produce all letters in the album Ghislaine Maxwell compiled for Epstein's fiftieth birthday (the "Birthday Book"). The Epstein Estate complied with the Subpoena; and on September 8, 2025, the Committee released the produced documents on its official webpage via a press release (the "Press Release"). The production included a copy of the Birthday Book. The Birthday Book includes a page matching the Article's description of the Letter (the "Produced Letter"). {The Complaint alleges that "no authentic letter or drawing exists," "the supposed letter is a fake," and "the letter was fake and nonexistent." In Response to the Motion to Dismiss, and at the hearing, President Trump's counsel only argued that the Letter was not written by President Trump and is not authentic.} …

The court dismissed the claim:

Defendants ask the Court to make a factual determination that the statements in the Article are true and a legal determination that they are not defamatory. Because the Court finds that the Complaint fails to adequately allege actual malice, it declines to address these issues at this juncture. Moreover, whether President Trump was the author of the Letter or Epstein's friend are questions of fact that cannot be determined at this stage of the litigation….

"[T]o plead actual malice, [President Trump] must allege facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable inference that the false statement was made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." "This is a subjective test, focusing on whether the defendant 'actually entertained serious doubts as to the veracity of the published account, or was highly aware that the account was probably false.'"

In some circumstances, actual malice can be inferred "where a story is fabricated by the defendant, is the product of his imagination, or is based wholly on an unverified anonymous telephone call[,] … [or] when the publisher's allegations are so inherently improbable that only a reckless man would have put them in circulation[, or] where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or accuracy of his reports." However, "[a]ctual malice requires more than a departure from reasonable journalistic standards … [t]hus, a failure to investigate, standing on its own, does not indicate [its] presence …."

Here, the Complaint falls short of pleading actual malice. President Trump's primary allegations relating to malice are that Defendants "knew or should have known" the statements in the Article were false," and published the Article:

maliciously, with knowledge of the falsity of the statement, and/or with reckless disregard of their truth or falsity [and]

with actual malice, oppression, and fraud in that they were aware of the falsity of the publication and, thus, made said publications in bad faith, out of disdain and ill-will directed towards Plaintiff without any regard for the truth.

These "formulaic recitations of the 'actual malice' element" are insufficient to state a claim. President Trump also fails to allege how each Defendant acted with actual malice.

The Complaint also alleges that President Trump told Defendants that the Letter was a fake before they ran the Article. President Trump argues that this allegation shows that Defendants acted with serious doubts about the truth of their reporting and, therefore, with actual malice. The Court disagrees. To establish actual malice, "a plaintiff must show the defendant deliberately avoided investigating the veracity of the statement in order to evade learning the truth."

The Complaint comes nowhere close to this standard. Quite the opposite. The Article explains that, before running the story, Defendants contacted President Trump, Justice Department officials, and the FBI for comment. President Trump responded with his denial, the Justice Department did not respond at all, and the FBI declined to comment. In short, the Complaint and Article confirm that Defendants attempted to investigate. The Article also states that the WSJ reviewed the Letter. Accordingly, President Trump's conclusory allegation that Defendants had contradictory evidence and failed to investigate is rebutted by the Article and is insufficient to establish actual malice.

{President Trump argues that Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 692 (1989), supports his position that Defendants' purported failure to investigate is enough to support an inference of actual malice. However, in Harte-Hanks, the Supreme Court expressly stated that "[a]lthough failure to investigate will not alone support a finding of actual malice, the purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a different category. Here, President Trump has not alleged any facts, beyond conclusory allegations, that support an inference that Defendants purposefully avoided the truth.}

The Article also informed readers that President Trump decried the Letter as a fake and denied writing it. By "allowing readers to decide for themselves what to conclude from the [Article], any allegation of actual malice [is] less plausible."

Finally, President Trump's allegation that Defendants acted with ill-will is insufficient to plead actual malice. Aside from being conclusory and without factual support, "ill-will, improper motive or personal animosity plays no role in determining whether a defendant acted with actual malice."

Because President Trump has not plausibly alleged that Defendants published the Article with actual malice, both Counts must be dismissed. However, "[a] dismissal based on the failure to plead facts giving rise to an inference of actual malice should be without prejudice[,] and the plaintiff should have the opportunity to amend his complaint." But see Reed v. Chamblee (M.D. Fla. 2025) (dismissing defamation claim with prejudice where plaintiff "had two opportunities to plausibly allege claims for defamation in his lengthy complaints but has failed both times to sufficiently allege any Defendant acted with actual malice."). Because President Trump has only made one attempt to state his claims, the Court dismisses the Complaint without prejudice….

And the court had this to say about whether Trump would have to pay defendants' attorneys' fees:

Defendants request attorneys' fees and costs arguing that President Trump's lawsuit lacks merit and that he only brought it because they exercised their right to free speech on a public issue. Florida's Anti-SLAPP Statute prohibits a person from filing a lawsuit "against another person or entity without merit and primarily because such person or entity has exercised the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue[.]" The statute awards the prevailing party attorneys' fees and costs incurred in defending such a meritless lawsuit.

Because the Complaint is dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend, the Court denies Defendants' request for fees and costs without prejudice and with leave to renew. See Barbuto v. Miami Herald Media Co. (S.D. Fla. 2021) (denying without prejudice the defendant's request for fees and costs under Florida's Anti-SLAPP statute following dismissal of a plaintiff's complaint without prejudice because "the Court ha[d] not addressed the merits of [the p]laintiff's claims nor ha[d] the Court made the finding that [the p]laintiff's lawsuit as a whole [was] without merit.").

Amanda B. Levine, Katherine M. Bolger, and Meenakshi Krishnan (Davis Wright Tremaine LLP), Andrew J Levander and Steven A. Engel (Dechert LLP), and Eric Corey Edison, George S. LeMieux, and Timothy John McGinn, Jr. (Gunster Yoakley & Stewart, P.A.) represent defendants.

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I therefore reached out about this to Doe's lawyers, thinking about whether I should file an opposition to pseudonymity here, as I have in past cases (see, e.g., Roe v. Smith (Cal. App. 2025)). The lawyers promptly responded that  the pseudonymity will likely be temporary:

[W]e will not be seeking to have the case proceed in full with pseudonyms. Here's the context: our client's stalker is both dangerous and has lost touch with reality. He believes that there is a broad conspiracy that is plotting against him. He has made death threats to our client and, after being released from custody, made immediate contact with her. She currently has armed security and is deathly afraid.

We have reason to believe he will be arrested shortly. Once he is in custody, we don't believe there will be a need to continue to proceed with pseudonyms. We do think that if his name is made public in connection with this case, it will reinforce his paranoid delusions and significantly increase the likelihood that he harms our client or others who he has targeted.

Now I'm not sure that this suffices to justify even temporary pseudonymity. I'm skeptical that pseudonymity will indeed affect her safety from the ex-boyfriend: Even if the Complaint has to name her, the Complaint won't need to use his name (though at some point his name will likely be disclosed, especially if the case goes to trial). And given the news coverage of the Complaint, the ex seems likely to find out that there is a lawsuit being filed, whether or not Doe is named in the caption.

Plaintiffs can sometimes sue under a pseudonym if they can show real evidence of a reasonable fear that they will face retaliation (usually it has to be violent retaliation) if their names are publicized. But the risk of physical retaliation must come from third parties who don't already know the plaintiff's identity, rather than from defendants, who generally know the plaintiff's identity. As Roe v. Smith noted, "Plaintiffs' argument that disclosing their names would increase their risk of physical harm or other retaliation from defendants is unsupported. Since defendants already know who plaintiffs are, allowing plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously would not protect against an alleged danger from defendants learning their identity."

Here, while Doe may understandably fear continued misconduct from the person identified as "the user" in her Complaint, that person already knows her identity. And there seems to be no reason to think that Doe would be vulnerable to misbehavior from third parties who learn her identity from this case.

Still, I thought there was no need to fight over a few weeks' delay in depseudonymizing the matter, if that is indeed what ends up happening (especially since such a fight would itself take time). So I expect the filings will soon be revised to disclose plaintiff's name, much as plaintiffs in the overwhelming majority of American civil cases disclose their names. But if turns out that doesn't happen, I may indeed file an opposition to continued pseudonymity.

The post Why the Pseudonymity in <i>Doe v. OpenAI</i>? appeared first on Reason.com.

Plaintiff Jane Doe is in immediate danger. Driven by a ChatGPT-fueled delusional spiral, her ex-boyfriend (the "User") stalked and harassed her for months—generating dozens of fake psychological reports about her via ChatGPT and distributing them to her family, friends, and colleagues, which escalated to leaving her voicemails threatening her physical safety.

His campaign culminated in encoding a death threat through ChatGPT and sending it to her family, just before he was arrested on four felony counts, including communicating a bomb threat and assault with a deadly weapon in January 2026. The criminal court deemed him incompetent and ordered him committed to a mental health facility, but—just two days ago—ordered his release due to a procedural failure by the state (a delay in transferring him from jail to the facility)….

Before he was arrested, the User was in constant communication with ChatGPT, which affirmed his delusions that he had cured sleep apnea, that the medical industry was out to get him, and that his ex-girlfriend was the problem. As he became more unhinged, it also began consulting on violent plans against third parties: in addition to helping him harass and threaten Plaintiff, his account contains conversations titled "Violence list expansion" and "Fetal suffocation calculation." [My read of the exhibits to the TRO application suggests that "fetal suffocation calculation" likely refers to the user's theories that maternal sleep apnea causes fetal asphyxiation, not to plans by the user to violently suffocate fetuses, though I appreciate that is guesswork on my part. -EV]

With the User now ordered to be freed for procedural reasons, he will be further emboldened in his belief that his worldview was exactly right. It is a certainty that he will immediately attempt to turn back to ChatGPT—again spinning out his delusions and planning violence on the platform….

[So far], OpenAI [has] agreed only to "suspend" his accounts—the same action the company took and dangerously reversed with respect to the User already.

OpenAI's conduct is unacceptable: it has known for months the User was dangerous. Well before he was arrested for calling in a bomb threat, Defendants' own safety systems flagged his account for "Mass Casualty Weapons" activity and banned it. OpenAI initially upheld that determination on appeal after a careful review. The next day, it reversed itself, restored the User's access, and apologized to him for the inconvenience. That reinstatement had the effect of validating his delusions that he was right and everyone else was wrong.

After that, Plaintiff herself had to beg OpenAI for help: she submitted a detailed Notice of Abuse identifying the User as her stalker and describing exactly how ChatGPT was encouraging and assisting his harassment, OpenAI acknowledged the report was "extremely serious and troubling," promised "appropriate action," and did nothing….

Plaintiff sued OpenAI for negligent entrustment, negligence, product design defect, failure to warn, and unlicensed psychological counseling. In her TRO motion, she focuses on her negligence claim:

[OpenAI] breached its duty in at least three ways. First, it designed GPT-4o to validate user delusions, sustain dangerous conversations, and remove safeguards that previously required the system to reject false premises, producing the harassing material the User weaponized against Plaintiff. Second, it failed to warn Plaintiff or anyone else that the User had been flagged for dangerous conduct, even though his chat logs named specific targets. Third, it reinstated the User's access after its own systems determined he was dangerous, then ignored Plaintiff's Notice of Abuse. The User's subsequent arrest on four felony counts and his finding of incompetence confirm that OpenAI's original deactivation was not only justified but necessary. OpenAI "caused [Plaintiff] to be put in a position of peril of a kind from which the injuries occurred," and it cannot disclaim its duty here.

And she argues that she is entitled to a TRO:

The harm to Plaintiff if the Court does not act is severe and ongoing. The User subjected Plaintiff to months of AI-assisted stalking and harassment, generating dozens of defamatory psychological reports about her through ChatGPT and distributing them to her family, friends, colleagues, and clients. He spoofed her company email, contacted former employers, threatened to damage her reputation and finances, disclosed private medical information, and attempted to isolate her from her support network. He left her voicemails threatening her physical safety, used ChatGPT to encode and transmit a death threat to her family, and texted her: "Who is going to kill you?" Plaintiff was forced to alter every aspect of her daily routine, suffered panic attacks and ongoing psychological distress, obtained an Emergency Protective Order, and twice considered taking her own life. In addition to the four felony counts on which the User was ultimately arrested, a separate arrest warrant was issued for the User for misdemeanor electronic harassment and stalking….

Plaintiff's lawyers argue that OpenAI won't suffer much of a hardship if a TRO is issued. But they don't at all discuss the question whether such an injunction would unconstitutionally interfere with the user's ability to use ChatGPT to create speech.

Of course, there wouldn't be a First Amendment problem with OpenAI itself choosing to cut off the user's access. But I take it that a court order requiring OpenAI to do so would implicate the First Amendment (see NRA v. Vullo; Bantam Books v. Sullivan), just as the federal government's recent demands that private universities limit students' pro-Palestinian and allegedly anti-Semitic speech implicate the First Amendment.

The matter is complicated by the user's allegedly illegal conduct, which has led to an arrest and an order of mental health commitment: When someone is jailed or committed, his speech can indeed be restricted incident to the other restrictions on his liberty. But it's not clear to me that such restrictions can be imposed via a TRO in a separate proceeding, at which the person whose access to communications technology isn't even heard.

UPDATE: I now have OpenAI's opposition; to quickly summarize it, it basically argues that OpenAI has already done what it can to block the user's ChatGPT access (though "Because a limited version of ChatGPT can be accessed without an account, OpenAI cannot prevent John Roe from accessing any form of the ChatGPT services"), and a TRO is thus unnecessary. It also argues that a TRO requires a showing of "a likelihood of success on the merits" on plaintiff's underlying substantive claims (and not just that this particular order is needed to avoid certain harms), and that such a showing hasn't been made and can't be made in this abbreviated proceeding:

As Plaintiff's counsel knows from their other cases against OpenAI, … these claims pose multiple difficult and novel questions so far unsettled, especially around causation, application of the First Amendment and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. The Application's two-page analysis of that claim does not even grapple with those complex legal questions, let alone provide a reasonable probability that Plaintiff will prevail on them.

It also briefly mentions the user's First Amendment rights:

It is important to note, beyond just this case, that the government's ability to order OpenAI to block a user's access to general-purpose services raises significant questions under the First Amendment and Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. See Packingham v. North Carolina (2017).

It also discusses the user privacy questions related to a separate request made in the TRO application (which I hadn't focused on in the initial post):

[T]he Application demands that OpenAI provide all the information in its possession about absent third party John Roe [that's the opposition's label for the person whom the TRO application just calls the user]—including his ChatGPT transcripts—to Plaintiff's counsel. The Application's claim of irreparable harm absent a TRO does not even mention this request….

Instead of establishing exigency, Plaintiff's counsel argues that they will need these discovery materials "to show that [John Roe's] ChatGPT account must be permanently shut down for her own safety and that OpenAI was negligent in its handling of that account." But the Application identifies no harm, much less irreparable harm, from making that showing after going through the ordinary discovery process—given the suspension of the accounts.

The Application asserts that the chatlogs are needed to "engage the police and prosecutors," but the record shows otherwise. Despite not having these materials, Plaintiff has successfully complained to the police about John Roe, as evidenced by the outstanding warrant against him "for misdemeanor electronic harassment and stalking of" Plaintiff. Plaintiff has even been able to obtain an Emergency Protective Order against John Roe. Both the warrant and protective order were issued without law enforcement even contacting OpenAI. In sum, Plaintiff's counsel has not shown that these ordinary-course discovery materials, which contain stale information that is at least three months old if not more, are necessary for her to obtain law enforcement or court protection. Thus, there is no emergency reason for Plaintiff's counsel to access materials that they can seek in ordinary-course discovery.

Moreover, granting the requests for these discovery materials now would cause irreparable harm to an absent third party, John Roe. Plaintiff's counsel seeks private materials related to John Roe, but has chosen not to add him as a party or (as far as OpenAI is aware) give him notice and an opportunity to be heard before those private materials are released to his former romantic partner.

The Court is being asked to override any legally cognizable interest or statutory protection he may have in those materials {see, e.g., [the Stored Communications Act]}, which would ordinarily be considered in the JCCP [Judicial Council Coordinated Proceeding that deals with various other cases raising similar claims] after coordination. Instead, this question should be addressed by Judge Schulman in the ongoing JCCP, which was expressly created to provide consistent answers across cases to these difficult, novel questions. Deciding these questions now risks preempting that coordinated process.

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In April 2016 J.E. filed a petition for a domestic violence restraining order against his then-ex-girlfriend, A.C., and a temporary restraining order was granted pending the hearing on a permanent restraining order. J.E. did not appear at the hearing, and the court dissolved the temporary restraining order and dismissed the case without prejudice for lack of prosecution.

More than eight years after filing the petition, in November 2024, J.E. filed a motion to "seal or destroy" the record of the restraining order proceeding. He cited the "sensitive nature of this matter and the parties' current relationship" and argued "[p]ublic dissemination of this motion and the underlying records could cause irreparable harm to the parties' reputations and privacy," as well as "professional challenges[ ] and emotional distress." …

J.E. supported his motion with a declaration stating he and A.C. had reconciled and were now life partners. He explained he requested the restraining order when the parties "were navigating a complex and emotionally charged dynamic, which led to misunderstandings and impulsive actions on my part." J.E. stated A.C.'s attempts to contact him were "not motivated by malice or harm but rather by her deep affection and immaturity at the time."

He stated the continued existence of the records had drawn "unwanted scrutiny" in his personal and professional life and undermined the couple's efforts to "build a positive future together." He concluded, "I deeply regret filing the restraining order petition in 2016 and have since come to understand the situation in its proper context. [A.C.] had no harmful intentions, and my actions were a reaction to misunderstanding and emotional distress. Destroying these records would bring closure and allow us to continue building our lives together." …

Rules 2.550 and 2.551, which govern requests to seal court records, "expressly implement the First Amendment principles espoused in NBC Subsidiary [v. Superior Court (Cal. 1999)] and establish a presumption that 'court records … be open' unless the law requires confidentiality." Under rule 2.550(d), a court may order a record filed under seal "only if it expressly finds facts that establish: (1) There exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record; (2) The overriding interest supports sealing the record; (3) A substantial probability exists that the overriding interest will be prejudiced if the record is not sealed; (4) The proposed sealing is narrowly tailored; and (5) No less restrictive means exist to achieve the overriding interest." …

The [trial] court recognized California's "very strong and important" policy favoring open courts and explained that sealing required a "specific reason" sufficient to overcome that policy. (See rule 2.550(d)(1) [a court may order record filed under seal "only if … [t]here exists an overriding interest that overcomes the right of public access to the record"].) In his motion, J.E. asserted that the records caused "unwarranted scrutiny in both [his] personal and professional life" and hampered his and A.C.'s efforts to "build a positive future together." But the court properly concluded those generalized concerns did not constitute an overriding interest sufficient to overcome the public right of access, concluding, "On what you've shown me, there's no basis to seal these records anymore than anybody else's domestic violence prevention act records would be sealed.

J.E. then informed the court he was "a public figure now after … doing a documentary" and people were using the restraining order filing against him and A.C. in other courts. The court responded by noting that a federal public defender had sought access to the case file in connection with another case, and stated, "[I]f there are other cases and a federal public defender is looking into this file, that's a whole other reason why public access to court records is important." The court appropriately determined that J.E.'s assertion that he had become a public figure did not establish that he had an interest supporting sealing the record that overrode the public right of access.

On appeal J.E. asserts he is facing extraordinary circumstances that distinguish his filing from others because he "has become a public figure as the documented target of a federal murder-for-hire plot that received widespread media attention," and the court records involving his request for a restraining order have created an "enduring stigma" for him. He asserts the records have "been used to mischaracterize [him] in online searches and background checks, thereby impeding his employment, professional credibility, and personal safety."

However, J.E. did not include this information in his motion filed in the trial court or raise these points at the hearing. Therefore, we may not consider these additional alleged facts in determining whether the court properly denied the motion to seal….

J.E. also asserts the court should have considered "partial or tailored sealing—such as removing the case from online docket systems or restricting access through in-person review." But he did not ask the trial court for that relief, so he has forfeited that argument….

An L.A. Times article about J.E.'s documentary and the murder-for-hire plot is here. Though the court elected to refer to the parties with their initials in the opinion, there was no order providing for pseudonymity (and I doubt such an order would have been granted even if the parties had asked for it). The parties' full names therefore appear in the docket.

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