Some excerpts from today's long opinion by Judge Joseph Dawson, III (D.S.C.) in Lemoine v. Horry Georgetown Tech. Coll.:

On September 5, 2024, while off campus, Lemoine [a cosmetology student at HGTC] sent a message in a Snapchat group that included some HGTC students. The message concerned an off-campus interaction involving Lemoine's boyfriend's roommate, who was not an HGTC student or employee. Lemoine wrote: "But naw I was trying to be nice but f[**]k that some random ugly ass in bread looking f[**]k dude called me a bitch he needa get blasted." [Expurgation in the court decision. -EV] …

[In a meeting with school officials on September 11, 2024,] Lemoine denied that "blasted" referred to physical harm and explained that she meant the roommate should be called out or held accountable for his behavior. Lemoine also stated that neither she nor her parents owned guns.

Defendants contend that Lemoine's statements suggested a broader disassociation from firearms. Plaintiff disputes that characterization and contends she did not state that she had never fired a gun, had no experience with guns, or had no association with anyone who possessed firearms.

The record reflects that, at the conclusion of the September 11 meeting, HGTC accepted Lemoine's explanation of the Snapchat comment. The September 20 conduct decision later recounted that Lemoine had been told there was then no evidence to find her in violation of the Student Code and that the College had accepted her explanation for the Snapchat comment. Plaintiff further contends that Sawyer communicated internally that there had been "no direct threat to others," and that Batten and Sawyer reached the same conclusion after speaking with students. Defendants contend the matter remained under review and that HGTC was required to continue assessing safety and disruption concerns….

On September 13, 2024, HGTC discovered a video posted to Lemoine's Instagram account about a year earlier, in which Lemoine fired a handgun at a target while wearing western-style attire. Plaintiff contends the video predated her enrollment at HGTC, was taken on private property, did not involve HGTC, and did not refer to any HGTC student, employee, or campus. Defendants contend the video caused them to question Lemoine's prior explanation of the Snapchat message and her statements concerning firearms.

Batten requested authorization from Fore for an interim suspension. Fore authorized the interim suspension. Plaintiff contends that, before authorizing the interim suspension, Fore was presented with both the Snapchat message and the Instagram video. Defendants contend Fore acted reasonably based on the safety concerns presented to her.

On September 17, 2024, Lemoine again met with HGTC personnel, including Batten and Sawyer, to discuss the Instagram video. Lemoine acknowledged that she was the person in the video, stated that the video was from around Thanksgiving 2023, stated that the gun did not belong to her, and stated that it was the only time she had fired a gun. She also offered consent for HGTC to search her belongings, which HGTC declined. At that meeting, Lemoine received an interim suspension and no-trespass notice….

On September 20, 2024, HGTC issued a conduct decision suspending Lemoine from HGTC and imposing a no-trespass order. The decision identified two matters as the basis for discipline: the Snapchat message using the term "blasted" and the Instagram video of Lemoine firing a handgun. The decision stated that the Instagram video caused HGTC to question Lemoine's explanation of the term "blasted," and that, "[i]n today's climate," Lemoine's "failure to disclose the existence of the video" together with her use of "blasted" caused concern about her ability to remain in the cosmetology cohort. The letter further stated that the two facts caused "a significant amount of apprehension related to the presence and use of guns" and had impacted the learning environment because students and employees expressed that they felt unsafe.

The September 20 decision concluded that Lemoine violated the Student Code provision prohibiting conduct that disrupts the educational process, interferes with the rights of others, or adversely interferes with normal college functions and services….

The court concluded that Lemoine's speech was protected by the First Amendment, and thus granted Lemoine summary judgment on that issue:

The Snapchat message was sent while Lemoine was off campus. The message appeared in a private Snapchat group that included some HGTC students, but it did not arise from school-sponsored activity, did not involve coursework, did not address HGTC personnel, and did not refer to any HGTC campus or event. The message concerned an off-campus interaction involving Lemoine's boyfriend's roommate, who was neither an HGTC student nor an employee. Lemoine wrote that the roommate "needa get blasted."

The phrase was crude, angry, and capable of causing concern if read literally or in isolation. But the First Amendment does not permit a public college to treat every intemperate or ambiguous phrase as unprotected speech. Context matters. The message was not directed to the roommate or to HGTC, and did not identify any HGTC student, employee, classroom, or campus as a target. When Batten and Sawyer interviewed Lemoine on September 11, Lemoine denied that "blasted" referred to physical harm and explained that she meant the roommate should be called out or held accountable for his behavior. The September 20 conduct decision letter acknowledged that HGTC had accepted Lemoine's explanation and had told her there was then no evidence to find her in violation of the Student Code. …

The Instagram video likewise involved expression outside the school setting. The video was posted about a year before HGTC discovered it. It showed Lemoine firing a handgun at a target while wearing western-style attire. The record does not show that the video was recorded on HGTC property, involved HGTC activity, referred to HGTC, or was directed toward any HGTC student or employee.

Defendants argue that the Instagram video changed the context of the Snapchat message because Lemoine had previously stated that she and her parents did not own guns. Defendants therefore contend that the video caused them to question Lemoine's explanation of the Snapchat message and her broader relationship to firearms.

That argument explains why HGTC continued its investigation. It does not, standing alone, establish that the Instagram video itself was unprotected speech. Lawful target shooting, without more, is not a threat. Nor does the mere existence of a prior video depicting lawful firearm use transform a separate ambiguous Snapchat message into a serious expression of intent to commit unlawful violence.

The Instagram video may be considered as part of the surrounding context for HGTC's response, including the reasonableness of its investigation and any temporary safety measures. But the video itself was off-campus expression, not directed at HGTC or any member of the HGTC community, and not inherently outside the protection of the First Amendment….

Defendants also contend that Lemoine's words and actions constituted a true threat. A true threat is not protected by the First Amendment. But the true-threat exception is limited to serious expressions of intent to commit unlawful violence against a particular individual or group of individuals….

Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Defendants, the Snapchat message used language that could cause concern. The term "blasted" can carry violent connotations, and HGTC officials were entitled to investigate when students or faculty reported that the language made them uncomfortable or unsafe. Schools are not required to ignore potential safety concerns, particularly when a reported statement appears to reference violence.

But investigation is different from discipline. The record does not show that Lemoine communicated a serious expression of intent to commit unlawful violence against an HGTC student, employee, or campus. The Snapchat message referred to a nonstudent involved in an off-campus personal dispute. It did not threaten HGTC, did not identify a school target, and was not sent to the person referenced in the message. When questioned, Lemoine denied any violent meaning and explained that she meant the person should be called out or held accountable. HGTC's own September 20 decision acknowledged that this explanation had initially been accepted.

The Instagram video does not change that conclusion. The video showed Lemoine firing a handgun at a target about a year earlier. It did not contain threatening language, reference the Snapchat message, or identify any HGTC-related target. The combination of an ambiguous slang phrase and an old target-shooting video may have justified additional inquiry, but it did not transform Lemoine's speech into a true threat on this record.

Nor does the record establish the mental-state component [recklessness] required by Counterman v. Colorado. The evidence does not show that Lemoine consciously disregarded a substantial risk that her Snapchat message would be understood as a serious threat of unlawful violence toward HGTC students or employees. Her explanation, the off-campus context, the nonstudent subject of the message, and HGTC's initial acceptance of her explanation all weigh against treating the statement as a true threat. Accordingly, Defendants have not shown that the true-threat doctrine removed Lemoine's speech from First Amendment protection…..

The remaining question is whether HGTC could discipline Lemoine's off-campus speech because it materially and substantially disrupted school operations [under Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist.] or because HGTC reasonably forecast such disruption. The Court recognizes that HGTC had a legitimate interest in student safety and in maintaining an educational environment in which students and employees could attend class without reasonable fear of violence. That interest permitted HGTC to investigate the Snapchat message, speak with students and faculty, interview Lemoine, review the Instagram video, and take reasonable steps to assess whether a genuine threat or disruption existed.

But Tinker requires more than discomfort, apprehension, or generalized safety concerns. A public school may not restrict protected speech based on undifferentiated fear or a desire to avoid unpleasantness. And under Mahanoy Area School Dist. v. B.L., HGTC's regulatory interest was diminished because the speech occurred off campus, outside school supervision, in a private social-media setting, and concerned a nonstudent and non-school matter.

The summary-judgment record does not show actual substantial disruption. The record reflects that some students or employees expressed discomfort or safety concerns after learning of the Snapchat message and Instagram video. But the record does not show that classes stopped, instruction materially changed, campus operations were substantially interrupted, or Lemoine engaged in conduct at school that interfered with the rights of others….

Nor did HGTC identify facts sufficient to support a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption. A reasonable forecast must be grounded in evidence, not speculation.

The September 20 decision stated that, "[i]n today's climate," the Snapchat message and Instagram video caused apprehension related to guns and caused students and employees to feel unsafe. The Court does not minimize those concerns. But the constitutional question is not whether HGTC officials were permitted to be concerned or to investigate. The question is whether the record contains sufficient facts showing that Lemoine's off-campus speech either caused or reasonably threatened a material and substantial disruption of HGTC's educational environment. On this record, it does not.

The facts here are materially different from cases involving threats directed at students or school personnel, severe harassment, targeted bullying, school-sponsored speech, or speech that foreseeably invades the school environment in a substantial way. Lemoine's Snapchat message concerned a nonstudent and off-campus personal matter. The Instagram video was old, involved target shooting, and did not reference HGTC.

The record does not support a finding that either item, separately or together, gave HGTC a constitutionally sufficient basis to impose a suspension and no-trespass order….

Accordingly, the Court concludes that Lemoine's Snapchat message and Instagram video were protected speech. Defendants were entitled to investigate the reported concerns and to take reasonable steps to determine whether a threat or substantial disruption existed. But the First Amendment did not permit HGTC to discipline Lemoine for protected off-campus expression absent a true threat, actual substantial disruption, or a reasonable forecast of substantial disruption supported by the record….

The court had reached a similar result at the preliminary injunction stage; I blogged about that in December 2024. But the court rejected Lemoine's separate claim that the school's actions denied her due process.

Ben LeClercq and David Dale Ashley (LeClercq Law Firm) represent Lemoine.

The post Suspending College Student for Saying Man Who Insulted Her "Needa Get Blasted" + Having Posted Shooting Range Video (Year Before) Violated First Amendment appeared first on Reason.com.

This is a firearm design defect case. The Sig Sauer P365X pistol is a striker-fired pistol, which uses an internal, spring-loaded firing pin to hit the primer and fire the cartridge instead of an external hammer like a traditional gun. When the slide is racked back and released forward to chamber a round, the firing pin remains back and under spring tension, making it ready to fire. The firearm did not feature a manual safety. Nonetheless, the Defendant designed, manufactured, and sold the firearm and advertised it as a firearm that was equipped with the necessary features to prevent unintentional discharges.

The Plaintiff is an individual who purchased a Sig Sauer P365X on November 18, 2023. A month later, the Plaintiff was at the Rock Bottom Hunting Club in Roberta, Georgia with the firearm in his possession. The firearm was fully seated and properly secured in a holster, which was attached to the Plaintiff's belt on his waistband. At some point, the Plaintiff proceeded to remove the holster, with the firearm inside it from his waistband, using his left hand to relieve the tension from the holster clip. The Plaintiff held the holster with his right hand, with his hand positioned over the muzzle end of the holster.

After the holster was removed and while the Plaintiff was holding it, the firearm suddenly discharged without the Plaintiff touching the trigger or taking any action to cause it to discharge. The firearm remained fully seated inside the holster at the time of discharge. Additionally, the shell casing did not eject from the firearm during the time of discharge, remaining in the chamber. The discharge caused severe and permanent injury to the Plaintiff's right index finger near the middle joint. Despite having knowledge of incidents like the one suffered by the Plaintiff at the time of the injury, the Defendant continued to make the firearm available for purchase without a manual safety and never issued a mandatory recall of the firearm.

Plaintiff sued for design defect product liability, failure to warn, and negligence, and the court allowed the case to go forward, rejecting Sig Sauer's Second Amendment defense, at least at this stage (a motion to dismiss):

The Court must determine whether the Plaintiff's design defect claims, and any subsequent decision by this Court, could infringe on the fundamental right to bear arms enshrined within the Second Amendment. See Bruen ("[W]e hold that when the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct."); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) (holding, in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, that a rule of decision imposed by a court based on state or common law in a private action is reviewable for constitutionality). After all, the Plaintiff's suit is not a firearm regulation imposed by the government. However, Georgia courts have acknowledged that, in order to resolve a design defect case, "the court is called upon to supply the standard for defectiveness." Because the answer is not apparent like in most other Second Amendment cases, the Court addresses it herein….

[Under Georgia design defect liability law], "the factfinder performs a 'risk-utility analysis,' assessing 'the reasonableness of choosing from among various alternative product designs' by asking whether 'the risk of harm outweighs the utility of a particular design' to determine whether 'the product is not as safe as it should be.'" "In addition to proving that a product was defectively designed, a plaintiff seeking to hold a manufacturer liable for a design defect must show that the defect proximately caused the plaintiff's injury." Ultimately, the question of whether a manufacturer breached its design duty "turns on whether it 'failed to adopt a reasonable, safer design that would have reduced the foreseeable risks of harm presented by the product.'" …

[T]he Defendant argues that the Plaintiff's design defect claims amount to a de facto ban of purchasing handguns without an external safety, which runs antithetical to the Second Amendment….

[But] in the relevant section of the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff asserts that there is a design defect within the firearm arising from internal defective components and that the Defendant was on notice of this defect. It is this defect that caused the firearm to spontaneously discharge and cause the Plaintiff's injury.

It is only later that the Plaintiff suggests that the addition of an external safety could have significantly reduced the risk of misfire from defective components. This paragraph was likely included to demonstrate, at the pleading stage, that a "reasonable, safer design" could have been adopted by the Defendant to reduce the risk of misfires arising from internal defects. There is little indication within the Amended Complaint that the Plaintiff considers the lack of an external manual safety the defective part of the Gun, especially when the Plaintiff emphasizes that the Defendant marketed the firearm as one with the necessary internal features to prevent unintentional discharges….

But this discussion does not foreclose the Defendant from raising its Second Amendment argument at a later stage of the litigation. After discovery, if it becomes clear that there are no internal design defects present within the firearm, then the only design defect that could be construed from the Amended Complaint would be the lack of an external manual safety. And, in that case, the Defendant might plausibly assert that the Plaintiff's design defect claims infringe on the Second Amendment. This is because, if the Plaintiff prevails, then judicial action could reasonably be interpreted to impose liability on all manufacturers that produce guns similar to the P365X. In any case, the Court will not endeavor to analyze the issue at this time….

Brendan Gerard Krasinski and Darl Champion (The Champion Firm, Personal Injury Attorneys, P.C.) represent plaintiff.

The post Design Defect Claim That Sig Sauer Fired Without Trigger Pull Not Necessarily Blocked by Second Amendment appeared first on Reason.com.

This dispute concerns the Government's—specifically, the United States Attorney for the Middle District of Alabama's—decision to indict the Southern Poverty Law Center. The parties present diametrically opposed accounts of that decision. The SPLC contends that it is being vindictively prosecuted at the behest of various political actors—including the President of the United States—for engaging in speech protected under the First Amendment.

To remedy this alleged constitutional wrong, the SPLC moves for dismissal of the indictment or, in the alternative, discovery into the Government's prosecutorial motives. The Government opposes the SPLC's motion in its entirety, asserting that "this indictment was secured based on the law and the facts uncovered during a federal investigation." The parties' briefing is, like much of our modern political discourse, heavy on heated rhetoric, better suited for cable news, or a podcast. It emphasizes noise over substance.

After filtering out the noise, the Court is left to decide only whether the Government's decision to prosecute the SPLC was constitutionally impermissible. On this record, the SPLC is not entitled to discovery or dismissal of the indictment. The SPLC has failed to offer some evidence tending to show animus on the part of the prosecutors involved in bringing this case and that such animus resulted in the prosecution, the showing required for discovery. Because it cannot satisfy that standard, it necessarily fails to satisfy the higher standard that would entitle it to dismissal of the indictment. Accordingly, the SPLC's motion is due to be denied….

A quick summary of the allegations against the SPLC (see here for more):

In 1971, two lawyers founded the SPLC as a nonprofit organization dedicated "to ensur[ing] the promise of the Civil Rights Movement became a reality for all." According to the SPLC, part of its mission is to "track[ ] and expose[ ] the existence and activities of hate groups and other domestic extremists." In pursuit of these "hate groups," "the SPLC used paid consultants to infiltrate and inform on various white supremacist and other extremist groups." The Government contends that this "informant program" forms the basis of the SPLC's criminal liability.

On April 21, 2026, the Government unsealed an eleven-count indictment against the SPLC, charging it with six counts of wire fraud, four counts of false statements to a federally insured bank, and one count of conspiracy to commit concealment money laundering. The superseding indictment, unsealed on June 2, 2026, charges the SPLC with the same eleven counts.

On May 26, 2026, the SPLC moved to dismiss the indictment for vindictive prosecution or, in the alternative, for further discovery and an evidentiary hearing. According to the SPLC, President Donald J. Trump's administration has launched an all-out assault "on civil rights groups in general" and the SPLC faces charges solely because it "exercis[ed] its First Amendment right to identify, report on, and criticize extremist hate groups." The SPLC submits that in this case the Government started with a target—the SPLC—and looked for some crime, any crime, to pin on it….

There's a lot more, but here's the court's summary of the legal standards in vindictive prosecution cases:

While prosecutors enjoy broad discretion in deciding whether to bring charges, the Government cannot punish someone simply for exercising his rights. That is to say, the Government cannot punish someone out of "vindictiveness." "Vindictiveness in this context means the desire to punish a person for exercising his rights." Accordingly, a criminal defendant can seek to dismiss the indictment against him on the basis that his prosecution is vindictive.

There are two ways that a defendant can succeed on a vindictive prosecution claim. He can show actual vindictiveness, "prov[ing] objectively that the prosecutor's charging decision was motivated by a desire to punish him for doing something that the law plainly allowed him to do." "This showing is, of course, exceedingly difficult to make." To meet this high bar, "a defendant must show, through objective evidence, that (1) the prosecutor acted with genuine animus toward the defendant and (2) the defendant would not have been prosecuted but for that animus."

Alternatively, a defendant may rely on a presumption of vindictiveness, but "only in cases in which a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists."

If a defendant cannot satisfy either of these standards, he may nevertheless obtain discovery in support of his claim if he comes forward with "some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements of the defense." In the First Amendment context, a defendant "must offer some evidence tending to show that he would not have been prosecuted but for his protected speech."

However, even this standard "is a 'rigorous' one." "To obtain discovery, [a defendant] must do more than simply 'identify a potential motive for prosecutorial animus.'" "He must connect any vindictive animus to those making the challenged charging decisions in his case." And "to obtain an evidentiary hearing …, 'the defendant must present facts sufficient to create a reasonable doubt about the constitutionality of a prosecution.'" …

[T]he Supreme Court has limited the application of a presumption to situations involving a specific fact pattern or series of events that would, no matter when or where that pattern or series appeared, necessarily give rise to a "reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness." See North Carolina v. Pearce (1969) (presumption of vindictiveness exists where a trial judge "imposes a more severe sentence upon a defendant" after he "successfully attacked his first conviction"); Blackledge v. Perry (1974) (applying the same presumption where a prosecutor obtained a felony indictment after the defendant appealed his misdemeanor conviction). That is, a presumption must be "applicable in all cases." "[A] presumption is warranted only when circumstances warrant it for all cases of the type presented."

No presumption is called for here. The SPLC relies upon the "pattern of Executive Branch conduct" in this case—that is, the purported opening, closing, and reopening of a "moribund" investigation into the SPLC—as producing the requisite "'realistic likelihood' of vindictiveness." But the Supreme Court has cautioned against presuming vindictiveness based on pretrial conduct. Goodwin (noting that, prior to trial, "the prosecutor's assessment of the proper extent of prosecution may not have crystallized")….

Assuming that a presumption of vindictiveness can apply in the pretrial setting, the facts of this case do not warrant one. [The SPLC argues that "] {[A]fter some investigative activity in 2019 or 2020, the Biden administration reviewed the activities of the SPLC's field program, and despite the acquisition of financial records, interviews of those involved, and even a review by [the] DOJ and the IRS, no charges were brought. Then, as part of President Trump's specific targeting of civil rights groups and his … officials' particular focus on the SPLC, a dormant or closed investigation was revived, and the charges were filed.}["]

As the Government notes, investigations are routinely opened, shut, and opened again for myriad, proper reasons. Indeed, the fact that the closing and reopening of the investigation into the SPLC each corresponds to changes in presidential administrations is susceptible of an innocent explanation just as readily as an improper one, as different administrations routinely have different enforcement priorities. Accordingly, it would be improper to presume vindictiveness merely because an indictment issued after an investigation was reopened, as this would not, standing alone, necessarily mean that "a reasonable likelihood of vindictiveness exists."

And evidence merely that the defendant is a political foe of the prosecuting administration isn't enough to show vindictiveness:

Nor does the fact that the SPLC was indicted after engaging in protected activity entitle it to a presumption. It is true that before its indictment, the SPLC extensively criticized the Trump administration. But if that were sufficient to warrant a presumption, then … an entity could effectively immunize itself from prosecution simply by engaging in protected speech, such as criticizing political figures and their policies….

The court's conclusion:

The question before this Court is not whether the Government should prosecute the SPLC. It is a bedrock principle of constitutional law that the decision to prosecute is entirely within the Executive's purview. Separation of powers prevents this Court from entering upon or intruding into "the business of prosecution." The Court is not blind to the fact that this prosecution has generated strong reactions from individuals equally delighted and outraged by the indictment.

But, as the Court noted at the outset, the only question before the Court is a narrow one: Whether the Government's decision to prosecute the SPLC was constitutionally impermissible. Because the SPLC has not adduced some evidence tending to show the existence of the essential elements of vindictive prosecution, the Court denies the SPLC's motion in its entirety.

Although the Government is entitled to the presumption of regularity, courts are not forced to turn a blind eye to constitutionally suspect conduct. In the rare case that warrants a closer look, courts can and should order the Government to produce discovery into a prosecutor's motivations to ensure the defendant's due process rights are protected.

But this is not the rare case in which such extraordinary relief is appropriate. The SPLC's submissions stack speculation upon conjecture, relying upon hypothetical links in assumed chains to show prosecutorial vindictiveness. Once again, the standard to receive discovery is a rigorous one that the Court finds has not been met here.

This case typifies modern American discourse. It is unsurprising that the parties' arguments primarily comprise what has become all too common: ad hominem attacks in the form of press releases, interviews, and social media posts. Opponents of past, current, and future administrations may full-throatedly protest the decisions made by those in power. But our Republic recognizes different venues to vindicate different wrongs; federal courts are not the proper forum for airing political grievances.

For that reason, the doctrine of vindictive prosecution places a heavy burden on the accused, and decades of precedent counsels against its application here. Two things can be true at once: critics are not constitutionally immunized solely because they speak frequently and prosecutorial decisions may be second guessed—if they evince some evidence of animus. Missing here is the requisite objective evidence to show that the United States Attorney's Office for the Middle District of Alabama (on its own accord or at the direction of others) prosecuted the SPLC for exercising its First Amendment rights.

The SPLC fails to establish some evidence tending to show prosecutorial animus or causation, rendering discovery improper. And because the SPLC cannot establish some evidence of vindictiveness, the Court will not grant the extraordinary relief of dismissing the indictment. The SPLC's motion is thus denied in full….

Read the full opinion for more.

Kevin P. Davidson, Joel Feil, and Russell Turner Duraski represent the government.

The post Federal Court Refuses to Dismiss Case Against Southern Poverty Law Center appeared first on Reason.com.

The post Today in Supreme Court History: August 10, 1993 appeared first on Reason.com.

The post Today in Supreme Court History: August 9, 1974 appeared first on Reason.com.

Police in Davie, Florida, arrested Demarquize Dawson under a state law criminalizing the concealment of license plate information because the frame on his rental car covered the first S in Sunshine State. Dawson spent a night in jail and suffered a panic attack. In April 2026, state lawmakers passed a new law clarifying that only the plate number and registration sticker must be uncovered.

The Russian government caused a major disruption to the country's online financial services while attempting to tighten internet censorship. In an effort to stop citizens from using VPNs, the government's filtering systems accidentally interfered with encrypted data used by financial institutions, causing widespread glitches in banking apps and online payment services. The technical failures were reportedly so severe that cash became the only reliable means of payment for goods in many areas, including the Moscow Metro.

A Miami-Dade County sheriff's deputy threatened to arrest a reporter for asking Mayor Daniella Levine Cava a question at an event in a public park. Jeff Weinsier of WPLG Local 10 News tried to ask the mayor about a series of electric buses, costing taxpayers more than $80 million, that kept breaking down and were taken out of service. But Deputy Lester Aguilar stepped in and pushed him, saying if Weinsier didn't back off, "You will go to jail."

Alecia Lindsay froze to death in Anchorage after a 911 dispatcher failed to send help for over an hour. When a witness called to report Lindsay behaving erratically, as in speaking incoherently and lying in the snow, the operator said help was on the way but logged it as a disturbance, not a medical emergency. When the witness called back over an hour later, the dispatcher sent police, not paramedics. The responding officer was the first one to alert emergency medical services. Lindsay died of hypothermia shortly after arriving at the hospital.

Masked thieves burglarized an Australian couple, stealing valuables and driving off with their car. The couple said police did not respond to the incident for over a month, though they did receive a 6,258 Australian dollar ($4,500) fine because a traffic camera recorded someone driving their stolen car without wearing a seat belt.

A Minnesota court found Anthony Israelson guilty of two misdemeanors for driving a school bus drunk. In 2024, a bar patron called police to say Israelson had been drinking heavily the night before work. When police went to his house in the morning, he said he was not working that day, but when officers checked his route, they found him driving erratically, with more than a dozen children between kindergarten and 10th grade on board. He registered a blood alcohol level of 0.161, more than four times the limit for commercial drivers. Israelson received 364 days in prison, with all but one day suspended, plus home monitoring and two years of probation.

A sheriff's deputy in Palm Beach County, Florida, issued a $116 citation to a woman for using a cellphone while driving. He said he saw her holding the phone in her right hand—though as she pointed out in a video of the stop posted to TikTok, she does not have a right hand.

In Watauga, Texas, a 911 dispatcher was formally reprimanded after making an inappropriate remark during an emergency call. A mother called for help because her daughters were fighting and one had kicked a hole in the door. "OK," the dispatcher replied. "Do you want us to come over to shoot her?" He later apologized, saying the comment was wrong and meant as a joke.

The post Brickbats: August/September 2026 appeared first on Reason.com.

The post Today in Supreme Court History: August 8, 2009 appeared first on Reason.com.

According to the complaint, … plaintiff [Suzannah Van Rooy] was … "social media manager" at Beuchert's [Saloon] …. In November 2024, after the most recent presidential election, plaintiff used her personal Instagram account to reply to a post by a food editor from the Washingtonian "asking servers in the District if they would feel comfortable serving officials in the new Trump administration that had committed criminal offenses." Plaintiff agreed to be interviewed in her personal capacity, and after the interview, the Washingtonian quoted plaintiff in an article entitled, "Clashes Are Coming for Trump Officials Dining Out in DC—'I have the power to make you wait 20 minutes to get your entrée'":

'This time around, there is kind of a sense of defeat and acceptance, but I hope people still do stand up to this administration and tell them their thoughts on their misbehavior,' says Suzannah Van Rooy, a server and manager at Beuchert's Saloon in Capitol Hill. 'I personally would refuse to serve any person in office who I know of as being a sex trafficker or trying to deport millions of people. It's not, Oh, we hate Republicans. It's that this person has moral convictions that are strongly opposed to mine, and I don't feel comfortable serving them.'

Following the article's publication on December 11, 2024, Beuchert's received a flood of negative comments by phone and through its social media accounts. Plaintiff used Beuchert's account to respond to several of the social media comments surrounding the article, with varying degrees of hostility. For example, to one comment on Facebook stating, "Has this staff member been disciplined for their statement?? There should be consequences for the inappropriate comments. Was just getting ready to never ever enter the door of your restaurant and to encourage others to do the same," plaintiff responded, "everyone has a right to refuse service to sex traffickers. You're safe, unless you're a sex trafficker. Are you a sex trafficker?"

Plaintiff was fired, and sued, alleging that Beuchert's posted two social media posts about the controversy containing seven statements that defamed her (emphasis added to reflect the statements as to which the court allowed the claim to go forward):

1. "Recent comments made by a member of our staff who had no authority to speak on behalf of the entire restaurant have been quite rightly, flagged as inappropriate, hostile, intolerant and unacceptable."
2. "We tried to take the night to review Ms. Van Rooy's full comments, and any other interviews she may have given, to make an informed decision as to her continued employment based on our employee contracts."
3. "Van Rooy's comments clearly violate our zero-tolerance policy on discrimination."
4. "[H]er decision to sign into our social media account in the middle of the night to post her rhetoric in wildly offensive responses to comments is a further breach of conduct and protocol."
5. "[W]e as a restaurant are simply horrified to be associated with base prejudice."
6. "[W]e would welcome any opportunity to clarify that Ms. Van Rooy is not a manager at our restaurant but instead a part time server."
7. "[S]he had no authority or permission to act as spokesperson or hijack our social media accounts."

She also alleged that "the widespread negative public reaction to Beuchert's December 12 and 13 social media posts and the subsequent national and international media coverage." led to her being fired from her day job (at a place other than Beuchert's).

The court held that statement 5 was nonactionable opinion, as was the "have been quite rightly, flagged as inappropriate, hostile, intolerant and unacceptable" part of statement 1. It also held that statement 2 was nonactionable because it didn't "convey any defamatory meaning," in the sense of a meaning that would damage Van Rooy's reputation. But the other statements, the court held, were factual assertions that did convey defamatory meaning, and thus could be libelous if they were factually false:

The rest of the statements concern whether plaintiff had authority to access and use Beuchert's social media accounts or to act as a spokesperson, whether she was a manager, whether her conduct constituted a "breach of conduct and protocol," and whether she violated the restaurant's "zero-tolerance policy on discrimination." These do not pertain to defendants' state of mind or their opinion of plaintiff; they are posited as facts that could be verified by reviewing the terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment and determining whether she did or did not have certain permissions or job titles….

The parties dispute the existence of the "employee contract," the "zero-tolerance policy on discrimination," and any "protocol," and they do not agree as to whether plaintiff had authority to speak on behalf of Beuchert's and whether she was a manager. Defendants ask the Court to find that their statements were true as a matter of law, and they rely on multiple documents, including a copy of the Beuchert's server manual that "[e]very staff member … signed," which includes the restaurant's "Policy Against Harassment":

It is the policy of Beuchert's that it will not tolerate or condone any form of harassment, whether verbal, non-verbal, or physical, that is based on race, color, creed, religion, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, national origin, age, disability, citizenship status, marital status, medical condition or status as a veteran. Beuchert's is committed to enforcing the requirements of the law with respect to harassment.

But this is a motion to dismiss, which must be decided solely on the face of the complaint and any documents incorporated therein. The Court is required to assume the truth of the allegations and to draw all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that she never had an employment contract, that Beuchert's did not have a zero-tolerance policy on discrimination, and that it did not have a "conduct and protocol" to breach, and further that she was a manager at the restaurant and did have authority to speak on Beuchert's behalf as the social media manager.

The question of whether defendants' statements about these matters were false will be more appropriately resolved at the summary judgment stage….

The court also held that Van Rooy was a limited purpose public figure, because she voluntarily "chose to respond to the inquiry from a journalist and went on the record with her name and title" and "the opinions that triggered the backlash." She therefore had to allege that the defendants knew the statements about her were false (or at least were likely false)—the "actual malice" standard—but that she had adequately alleged such knowledge. And the court held that she had adequately alleged damages, because she "alleges that plaintiff was terminated from her second job at Potomac Wave consulting 'based on the widespread negative public reaction to Beuchert's December 12 and 13 social media posts and the subsequent national and international media coverage.'"

But the court rejected plaintiff's infliction of emotional distress claim:

To state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in the District of Columbia, a plaintiff must allege "(1) extreme and outrageous conduct on the part of the defendants, which (2) intentionally or recklessly (3) causes the plaintiff severe emotional distress." Extreme and outrageous conduct is "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Liability is not imposed for "mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities."

Plaintiff argues that defendants' decision to name her explicitly in their December 13 social media posts was extreme and outrageous. But while defendants' attempts to distance themselves from plaintiff were not necessarily constrained or measured, it cannot be said that they crossed the line from mere insult to atrocity, or that posts were so extreme as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.

The restaurant was under public attack and its reputation was at stake, and without expressing a view as to how the employers [went] about it, their attempt at damage control and their public announcement of her termination, the Court finds that the decision to name plaintiff in the post can hardly be considered extreme when plaintiff had already permitted herself to be named in the Washingtonian article. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has warned that "[c]alling pure speech about an issue of public concern 'extreme and outrageous' conduct is clearly reserved for the rarest of cases," and this is not the "rare" case where the speech met the level necessary for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

The court also allowed plaintiff to move forward on her separate claim that "[b]etween January 12, 2024 and December 6, 2024, twenty-four of [plaintiff]'s paychecks … did not clear because of insufficient funds," that she "had to wait more than two weeks to receive her regular paycheck from Beuchert's," and "that following her termination from Beuchert's, plaintiff had to wait ten days before receiving her final paycheck," all in violation of D.C. employment law.

The post Libel Suit by D.C. Saloon Employee Who Said She Wouldn't Serve Some Government Officials Can Go Forward appeared first on Reason.com.

Ali and Osman married in 2001 in Sudan. Both parties are dual citizens of the United States and Sudan. The parties are the parents of five children—three of whom were minors at the time of trial….

In July 2024, Ali commenced this action seeking a divorce from Osman. In October 2024, Osman moved to dismiss the divorce action, disputing that he and Ali were still married at the time of the action. Osman asserted they were no longer married because he had obtained a divorce certificate in Sudan on December 11, 2022….

The [trial] court found that, unbeknownst to Ali, Osman pronounced talaq three times prior to December 11, 2022; and on or about December 11, 2022, Osman obtained the certificate of divorce from Ali in Sudan based on his pronouncement of talaq. {The district court found: "Under Islamic law, a husband has the right to initiate a divorce ('talaq') against his wife. All that is required to achieve talaq is for a husband to pronounce his intent to divorce his wife on three separate occasions, either verbally or in writing. The husband does not need to communicate his three pronouncements to his wife. She need not be present for them or even aware of them. A wife cannot object to a talaq."}

The court found that when he obtained the divorce certificate, neither Osman nor Ali lived in Sudan, but rather they lived in the UAE at the time, which had been their residence since 2015. The court found Ali was not present when Osman obtained the divorce certificate. Ali first learned of the divorce proceeding when Osman emailed a copy of the divorce certificate on December 19, 2022….

The district court denied Osman's motion to dismiss, declining to exercise comity to recognize and enforce the divorce certificate. In so doing, the court specifically found public policy concerns and a lack of due process: Osman obtained the divorce certificate in Sudan when neither party resided in the country; Osman unilaterally obtained the certificate, declaring talaq outside of Ali's presence; Ali was not given notice Osman was pronouncing talaq or seeking the certificate in Sudan; Ali did not receive a copy of the certificate until Osman emailed it to her days later; and Ali was not provided the basic rudiments of due process for the divorce proceedings….

The court found, "Even though [Ali] was aware that her religion allowed [Osman], as her husband, to unilaterally initiate a divorce, she did not have any due process related to the Divorce Certificate, including any opportunity to be heard." The court further found that "even if the parties acknowledged the divorce after [Osman] obtained the Divorce Certificate and abided by their cultural and religious norms, proper due process safeguards did not exist with the issuance of the Divorce Certificate."

Other courts have declined to grant comity in similar situations. See Aleem v. Aleem (Md. 2008) (holding divorce husband obtained under Islamic religious law and secular Pakistani law by performing talaq would not be afforded comity in Maryland); In re Ramadan (N.H. 2006) (holding principles of comity did not require trial court to defer to Lebanese divorce decree and public policy considerations supported the trial court's decision to retain subject matter jurisdiction); Tarikonda v. Pinjari (Mich. Ct. App. 2009) (holding wife was denied due process in the Indian divorce arising from husband's pronouncement of the triple talaq, and the trial court erred by recognizing the Indian divorce and dismissing wife's divorce complaint); DAB v. MAS (N.Y. trial Ct. 2022) (holding trial court would not extend comity to uphold the validity of an Egyptian divorce judgment based on serious concerns about whether the process undertaken by husband in the Egyptian court comported with due process and equal protection requirements, there was no proof wife was served with process, and wife was not a resident of Egypt but rather a permanent United States resident). Further, one court has held that a trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to extend comity to a Sudanese divorce certificate…. Mustafa v. Elfadli (Ohio Ct. App. 2013) ….

On this record, the district court made findings of fact and articulated its specific due process and public policy reasons for not granting comity to the foreign divorce certificate. The district court did not act in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner; did not misinterpret or misapply the law; and its decision is the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination. We therefore conclude the court did not abuse its discretion by declining to recognize and enforce the Sudanese divorce certificate ….

Logan J. Meyer represents Ali.

The post North Dakota Court Upholds Rejection of Sudanese Triple-Talaq Divorce appeared first on Reason.com.