As I've blogged about previously, recall that Judge Newman has challenged her suspension from new case assignments. (Fellow bloggers Josh Blackman and Jonathan Adler have also followed the case closely.) But in the latest ruling, the D.C. Circuit held that the Judicial Council's Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 blocks any review of the lawfulness of this suspension.

In March, Judge Newman filed a cert petition presenting the important constitutional question of whether she is entitled to her day in court to challenge the lengthy suspension, which has no end in sight. Her petition begins with this powerful introduction:

This petition presents questions concerning crucial constitutional and statutory aspects of lifetime tenure and judicial independence, especially the availability of judicial review for intra-branch infringements on judicial service. These questions affect the very independence of Article III courts and potentially affect every member of the federal judiciary and every litigant who appears before them. For three years the Federal Circuit has been operating short-handed because the judges of that court have summarily removed its longest-serving and most storied jurist (its "Great Dissenter") from the bench.

The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 ("the Disability Act") bars review of the unlawful actions taken against Judge Pauline Newman. This administrative removal of a judge who is famous for dissenting from her colleagues, by those same colleagues, with judicial refusal to review the merits of the action, undermines the judicial independence that is a vital foundation of our constitutional design. Every judge who gets crosswise with her chief judge or her colleagues must now worry whether similar tactics could be used to remove them.

Judge Newman has continued to speak and write before the legal community, and no finding of disability has been made concerning her in the years since the unlawful administrative orders began. She voluntarily underwent and passed three expert evaluations of her mental fitness and was reported as having the mental ability of someone decades younger. She now has been suspended longer than any federal judge in history. The length of the suspension, the apparent intention to keep her off the bench permanently, the same judges acting as complainant, witnesses and judges, and the refusal to transfer the matter to another circuit for neutral investigation are unprecedented.

Since then, significant amicus briefs have been filed supporting Judge Newman. Last month, I filed one such supporting amicus brief, joined by former federal judges Janice Roger Brown, Paul R. Michel, Kent A. Jordan, Randall R. Rader, Thomas I. Vanaski, and Susan G Braden.  Our brief argues that federal courts must be able to review constitutional claims of the type presented by Judge Newman:

In its decision below, the D.C. Circuit reaffirmed a 25-year-old precedent that prevents federal judges from seeking federal-court redress from Judicial Council actions that de  facto remove them from the federal bench. That bar applies without regard to whether—as alleged here—the Judicial Council has acted in violation of the judge's rights under the U.S. Constitution. Particularly in light of the threat to judicial independence posed by the many recent attacks on the authority of federal judges, the Court should grant review to reaffirm the authority of federal courts to intervene to hear claims raising constitutional claims of the sort at issue here.

Another supporting brief came from the District of Columbia Bar Association. Its brief  highlights the importance of Judge Newman's independent voice on the Federal Circuit:

The involuntary and indefinite suspension of Judge Newman from all judicial duties is an impeachment and deprives our legal community of an experienced and fiercely independent voice in the ongoing weaving of the tapestry of caselaw at the Federal Circuit. This ongoing suspension circumvents our Constitution because Judge Newman can only be impeached by Congress. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 4.

University of Houston law professor Andrew Michaels, a former law clerk to Judge Newman (2010 to 2012), also supports review in a strong amicus brief.  He explains why Judge Newman's allegedly "temporary" suspension is tantament to impeachment:

The Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 expressly prohibits permanent removal.2 Administrative tribunals should not be permitted to circumvent this prohibition (as well as constitutional guarantees) merely by characterizing the removal as an indefinite series of consecutive "temporary" suspensions. Judge Newman has now been "suspended" for over three years, and counting.

The Buckeye Institute, the Manhattan Institute, and the Committee for Justice also filed a supporting amicus brief, asking the Supreme Court to review the foundational principles at issue in the case:

This de facto impeachment circumvents the Constitution's structural safeguards. Impeachment requires bicameral action, supermajority agreement in the Senate, and  public, deliberative proceedings. These protections reflect the Framers' judgment that  removing a federal judge demands broad political accountability and careful deliberation.  The Federal Circuit's unilateral action evades those safeguards entirely, consolidating investigative, prosecutorial, and adjudicative functions within the judiciary itself.

Some of Judge Newman's former law clerks also filed to support her, arguing that she deserves a day in court:

Without judicial review of her suspension, Judge Newman is in limbo. To safeguard judicial independence and to provide due process, Judge Newman is entitled to meaningful review of her constitutional claims.

The sole brief opposing review came from the Federal Circuit's Chief Judge, Kimberly A. Moore, and was filed by the Solicitor General.  The SG's brief raises largely technical jurisdictional arguments, rather than disputing the merits of Judge Newman's claims. The brief argues:

[Judge Newman's] contentions lack merit and implicate no circuit split. As the courts below correctly held, Congress directed challenges to judicial-council orders to the Article III judges serving on the Judicial Conference, not to federal district courts. That sensible policy decision ensures a mechanism for reviewing allegations of judicial misconduct or incapacity that comports with separationof-powers considerations, offers multiple layers of review, and prevents overburdening federal courts with complaints about judicial-council decisions. And petitioner identifies no plausible conflict among the circuit courts warranting this Court's review.

Understandably, the SG's brief makes no attempt to discuss Judge Moore's bizarre AI cartoon about the Federal Circuit -- a cartoon that glaringly removed Judge Newman from her position on the court, as Josh Blackman discussed in detail here.

Yesterday, Judge Newman replied to Judge Moore's legal arguments. Thus, the briefing is complete on the cert petion. The Court is scheduled to consider the petition at its June 11 conference. That means we may hear as soon as Monday, June 15, whether the Court has agreed to hear Judge Newman's important petition.

I hope that the Supreme Court takes this case. The "stealth impeachment" launched against Judge Newman obviously has the potential to threaten judicial indpendent in many ways. The Supreme Court should speak definitively about whether this end-run around the Constitution's impeachment process is permitted.

Update: I corrected a few small typos in the original post.

The post Will the Supreme Court Review Judge Newman's Stealth Impeachment? appeared first on Reason.com.

The Southern Poverty Law Center's ("SPLC") stated mission included the dismantling of white supremacy and confronting hate across the country. However, unbeknownst to donors, some of their donated money was being used to fund the leaders and organizers of racist groups, including the Ku Klux Klan, the Aryan Nation, and the National Alliance. The SPLC's paid informants ("field sources") engaged in the active promotion of racist groups at the same time that the SPLC was denouncing the same groups on its website….

[T]he SPLC explicitly sought donations under the auspices that donor money would be used to help "dismantle" violent extremist groups. In the SPLC's solicitations for donations as outlined herein, donors were not told that some of the donated funds were to be used by the SPLC to pay high-level leaders of violent extremist groups and others, nor were donors ever told that some of the donated funds were used for the benefit of the violent extremist groups or that some of the donated funds would be used in the commission of state and federal crimes.

Tuesday's Superseding Indictment offers some more detail about the allegations, among other things elaborating on the activities of one of the people working for it (labeled F-30, with "F" being the SPLC term for "field source") and adding information about two others (F-31 and F-32):

F-30 led the National Socialist Party of America, was a member of the Ku Klux Klan, and was the leader of a faction of the Aryan Nations that had chapters in approximately 17 states.

In approximately 2010, out of money and seeking to get out of the white nationalist movement ("the movement"), F-30 reached out to the SPLC, unsolicited, and discussed a plan to leave the movement. Thereafter, the SPLC employee offered F-30 a monthly salary of approximately $2,500.00 in addition to payment of expenses to continue to lead and maintain the violent extremist organization F-30 told the SPLC employee he wanted to leave….

From approximately 2010 through 2016, the SPLC secretly moved over $70,000.00 in donors' money from the SPLC operating account … onto F-30's pay card…. F-30 used donors' money to, among other things, travel to extremist rallies, host extremist rallies, donate money to leaders of other extremist organizations, recruit new members into his extremist organization, publish racist and extremist material for the purpose of recruiting new members, both inside and outside of prison, and create racist paraphernalia to sell at rallies to raise more money for his extremist organization. This was known to certain SPLC employees as they continued to secretly funnel donors' money to F-30.

During the same period that SPLC was secretly using donors' money to fund F-30's extremist activities, the SPLC had an entire "Extremist File" webpage dedicated to F-30. The SPLC used this "Extremist File" webpage to solicit more public donations. At one point F-30 asked an SPLC employee to soften the language about him on his "Extremist File" webpage so that it would not scare off new members from joining his extremist organization. The SPLC employee agreed and changed the language on the SPLC's "Extremist Files" webpage for F-30….

F-31 and F-32 were members of a Ku Klux Klan organization in their area. In or about 2010, F-31 and F-32 feared for their safety from other Klan members and wanted out of the movement. F-32 had seen media coverage about how the SPLC helped an individual leave an extremist organization and how the SPLC paid for this individual's tattoo removals. This media coverage prompted F-32 to reach out to the SPLC, unsolicited, and ask the SPLC for help to get F-31 and F-32 out of the movement.

An SPLC employee invited F-31 and F-32 to Montgomery for a meeting. There, despite their requests for help getting out of the movement, an SPLC employee encouraged F-31 and F-32 to stay in the movement and offered to pay them a $1,200.00 monthly salary as well as to pay for expenses as incurred. Once they were financially backed by the SPLC to do so, F-31 and F-32 agreed to remain in the movement….

Using donors' money, F-31 and F-32 attended extremist group rallies in multiple states. This led to F-31 rising from merely a group member to a leadership role within an extremist group. In the new leadership role, F-31 actively recruited new members using donors' money.

F-32 also participated in recruiting new members using donors' money. In addition, an SPLC employee knew that F-32 used donors' money to purchase material to make Ku Klux Klan garments for others.

F-31 and F-32 were reimbursed by the SPLC with donor money for all expenses they incurred for cross-burning events to include the wood and fuel used….

As I noted in my original post,

I take it that one defense argument as to the donor fraud claims may be that they were trying to dismantle violent extremist groups, both by paying money to get information about them and by causing the groups to do and say things that would discredit them. That may itself be discreditable, but the question will be whether it's a fraud on the donors.

And I followed up with expressing some tentative skepticism about the government's theory. (The government is also accusing the SPLC of making false statements to banks about the accounts that were used to fund its activities; I didn't focus much on that.) But in any event, the indictment and now the superseding indictment are factually noteworthy, whatever one thinks of the legal theory. Of course, note that they are just indictments, which is to say the government's allegations; we'll see what emerges at trial.

The post More on the Southern Poverty Law Center Allegedly Funding the American Nazi Party and Other Racists appeared first on Reason.com.

This Court recently began making uncertified transcripts of the audio recordings of Court proceedings (each such transcript, an "Uncertified Transcript") available to parties with a need for them. However, such Uncertified Transcripts are provided for informational purposes only. They are not checked, proofread, or corrected. They are not official Court records and may not be relied upon for any purpose absent agreement of all parties and further Court order;

Uncertified Transcripts are machine-generated by natural language processing artificial intelligence software that, while improving, often produces meaningful inaccuracies, limiting the usefulness of such transcripts and creating a risk that a person reading them, and particularly a non-party, will misunderstand what actually happened during the transcribed proceedings;

Certified transcripts, produced by qualified court reporters, are far more accurate and are, under Virginia law, the preferred method of recording and demonstrating what occurred in any Court proceeding. See, e.g., Code § 8.01-420.3;

This action involved matters of child custody, raising the best interests of the involved children as the paramount concern of the Court. See, e.g., Bottoms v. Bottoms, 259 Va. 410,413 (1995) (quoting Bailes v. Sours, 231 Va. 96, 99 (1986));

On April 17, 2026, Lauren Burke ("Requestor") submitted three requests for the Uncertified Transcript of the Trial (such requests, the "Request");

Requestor was neither a party to this action nor a witness at the Trial;

A qualified court reporter attended the Trial and would be able to produce a certified transcript of the proceedings;

The Court has reviewed the Uncertified Transcript of the Trial and found it to be replete with errors, omissions, and other inaccuracies such that it does not constitute an accurate record of the testimony, argument, and rulings made during the Trial;

Release of the Uncertified Transcript creates a substantial risk of misrepresenting the nature, details, and conduct of the Trial, which is contrary to the best interests of the children involved;

A more accurate, certified transcript should be available to the parties from the court reporter who attended the Trial;

Accordingly, declining to release the Uncertified Transcript of the Trial is in the best interests of the children and would result in no prejudice to any party;

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:

The Request is DENIED …;

The Uncertified Transcript of the Trial must not be released ….

A certificated transcript, as the court notes, would be available, but would presumably cost a considerable amount of money (at least in the hundreds of dollars, depending on the length of the proceeding).

The post Court Refuses to Release Auto-Generated Transcript in Justin Fairfax Child Custody Trial, Citing AI Transcription Errors appeared first on Reason.com.

[The] charges [in this case] were predicated on photographs and videos of the defendant's minor daughters taken between 2002 and 2016 and were found on a computer and an external hard drive in the defendant's home. The defendant's husband, Douglas Nichols, who is not a party to this appeal [but who reportedly has filed his own appeal -EV], was also charged … with possession of the same images and videos.

Some backstory on how the images were found, from a March article in the Decator Herald & Review (Tony Reid):

Detectives with the Decatur Police Department had been looking for evidence on four counts of … earlier criminal sexual assault charges against Douglas Nichols alone plus eight counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse involving a female teenage victim when they came across the pictures and video that led to the child sex abuse image charges.

A December 2022 story in the same newspaper by the same reporter says:

On May 20, 2021, the Decatur Police Department received a complaint from an individual alleging sexual assault that had occurred over 10 years ago by a subject known to them. The case was assigned to a detective and an investigation into the allegations immediately commenced.

Back to the wife's appeal:

[D]efendant had two daughters, Ky.N. (born November 4, 2000) and Ki.N. (born October 1, 2002)…. Ky.N. testified [at trial] that she was voluntarily testifying, and that she had always felt safe and felt that her mother was supportive growing up. She testified that the family's digital cameras were usually placed where anyone could access or use them, that she had used her mother's phone to take pictures whenever she had wanted to, even daily, and that her sister had done the same. She also testified that her mother took photos of her and her sister all the time. Additionally, Ky.N. testified that her parents never asked her to take her clothes off before taking photographs or videos of her, and that they had never asked her to pose in a sexually suggestive manner….

Ky.N. testified that she didn't recognize the photos but did recognize the home. She testified that she recognized her sister and herself, but she did not remember the photographs being taken or the events being depicted. She stated that it looked like they were having fun playing horses or unicorns with the toilet paper tails, and that she and her sister commonly played with toilet paper.

In regard to People's Exhibit 4, she testified that she did not recognize the video, but that it was her sister Ki.N. playing with a pogo stick, and that she recognized both her and the defendant's voice. In regard to People's Exhibit 5, Ky.N. testified that she did not recognize the video, but that it was of Ki.N. and her cousin in the shower. She testified that her sister commonly sang in the shower and that, growing up, she recorded her sister singing in the shower by pointing the phone at the floor. On cross-examination, Ky.N. testified that she did not remember her parents ever taking nude photographs of her, and that she did not remember anyone else ever taking nude photos of her, and further reiterated she did not know who took the photographs but that it could have been anyone….

[D]efendant's husband … testified that they left the children with babysitters on Tuesdays when both he and the defendant were at work. He testified that he took photos of his children all the time. He also testified that neither he nor the defendant had ever asked them to take their clothes off to take pictures, nor had they ever asked them to pose in suggestive ways. He testified that anyone could use any cameras at any time, but that he was the one who backed up all the photographs and videos from the family's devices to the computer…. He testified that before he was charged, he had never seen any of the charged photographs, but that his children had been spontaneous, and that included doing the things seen in the charged exhibits….

The defendant … testified that she and Douglas would occasionally leave the children with babysitters every couple of weeks to go out together, and they left them with one every Tuesday while they both worked. She testified that the behavior seen in the photos was all in line with how Ky.N. and Ki.N. used to play. She testified that she took photos with her kids daily and that she took photos of them in both posed and spontaneous moments, but she never asked them to take their clothes off before doing so, nor did she ever pose them in sexually suggestive ways…. [She testified] that she never reviewed the old photos and stated she did not recall ever taking the charged images, but she admitted she had taken photos of her children while they were nude. She also admitted there were times she had recorded Ki.N. topless while she was engaged in physical activity….

[T]he defendant's other daughter … testified that she was thankful for her parents and felt safe growing up. She testified that growing up, the family camera was typically kept in the kitchen and that everyone, including members of her extended family, and possibly even babysitters, had used it. She also testified that she used her mother's phone to take pictures daily and her sister had used it frequently as well.

In regard to People's Exhibits 7 through 12, she testified that she did not recall the photographs being taken, but believed that they had come up with the idea of making and playing with toilet paper tails, and that such activity was representative of the sort of spontaneous things they would do. In regard to People's Exhibit 4, she testified that she was the girl on the pogo stick and that it was not uncommon for her to take off her shirt when she got hot as a kid. She also testified that she recognized defendant's voice, as well as her sister's voice in the video, but did not remember which one took the video.

In regard to People's Exhibit 5, she testified that the girls in the shower were herself and her cousin, and that they were having fun showering and singing "Bop to the Top." She also testified that she did not know who took the video. Finally, Ki.N. testified that her parents had never asked her to take her clothes off for a photo or video, nor had they ever asked her to pose in a sexually suggestive manner.

On cross-examination, she testified that she did not specifically remember if she took her top off in People's Exhibit 4 because she was hot, nor did she remember who took People's Exhibit 5, despite her claim on direct examination that she could see anyone who came in the bathroom due to its layout. She also testified that she didn't believe People's 7 through 12 were posed as she believed they were spontaneous….

The court goes through the relevant photographs in detail, and concludes that, though they showed some nudity, they "were not lewd as a matter of law" (which is what would be required to find that the photographs were constitutionally unprotected child pornography). The analysis is long, but here's an excerpt:

People's Exhibit 4 is a 17-second-long video of a partially nude adolescent female with partially developed breasts fully exposed. The video is filmed by a separate individual and appears to be taking place in a finished basement living room type area due to the placement of the window on the roofline of the wall and the presence of couches and a large television in the room,. As the video begins, the female's entire body is visible in the frame, and she is only wearing underwear, socks, and slippers, with no other clothing. She is holding the pogo stick handles in her hands, with one foot on the pogo stick and one foot on the floor.

The female appears to know she is being recorded because she looks straight ahead, then at the camera, then back straight ahead. As the female begins jumping on the pogo stick, the video zooms in on her clothed pubic area, and then moves upwards, focusing on her head and unclothed torso, though much of her legs and arms remain visible as well. The female then falls off the pogo stick and out of frame. As the female steps back into frame, the video zooms out to show her whole body again, and she returns to her starting position. The video then ends.

Turning to the first factor [of the test that the Illinois Supreme Court developed to determine whether material was child pornography], the focal point of the video, we note that the video begins with the female visible "head-to-toe"; but once she begins bouncing it does zoom in on the area of her clothed genitals, then moves upward to focus on her head and unclothed torso until she quickly falls out of frame and it zooms back out to capture her whole body. The zooming appears somewhat clumsy. Taken as a whole, we find that this factor weighs in favor of finding that the video was lewd.

Turning to the second factor, the setting of the video appears to be a basement living room. There is nothing in the setting that would suggest or invite sexual activity. Therefore, we find that the video's setting does not weigh in favor of finding it lewd.

Turning to the third factor, the adolescent female in the video is playing with a pogo stick, which is an age-appropriate activity. While she knows she is being recorded, she does not appear posed but instead appears to be actively playing in a moment of adolescent spontaneity. While the toplessness is inappropriate for the activity, we find it a minor factor here, as we note that we do not consider the nudity itself under this factor. Therefore, taken as a whole, we find that this factor does not weigh in favor of finding that the video was lewd.

Turning to the fourth factor, we note that the adolescent female in this video appears partially clothed, wearing underwear on her genitals but not wearing any top. While the nudity is partial, we do find that this factor weighs in favor of finding that the video was lewd.

Turning to the fifth factor, we note that there does not appear to be anything, including gestures, facial expressions, or the posing of the adolescent female, to suggest sexual coyness or willingness to engage in sexual activity. Therefore, we find that this factor does not weigh in favor of finding that the video was lewd.

Turning to the sixth and final factor, we note that the video does not appear to suggest an intention to elicit a sexual response in an objective viewer. Neither does the video appear to invite the viewer to perceive the images from a sexualized or deviant point of view, such as that of a voyeur, as the adolescent female appears to know she is being recorded. Therefore, we find that this factor does not weigh in favor of finding that the video was lewd.

In evaluating all of the factors together, we find that factors one and four are present while factors two, three, five, and six are not. While not all factors need to be present to support a finding that a video is lewd, we find that, taking into account the overall content of the image and the age of the minor, the video shows an adolescent engaged in nonsexual conduct that is not inappropriate for her age. While we find the video deplorable, it does not meet the standard required to deem it objectively lewd. Accordingly, we find that it does not constitute child pornography under Illinois law.

The post Court Reverses Child Porn Convictions, Finding Material Was Non-Lewd Family Photos and Videos appeared first on Reason.com.

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In this case, the only alleged defamatory statements Defendant made were included in his YouTube video where he stated that Auto Junction "don't give me my money," "they don't give me my bucks." As Defendant's reply brief points out, these statements are not defamatory because they are not substantially false. Indeed, Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint admits that the contract between Plaintiff and Defendant provided for a delivery price of $1,150.00. Because the vehicle was delivered late and with only one set of keys, Auto Junction paid what it considered to be the "reasonable value" of the delivery, but did not pay the full contract amount. Accordingly, Plaintiff's defamation claim fails as a matter of law.

The crux of Plaintiff's Complaint, however, is not that Defendant made defamatory statements himself. Instead, the Complaint asserts that Plaintiff encouraged his many followers to post false, negative reviews about Plaintiff's business. The damage to Plaintiff's business was accomplished by those false negative reviews posted by Defendant's Youtube followers. As a result, Plaintiff also asserts a claim against Defendant for "aiding and abetting" defamation.

In order for a plaintiff to prevail on an aiding and abetting claim, proof of the following elements is required: "(1) the primary tortfeasor must commit a tort causing injury to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant must know the primary tortfeasor's conduct constitutes a breach of duty; and (3) the defendant must substantially assist or encourage the primary tortfeasor in achieving the breach." "Advice or encouragement to act operates as a moral support to a tortfeasor and if the act encouraged is known to be tortious it has the same effect upon the liability of the adviser as participation or physical assistance." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 876, cmt. d (1979). An illustration to section 876 of the Restatement (which Arizona follows) elucidates the kind of encouragement necessary to create aiding and abetting liability under Illustration 4: "A and B participate in a riot in which B, although throwing no rocks himself, encourages A to throw rocks. One of the rocks strikes C, a bystander. B is subject to liability to C."

The Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint and the evidence submitted in response to the pending Motion establishes that Defendant's conduct was intended to encourage his followers to attack Plaintiff's business publicly. Plaintiff presented evidence that these third-party reviews were false and defamatory and are therefore unprotected speech.

While Defendant's encouragement in the video does not reflect a direct request that his followers post negative reviews of Plaintiff's business, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Complaint and the evidence submitted in response to the pending Motion are sufficient to infer that Defendant intended that result and knew it would be achieved by the statements made in his video. See Wells Fargo Bank v. Arizona Laborers, Teamsters & Cement Masons Local No. 395 Pension Tr. Fund (Ariz. 2002) (knowledge for purposes of aiding and abetting "may be inferred from the circumstances."). Accordingly, the claim that Defendant aided and abetted the defamation of Plaintiff's business is not subject to dismissal as a matter of law, either under the anti-SLAPP statute or for its failure to allege the elements of an aiding and abetting claim….

But the court also concluded that the claim was foreclosed by the statute of limitations, and the Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed on that ground this February. Here are more details on Kaluzhin's post, from the appellate decision:

[Kaluzhin's] video showed a verbal altercation between Kaluzhin and an Auto Junction representative. At the time, Kaluzhin had about 150,000 YouTube followers. {As of 2024, Kaluzhin had about 1 million YouTube followers.} To support its claims, Auto Junction highlighted a portion of the 2019 video where Kaluzhin addressed his followers and stated:

Hey, gang, they don't give me my money. Here is the name of the dealership center: Auto Junction Benz & Beemers. The huge appeal… huge appeal to you, guys… Phoenix, dealership center… they don't give my bucks. How is it possible to screw people like this?! …

You must show what crazy subscriber you are, who stand… stand for the truth. This is the very case to stand for truth. Go ahead, my… my crazy ones. Nobody can take money from an average driver. Nobody can…

The record shows that reviews began on or about November 1, 2019, from various sources. Some reviews included only a rating while other reviews included comments. The following are some of the comments Auto Junction received:

You will delete reviews for a long time. Until you return to the driver his earned money….

Awful customer service. Rude people. Don't buy anything here! …

Scammers! …

the owner rude pig. He dont wanna pay for delivery everytime. stay away!

Kaluzhin's videos are apparently in Russian, and plaintiffs argued on appeal that "his fanbase is largely made up of persons in Russia and surrounding areas in Western Asia and Eastern Europe." His YouTube channel appears to be https://www.youtube.com/@i_am_americanec.

Note that on Feb. 7, 2022, Judge Sara J. Agne issued a TRO blocking defendant "from posting or allowing to remain posted the video on YouTube dated 10/28/2019 with the link as follows https://youtu.be/Bpdmys6EMW8, as well as any online reviews on any internet platform to include but not limited to YouTube, Google, Yelp, Car.com, BBB.org, or Trustpilot, concerning the Plaintiff and/or encouraging others to post online reviews about the Plaintiff."

By the way, the court didn't discuss 47 U.S.C. § 230, perhaps because it wasn't raised by the defendant. It's not clear whether § 230 have offered Kaluzhin a defense against the aiding and abetting theory.

The post Influencer's Nondefamatory Service Review Could Be Aiding and Abetting of Defamatory Comments appeared first on Reason.com.

One, with James Heilpern, examines how "subject to the jurisdiction" was used in legal texts in the United States through the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Making use of treaties, statutes, congressional debates, and judicial opinions, the article considers whether that language, which was used in the Fourteenth Amendment's citizenship clause, had an established legal meaning that would have been known to the legal community in 1868. If so, what might that meaning be?

From the conclusion of that article:

The task of this Article is a narrow one. We do not investigate the specific intentions of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment or examine their specific purposes in including the Citizenship Clause. We simply ask to what degree did the drafters of that Clause use familiar legal terms and what would have been the ordinary meaning of those terms as used in a legal text. The evidence is overwhelming that the phrase "subject to the jurisdiction" would have had a natural and obvious meaning to mid-nineteenth century American lawyers. These were ordinary legal terms that regularly appeared in legal discourse.

Moreover, the evidence is overwhelming as well as to what the substantive content of that language would have been in 1866. In the legal language of the mid-nineteenth century, "subject to the jurisdiction" of the United States simply meant governed by the United States. That governing authority might have been exclusive or shared, and those subject to that governing authority might have owed a duty of allegiance or they might merely have owed a duty of obedience. Those governed by the United States might be subject to American jurisdiction on a more permanent basis or they might only be subject to that governing authority on a contingent and temporary basis. Those governed by the United States might only be subject to its authority for limited purposes or they might be governed by it more comprehensively. When lawyers wanted to restrict the scope of jurisdiction, they used appropriate modifiers to do so. Using the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to express any idea other than "within the governing authority" would have been creative to the point of absurdity.

That article is now available from the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy here.

The second examines Indiana's statutory intellectual diversity mandate, known as Senate Bill 202. The law requires that professors teaching in state universities in Indiana demonstrate, among other things, that their courses include an intellectually diverse set of materials in order to retain their jobs. It charges the board of regents to use the tenure process to enforce this requirement. As written, the statute poses a multitude of difficulties for academic freedom and the intellectual enterprise of university teaching.

From the article:

SB 202 might identify a real concern about American higher education, but the solution it offers is not only ineffective but problematic. SB 202 creates a vague set of tenure criteria that can easily be misused to target politically controversial professors. The result is unlikely to improve the quality of classroom teaching or genuinely foster a climate of free inquiry on university campuses, but it might lead professors to cater to the loudest cavilers in an effort to insulate themselves from capricious reprisals.

That article is based on the Addison C. Harris Lecture at the Maurer School of Law and is now available in the Indiana Law Journal here.

The post More on Birthright Citizenship and Intellectual Diversity Mandates appeared first on Reason.com.

… Quraishi worked as an independent contractor at the Clinic doing IT work. In 2017, the plaintiffs began having issues with Quraishi, which ultimately led to Hussain applying for a civil protection order against Quraishi, which the Court granted on October 12, 2018.

After that, Quraishi stopped harassing the plaintiffs, but in July of 2025, for reasons unknown to the plaintiffs, Quraishi began posting on Facebook repeatedly about them.

In the Facebook posts, he accused them of various crimes and fraudulent actions, including, among other claims, fraud and identity theft, Medicare and Medicaid fraud, and using a deceased doctor as their medical director.

As a result, on July 7, 2025, Hussain applied for a civil protection order against Quraishi, which the Court granted on July 21, 2025. On that same date, Garcia applied for a restraining order against Quraishi (they had briefly dated in 2015), which the Court granted on July 16, Quraishi was ultimately arrested for violating the restraining order.

Despite the entry of the civil protection order and the restraining order, Quraishi continued posting about the plaintiffs throughout July of 2025 and then from November of 2025 through April of 2026. These posts included more allegations of perjury, witchcraft, identify theft, Medicare and Medicaid fraud, theft of intellectual property, counterfeiting of documents, filing false statements to the police and the courts, and fraudulent billing.

The plaintiffs deny all of the allegations made by the plaintiff [presumably intended to say "defendant" -EV] in his Facebook posts….

For purposes of obtaining a prejudgment remedy, the plaintiffs do not have to establish that they will prevail, only that there is probable cause to sustain the validity of their claims. Under this standard, the court concludes on the evidence presented that there is probable cause to sustain the validity of the plaintiffs' claim against the defendant.

Quraishi's Facebook posts contain serious allegations against the plaintiffs, particularly given their professional roles in operating a primary care clinic. He accuses them of fraudulent billing, Medicare and Medicaid fraud, and countless other fraudulent actions. Quraishi's Facebook posts are detailed extensively in the plaintiffs' exhibits.

In addition to the allegations against the plaintiffs, many of Quraishi's Facebook posts contain inflammatory, threatening language directed at the plaintiffs. For example, Quraishi wrote on Facebook "Hussain, I'm not just coming for you … I'm going after your family line. And my not yet born children will continue if they must … In this situation I'm like Liam Neeson's character from the movie Taken … 'I have a very special set of skills.'" In another post regarding Hussain and Garcia, Quraishi wrote, "I would've gone full Liam Neeson on you[ ] … I'll let the 5 US Federal Agencies handle you and your whole coven."

In another of his Facebook posts, he wrote that Hussain "is a high level criminal in a medical masonic mafia and he should be placed into either (1) the original Alcatraz prison in San Francisco; (2) the new alligator Alcatraz in Florida." In another Facebook post, Quraishi wrote "the whole world is going to watch you … burn in the hottest inferno hell has provisioned." In yet another Facebook post, Quraishi wrote "a gay male nurse and smelly jew bribed a little piggie." In another Facebook post, Quraishi accuses the plaintiffs, as well as three Judges of the Rockville Superior Court of "racketeering."

Garcia testified that Quraishi has 822 followers on Facebook, and that his posts may have been seen by more people if any of his followers shared his posts with others.

Garcia also testified that Quraishi's Facebook posts have affected her and the Clinic. She testified that the staff is scared, and that she has to review Facebook to see Quraishi's state of mind before she goes to work. She testified that they are particularly vigilant at the Clinic, where they have cameras "all over," and the staff is monitoring who comes in. She testified that she has worked very hard to get where she is, and that it is upsetting to be accused of what Quraishi has accused her of in his Facebook posts. She believes that the posts have harmed her personal and professional reputation. Patients and family members have called the Clinic to ask if they have seen what Quraishi is posting about them….

The court concluded there was probable cause that plaintiffs will prevail on their claims for defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and false light invasion of privacy, and, therefore granted a prejudgment remedy:

Based on the defendant's Facebook posts, there is probable cause that a judgment in the amount of the prejudgment remedy sought, or in an amount greater than the amount of the prejudgment remedy sought, taking into account any defenses, counterclaims or set-offs, will be rendered in the matter in favor of the plaintiffs….

The plaintiffs shall be authorized to attach and/or garnish any or all of the following to the amount of $300,000.00.

1. To attach the defendant Mansoor Quraishi's interest in 2 Davenport Road, West Hartford, Connecticut; and
2. To attach and/or garnish such other assets, property or obligations held by or on behalf of the defendant Mansoor Quraishi as may be identified by defendant's disclosure pursuant to the plaintiffs' motion for disclosure of assets….

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