Writing in The Daily Pioneer, Sushant K. Singh offers his perspective on the recent reports on civil-military conflict,

It has been asserted by most military veterans — who can be safely assumed as surrogates for serving officers — that that this premise has resulted in bureaucrats protecting their turf in a perverse interpretation of civil control. While the military prefers political control exercised by elected politicians, the intervening bureaucratic layer between the brass and the political leadership results in ‘bureaucratic control’. But in the recent case of the Defence Minister forcing the Army chief’s hand against his own wishes, the ire of the military has been directed against the political leadership as well. Some commentators have even gone on to suggest that the Army chief should have resigned rather than accept the ministerial advice. They forget that walking away from the civil-military relationship through resignation is a dangerous instrument that, if used, will destroy all civilian trust in the military leadership.

The line between what constitutes ‘political control’ and ‘political interference’ in military affairs is rather blurred. Most military officers desire that the civilian leadership delegate to the military autonomous control over all things military. But military control in practice — as articulated by Feaver — allows for direct civilian supervision of military matters, down to whatever level the civilian authorities find necessary. [link]

The idea that bureaucrats can be excised from the political military relationship is a non-starter and is merely a fig leaf to suggest no political oversight of military institution—an anathema in a constitutional democracy.

Writing in the Times of India, Jug Suraiya seems genuinely perplexed by what should be the liberal reaction to Article 370. Well, if intellectual honesty is  valued, then the answer is clear enough. Nevertheless, kudos to Suraiya for at least discussing Article 370 especially with Mumbai drama capturing national headlines.

But defending his “secular-liberal” fellow travellors, Suraiya makes a curious assertion,

The parivar’s game plan which the secular-liberals have so far thwarted has been to ’saffronise’ the Valley through mass Hindu migration and so resolve the so-called ‘Kashmir problem’ once and for all. The liberal quandary now is how to continue to make a special case for Kashmir while siding, however uncomfortably, with the parivar’s assertion that all of India should be equally hospitable to all Indians. [link]

Now, suppose for a moment this was BJP/RSS game plan from the beginning. Considering the population of the valley, to effect such a demographic transformation would require migration of millions of Hindus from rest of the country. Unless Suraiya believes that RSS controls an army of zombies who will move to any geographical location in the name of Hindu interest—family, job, and societal considerations be damned—it is curious how this giant conspiracy was to be effected. Amusing indeed that subsequently Suraiya pats the back of “secular-liberals”—in other words, his own—for thwarting this magnificent product of his overactive imagination! Perhaps, Suraiya should be worried about the demographic shift which actually happened in Kashmir: the ethnic cleansing of hundreds of thousands of Kashmiri Pandits from the valley.

It would have been more useful if Suraiya had acknowledged the intellectual dishonesty, and indeed pusillanimity which allows some to support Article 370 and yet be vehemently opposed to Thackeray’s parochial politics. But that he has even given it some thought is a useful start in it self.

In the Indian Express, the ever perspicuous Pratap Bhanu Mehta writes,

The third dimension of the crisis is social. Elites set standards in any society. And the extraordinary social respectability, if not downright obsequiousness, with which the Sena leadership has been treated over the years has sent out the wrong message twice over. It has legitimised the illegitimate, and it has probably led people to overestimate the Sena’s power. Power is always odd, in that you have it if other people think you have it. The minute others stop believing it dissipates. We have let the Sena get away with this illusion by not standing up to it. No single political group or powerful social force in Maharashtra wanted to call the Sena’s bluff. It makes you wonder how many of us are liberals by conviction or how many are deciding to be so. [link]

It is an important point: Witness the way someone of the stature of Amitabh Bachchan holds the Thackerays in exalted status. But with due respect to Mr Mehta, the malaise runs deeper. The elite do not merely acquiesce but frequently are a willing participant in this racket. Again, Mr Bachchan is a good example. From Rajiv Gandhi’s good friend to Mulyam Singh’s foot solider and now Narendra Modi’s brand ambassador, Mr Bachchan has traversed the entire political spectrum, willingly sacrificing his personal beliefs—if he has any—in lieu of personal aggrandizement. The willingness to play second fiddle to the political establishment is not merely a function of fear but also derives from the benefits such relationships accord. Those once co-opted by the establishment find it extremely difficult to break free even if they subsequently find the embrace uneasy.

Specifically, in terms of Maharashtra though Thackerays have always benefited from the political-social elite’s failure to take them on. Congress which has tolerated Thackerays for decades, and indeed propped up Raj Thackeray as a counter to Shiv Sena is hardly in a position to politically fight  them—the breathless gladiatorial headlines not withstanding. Ditto for BJP which has willingly blinked at their anti-Muslim tirade for years. Add to this cauldron the relatively high tolerance in Indian society for mob violence, and it is easy to understand why Thackerays refuse to fade away despite their dwindling political fortunes.

Well, better late than never. If there is a renewed willingness to stand up to the likes of Thackerays, it can only strengthen Indian democracy. But the jury is still out on it

In many ways, Tehelka’s cover story on Bihar breaks no fresh ground. It reiterates the usual talking points: improvement in security, investment in basic infrastructure, and a better business climate while pointing out that many pitfalls lie ahead and there is a long way to go  before Bihar can be considered developed even by Indian standards.

However, the most important story emerging out of Bihar is one of spirit. A society which lost its confidence—it’s ability to dream big—is finally emerging from the shadows and sees hope where it once saw only desperation. Roads can be rebuilt; infrastructure created; and policing improved; but a society’s self–belief—once shattered—is extremely difficult to resurrect. And without that can-do spirit, no society can progress or indeed, even see the need to progress. As Retributions has previously argued, the most discouraging thing about Hindi heartland is people’s acceptance of their state of poverty and utter destitute. Nitish Kumar’s primary challenge is to battle that sense of despondence so that his people can dream, and demand. That he may be succeeding is the biggest marker of change. Or the fact that his principal political adversary, Laloo Yadav, who routinely dismissed the need for development when in power, now accuses Nitish Kumar government of failing on development. A region ravaged by identity politics may be moving, slowly but surely, to politics of development.

But  Tehelka makes an important point,

Nitish Kumar is too canny to miss the signs. He senses that the mood could be in his favour and it is beginning to show in his walk and talk. He is Mr Bihar now and he loves it. He calls a cabinet meeting on board a ship in the Ganga, and the local media laps it up. He holds camps in various parts of the state, during which time he also chairs a cabinet meeting on site, and the people applaud. He believes he is heading the biggest reconstruction story in India. He also believes he is right. He is beginning to acquire the same self-righteousness that Lalu Prasad Yadav once had. It led Lalu into a world of his own where he did no wrong. Bihar went into the dark ages but Lalu saw the reverse in his mind. (emphasis added)

There are two dangers Nitish faces. One, revolutions have a habit of consuming their leaders. Nitish Kumar has hitherto benefited from low expectations of the people of the state and of the larger civil society. In a society which has seen virtually no development or for that matter governance for decades, even a dysfunctional state may appear as blessing from the heaven. But if the Nitish revolution rolls on, people’s expectations would increase dramatically and Nitish would be required to provide much more than minimal governance.

Second, Laloo Yadav’s takeover in Bihar was an important step in empowerment of OBC’s and dalits in the state’s complex polity—as Laloo liked to put it, he offered them Izzat which a caste-ridden feudal society had denied them for centuries. Laloo unfortunately never moved beyond mere words and left the people who voted for him in a much worse condition than he had found them. As Tehelka points out, Nitish Kumar is beginning to be driven by the same sense of self-righteousness. It is important that he keeps his feet firmly to the ground and understands that his job has just begun. And that merely doing something is not good enough. In fact, offering hope and then not delivering is the worst a politician can do.

But perhaps, his first challenge is to win the state elections in November 2010.

In an op-ed in Indian Express, Nitin Pai and I argue in favor India’s intervention in Afghanistan, and address some of the concerns our previous article in Pragati had raised,

The government of President Hamid Karzai and members of the erstwhile Northern Alliance have long argued for India to scale up its involvement in Afghanistan. Iran and Russia, both of whom share an interest in keeping the Taliban out of power, are far more likely to be comfortable and co-operative with Indian troops in Afghanistan’s western and northern provinces than with US troops. Over time, a co-operative arrangement between India, Iran and Russia could form the bedrock of a regional solution to a stable Afghanistan.

Unfortunately, the very mention of an overseas military deployment runs into a dogmatic wall of domestic opposition. First, the bad experience of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka in the late 1980s is brought up as if that episode should cause India to for forever foreswear the use of its armed forces beyond its borders. Apart from the significant differences in context, the Indian army has accumulated two decades of counter-insurgency experience in Kashmir and elsewhere that makes it a qualitatively different force from what it was before the Sri Lankan intervention.

Second, it is argued that sending Indian troops to Afghanistan will be seen as anti-Muslim. On the contrary, it is ordinary Afghans, a vast majority of who are Muslims, who will be the biggest beneficiaries of an Indian intervention. How can supporting the legitimate government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan be anti-Muslim? The idea that fighting the Taliban is a war against Islam is a misleading canard that only benefits the likes of Osama bin Laden and the Pakistani military-jihadi complex. [link]

For discussion, hop over to The Acorn.

There is a blogging elite on the prowl these days, argues Vir Sanghvi on, well, his blog. They criticize the media and television news channels for running after eyeballs at the cost of serious news.

The answer is obvious. Some of the more opinionated bloggers and tweeters believe that they are part of an elite. They distance themselves from the tastes of ordinary people and have contempt for the kind of programming that gets TRPs (i.e. is preferred by ordinary people).

Thus, we have a bizarre situation where traditional media are criticized for fulfilling their role of appealing to mass audiences on the grounds that the programming does not appeal to a tiny minority on the Internet (and compared to TV audiences or newspaper readerships, the blogging elite is really tiny). [link]

Now, it is quite an interesting claim. One could get a little snarky and point out that writing in a language which is understood by less than 10% of Indian population makes one elitist in it self. Or that, pray, why would Vir Sanghvi, prominent columnist,  bothered by criticism of a tiny elite—even if one admits such an elite exists.

But let’s look at more substantive criticism. First, if the news media admitted that  eyeballs was all that mattered, then little criticism would come it’s way. If it claimed no special privileges—from protected speech to benefits like subsidized housing–no one would attempt to hold it to higher standards. But the media claims it serves a larger purpose—a pillar of democracy no less—and therefore deserves special considerations. Well, as the oldest cliche in the book goes, with power comes responsibility. So let the media admit that it is no better than the entertainment channels of Indian television, and no one would be particularly concerned by what they produce.

Second, the media claims it holds elected representatives accountable. And why would it then shy away from accountability it self? Indeed, many politicians argue that they are not accountable for their acts of commission and omission because they have been elected by their constituents. By Sanghvi’s logic, media should leave them alone because they have won the electoral equivalent of TRPs by winning elections! For starters, maybe, Sanghvi should stop calling Narendra Modi a “mass murderer” because he did win the election in Gujarat despite his dubious role in the 2002 riots.

Third and perhaps most importantly, what is the role of criticism? Should movies or books be judged by their content or only their sales ? If that is the case, why does the media employ reviewers which routinely dismiss a lot of Bollywood blockbusters as bad movies. Is it a form of elitism? Of course it is. But does that make it wrong? The idea that popular taste cannot be critiqued militates not only against the idea of excellence but also of personal taste and choice. Those who criticize the media—the dreaded blogging elite—are in no way stopping anyone from enjoying the dubious pleasures of The Times of India. But to argue that somehow criticizing the Times of India “is dissing the vast majority of media readership and viewership” is simply preposterous.

Finally, Sanghvi rather rhetorically asks,

But the next time I see attacks on journalists from pseudonymous bloggers who complain that the journos are only trying to get TRPs (i.e. reach a mass audience), I will wonder: just who do you guys represent? Are you speaking on behalf of viewers and readers? Or are you just another anonymous elite that feels emboldened to pass judgement on the rest of the world from the darkness of your rooms?

It is interesting indeed that Sanghvi does not even admit the possibility of non-anonymous bloggers. But it is amusing that the idea people may speak for themselves does not even cross Sanghvi’s mind!

p.s And what may be wrong with pseudonymous bloggers considering they don’t enjoy the protection of large media houses and  cannot command mobs of thousands ostensibly marching to protect freedom of speech. Or the fact that the traditional media has been  the first one to demand the muzzling of their voice.

In an op-ed in Mint, Harsh Gupta and I argue that Uniform Civil Code (UCC) and Article 370 are essentially liberal and secular issues and the large civil society should treat them as such,

Indeed, when even seasoned BJP politicians are unable to define Hindutva beyond mouthing platitudes, and considering the party’s past association with a particularly rabid brand of denominational politics, discarding Hindutva as the party’s core ideology may well be the first step in a fundamental restructuring of its polity. Nevertheless, it does not follow that what has historically constituted the Hindutva agenda policy-wise—implementation of the Uniform Civil Code (UCC), abrogation of Article 370 that provides for special rights for the state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and establishment of a Ram temple at Ayodhya—is entirely communal in nature.

While the Ram temple issue is undoubtedly a communal one, the same isn’t true for UCC and Article 370. Unfortunately, because of political correctness and a desire not to be associated with the “communal” BJP, the nation’s media, intelligentsia and the larger civil society have avoided these intrinsically liberal and secular concerns. [link]

It would seem at first flush that Amar Singh has reached a dead end with Mulayam Singh & family aka as  Samajwadi Party. Strong statements have been issued; threats made; and it appears as if the relationship between Mulayam Singh’s family led by his cousin Ram Gopal Yadav and the swinging Singh have reached a point of no return.

But it is highly unlikely that Mulayam would led Amar Singh sulk for long. For two reasons. One, the fight between Ram Gopal Yadav and Amar Singh is really a proxy battle between Mulayam’s extended family and his heir apparent, Akhilesh Yadav. Ram Gopal and party clearly don’t relish the idea of Mulayam anointing his son as his successor and leaving them perpetually in support roles. Since they can’t afford to take on Mualyam directly, attacking his man Friday—a man with little political base of his own—makes strategic sense. This battle was clearly seen in the recent by-election for the Firozabad Lok Sabha seat where Raj Babbar defeated Mulayam’s daughter-in-law Dimple Yadav. This result was quite astonishing because Firozabad falls squarely in Mulayam’s Yadav stronghold and it is inconceivable Dimple could have lost without internal sabotage. In simple terms, this fight is no different from those witnessed in India’s other political families.

But there is an even stronger reason why Amar Singh is not going anywhere. Singh is the quintessential fixer which has become a fixture in Indian politics with the rise of what columnist Swapan Das Gupta terms transactional politics. Essentially, apolitical wheeler-dealers who nevertheless are essential for managing leaders’ finances, hold delicate political negotiations, and deal with the media. This need is more evident in the case of old-style politicians of the Hindi heartland who have yet to emerge as the entrepreneur-politician of the South.

Without Mulayam Singh, Amar Singh can still survive—after all, there is always a demand for fixers but what will Mulayam do without him? Much drama may ensue but in the end a rapprochement is the most likely result. Unless, of course, Akhilesh Yadav puts his foot down. Suave and well-versed in politics of modern era, the junior Yadav may have much less need for Amar Singh’s talents than his father.

Whatever may be the end result, for observer of Hindi heartland politics, continuous entertainment is guaranteed!

Indian Express’ editorial on the latest media-manufactured Shashi Tharoor controversy—the minister’s purported comments criticizing Gandhi and Nehru for their foreign policy outlook—introduces a strange new dichotomy: Either you can be a “glib crusader for social media” or a “responsible junior minister” in Dr. Singh’s government.

Strange not merely because the latest controversy had little to do with twitter—Tharoor’s alleged blasphemy was committed in a conference—but because using twitter does not detract from ministerial responsibilities.  Indeed, a look outside India’s borders would reveal that many responsible people in high government ranks are using social media to influence public opinion. Agreed a minister’s job requires tact and if Tharoor had used the forum to bad-mouth visiting state dignitaries or reveal state secrets, the opprobrium directed against him would have been well deserved. But how does merely using twitter disqualify one from the job? Or indeed, make one a crusader?

The Express editorial is doubly troubling because it acknowledges that the crusty old Congress establishment may be uncomfortable with the idea of a twittering minister, and then glibly goes on to blame Tharoor!  How is it the minister’s fault? Surely, the Express would agree that the importance of social media would only increase in future–to dismiss it as “shoot-from-the-hip” voice is really unfair. And if it is, why is the media constantly bothered about Tharoor’s tweets?

Two final points need to be made here. One, the side-issue of Tharoor’s tweets and creating controversies around them serves  the Indian media well. The business of media dictates that more controversies mean rising TRPs. And targeting a minister with little political base and no goons is safe journalism. Second, as has been previously argued on Retributions, MSM remains suspicious of social media. Perhaps because of the fear that  it would be swamped by the new-age media as it has happened in the West with newspapers rapidly losing circulation. Or perhaps because it is just disdain for a medium which removes the middleman from conversations. But this confrontation is meaningless: MSM and social media can exist together.  Or as this blog has argued,

As the blogosphere continues to grow and develop, the MSM faces two stark choices: It can either continue in its present state of denial or it can accept that bloggers have managed to carve their own niche and are unlikely to disappear. It is a choice between confrontation and cooperation. We can only hope that, for once, MSM would display wisdom and humility.

There is an attempt at cult formation around P.V Narsimha Rao, suggests Vir Sanghvi in his latest counterpoint column. It is particularly manifest among the Internet generation who may have little idea about who Rao was and why exactly his reputation is “mud” in the Congress party. Sanghvi follows this with a litany of “truths” about the real Rao: inefficient, a failed administrator, corrupt, and a crony of tantrik gurus like Chandraswami.

Now, for argument’s sake, let’s accept all of Sanghvi’s criticism. After all, it is undeniable that bad things happened during Rao’s reign; what may be disputed are only the details.

However, it does not follow that Rao is hated in the Congress merely because he was a bad prime minister. For that it needs to be established that his record was markedly worse than Congress’ other leaders who are venerated by the party’s leadership. Considering Rao ruled the country for five years, and Rajiv Gandhi was his immediate full-term predecessor, it would be apt to compare  Rao’s term with Gandhi’s. For fairness sake, let’s compare them only within the parameters used by Sanghvi to criticize Rao.

Sanghvi begins by pointing out Rao’s role during the 1984 anti-Sikh riots in Delhi,

His moment of great shame came during the 84 Sikh riots when as home minister he failed to protect the Sikhs. Rajiv Gandhi included him in his Cabinet nevertheless.

Shameful indeed. But then why would Rajiv Gandhi give such a man a prominent place in his cabinet? Perhaps, because during the riots, he was busy making comments virtually justifying the riots! Perhaps, because during his entire reign, no steps were taken against rioters many of whom were prominent congressman. Indeed, it is indisputable that the Delhi riots of 1984 could never have happened without the tacit support of the Congress party establishment of whom Rajiv Gandhi was the leading light. Indeed, so moved was the RSS by Rajiv Gandhi’s soft communalism of that era that it supported him in the 1984 general elections against its own creation: BJP!

Sanghvi then moves on to the fact that Rao failed to control the insurgency in Kashmir,

The insurgency in Kashmir that had begun in 1989 raged out of control.

This is again quite an interesting accusation because while the Kashmir dispute owes its origins to India’s partition, the terrorism which has ravaged the state for the last two decades can be directly traced to the rigged elections of 1987 in which the Congress-National Conference alliance relied on fraud and coercion to win the state elections. Indeed, many of the defeated candidates in that election subsequently became the leading lights of the insurgency movement.

And the criticism that Rao failed to stabilize Kashmir can be leveled against virtually all subsequent Indian prime ministers. Indeed, it is only in the last few years that the situation in the Kashmir valley has improved and that is due as much to the changed geo-political environment as to a particularly adroit display of skills by the Indian political establishment.

And if Rao gets blame for not solving the Kashmir problem, then what about the Punjab problem? K.P.S. Gill, widely seen as the architect of Punjab’s resurrection, was first appointed as the state police chief by Rao. Gill credits Rao for never interfering with policing in Punjab. A militancy which had ravaged the state for years was completely crushed under Rao’s watch.

And what of Rajiv Gandhi’s record on Punjab? He signed the Rajiv-Longowal accord but even failed to protect his partner!

Moving on,

He failed to protect the Babri Masjid (though Liberhan has mysteriously let him off on that one) and could not prevent the rise of the BJP. At the same time, he alienated India’s Muslims, most of whom have never forgiven him.

Now, it is indisputable that failing to protect the Babri Masjid is the biggest blot on Rao’s record. No defending that. But here again, the role of the Rajiv Gandhi’s government must be examined.

To balance the Shah Bano case in which his government had bowed to the demands of Muslim fundamentalists, Rajiv Gandhi’s  government opened the locks of the Babri Masjid and permitted Shilanyas. The government’s decision—motivated by political considerations of undercutting BJP—subsequently led to Advani’s  rath yatra and the demolition of Babri Masjid. So while the Rao government deservedly faces flak for its failure to protect the Mosque, the role of the Rajiv Gandhi government cannot be discounted.

And what of Sanghvi’s charge of Rao failing to prevent the rise of BJP. Well, even if one admits that a challenge to what was virtually a one party system was necessarily bad, Rao can hardly be the only Congress leader blamed when BJP grew from a paltry two seats in 1984 to 89 seats in 1989 general elections which were fought under Rajiv Gandhi’s leadership. In most quarters, a 45 times increase in merely five years would count as quite a substantial growth!

Finally, Sanghvi points out the corruption which was endemic during the Rao era. Here again, Rao is on a sticky wicket. It is indeed true that Rao tolerated and perhaps even encouraged high-level corruption most noticeably in the JMM bribery case.

But surely Sanghvi could not be oblivious of the fact that the Rajiv Gandhi government was perhaps the first government in free India’s history unseated solely due to corruption–the infamous Bofors scandal. Surely,  Sanghvi cannot have forgotten  the cries which reverberated across the country: Gali gali mein shor hai, Rajiv Gandhi chor hai. V.P Singh’s movement brought high-level government corruption to the forefront for the first time. It marked the end of the era of innocence in which it was believed that while India may indeed be an extremely corrupt country, at least the highest echelons of power were imperious to the attractions of graft. Now, Rao’s record on corruption may be murkier than Rajiv’s but not by much.

What must be clearly understood is that the different level of challenges faced by the Rajiv and Rao administrations. Rajiv Gandhi was elected with the largest majority in this nation’s history riding on the sympathy wave after Indira Gandhi’s assassination. He was young and passionate and appeared unblemished by coterie politics. The world was at his feet and yet, what exactly did he achieve? Contrast that with Rao who lacked Gandhi’s number—during his entire term Congress was a minority government—and his impeccable pedigree. He inherited an India which was economically collapsing with major insurgencies raging on in sensitive states. Whatever he achieved was despite these severe handicaps.

Here, the record on economic reforms must be set straight,

India was bankrupt. We needed the IMF’s money. The IMF would only give us money if we agreed to liberalize the economy. Rao accepted the IMF’s term because he had no choice. But in his single-best decision while in office, he chose a non-politician, Manmohan Singh, to be finance minister. Singh reformed the economy and put India on the path to glory.

This is a strange and yet oft-heard argument. So Rao should get no credit—apart from his decision to appoint Dr. Manmohan Singh as his finance minister—because India was operating under IMF imposed duress. However, Dr. Singh deserves to be hailed because he reformed the Indian economy! Was he not operating under the same rules?*

Indeed, what needed to be done about the Indian economy—essentially, dismantling the license permit Raj has been known since the days of the Swantrata party. What was lacking was the requisite political understanding and will. Rao provided the political cover which Dr. Singh needed. How important was that political guidance is clear from the fact that when Dr. Singh himself took over as the prime minister in 2004, he failed to advance the process of economic reforms because of pressure from the Left (Or at least that was the claim.)

So to blame Rao for not being an entirely enthusiastic supporter of liberalization in a party which is officially socialist to this day is laughable considering its leader in 2009 credits a retrograde step like bank nationalization carried on in 1969 at the height of the socialist mania for saving the Indian financial sector in 2009! Or is it Sanghvi’s argument that Sonia Gandhi is an extremely enthusiastic supporter of economic reforms? ( A detailed examination of Dr. Singh’s own record as an economist would reveal that he was never a particularly enthusiastic supporter of liberalization either.)

Now, Sanghvi may well argue that he is no fan of Rajiv Gandhi. Fair enough. But that is not the point. What Sanghvi essentially argues is that Congress’ distaste for Rao is justified by his disastrous record of governance. In that case, the Congress should be equally embarrassed by Rajiv Gandhi whose record of governance—as established in the above paragraphs—was anything if worse. And yet, While Rao’s reputation is “mud”, Congress party claims Rajiv as a great visionary and runs full page advertisements on his anniversaries. For exactly what? Computerizing the Indian Railways system?!!!

So why this discrepancy? Is it really hard to attribute it to dynastic considerations in a party which unapologetically accepts members of a single family as its ruling deity generation after generation?

It is perhaps a measure of the intellectual vacuousness of our leading media lights that they indisputably accept the notion that Congress can only be run by Nehru-Gandhis. Who else has even been given the chance to govern independently? And the one who got the opportunity as an accident of history is run down when his record can stand up to close scrutiny with any of the Family’s leading lights.

If only as Sanghvi argues, Indians had a sense of history!

* Is it not one of the true hallmarks of leadership to appoint the right people for the job?