In my article in the October issue of Pragati, I argue that UPA government’s so-called austerity drive achieves little except legitimizing poverty,

The fundamental problem with the austerity drive and its glorification in certain quarters is that like  Mr Bachchan’s movies from the 1970’s, it legitimises poverty. The clarion calls for return to days of Gandhian socialism might be mere sloganeering but it still represents the idea that poverty is an elevated state of consciousness attaching to it an ill-deserved moralistic value. Now that large swathes of India are enveloped in the darkness of poverty is undeniable. Whether couched in terms of “inclusive growth” or “growth with human face”, Indian growth story needs to embrace hundreds of millions who continue to live in poverty.

Download the October issue for much more including extensive coverage of India’s ”gravest internal security threat”: Maoism.

P.S The Pragati article also appears as an op-ed in the Mail Today.

The tragic death of the Andhra Pradesh chief minister has achieved what had seemed impossible only a few days earlier: displacing BJP from news headlines. In an era of 24/7 news channels, it was almost inevitable that a search for a missing copter which went on for over 24 hours would dominate the news cycle. While the media covers YSR’s career and death from every angle conceivable, two larger points need to be made,

First, YSR’s rise to political prominence  (a heavyweight regional satrap in the Congress party is a breed which is almost extinct), represents the culmination of a process in which strongmen and warlords  are no longer content to serve as the lackeys of the regular politicians–providing muscle power in return for preservation of economic interests and safety from legal consequences. Instead, they wish to capture the political power for they realize the rewards are much higher when they are their own bosses. While YSR’s dynamism and popularity is undeniable, what deserves to be mentioned in equal detail is the sordid side of his rise: Not just the violence and murders which were his preferred companions in his younger years but the ability to leverage state’s economic apparatus for personal aggrandizement. Much like the Reddy brothers of Bellary who virtually bankroll the BJP in the state, and in the process, have benefited enormously from capturing mining interests, YSR exploited his political rise to become perhaps the most prominent of that breed which is a recent phenomenon in Indian politics: businessman-politician. Inevitably, this crony capitalism is most effective in sectors where the state retains monopoly powers: land, mining, and  infrastructural projects. Indeed, a more sophisticated example of the same phenomenon is the battle between the Ambani brothers currently underway in the corridors of power in New Delhi.

Now, of course, these leaders have won elections. They are almost invariably populists who rather than building sustainable institutions, have bought popularity by handouts: free power, rice at 2rs per kg and lately even insurance schemes for the poor. While a large section of the poor benefit to some extent from these populist schemes and they, in turn, vote their benefactors back to power, not only the financial viability of these myriad schemes but even the their long term positive effects are doubtful. More importantly, electoral success provides cover for the corruption and the loot.

And that brings us to the second point: While elections are an important part of democracy, and leaders who cannot win elections are unlikely to influence public policy, they cannot be the end all of the democratic process. Lately, the media, or specifically the electronic media, has a adopted a template in which success in elections seems to wash away all the sins of a leader. (Except for one, of course.) Perhaps, it is the need of television punditry which rests on certitude–when was the last time a television pundit confessed that he did not know an answer?–or the requirement for instant heroes and villains, but measuring leadership and achievement merely by elections is fraught with danger. For it reduces the entire democratic process to a five year ritual. Yes, in a democracy, elections are the calculus for judging popular support, but should a political entire career be reduced to merely that? The effusive eulogies which have followed YSR’s departure seems to have entirely missed this point.

Recently, the Financial Times had warned the danger oligarchs present to the Indian democracy. While the FT’s view may be too alarmist, the rise of the the likes of YSR signals that it is a danger which Indian democracy must guard against.

Reading prominent political commentators it would appear that the current factional fights in BJP are about ideology: On one side are the ”moderates” led by the likes of Jaswant Singh and Yashwant Sinha opposed by the Hinduvata lobby led by the party president, Rajnath Singh. The more liberal commentators despair that the party is losing the ideological battle and is unable to transform into a genuine Right-of-center party. (As if there is a version of the party they would find agreeable.)

The argument of the commentariat are certainly strengthened by the bellicose statements issued by Rajnath Singh who promises that the party would never deviate from the path of Hinduvata (And adds in the next line that the party must win the support of the poor, agriculturists, and the middle class; what may be the connection, if one may ask?)

So in a typical Rajnath Singh interview during general elections, Singh would be asked if Ram Temple was still on the BJP agenda;  he would reply, yes, of course and the media would run headlines of how BJP was still interested in old issues like the Ram Temple. There were never a follow up question—for example, what steps did the NDA government take for constructing the Ram Temple, and if BJP’s hands were tied together by coalition dharma, how did the party, which was again fighting the elections in an alliance, propose to achieve its agenda this time? This suited both sides equally: the media could happily paint BJP as a rabid Hindu-Right party while Rajnath Singh was saved from answering uncomfortable questions on his party’s cynical exploitation of the Mandir issue. (In Sushma Swaraj’s unforgettable words: A check which cannot be encashed again.) It had become a party which became a caricature of it self!

That BJP was a far more rabid Hinduvata party in the 1990s was a minor detail which seems to have escaped every one’s attention. And that though it continued to cling to Hinduvata, it had left all its core components—Ram Temple, Article 370, and Uniform Civil Code—far behind. Indeed, its Hinduvata had been reduced to defending thugs like Varun Gandhi for narrow political gains–a situation which could hardly be distinguished from the Left’s embrace of Madani in Kerala. At least, Varun Gandhi has not been accused of setting off bomb blasts. In fact, a barely three line mention of the Ram Temple issue in a 47 page election manifesto resulted in excited headlines and shrieking television anchors.

Continuing from the same template, the current war within the party has been characterized as an ideological struggle between the moderates and the religious warriors.  It is nothing of that sort. It is simply a power struggle between two factions within the party with the clique which had led the party to a spectacular electoral defeat refusing to accept responsibility or relinquish control. Advani who had been initially ”reluctant” to even assume the post of the leader of the opposition wants to continue till 2014. Rajnath Singh who would have struggled to win his own Lok Sabha seat without Ajit Singh’s support sees a bleak political future if he is not re-elected to the post of the party president. And Arun Jaitley visualizes  himself as a future leader of BJP. Ranged against them are the leaders of the Generation-ex who believe it is now or never.

It is doubtful if Rajnath Singh and company have studied the methods of the likes of Stalin in any detail. Nevertheless, claiming exclusive rights on ”core ideology” and purging all deviants—counter-revolutionaries— is a classical Stalinist technique. All that is missing is accusations of being on payroll of the opposition—Congress party in this case—and a quick trip to the Gulags for the re-education. As in the case of Stalinist Purges,  ideology is merely a fig leaf for claiming absolute power and control over the party.

Now, it is certainly true that BJP needs ideological clarity, or, in simpler terms, give up its token endorsement of issues like Ram Temple which neither the party nor the electorate are particularly interested in. Similarly, it needs to decide if it believes in markets or in swadeshi. And to explicitly acknowledge what it has implicitly conceded on Hinudvata. But every significant political party harbors these contradictions: Before the Mamata tornado hit them, the CPI(M) was ranting against neo-liberal policies in New Delhi while actively encouraging private capital in Bengal.

BJP can resolve these contradictions if it remains a broad church of personalities and power centers.  But as Swapan Dasgupta puts it, is increasingly turning into a narrow sect but this sect is constructed not around issue but personalities of the ruling clique: A BJP 10 Janpath. Any opposition to the ruling Gods would automatically result in expulsion from the party on charge of ideological deviation. Because the ruling Gods have defined their own narrow interest as ideological core. Rest is all talk.

And that is why the internecine warfare. And that is why it is unlikely to resolve it self anytime soon till the 10 Janpath triumphs because like the address in New Delhi, it demands absolute power and obedience.

And if in the process Rome burns, who cares? Power knows no  piety; no vision. It knows only it self.

The most hopeful take on the sordid Jaswant Singh affair is that he was really expelled due to internal politics of the BJP: The Advani clique is simply unprepared to accept accountability for the party’s stunning electoral defeat and BJP will act against anyone who demands even a degree of accountability. By expelling Jaswant Singh in this manner—the party president informed him on the phone—the party’s ruling clique is sending out a clear message that anyone challenging its authority would no longer find any place in the party. In short, forget 2009, Advani is preparing to battle for the position of leader of opposition after the 2014 elections.

Because if he was really expelled for writing a book—a book!—then this Talibani party should really self-destruct. A party led by an intellectual pygmy who probably has never read a book after primary school; shepherded by apparatchiks in RSS who have made not one—not one!—contribution to understanding of Indian history and culture; and commanded by a hypocrite who explained in multiple media interviews how his comments were misunderstood on Jinnah should really dissolve it self. And spare India the spectacle of its principal opposition party go bust.

Because if he was really expelled for writing a book—a book!—then clearly this party has no use for intellectual discussion; for thought; and for openness. Much like the Congress party whose principal purpose now is advancement of the dynasty, BJP has its own set of holy cows, who can never be questioned—not even in the slightest—because it will go against the party’s core ideology. What sort of ideology is defined by individuals?

With its current leadership, there is no hope for BJP—none whatsoever! Unfortunately, BJP will not disappear. It will stick around as a skeleton of its glory days, confined to 50-60 seats in the Lok Sabha, left with  a core loony fringe and Internet warriors, and its leaders will continue to provide entertainment for the nation.

All we can do is wait for the next episode of this never-ending saga.

Jaswant Singh’s new biography of Muhammad Ali Jinnah has quite predictably raised political hackles. The Congress which has long forgotten the distinction between the Nehru-Gandhi family and India has raised questions about Mr Singh’s nationalism. BJP, a party which has never shown much fondness for intellectual pursuits, has disassociated it self ”completely” from Jaswant Singh’s book with some leaders even demanding ”action” against the author.

But what is particularly disappointing is the response from the media. Barring some honorable exceptions–Karan Thapar’s interview with Jaswant Singh was particularly well done–the majority seems to view the book from the prism of current Indian politics. Or worse, question why BJP leaders are obsessed with Jinnah. Sample this comment from CNN-IBN’s National affairs’ editor,

This BJP craze for Jinnah is ridiculous. Why deify a partitionist when Maulana Azad harboured little ambition and worked for a united India?[link]

For one, Jaswant Singh has clearly stated that he has written his book as an Indian concerned about one of the most important events in modern Indian history (Not to mention that BJP is most embarrassed about Jinnah). For another, true history can never only be about the ”good guy”–it must involve those who shape history whether we like their politics or not. In that respect, Jinnah was definitely one of the most important and influential figures of Indian history.

Now, it may be quite possible that Jaswant Singh’s reading of Jinnah is entirely incorrect.  After all, this allegedly non-religious secular man championed the idea of Hindus and Muslims as separate nations rejecting the shared history of hundreds of years. Despite his oft-referenced speech, the country he fathered has turned into a virtual Islamic theocracy. And it is indisputable that his basic idea–that religion can be the basis of nationhood–lies repudiated not only by the creation of Bangladesh but by the sectarian violence which ravages the land of pure.

But does that mean that partition and the role of principal players–and Jinnah definitely was one–should not be subject of genuine intellectual inquiry?  After all, why did India fail to prevent partition? Even if we assume that intentions of Nehru and rest of the Congress leadership was completely overboard, they failed at a certain level otherwise India would never have been divided.  How is it possible that Pakistan–a concept which was ill-defined as late as 1940–suddenly became such an unstoppable force that the Congress was forced to agree to a division which  its top leadership deeply disagreed with? These are important questions which must be dispassionately explored in detail. Why the reluctance to do so? Why the hesitation to have an open debate?

In his book India After Gandhi, Ram Chandra Guha argues that Hindi cinema is one of the binding forces which keeps India together. For a cultural force which enjoys such importance in our collective consciousness, how many Bollywood movies have critically examined what happened in 1947? Perhaps, except, Garam Hawa, none. Or even the last three decades where India has seen Emergency, assassination of two prime ministers, secessionist movements in Punjab and Kashmir, and a war fought in the icy heights of Kargil, the number of movies which have examined these events with more than a superficial understanding can be counted on fingertips.

It is extremely unfortunate that for a country which has perhaps the richest and most varied history in modern world, there is marked reluctance to discuss certain painful historical episodes and a deliberate attempt to reduce history to Black and White: Jinnah bad; Nehru good. Indeed, the hesitation to ruffle feathers extends across the political spectrum. While it is understandable why Congress governments refuse to release Henderson-Brooks report, what stopped the NDA government from doing so? A fear that a future Congress government would expose its equally inept handling of the Kargil war? India is poorer for this intellectual pusillanimity; this conspiracy of silence for we are reduced to learning about the gross failures in Kargil from perspicacious journalists like Praveen Swamy.

And therein lies the importance of Jaswant Singh. Mr Singh deserves praise for telling Jinnah’s story as he read it. It matters nary whether Singh is right or not–that is a matter of historical judgment and this blogger, an arm-chair enthusiast at best,  is hardly qualified to make that call. But if it can spark off a debate on one of the saddest episodes in Indian history, it would have more than served its purpose.

And let’s not forget the old adage,

‘Those who forget history are doomed to repeat it.”

Addressing the Chief Minister’s Conference on internal security, home minister, P Chidambaram makes an important point,

We believe in the two-pronged approach of development and police action. However, the naxalites are anti-development and have targeted the very instruments of development – school buildings, roads, telephone towers etc. They know that development will wean the masses, especially the poor tribals, away from the grip of the naxalites. Hence, these deliberate attacks on developmental activities. Our response therefore will be police action to wrest control of territory that is now dominated by the naxalities, restoration of civil administration and undertaking developmental activities – in that order[link]

The order is exactly right. As we have argued in our Indian Express op-ed, security operations must happen first, and then only development can happen. Hopefully, Mr Chidambaram’s message will be heard by the chief ministers and the larger establishment and the temptation of pouring thousands of crores without first ensuring rule of law will be eschewed.

Retributions has previously argued that focusing on development or reward for surrender schemes in Maoist affected areas will be ineffective  in absence of security as it is simply too lucrative to be a Maoist these days. How lucrative? The Times of India estimates that the extortion and drug smuggling earns the Maoists close to 1500 crores a year,

If a conservative estimate is taken of the income generated from ‘levy’ in the seven most Naxal-infested states — Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh, Andhra Pradesh, Orissa, Bihar, West Bengal and Maharashtra — security agencies feel the collection from these areas, which are commonly referred to as ‘red corridor’, amount to nearly Rs 1,500 crore.

The Naxals have even come out with a card, recovered by forces, which clearly shows the exact amount of ‘levy’ to be paid by contractors, petrol pump owners and land owners.

It usually ranges from 10% of the project cost for those making unpaved roads to five per cent for small bridges and others.

Besides the fixed levy, the left-wing extremists groups also demand money from industries functioning in the areas “as and when they need” and even issue receipts for the same [link]

Without ending this easy source of funds, merely pouring in thousands of crores will only help the Maoists further enrich themselves. The government should focus on well thought out security operations against the Maoists while ensuring minimum inconvenience to local populace, and then focus on development.

So yesterday we heard from Aakar Patel why Britishers had left India six decades too early. Mr Patel explained, with great delight it appeared, how if only the Britishers had stayed around a few years more, things in India would have been much better. Indeed, if Mr Patel is to be believed, the modern Indian state is almost exclusively the construct of British colonization. Responding to such an article is sheer waste of time because a selective telling of facts can justify virtually anything: Slavery and genocide included.
But how selective are those facts? Hear it from Mr Patel himself,

Bengal has had two major famines that we know of. The first was in 1770, 13 years after Robert Clive defeated Siraj-ud-Daulah at Plassey. One crore (10 million) people, one fifth of the area’s population, died of starvation that year. Clive committed suicide four years later, but not from guilt.

The second Bengal famine was in 1943, in which thirty lakh people (three million) died. Britain was diverting India’s resources to its war effort. The pain of this famine was observed by the 10-year-old Amartya Sen, who did his research on hunger after that when he became an economist. He went around villages on his bicycle with weighing scales and measured infants for malnourishment. It was for this work that he won the Nobel for economics in 1998.

There were many famines during British rule. One crore (10 million) people died in Central India in a famine that began in 1789, the year of the French Revolution. One in South India in 1877 killed 50 lakh (five million) people. [link]

By Mr Patel’s own reading of history, the wonderful British empire whose virtues he was extolling only yesterday, caused the death of millions of Indians in famines only. While, the inefficient Indian state–despite all its weaknesses–has prevented famine deaths since independence.

And it cannot be stressed enough: Those two articles appeared on successive days. What an intellectually vacuous and dishonest man!

In an op-ed in the Indian Express, Sushant K. Singh and I argue that without ensuring security in Maoist affected areas, government’s development package is destined to fail,

In states where even policemen are shying away from serving in Maoist zones, is it reasonable to believe that the local population would risk their lives by challenging Maoist authority because they have — or are promised — more electricity or cleaner water by the government? Indeed, Maoists — wary of even the slightest challenge to their authority in areas they control — are selectively targeting contractors, civil agencies and NGOs. Genuine progress in reconstruction and economic development rests on adequate security. Unless security is established first, any “hearts and minds” approach is destined to fail, fuelling even more discontent among the local population and providing further ammunition to the Maoist propaganda machinery.

Similarly, the ‘rewards for surrender’ scheme can deliver results only when the core groups of Maoists have been neutralised. With Maoists running a lucrative extortion racket in the “red corridor”, there are no incentives for even the ideologically uncommitted cadres to surrender.[link]

The August issue of Pragati features my review of Salil Tripathi’s book: ‘Offense: The Hindu Case‘.

Mr Tripathi’s answer would no doubt be unequivocal: No. But by placing his arguments in religious morality rather than constitutional morality, he leaves room for unwinnable religious arguments. To be fair, he does discuss the constitutional weaknesses—Article (19)(1)(a) of the Constitution and Section 295(A) of the Indian Penal Code which allow the state to proscribe ‘’offensive’’ material—but that discussion is perfunctory. This is not a mere pedantic argument—after all, it is only the constitutional weaknesses which have allowed Hindu fundamentalists to file hundreds of cases against Husain, virtually hounding him out of the country. It is the Indian state which has permitted this travesty by arming itself with an arsenal of draconian laws which impinge on free speech. And lest it be forgotten, those laws were incorporated in the Indian constitution not by religious fundamentalists but by founding fathers and their parliamentary successors, encouraged by an overarching and overzealous government. [link]

Read the rest at Pragati website or download the entire issue for much more.