Russian strategic nuclear forces

Typhoon submarines are staying

2009-07-03T05:34:05Z

A week ago, Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy, the Navy Commander-in-Chief, told journalists that the Navy intends to keep Project 941 Typhoon submarines in service. These submarines were waiting for some kind of decision about their future since at least 2004, then the Navy disbanded the division that held them.

It appears that the Navy plan is to keep the Project 941 submarines, but without ballistic missiles - as cruise missile carriers or in some other role (these options were mentioned some time ago). I'm not sure why the Navy would want to get into the trouble of converting the submarines, but this definitely can be done. Especially since the conversion would not have to involve cutting out the missile compartment as it is required by the START treaty.

Will missile defense derail START-Plus?

2009-07-02T23:49:00Z

It looks like missile defense will make for some drama at the Moscow summit next week - responding to Russia's hardening stance on missile defense the U.S. administration is making it clear that it is not ready to offer any firm commitment regarding the missile defense deployment in Eastern Europe. Michael McFaul, special assistant to the president and senior White House director for Russian and Eurasian Affairs, told The Wall Street Journal that the United States is "not going to reassure or give or trade...anything with the Russians regarding NATO expansion or missile defense."

It is quite clear that at this point Russia's strong opposition to the missile defense site in Europe is probably the only thing that could save the project - without that opposition the idea is likely to quietly die on its own. (A colleague who returned from a major missile defense conference held about a month ago said that the industry has already got the message and is actively looking for other ideas that would be easier to sell to the skeptical public.) It appears that the U.S. administration would be happy to let this process take its course, but for internal political reasons it cannot possibly open itself to charges that it traded the missile defense away.

One would think that Russia would understand the reasons why Obama can go only so far on missile defense. But the problem is that that Russia does not necessarily want to resolve the issue - far too many people in Moscow get a lot of political mileage out of the controversy and wouldn't mind keeping it alive. This would make any compromise very difficult.

To make things clear, the United States has only itself to blame. As someone noted, the United States often practices North Korea-style politics - it creates a problem and then demands a price to make it go away. It looks like the administration understands that it has to come up with something positive - it apparently wants to seriously explore Russia's offer to use its radars in Gabala and Armavir. But that interest alone might not be enough - some words would need to be said about the elements of missile defense system in Poland and Czech Republic.

One way to deal with the issue would be to return to the idea of "tying together the activation of the sites in Poland and the Czech Republic with definitive proof of the threat", which was articulated by Robert Gates in October 2007. This idea was later killed in the interagency process in the Bush administration, but the Obama administration could certainly revive it (as a bonus, the Bush legacy could help deal with inevitable criticism from the right). That way, the Gabala/Armavir enterprise would not even be part of the missile defense system, which is still quite controversial in Russia. Rather, the U.S.-Russian cooperation would concentrate on threat assessment - a much more reasonable and useful undertaking than missile defense. I certainly hope that the Obama team could put together a reasonable proposal along these lines.

There are many ways to count launchers

2009-07-01T18:47:29Z

For the START Plus treaty to have any chance to come into force before December, the United States and Russia would probably have to agree on the basic outline of the treaty during the upcoming visit of President Obama to Moscow. I think it is quite possible, especially if Russia does not try insist on a formal U.S. commitment to forgo missile defense deployment in Eastern Europe (this is not to say that missile defense is a good idea, it's just that there are better ways of dealing with the issue).

At this point it looks like both sides would be happy with the new treaty setting a limit of 1500 operationally deployed warheads - that would be a more than 30 percent reduction from the 2200 level specified in the Moscow treaty. Hardly a breakthrough, but still a reasonably low number.

Getting an agreement on the number of launchers would be somewhat more difficult. For Russia, the limit on launchers is quite important, because it sees it as a way to limit U.S. "upload potential". Whether it is the best way of dealing with the issue is somewhat debatable, but this is an important part of Russia's official position.

The United States apparently suggested setting the limit at 1100 strategic launchers. Russia reportedly wants to go significantly lower, probably to 500 launchers. These proposals, of course, reflect the current status of strategic forces - by the last START count the United States has 1198 launchers, while Russia has 814. Here is how these numbers break down:

U.S. START data (January 1, 2009)

Minuteman III	550	451 deployed ICBMs
MX/Peacekeeper	0
Trident I	96	0 deployed SLBMs
Trident II	336
B-1	56
B-2	19
B-52	141	94 with ALCMs + 47 with bombs
Total	1198

The four submarines that are listed in START as carrying Trident I missiles have, in fact, been converted to SLCM carriers. The missiles are still listed as deployed, but the listings are accompanied by footnotes that say "TRIDENT I SLBMS CONSIDERED DEPLOYED HERE ARE LOCATED AT OTHER FACILITIES AND REPORTED AS NON-DEPLOYED".

As we can see, there is not a lot of room for reductions here. If the new treaty preserves the START definition of a deployed launcher, then the United States could eliminate the 99 empty ICBM silos to get to the 1100 level. Which, as I understand, is exactly the plan. Getting lower than that would require either liquidating more ICBM silos (I don't think the U.S. would be ready to touch other legs of the triad) or changing the definition.

The smart thing to do in this situation would be to get rid of the ICBM force (isn't it what Reagan wanted - to get rid of ballistic missiles?), but the U.S. administration could not realistically do it before the results of the Nuclear Posture Review are available (and, unfortunately, NPR is unlikely to endorse this option anyway).

Russia, of course, is already way below the suggested 1100 level:

Russia START data (January 1, 2009)

SS-18	104	68 deployed ICBMs
SS-19	120	72 deployed ICBMs
SS-25	180
SS-27 silo	50
SS-27 mobile	15
SS-N-18	96	76 deployed SLBMs
SS-N-20	40	21 deployed SLBMs
SS-N-23	96
RSM-56/Bulava	36	0 deployed SLBMs
Bear/Tu-95MS	63
Blackjack/Tu-160	14
Total	814

Even though the total number of launchers listed in START is 814, if we don't count the empty silos and launch tubes (as well as the SS-N-20 SLBMs on Typhoon submarines) the number would be 634. Given that the Project 667BDR submarines with SS-N-18 missiles are being liquidated, as are SS-19 and some of SS-18 ICBMs, 500 launchers is indeed a reasonable number for Russia to suggest. In fact, the current plan is to have a 400-launchers force.

The number of launchers may emerge as a major contentious point at the talks, but I hope that it won't. It would still be possible to get to the lower launcher count, but only if Russia agrees to a new definition of a deployed launcher, for example, the one that would exclude launchers that are not "operationally deployed" - Trident I submarines, non-nuclear B-1 bombers, Trident II submarines that are in overhaul. That would add up to another 200 launchers (96+56+48), bringing the U.S. total down to 899, but I don't think that would be worth it - it is much better to keep launchers on the books, even though the number would be somewhat higher. After all, compared to the START ceiling of 1600 launchers, getting to 1100 would be a reduction of more than 30 percent - again, hardly a breakthrough, but not bad either.

The main point, of course, is that it would be much better to have a treaty with somewhat higher numbers and to keep the transparency and verification structure in place than to have no treaty at all. I believe that if the presidents announce in Moscow that they agreed to have the START-Plus treaty that would set the limits of 1500 warheads and 1100 launchers, there is a reasonably good chance to have the treaty done by December.

Bulava tests to resume later this summer

2009-06-22T07:53:25Z

Speaking to journalists on June 19, 2009, Vladimir Vysotskiy, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, said that the flight tests of the Bulava missile will resume "after the second half of July". Vysotskiy also said that there will be four or five flight tests in 2009.

As far as I can tell from the reports, the plan is to conclude the flight tests in 2009, so the Yuri Dolgorukiy submarine with the missile can be accepted for service in 2010. This maybe too optimistic, but probably not impossible if all the tests go well.

Russia wants better deal on missile defense

2009-06-19T22:01:20Z

Russia's position on the link between missile defense is getting harder with each new statement on the U.S.-Russia arms control talks. In the March 2009 official statement missile defense was mentioned, but it was not included in the part of the address that was attributed to the president. When President Medvedev mentioned it in his speech in Helsinki in April, he did say that missile defense would complicate disarmament efforts, but he seemed to be making a general point, rather than referring to the U.S.-Russia negotiations currently underway. An official statement made in May made the connection more direct, suggesting that Russia would want to use the new treaty to deal with the issue of missile defense in Europe. And finally, speaking in Amsterdam on June 20, 2009, Medvedev explicitly said that "the he reductions we are suggesting are possible only if the United States addresses Russian concerns [about missile defense]".

It may seem that Medvedev was talking about the next round of talks - the statement was billed as a new bold arms reduction offer, so many assumed that it goes beyond of what is being discussed today. It is hard to say if that was indeed the case, for the statement is extremely thin on details, so it is quite possible that the "new offer" is in fact the current negotiating position.

Medvedev said that Russia is ready to reduce "the number of strategic delivery vehicles by a significant factor" relative to START ceiling of 1600 launchers. But this is hardly anything new or bold - Russia already has 814 accountable launchers and fewer than 600 "real" ones. With the warheads, Medvedev promised to reduce their number below the Moscow treaty level. This is hardly anything new or bold - I don't think anyone expected the number to be higher than that of the Moscow treaty (as I understand, it will be 1500).

I still hope that Russia will not torpedo the current talks by linking reductions with missile defense. But it may well decide that this is the right moment and try to get the United States to make some concessions on missile defense. That would be unfortunate, because it is highly unlikely that the United States would be ready to negotiate away its missile defense system. Even though the U.S. administration is fairly skeptical about missile defenses in general and the system in Europe in particular, it would find it much harder to kill the program if it would look like it is done under a pressure from Russia. I understand how Russia feels about missile defense, but trying to insert this issue into the current round of arms control talks is the best way to fail on both counts - Russia may find itself without a treaty and with U.S. missile defense in Eastern Europe.

Yuri Dolgorukiy goes to the sea

2009-06-19T21:09:03Z

On June 19, 2009 Yuri Dolgorukiy, the lead ship of the Project 955 class, sailed to the sea to begin its first sea trials.

Thanks to a reader, who found a nice photo of the event (I wish I knew who is the author, so I could credit him).

Project 955 submarines deployment

2009-06-04T04:14:22Z

As Bulava is slowly making its way through flight tests, the first Project 955 submarine, Yuri Dolgorukiy, is getting closer to actually going to sea. Its reactor was turned on in November 2008 and the submarine is expected to begin sea trials this month.

Speaking to journalists today, Sergei Ivanov said that Project 955 submarines will be eventually deployed in the Pacific and with the Northern Fleet. What's interesting is that when asked about the number of submarines of this class to be constructed, Ivanov replied that it will depend on the funds available. So far, the plan was to build eight submarines by 2015. It is unclear if Ivanov meant that it could be more than eight or fewer. I guess we will have to wait to find out. He said, however, that the navy already absorbs a lion share of the military budget - about 40% - most of which goes to the sea-based nuclear force.

More delays for Bulava

2009-06-04T03:49:44Z

Speaking to journalists today, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov admitted that the flight tests of the Bulava missile will be extended into the next year. That was hardly a surprise - the problems with the program are well known and earlier it was reported that the missile will be tested from a land test site before going to the sea.

It is interesting to track the history of projections about the Bulava program -Vladimir Kuroyedov, then the Navy Commander-in-Chief, was saying in April 2005 that the he expects two submarines with Bulava missiles operational by the end of 2006. I was a bit more cautious back then, writing that "it is unlikely that new submarines with Bulava missiles will become fully operational before 2008-2010." 2010 still seems to be possible, although this time caution suggests that 2011 might be a more realistic date.

Last plutonium production reactor shut down

2009-06-01T06:59:49Z

Russia's last plutonium production reactor, ADE-2 at Zheleznogorsk, was shut down at midnight on May 31, 2009 (at 24:00 MSK according to one report, which was 04:00, June 1st in Zheleznogorsk). The shutdown is not permanent yet - officially, the reactor has been stopped for maintenance and could be restarted in September if the replacement power station is not ready by that time. According to the U.S.-Russian agreement, the reactor should be shut down completely no later than 2010.

Since 1994, the ADE-2 reactor and its two counterparts in Seversk, ADE-4 and ADE-5, which were shut down in April 2008 and June 2008 respectively, have been producing weapon-grade plutonium that was placed in storage as plutonium oxide - about 8 tonnes in Zheleznogorsk and 10 tonnes at Seversk. All this material will be consolidated at Zheleznogorsk.

Consolidation of Russia's nuclear complex

2009-05-28T06:34:19Z

International Panel on Fissile Materials just published my paper on consolidation of Russia's nuclear complex. It is an overview of the current status of the nuclear complex and some suggestions on what can be done to consolidate fissile materials to make them more secure.

Most recommendations are hardly controversial - reduce the number of sites that work with weapon-grade materials, clean out small research facilities, convert research reactors to LEU fuel. I tried to come up with some proposals that would facilitate this process.

There are two things that I want to mention. One is that preference should be given to securing military fissile material at the existing sites. There are four or five of them, each holding tens of tonnes of HEU and plutonium. Consolidating this material at a smaller number of sites would mean transporting tens and probably hundred tonnes of material across the country - hardly a secure option. Moreover, the material can and should be secured even if we don't know how much material is in storage. It is important to eliminate the movements of material - we could always count it later.

From the point of view of material transfers, we should recognize that the HEU-LEU program (also known as Megatons to Megawatts) is an insanity from the security point of view - it creates a net security risk by taking weapon materials from storage and then sending it several times across the country. There is no way this program reduces the risks associated with HEU (I wrote about it in more details in a Bulletin column last year). The right thing to do would be to terminate the program as soon as possible, but that is politically impossible - everybody counts on its running through 2013 as planned. The next best choice is to restructure the program to eliminate unnecessary flows of HEU. The diagram on the left shows how this would change the amount of HEU shipments.

What if North Korea were the only nuclear weapon state?

2009-05-27T18:50:00Z

The Bulletin Online

By Pavel Podvig | 27 May 2009

North Korea's nuclear test will almost certainly fuel skepticism about the nuclear disarmament agenda. If no country has nuclear weapons, skeptics will ask, then how can “nuclear renegades” such as North Korea be deterred or dissuaded from getting a nuclear weapon and how can they be disarmed if they get one? For most opponents of nuclear abolition this argument ends the debate. It also gives pause to many abolition supporters who argue that nuclear powers would be prudent to hang on to their nuclear arsenals unless a new international regime can be built to deal with situations such as this one--a la the sentiment expressed by William Perry, Brent Scowcroft, and Charles Ferguson in an op-ed they published in the Wall Street Journal on Wednesday. But the development in North Korea shows that nuclear weapons aren't much help and, in fact, make the situation more difficult to handle.

Imagine, in a thought experiment, that no country other than North Korea has nuclear weapons today. How would this change the practical policy choices and actions available to those involved? I would suggest the answer is surprisingly little, if at all. To begin with, existing nuclear weapon states' arsenals (and the U.S. arsenal in particular) have already failed in what many believe is one of their primary missions--dissuading countries such as North Korea from building a nuclear weapon. The key premise of the “dissuasion” theory is that if the United States maintains its large nuclear arsenal and extensive nuclear infrastructure, no country will try matching it. Yet, it never worked that way, and it shouldn't be a surprise that it didn't work that way with North Korea.

Could nuclear weapons help deal with a nuclear North Korea? At first, they may appear to--after all, the threat of nuclear retaliation seems to be a persuasive argument against a nuclear attack. But retaliation doesn't have to be nuclear. It's hard to imagine that anyone in North Korea would be under the illusion that they can launch a nuclear strike and survive, regardless of whether the response is nuclear or not. This isn't just a consequence of U.S. conventional superiority--in a nuclear-weapon-free world one could expect that a North Korean nuclear attack would unite a broad coalition of countries (including China and Russia), ensuring that any military response would be swift and overwhelming. Prevailing wisdom still says that nuclear deterrence would work better than the conventional alternative, but regarding North Korea, it appears that both would work equally well--or equally poorly, for that matter.

The accepted wisdom also seems to suggest that the lack of a U.S. nuclear umbrella would lead countries in the region to build their own nuclear arsenals, triggering the much-feared proliferation chain reaction. But would, say, a nuclear Japan be any better in deterring North Korea than a nuclear United States? Of course, not. A Japanese nuclear arsenal would be just as helpless as the U.S. arsenal has been.

A world with North Korea as the only nuclear power would be a rather uncomfortable place, but the world in which it is the ninth nuclear weapons state is even more uncomfortable. In fact, this thought experiment suggests that nuclear weapons add nothing to existing nuclear weapons states' or the international community's abilities to prevent future North Koreas or to effectively confront them. For all practical purposes, we're already living in a nuclear-zero world. Managing international security in this world is indeed a serious challenge, but it isn't impossible. And getting rid of nuclear weapons would make this challenge easier, not harder.

Who is afraid of Rose Gottemoeller?

2009-05-27T02:54:52Z

VPK (Military Industrial Courier) is one of the two key Russian newspapers that cover military issues (the other one being NVO, Independent Military Review). It is a fairly conservative publication, financed by the defense industry. Its bias notwithstanding, it is a very useful source of information about various developments in the Russian military and about the views common in the military and defense industry.

In its June 2nd issue, VPK published an op-ed piece by its editor-in-chief, Igor Korotchenko, (would that make it an editorial?) on the U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations. Nothing really new there - more Topol-M/RS-24, Bulava, and no missile defense. But this paragraph caught my eye:

The danger of the situation is that the head of the U.S. delegation is Assistant Secretary of State Rose Gottemoeller, who until recently was leading the Carnegie Moscow Center. She personally and informally knows almost all key Russian experts on strategic forces, who have been attending numerous events at the Carnegie Moscow Center; she has an "inside" knowledge of Moscow's logic and its approach to the negotiating process. Gottemoeller has been dealing with nuclear issues for quite some time and is known as a brilliant professional. It would be difficult, almost impossible to outplay her. For Russia a draw would be almost like a victory. Will we be able to find a figure of similar caliber?

He does, in fact, have a point - there are not very many people on the Russian side of the negotiations who know the subject as well as Rose and her team.

Launch of the second Meridian communication satellite

2009-05-23T04:26:17Z

On 22 May 2009 the Space Forces conducted a launch of a Soyuz-2.1a space launcher equipped with a Fregat post-boost stage, which delivered into orbit a Meridian military communication satellite. The launch took place at 01:53 MSK (21:53 21 May 2009 UTC) from the launch pad No. 4 of the launch complex No. 43 of the Plesetsk space launch site.

The spacecraft received international designation 2009-029A and NORAD catalog number 35008. According to NORAD data, it was deployed in an orbit with inclination of 62.8 degrees, orbital period of about 645 minutes, apogee of about 36500 km, and perigee of 320 km. This is a highly-elliptical orbit, similar to those traditionally used by Molniya-type communication satellites.

Although the Space Forces reported today's launch a success, the initial orbit of the satellite is lower than the one of the Meridian-1 satellite, which has the apogee of about 39000 km and perigee of about 1270 km. Accordingly, the orbital period is less that it is required to maintain a stable semisynchronous orbit. This appears to be a result of a malfunction of the third stage, which was cut off prematurely. At this point it is not clear how this will affect operations of the satellite.

Meridian-2 is a second satellite of this kind. The first, Meridian-1, was launched in December 2006.

UPDATE: The satellite reportedly received a designation Cosmos-2451. It should be noted that Meridian-1 did not receive a Cosmos designation.

LATE UPDATE: The satellite will not receive a Cosmos designation and will be known as Meridian.

LATE UPDATE: The Reshetnev Design Bureau in a press-release about the launch admitted that the satellite was deployed on an orbit that is "close to nominal". Other than that, the satellite is fully operational.

Movements of bombers in 2009

2009-05-21T04:15:06Z

A few weeks ago several Russian forums published an interesting document that details Russian Air Force plans for 2009 (I was told that although it is probably a draft of the plan it appears to be authentic). According to that document, in 2009 Russia plans to remove four Tu-96MS bombers from service (all four - from Ukrainka). One aircraft will be decommissioned and three - moved to storage (it's not entirely clear what that means, though). This means that the number of operational Tu-95MS bombers will be reduced to 59 from the current 63.

As of January 2009, 18 Tu-95MS aircraft were based at Engels, 40 - at Ukrainka, 4 - at Dyagilevo base near Ryazan, and one - at a test center in Akhtubinsk (for the purposes of the START Treaty this aircraft is listed in Ryazan).

The number of Tu-160 bombers listed in the document is 16, all of which are based in Engels. Which again raises a question about the discrepancy between the number of Tu-160 aircraft reported in the START treaty (14) and the number reported by the Air Force (16).

The only explanation I can come up with is that two of these 16 bombers are listed as test bombers located in Zhukovskiy, even though they are in fact part of the operational force.

Here is the list of operational Tu-160 bombers based in Engels as part of the 121st Guards regiment of heavy bombers:

19 Valentin Bliznyuk,
10 Nikolai Kuznetsov
11 Vasili Sen'ko
12 Aleksandr Novikov
14 [no name]
15 Vladimir Sudets
16 Aleksei Plokhov
17 Valeri Chkalov
18 [no name]
02 Vasili Reshetnikov
03 Pavel Taran
04 Ivan Yarygin
05 Aleksandr Golovanov
06 Il'ya Muromets
07 Aleksandr Molodchiy
08 Vitali Kopylov

There are 16 of them. In addition to that, there are three test aircraft that are based in Zhukovskiy - a "flying" test aircraft, Boris Veremey, and two "non-flying" ones. One more test aircraft has reportedly been moved to the Kazan Aviation Plant. This makes four test bombers, while START MOU lists six test bombers. But if two of operational bombers are listed as test ones, then the pieces seem to fit together.

This seems to make sense - one of the two bombers that recently joined the force one, Valentin Bliznyuk (joined in July 2006), is a test aircraft that underwent modernization. It has always been listed as test aircraft in START. Another - Vitaly Kopylov (April 2008) - reportedly is not fully equipped, so it is operational only nominally. It was briefly listed in START MOU as operational - in July 2008 - but by January 2009 was transferred to the test bombers column.

Missile defense ban through the back door

2009-05-07T03:22:17Z

Here is how Russia decided to use its idea of a ban on "deployment of strategic offensive arms outside of national territories", which first appeared in the March 7 presidential statement. I guessed at the time that this is somehow related to missile defense, but I didn't expect that the Kremlin would be that brazen - it wants to declare that missile defense is a strategic system and therefore should be confined to national territories.

In his remarks to the NPT Prepcom conference in New York Anatoly Antonov, the head of the arms control department at the Foreign Ministry, said that (emphasis added):

...it is important to reiterate the START Treaty provision which says that the Parties' respective arms shall not be deployed outside their national territories. We attach great importance to this provision in regard to both offensive and defensive systems.

The idea that missile defense is a "strategic system" is not exactly new - this was something that then president Putin liked to point out when talking about the system in Europe - something along the lines that "this is the first time the United States deploys elements of its strategic systems in Europe". This line is still somewhere in the Foreign Ministry talking points. It is also clear that Russia wouldn't mind brining the ABM Treaty back in some shape or form. So, I guess it was probably just the matter of time before someone came up with the idea of bundling the two together.

It is not that missile defense, outside of national territory or not, is a good idea. But linking missile defense directly to the START Plus negotiations is not much better - the new treaty has enough problems already. Let's hope this idea remains a theoretical point rather than a negotiating instruction.