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      <title>The Frontal Cortex</title>
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         <title>ChatRoulette </title>
          <description>&lt;p&gt;Sam Anderson, in &lt;a href="http://nymag.com/news/media/63663/"&gt;New York Magazin&lt;/a&gt;e, takes on ChatRoulette, that strange new site that connects you, via webcam, with a stream of strangers:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;The site was only a few months old, but its population was beginning to explode in a way that suggested serious viral potential: 300 users in December had grown to 10,000 by the beginning of February. Although big media outlets had yet to cover it, smallish blogs were full of huzzahs. The blog Asylum called ChatRoulette its favorite site since YouTube; another, The Frisky, called it "the Holy Grail of all Internet fun." Everyone seemed to agree that it was intensely addictive--one of those gloriously simple ideas that manages to harness the crazy power of the Internet in a potentially revolutionary way.

&lt;p&gt;The site activates your webcam automatically; when you click "start" you're suddenly staring at another human on your screen and they're staring back at you, at which point you can either choose to chat (via text or voice) or just click "next," instantly calling up someone else. The result is surreal on many levels. Early ChatRoulette users traded anecdotes on comment boards with the eerie intensity of shipwreck survivors, both excited and freaked out by what they'd seen. There was a man who wore a deer head and opened every conversation with "What up DOE!?" A guy from Sweden was reportedly speed-drawing strangers' portraits. Someone with a guitar was improvising songs for anyone who'd give him a topic. One man popped up on people's screens in the act of fornicating with a head of lettuce. Others dressed like ninjas, tried to persuade women to expose themselves, and played spontaneous transcontinental games of Connect Four. Occasionally, people even made nonvirtual connections: One punk-music blogger met a group of people from Michigan who ended up driving eleven hours to crash at his house for a concert in New York. And then, of course, fairly often, there was this kind of thing: "I saw some hot chicks then all of a sudden there was a man with a glass in his butthole." I sing the body electronic.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;You can probably tell where this story is headed: ChatRoulette, of course, proves to be a profound disappointment. Anderson doesn't meet the Whitmanesque masses, but is instead rejected by a slew of surly teenagers and online weirdos:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I entered the fray on a bright Wednesday afternoon, with an open mind and an eager soul, ready to sound my barbaric yawp through the webcams of the world. I left absolutely crushed. It turns out that ChatRoulette, in practice, is brutal. The first eighteen people who saw me disconnected immediately. They appeared, one by one, in a box at the top of my screen--a young Asian man, a high-school-age girl, a guy lying on his side in bed--and, every time, I'd feel a little flare of excitement. Every time, they'd leave without saying a word. Sometimes I could even watch them reach down, in horrifying real-time, and click "next." It was devastating. My first even semi-successful interaction was with a guy with a blanket draped over his lap who asked if I wanted to "jack of" with him. I declined; he disconnected. &lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;There are two things to say about ChatRoulette. The first is that it exploits a pretty fundamental reward mechanism in the brain, which we've known about since Pavlov: the power of random reinforcement. It turns out that predictable rewards get boring rather quickly, as the brain adapts to new stimuli. (Are you still excited about your Christmas presents? Exactly. You've been designed to be ungrateful.) &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Human interaction, of course, is pretty damn predictable. We've got elaborate rituals for dealing with strangers, thus minimizing the chance of a surprising interaction. ("How are you?" "Good, thanks. How are you?" "Great. Thanks for asking. Have a nice day.") And then there's the fact that the vast majority of our interactions are with people we already know, whether it's family, friends or co-workers. So they probably won't surprise us, either. The end result is that our social exchanges become tedious and rote. They might be rewarding, but they're rarely exciting.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;And this is where ChatRoulette comes in. I've only played around on the site for a few minutes, but it seems to me that its allure is inseparable from its unpredictability. Will this new person be a masturbator or a friendly stranger? Will we be rejected or will we do the rejecting? It all reminds me of Vegas, where people are willing to endure big losses for the occasional thrill of a surprising gain. (According to the data of Wolfram Schultz, an &lt;a href="http://www.boston.com/news/globe/ideas/articles/2007/08/19/your_brain_on_gambling/"&gt;unexpected reward&lt;/a&gt; generates a much larger dopaminergic signal in the brain.) Of course, those gamblers know they're wasting  time and money, but the possibility of an unexpected reward is simply too tantalizing. ChatRoulette takes this same logic to the social realm: at its core, it's a slot machine made of other people.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The other thing to say about ChatRoulette is that it reminded me of an urban subway. Like a dense city, the website mixes together strangers, forcing them to stare at each other for a few fleeting seconds. This momentary mixing, while often unpleasant and awkward, turns out to be a crucial function of cities. Jane Jacobs, in her seminal work&lt;em&gt; The Death and Life of Great American Cities&lt;/em&gt;, argued that every healthy city was defined by its ability to facilitate social interaction. She saw the busy sidewalk as an improvisational "ballet," in which information freely flowed between city dwellers. Her book identified the specific urban ingredients⎯from short city blocks to mixed-use neighborhoods⎯that encouraged "the intricate mingling of diversity."  &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Of course, most Americans don't live in neighborhoods that Jacobs would endorse. We like our privacy and suburbs, which means that our cities look more like Phoenix than Manhattan. While this makes us more comfortable - I like my air-conditioned car as much as the next person - there's some suggestive evidence that it also makes cities less innovative. A few years ago, I wrote about this PNAS &lt;a href="http://www.pnas.org/content/104/17/7301.abstract"&gt;paper&lt;/a&gt;, which analyzes vast amounts of data to figure out why some cities are so much more innovative than others:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;While certain institutions can encourage innovation, the scientists are quick to point out that the innovative abilities of cities are ultimately rooted in the one thing that every city has in common: lots of human interaction. "Cities concentrate our social interactions," Bettencourt says, "and that's what leads to this explosion in knowledge creation and innovation." Think of people as particles and the urban space as a container: as more and more particles enter the container (the population of the city is increasing), each particle increases its speed. The end result is that the particles are constantly colliding. According to the scientists, these random urban collisions are the source of innovation. Creativity spontaneously emerges from human friction.&lt;/blockquote&gt;

&lt;p&gt;ChatRoulette is an online version of the friction that cities produce for free. It's like a subway ride on your computer, a chance to bump into strangers on the "street" without leaving your desk. Sure, there are lots of weirdos out there, and plenty of those strangers won't stare back. But every once in a while, a meaningful interaction might occur, as the social slot machine dispenses a few quarters. I'd like to think that if Walt Whitman were around - and boy do I wish he were - he'd write a poem about ChatRoulette.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;PS. I forgot to describe my own experience on ChatRoulette. I spent the first 20 minutes getting rejected, propositioned and yelled at. It was gross, crushing and so entertaining. Then I found a nice twentysomething male in Oslo who worked as a computer programmer. We talked for 5 minutes about the weather. It was a perfectly banal conversation, but in all my years riding the subway in NYC I can only remember a handful of spontaneous chats with my fellow riders. Of course, those same riders also didn't ask me to take off my clothes. (As usual, the internet is just like real life, only more so.) &lt;/p&gt; &lt;a href="http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2010/02/chatroulette.php#commentsArea"&gt;Read the comments on this post...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/scienceblogs/wDAM/~4/KbW9fSnShkw" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description>
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         <pubDate>Mon, 08 Feb 2010 12:55:11 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>Borges Was A Neuroscientist</title>
          <description>&lt;p&gt;The neuroscientist Rodrigo Quian Quiroga has written a lovely appreciation of Jorge Luis Borges in the latest Nature (not online). Quiroga focuses on Borges interest in neuroscience, which led him to write his classic short story &lt;em&gt;Funes the Memorious&lt;/em&gt;, about a man who cannot forget:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;In the story of Funes, Borges described very precisely the problems of distorted memory capacities well before neuroscience caught up...In a study using electrodes to probe the hippocampus in epileptic patients for clinical reasons, we identified a type of neuron that fires in response to particular abstract concepts. For example, one neuron in a patient fired only in recognition of different pictures of the actress Jennifer Aniston; another responded only to images of another celebrity, Halle Berry. It is thus possible that these neurons link perception and memory by creating the abstract encoding we use to store memories -- especially considering that we tend to remember concepts and forget irrelevant details. If these neurons are lacking, the ability to generate abstractions may be limited, leading to pathologies such as autism or characters like Funes.

&lt;p&gt;Even without this scientific knowledge, Borges's intuitive description is sharp: Funes, he wrote, was "virtually incapable of general, platonic ideas ... His own face in the mirror, his own hands, surprised him every time he saw them ... To think is to ignore (or forget) differences, to generalize, to abstract. In the teeming world of Ireneo Funes there was nothing but particulars." &lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I've written about Funes &lt;a href="http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2007/06/the_virtue_of_forgetting.php"&gt;before&lt;/a&gt;, but it's worth pointing out that the short story isn't Borges' only work with neuroscientific implications. One of my favorite Borgesian parables is &lt;em&gt;The Analytical Language of John Wilkins&lt;/em&gt;, which describes a "certain Chinese encyclopedia called the Heavenly Emporium of Benevolent Knowledge". What makes this encyclopedia so peculiar is its division of knowledge. The animal kingdom, for instance, has been parsed into the following categories:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;(a) those that belong to the emperor; (b) embalmed ones; (c) those that are trained; (d) suckling pigs; (e) mermaids; (f) fabulous ones; (g) stray dogs; (h) those that are included in this classification; (i) those that tremble as if they were mad; (j) innumerable ones; (k) those drawn with a very fine camel's-hair brush; (l) etcetera; (m) those that have just broken the flower vase; (n) those that at a distance resemble flies.&lt;/blockquote&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The moral of the story is that &lt;em&gt;all&lt;/em&gt; categories are arbitrary; there is no natural way to subdivide nature. Of course, our own classification schemes don't seem strange at all - they seem necessary and true. That faith, however, is a mere side-effect of the mind, which has a weakness for &lt;em&gt;essences&lt;/em&gt;. This is known as essentialism, and it's reflected in our instinctive belief that there is something intrinsic to every thing, from tigers to chairs to water, that make it that particular thing. (A tiger born &lt;a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/southafrica/5757149/Tiger-born-with-no-stripes.html"&gt;without&lt;/a&gt; stripes is still a tiger, right?) Look, for instance, at Platonic idealism, which argues that behind the chaotic confusion of details - there are so many different kinds of chair - there is an ideal chair, which reflects the essence of all chairs. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Children are natural essentialists. &lt;a href="http://www.amazon.com/Concepts-Kinds-Cognitive-Development-Frank/dp/0262610760"&gt;Frank Keil&lt;/a&gt;, a psychologist at Yale, has done some interesting work that captures this tendency at work. He begins by showing his young subjects a variety of visual transformations: a tiger that's been dressed in a lion suit, a porcupine that has been turned into a cactus, a real dog that resembles a toy. Not surprisingly, the children dismiss these transformations as irrelevant and superficial. The porcupine is still a porcupine. The dog is still a dog. The tiger is still a tiger, even if it looks like a lion. It was only when Keil told the children that the transformations also took place on the inside - their internal essences had been altered - that the little kids were convinced the animals had changed categories. The tiger was now a lion.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The lesson is that even a kid would find the Borgesian encyclopedia peculiar. Plato thought it was possible to "cut nature at its joints, like a good butcher". But this  faith assumes that nature has joints, and that the essences we perceive are real and everlasting. Unfortunately, those essences are mostly figments of the mind, projections of a brain that is born believing in Platonic forms.  &lt;/p&gt; &lt;a href="http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2010/02/borges_was_a_neuroscientist.php#commentsArea"&gt;Read the comments on this post...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/scienceblogs/wDAM/~4/DNvdR68En2s" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description>
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         <pubDate>Fri, 05 Feb 2010 10:42:23 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>The Isolated Mind</title>
          <description>&lt;p&gt;Megan O'Rourke has a really eloquent and important &lt;a href="http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2010/02/01/100201crat_atlarge_orourke?printable=true"&gt;article&lt;/a&gt; on the history of grieving in the New Yorker. She spends a lot of time on the life and death of Elisabeth Kübler-Ross, who invented the five stages theory of human grief. (It turns out the stages don't really exist.) But I was most interested in this paragraph on the death of public funeral rituals - we no longer grieve with others, unless we're grieving over Princess Diana or Michael Jackson - and how it was driven, at least in part, by the new sciences of the mind:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;With the rise of psychoanalysis came a shift in attention from the communal to the individual experience. Only two years after Émile Durkheim wrote about mourning as an essential social process, Freud's "Mourning and Melancholia" defined it as something fundamentally private and individual. In a stroke, the work of mourning had become internalized. As Ariès says, within a few generations grief had undergone a fundamental change: death and mourning had been largely removed from the public realm. In 1973, Ernest Becker argued, in "The Denial of Death," that avoidance of death is built into the human mind; instead of confronting our own mortality, we create symbolic "hero-systems," conceptualizing an immortal self that, through imagination, allows us to transcend our physical transience. ("In the early morning on the lake sitting in the stern of the boat with his father rowing, he felt quite sure that he would never die," the young Nick Adams thinks in the last line of Ernest Hemingway's "Indian Camp.")&lt;/blockquote&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In other words, we became so focused on the internal mechanics of the mind - the private electrical events taking place inside our skull - that we neglected the social world, and the cultural web in which we're embedded. How could a ritual compete with the id?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Furthermore, I think this emphasis on the primacy of the individual brain (at the expense of larger social structures) has only been exacerbated by the rise of modern neuroscience. With rare exceptions, the field is forced to study the brain in artificial isolation, so that we look at people all by themselves in brain scanners, or study them one by one in the lab. (It's ironic that even the field of social neuroscience is forced to use experimental tools, like fMRI machines, that require isolation.) And so the mind becomes the brain and the brain becomes a collection of fleshy parts, like the insula and the PFC.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;But we are not meant to be alone: The private events inside the brain depend, in larger part, on where we are and who we are with. It reminds me of something Nicholas Christakis, who studies human social networks along with James Fowler, recently &lt;a href="http://www.wired.com/print/medtech/health/magazine/17-10/ff_christakis"&gt;told&lt;/a&gt; me: "The story of modern science is the story of studying ever smaller bits of nature, like atoms and neurons," he said. "But people aren't just the sum of their parts. I see this research as an attempt to put human beings back together again."&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Christakis, for instance, has done some interesting work on the &lt;a href="http://www.hcp.med.harvard.edu/node/1471"&gt;widower effect&lt;/a&gt;, which is the poignant observation that the death of a spouse significantly increases the likelihood that the surviving spouse will also die. According to the data, the death of a wife in the previous 30 days increases her husband's risk of death 53 percent, and the death of a husband increases his wife's risk of death by 61 percent.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;When I spent time with Christakis and Fowler last summer, Christakis told me about one of his patients, an elderly woman with severe dementia. She was being cared for by her youngest daughter, who was clearly exhausted. This wasn't particularly surprising: there was a large body of research documenting the mental toll of caring for an ill parent. But then Christakis got a telephone call.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;"The call is from the best friend of the husband of the daughter who is taking care of my patient," Christakis says. "And he's worried about how the husband is doing, because the husband is really stressed out." For Christakis, the complaint was a revelation: "It might seem like an obvious idea, but I suddenly realized that the effects of illness aren't limited to the primary caretaker. Instead, they cascade through the network, from person to person to person." The stress of grief, in other words, was like an infectious disease.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The lesson is that no mind is an island; our neurons depend on the neurons of others. Even when the tools of modern science require us to be alone, it's worth remembering that such loneliness is an artificial construct, a distortion of the lab.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;By the way, if you're interested in the power of social networks, I recommend &lt;a href="http://www.amazon.com/Connected-Surprising-Power-Social-Networks/dp/0316036145/ref=ntt_at_ep_dpi_1"&gt;Connected&lt;/a&gt;, by Christakis and Fowler.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;a href="http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2010/02/megan_orourke_has_a_really.php#commentsArea"&gt;Read the comments on this post...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/scienceblogs/wDAM/~4/9tlN4yyGwos" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description>
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         <pubDate>Thu, 04 Feb 2010 11:34:59 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>Prozac</title>
          <description>&lt;p&gt;Sharon Begley has an excellent &lt;a href="http://www.newsweek.com/id/232781"&gt;Newsweek&lt;/a&gt; cover story on the rise and fall of anti-depressant medications, or how a class of drugs that were once hailed as medical miracles are now seen as barely better than placebos:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;In just over half of the published and unpublished studies, Kirsch and colleagues reported in 2002, the drug alleviated depression no better than a placebo. "And the extra benefit of antidepressants was even less than we saw when we analyzed only published studies," Kirsch recalls. About 82 percent of the response to antidepressants--not the 75 percent he had calculated from examining only published studies--had also been achieved by a dummy pill.

&lt;p&gt;The extra effect of real drugs wasn't much to celebrate, either. It amounted to 1.8 points on the 54-point scale doctors use to gauge the severity of depression, through questions about mood, sleep habits, and the like. Sleeping better counts as six points. Being less fidgety during the assessment is worth two points. In other words, the clinical significance of the 1.8 extra points from real drugs was underwhelming. Now Kirsch was certain. "The belief that antidepressants can cure depression chemically is simply wrong," he told me in January on the eve of the publication of his book The Emperor's New Drugs: Exploding the Anti-depressant Myth.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The 2002 study ignited a furious debate, but more and more scientists were becoming convinced that Kirsch--who had won respect for research on the placebo response and who had published scores of scientific papers--was on to something. One team of researchers wondered if antidepressants were "a triumph of marketing over science." Even defenders of antidepressants agreed that the drugs have "relatively small" effects. "Many have long been unimpressed by the magnitude of the differences observed between treatments and controls," psychology researcher Steven Hollon of Vanderbilt University and colleagues wrote--"what some of our colleagues refer to as 'the dirty little secret.' " In Britain, the agency that assesses which treatments are effective enough for the government to pay for stopped recommending antidepressants as a first-line treatment, especially for mild or moderate depression.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I'm currently working on a longer article on a related subject, so I won't go into detail here, but I think it's worth pointing out that anti-depressants might still prove to be a very useful class of drugs, just not for depression. To understand why, it's important to realize that antidepressants don't work the way the way the big pharm companies tell you they work, at least on their &lt;a href="http://www.zoloft.com/how_zoloft_works.aspx"&gt;websites&lt;/a&gt;. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Their neat little story goes like this: antidepressants increase the brain's supply of serotonin, thus correcting our chemical imbalance. This implies that sadness is simply a lack of chemical happiness. The little blue pills cheer us up because they give the brain what it has been missing.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;There's only one problem with this theory of depression: it's almost certainly wrong, or at the very least woefully incomplete. Experiments have since shown that lowering people's serotonin levels does not make them depressed, nor does it worsen their symptoms if they are already depressed. And then there's the "Prozac lag": although antidepressants increase the amount of serotonin in the brain within hours, their beneficial effects are not usually felt for weeks.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;But just because antidepressants don't work via some silly and obsolete chemical model of depression doesn't mean the drugs don't trigger important changes in the brain. In recent years, scientists have found that the little blue pills modulate the neural pathways of plasticity, up-regulating trophic factors and neurogenesis. Because they make our mind more malleable - and help counter the the toxic effects of stress - the drugs have potential implications far beyond the treatment of depression. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Consider this 2008 &lt;a href="http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/abstract/sci;320/5874/385"&gt;study&lt;/a&gt; by Italian researchers, published in the journal Science. The scientists were interested in seeing if fluoxetine, the active ingredient of Prozac, could increase the potential of brain cells in the adult rat. They studied animals with severe cases of "lazy eye," a condition characterized by poor vision in one eye due to underdevelopment of the visual cortex. The scientists showed that fluoxetine gave brain cells the ability to take on new roles and form new connections, which erased the symptoms of the disorder.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Jose Vettencourt, a lead author on this paper, told me that "The drug appears to make brain cells quite young". The scientists are currently repeating the experiment with humans, raising the possibility that fluoxetine might one day be used to treat lazy eye and related conditions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;And then there's this brand new &lt;a href="http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-sci-antidepressants2-2010feb02,0,1093577.story"&gt;paper&lt;/a&gt;:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;Widely used antidepressants may help patients recover cognitive functions, such as memory skills, that are damaged following a stroke, according to research released Monday.

&lt;p&gt;Escitalopram, a type of selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor, or SSRI, was linked to improved cognitive functioning in a group of stroke patients who did not have symptoms of depression, scientists found.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Participants were treated within three months of the stroke in one of three ways: a low dose -- 5 to 10 milligrams -- of escitalopram, a placebo pill or problem-solving therapy but no medication. (The standard dose of escitalopram, also known by the brand name Lexapro, for treating depression is 20 milligrams.)&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;After one year, the group on escitalopram had higher scores on tests assessing thinking, learning and memory functions as well as ones testing verbal and visual memory. The group treated with medication also had greater improvements in activities related to daily living.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The point is that we might still be taking Prozac, et. al. years from now, just not for depression. The pills &lt;em&gt;do&lt;/em&gt; something - they just aren't great at cheering us up.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;a href="http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2010/02/prozac.php#commentsArea"&gt;Read the comments on this post...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/scienceblogs/wDAM/~4/1rkdNA6poss" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description>
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         <pubDate>Wed, 03 Feb 2010 15:54:54 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>The Blue Brain</title>
          <description>&lt;p&gt;Via Vaughan at &lt;a href="http://mindhacks.com/"&gt;MindHacks&lt;/a&gt;, comes this link to a preview of a documentary-in-progress on The Blue Brain, that epic &lt;a href="http://thebeautifulbrain.com/2010/02/bluebrain-film-preview/"&gt;attempt&lt;/a&gt; to create a conscious supercomputer. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I was fortunate enough to profile the &lt;a href="http://seedmagazine.com/content/article/out_of_the_blue/"&gt;Blue Brain&lt;/a&gt; in 2008:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;In the basement of a university in Lausanne, Switzerland sit four black boxes, each about the size of a refrigerator, and filled with 2,000 IBM microchips stacked in repeating rows. Together they form the processing core of a machine that can handle 22.8 trillion operations per second. It contains no moving parts and is eerily silent. When the computer is turned on, the only thing you can hear is the continuous sigh of the massive air conditioner. This is Blue Brain.

&lt;p&gt;The name of the supercomputer is literal: Each of its microchips has been programmed to act just like a real neuron in a real brain. The behavior of the computer replicates, with shocking precision, the cellular events unfolding inside a mind. "This is the first model of the brain that has been built from the bottom-up," says Henry Markram, a neuroscientist at Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL) and the director of the Blue Brain project. "There are lots of models out there, but this is the only one that is totally biologically accurate. We began with the most basic facts about the brain and just worked from there."&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;a href="http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2010/02/the_blue_brain_1.php#commentsArea"&gt;Read the comments on this post...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/scienceblogs/wDAM/~4/NitAxXwiaLA" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description>
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         <title>Sex Ed</title>
          <description>&lt;p&gt;Ross Douthat &lt;a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/01/opinion/01douthat.html"&gt;reflects&lt;/a&gt; on the recent news that teenage birthrates inched upward during the Bush era, after more than a decade of decline:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;The new numbers, declared the president of Planned Parenthood, make it "crystal clear that abstinence-only sex education for teenagers does not work."

&lt;p&gt;In reality, the numbers show no such thing. Abstinence financing increased under Bush, but the federal government has been funneling money to pro-chastity initiatives since early in Bill Clinton's presidency. If you blame abstinence programs for a year's worth of bad news, you'd also have to give them credit for more than a decade's worth of progress.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;More likely, neither blame nor credit is appropriate. The evidence suggests that many abstinence-only programs have little impact on teenage sexual behavior, just as their critics long insisted. But most sex education programs of any kind have an ambiguous effect, at best, on whether and how teens have sex. The abstinence-based courses that social conservatives champion produce unimpressive results -- but so do the contraceptive-oriented programs that liberals tend to favor.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I think Douthat overstates the equivalence: there's much more evidence that abstinence-based sex education is a failure (such as &lt;a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/04/13/AR2007041301003.html"&gt;this&lt;/a&gt; 2007 Congressional study) than there is for contraceptive sex ed, which has been linked to mild reductions in teen pregnancy. But I think his larger point is accurate: it's really difficult to change the sexual habits of adolescents.  &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;That's because we've been trying to change behavior with facts and information. We've assumed that the way to get kids to wear condoms is give them statistics about sexually transmitted disease, or that the way to get students to abstain from sex is to lecture them on morality, or the difficulty of caring for a child while in high school. The problem with such facts is that they don't help teens deal with their moment of sexual decision, which most likely occurs when they're half naked and deranged with desire. In other words, we've assumed that sexual choices are rational choices, influenced by classroom exhortations and dry information. But that's wrong. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Look, for example, at this R-rated experiment, by the behavioral economist Dan Ariely and neuroeconomist George Loewenstein. They began by asking twenty-five male undergraduates at UC-Berkeley a series of provocative sexual questions. The first set of questions concerned their sexual preferences. Could they imagine having sex with a 60 year old woman? What about getting sexually excited by contact with an animal? Did they like getting tied up during sex? The next set of questions dealt with sexual morality. Would the male students slip a woman a drug to increase the chance that she would have sex with them? Would they keep trying to have sex after their date said "no"? The final set of questions was about safe sex. Would the men insist on using a condom? Is it safe to have unprotected sex if you "pull out" before ejaculation?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Each male student answered these naughty hypotheticals in two different states of mind. In the first condition, the subjects were told to answer the questions without being aroused. They were supposed to contemplate sex in an un-sexual state of mind. In the second condition, the subjects were shown pornography while answering the questions. (They were alone in their dorm room for this part of the experiment.) When asked in advance, the men didn't think that being aroused would significantly alter their answers. They assumed that their sexual preferences were relatively immune to such temporary emotional biases.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The men were completely wrong. Their desire to engage in peculiar sexual acts - like being tied up, or getting spanked while having sex - nearly doubled when they were aroused. Their morality was even more malleable: they were three times more likely to commit a sex crime⎯such as using a date-rape drug⎯when staring at pornographic images. And, of course, being aroused also made them much less likely to use condoms. Although the undergraduates could all recite the benefits of sexual protection, this rational knowledge was irrelevant. The charge of arousal was simply too powerful: they could no longer resist doing the wrong thing, even though they knew it was wrong. As Ariely and Loewenstein drolly concluded: "Efforts at self-control that involve raw willpower are likely to be ineffective in the face of the dramatic cognitive and motivational changes caused by arousal."&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The point is that we've been arming our kids with the wrong mental tools. Instead of giving them statistics, we need to provide them with the cognitive tools to deal with temptation. Instead of urging them to abstain, we need to show them &lt;em&gt;how&lt;/em&gt; to abstain. There is no secret recipe for overcoming our "hottest" urges, like sexual desire. But you could do worse than giving kids a short lesson in metacognition. I think &lt;a href="http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/05/18/090518fa_fact_lehrer?currentPage=all"&gt;Walter Mischel's&lt;/a&gt; work with four-year olds and marshmallows is relevant here:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;At the time, psychologists assumed that children's ability to wait [to delay gratification for a second marshmallow] depended on how badly they wanted the marshmallow. But it soon became obvious that every child craved the extra treat. What, then, determined self-control? Mischel's conclusion, based on hundreds of hours of observation, was that the crucial skill was the "strategic allocation of attention." Instead of getting obsessed with the marshmallow--the "hot stimulus"--the patient children distracted themselves by covering their eyes, pretending to play hide-and-seek underneath the desk, or singing songs from "Sesame Street." Their desire wasn't defeated--it was merely forgotten. "If you're thinking about the marshmallow and how delicious it is, then you're going to eat it," Mischel says. "The key is to avoid thinking about it in the first place."

&lt;p&gt;In adults, this skill is often referred to as metacognition, or thinking about thinking, and it's what allows people to outsmart their shortcomings. (When Odysseus had himself tied to the ship's mast, he was using some of the skills of metacognition: knowing he wouldn't be able to resist the Sirens' song, he made it impossible to give in.) Mischel's large data set from various studies allowed him to see that children with a more accurate understanding of the workings of self-control were better able to delay gratification. "What's interesting about four-year-olds is that they're just figuring out the rules of thinking," Mischel says. "The kids who couldn't delay would often have the rules backwards. They would think that the best way to resist the marshmallow is to stare right at it, to keep a close eye on the goal. But that's a terrible idea. If you do that, you're going to ring the bell before I leave the room."&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;a href="http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2010/02/sex_ed.php#commentsArea"&gt;Read the comments on this post...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/scienceblogs/wDAM/~4/acwTsUBgH6g" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description>
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         <title>Musical Predictions, Redux</title>
          <description>&lt;p&gt;In response to my recent &lt;a href="http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2010/01/musical_predictions.php"&gt;post&lt;/a&gt; on the neuroscience of musical predictions, Alex Rehding, the Fanny Peabody Professor of Music at Harvard, wrote in to offer a musical theorist perspective. He makes several excellent points, and complicates the neuroscience in useful ways, so I thought I'd reproduce the relevant parts of his email below:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;The point you raise in your latest posting -- about expectation and prediction -- is one that has fascinated music theorists pretty much for the last 200 years. I realize that yours is a science blog, and I'll try my best to resist the urge to add too many traditional music-theoretical talking points.

&lt;p&gt;There is one interesting problem with this model, though, that has generated some interesting discussion in the music-theoretical world over the last twenty or so years. If we derive pleasure from anticipating potential connections - and especially being surprised by thwarted expectations - then it becomes difficult to explain why we would want to listen to a piece more than once: the novelty factor wears off, the uncertainty factor becomes less pronounced. In principle, the piece should get less interesting each time we hear it. Experience, however, shows that this is not the case: we greatly enjoy re-hearing familiar pieces. The whole recording industry makes a lot of money on the basis of this phenomenon.&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Personally, I'd frame the discussion slightly differently. (And please take my views with a huge grain of salt. I'm a lay listener, not an expert.) I think our inexhaustible need for &lt;em&gt;new&lt;/em&gt; music - we want the latest Rihanna radio hit - demonstrates that, once we memorize a piece of music, it grows a little stale. The essential surprise is drained out of the notes, so that there are no subtle patterns left to learn. And that's when our attention begins to wander, and we buy the current pop phenom on iTunes. While there are certain songs I will be listening to forever - most of Blonde on Blonde, late 70s Bruce, Astral Weeks, Otis R., a few Pavement songs, Wilco, a little Bright Eyes, etc. - I'm always struck by the short half-life of most of my music. The stimulus goes from intoxicating and enthralling to tired and tedious in a few short listens. And so we keep on consuming, searching for another shot of acoustic excitement. I think the recording industry makes a lot of money on &lt;em&gt;this&lt;/em&gt; phenomenon.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;We can now see the neural anatomy that makes this cultural learning possible. The auditory cortex, like all our sensory areas, is deeply plastic. Neuroscience, stealing vocabulary from music, has named these malleable cells "&lt;a href="http://www.nature.com/nrn/journal/v4/n10/abs/nrn1222.html"&gt;the corticofugal network&lt;/a&gt;," after the fugal form Bach made famous. These contrapuntal neurons feed back onto the very substrate of our hearing, altering the specific frequencies, amplitudes and timing patterns that our sensory cells actually respond to. The brain, in other words, tunes its own sense of sound, just like violinists tune the strings of their instrument. One of the central functions of the corticofugal network is what neuroscience calls "&lt;a href="http://www.pnas.org/content/97/14/8081.abstract"&gt;egocentric&lt;/a&gt;" selection. When a pattern of noises is heard repeatedly, the brain memorizes that pattern. Feedback from higher-up brain regions reorganizes the auditory cortex, which makes it easier for us to hear that same pattern in the future. So when we get sick of the latest top 40 jingle playing on the radio, these are the cells to blame. Their infinite capacity to learn means that we quickly get bored. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This, of course, raises the larger question of why certain pieces of music don't go stale. Why are we still listening to Bach's fugues, or Beethoven's symphonies, or Kind of Blue? What is it about these particular soundwaves that allows them to evade the corticofugal boredom? I'd suggest that their place in the canon is inseparable from their ambiguity - their ability to encourage a multiplicity of interpretations - so that new listens reveal new elements to listen for. In other words, we are continually surprised by their sounds, by the capacity of the music to subvert our expectations. Frank Kermode famously argued that literature worked the same way: What makes a novel or poem immortal is its complex indeterminacy, the way every reader discovers in the same words a different story. The same book manages to inspire two completely different conclusions. But there is no right interpretation. If there were - if there was only one way to read Hamlet - then the words would be far less interesting. The art that endures is the art that never loses its capacity to surprise.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I think Professor Rehding makes another essential point in his discussion of rhythm:&lt;br /&gt;
  &lt;br /&gt;
&lt;blockquote&gt;The other point that I think is quite important in this respect -- and that's one that most music theory traditionally ignores -- is the importance of rhythm and pulse. We don't simply yearn for the eventual return of the tonic, but we want it to fall in one particular place (or a small range of places) within the temporal order of the piece of music. Composers generate a lot of tension by carefully manipulating the temporal features of their music: a musical climax is not merely about writing loud music but also about the careful gradual build-up and the decline afterwards.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This idea is an even more urgent given current musical trends. Over the last few decades, popular music has been transformed by its rhythms, so that some rap songs consist of nothing but words propelled by a pulse. Why is this so exciting, at least for the auditory cortex of people under 25? Does rhythm also take advantage of our musical prediction machinery? Or is it a kind of acoustic scaffolding, making it easier for us to follow the subtle patterns in the rest of the song?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I won't even venture a bad guess to those questions. But I want to thank Professor Rehding for his feedback and comments.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;a href="http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2010/02/musical_predictions_redux.php#commentsArea"&gt;Read the comments on this post...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/scienceblogs/wDAM/~4/fmIzKqA1ONI" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description>
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         <title>Self-Control and Peer Groups</title>
          <description>&lt;p&gt;For the most part, self-control is seen as an individual trait, a measure of personal discipline. If you lack self-control, then it's your own fault, a character flaw built into the brain.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;However, according to a new &lt;a href="http://psp.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/0146167209356302v1"&gt;study&lt;/a&gt; by Michelle vanDellen, a psychologist at the University of Georgia, self-control contains a large social component; the ability to resist temptation is contagious. The paper consists of five clever studies, each of which demonstrates the influence of our peer group on our self-control decisions. For instance, in one study 71 undergraduates watched a stranger exert self-control by choosing a carrot instead of a cookie, while others watched people eat the cookie instead of the carrot. That's all that happened: the volunteers had no other interaction with the eaters. Nevertheless, the performance of the subjects was significantly altered on a subsequent test of self-control. People who watched the carrot-eaters had more discipline than those who watched the cookie-eaters.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What accounts for this contagion of discipline? One possibility, of course, is that watching someone eat a cookie makes us think about the deliciousness of cookies. In other words, we're primed to crave a reward, since we just saw a reward get consumed. vanDellen, however, argues that the spread of self-control is mostly driven by the "accessibility" of thoughts &lt;em&gt;about&lt;/em&gt; self-control. When we see someone resist the cookie, we're cognitively inspired, and temporarily aware that resistance is possible. We don't have to surrender to impulse.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Consider the last experiment described in the paper. In this study of 117 subjects, those who were randomly assigned to write about friends with good self-control were faster than a control group at identifying words related to self-control, such as "achieve," "discipline" and "effort". This suggests that thinking about self-control - or watching it happen - makes us more attuned to its benefits. We think about our waistline and calories, and not just chocolate-chips.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The contagiousness of self-control has important consequences. For one thing, it helps explain why Dominos, Taco Bell and McDonald's spend so much money on television ads. Their commercials are testimonials for indulgence - they show people happily consuming thousands of calories - and so that makes us less likely to resist. Why munch on carrots when a large pepperoni pizza is only a phone call away?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This study also begins to reveal the ways in which culture can impact character. Kids who grow up surrounded by rituals of discipline - they watch people counter their impulses all the time - have a very different sense of their own potential. They don't have to eat the cookie because they've watched their parents and peers eat the carrot. This is an implicit kind of knowledge - it's not something you can measure on a multiple-choice test - and yet it has profound implications for our success in the real world.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Last year, I wrote about this idea in the &lt;a href="http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/05/18/090518fa_fact_lehrer?currentPage=all"&gt;New Yorker&lt;/a&gt;:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;Mischel is also preparing a large-scale study involving hundreds of schoolchildren in Philadelphia, Seattle, and New York City to see if self-control skills can be taught. Although he previously showed that children did much better on the marshmallow task after being taught a few simple "mental transformations," such as pretending the marshmallow was a cloud, it remains unclear if these new skills persist over the long term. In other words, do the tricks work only during the experiment or do the children learn to apply them at home, when deciding between homework and television?

&lt;p&gt;Angela Lee Duckworth, an assistant professor of psychology at the University of Pennsylvania, is leading the program. She first grew interested in the subject after working as a high-school math teacher. "For the most part, it was an incredibly frustrating experience," she says. "I gradually became convinced that trying to teach a teen-ager algebra when they don't have self-control is a pretty futile exercise." And so, at the age of thirty-two, Duckworth decided to become a psychologist. One of her main research projects looked at the relationship between self-control and grade-point average. She found that the ability to delay gratification--eighth graders were given a choice between a dollar right away or two dollars the following week--was a far better predictor of academic performance than I.Q. She said that her study shows that "intelligence is really important, but it's still not as important as self-control."&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;For the past few months, the researchers have been conducting pilot studies in the classroom as they try to figure out the most effective way to introduce complex psychological concepts to young children. Because the study will focus on students between the ages of four and eight,&lt;strong&gt; the classroom lessons will rely heavily on peer modelling&lt;/strong&gt;, such as showing kindergartners a video of a child successfully distracting herself during the marshmallow task.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The point is that self-improvement isn't impossible, and that changing the habits of one kid just might help change a classroom. Nobody is an island. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;/p&gt; &lt;a href="http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2010/01/self-control_and_peer_groups.php#commentsArea"&gt;Read the comments on this post...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/scienceblogs/wDAM/~4/IzeJkjOiRrI" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description>
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         <title>Cable News</title>
          <description>&lt;p&gt;Cable news is not good for the soul. People make fun of Jersey Shore, but at least those randy kids don't reinforce our deep-seated political biases. A new &lt;a href="http://mwc.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/2/3/263"&gt;paper&lt;/a&gt; by Shawn Powers of USC and Mohammed el-Nawawy of Queens University of Charlotte looked at the effect of international cable news on the ideology of its viewers. Not surprisingly, they found that people were only interested in "news" that didn't contradict what they already believed: &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;Powers and el-Nawawy show that global media consumers tuned in to international news media that they thought would further substantiate their opinions about U.S. policies and culture, and provide them with information on the international issues that they deemed most important. The study found a strong relationship between the participants' attitudes toward U.S. policy and culture and their choice of broadcaster. Those who were dependent on BBC World and especially CNNI were overall more supportive of U.S. foreign policy.&lt;/blockquote&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This shouldn't be too surprising. As Ken Auletta recently reported in the &lt;em&gt;New Yorker&lt;/em&gt;, cable news has grown increasingly partisan in recent years, seeking out an ever more balkanized audience. He cites a study of 35,000 viewers conducted by TiVo: for each Democrat who watches Fox News there are eighteen Republicans, and for every Republican who watches MSNBC there are six Democrats. It turns out that everybody wants their own set of facts.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This is an old phenomenon that's been exaggerated by new media trends. Partisan voters are convinced that they're rational⎯only the other side is irrational⎯but we're actually &lt;em&gt;rationalizers&lt;/em&gt;. The Princeton political scientists Christopher Achen and Larry Bartels analyzed survey data from the 1990's to prove this point. During the first term of Bill Clinton's presidency, the budget deficit declined by more than 90 percent. However, when Republican voters were asked in 1996 what happened to the deficit under Clinton, more than 55 percent said that it had increased. What's interesting about this data is that so-called "high-information" voters⎯these are the Republicans who read the newspaper, watch cable news and can identify their representatives in Congress⎯weren't better informed than "low-information" voters. According to Bartels, the reason knowing more about politics doesn't erase partisan bias is that voters tend to only assimilate those facts that confirm what they already believe. If a piece of information doesn't follow Republican talking points⎯and Clinton's deficit reduction didn't fit the "tax and spend liberal" stereotype⎯then the information is conveniently ignored. "Voters think that they're thinking," Achen and Bartels &lt;a href="http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/apw/archives/achen_bartels_thinking.pdf"&gt;write&lt;/a&gt;, "but what they're really doing is inventing facts or ignoring facts so that they can rationalize decisions they've already made."  &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The bleak lesson is that we turn the spotlight of attention into an information-filter, a way to block-out disagreeable points of view.  Consider this experiment, which was done in the late 1960's, by the cognitive psychologists Timothy Brock and Joe Balloun. I describe the study in my &lt;a href="http://www.amazon.com/How-We-Decide-Jonah-Lehrer/dp/0547247990/ref=tmm_pap_title_0"&gt;book&lt;/a&gt;:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;Brock and Balloun played a group of people a tape-recorded message attacking Christianity. Half of the subjects were regular churchgoers while the other half were committed atheists. To make the experiment more interesting, Brock and Balloun added an annoying amount of static⎯a crackle of white noise⎯to the recording. However, they allowed listeners to reduce the static by pressing a button, so that the message suddenly became easier to understand. Their results were utterly predicable and rather depressing: the non-believers always tried to remove the static, while the religious subjects actually preferred the message that was harder to hear. Later experiments by Brock and Balloun demonstrated a similar effect with smokers listening to a speech on the link between smoking and cancer. We silence the cognitive dissonance through self-imposed ignorance. &lt;/blockquote&gt; 

&lt;p&gt;Cable news takes advantage of this cognitive weakness. Interestingly, however, this latest study found that not every cable news channel reinforced the beliefs of its audience. The big exception? Al-Jazeera English, which reduced the dogmatism of viewers:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;The longer participants had been watching AJE, the less dogmatic they were in their thinking...The reduced dogmatism applies only to the cognitive levels of thinking, or the way in which people process new information. People who are less dogmatic in their thought are more open to information that contradicts their worldviews, whereas people who think very dogmatically are more likely to ignore or minimize information that does not support their own beliefs. These levels of dogmatism are strongly related to political and cultural tolerance, and how people behave in confrontational situations. &lt;/blockquote&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Thanks to &lt;a href="http://bakadesuyo.com/"&gt;Eric Barker&lt;/a&gt; for the pointer.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;a href="http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2010/01/cable_news.php#commentsArea"&gt;Read the comments on this post...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/scienceblogs/wDAM/~4/S3K-idVHgS0" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description>
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         <title>Power</title>
          <description>&lt;p&gt;The Economist &lt;a href="http://www.economist.com/sciencetechnology/displayStory.cfm?story_id=15328544"&gt;reviews&lt;/a&gt; an interesting new study that investigates the immorality of power:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;In their first study, Dr Lammers and Dr Galinsky asked 61 university students to write about a moment in their past when they were in a position of high or low power. Previous research has established that this is an effective way to "prime" people into feeling as if they are currently in such a position. Each group (high power and low power) was then split into two further groups. Half were asked to rate, on a nine-point morality scale (with one being highly immoral and nine being highly moral), how objectionable it would be for other people to over-report travel expenses at work. The other half were asked to participate in a game of dice.

&lt;p&gt;The dice players were told to roll two ten-sided dice (one for "tens" and one for "units") in the privacy of an isolated cubicle, and report the results to a lab assistant. The number they rolled, which would be a value between one and 100 (two zeros), would determine the number of tickets that they would be given in a small lottery that was run at the end of the study.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;In the case of the travel expenses--when the question hung on the behaviour of others--participants in the high-power group reckoned, on average, that over-reporting rated as a 5.8 on the nine-point scale. Low-power participants rated it 7.2. The powerful, in other words, claimed to favour the moral course. In the dice game, however, high-power participants reported, on average, that they had rolled 70 while low-power individuals reported an average 59. Though the low-power people were probably cheating a bit (the expected average score would be 50), the high-power volunteers were undoubtedly cheating--perhaps taking the term "high roller" rather too literally. &lt;/blockquote&gt; &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The scientists argue that power is corrupting because it leads to moral hypocrisy. Although we almost always know what the right thing to do is - cheating at dice is a sin - power makes it easier to justify the wrongdoing, as we rationalize away our moral mistake. For instance, when Lammers and Galinsky asked the subjects (in both low and high-power conditions) how they would judge an individual who drove too fast when late for an appointment, or whether it was acceptable to cheat on the income tax, people with power consistently said it was worse when others committed those crimes than when they did. In other words, the powerful people believe they had a good reason for speeding - they're &lt;em&gt;important&lt;/em&gt; people, with important things to do - but everyone else should follow the posted signs. We become the exception to the rule, which is the law.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The real question, of course, is what causes this blatant hypocrisy. One possibility is that power makes us less sensitive to the needs and feelings of others - it silences our empathy - and so we only think about our own motivations and needs. Adam Smith, the 18th century philosopher, was the first modern thinker to emphasize the importance of empathy in shaping morality. "As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel," Smith wrote, "we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation."  This mirroring process leads to an instinctive sympathy for our fellow man⎯Smith called it "fellow-feeling"⎯which formed the basis for our moral decisions.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Smith was right. Just look at the ultimatum game. In this simple experimental task, an experimenter pairs two people together, and hands one of them $10. This person (the proposer) gets to decide how the ten dollars is divided. The second person (the responder) can either accept the offer, allowing both players to pocket their respective shares, or reject the offer, in which case both players walk away empty-handed.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;When economists first started playing this game in the early 1980's, they assumed that this elementary exchange would always generate the same outcome. The proposer would offer the responder approximately $1⎯a minimal amount⎯and the responder would accept it. After all, $1 is better than nothing, and a rejection leaves both players worse off. Such an outcome would be a clear demonstration of our innate selfishness and rationality. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;However, the researchers soon realized that their predictions were all wrong.  Instead of swallowing their pride and pocketing a small profit, responders typically rejected any offer they perceived as unfair. Furthermore, proposers anticipated this angry rejection and typically tendered an offer around $4.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Why are most people so generous? The answer returns us to the "fellow-feeling" described by Smith: proposers make fair offers in the ultimatum game is because they are able to imagine how the responder will &lt;em&gt;feel&lt;/em&gt; if they make an unfair offer.  (When people play the game with computers, they are never generous.) They know that a lowball proposal will make the other person angry, which will lead them to reject the offer, which will leave everybody with nothing. So the proposers suppress their greed, and equitably split the ten dollars. (When people are given oxytocin, a hormone released during childbirth and during moments of social bonding, they make offers that are nearly 80 percent more equitable than normal.) This ability to sympathize with the feelings of others leads to fairness.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Unfortunately, states of power seem to induce a temporary state of mindblindness, so that our sympathetic instincts are repressed. A simple variation on the ultimatum game known as the dictator game makes this clear. Unlike the ultimatum game, in which the responder can decide whether or not to accept the monetary offer, in the dictator game, the proposer simply dictates how much the responder receives. (In other words, they have absolute power.) What's surprising is that these petit tyrants are still rather generous, and give away about one-third of the total amount of money. Even when people have power, they remain mostly constrained by their sympathetic instincts. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;However, it only takes one minor alteration for this benevolence to disappear. When the dictator cannot see the responder⎯the two players are located in separate rooms⎯the dictator lapses into unfettered greed. Instead of giving away a significant share of the profits, the despots start offering mere pennies, and pocketing the rest.  Once we become socially isolated, we stop simulating the feelings of other people.* As a result, our inner Machiavelli takes over, and our sense of sympathy is squashed by selfishness. The UC Berkeley psychologist &lt;a href="http://greatergood.berkeley.edu/greatergood/2007winter/keltner.html"&gt;Dacher Keltner&lt;/a&gt; has found that, in many social situations, people with power act just like patients with severe brain damage. "The experience of power might be thought of as having someone open up your skull and take out that part of your brain so critical to empathy and socially-appropriate behavior," he writes. "You become very impulsive and insensitive, which is a bad combination."&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Of course, we live in an age when our most powerful people - they tend to also have lots of money - are also the most isolated. They live in gated communities with private drivers. They eat at different restaurants and stay at different resorts. They wear different clothes and skip the security lines at airports, before sitting at the front of the plane. We shouldn't be surprised that they're also assholes.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;*I think this helps explain the public preference for politicians with ordinary preferences, or why Scott Brown kept on talking about his truck. And it also justifies Obama insistence on not becoming informationally &lt;a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/01/24/AR2010012403014_pf.html"&gt;isolated&lt;/a&gt;, whether that's by reading ten letters from constituents every day or following a variety of blogs.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;a href="http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2010/01/power.php#commentsArea"&gt;Read the comments on this post...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/scienceblogs/wDAM/~4/Twkb_g88zRk" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description>
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         <pubDate>Mon, 25 Jan 2010 12:48:19 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>Musical Predictions</title>
          <description>&lt;p&gt;There's an interesting new &lt;a href="http://www.sciencedirect.com/science?_ob=ArticleURL&amp;_udi=B6WNP-4XX23NY-1&amp;_user=10&amp;_rdoc=1&amp;_fmt=&amp;_orig=search&amp;_sort=d&amp;_docanchor=&amp;view=c&amp;_acct=C000050221&amp;_version=1&amp;_urlVersion=0&amp;_userid=10&amp;md5=05ba3787e20be68d2dd400e80e64d907"&gt;paper&lt;/a&gt; on how the brain makes sense of music by constructing detailed models in real time. The act of listening, it turns out, is really an act of neural prediction. Here are the scientists, from the University of London:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;The ability to anticipate forthcoming events has clear evolutionary advantages, and predictive successes or failures often entail significant psychological and physiological consequences. In music perception, the confirmation and violation of expectations are critical to the communication of emotion and aesthetic effects of a composition. &lt;/blockquote&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The paper consists of a computational model and and an experiment. The model essentially demonstrated that statistical predictions based on our personal listening experience - because I listen to Bruce Springsteen, I'm able to predict the melodies of John Mellencamp - was much better at simulating the mind than a rule-based model, in which our expectations are fixed and inflexible.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The experiment was more compelling. The scientists measured the brain waves of a twenty subjects while they listened to various hymns. It turned out that unexpected notes - pitches that violated the previous melodic pattern - triggered an interesting sequence of neural events and a spike in brain activity: &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;Our electrophysiological results showed that low-probability notes, as compared to high-probability notes, elicited a larger (i) negative ERP component at a late time period (400-450 ms), (ii) beta band (14-30 Hz) oscillation over the parietal lobe, and (iii) long-range phase synchronization between multiple brain regions.  &lt;/blockquote&gt;

&lt;p&gt;There are two interesting takeaways from this experiment. The first is that music hijacks some very fundamental neural mechanisms. The brain is designed to learn by association: if this, then that. Music works by subtly toying with our expected associations, enticing us to make predictions about what note will come next, and then confronting us with our prediction errors. In other words, every melody manipulates the same essential mechanisms we use to make sense of reality. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The second takeaway is that music requires surprise, the dissonance of "low-probability notes". While most people think about music in terms of aesthetic beauty - we like pretty consonant pitches arranged in pretty patterns - that's exactly backwards. The point of the prettiness is to set up the surprise, to frame the deviance. (That's why the unexpected pitches triggered the most brain activity, synchronizing the activity of brain regions involved in motor movement and emotion.) I wrote about this concept in &lt;a href="http://www.amazon.com/Proust-Was-Neuroscientist-Jonah-Lehrer/dp/0618620109"&gt;Proust Was A Neuroscientist&lt;/a&gt;:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;Before a pattern can be desired by the brain, it must play hard to get. Music only excites us when it makes our auditory cortex struggle to uncover its order. If the music is too obvious, if its patterns are always present, it is annoyingly boring. This is why composers introduce the tonic note in the beginning of the song and then studiously avoid it until the end. The longer we are denied the pattern we expect, the greater the emotional release when the pattern returns, safe and sound.  Our auditory cortex rejoices. It has found the order it has been looking for. 

&lt;p&gt;To demonstrate this psychological principle, the musicologist Leonard Meyer, in his classic book Emotion and Meaning in Music (1956), analyzed the 5th movement of Beethoven's String Quartet in C-sharp minor, Op. 131.  Meyer wanted to show how music is defined by its flirtation with--but not submission to--our expectations of order.  He dissected fifty measures of Beethoven's masterpiece, showing how Beethoven begins with the clear statement of a rhythmic and harmonic pattern and then, in an intricate tonal dance, carefully avoids repeating it.  What Beethoven does instead is suggest variations of the pattern.  He is its evasive shadow. If E major is the tonic, Beethoven will play incomplete versions of the E major chord, always careful to avoid its straight expression. He wants to preserve an element of uncertainty in his music, making our brains beg for the one chord he refuses to give us. Beethoven saves that chord for the end. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;According to Meyer, it is the suspenseful tension of music (arising out of our unfulfilled expectations) that is the source of the music's feeling. While earlier theories of music focused on the way a noise can refer to the real world of images and experiences (its "connotative" meaning), Meyer argued that the emotions we find in music come from the unfolding events of the music itself.  This "embodied meaning" arises from the patterns the symphony invokes and then ignores, from the ambiguity it creates inside its own form. "For the human mind," Meyer writes, "such states of doubt and confusion are abhorrent. When confronted with them, the mind attempts to resolve them into clarity and certainty."  And so we wait, expectantly, for the resolution of E major, for Beethoven's established pattern to be completed. This nervous anticipation, says Meyer, "is the whole raison d'etre of the passage, for its purpose is precisely to delay the cadence in the tonic."   The uncertainty makes the feeling. &lt;strong&gt;Music is a form whose meaning depends upon its violation&lt;/strong&gt;.&lt;/blockquote&gt; &lt;/p&gt; &lt;a href="http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2010/01/musical_predictions.php#commentsArea"&gt;Read the comments on this post...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/scienceblogs/wDAM/~4/WpB1S6LhGmc" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description>
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         <pubDate>Wed, 20 Jan 2010 08:54:42 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>Chess Intuition</title>
          <description>&lt;p&gt;Time Magazine has an interesting &lt;a href="http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1950683,00.html"&gt;profile&lt;/a&gt; of Magnus Carlsen, the youngest chess player to achieve a number one world ranking:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;Genius can appear anywhere, but the origins of Carlsen's talent are particularly mysterious. He hails from Norway -- a "small, poxy chess nation with almost no history of success," as the English grand master Nigel Short sniffily describes it -- and unlike many chess prodigies who are full-time players by age 12, Carlsen stayed in school until last year. His father Henrik, a soft-spoken engineer, says he has spent more time urging his young son to complete his schoolwork than to play chess. Even now, Henrik will interrupt Carlsen's chess studies to drag him out for a family hike or museum trip. "I still have to pinch my arm," Henrik says. "This certainly is not what we had in mind for Magnus."

&lt;p&gt;Even pro chess players -- a population inured to demonstrations of extraordinary intellect -- have been electrified by Carlsen's rise. A grand master at 13 (the third youngest in history) and a conqueror of top players at 15, he is often referred to as the Mozart of chess for the seeming ease of his mastery. In September, he announced a coaching contract with Garry Kasparov, arguably the greatest player of all time, who quit chess in 2005 to pursue a political career in Russia. "Before he is done," Kasparov says, "Carlsen will have changed our ancient game considerably."&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;One of the fascinating elements of Carlsen's talent is that he's learned the game by playing computer chess, matching his wits against advanced algorithms. The end result is a prodigy who's amassed an unprecedented amount of deliberate practice at an early age, as he's able to play multiple games on the same machine at the same time. Computers, in other words, have accelerated the pace of his chess education.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The article then discusses Carlsen's semi-mystical chess "intuition," which allows the youngster to "feel for where to place the pieces":&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;According to Kasparov, Carlsen has a knack for sensing the potential energy in each move, even if its ultimate effect is too far away for anyone -- even a computer -- to calculate. In the grand-master commentary room, where chess's clerisy gather to analyze play, the experts did not even consider several of Carlsen's moves during his game with Kramnik until they saw them and realized they were perfect. "It's hard to explain," Carlsen says. "Sometimes a move just feels right."&lt;/blockquote&gt;

&lt;p&gt;At first glance, there is something surprising about a teenager weaned on chess software extolling the wonders of intuition. It's as if we expect Carlsen to act like his software, to be as explicit in his strategic decisions as Deep Blue, the IBM supercomputer. But that misses the real purpose of practice and the real genius of the human brain. When we practice properly - and this means engaging in &lt;a href="http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&amp;client=safari&amp;rls=en&amp;q=author:%22Ericsson%22+intitle:%22The+role+of+deliberate+practice+in+the+acquisition+of+...%22+&amp;um=1&amp;ie=UTF-8&amp;oi=scholarr"&gt;deliberate practice&lt;/a&gt; - we aren't just accumulating factual knowledge. Instead, we're embedding our experience into our unconscious, so that even insanely complicated calculations - and Carlsen can regularly plan twenty chess moves in advance - become mostly automatic. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;This is a truism of expertise. Although we tend to think of experts as being weighted down by information, their intelligence dependent on a vast set of facts, experts are actually profoundly intuitive. When experts evaluate a situation, they don't systematically compare all the available options or consciously analyze the relevant information. Carlsen, for instance, doesn't compute the probabilities of winning if he moves his rook to the left rather than the right. Instead, experts naturally depend on the emotions generated by their experience. Their prediction errors - all those mistakes they made in the past - have been translated into useful knowledge, which allows them to tap into a set of accurate feelings they can't begin to explain. Neils Bohr said it best: an expert is "a person who has made all the mistakes that can be made in a very narrow field."  From the perspective of the brain, Bohr was absolutely right. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;And this is why we shouldn't be surprised that a chess prodigy raised on chess computer programs would be even &lt;em&gt;more&lt;/em&gt; intuitive than traditional grandmasters. The software allows him to play more chess, which allows him to make more mistakes, which allows him to accumulate experience at a prodigious pace.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;a href="http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2010/01/chess_intuition.php#commentsArea"&gt;Read the comments on this post...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/scienceblogs/wDAM/~4/WsPM0bMKbBk" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description>
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         <pubDate>Mon, 18 Jan 2010 12:20:51 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>Charity is Social</title>
          <description>&lt;p&gt;There's a new and very timely &lt;a href="http://www.jneurosci.org.resources.library.brandeis.edu/cgi/content/abstract/30/2/583"&gt;paper&lt;/a&gt; out this week that looks at the cortical mechanics of charitable giving. While it's been known for a few years that giving away money activates the dopamine reward pathway - that's why doing good &lt;em&gt;feels&lt;/em&gt; good - this latest paper attempted to investigate the philanthropic system in detail. In a world full of need, how do we choose where to give?&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The larger goal of the scientists was to better understand a core feature of the human brain, which is the ability to assign value to alternatives. How do we know that X is better than Y? How does the cacophony of mental activity - a confusing swirl of experience, memory and sensation - get transformed into a neat computational signal, which allows us to automatically assess our options? Here are the Caltech neuroeconomists, laying out their agenda:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;Donations to charity represent a complex social decision in which the benefits for the giver are abstract and indirect, unlike decisions involving primary reward or money where the benefit is concrete. Although two previous neuroimaging studies of charitable giving have reported activity in regions that respond to primary reward, neither addressed the questions of what neural networks provide the input used to compute values. In the case of decisions over primary rewards (e.g., choosing which juice to drink), the value is likely to be influenced by sensory factors such as expected taste and by somatic states such as thirst. On the other hand, computing the value of a charitable donation might require inputs from areas involved in social cognition. For example, because giving to charity involves sacrificing resources for the benefit of others, these decisions are likely to require a shift in attention away from the subject's own state to focus on the needs of others. In addition, the value that we assign to addressing the needs of others might depend on how much empathy we feel for them.&lt;/blockquote&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The experiment itself was straightforward. Twenty-two female subjects were given $100 to spend in the fMRI machine on various charities; whatever money they didn't spend was theirs to keep.(In addition, subjects were told that their donations to charity would be matched by a separate pool of research funds. Thus, when a subject donated $25 from her endowment, the charity received $50. So this investigation into altruism was itself altruistic.) The subjects then completed 150 trials in the scanner, as they decided how much to donate to 75 different charitable organizations, from the Brain Tumor Society to the Los Angeles Opera. (Before the scanning, the women were asked to rate the charity on a scale of "deservingness" and its "closeness to them," which was defined as the likelihood that someone they knew would directly benefit from its mission.)&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;What did the fMRI machine reveal? The "value" of a charitable donation was reflected in the activity of a brain area called the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), a bit of tissue a few inches behind the forehead. Furthermore, the VMPFC seemed to be making its computations by summing the responses of a variety of other "primary areas," such as the anterior insula and posterior superior temporal cortex (pSTC), both of which are associated with aspects of social cognition. (The insula has been linked to feelings of empathy, while the pSTC is in charge of perceiving agency in others.) &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The real question, of course, is what this scanning experiment can teach us about the psychology of charity, apart from giving us a few new acronyms to reference. Here's Hare, et. al.:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;One basic hypothesis that has been proposed in behavioral economics is that the amount given to a charity depends solely on the giver's preferences for that donation. The functional connectivity data presented here suggest that social cognition capabilities might also play a role in determining the size of the donation, perhaps by influencing how the value of giving (i.e., the preferences) are computed at the time of the decision. For example, a subject who does not activate the insula might end up giving a small donation because she does not generate the empathy necessary to construct such a preference. Similarly, a subject who does not activate pSTC with sufficient strength might make a small donation, not because she is indifferent to the charity's beneficiaries when she is able to take their perspective, but because she has difficulty focusing her attention on others. &lt;/blockquote&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The point, then, is that charitable donations aren't purely rational calculations. Instead, our decisions are deeply influenced by the quirky social machinery of the brain, which is influenced by variables like empathy (How close do we feel to the beneficiaries of the good cause?) and the ability to detect agency (Does the charity make us think of other people?). This helps explain the effect I &lt;a href="http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2010/01/haiti.php"&gt;blogged&lt;/a&gt; about yesterday, or why abstract appeals tend to be less compelling than concrete examples of individual suffering. When it comes to altruism, specificity beats scope, if only because the decision to give is inherently social.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I think this research also helps explain why social media like Facebook, Twitter, etc. always seem to become extra relevant during crises and disasters. While the platforms were designed to convey social banalities, they can also serve as vessels of empathy, as people forward along the latest reports and most resonant stories. It doesn't matter if the subject is Iranian protests or Haitian refugees - social media makes the tragedy feel closer, more human.  And that is what makes the tragedy feel real.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;a href="http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2010/01/charity_is_social.php#commentsArea"&gt;Read the comments on this post...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/scienceblogs/wDAM/~4/i1YRiU0QAQs" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description>
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         <pubDate>Thu, 14 Jan 2010 12:12:13 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>Haiti</title>
          <description>&lt;p&gt;The news out of Haiti this morning is hellish; the Earth slips and thousands die. The early reports have the same feel as the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, in that every bulletin brings more awful news. I already find myself dreading tomorrow's newspaper, which will outline the full scope of the tragedy. Here is more &lt;a href="http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/01/13/haiti-disaster-relief-how-to-contribute/"&gt;information&lt;/a&gt; on where to donate.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;I'd like to take a moment and discuss a cruel paradox of such events, which is that the sheer scale of the suffering seems to inhibit our empathy. There are no stories yet, just anecdotal shards and heartbreaking photographs. And so all we get is ledes citing the horrifying statistics and shocking numbers of dead. But these numbers quickly get incomprehensible - we can't imagine a thousand corpses - and so the emotional event becomes an abstraction, which fails to trigger the proper moral reaction. In my book, I write about the research of Paul Slovic, a psychologist at the University of Oregon, who has looked at this paradox in detail:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;Slovic's experiments are simple: he asks people how much they would be willing to donate to various charitable causes.  For example, Slovic found that when people were shown a picture of a single starving child named Rokia in Mali, they acted with impressive generosity. After looking at Rokia's emaciated body and haunting brown eyes, they donated, on average, two dollars and fifty cents to Save the Children. However, when a second group of people were provided with a list of statistics about starvation throughout Africa⎯more than three million children in Malawi are malnourished, more than eleven million people in Ethiopia need immediate food assistance, etc.⎯the average donation was fifty percent lower. At first glance, this makes no sense. When we are informed about the true scope of the problem we should give more money, not less. Rokia's tragic story is just the tip of the iceberg.

&lt;p&gt;According to Slovic, the problem with statistics is that they don't activate our moral emotions. The depressing numbers leave us cold: our mind can't comprehend suffering on such a massive scale. This is why we are riveted when one child falls down a well, but turn a blind eye to the millions of people who die every year for lack of clean water. Or why we donate thousands of dollars to help a single African war orphan featured on the cover of a magazine, but ignore widespread genocides in Rwanda or Darfur. As Mother Theresa put it, "If I look at the mass I will never act. If I look at the one, I will."&lt;br /&gt;
&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/p&gt; &lt;a href="http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2010/01/haiti.php#commentsArea"&gt;Read the comments on this post...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/scienceblogs/wDAM/~4/mYxuhL-Fwlw" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description>
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         <pubDate>Wed, 13 Jan 2010 11:51:11 -0500</pubDate>
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         <title>Falsification</title>
          <description>&lt;p&gt;In a recent New Yorker, &lt;a href="http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/johncassidy/2010/01/the-chicago-school-and-the-financial-crisis.html"&gt;John Cassidy&lt;/a&gt; spends time with a number of influential economists at the University of Chicago, home to the Chicago School and its emphasis on the productive efficiency of free markets. Obviously, the financial maelstrom of the last few years has led many to question this premise, at least in its strongest form. How have these economists reacted? If you read my recent article in &lt;a href="http://www.wired.com/magazine/2009/12/fail_accept_defeat/all/1"&gt;Wired&lt;/a&gt; on the psychology of failure, you probably aren't too surprised to learn that Cassidy finds several eminent Chicago economists who insist that the market failure wasn't actually a failure, or that even if there was a failure then it didn't involve the markets. In other words, their assumption remains intact - it's the evidence that's so flawed.&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;Here, for instance, is Cassidy interviewing Eugene Fama:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;I asked him how this theory [the efficient-markets hypothesis, which "underpinned the deregulation of financial markets] had fared in the recent crisis, which many, myself included, have described as an example of gross inefficiency. Fama was unruffled. "I think it did quite well in this episode," he said..."Stock prices typically decline prior to a recession and in a state of recession. This was a particularly severe recession. Prices started to decline in advance of when people recognized that it was a recession and then continued to decline. That was exactly what you would expect if markets were efficient."

&lt;p&gt;The emphasis that Fama placed on the stock market surprised me. Surely, I said, we had experienced a giant credit bubble, which eventually had burst. "I don't know what a credit bubble means," Fama replied, his eyes twinkling. "I don't even know what a bubble means. These words have become popular. I don't think they have any meaning...People have jumped on the bandwagon of blaming financial markets. I can tell a story very easily in which the financial markets were a casualty of the recession, not a cause of it."&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The interview continues in a similar vein. The point is that nothing in the last few years, at least in Cassidy's telling, has led Fama to reconsider his theoretical assumptions. The financial markets are efficient; government regulation is to blame. In my Wired article, I discuss some of the neuroscience behind such intellectual stubbornness, and the way the brain cleverly dismisses dissonant information. &lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;But Cassidy's excellent article also made me think about the role of colleagues in triggering new ideas, and the potential dangers of working in a department filled with people who share the same ideology. Here I describe the research of Kevin Dunbar, who spent several years watching scientists work:&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;blockquote&gt;While the scientific process is typically seen as a lonely pursuit -- researchers solve problems by themselves -- Dunbar found that most new scientific ideas emerged from lab meetings, those weekly sessions in which people publicly present their data. Interestingly, the most important element of the lab meeting wasn't the presentation -- it was the debate that followed. Dunbar observed that the skeptical (and sometimes heated) questions asked during a group session frequently triggered breakthroughs, as the scientists were forced to reconsider data they'd previously ignored. The new theory was a product of spontaneous conversation, not solitude; a single bracing query was enough to turn scientists into temporary outsiders, able to look anew at their own work.

&lt;p&gt;But not every lab meeting was equally effective. Dunbar tells the story of two labs that both ran into the same experimental problem: The proteins they were trying to measure were sticking to a filter, making it impossible to analyze the data. "One of the labs was full of people from different backgrounds," Dunbar says. "They had biochemists and molecular biologists and geneticists and students in medical school." The other lab, in contrast, was made up of E. coli experts. "They knew more about E. coli than anyone else, but that was what they knew," he says. Dunbar watched how each of these labs dealt with their protein problem. The E. coli group took a brute-force approach, spending several weeks methodically testing various fixes. "It was extremely inefficient," Dunbar says. "They eventually solved it, but they wasted a lot of valuable time."&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The diverse lab, in contrast, mulled the problem at a group meeting. None of the scientists were protein experts, so they began a wide-ranging discussion of possible solutions. At first, the conversation seemed rather useless. But then, as the chemists traded ideas with the biologists and the biologists bounced ideas off the med students, potential answers began to emerge. "After another 10 minutes of talking, the protein problem was solved," Dunbar says. "They made it look easy."&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;When Dunbar reviewed the transcripts of the meeting, he found that the intellectual mix generated a distinct type of interaction in which the scientists were forced to rely on metaphors and analogies to express themselves. (That's because, unlike the E. coli group, the second lab lacked a specialized language that everyone could understand.) These abstractions proved essential for problem-solving, as they encouraged the scientists to reconsider their assumptions. Having to explain the problem to someone else forced them to think, if only for a moment, like an intellectual on the margins, filled with self-skepticism.&lt;/blockquote&gt;&lt;/p&gt;

&lt;p&gt;The lesson is that the process of discovery benefits from our differences, from the disagreements and contradictions that arise when people with different assumptions discuss the same data. When everyone agrees, or has the same academic background,&lt;br /&gt;
then the stubbornness is reinforced. The theory doesn't change. The School of X - and it doesn't matter what X is - remains tethered to its dusty preconceptions. The failure never leads to a better answer.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;a href="http://scienceblogs.com/cortex/2010/01/falsification.php#commentsArea"&gt;Read the comments on this post...&lt;/a&gt;&lt;img src="http://feeds.feedburner.com/~r/scienceblogs/wDAM/~4/2QMiCuUuH1I" height="1" width="1"/&gt;</description>
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         <pubDate>Tue, 12 Jan 2010 12:38:34 -0500</pubDate>
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