Scire Licet

Avelino S. Alilin, et al. vs. Petron Corporation

2016-07-02T07:00:00.000+08:00

G.R. No. 177592

June 9, 2014

FACTS:

Alilin, et al. are laborers hired by Romualdo D. Gindang Contractor and RDG to work in the premises of Petron's bulk plant. Their dates of hiring range from 1968 to 1993. In 2000, Petron and RDG entered into a Contract of Services for the period June 1, 2000 to May 31, 2002 whereby RDG undertook to provide Petron with janitorial, maintenance, tanker receiving, packaging and other utility services in its Mandaue Bulk Plant. This contract was extended on July 31, 2002 and further extended until September 30, 2002. Upon expiration, no further extension was made. Thus, on October 16, 2002, Alilin, et al. were barred from continuing their services with Petron.

Hence, the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, etc. against Petron, claiming to be the latter's regular employees. Petron, on the other hand, alleges that they are employees of RDG, an independent contractor. It presented the following pieces of evidence: (1) RDG's Certificate of Registration of Business Name issued by DTI; (2) RDG's Certificate of Registration issued by DOLE; (3) Contractor's Pre-Qualification Statement; (4) Conflict of Interest Statement signed by Romeo Gindang as manager of RDG; (5) RDG's Audited Financial Statements for the years 1998, 1999 and 2000; (6) RDG's Mayor's Permit for the years 2000 and 2001; (7) RDG's Certificate of Accreditation issued by DTI; (8) performance bond and insurance policy; (9) SSS Online Inquiry System Employee Contributions and Employee Static Information; and (10) Romeo's affidavit stating that he had paid the salaries of his employees assigned to Petron.

LA found against Petron and ruled that Alilin, et al. are its regular employees because their jobs were directly related to Petron's business operations; they worked under the supervision of Petron's foreman; they were using Petron's tools and equipment in the performance of their works. NLRC affirmed the ruling. However, CA reversed the ruling and found RDG to be a legitimate contractor.

ISSUE: Whether or not RDG is a legitimate contractor

HELD:

Petron failed to discharge the burden of proving that RDG is a legitimate contractor. Hence, the presumption that RDG is a labor-only contractor stands.

The audited financial statements and other financial documents of RDG for the years 1999 to 2001 establish that it does have sufficient working capital to meet the requirements of its service contract. In fact, the financial evaluation conducted by Petron of RDG's financial statements for years 1998-2000 showed RDG to have a maximum financial capability of Php4.807 Million as of December 1998, and PHp1.611 Million as of December 2000. Petron was able to establish RDG's sufficient capitalization when it entered into the service contract in 2000. The Court stresses though that this determination of RDG's status as an independent contractor is only with respect to its financial capability for the period covered by the financial and other documents presented. In other words, the evidence adduced merely proves that RDG was financially qualified as a legitimate contractor but only with respect to its last service contract with Petron in the year 2000.

As may be recalled, petitioners have rendered work for Petron for a long period of time even before the service contract was executed in 2000. The respective dates on which petitioners claim to have started working for Petron, as well as the fact that they have rendered continuous service to it until October 16, 2002, when they were prevented from entering the premises of Petron's Mandaue Bulk Plant, were not at all disputed by Petron. In fact, Petron even recognized that some of the petitioners were initially fielded by Romualdo Gindang, the father of Romeo, through RDG's precursor, Romualdo D. Gindang Contractor, while the others were provided by Romeo himself when he took over the business of his father in 1989. Hence, while Petron was able to establish that RDG was financially capable as a legitimate contractor at the time of the execution of the service contract in 2000, it nevertheless failed to establish the financial capability of RDG at the time when petitioners actually started to work for Petron in 1968, 1979, 1981, 1987, 1990, 1992 and 1993.

Petron's power of control over petitioners exists in this case

The facts that petitioners were hired by Romeo or his father and that their salaries were paid by them do not detract from the conclusion that there exists an employer-employee relationship between the parties due to Petron's power of control over petitioners. One manifestation of the power of control is the power to transfer employees from one work assignment to another. Here, Petron could order petitioners to work outside of their regular "maintenance/utility" job. Also, petitioners were required to report for work every day at the bulk plant, observe an 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. daily work schedule, and wear proper uniform and safety helmets as prescribed by the safety and security measures being implemented within the bulk plant. All these imply control. In an industry where safety is of paramount concern, control and supervision over sensitive operations, such as those performed by the petitioners, are inevitable if not at all necessary. Indeed, Petron deals with commodities that are highly volatile and flammable which, if mishandled or not properly attended to, may cause serious injuries and damage to property and the environment. Naturally, supervision by Petron is essential in every aspect of its product handling in order not to compromise the integrity, quality and safety of the products that it distributes to the consuming public.

Petitioners already attained regular status as employees of Petron

Petitioners were given various work assignments such as tanker receiving, barge loading, sounding, gauging, warehousing, mixing, painting, carpentry, driving, gasul filling and other utility works. Petron refers to these work assignments as menial works which could be performed by any able-bodied individual. The Court finds, however, that while the jobs performed by petitioners may be menial and mechanical, they are nevertheless necessary and related to Petron's business operations. If not for these tasks, Petron's products will not reach the consumers in their proper state. Indeed, petitioners' roles were vital inasmuch as they involve the preparation of the products that Petron will distribute to its consumers.

Furthermore, while it may be true that any able-bodied individual can perform the tasks assigned to petitioners, the Court notes the undisputed fact that for many years, it was the same able-bodied individuals (petitioners) who performed the tasks for Petron. The engagement of petitioners for the same works for a long period of time is a strong indication that such works were indeed necessary to Petron's business. In view of these, and considering further that petitioners' length of service entitles them to become regular employees under the Labor Code, petitioners are deemed by law to have already attained the status as Petitioner's regular employees. As such, Petron could not terminate their services on the pretext that the service contract it entered with RDG has already lasped.

The principal who alleges that the contractor is a legitimate one has the burden of proving permissible contracting
For a contractor to be considered a legitimate one, it must have substantial capitalization for the entire duration that the contractor's employees were assigned at the principal's premises

Filcar Transport Services vs. Jose A. Espinas

2016-07-01T17:16:00.000+08:00

G.R. No. 174156

June 20, 2012

FACTS:

Respondent Jose A. Espinas was driving his car along Leon Guinto Street in Manila when he was suddenly hit by another car. Upon verifying with the LTO, Espinas learned that the owner of the other car is Filcar. This car was assigned to Filcar's Corporate Secretary Atty. Candido Flor and, at the time of the incident, was driven by Atty. Flor's personal driver, Timoteo Floresca.

Espinas sued Filcar for damages. Filcar denied liability, claiming that the incident was not due to its fault or negligence since Floresca was not its employee but that of Atty. Flor.

ISSUE: Whether or not Filcar, as registered owner of the motor vehicle which figured in an accident, may be held liable for the damages caused to the Espinas

HELD:

Filcar, as registered owner, is deemed the employer of the driver, Floresca, and is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code

It is undisputed that Filcar is the registered owner of the motor vehicle which hit and caused damage to Espinas' car. It is on this basis that Filcar is primarily and directly liable to Espinas for damages.

As a general rule, one is only responsible for his own act or omission. Thus, a person will generally be held liable only for the torts committed by himself and not by another. This general rule is laid down in Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides to wit:

Article 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

Based on the above-cited article, the obligation to indemnify another for damage caused by one's act or omission is imposed upon the tortfeasor himself, i.e., the person who committed the negligent act or omission. The law, however, provides for exceptions when it makes certain persons liable for the act or omission of another.

One exception is an employer who is made vicariously liable for the tort committed by his employee. Article 2180 of the Civil Code states:

Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

x x x x

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

x x x x

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, an action predicated on an employee's act or omission may be instituted against the employer who is held liable for the negligent act or omission committed by his employee.

Although the employer is not the actual tortfeasor, the law makes him vicariously liable on the basis of the civil law principle of pater familias for failure to exercise due care and vigilance over the acts of one's subordinates to prevent damage to another. In the last paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the employer may invoke the defense that he observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

It is well settled that in case of motor vehicle mishaps, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is considered as the employer of the tortfeasor-driver, and is made primarily liable for the tort committed by the latter under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code.

In so far as third persons are concerned, the registered owner of the motor vehicle is the employer of the negligent driver, and the actual employer is considered merely as an agent of such owner.

Thus, it is clear that for the purpose of holding the registered owner of the motor vehicle primarily and directly liable for damages under Article 2176, in relation with Article 2180, of the Civil Code, the existence of an employer-employee relationship, as it is understood in labor relations law, is not required. It is sufficient to establish that Filcar is the registered owner of the motor vehicle causing damage in order that it may be held vicariously liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

Rationale for holding the registered owner vicariously liable

The rationale for the rule that a registered owner is vicariously liable for damages caused by the operation of his motor vehicle is explained by the principle behind motor vehicle registration, viz:

The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on the public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner. Instances are numerous where vehicles running on public highways caused accidents or injuries to pedestrians or other vehicles without positive identification of the owner or drivers, or with very scant means of identification. It is to forestall these circumstances, so inconvenient or prejudicial to the public, that the motor vehicle registration is primarily ordained, in the interest of the determination of persons responsible for damages or injuries caused on public highways.

Employer-employee relationship between registered owner and driver is irrelevant

Thus, whether there is an employer-employee relationship between the registered owner and the driver is irrelevant in determining the liability of the registered owner who the law holds primarily and directly responsible for any accident, injury or death caused by the operation of the vehicle in the streets and highways.

The general public policy involved in motor vehicle registration is the protection of innocent third persons who may have no means of identifying public road malefactors and, therefore, would find it difficult if not impossible to seek redress for damages they may sustain in accidents resulting in deaths, injuries and other damages; by fixing the person held primarily and directly liable for the damages sustained by victims of road mishaps, the law ensures that relief will always be available to them.

To identify the person primarily and directly responsible for the damages would also prevent a situation where a registered owner of a motor vehicle can easily escape liability by passing on the blame to anther who may have no means to answer for the damages caused, thereby defeating the claims of victims of road accidents. We take note that some motor vehicles running on our roads are driven not by their registered owners, but by employed drivers who, in most instances, do not have the financial means to pay for the damages caused in case of accidents.

Filcar cannot pass on the liability to another party

The agreement between Filcar and Atty. Flor to assign the motor vehicle to the latter does not bind Espinas who was not a party to and has no knowledge of the agreement, and whose only recourse is to the motor vehicle registration.

Filcar cannot use the defense that the employee acted beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage

Neither can Filcar use the defenses available under Article 2180 of the Civil Code – that the employee acts beyond the scope of his assigned task or that it exercised the due diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage – because the motor vehicle registration law, to a certain extent, modified Article 2180 of the Civil Code by making these defenses unavailable to the registered owner of the motor vehicle. Thus, for as long as Filcar is the registered owner of the car involved in the vehicular accident, it could not escape primary liability for the damages caused to Espinas.

Filcar's recourse is against the actual employer of the driver and the driver himself

This does not mean, however, that Filcar is left without any recourse against the actual employer of the driver and the driver himself. Under the civil law principle of unjust enrichment, the registered owner of the motor vehicle has a right to be indemnified by the actual employer of the driver of the amount that he may be required to pay as damages for the injury caused to another.

Registered owner is deemed employer of the driver and is thus vicariously liable under Article 2176 in relation with Article 2180 of the Civil Code
The main aim of motor vehicle registration is to identify the owner so that if any accident happens, or that any damage or injury is caused by the vehicle on public highways, responsibility therefor can be fixed on a definite individual, the registered owner.
The motor vehicle registration law modified Article 2180 to a certain extent so that the defense available thereunder cannot be used by the registered owner
The registered owner can recover from the actual owner and the driver under the doctrine of unjust enrichment

Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc. vs. Alan M. Agito, et al.

2016-03-28T15:00:00.001+08:00

G.R. No. 179546, February 13, 2009

FACTS:

Agito, et al. are salesmen assigned at the Lagro Sales Office of Coca-Cola for a number of years but were not regularized. Their employment was terminated without just cause and due process. They filed complaints against Coca-Cola, Interserve, Peerless Integrated Services, Inc. Better Builders, Inc., and Excellent Partners, Inc. However, they failed to state a reason for filing complaints against Interserve, Peerless, Better Builders and Excellent Partners.

Coca-Cola averred that Agito, et al. were employees of Interserve who were tasked to perform contracted services in accordance with the provision of the Contract of Services. The contract covering the period of April 1, 2002 to September 30, 2002 constituted legitimate job contracting.

To prove that Interserve is an independent contractor, Coca-Cola presented the following: (1) AOI of Interserve; (2) Certificate of Registration of Interserve with BIR; (3) ITR with Audited Financial Statements of Interserve for 2001; and (4) Certificate of Registration of Interserve as an independent contractor issued by DOLE.

As a result, Coca-Cola asserted that Agito, et al. were employees of Interserve since it was the latter which hired them, paid their wages and supervised their work, as proven by: (1) PDFs are in the records of Interserve; (2) Contracts of Temporary Employment with Interserve; and (3) payroll records of Interserve.

LA found for Coca-Cola and held that Interserve was a legitimate job contractor. The complaints against Peerless, Better Building and Excellent Partners was dismissed for failure to pursue the case.

On appeal, NLRC affirmed LA's decision.

CA reversed the NLRC decision and ruled that Interserve was a labor-only contractor with insufficient capital and investments for the services which it was contracted to perform. Additionally, CA determined that Coca-Cola had effective control over the means and method of Agito, et al.'s work as evidenced by the Daily Sales Monitoring Report, the Conventional Route System Proposed Set-Up, and the memoranda issued by the supervisor of petitioner addressed to workers. Respondents' tasks were directly related and necessary to the main business of Coca-Cola. Finally, certain provisions of the Contract of Service between Coca-Cola and Interserve suggested that the latter's undertaking did not involve a specific job but rather the supply of manpower.

ISSUE: Whether or not Interserve is a legitimate job contractor

HELD:

Legitimate Contracting vs. Labor-Only Contracting

The relations which may arise in a situation, where there is an employer, a contractor, and employees of the contractor, are identified and distinguished under Article 106 of the Labor Code:

Article 106. Contractor or subcontractor. - Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another person for the performance of the formers work, the employees of the contractor and of the latters subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly employed by him.

The Secretary of Labor may, by appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit the contracting out of labor to protect the rights of workers established under this Code. In so prohibiting or restriction, he may make appropriate distinctions between labor-only contracting and job contracting as well as differentiations within these types of contracting and determine who among the parties involved shall be considered the employer for purposes of this Code, to prevent any violation or circumvention of any provision of this Code.

There is labor-only contracting where the person supplying workers to an employee does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by such persons are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of such employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.

The afore-quoted provision recognizes two possible relations among the parties: (1) the permitted legitimate job contract, or (2) the prohibited labor-only contracting.

A legitimate job contract, wherein an employer enters into a contract with a job contractor for the performance of the formers work, is permitted by law. Thus, the employer-employee relationship between the job contractor and his employees is maintained. In legitimate job contracting, the law creates an employer-employee relationship between the employer and the contractors employees only for a limited purpose, i.e., to ensure that the employees are paid their wages. The employer becomes jointly and severally liable with the job contractor only for the payment of the employees wages whenever the contractor fails to pay the same. Other than that, the employer is not responsible for any claim made by the contractors employees.

On the other hand, labor-only contracting is an arrangement wherein the contractor merely acts as an agent in recruiting and supplying the principal employer with workers for the purpose of circumventing labor law provisions setting down the rights of employees. It is not condoned by law.A finding by the appropriate authorities that a contractor is a labor-only contractor establishes an employer-employee relationship between the principal employer and the contractors employees and the former becomes solidarily liable for all the rightful claims of the employees.

Section 5 of the Rules Implementing Articles 106-109 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides the guidelines in determining whether labor-only contracting exists:

Section 5. Prohibition against labor-only contracting. Labor-only contracting is hereby declared prohibited. For this purpose, labor-only contracting shall refer to an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies, or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal, and any of the following elements are [is] present:

i) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment which relates to the job, work, or service to be performed and the employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal; or

ii) The contractor does not exercise the right to control the performance of the work of the contractual employee.

The foregoing provisions shall be without prejudice to the application of Article 248(C) of the Labor Code, as amended.

Substantial capital or investment refers to capital stocks and subscribed capitalization in the case of corporations, tools, equipment, implements, machineries and work premises, actually and directly used by the contractor or subcontractor in the performance or completion of the job, work, or service contracted out.

The right to control shall refer to the right reversed to the person for whom the services of the contractual workers are performed, to determine not only the end to be achieved, but also the manner and means to be used in reaching that end. (Emphasis supplied.)

When there is labor-only contracting, there is employer-employee relationship between the principal and the contractual employee

When there is labor-only contracting, Section 7 of the same implementing rules, describes the consequences thereof:

Section 7. Existence of an employer-employee relationship. The contractor or subcontractor shall be considered the employer of the contractual employee for purposes of enforcing the provisions of the Labor Code and other social legislation. The principal, however, shall be solidarily liable with the contractor in the event of any violation of any provision of the Labor Code, including the failure to pay wages.

The principal shall be deemed the employer of the contractual employee in any of the following case, as declared by a competent authority:

a. where there is labor-only contracting; or

b. where the contracting arrangement falls within the prohibitions provided in Section 6 (Prohibitions) hereof.

According to the foregoing provision, labor-only contracting would give rise to: (1) the creation of an employer-employee relationship between the principal and the employees of the contractor or sub-contractor; and (2) the solidary liability of the principal and the contractor to the employees in the event of any violation of the Labor Code.

Even if employees are not performing activities indispensable to the business of the principal, labor-contracting may still exist if the contractor does not demonstrate substantial capital or investment

The law clearly establishes an employer-employee relationship between the principal employer and the contractors employee upon a finding that the contractor is engaged in labor-only contracting. Article 106 of the Labor Code categorically states: There is labor-only contracting where the person supplying workers to an employee does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by such persons are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of such employer. Thus, performing activities directly related to the principal business of the employer is only one of the two indicators that labor-only contracting exists; the other is lack of substantial capital or investment. The Court finds that both indicators exist in the case at bar.

Interserve has no substantial capital; it is impossible to measure whether or not there is substantial capital because the Contract between Coca-Cola and Interserve does not specify the work or the project that needs to be performed or completed.

At the outset, the Court clarifies that although Interserve has an authorized capital stock amounting toP2,000,000.00, only P625,000.00 thereof was paid up as of 31 December 2001. The Court does not set an absolute figure for what it considers substantial capital for an independent job contractor, but it measures the same against the type of work which the contractor is obligated to perform for the principal. However, this is rendered impossible in this case since the Contract between petitioner and Interserve does not even specify the work or the project that needs to be performed or completed by the latters employees, and uses the dubious phrase tasks and activities that are considered contractible under existing laws and regulations. Even in its pleadings, petitioner carefully sidesteps identifying or describing the exact nature of the services that Interserve was obligated to render to petitioner. The importance of identifying with particularity the work or task which Interserve was supposed to accomplish for petitioner becomes even more evident, considering that the Articles of Incorporation of Interserve states that its primary purpose is to operate, conduct, and maintain the business of janitorial and allied services. But respondents were hired as salesmen and leadman for petitioner. The Court cannot, under such ambiguous circumstances, make a reasonable determination if Interserve had substantial capital or investment to undertake the job it was contracting with petitioner.

Burden of proof of substantial capital rests in the contractor, or in its absence, the principal claiming it to be an independent contractor

The contractor, not the employee, has the burden of proof that it has the substantial capital, investment, and tool to engage in job contracting. Although not the contractor itself (since Interserve no longer appealed the judgment against it by the Labor Arbiter), said burden of proof herein falls upon petitioner who is invoking the supposed status of Interserve as an independent job contractor. Noticeably, petitioner failed to submit evidence to establish that the service vehicles and equipment of Interserve, valued at P510,000.00 and P200,000.00, respectively, were sufficient to carry out its service contract with petitioner. Certainly, petitioner could have simply provided the courts with records showing the deliveries that were undertaken by Interserve for the Lagro area, the type and number of equipment necessary for such task, and the valuation of such equipment. Absent evidence which a legally compliant company could have easily provided, the Court will not presume that Interserve had sufficient investment in service vehicles and equipment, especially since respondents allegation that they were using equipment, such as forklifts and pallets belonging to petitioner, to carry out their jobs was uncontroverted.

Interserve did not exercise the right to control the performance of the work of the respondents

The lack of control of Interserve over the respondents can be gleaned from the Contract of Services between Interserve (as the CONTRACTOR) and petitioner (as the CLIENT).

Paragraph 3 of the Contract specified that the personnel of contractor Interserve, which included the respondents, would comply with CLIENT as well as CLIENTs policies, rules and regulations. It even required Interserve personnel to subject themselves to on-the-spot searches by petitioner or its duly authorized guards or security men on duty every time the said personnel entered and left the premises of petitioner. Said paragraph explicitly established the control of petitioner over the conduct of respondents. Although under paragraph 4 of the same Contract, Interserve warranted that it would exercise the necessary and due supervision of the work of its personnel, there is a dearth of evidence to demonstrate the extent or degree of supervision exercised by Interserve over respondents or the manner in which it was actually exercised. There is even no showing that Interserve had representatives who supervised respondents work while they were in the premises of petitioner.

Also significant was the right of petitioner under paragraph 2 of the Contract to request the replacement of the CONTRACTORS personnel. True, this right was conveniently qualified by the phrase if from its judgment, the jobs or the projects being done could not be completed within the time specified or that the quality of the desired result is not being achieved, but such qualification was rendered meaningless by the fact that the Contract did not stipulate what work or job the personnel needed to complete, the time for its completion, or the results desired. The said provision left a gap which could enable petitioner to demand the removal or replacement of any employee in the guise of his or her inability to complete a project in time or to deliver the desired result. The power to recommend penalties or dismiss workers is the strongest indication of a companys right of control as direct employer.

Paragraph 4 of the same Contract, in which Interserve warranted to petitioner that the former would provide relievers and replacements in case of absences of its personnel, raises another red flag. An independent job contractor, who is answerable to the principal only for the results of a certain work, job, or service need not guarantee to said principal the daily attendance of the workers assigned to the latter. An independent job contractor would surely have the discretion over the pace at which the work is performed, the number of employees required to complete the same, and the work schedule which its employees need to follow.

As the Court previously observed, the Contract of Services between Interserve and petitioner did not identify the work needed to be performed and the final result required to be accomplished. Instead, the Contract specified the type of workers Interserve must provide petitioner (Route Helpers, Salesmen, Drivers, Clericals, Encoders & PD) and their qualifications (technical/vocational course graduates, physically fit, of good moral character, and have not been convicted of any crime). The Contract also states that, to carry out the undertakings specified in the immediately preceding paragraph, the CONTRACTOR shall employ the necessary personnel, thus, acknowledging that Interserve did not yet have in its employ the personnel needed by petitioner and would still pick out such personnel based on the criteria provided by petitioner. In other words, Interserve did not obligate itself to perform an identifiable job, work, or service for petitioner, but merely bound itself to provide the latter with specific types of employees. These contractual provisions strongly indicated that Interserve was merely a recruiting and manpower agency providing petitioner with workers performing tasks directly related to the latters principal business.

Certification issued by DOLE is not sufficient to prove independent contractorship

The certification issued by the DOLE stating that Interserve is an independent job contractor does not sway this Court to take it at face value, since the primary purpose stated in the Articles of Incorporation of Interserve is misleading. According to its Articles of Incorporation, the principal business of Interserve is to provide janitorial and allied services. The delivery and distribution of Coca-Cola products, the work for which respondents were employed and assigned to petitioner, were in no way allied to janitorial services. While the DOLE may have found that the capital and/or investments in tools and equipment of Interserve were sufficient for an independent contractor for janitorial services, this does not mean that such capital and/or investments were likewise sufficient to maintain an independent contracting business for the delivery and distribution of Coca-Cola products.

Legitimate Contracting vs. Labor-only Contracting
When there is labor-only contracting, an employer-employee exists between the contractual employee and the principal
Even if employees are not performing activities indispensable to the business of the principal, labor-only contracting may still exist if the contractor does not demonstrate substantial capital or investment
To determine whether or not there is substantial capital for purposes of legitimate contracting, one must examine the specific job, work or service provided in the Service Agreement
The burden of proof that the contractor is a legitimate contractor rests with the contractor, or in its absence, the principalCertification from DOLE is not sufficient to prove independent contractorship

Polyfoam-RGC International Corporation and Precilla A. Gramaje vs. Edgardo Concepcion

2016-03-19T22:18:00.001+08:00

G.R. No. 172349, June 13, 2012

FACTS :

Concepcion was hired by Polyfoam as an all-around factory worker and served as such for almost six years. One day, when Concepcion reported for work, he discovered that his time card was not in the rack and he was later informed by the security guard that he could no longer punch his time card. He was informed by his supervisor that the management decided to dismiss him due to an infraction of a company rule.

Hence, the filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal.

Gramaje later intervened, claiming to be the real employer of Concepcion. Gramaje claimed that P.A. Gramaje Employment Services (PAGES) is a legitimate job contractor who provided some manpower needs of Polyfoam and that Concepcion was hired as a packer and assigned to Polyfoam. She claimed no dismissal but that Concepcion simply stopped reporting for work.

LA found that Concepcion was illegally dismissed and holding Polyfoam and Gramaje solidarily liable for money claims.

On appeal, NLRC modified the decision by exonerating Polyfoam from liability and deleting the awards of backwages, 13th month pay, damages and attorney's fees. NLRC found Gramaje to be an independent contractor who had its own office equipment, tools, and substantial capital, and in fact supplied the plastic containers and carton boxes used by her employees in performing their duties. NLRC also found that Gramaje paid respondents wages and benefits and reported the latter to the SSS as a covered employee.

CA agreed with LA's conclusion that Gramaje is a labor-only contractor because of the following: (1) Gramaje failed to present its Audited Financial Statement that would have show its financial standing and ownership of equipment, machineries, and tools necessary to run her own business; (2) Gramaje failed to present a single copy of the purported contract with Polyfoam as to the packaging aspect of the latter's business; (3) Gramaje's licenses supposedly issued by the DOLE appeared to be spurious; (4) Gramaje was not registered with DOLE as a private recruitment agency; and (5) Gramaje presented only one SSS Quarterly Collection List whose authenticity is doubtful. The CA noted that petitioners are represented by only one law firm though they made it appear that they were represented by different lawyers.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Gramaje is an independent job contractor
2. Whether or not an employer-employee relationship exists between Polyfoam and respondent; and
3. Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed from employment

HELD:

Contracting or subcontracting

Article 106 of the Labor Code explains the relations which may arise between an employer, a contractor, and the contractor's employees, thus:

Art. 106. Contracting or subcontracting. – Whenever an employer enters into a contract with another person for the performance of the former's work, the employees of the contractor and of the latter's subcontractor, if any, shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of this Code.

In the event that the contractor or subcontractor fails to pay the wages of his employees in accordance with this Code, the employer shall be jointly and severally liable with his contractor or subcontractor to such employees to the extent of the work performed under the contract, in the same manner and extent that he is liable to employees directly employed by him.

The Secretary of Labor and Employment may, by appropriate regulations, restrict or prohibit the contracting out of labor to protect the rights of workers established under the Code. In so prohibiting or restricting, he may make appropriate distinctions between labor-only contracting and job contracting as well as differentiations within these types of contracting and determine who among the parties involved shall be considered the employer for purposes of this Code, to prevent any violation or circumvention of any provision of this Code.

There is labor-only contracting where the person supplying workers to an employer does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools, equipment, machineries, work premises, among others, and the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of such employer. In such cases, the person or intermediary shall be considered merely as an agent of the employer who shall be responsible to the workers in the same manner and extent as if the latter were directly employed by him.

In Sasan, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission 4th Division, the Court distinguished permissible job contracting or subcontracting from labor-only contracting, to wit:

Permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to put out or farm out to a contractor or subcontractor the performance or completion of a specific job, work or service within a definite or predetermined period, regardless of whether such job, work or service is to be performed or completed within or outside the premises of the principal. A person is considered engaged in legitimate job contracting or subcontracting if the following conditions concur:

(a) The contractor or subcontractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes to perform the job, work or service on its own account and under its own responsibility according to its own manner and method, and free from the control and direction of the principal in all matters connected with the performance of the work except as to the results thereof;

(b) The contractor or subcontractor has substantial capital or investment; and

(c) The agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual employees entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization, security of tenure, and social and welfare benefits.

Labor-only Contracting

In contrast, labor-only contracting, a prohibited act, is an arrangement where the contractor or subcontractor merely recruits, supplies or places workers to perform a job, work or service for a principal. In labor-only contracting, the following elements are present:

(a) The contractor or subcontractor does not have substantial capital or investment to actually perform the job, work or service under its own account and responsibility; and

(b) The employees recruited, supplied or placed by such contractor or subcontractor are performing activities which are directly related to the main business of the principal.[42]

The test of independent contractorship

The test of independent contractorship is whether one claiming to be an independent contractor has contracted to do the work according to his own methods and without being subject to the control of the employer, except only as to the results of the work.[43] In San Miguel Corporation v. Semillano,[44] the Court laid down the criteria in determining the existence of an independent and permissible contractor relationship, to wit:

x x x [W]hether or not the contractor is carrying on an independent business; the nature and extent of the work; the skill required; the term and duration of the relationship; the right to assign the performance of a specified piece of work; the control and supervision of the work to another; the employers power with respect to the hiring, firing and payment of the contractors workers; the control of the premises; the duty to supply the premises, tools, appliances, materials, and labor; and the mode, manner and terms of payment.[45]

Simply put, the totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances of the case are to be considered. Each case must be determined by its own facts and all the features of the relationship are to be considered.[46]

Gramaje is a labor-only contractor

Applying the foregoing tests, we agree with the CAs conclusion that Gramaje is not an independent job contractor, but a labor-only contractor.

First, Gramaje has no substantial capital or investment. The presumption is that a contractor is a labor-only contractor unless he overcomes the burden of proving that it has substantial capital, investment, tools, and the like. The employee should not be expected to prove the negative fact that the contractor does not have substantial capital, investment and tools to engage in job-contracting.[47]

Gramaje claimed that it has substantial capital of its own as well as investment in its office, equipment and tools. She pointed out that she furnished the plastic containers and carton boxes used in carrying out the function of packing the mattresses of Polyfoam. She added that she had placed in Polyfoams workplace ten (10) sealing machines, twenty (20) hand trucks, and two (2) forklifts to enable respondent and the other employees of Gramaje assigned at Polyfoam to perform their job.Finally, she explained that she had her own office with her own staff.[48] However, aside from her own bare statement, neither Gramaje nor Polyfoam presented evidence showing Gramajes ownership of the equipment and machineries used in the performance of the alleged contracted job.Considering that these machineries are found in Polyfoams premises, there can be no other logical conclusion but that the tools and equipment utilized by Gramaje and her employees are owned by Polyfoam. Neither did Polyfoam nor Gramaje show that the latter had clients other than the former. Since petitioners failed to adduce evidence that Gramaje had any substantial capital, investment or assets to perform the work contracted for, the presumption that Gramaje is a labor-only contractor stands.[49]

Second, Gramaje did not carry on an independent business or undertake the performance of its service contract according to its own manner and method, free from the control and supervision of its principal, Polyfoam, its apparent role having been merely to recruit persons to work for Polyfoam.[50] It is undisputed that respondent had performed his task of packing Polyfoams foam products in Polyfoams premises. As to the recruitment of respondent, petitioners were able to establish only that respondents application was referred to Gramaje, but that is all. Prior to his termination, respondent had been performing the same job in Polyfoams business for almost six (6) years. He was even furnished a copy of Polyfoams Mga Alituntunin at Karampatang Parusa,[51]which embodied Polyfoams rules on attendance, the manner of performing the employees duties, ethical standards, cleanliness, health, safety, peace and order. These rules carried with them the corresponding penalties in case of violation.

While it is true that petitioners submitted the Affidavit of Polyfoams supervisor Victor Abadia, claiming that the latter did not exercise supervision over respondent because the latter was not Polyfoams but Gramajes employee, said Affidavit is insufficient to prove such claim. Petitioners should have presented the person who they claim to have exercised supervision over respondent and their alleged other employees assigned to Polyfoam. It was never established that Gramaje took entire charge, control and supervision of the work and service agreed upon. And as aptly observed by the CA, it is likewise highly unusual and suspect as to the absence of a written contract specifying the performance of a specified service, the nature and extent of the service or work to be done and the term and duration of the relationship.[52]

An Employer-Employee Relationship Exists
Between Respondent and Polyfoam

A finding that a contractor is a labor-only contractor, as opposed to permissible job contracting, is equivalent to declaring that there is an employer-employee relationship between the principal and the employees of the supposed contractor, and the labor-only contractor is considered as a mere agent of the principal, the real employer.[53] In this case, Polyfoam is the principal employer and Gramaje is the labor-only contractor. Polyfoam and Gramaje are, therefore, solidarily liable for the rightful claims of respondent.[54]

Respondent was Illegally Dismissed
From Employment

Respondent stated that on January 14, 2000, his time card was suddenly taken off the rack. His supervisor later informed him that Polyfoams management decided to dismiss him due to infraction of company rule. In short, respondent insisted that he was dismissed from employment without just or lawful cause and without due process. Polyfoam did not offer any explanation of such dismissal.It, instead, explained that respondents real employer is Gramaje. Gramaje, on the other hand, denied the claim of illegal dismissal. She shifted the blame on respondent claiming that the latter in fact abandoned his work.

The LA gave credence to respondents narration of the circumstances of the case. Said conclusion was affirmed by the CA. We find no reason to depart from such findings.

Abandonment cannot be inferred from the actuations of respondent. When he discovered that his time card was off the rack, he immediately inquired from his supervisor. He later sought the assistance of his counsel, who wrote a letter addressed to Polyfoam requesting that he be re-admitted to work. When said request was not acted upon, he filed the instant illegal dismissal case. These circumstances clearly negate the intention to abandon his work.

Petitioners failed to show any valid or authorized cause under the Labor Code which allowed it to terminate the services of respondent. Neither was it shown that respondent was given ample opportunity to contest the legality of his dismissal. No notice of termination was given to him. Clearly, respondent was not afforded due process. Having failed to establish compliance with the requirements of termination of employment under the Labor Code, the dismissal of respondent was tainted with illegality.[55] Consequently, respondent is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and other privileges and to his full backwages inclusive of allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of his actual reinstatement. However, if reinstatement is no longer feasible as in this case, separation pay equivalent to one month salary for every year of service shall be awarded as an alternative.[56] Thus, the CA is correct in affirming the LAs award of separation pay with full backwages and other monetary benefits.

Permissible job contracting vis-à-vis labor-only contracting
The test of independent contractorship: totality of facts and circumstances
One who claims to be an independent contractor has the burden of proving substantial capital and/or investment
Independent contractor carries on an independent business
A finding of labor-only contracting creates an employer-employee relationship between the "principal" and the employee
Abandonment of work must be inferred from the actuations of the employee

2015 Bar Exam: Political Law and Labor Law Questionnaire

2015-11-12T20:14:00.001+08:00

This is a bit late but it's that time of the year again. The 2015 Bar Exam started on November 8, 2015 at UST. The subjects are Political Law in the morning and Labor Law in the afternoon.

The questionnaires are available for download at the Supreme Court website.

In case the above site fails due to traffic, I'm also providing them here as a download:

What They Think I do, What I Really Do Meme

2012-04-28T21:04:00.002+08:00

MCQ Negotiable Instruments Law

2012-02-04T22:26:00.001+08:00

Hello, strangers. The following are some exam questions I used for my BS Accountancy students for the subject Negotiable Instruments. They're very basic so I decided not to post the answers. Test yourselves.

1. The Negotiable Instruments Law of the Philippines took effect on
A. June 2, 1911
B. July 2, 1911
C. June 1, 1911
D. July 1, 1911

2. Negotiable instruments allow a person to avail of his existing credit.
A. Substitute for money
B. Medium of exchange
C. Medium of credit transactions
D. All of the above

3. It is a form of deferred payment
A. Credit
B. Money
C. Debt
D. Currency

4. Which law applies primarily to crossed checks?
A. Negotiable Instruments Law
B. New Civil Code
C. U.S. Uniform Commercial Code
D. Code of Commerce

5. Which law applies primarily to promissory notes?
A. Negotiable Instruments Law
B. New Civil Code
C. U.S. Uniform Commercial Code
D. Code of Commerce

6. It is a special type of bill of exchange
A. Promissory Note
B. Check
C. Money
D. Special Bill

7. A quality of a bill or a note whereby it may pass from hand to hand similar to money.
A. Tranferability
B. Assignability
C. Negotiability
D. Capability

8. An instrument is non-negotiable under the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL) if it states:
A. The amount is payable out of a particular fund.
B. There is a stipulation that interest shall be paid.
C. Designates the account out of which reimbursement is to be made.
D. Designates the account where the amount payable shall be debited.

9. The following are persons involved in a bill of exchange, except:
A. Drawer
B. Maker
C. Drawee
D. Payee

10. Which of the following bills of exchange may be treated as a promissory note by the holder?
A. To C. Pay P100.00 to the order of P. Signed A.
B. To X. Pay P1,000.00 to P or bearer. Signed X.
C. To Drawee. Pay P10,000 to P or order. Signed Drawer.
D. To Metrobank. Pay P100,000 to bearer. Signed Mr. Luhit.

11. Statement I: Payment by check extinguishes an obligation.
Statement II: A check is always drawn on a bank.
A. Only Statement I is true
B. Statements I and II are true
C. Only Statement II is true
D. Statements I and II are false

12. Statement I: An instrument which contains an order or promise to do any act in addition to the payment of money is not negotiable.
Statement II: An instrument that gives the holder an election to require something to be done in lieu of payment of money is negotiable.
A. Only Statement I is true
B. Statements I and II are true
C. Only Statement II is true
D. Statements I and II are false

13. The following are bearer instruments, except:
A. “I promise to pay bearer P1,000”
B. “I promise to pay P or bearer P1,000”
C. “I promise to pay to the order of Harry Potter P1,000”
D. “I promise to pay Ms. Eyas or order P1,000”

14. Statement I: Once a bearer instrument, always a bearer instrument.
Statement II: A bearer instrument becomes an order instrument if it has been specially indorsed.
A. Only Statement I is true
B. Statements I and II are true
C. Only Statement II is true
D. Statements I and II are false

15. The following are parties to a bill of exchange, except:
A. Drawer
B. Drawee
C. Acceptor
D. Payee

16. He makes the promise and signs the instrument.
A. Maker
B. Drawer
C. Payee
D. Drawee

17. He is ordered to pay under the instrument.
A. Maker
B. Drawer
C. Payee
D. Drawee

18. He is the person to whom the promise is made or the instrument is made payable.
A. Holder
B. Referee
C. Payee
D. Acceptor

19. The following are exceptions to the general rule that only persons who sign the negotiable instrument are liable thereon, except:
A. Agent who fails to disclose his principal
B. Written promise to accept a bill before it is drawn
C. Acceptance of a bill on a separate paper
D. Persons signing under a trade name

20. Order by one person to another to pay money to a third person.
A. Payable to order
B. Good order
C. Mail order
D. Bill of exchange

21. Statement I: In case of conflict between words and figures, the words control.
Statement II: The written words prevail over the printed words.
A. Only Statement I is true
B. Statements I and II are true
C. Only Statement II is true
D. Statements I and II are false

22. If this is the last indorsement, the instrument may be negotiated by delivery.
A. Special
B. Restrictive
C. Blank
D. Qualified

23. The counterfeit-making or fraudulent alteration of a writing.
A. Allonge
B. Forgery
C. Procuration
D. Issuance

24. Ante-dating or post-dating a negotiable instrument
A. is not invalid
B. is valid if done for an illegal purpose
C. is valid if done for a fraudulent purpose
D. is invalid

25. M wrote a complete promissory note payable to bearer. The note was stolen and his signature forged. It ends up in the hands of a holder in due course. Which of the following is true?
A. M can set up the defense of want of delivery of a complete instrument.
B. M is liable because he is an indorser.
C. M is not liable because the forged signature is inoperative.
D. M is liable to a holder in due course.

26. Which of the following are requirements for acceptance of a bill on a separate piece of paper?
A. acceptance must be shown to the person to whom the instrument is negotiated
B. such person must take the bill for value on the faith of such acceptance
C. A and B
D. None of the above

27. The transfer of possession, actual or constructive, from one person to another with intent to transfer title thereto
A. Delivery
B. Negotiation
C. Assignment
D. Indorsement

28. X forged the signature of an indorser on a bill of exchange payable to order. Which of the following is true?
A. Only X is liable as forger
B. All indorsers prior to the forgery are liable
C. All indorsers after the forgery are liable
D. Blank indorsers are not liable

29. M signs a blank piece of paper and delivers it to P with the intention of making the instrument negotiable.
A. P can fill it up for any amount
B. P has implied authority to complete it
C. A and B
D. None of the above

30. It is the first delivery of the instrument complete in form to a person who takes it as a holder
A. Assignment
B. Negotiation
C. Issuance
D. Indorsement

31. They are parties who are not in direct contractual relation to each other.
A. remote parties
B. immediate parties
C. Drawers
D. Holders

32. An indorsement is made by:
A. Writing the signature on the instrument
B. Allonge
C. A and B
D. None of the above

33. There can be no partial indorsement of a negotiable instrument, except:
A. If the parties agree to a partial indorsement
B. If part of the amount has already been paid
C. If the instrument is indorsed jointly
D. If the instrument is indorsed severally

34. It is the final act essential to the consummation of an obligation under a negotiable instrument.
A. Delivery
B. Indorsement
C. Transfer
D. Signature

35. A signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the signature in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument operates as a _______ authority to fill it up as such for any amount.
A. Absolute
B. General
C. Special
D. Prima facie

36. The writing of the signature on a paper attached to the negotiable instrument.
A. Allonge
B. Procuration
C. Forgery
D. Issuance

37. The following omissions do not affect negotiability, except:
A. Date
B. Value
C. Seal
D. Order

38. The act by which a principal gives power to another to act in his place as he could himself.
A. Allonge
B. Forgery
C. Procuration
D. Issuance

39. Statement I: A due bill is a special type of bill of exchange.
Statement II: Acceptor is a drawer who accepts a bill of exchange.
A. Only Statement I is true
B. Statements I and II are true
C. Only Statement II is true
D. Statements I and II are false

40. Statement I: A person who places his signature on an instrument where it is not clear in what capacity he is signing is deemed a holder.
Statement II: An instrument that states: "Pay to bearer Jill P1,000.00" is not negotiable.
A. Only Statement I is true
B. Statements I and II are true
C. Only Statement II is true
D. Statements I and II are false

Who writes this blog?

2011-03-12T13:48:00.000+08:00

a male somewhere between 66-100 years old. The writing style is academic and upset most of the time, according to a blog A.I. This cracks me up! Not so much with the supposed gender and age of the blogger but the mood. The mood! lol

Still alive

2011-01-10T21:20:00.000+08:00

Dammit.

Will post something relevant later this week.

Not a Bomberman

2010-09-30T15:57:00.000+08:00

*PHOTO CREDIT: Got this from Facebook friends. I don't know who originally made this. If this photo is yours and you want it taken down or your name to be credited, please leave a comment.

ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT

2010-08-18T08:28:00.001+08:00

(RA 9262, March 8, 2004)

I. PURPOSE (Sec. 2)

It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights

To protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security

II. DEFINITION OF TERMS (Sec. 3)

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN – any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

PHYSICAL VIOLENCE – acts that include bodily or physical harm

SEXUAL VIOLENCE – an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child, including but not limited to:

rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
Prostituting the woman or child.

PSYCHOLOGICAL VIOLENCE - acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children

ECONOMIC ABUSE - acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:

withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
destroying household property;
controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.

BATTERY - an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child resulting to the physical and psychological or emotional distress.

BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME - scientifically defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse.

STALKING - an intentional act committed by a person who, knowingly and without lawful justification follows the woman or her child or places the woman or her child under surveillance directly or indirectly or a combination thereof.

DATING RELATIONSHIP - a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship.

SEXUAL RELATIONS - a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child

III. ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN (Sec. 5)

The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to her/his family;
Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; (3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own mon4ey or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties;
Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions;
Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family;
Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;
Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will;
Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and
Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.

IV. VENUE (Sec. 7)

RTC designated as Family Court (EOJ)

V. RELIEFS/REMEDIES

A. PROTECTION ORDER (Sec. 8)

A protection order is an order issued under this act for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief.

KINDS:

Barangay protection order (BPO) (Sec. 14) – issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Sec. 5 (a) and (b) of this Act
Temporary protection order (TPO) (Sec. 15) – issued by the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order should be issued; effective for 30 days
Permanent Protection order (PPO) (Sec. 16) – issued by the court after notice and hearing

B. WHO MAY FILE PETITION FOR PROTECTION ORDER (Sec. 9)

Offended party
Parents or guardians of offended party
Ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity
Officers or social workers of the DSWD or social workers of LGUs
Police officers, preferably those in charge of women and children’s desks
Punong barangay or Barangay Kagawad
Lawyer, counsellor, therapist or healthcare provider of the petitioner
At least 2 concerned responsible citizens of the city or municipality where the violence against women and their children occurred and who has personal knowledge of the offense committed

C. WHERE TO APPLY FOR PROTECTION ORDER (Sec. 10)

BPO – Rules on venue under Sec. 409 of LGC
TPO/PPO – Family Court, or if none, RTC, MTC, MeTC, MCTC with territorial jurisdiction over the place of residence of petitioner

D. HOW TO APPLY FOR PROTECTION ORDER (Sec. 11)

Accomplish a standard protection order application form, signed and verified under oath by applicant
Filed as an independent action or as incidental relief
If applicant is not the victim, application must be accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant attesting to (a) the circumstances of the abuse suffered by the victim and (b) the circumstances of consent given by the victim for the filling of the application. When disclosure of the address of the victim will pose danger to her life, it shall be so stated in the application. In such a case, the applicant shall attest that the victim is residing in the municipality or city over which court has territorial jurisdiction, and shall provide a mailing address for purpose of service processing.

VI. BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME AS A DEFENSE (Sec. 26)

Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.

In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from battered woman syndrome at the time of the commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.

A victim who is suffering from battered woman syndrome shall not be disqualified from having custody of her children. In no case shall custody of minor children be given to the perpetrator of a woman who is suffering from Battered woman syndrome (Sec. 28)

MIGRANT WORKERS AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS ACT OF 1995

2010-08-17T08:21:00.000+08:00

(RA 8042)

I. PURPOSE

To institute the policies of overseas employment and establish a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families and overseas Filipinos in distress, and for other purposes

II. DEFINITION OF TERMS (Sec. 3)

MIGRANT WORKER – a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a renumerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident to be used interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker

OVERSEAS FILIPINOS – refers to dependents of migrant workers and other Filipino nationals abroad who are in distress

III. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT (II)

A. Any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-license or non-holder of authority

SOME FORMS:

Leaving the country as a tourist but with the intention of working abroad;
Escort Services – tourist/workers “escorted” at the country’s airports and seaports;
By Correspondence – applicants are encouraged by the recruiter to comply with employment requirements and placements through mail;
Blind Ads – fraudulent and misleading advertisements promising facility of employment;
Au Pair – an inter-cultural program wherein a host family sponsors a person to study language and culture for a monthly allowance in exchange for a home to stay in;
Backdoor Exit – going out of the country through some airports and seaports in the southern part of the Philippines;
Camouflaged participation in foreign seminars and sports events;
Workers leave as participants in seminars or sports events but eventually finding jobs in the host country; and,
Traineeship Scheme – Hotel and Restaurant Management (HRM) students leaving in the guise of a traineeship program for hotels abroad but eventually landing jobs in the training establishment.

B. Include the following acts, whether committed by any persons, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority

To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than the specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance;
To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to recruitment or employment;
To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority under the Labor Code;
To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in order to offer him another unless the transfer is designed to liberate a worker from oppressive terms and conditions of employment;
To influence or attempt to influence any persons or entity not to employ any worker who has not applied for employment through his agency;
To engage in the recruitment of placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health or morality or to dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;
To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or by his duly authorized representative;
To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies, remittances of foreign exchange earnings, separations from jobs, departures and such other matters or information as may be required by the Secretary of Labor and Employment;
To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment;
For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an officer or member of the Board of any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged directly on indirectly in the management of a travel agency;
To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for monetary or financial considerations other than those authorized under the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations;
Failure to actually deploy without valid reasons as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment; and
Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as offense involving economic sabotage.

IV. ECONOMIC SABOTAGE

Illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate or in large scale

A. SYNDICATE - carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another

B. LARGE SCALE - committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group

HUMAN SECURITY ACT

2010-08-16T07:58:00.010+08:00

(RA 9372)

I. PURPOSE (Sec. 2)

To protect life, liberty, and property from acts of terrorism, to condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous to the national security of the country and to the welfare of the people, and to make terrorism a crime against the Filipino people, against humanity, and against the law of nations

II. ACTS PUNISHED

A. TERRORISM (Sec. 3)

Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code:

Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine Waters);
Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
Article 134-a (Coup d' Etat), including acts committed by private persons;
Article 248 (Murder);
Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);
Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under

Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);
Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990);
Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968);
Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);
Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974); and,
Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)

thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as provided for under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended

Includes accomplices and accessories
EXEMPTION: Accessories who are spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees are exempt (EXCEPT: if they profit by the crime or assisted the principal to profit)

B. CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT TERRORISM (Sec. 4)

C. PROSCRIPTION OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, ASSOCIATION, OR GROUP OF PERSONS (Sec. 17)

Any organization, association, or group of persons organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism, or which, although not organized for that purpose, actually uses the acts to terrorize mentioned in this Act or to sow and create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall, upon application of the Department of Justice before a competent Regional Trial Court, with due notice and opportunity to be heard given to the organization, association, or group of persons concerned, be declared as a terrorist and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons by the said Regional Trial Court

III. SURVEILLANCE

Exception to the Anti-Wire Tapping Law (RA 4200)

A. WHO ARE SUBJECT (Sec. 7)

A police or law enforcement official and the members of his team may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways and means for that purpose, any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words:

Between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons
Any person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism
Any person suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism

EXCEPT: Communications between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence

B. APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION (Sec. 8)

Only granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte written application of a police or of a law enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file such ex parte application, and upon examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce to establish:

That there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the said crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed;
That there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that evidence, which is essential to the conviction of any charged or suspected person for, or to the solution or prevention of, any such crimes, will be obtained; and
That there is no other effective means readily available for acquiring such evidence

C. CLASSIFICATION AND CONTENTS OF THE ORDER OF THE COURT (Sec. 9)

Classified Information:

Written order granted by the authorizing division of the CA
Its order to extend or renew the authorization
Written authorizations of the Anti-Terrorism Council

The person being surveilled has the right to be informed of the acts done by the law enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge the legality thereof

CONTENTS OF WRITTEN ORDER OF AUTHORIZING DIVISION OF CA:

The identity, such as name and address, if known, of the charged or suspected person whose communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words are to be tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and, in the case of radio, electronic, or telephonic (whether wireless or otherwise) communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words, the electronic transmission systems or the telephone numbers to be tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and their locations or if the person suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is not fully known, such person shall be subject to continuous surveillance provided there is a reasonable ground to do so;
The identity (name, address, and the police or law enforcement organization) of the police or of the law enforcement official, including the individual identity (names, addresses, and the police or law enforcement organization) of the members of his team, judicially authorized to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record the communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words;
The offense or offenses committed, or being committed, or sought to be prevented; and
The length of time within which the authorization shall be used or carried out

D. EFFECTIVE PERIOD OF JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION (Sec. 10)

Effective only for the length of time specified in the written order of the authorizing division of the CA

Not exceeding 30 days from the date of receipt of the written order by the applicant police or law enforcement official

EXTENSION: 30 days non-extendible, provided that:

The authorizing division of the CA is satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest
The ex parte application for extension or renewal, which must be filed by the original applicant, has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council

NOTICE TO PERSON SUBJECT OF SURVEILLANCE: required if no case is filed within the 30-day period

E. CUSTODY OF INTERCEPTED AND RECORDED COMMUNICATIONS (Sec. 11)

All tapes, discs, and recordings shall, within, 48 hours after expiration of the period fixed in the written order, be deposited with the authorizing division of the CA in a sealed envelope or sealed package and shall be accompanied by a joint affidavit of the applicant police or law enforcement official and the members of his team

CONTENTS OF THE JOINT AFFIDAVIT (Sec. 12):

The number of tapes, discs, and recordings that have been made, as well as the number of excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of written notes and memoranda, if any, made in connection therewith;
The dates and times covered by each of such tapes, discs, and recordings;
The number of tapes, discs, and recordings, as well as the number of excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of written notes and memoranda made in connection therewith that have been included in the deposit; and
The date of the original written authorization granted by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the applicant to file the ex parte application to conduct the tracking down, tapping, intercepting, and recording, as well as the date of any extension or renewal of the original written authority granted by the authorizing division of the CA
Certify under oath that no duplicates or copies of the whole or part of any of such tapes, discs, and recordings have been made, or if made, such duplicates or copies are included in the sealed envelope or sealed package

F. DISPOSITION OF DEPOSITED MATERIALS (Sec. 13)

Classified information

The sealed envelope or sealed package shall not be opened and its contents (including the tapes, discs, and recordings and all the excerpts and summaries thereof and the notes and memoranda made in connection therewith) shall not be divulged, revealed, read, replayed, or used as evidence unless authorized by written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals

APPLICATION TO USE AS EVIDENCE:

Written application of the DOJ
Filed before the authorizing division of the CA
Upon showing that the DOJ has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council to file the application
With proper written notice to the person whose conversation, communication, message, discussion or spoken or written words have been the subject of surveillance, monitoring, recording and interception, specifying purpose or reason (Sec. 14):

For opening the sealed envelope or sealed package;
For revealing or disclosing its classified contents;
For replaying, divulging, and or reading any of the listened to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words (including any of the excerpts and summaries thereof and any of the notes or memoranda made in connection therewith); and
For using any of said listened to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words (including any of the excerpts and summaries thereof and any of the notes or memoranda made in connection therewith) as evidence

EVIDENTIARY VALUE (Sec. 15): Absolutely not admissible or usable as evidence, if obtained in violation of this Act

IV. DETENTION WITHOUT JUDICIAL WARRANT OF ARREST

Exception to Article 125, RPC (Arbitrary Detention)

A. DETENTION UNDER ORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES (Sec. 18)

Any police or law enforcement personnel
Duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council
Before detention, present the person before any judge at the latter’s residence or office nearest the place where the arrest took place at any time of the day or night
Take a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism in custody
Immediately after taking custody of the person, notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest (if Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, then at judge’s residence)
Deliver said charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authorities within a period of 3 days counted from the moment the said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into custody
The arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the surveillance under Sec. 7 and examination of bank deposits under Sec. 27 of this Act

B. DETENTION IN THE EVENT OF AN ACTUAL OR IMMINENT TERRORIST ATTACK (Sec. 19)
Suspects may not be detained for more than three (3) days without the written approval of a municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a Human Rights Commission or judge of the municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of Appeals nearest the place of the arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the arresting police or law enforcement personnel shall bring the person thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest the place where the accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any of the said officials shall be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned within five (5) days after the date of the detention of the persons concerned: Provided, however, That within three (3) days after the detention the suspects, whose connection with the terror attack or threat is not established, shall be released immediately

C. DUTY OF THE JUDGE

Submit a written report of what he/she had observed when the subject was brought before him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested. the judge shall forthwith submit his/her report within three (3) calendar days from the time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office

V. RESTRICTION ON RIGHT TO TRAVEL (Sec. 16)

Even when the accused is out on bail

A. RESTRICTION ON RIGHT TO TRAVEL

Upon application by the prosecutor, limit the right to travel of the accused to within the municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety

Authorization of the court is needed in order to travel outside the said municipality or city (otherwise, bail may be cancelled)

B. HOUSE ARREST

By order of the court at his usual place of residence

Not allowed to use telephones, cellphones, e-mails, computers, the internet and other means of communications with people outside the residence until otherwise ordered by the court

VI. EXAMINATION OF BANK DEPOSITS, ACCOUNTS AND RECORDS

Exception to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act (RA 1405)

A. JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION (Sec. 27)

1. WHO MAY AUTHORIZE: CA justices designated as a special court to handle anti-terrorism cases, after satisfying themselves of the existence of probable cause in a hearing called for that purpose

2. WHO ARE SUBJECT:

A person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism,
Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons, and
Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons

3. Written authorization to any police or law enforcement officer and the member of his/her team duly authorized in writing by the anti-terrorism council

4. WHAT:

Examine, or cause the examination of, the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records in a bank or financial institution; and
Gather or cause the gathering of any relevant information about such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records from a bank or financial institution

B. APPLICATION TO EXAMINE BANK DEPOSITS, ACCOUNTS AND RECORDS (Sec. 18)

Only be granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals

CONDITIONS:

Ex parte application to that effect of a police or of a law enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing to file such ex parte application by the Anti-Terrorism Council
Upon examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce to establish the facts that will justify the need and urgency of examining and freezing the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records

C. CLASSIFICATION AND CONTENTS OF THE COURT ORDER AUTHORIZING THE EXAMINATION OF BANK DEPOSITS, ACCOUNTS, AND RECORDS (Sec. 19)

Classified Information

The person whose bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records have been examined, frozen, sequestered and seized by law enforcement authorities has the right to be informed of the acts done by the law enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to do so, the legality of the interference

The written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals designated to handle cases involving terrorism shall specify:

Identity of the said: (1) person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, (2) judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons, and (3) member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons, as the case may be, whose deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are to be examined or the information to be gathered;
The identity of the bank or financial institution where such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are held and maintained;
The identity of the persons who will conduct the said examination and the gathering of the desired information; and
The length of time the authorization shall be carried out

D. EFFECTIVE PERIOD OF COURT AUTHORIZATION TO EXAMINE AND OBTAIN INFORMATION ON BANK DEPOSITS, ACCOUNTS AND RECORDS (Sec. 30)

Effective for the length of time specified in the written order, which shall not exceed a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the written order of the authorizing division of the CA by the applicant police or law enforcement official

EXTENSION: 30 days, renewable to another 30 days from the expiration of the original period, provided:

The authorizing division of the CA is satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest
The application for extension or renewal, which must be filed by the original applicant, has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council

E. CUSTODY OF BANK DATA AND INFORMATION OBTAINED AFTER EXAMINATION (Sec. 31)

All information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, and other documents obtained from the examination of the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records shall, within 48 hours after the expiration of period in the written order (including renewal), be deposited with the authorizing division of the CA in a sealed envelope or sealed package and shall be accompanied by a joint affidavit of the applicant police or law enforcement official and the persons who actually conducted the examination

CONTENTS OF JOINT AFFIDAVIT (Sec. 32):

Identifying marks, numbers, or symbols of the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records examined;
The identity and address of the bank or financial institution where such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are held and maintained;
The number of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records discovered, examined, and frozen;
The outstanding balances of each of such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets;
All information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, documents, records examined and placed in the sealed envelope or sealed package deposited with the authorizing division of the CA;
The date of the original written authorization granted by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the applicant to file the ex parte application to conduct the examination of the said bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records, as well as the date of any extension or renewal of the original written authorization granted by the authorizing division of the CA; and
That the items enumerated were al that were found in the bank or financial institution examined at the time of the completion of the examination

Certify under oath that no duplicates or copies have been made, or if made, such duplicates or copies are included in the sealed envelope or sealed package

F. DISPOSITION OF BANK MATERIALS (Sec. 33)
Classified information

Shall not be opened and its contents shall not be divulged, revealed, read, or used as evidence unless authorized in a written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals

APPLICATION TO USE AS EVIDENCE:

Written application of the DOJ
Upon showing that the DOJ has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council to file the application
Notice in writing to the party concerned not later than 3 days before scheduled opening
Clearly state the purpose and reason (Sec 34):

For opening the sealed envelope or sealed package;
For revealing and disclosing its classified contents; and
For using the classified information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, and documents as evidence

EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF DEPOSITED BANK MATERIALS (Sec. 35): Absolutely not admissible and usable as evidence, if secured in violation of this Act

VII. SEIZURE AND SEQUESTRATION

A. WHO ARE SUBJECT (Sec. 39)

The deposits and their outstanding balances, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records in any bank or financial institution, moneys, businesses, transportation and communication equipment, supplies and other implements, and property of whatever kind and nature belonging:

To any person suspected of or charged before a competent RTC for the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism;
To a judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons; or
To a member of such organization, association, or group of persons shall be seized, sequestered, and frozen in order to prevent their use, transfer, or conveyance for purposes that are inimical to the safety and security of the people or injurious to the interest of the State

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED: (1) to withdraw such sums as may be reasonably needed by the monthly needs of his family including services of his or her counsel and his family’s medical needs upon approval of the court; and (2) to use any of his property that is under seizure or sequestration or frozen because of his or her indictment as a terrorist upon permission of hte court for any legitimate reason

B. NATURE OF SEIZED, SEQUESTERED AND FROZEN BANK DEPOSITS, PLACEMENTS, TRUST ACCOUNTS, ASSETS AND RECORDS (Sec. 40)

Property held in trust by the bank or financial institution

Use or disposition of such is subject to approval of the court while case is pending

C. DISPOSITION OF THE SEIZED, SEQUESTERED AND FROZEN BANK DEPOSITS, PLACEMENTS, TRUST ACCOUNTS, ASSETS AND RECORDS (Sec. 41)

ACQUITTAL/DISMISSAL OF CHARGES: seizure order shall be deemed lifted and the property shall be immediately released

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES: Upon acquittal or dismissal of charges, P500,000 a day for the period in which his properties, assets or funds were seized shall be paid , the amount to be taken from the appropriations of the police or law enforcement agency that caused the filing of the charges

APPEAL/MOTION FOR RECON: will not stay the release of said funds

CONVICTION BY FINAL JUDGMENT: automatic forfeiture in favour of the government

VIII. CONTINUOUS TRIAL (Sec. 48)

In cases of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the judge shall set the case for continuous trial on a daily basis from Monday to Friday or other short-term trial calendar so as to ensure speedy trial.

IX. PROSECUTION UNDER THIS ACT SHALL BE A BAR TO ANOTHER PROSECUTION UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE OR ANY SPECIAL PENAL LAWS (Sec. 49)

When a person has been prosecuted under a provision of this Act, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for any offense or felony which is necessarily included in the offense charged under this Act

X. DAMAGES FOR UNPROVEN CHARGE OF TERRORISM (Sec. 50)

Upon acquittal, any person who is accused of terrorism shall be entitled to the payment of damages in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) for every day that he or she has been detained or deprived of liberty or arrested without a warrant as a result of such an accusation. The amount of damages shall be automatically charged against the appropriations of the police agency or the Anti-Terrorism Council that brought or sanctioned the filing of the charges against the accused. It shall also be released within fifteen (15) days from the date of the acquittal of the accused. The award of damages mentioned above shall be without prejudice to the right of the acquitted accused to file criminal or administrative charges against those responsible for charging him with the case of terrorism

XI. LIABILITIES OF POLICE OFFICER OR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL

A. INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF INTERCEPTED AND RECORDED COMMUNICATIONS (Sec. 11)

It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or any custodian of the tapes, discs and recording, and their excerpts and summaries, written notes or memoranda to copy in whatever form, to remove, delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the items enumerated above in whole or in part under any pretext whatsoever

B. FALSE OR UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENT OR MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACT IN JOINT AFFIDAVITS (Sec. 12 and Sec. 32)

Any false or untruthful statement or misrepresentation of material fact in the joint affidavits required respectively in Section 12 and Section 32 of this Act shall constitute a criminal offense and the affiants shall suffer individually the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

C. VIOLATION OF DUTY TO NOTIFY IN WRITING PERSONS SUBJECT OF SURVEILLANCE ON DISPOSITION OF DEPOSITED MATERIALS (Sec. 13)

Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify in writing the persons subject of the surveillance as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one day to eight (8) years of imprisonment

D. UNAUTHORIZED OR MALICIOUS INTERCEPTIONS AND/OR RECORDINGS (Sec. 16)

Any police or law enforcement personnel who, not being authorized to do so by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, tracks down, taps, listens to, intercepts, and records in whatever manner or form any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written word of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
Any police or law enforcement personnel who maliciously obtained an authority from the Court of Appeals to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record in whatever manner or form any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism (in addition to above)

E. FAILURE TO NOTIFY THE JUDGE IN DETENTION WITHOUT JUDICIAL WARRANT (Sec. 18)

The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify any judge as provided in the preceding paragraph

F. FAILURE TO DELIVER SUSPECT TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITY WITHIN 3 DAYS (Sec. 20)

The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any police or law enforcement personnel who has apprehended or arrested, detained and taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and fails to deliver such charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority within the period of three (3) days.

G. PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF RIGHTS OF DETAINEE (Sec. 22)

Any police or law enforcement personnel, or any personnel of the police or other law enforcement custodial unit that violates any of the aforesaid rights of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

Unless the police or law enforcement personnel who violated the rights of a detainee or detainees as stated above is duly identified, the same penalty shall be imposed on the police officer or head or leader of the law enforcement unit having custody of the detainee at the time the violation was done.

H. FAILURE TO KEEP AN OFFICIAL CUSTODIAL LOGBOOK (Sec. 23)

The police or other law enforcement custodial unit who fails to comply with the preceding paragraph to keep an official logbook shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

I. PENALTY FOR THREAT, INTIMIDATION, COERCION, OR TORTURE IN THE INVESTIGATION AND INTERROGATION OF A DETAINED PERSON (Sec. 25)

Any person or persons who use threat, intimidation, or coercion, or who inflict physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure, which shall vitiate the free-will of a charged or suspected person under investigation and interrogation for the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.

J. FAILURE TO NOTIFY IN WRITING THE PERSON WHOSE BANK DEPOSITS IS SUBJECT TO EXAMINATION WITHIN 30 DAYS IF NO CASE IF FILED (Sec. 30)

Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify in writing as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one day to eight (8) years of imprisonment.

K. INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF BANK DATA AND INFORMATION (Sec. 32)

It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or custodian of the bank data and information obtained after examination of deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records to copy, to remove, delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the items enumerated above in whole or in part under any pretext whatsoever.

L. FAILURE TO NOTIFY IN WRITING THE PERSON WHOSE BANK MATERIALS ARE SUBJECT OF APPLICATION FOR DISPOSITION (Sec. 33)

Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify in writing as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one day to eight (8) years of imprisonment.

M. UNAUTHORIZED OR MALICIOUS EXAMINATION OF A BANK OR A FINANCIAL INSTITUTION (Sec. 36)

Any person, police or law enforcement personnel who examines the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, or records in a bank or financial institution
Any police or law enforcement personnel, who maliciously obtained an authority form the CA to examine the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, or records in a bank or financial institution (in addition to above)

N. REFUSAL TO FOLLOW ORDER TO ALLOW ACCUSED TO WITHRDAW (Sec. 39)

Any person who unjustifiably refuses to follow the order of the proper division of the Court of Appeals to allow the person accused of the crime of terrorism or of the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism to withdraw such sums from sequestered or frozen deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records as may be necessary for the regular sustenance of his or her family or to use any of his or her property that has been seized, sequestered or frozen for legitimate purposes while his or her case is pending shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

O. UNJUSTIFIED REFUSAL TO RESTORE OR DELAY IN RESTORING SEIZED, SEQUESTERED AND FROZEN BANK DEPOSITS (Sec. 42)

Any person who unjustifiably refuses to restore or delays the restoration of seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records of a person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism after such suspected person has been found innocent by the investigating body or after the case against such charged person has been dismissed or after he is acquitted by a competent court shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

P. LOSS, MISUSE, DIVERSION OR DISSIPATION OF SEIZED, SEQUESTERED AND FROZEN BANK DEPOSITS (Sec. 43)

Any person who is responsible for the loss, misuse, diversion, or dissipation of the whole or any part of the seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records of a person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

Q. INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF DETAINED PERSONS (Sec. 44)

Any public officer who has direct custody of a detained person under the provisions of this Act and who by his deliberate act, misconduct, or inexcusable negligence causes or allows the escape of such detained person shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of: (a) twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment, if the detained person has already been convicted and sentenced in a final judgment of a competent court; and (b) six (6) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment, if the detained person has not been convicted and sentenced in a final judgment of a competent court.

R. UNAUTHORIZED REVELATION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIALS (Sec. 46)

The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person, police or law enforcement agent, judicial officer or civil servant who, not being authorized by the Court of Appeals to do so, reveals in any manner or form any classified information under this Act.

S. FURNISHING FALSE EVIDENCE, FORGED DOCUMENT, OR SPURIOUS EVIDENCE (Sec. 47)

The penalty of twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly furnishes false testimony, forged document or spurious evidence in any investigation or hearing under this Act.

XII. PENALTY OF BANK OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES

Defying court authorization (Sec. 37)

Fried.

2010-08-01T22:25:00.000+08:00

Yes, they are. Sure their usefulness and pervasiveness might lull you into thinking they're the only completely dependable constants in your life until you practically live and breathe technology, whether it be your trusty desktop or (if you're a sucker for hype) the effin' cool new iPad, but mark my words, they are evil. They will lure unsuspecting victims into relying on them for almost anything (mind you, that includes bathroom calisthenics), and then they will randomly and utterly fail to work, FOR NO APPARENT REASON, other than 'oh, did I push the wrong button?' And no amount of fixing and kicking and begging (with real tears!) will revive the blasted things. You are doomed. You are doomed. You are so doomed I have to type the same sentence thrice. That is, unless you are willing to develop muscles in all the wrong places as you haul the whole thing, brains, intestines and all, to the service technician whose office is. of bloody course, located far, far away.

Well, booger.

Long story short, this bog is on hiatus while my computer is being repaired at the service center.

United Airlines vs. Uy

2010-07-28T07:36:00.000+08:00

G.R. No. 127768, Nov. 19, 1999

INTERNATIONAL LAW: Applicability of the Warsaw Convention: the Convention's provisions do not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of damage. Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger and preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said Convention. Likewise, we have held that the Convention does not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is found or established

FACTS:

October 13, 1989 – Respondent Willie Uy is a passenger of petitioner United Airlines, bound from San Francisco to Manila. While in San Francisco, it was found that one piece of his luggage was over the maximum weight allowance of 70 kg. per bag. A United Airlines employee rebuked him and in a loud voice, in front of the milling crowd, ordered him to repack his things accordingly. Wishing not to create a scene, Willie did as asked. Unfortunately, his luggage was still overweight so the airline billed him overweight charges. Willie offered to pay the charges with a Miscellaneous Charge Order (MCO) or an airline pre-paid credit but the same employee, and an airline supervisor, refused to honor it, contending that there were discrepancies in the figures. Thus, Willie was forced to pay the charges with his American Express credit card. Upon arrival in Manila, Willie discovered that one of his bags had been slashed and its contents, amounting to US$5,310.00, stolen.

October 16, 1989 – he sent his first letter of demand to United Airlines. The airline did not refute Willie’s allegations and mailed a check representing payment of his loss based on the maximum liability of US$9.70 per pound. Willie, thinking the amount to be grossly inadequate to compensate him for his losses as well as for the indignities he was subjected to, sent two more letters to petitioner airline, one dated January 4, 1990 and the other dated October 28, 1991, demanding out-of-court settlement of P1,000,000.00.

June 9, 1992 – Willie filed a complaint for damages before the Philippine courts. He had two causes of action: (1) the shabby and humiliating treatment he received from petitioner’s employees at the San Francisco Airport which caused him extreme embarrassment and social humiliation; and (2) the slashing of his luggage and the loss of personal effects amounting to US$5,310.00.

For its part, United Airlines moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was filed out of time. Under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention, the right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within 2 years. However, the second paragraph of the said provision stated that the method of calculating the period of limitation shall be determined by the law of the court to which the case is submitted. It is Willie’s position that our rules on interruption of prescriptive period should apply. When he sent his letters of demand, the 2-year period was tolled, giving him ample time to file his complaint.

The trial court ordered the dismissal of the case, holding that Art. 29(2) refers not to the local forum’s rules in interrupting the prescriptive period but only to the rules of determining the time in which the action was deemed commenced (meaning “filed”). Willie filed his motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal only on the 14th day. The trial court denied his motion and 2 days later Willie filed his notice of appeal. United Airlines this time contended that the notice of appeal was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period and should therefore be dismissed. The CA, however, took cognizance of the case in the interest of justice and ruled in favour of respondent. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action for damages is barred by the lapse of the 2-year prescriptive period under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention

HELD:

Supreme Court held that although the 2-year prescriptive period under the Warsaw Convention has lapsed, it did not preclude the application of other pertinent provisions of the Civil Code. Thus, the action for damages could still be filed based on tort which can be filed within 4 years from the time cause of action accrued. As for the action pertaining to the loss of the contents of the luggage, while it was well within the bounds of the Warsaw Convention, the Supreme Court found that there was an exception to the applicability of the 2-year prescriptive period – that is when the airline employed delaying tactics and gave the passenger the run-around.

Applicability of the Warsaw Convention: Courts have discretion whether to apply them or not

Within our jurisdiction we have held that the Warsaw Convention can be applied, or ignored, depending on the peculiar facts presented by each case. Thus, we have ruled that the Convention's provisions do not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of damage. Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger and preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said Convention. Likewise, we have held that the Convention does not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is found or established.

Respondent's complaint reveals that he is suing on two (2) causes of action: (a) the shabby and humiliating treatment he received from petitioner's employees at the San Francisco Airport which caused him extreme embarrassment and social humiliation; and, (b) the slashing of his luggage and the loss of his personal effects amounting to US $5,310.00.

While his second cause of action - an action for damages arising from theft or damage to property or goods - is well within the bounds of the Warsaw Convention, his first cause of action -an action for damages arising from the misconduct of the airline employees and the violation of respondent's rights as passenger - clearly is not.

Action for damages arising from the misconduct of the airline employees and the violation of the respondent’s rights as passengers is covered under the Civil Code

Consequently, insofar as the first cause of action is concerned, respondent's failure to file his complaint within the two (2)-year limitation of the Warsaw Convention does not bar his action since petitioner airline may still be held liable for breach of other provisions of the Civil Code which prescribe a different period or procedure for instituting the action, specifically, Art. 1146 thereof which prescribes four (4) years for filing an action based on torts.

Exception to the Application of the 2-year prescriptive period: When airline employed delaying tactics

As for respondent's second cause of action, indeed the travaux preparatories of the Warsaw Convention reveal that the delegates thereto intended the two (2)-year limitation incorporated in Art. 29 as an absolute bar to suit and not to be made subject to the various tolling provisions of the laws of the forum. This therefore forecloses the application of our own rules on interruption of prescriptive periods. Article 29, par. (2), was intended only to let local laws determine whether an action had been commenced within the two (2)-year period, and within our jurisdiction an action shall be deemed commenced upon the filing of a complaint. Since it is indisputable that respondent filed the present action beyond the two (2)-year time frame his second cause of action must be barred. Nonetheless, it cannot be doubted that respondent exerted efforts to immediately convey his loss to petitioner, even employed the services of two (2) lawyers to follow up his claims, and that the filing of the action itself was delayed because of petitioner's evasion.

Verily, respondent filed his complaint more than two (2) years later, beyond the period of limitation prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for filing a claim for damages. However, it is obvious that respondent was forestalled from immediately filing an action because petitioner airline gave him the runaround, answering his letters but not giving in to his demands. True, respondent should have already filed an action at the first instance when his claims were denied by petitioner but the same could only be due to his desire to make an out-of-court settlement for which he cannot be faulted. Hence, despite the express mandate of Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention that an action for damages should be filed within two (2) years from the arrival at the place of destination, such rule shall not be applied in the instant case because of the delaying tactics employed by petitioner airline itself. Thus, private respondent's second cause of action cannot be considered as time-barred under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals reversing and setting aside the appealed order of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss the complaint, as well as its Resolution denying reconsideration, is AFFIRMED. Let the records of the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings taking its bearings from this disquisition.

SO ORDERED.

Laurel vs. Garcia

2010-07-27T07:32:00.000+08:00

G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Before determining whether it is domestic or foreign law that should be applied, one must first determine whether a conflict of laws situation exists.

FACTS:

The Roppongi Property is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement, as part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during WWII. The Roppongi property became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to another site when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time. After many years, the Aquino administration advanced the sale of the reparation properties, which included the Roppongi lot. This move was opposed on the ground that the Roppongi property is public in character. For their part, the proponents of the sale raised that Japanese law should apply, following the doctrine of lex loci rei sitae.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conflict of law rule on lex loci rei sitae should apply

HELD:

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined (See Salonga, Private International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.

The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.

The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no point in belaboring whether or not this opinion is correct. Why should we discuss who can acquire the Roppongi lot when there is no showing that it can be sold?

Tayag vs. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.

2010-07-26T07:32:00.000+08:00

G.R. No. L-23145, Nov. 29, 1968

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Situs of Shares of Stock: domicile of the corporation
SUCCESSION: Ancillary Administration: The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.
SUCCESSION: Probate: Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary administrator’s right to the stock certificates when the actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.

FACTS:

Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen who died in New York City, left among others, two stock certificates issued by Benguet Consolidated, a corporation domiciled in the Philippines. As ancillary administrator of Perkins’ estate in the Philippines, Tayag now wants to take possession of these stock certificates but County Trust Company of New York, the domiciliary administrator, refused to part with them. Thus, the probate court of the Philippines was forced to issue an order declaring the stock certificates as lost and ordering Benguet Consolidated to issue new stock certificates representing Perkins’ shares. Benguet Consolidated appealed the order, arguing that the stock certificates are not lost as they are in existence and currently in the possession of County Trust Company of New York.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the lower court is proper

HELD:

The appeal lacks merit.

Tayag, as ancillary administrator, has the power to gain control and possession of all assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines

It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, in an earlier case, set forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the [Philippines]. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs."

Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary administrator’s right to the stock certificates when the actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.

It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary administrator's right to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in her name in the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is equally beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders.

Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue finds application. "In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of the above undeniable proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It does not dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even if it were so minded.

I give a crap

2010-07-21T21:20:00.000+08:00

Yes. That icon text. Still here, still alive. Will continue with the usual updating schedule: Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday.

Wow, 12 followers. Thanks for continuing to visit this blog.

Vda. De Perez vs. Tolete

2010-07-21T07:04:00.000+08:00

G.R. No. 76714, June 2, 1994

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Reprobate of Foreign Wills: Requirement of Notices

FACTS:

Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.

Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give.

For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the wills.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed

HELD:

Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens

The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.

Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.

Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.

The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.

On Lack of Notice to Jose’s Heirs

This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).

The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.

The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "

WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Santos III vs. Northwest Orient Airlines

2010-07-20T06:56:00.001+08:00

G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992

INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention is constitutional, a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.
INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention, when applicable: To all "international transportations of persons by aircraft for hire." Whether the transportation is "international" is determined by the contract of the parties, which in the case of passengers is the ticket. When the contract of carriage provides for the transportation of the passenger between certain designated terminals "within the territories of two High Contracting Parties," the provisions of the Convention automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the airline and its passenger.
INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction: Place of Destination vis-a-vis Agreed Stopping Place: The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure and ending with the ultimate destination. The use of the singular in this expression indicates the understanding of the parties to the Convention that every contract of carriage has one place of departure and one place of destination. An intermediate place where the carriage may be broken is not regarded as a "place of destination."

FACTS:

Petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent Nortwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A. and licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in the Philippines. The petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San Francisco, U.S.A. In December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in the at the NOA counter in the San Francisco airport for his departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight for Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed. On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA for damages in RTC Makati. NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention is in accordance with the constitution so as to deprive the Philippine Courts jurisdiction over the case

HELD:

Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.

Constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention

The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. It took effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention was concurred in by the Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine instrument of accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was deposited with the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became applicable to the Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our formal adherence thereto. "to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof."

The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.

Does the Warsaw Convention apply in this case?

By its own terms, the Convention applies to all international transportation of persons performed by aircraft for hire.

International transportation is defined in paragraph (2) of Article 1 as follows:

(2) For the purposes of this convention, the expression "international transportation" shall mean any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a transshipment, are situated [either] within the territories of two High Contracting Parties . . .

Whether the transportation is "international" is determined by the contract of the parties, which in the case of passengers is the ticket. When the contract of carriage provides for the transportation of the passenger between certain designated terminals "within the territories of two High Contracting Parties," the provisions of the Convention automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the airline and its passenger.

Since the flight involved in the case at bar is international, the same being from the United States to the Philippines and back to the United States, it is subject to the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, including Article 28(1), which enumerates the four places where an action for damages may be brought.

Does Article 28(1) refer to Jurisdiction or Venue?

...where the matter is governed by the Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction takes on a dual concept. Jurisdiction in the international sense must be established in accordance with Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, following which the jurisdiction of a particular court must be established pursuant to the applicable domestic law. Only after the question of which court has jurisdiction is determined will the issue of venue be taken up. This second question shall be governed by the law of the court to which the case is submitted.

Was the case properly filed in the Philippines, since the plaintiff’s destination was Manila?

The place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is determined by the terms of the contract of carriage or, specifically in this case, the ticket between the passenger and the carrier. Examination of the petitioner's ticket shows that his ultimate destination is San Francisco. Although the date of the return flight was left open, the contract of carriage between the parties indicates that NOA was bound to transport the petitioner to San Francisco from Manila. Manila should therefore be considered merely an agreed stopping place and not the destination.

Article 1(2) also draws a distinction between a "destination" and an "agreed stopping place." It is the "destination" and not an "agreed stopping place" that controls for purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction under the Convention.

The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure and ending with the ultimate destination. The use of the singular in this expression indicates the understanding of the parties to the Convention that every contract of carriage has one place of departure and one place of destination. An intermediate place where the carriage may be broken is not regarded as a "place of destination."

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. vs. NLRC

2010-07-19T06:55:00.000+08:00

G.R. No. 129584, December 3, 1998

LABOR LAW: Disease as Ground for Dismissal, requisites: (1) the disease must be such that employee’s continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees; and (2) there must be a certification by competent public authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of 6 months with proper medical treatment.
LABOR LAW: same; The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employee’s illness and thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor.
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Lex Loci Contractus: Established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines.
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Law of the Forum vis-a-vis Public Policy: Settled is the rule that the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. Here in the Philippines, employment agreements are more than contractual in nature. The Constitution itself, in Article XIII Section 3, guarantees the special protection of workers.

FACTS:

Osdana, a Filipino citizen, was recruited by Triple Eight for employment with the latter’s principal, Gulf Catering Company (GCC), a firm based in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The employment contract (originally as “food server” but later changed to “waitress”) was executed in the Philippines but was to be performed in Riyadh. Once in Riyadh, however, Osdana was made to perform strenuous tasks (washing dishes, janitorial work), which were not included in her designation as a waitress. Because of the long hours and strenuous nature of her work, she suffered from Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, for which she had to undergo surgery. But during her weeks of confinement at the hospital for her recovery, she was not given any salary. And after she was discharged from the hospital, GCC suddenly dismissed her from work, allegedly on the ground of illness. She was not given any separation pay nor was she paid her salaries for the periods when she was not allowed to work. Thus, upon her return to the Philippines, she filed a complaint against Triple Eight, praying for unpaid and underpaid salaries, among others.

The LA ruled in her favour, which ruling NLRC affirmed. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Osdana was illegally dismissed
If so, whether or not she is entitled to award for salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract

HELD:

The petition must fail.

Disease as a Ground for Dismissal

Under Article 284 of the Labor Code and the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, for disease to be a valid ground for termination, the following requisites must be present:

The disease must be such that employee’s continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees
There must be a certification by competent public authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of 6 months with proper medical treatment

In the first place, Osdana’s continued employment despite her illness was not prohibited by law nor was it prejudicial to her health, as well as that of her co-employees. In fact, the medical report issued after her second operation stated that “she had very good improvement of the symptoms.” Besides, “Carpal Tunnel Syndrome” is not a contagious disease.

On the medical certificate requirement, petitioner erroneously argues that “private respondent was employed in Saudi Arabia and not here in the Philippines. Hence, there was a physical impossibility to secure from a Philippine public health authority the alluded medical certificate that public respondent’s illness will not be cured within a period of six months.”

Petitioner entirely misses the point, as counsel for private respondent states in the Comment. The rule simply prescribes a “certification by a competent public health authority” and not a “Philippine public health authority.”

If, indeed, Osdana was physically unfit to continue her employment, her employer could have easily obtained a certification to that effect from a competent public health authority in Saudi Arabia, thereby heading off any complaint for illegal dismissal.

The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employee’s illness and thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor. As the Court observed in Prieto v. NLRC, “The Court is not unaware of the many abuses suffered by our overseas workers in the foreign land where they have ventured, usually with heavy hearts, in pursuit of a more fulfilling future. Breach of contract, maltreatment, rape, insufficient nourishment, sub-human lodgings, insults and other forms of debasement, are only a few of the inhumane acts to which they are subjected by their foreign employers, who probably feel they can do as they please in their country. While these workers may indeed have relatively little defense against exploitation while they are abroad, that disadvantage must not continue to burden them when they return to their own territory to voice their muted complaint. There is no reason why, in their own land, the protection of our own laws cannot be extended to them in full measure for the redress of their grievances.”

Which law should apply: Lex Loci Contractus

Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical certificate requirement by contending that since Osdana was working in Saudi Arabia, her employment was subject to the laws of the host country. Apparently, petitioner hopes to make it appear that the labor laws of Saudi Arabia do not require any certification by a competent public health authority in the dismissal of employees due to illness.

Again, petitioner’s argument is without merit.

First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and other laws affecting labor apply in this case. Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. Here in the Philippines, employment agreements are more than contractual in nature. The Constitution itself, in Article XIII Section 3, guarantees the special protection of workers.

This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because to allow foreign employers to determine for and by themselves whether an overseas contract worker may be dismissed on the ground of illness would encourage illegal or arbitrary pre-termination of employment contracts.

Award of Salaries granted but reduced

In the case at bar, while it would appear that the employment contract approved by the POEA was only for a period of twelve months, Osdana’s actual stint with the foreign principal lasted for one year and seven-and-a-half months. It may be inferred, therefore, that the employer renewed her employment contract for another year. Thus, the award for the unexpired portion of the contract should have been US$1,260 (US$280 x 4 ½ months) or its equivalent in Philippine pesos, not US$2,499 as adjudged by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC.

As for the award for unpaid salaries and differential amounting to US$1,076 representing seven months’ unpaid salaries and one month underpaid salary, the same is proper because, as correctly pointed out by Osdana, the “no work, no pay” rule relied upon by petitioner does not apply in this case. In the first place, the fact that she had not worked from June 18 to August 22, 1993 and then from January 24 to April 29, 1994, was due to her illness which was clearly work-related. Second, from August 23 to October 5, 1993, Osdana actually worked as food server and cook for seven days a week at the Hota Bani Tameem Hospital, but was not paid any salary for the said period. Finally, from October 6 to October 23, 1993, she was confined to quarters and was not given any work for no reason at all.

Moral Damages granted but reduced

Now, with respect to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the same is likewise proper but should be reduced. Worth reiterating is the rule that moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.

According to the facts of the case as stated by public respondent, Osdana was made to perform such menial chores, as dishwashing and janitorial work, among others, contrary to her job designation as waitress. She was also made to work long hours without overtime pay. Because of such arduous working conditions, she developed Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. Her illness was such that she had to undergo surgery twice. Since her employer determined for itself that she was no longer fit to continue working, they sent her home posthaste without as much as separation pay or compensation for the months when she was unable to work because of her illness. Since the employer is deemed to have acted in bad faith, the award for attorney’s fees is likewise upheld.

How not to get caught while sleeping

2010-06-25T22:08:00.000+08:00

When Hapontukin sets in I...

1. Sit Down

Pfft. This is by far the simplest and requires the least effort from you. I've tried this dozens of time already during my stint at a call center. My supe was not quite tolerant of reps falling asleep in their chairs, even though there aren't that many calls coming in. I developed this technique simply because I didn't like sleeping at the sleeping room during lunch hour. So what to do?

Just sit there, place both your arms on the armrest, and close your eyes. If there's no armrest, cross your arms over your chest. Don't slouch because that's always a dead giveaway that you're sleeping. Instead, just sit with your back straight and close your eyes. Believe me, they won't even give you a second glance.

2. Drop-Your-Pen Act

Now, this reqiures a little bit of effort but don't worry the method is quite simple. All you need is a pen (a pencil will do, too). Be sure your pen is just an ordinary pen (not pilot) so it won't mess up when you try writing with it after employing this method of creative sleeping. The first thing you do is sit there in class. Make every appearance that you're paying attention to the lecturer or your professor (if you're in class). Taking down notes will even make it more convincing. So ok, while you're busy taking down notes, you "accidentally" drop your pen. Lean down as though to pick it up but instead of coming up, don't. Stay there and doze for a bit.

3. Four-Eyed Bean Pole

You need a prop. A pair of eyeglasses, in fact. In a typical lecture hall, the lights always come from the front. The lecturer or your professor will most likely be using a projector or LCD screen for his visual aid. Now, with eyeglasses, the glass is concave which means the light will bounce right off it, which further means that you can just close your eyes and your lecturer won't even notice anything amiss. All he sees is you sitting there, your eyeglasses and oily forehead reflecting the light from the projector. Wahahah! Ok, on to the next tip.

4. Cover Up

This one is a little bit complicated and needs some help from a trusted friend. First, make sure you're sitting beside your friend or a close acquaintance (the kind you can ask favors from without feeling embarassed). During the lecture, make as though you're talking to your friend. Look at him/her but use your hand to cover half of your face, primarily the eyes. Ask your friend, "Wake me up when he's done talking" and then sleep for the duration of the lecture.

5. Pray

This is classic. I've tried this a couple of times. This works best when you're in the library where sleeping's simply not aloud. Place both your hands on top of the table and rest your forehead there. Note that it will really appear as though you are sleeping (which you really are) but when the librarian approaches you or when she wakes you up rudely, make the sign of the cross quickly and then smile politely, "Yes?" She'll think she disturbed you from your path to heaven and will feel properly embarassed.

I'm sure there are lots more ways to sleep creatively. But let's leave the rest to more creative minds.

Book List for Bar Review

2010-04-22T20:55:00.001+08:00

These are the books that I used for my review. TIP: It's advisable to use the books you've been using all through your entire four years of law school. The advantages are: (1) you are already familiar with it; (2) you've probably already noted the more important passages and added in some text of your own; and finally (3) you can save your money for more important things, like your plane tickets to and accommodation in Manila for the exam month.

Political Law

Nachura's Outline/Reviewer in Political Law
1987 Constitution of the Philippines codal (with LGC, Omnibus Election Code, etc.)
Personal notes (with updated jurisprudence)

Labor Law and Social Legislation

Azucena's Everyone's Labor Code
Full text of social legislations
Personal notes (with updated jurisprudence)

Civil Law

Jurado's Civil Law Review
Civil Code of the Philippines codal
Personal notes (with updated jurisprudence)

Taxation Law

Vitug's Tax Law and Jurisprudence
Personal notes (with updated jurisprudence)

Commercial Law

Sundiang's Commercial Law Reviewer
Personal notes (with updated jurisprudence)
Materials provided by my professor in Commercial Law Review

Criminal Law

Reyes' Criminal Law Books I & II
Personal notes (with updated jurisprudence)

Remedial Law

Regalado's Remedial Law Compendium Vol. 1
Rules of Court codal
Personal notes (with updated jurisprudence)

Legal Ethics

Sample forms
Memory aids
Rules of Court codal

For the Saturdays before the exam, I no longer went through my review materials but instead read past Bar Exam questions and answers in order to school myself on the form of questions to be expected and the proper way to answer them.

Hiatus Extended

2010-04-05T22:10:00.003+08:00

This blog's hiatus is extended for I don't know exactly how long. Changes shall be announced so keep posted right here.

In the meanwhile, you might notice the shiny new "read more" link after some posts. I've decided to install that particular code because I want to display 5 posts a page without killing your eyes entirely. It's a tedious process as I have to go back to all my old posts and manually edit them. Be patient.

Also, on a different note, I've decided to try out in-text advertising for this blog. I'm referring to those green-colored double underline hyperlinks you see all over my posts. If you hover your mouse over those links, a box-shaped bubble will appear containing content from an advertiser. If you want the bubble to disappear, just hover your mouse somewhere else. By the way, clicking on those links will direct you to the advertiser's landing page. I want to emphasize that YOU ARE NOT required to click any of those links.

Holy Week 2010

2010-03-29T06:00:00.000+08:00

This blog is on hiatus for this week. Returning to the regular schedule after the week-long solemn celebration.