Scire Licet

MCQ Negotiable Instruments Law

2012-02-04T22:26:00.001+08:00

Hello, strangers. The following are some exam questions I used for my BS Accountancy students for the subject Negotiable Instruments. They're very basic so I decided not to post the answers. Test yourselves.

1. The Negotiable Instruments Law of the Philippines took effect on
A. June 2, 1911
B. July 2, 1911
C. June 1, 1911
D. July 1, 1911

2. Negotiable instruments allow a person to avail of his existing credit.
A. Substitute for money
B. Medium of exchange
C. Medium of credit transactions
D. All of the above

3. It is a form of deferred payment
A. Credit
B. Money
C. Debt
D. Currency

4. Which law applies primarily to crossed checks?
A. Negotiable Instruments Law
B. New Civil Code
C. U.S. Uniform Commercial Code
D. Code of Commerce

5. Which law applies primarily to promissory notes?
A. Negotiable Instruments Law
B. New Civil Code
C. U.S. Uniform Commercial Code
D. Code of Commerce

6. It is a special type of bill of exchange
A. Promissory Note
B. Check
C. Money
D. Special Bill

7. A quality of a bill or a note whereby it may pass from hand to hand similar to money.
A. Tranferability
B. Assignability
C. Negotiability
D. Capability

8. An instrument is non-negotiable under the Negotiable Instruments Law (NIL) if it states:
A. The amount is payable out of a particular fund.
B. There is a stipulation that interest shall be paid.
C. Designates the account out of which reimbursement is to be made.
D. Designates the account where the amount payable shall be debited.

9. The following are persons involved in a bill of exchange, except:
A. Drawer
B. Maker
C. Drawee
D. Payee

10. Which of the following bills of exchange may be treated as a promissory note by the holder?
A. To C. Pay P100.00 to the order of P. Signed A.
B. To X. Pay P1,000.00 to P or bearer. Signed X.
C. To Drawee. Pay P10,000 to P or order. Signed Drawer.
D. To Metrobank. Pay P100,000 to bearer. Signed Mr. Luhit.

11. Statement I: Payment by check extinguishes an obligation.
Statement II: A check is always drawn on a bank.
A. Only Statement I is true
B. Statements I and II are true
C. Only Statement II is true
D. Statements I and II are false

12. Statement I: An instrument which contains an order or promise to do any act in addition to the payment of money is not negotiable.
Statement II: An instrument that gives the holder an election to require something to be done in lieu of payment of money is negotiable.
A. Only Statement I is true
B. Statements I and II are true
C. Only Statement II is true
D. Statements I and II are false

13. The following are bearer instruments, except:
A. “I promise to pay bearer P1,000”
B. “I promise to pay P or bearer P1,000”
C. “I promise to pay to the order of Harry Potter P1,000”
D. “I promise to pay Ms. Eyas or order P1,000”

14. Statement I: Once a bearer instrument, always a bearer instrument.
Statement II: A bearer instrument becomes an order instrument if it has been specially indorsed.
A. Only Statement I is true
B. Statements I and II are true
C. Only Statement II is true
D. Statements I and II are false

15. The following are parties to a bill of exchange, except:
A. Drawer
B. Drawee
C. Acceptor
D. Payee

16. He makes the promise and signs the instrument.
A. Maker
B. Drawer
C. Payee
D. Drawee

17. He is ordered to pay under the instrument.
A. Maker
B. Drawer
C. Payee
D. Drawee

18. He is the person to whom the promise is made or the instrument is made payable.
A. Holder
B. Referee
C. Payee
D. Acceptor

19. The following are exceptions to the general rule that only persons who sign the negotiable instrument are liable thereon, except:
A. Agent who fails to disclose his principal
B. Written promise to accept a bill before it is drawn
C. Acceptance of a bill on a separate paper
D. Persons signing under a trade name

20. Order by one person to another to pay money to a third person.
A. Payable to order
B. Good order
C. Mail order
D. Bill of exchange

21. Statement I: In case of conflict between words and figures, the words control.
Statement II: The written words prevail over the printed words.
A. Only Statement I is true
B. Statements I and II are true
C. Only Statement II is true
D. Statements I and II are false

22. If this is the last indorsement, the instrument may be negotiated by delivery.
A. Special
B. Restrictive
C. Blank
D. Qualified

23. The counterfeit-making or fraudulent alteration of a writing.
A. Allonge
B. Forgery
C. Procuration
D. Issuance

24. Ante-dating or post-dating a negotiable instrument
A. is not invalid
B. is valid if done for an illegal purpose
C. is valid if done for a fraudulent purpose
D. is invalid

25. M wrote a complete promissory note payable to bearer. The note was stolen and his signature forged. It ends up in the hands of a holder in due course. Which of the following is true?
A. M can set up the defense of want of delivery of a complete instrument.
B. M is liable because he is an indorser.
C. M is not liable because the forged signature is inoperative.
D. M is liable to a holder in due course.

26. Which of the following are requirements for acceptance of a bill on a separate piece of paper?
A. acceptance must be shown to the person to whom the instrument is negotiated
B. such person must take the bill for value on the faith of such acceptance
C. A and B
D. None of the above

27. The transfer of possession, actual or constructive, from one person to another with intent to transfer title thereto
A. Delivery
B. Negotiation
C. Assignment
D. Indorsement

28. X forged the signature of an indorser on a bill of exchange payable to order. Which of the following is true?
A. Only X is liable as forger
B. All indorsers prior to the forgery are liable
C. All indorsers after the forgery are liable
D. Blank indorsers are not liable

29. M signs a blank piece of paper and delivers it to P with the intention of making the instrument negotiable.
A. P can fill it up for any amount
B. P has implied authority to complete it
C. A and B
D. None of the above

30. It is the first delivery of the instrument complete in form to a person who takes it as a holder
A. Assignment
B. Negotiation
C. Issuance
D. Indorsement

31. They are parties who are not in direct contractual relation to each other.
A. remote parties
B. immediate parties
C. Drawers
D. Holders

32. An indorsement is made by:
A. Writing the signature on the instrument
B. Allonge
C. A and B
D. None of the above

33. There can be no partial indorsement of a negotiable instrument, except:
A. If the parties agree to a partial indorsement
B. If part of the amount has already been paid
C. If the instrument is indorsed jointly
D. If the instrument is indorsed severally

34. It is the final act essential to the consummation of an obligation under a negotiable instrument.
A. Delivery
B. Indorsement
C. Transfer
D. Signature

35. A signature on a blank paper delivered by the person making the signature in order that the paper may be converted into a negotiable instrument operates as a _______ authority to fill it up as such for any amount.
A. Absolute
B. General
C. Special
D. Prima facie

36. The writing of the signature on a paper attached to the negotiable instrument.
A. Allonge
B. Procuration
C. Forgery
D. Issuance

37. The following omissions do not affect negotiability, except:
A. Date
B. Value
C. Seal
D. Order

38. The act by which a principal gives power to another to act in his place as he could himself.
A. Allonge
B. Forgery
C. Procuration
D. Issuance

39. Statement I: A due bill is a special type of bill of exchange.
Statement II: Acceptor is a drawer who accepts a bill of exchange.
A. Only Statement I is true
B. Statements I and II are true
C. Only Statement II is true
D. Statements I and II are false

40. Statement I: A person who places his signature on an instrument where it is not clear in what capacity he is signing is deemed a holder.
Statement II: An instrument that states: "Pay to bearer Jill P1,000.00" is not negotiable.
A. Only Statement I is true
B. Statements I and II are true
C. Only Statement II is true
D. Statements I and II are false

Who writes this blog?

2011-03-12T13:48:00.000+08:00

a male somewhere between 66-100 years old. The writing style is academic and upset most of the time, according to a blog A.I. This cracks me up! Not so much with the supposed gender and age of the blogger but the mood. The mood! lol

Still alive

2011-01-10T21:20:00.000+08:00

Dammit.

Will post something relevant later this week.

Not a Bomberman

2010-09-30T15:57:00.000+08:00

*PHOTO CREDIT: Got this from Facebook friends. I don't know who originally made this. If this photo is yours and you want it taken down or your name to be credited, please leave a comment.

ANTI-VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT

2010-08-18T08:28:00.001+08:00

(RA 9262, March 8, 2004)

I. PURPOSE (Sec. 2)

It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights

To protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal safety and security

II. DEFINITION OF TERMS (Sec. 3)

VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN – any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:

PHYSICAL VIOLENCE – acts that include bodily or physical harm

SEXUAL VIOLENCE – an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child, including but not limited to:

rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
Prostituting the woman or child.

PSYCHOLOGICAL VIOLENCE - acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children

ECONOMIC ABUSE - acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:

withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
destroying household property;
controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.

BATTERY - an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child resulting to the physical and psychological or emotional distress.

BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME - scientifically defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse.

STALKING - an intentional act committed by a person who, knowingly and without lawful justification follows the woman or her child or places the woman or her child under surveillance directly or indirectly or a combination thereof.

DATING RELATIONSHIP - a situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a business or social context is not a dating relationship.

SEXUAL RELATIONS - a single sexual act which may or may not result in the bearing of a common child

III. ACTS OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN (Sec. 5)

The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:

Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to her/his family;
Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; (3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity or controlling the victim's own mon4ey or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties;
Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or decisions;
Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate family;
Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:

Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;
Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will;
Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and
Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.

IV. VENUE (Sec. 7)

RTC designated as Family Court (EOJ)

V. RELIEFS/REMEDIES

A. PROTECTION ORDER (Sec. 8)

A protection order is an order issued under this act for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief.

KINDS:

Barangay protection order (BPO) (Sec. 14) – issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Sec. 5 (a) and (b) of this Act
Temporary protection order (TPO) (Sec. 15) – issued by the court on the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order should be issued; effective for 30 days
Permanent Protection order (PPO) (Sec. 16) – issued by the court after notice and hearing

B. WHO MAY FILE PETITION FOR PROTECTION ORDER (Sec. 9)

Offended party
Parents or guardians of offended party
Ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity
Officers or social workers of the DSWD or social workers of LGUs
Police officers, preferably those in charge of women and children’s desks
Punong barangay or Barangay Kagawad
Lawyer, counsellor, therapist or healthcare provider of the petitioner
At least 2 concerned responsible citizens of the city or municipality where the violence against women and their children occurred and who has personal knowledge of the offense committed

C. WHERE TO APPLY FOR PROTECTION ORDER (Sec. 10)

BPO – Rules on venue under Sec. 409 of LGC
TPO/PPO – Family Court, or if none, RTC, MTC, MeTC, MCTC with territorial jurisdiction over the place of residence of petitioner

D. HOW TO APPLY FOR PROTECTION ORDER (Sec. 11)

Accomplish a standard protection order application form, signed and verified under oath by applicant
Filed as an independent action or as incidental relief
If applicant is not the victim, application must be accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant attesting to (a) the circumstances of the abuse suffered by the victim and (b) the circumstances of consent given by the victim for the filling of the application. When disclosure of the address of the victim will pose danger to her life, it shall be so stated in the application. In such a case, the applicant shall attest that the victim is residing in the municipality or city over which court has territorial jurisdiction, and shall provide a mailing address for purpose of service processing.

VI. BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME AS A DEFENSE (Sec. 26)

Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal Code.

In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was suffering from battered woman syndrome at the time of the commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.

A victim who is suffering from battered woman syndrome shall not be disqualified from having custody of her children. In no case shall custody of minor children be given to the perpetrator of a woman who is suffering from Battered woman syndrome (Sec. 28)

MIGRANT WORKERS AND OVERSEAS FILIPINOS ACT OF 1995

2010-08-17T08:21:00.000+08:00

(RA 8042)

I. PURPOSE

To institute the policies of overseas employment and establish a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families and overseas Filipinos in distress, and for other purposes

II. DEFINITION OF TERMS (Sec. 3)

MIGRANT WORKER – a person who is to be engaged, is engaged or has been engaged in a renumerated activity in a state of which he or she is not a legal resident to be used interchangeably with overseas Filipino worker

OVERSEAS FILIPINOS – refers to dependents of migrant workers and other Filipino nationals abroad who are in distress

III. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT (II)

A. Any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-license or non-holder of authority

SOME FORMS:

Leaving the country as a tourist but with the intention of working abroad;
Escort Services – tourist/workers “escorted” at the country’s airports and seaports;
By Correspondence – applicants are encouraged by the recruiter to comply with employment requirements and placements through mail;
Blind Ads – fraudulent and misleading advertisements promising facility of employment;
Au Pair – an inter-cultural program wherein a host family sponsors a person to study language and culture for a monthly allowance in exchange for a home to stay in;
Backdoor Exit – going out of the country through some airports and seaports in the southern part of the Philippines;
Camouflaged participation in foreign seminars and sports events;
Workers leave as participants in seminars or sports events but eventually finding jobs in the host country; and,
Traineeship Scheme – Hotel and Restaurant Management (HRM) students leaving in the guise of a traineeship program for hotels abroad but eventually landing jobs in the training establishment.

B. Include the following acts, whether committed by any persons, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority

To charge or accept directly or indirectly any amount greater than the specified in the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment, or to make a worker pay any amount greater than that actually received by him as a loan or advance;
To furnish or publish any false notice or information or document in relation to recruitment or employment;
To give any false notice, testimony, information or document or commit any act of misrepresentation for the purpose of securing a license or authority under the Labor Code;
To induce or attempt to induce a worker already employed to quit his employment in order to offer him another unless the transfer is designed to liberate a worker from oppressive terms and conditions of employment;
To influence or attempt to influence any persons or entity not to employ any worker who has not applied for employment through his agency;
To engage in the recruitment of placement of workers in jobs harmful to public health or morality or to dignity of the Republic of the Philippines;
To obstruct or attempt to obstruct inspection by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or by his duly authorized representative;
To fail to submit reports on the status of employment, placement vacancies, remittances of foreign exchange earnings, separations from jobs, departures and such other matters or information as may be required by the Secretary of Labor and Employment;
To substitute or alter to the prejudice of the worker, employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the period of the expiration of the same without the approval of the Department of Labor and Employment;
For an officer or agent of a recruitment or placement agency to become an officer or member of the Board of any corporation engaged in travel agency or to be engaged directly on indirectly in the management of a travel agency;
To withhold or deny travel documents from applicant workers before departure for monetary or financial considerations other than those authorized under the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations;
Failure to actually deploy without valid reasons as determined by the Department of Labor and Employment; and
Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the workers in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker's fault. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered as offense involving economic sabotage.

IV. ECONOMIC SABOTAGE

Illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate or in large scale

A. SYNDICATE - carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another

B. LARGE SCALE - committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group

HUMAN SECURITY ACT

2010-08-16T07:58:00.010+08:00

(RA 9372)

I. PURPOSE (Sec. 2)

To protect life, liberty, and property from acts of terrorism, to condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous to the national security of the country and to the welfare of the people, and to make terrorism a crime against the Filipino people, against humanity, and against the law of nations

II. ACTS PUNISHED

A. TERRORISM (Sec. 3)

Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code:

Article 122 (Piracy in General and Mutiny in the High Seas or in the Philippine Waters);
Article 134 (Rebellion or Insurrection);
Article 134-a (Coup d' Etat), including acts committed by private persons;
Article 248 (Murder);
Article 267 (Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention);
Article 324 (Crimes Involving Destruction), or under

Presidential Decree No. 1613 (The Law on Arson);
Republic Act No. 6969 (Toxic Substances and Hazardous and Nuclear Waste Control Act of 1990);
Republic Act No. 5207, (Atomic Energy Regulatory and Liability Act of 1968);
Republic Act No. 6235 (Anti-Hijacking Law);
Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974); and,
Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended (Decree Codifying the Laws on Illegal and Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in, Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunitions or Explosives)

thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism and shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as provided for under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended

Includes accomplices and accessories
EXEMPTION: Accessories who are spouses, ascendants, descendants, legitimate, natural and adopted brothers and sisters, or relatives by affinity within the same degrees are exempt (EXCEPT: if they profit by the crime or assisted the principal to profit)

B. CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT TERRORISM (Sec. 4)

C. PROSCRIPTION OF TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS, ASSOCIATION, OR GROUP OF PERSONS (Sec. 17)

Any organization, association, or group of persons organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism, or which, although not organized for that purpose, actually uses the acts to terrorize mentioned in this Act or to sow and create a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall, upon application of the Department of Justice before a competent Regional Trial Court, with due notice and opportunity to be heard given to the organization, association, or group of persons concerned, be declared as a terrorist and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons by the said Regional Trial Court

III. SURVEILLANCE

Exception to the Anti-Wire Tapping Law (RA 4200)

A. WHO ARE SUBJECT (Sec. 7)

A police or law enforcement official and the members of his team may, upon a written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to, intercept and record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways and means for that purpose, any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words:

Between members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons
Any person charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism
Any person suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism

EXCEPT: Communications between lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their sources and confidential business correspondence

B. APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION (Sec. 8)

Only granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals upon an ex parte written application of a police or of a law enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council created in Section 53 of this Act to file such ex parte application, and upon examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce to establish:

That there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the said crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism has been committed, or is being committed, or is about to be committed;
That there is probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that evidence, which is essential to the conviction of any charged or suspected person for, or to the solution or prevention of, any such crimes, will be obtained; and
That there is no other effective means readily available for acquiring such evidence

C. CLASSIFICATION AND CONTENTS OF THE ORDER OF THE COURT (Sec. 9)

Classified Information:

Written order granted by the authorizing division of the CA
Its order to extend or renew the authorization
Written authorizations of the Anti-Terrorism Council

The person being surveilled has the right to be informed of the acts done by the law enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge the legality thereof

CONTENTS OF WRITTEN ORDER OF AUTHORIZING DIVISION OF CA:

The identity, such as name and address, if known, of the charged or suspected person whose communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words are to be tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and, in the case of radio, electronic, or telephonic (whether wireless or otherwise) communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words, the electronic transmission systems or the telephone numbers to be tracked down, tapped, listened to, intercepted, and recorded and their locations or if the person suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism is not fully known, such person shall be subject to continuous surveillance provided there is a reasonable ground to do so;
The identity (name, address, and the police or law enforcement organization) of the police or of the law enforcement official, including the individual identity (names, addresses, and the police or law enforcement organization) of the members of his team, judicially authorized to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record the communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words;
The offense or offenses committed, or being committed, or sought to be prevented; and
The length of time within which the authorization shall be used or carried out

D. EFFECTIVE PERIOD OF JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION (Sec. 10)

Effective only for the length of time specified in the written order of the authorizing division of the CA

Not exceeding 30 days from the date of receipt of the written order by the applicant police or law enforcement official

EXTENSION: 30 days non-extendible, provided that:

The authorizing division of the CA is satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest
The ex parte application for extension or renewal, which must be filed by the original applicant, has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council

NOTICE TO PERSON SUBJECT OF SURVEILLANCE: required if no case is filed within the 30-day period

E. CUSTODY OF INTERCEPTED AND RECORDED COMMUNICATIONS (Sec. 11)

All tapes, discs, and recordings shall, within, 48 hours after expiration of the period fixed in the written order, be deposited with the authorizing division of the CA in a sealed envelope or sealed package and shall be accompanied by a joint affidavit of the applicant police or law enforcement official and the members of his team

CONTENTS OF THE JOINT AFFIDAVIT (Sec. 12):

The number of tapes, discs, and recordings that have been made, as well as the number of excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of written notes and memoranda, if any, made in connection therewith;
The dates and times covered by each of such tapes, discs, and recordings;
The number of tapes, discs, and recordings, as well as the number of excerpts and summaries thereof and the number of written notes and memoranda made in connection therewith that have been included in the deposit; and
The date of the original written authorization granted by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the applicant to file the ex parte application to conduct the tracking down, tapping, intercepting, and recording, as well as the date of any extension or renewal of the original written authority granted by the authorizing division of the CA
Certify under oath that no duplicates or copies of the whole or part of any of such tapes, discs, and recordings have been made, or if made, such duplicates or copies are included in the sealed envelope or sealed package

F. DISPOSITION OF DEPOSITED MATERIALS (Sec. 13)

Classified information

The sealed envelope or sealed package shall not be opened and its contents (including the tapes, discs, and recordings and all the excerpts and summaries thereof and the notes and memoranda made in connection therewith) shall not be divulged, revealed, read, replayed, or used as evidence unless authorized by written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals

APPLICATION TO USE AS EVIDENCE:

Written application of the DOJ
Filed before the authorizing division of the CA
Upon showing that the DOJ has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council to file the application
With proper written notice to the person whose conversation, communication, message, discussion or spoken or written words have been the subject of surveillance, monitoring, recording and interception, specifying purpose or reason (Sec. 14):

For opening the sealed envelope or sealed package;
For revealing or disclosing its classified contents;
For replaying, divulging, and or reading any of the listened to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words (including any of the excerpts and summaries thereof and any of the notes or memoranda made in connection therewith); and
For using any of said listened to, intercepted, and recorded communications, messages, conversations, discussions, or spoken or written words (including any of the excerpts and summaries thereof and any of the notes or memoranda made in connection therewith) as evidence

EVIDENTIARY VALUE (Sec. 15): Absolutely not admissible or usable as evidence, if obtained in violation of this Act

IV. DETENTION WITHOUT JUDICIAL WARRANT OF ARREST

Exception to Article 125, RPC (Arbitrary Detention)

A. DETENTION UNDER ORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES (Sec. 18)

Any police or law enforcement personnel
Duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council
Before detention, present the person before any judge at the latter’s residence or office nearest the place where the arrest took place at any time of the day or night
Take a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism in custody
Immediately after taking custody of the person, notify in writing the judge of the court nearest the place of apprehension or arrest (if Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, then at judge’s residence)
Deliver said charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authorities within a period of 3 days counted from the moment the said charged or suspected person has been apprehended or arrested, detained, and taken into custody
The arrest of those suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism must result from the surveillance under Sec. 7 and examination of bank deposits under Sec. 27 of this Act

B. DETENTION IN THE EVENT OF AN ACTUAL OR IMMINENT TERRORIST ATTACK (Sec. 19)
Suspects may not be detained for more than three (3) days without the written approval of a municipal, city, provincial or regional official of a Human Rights Commission or judge of the municipal, regional trial court, the Sandiganbayan or a justice of the Court of Appeals nearest the place of the arrest. If the arrest is made during Saturdays, Sundays, holidays or after office hours, the arresting police or law enforcement personnel shall bring the person thus arrested to the residence of any of the officials mentioned above that is nearest the place where the accused was arrested. The approval in writing of any of the said officials shall be secured by the police or law enforcement personnel concerned within five (5) days after the date of the detention of the persons concerned: Provided, however, That within three (3) days after the detention the suspects, whose connection with the terror attack or threat is not established, shall be released immediately

C. DUTY OF THE JUDGE

Submit a written report of what he/she had observed when the subject was brought before him to the proper court that has jurisdiction over the case of the person thus arrested. the judge shall forthwith submit his/her report within three (3) calendar days from the time the suspect was brought to his/her residence or office

V. RESTRICTION ON RIGHT TO TRAVEL (Sec. 16)

Even when the accused is out on bail

A. RESTRICTION ON RIGHT TO TRAVEL

Upon application by the prosecutor, limit the right to travel of the accused to within the municipality or city where he resides or where the case is pending, in the interest of national security and public safety

Authorization of the court is needed in order to travel outside the said municipality or city (otherwise, bail may be cancelled)

B. HOUSE ARREST

By order of the court at his usual place of residence

Not allowed to use telephones, cellphones, e-mails, computers, the internet and other means of communications with people outside the residence until otherwise ordered by the court

VI. EXAMINATION OF BANK DEPOSITS, ACCOUNTS AND RECORDS

Exception to the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act (RA 1405)

A. JUDICIAL AUTHORIZATION (Sec. 27)

1. WHO MAY AUTHORIZE: CA justices designated as a special court to handle anti-terrorism cases, after satisfying themselves of the existence of probable cause in a hearing called for that purpose

2. WHO ARE SUBJECT:

A person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism,
Of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons, and
Of a member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons

3. Written authorization to any police or law enforcement officer and the member of his/her team duly authorized in writing by the anti-terrorism council

4. WHAT:

Examine, or cause the examination of, the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records in a bank or financial institution; and
Gather or cause the gathering of any relevant information about such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records from a bank or financial institution

B. APPLICATION TO EXAMINE BANK DEPOSITS, ACCOUNTS AND RECORDS (Sec. 18)

Only be granted by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals

CONDITIONS:

Ex parte application to that effect of a police or of a law enforcement official who has been duly authorized in writing to file such ex parte application by the Anti-Terrorism Council
Upon examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce to establish the facts that will justify the need and urgency of examining and freezing the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records

C. CLASSIFICATION AND CONTENTS OF THE COURT ORDER AUTHORIZING THE EXAMINATION OF BANK DEPOSITS, ACCOUNTS, AND RECORDS (Sec. 19)

Classified Information

The person whose bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records have been examined, frozen, sequestered and seized by law enforcement authorities has the right to be informed of the acts done by the law enforcement authorities in the premises or to challenge, if he or she intends to do so, the legality of the interference

The written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals designated to handle cases involving terrorism shall specify:

Identity of the said: (1) person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, (2) judicially declared and outlawed terrorist organization, association, or group of persons, and (3) member of such judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons, as the case may be, whose deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are to be examined or the information to be gathered;
The identity of the bank or financial institution where such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are held and maintained;
The identity of the persons who will conduct the said examination and the gathering of the desired information; and
The length of time the authorization shall be carried out

D. EFFECTIVE PERIOD OF COURT AUTHORIZATION TO EXAMINE AND OBTAIN INFORMATION ON BANK DEPOSITS, ACCOUNTS AND RECORDS (Sec. 30)

Effective for the length of time specified in the written order, which shall not exceed a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of the written order of the authorizing division of the CA by the applicant police or law enforcement official

EXTENSION: 30 days, renewable to another 30 days from the expiration of the original period, provided:

The authorizing division of the CA is satisfied that such extension or renewal is in the public interest
The application for extension or renewal, which must be filed by the original applicant, has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council

E. CUSTODY OF BANK DATA AND INFORMATION OBTAINED AFTER EXAMINATION (Sec. 31)

All information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, and other documents obtained from the examination of the bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records shall, within 48 hours after the expiration of period in the written order (including renewal), be deposited with the authorizing division of the CA in a sealed envelope or sealed package and shall be accompanied by a joint affidavit of the applicant police or law enforcement official and the persons who actually conducted the examination

CONTENTS OF JOINT AFFIDAVIT (Sec. 32):

Identifying marks, numbers, or symbols of the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records examined;
The identity and address of the bank or financial institution where such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records are held and maintained;
The number of bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records discovered, examined, and frozen;
The outstanding balances of each of such deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets;
All information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, documents, records examined and placed in the sealed envelope or sealed package deposited with the authorizing division of the CA;
The date of the original written authorization granted by the Anti-Terrorism Council to the applicant to file the ex parte application to conduct the examination of the said bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records, as well as the date of any extension or renewal of the original written authorization granted by the authorizing division of the CA; and
That the items enumerated were al that were found in the bank or financial institution examined at the time of the completion of the examination

Certify under oath that no duplicates or copies have been made, or if made, such duplicates or copies are included in the sealed envelope or sealed package

F. DISPOSITION OF BANK MATERIALS (Sec. 33)
Classified information

Shall not be opened and its contents shall not be divulged, revealed, read, or used as evidence unless authorized in a written order of the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals

APPLICATION TO USE AS EVIDENCE:

Written application of the DOJ
Upon showing that the DOJ has been duly authorized in writing by the Anti-Terrorism Council to file the application
Notice in writing to the party concerned not later than 3 days before scheduled opening
Clearly state the purpose and reason (Sec 34):

For opening the sealed envelope or sealed package;
For revealing and disclosing its classified contents; and
For using the classified information, data, excerpts, summaries, notes, memoranda, working sheets, reports, and documents as evidence

EVIDENTIARY VALUE OF DEPOSITED BANK MATERIALS (Sec. 35): Absolutely not admissible and usable as evidence, if secured in violation of this Act

VII. SEIZURE AND SEQUESTRATION

A. WHO ARE SUBJECT (Sec. 39)

The deposits and their outstanding balances, placements, trust accounts, assets, and records in any bank or financial institution, moneys, businesses, transportation and communication equipment, supplies and other implements, and property of whatever kind and nature belonging:

To any person suspected of or charged before a competent RTC for the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism;
To a judicially declared and outlawed organization, association, or group of persons; or
To a member of such organization, association, or group of persons shall be seized, sequestered, and frozen in order to prevent their use, transfer, or conveyance for purposes that are inimical to the safety and security of the people or injurious to the interest of the State

RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED: (1) to withdraw such sums as may be reasonably needed by the monthly needs of his family including services of his or her counsel and his family’s medical needs upon approval of the court; and (2) to use any of his property that is under seizure or sequestration or frozen because of his or her indictment as a terrorist upon permission of hte court for any legitimate reason

B. NATURE OF SEIZED, SEQUESTERED AND FROZEN BANK DEPOSITS, PLACEMENTS, TRUST ACCOUNTS, ASSETS AND RECORDS (Sec. 40)

Property held in trust by the bank or financial institution

Use or disposition of such is subject to approval of the court while case is pending

C. DISPOSITION OF THE SEIZED, SEQUESTERED AND FROZEN BANK DEPOSITS, PLACEMENTS, TRUST ACCOUNTS, ASSETS AND RECORDS (Sec. 41)

ACQUITTAL/DISMISSAL OF CHARGES: seizure order shall be deemed lifted and the property shall be immediately released

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES: Upon acquittal or dismissal of charges, P500,000 a day for the period in which his properties, assets or funds were seized shall be paid , the amount to be taken from the appropriations of the police or law enforcement agency that caused the filing of the charges

APPEAL/MOTION FOR RECON: will not stay the release of said funds

CONVICTION BY FINAL JUDGMENT: automatic forfeiture in favour of the government

VIII. CONTINUOUS TRIAL (Sec. 48)

In cases of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism, the judge shall set the case for continuous trial on a daily basis from Monday to Friday or other short-term trial calendar so as to ensure speedy trial.

IX. PROSECUTION UNDER THIS ACT SHALL BE A BAR TO ANOTHER PROSECUTION UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE OR ANY SPECIAL PENAL LAWS (Sec. 49)

When a person has been prosecuted under a provision of this Act, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for any offense or felony which is necessarily included in the offense charged under this Act

X. DAMAGES FOR UNPROVEN CHARGE OF TERRORISM (Sec. 50)

Upon acquittal, any person who is accused of terrorism shall be entitled to the payment of damages in the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) for every day that he or she has been detained or deprived of liberty or arrested without a warrant as a result of such an accusation. The amount of damages shall be automatically charged against the appropriations of the police agency or the Anti-Terrorism Council that brought or sanctioned the filing of the charges against the accused. It shall also be released within fifteen (15) days from the date of the acquittal of the accused. The award of damages mentioned above shall be without prejudice to the right of the acquitted accused to file criminal or administrative charges against those responsible for charging him with the case of terrorism

XI. LIABILITIES OF POLICE OFFICER OR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIAL

A. INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF INTERCEPTED AND RECORDED COMMUNICATIONS (Sec. 11)

It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or any custodian of the tapes, discs and recording, and their excerpts and summaries, written notes or memoranda to copy in whatever form, to remove, delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the items enumerated above in whole or in part under any pretext whatsoever

B. FALSE OR UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENT OR MISREPRESENTATION OF MATERIAL FACT IN JOINT AFFIDAVITS (Sec. 12 and Sec. 32)

Any false or untruthful statement or misrepresentation of material fact in the joint affidavits required respectively in Section 12 and Section 32 of this Act shall constitute a criminal offense and the affiants shall suffer individually the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

C. VIOLATION OF DUTY TO NOTIFY IN WRITING PERSONS SUBJECT OF SURVEILLANCE ON DISPOSITION OF DEPOSITED MATERIALS (Sec. 13)

Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify in writing the persons subject of the surveillance as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one day to eight (8) years of imprisonment

D. UNAUTHORIZED OR MALICIOUS INTERCEPTIONS AND/OR RECORDINGS (Sec. 16)

Any police or law enforcement personnel who, not being authorized to do so by the authorizing division of the Court of Appeals, tracks down, taps, listens to, intercepts, and records in whatever manner or form any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written word of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.
Any police or law enforcement personnel who maliciously obtained an authority from the Court of Appeals to track down, tap, listen to, intercept, and record in whatever manner or form any communication, message, conversation, discussion, or spoken or written words of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism (in addition to above)

E. FAILURE TO NOTIFY THE JUDGE IN DETENTION WITHOUT JUDICIAL WARRANT (Sec. 18)

The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon the police or law enforcement personnel who fails to notify any judge as provided in the preceding paragraph

F. FAILURE TO DELIVER SUSPECT TO THE PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITY WITHIN 3 DAYS (Sec. 20)

The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any police or law enforcement personnel who has apprehended or arrested, detained and taken custody of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism and fails to deliver such charged or suspected person to the proper judicial authority within the period of three (3) days.

G. PENALTY FOR VIOLATION OF RIGHTS OF DETAINEE (Sec. 22)

Any police or law enforcement personnel, or any personnel of the police or other law enforcement custodial unit that violates any of the aforesaid rights of a person charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

Unless the police or law enforcement personnel who violated the rights of a detainee or detainees as stated above is duly identified, the same penalty shall be imposed on the police officer or head or leader of the law enforcement unit having custody of the detainee at the time the violation was done.

H. FAILURE TO KEEP AN OFFICIAL CUSTODIAL LOGBOOK (Sec. 23)

The police or other law enforcement custodial unit who fails to comply with the preceding paragraph to keep an official logbook shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

I. PENALTY FOR THREAT, INTIMIDATION, COERCION, OR TORTURE IN THE INVESTIGATION AND INTERROGATION OF A DETAINED PERSON (Sec. 25)

Any person or persons who use threat, intimidation, or coercion, or who inflict physical pain or torment, or mental, moral, or psychological pressure, which shall vitiate the free-will of a charged or suspected person under investigation and interrogation for the crime of terrorism or the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment.

J. FAILURE TO NOTIFY IN WRITING THE PERSON WHOSE BANK DEPOSITS IS SUBJECT TO EXAMINATION WITHIN 30 DAYS IF NO CASE IF FILED (Sec. 30)

Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify in writing as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one day to eight (8) years of imprisonment.

K. INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF BANK DATA AND INFORMATION (Sec. 32)

It shall be unlawful for any person, police officer or custodian of the bank data and information obtained after examination of deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records to copy, to remove, delete, expunge, incinerate, shred or destroy in any manner the items enumerated above in whole or in part under any pretext whatsoever.

L. FAILURE TO NOTIFY IN WRITING THE PERSON WHOSE BANK MATERIALS ARE SUBJECT OF APPLICATION FOR DISPOSITION (Sec. 33)

Any person, law enforcement official or judicial authority who violates his duty to notify in writing as defined above shall suffer the penalty of six (6) years and one day to eight (8) years of imprisonment.

M. UNAUTHORIZED OR MALICIOUS EXAMINATION OF A BANK OR A FINANCIAL INSTITUTION (Sec. 36)

Any person, police or law enforcement personnel who examines the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, or records in a bank or financial institution
Any police or law enforcement personnel, who maliciously obtained an authority form the CA to examine the deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets, or records in a bank or financial institution (in addition to above)

N. REFUSAL TO FOLLOW ORDER TO ALLOW ACCUSED TO WITHRDAW (Sec. 39)

Any person who unjustifiably refuses to follow the order of the proper division of the Court of Appeals to allow the person accused of the crime of terrorism or of the crime of conspiracy to commit terrorism to withdraw such sums from sequestered or frozen deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records as may be necessary for the regular sustenance of his or her family or to use any of his or her property that has been seized, sequestered or frozen for legitimate purposes while his or her case is pending shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

O. UNJUSTIFIED REFUSAL TO RESTORE OR DELAY IN RESTORING SEIZED, SEQUESTERED AND FROZEN BANK DEPOSITS (Sec. 42)

Any person who unjustifiably refuses to restore or delays the restoration of seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records of a person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism after such suspected person has been found innocent by the investigating body or after the case against such charged person has been dismissed or after he is acquitted by a competent court shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

P. LOSS, MISUSE, DIVERSION OR DISSIPATION OF SEIZED, SEQUESTERED AND FROZEN BANK DEPOSITS (Sec. 43)

Any person who is responsible for the loss, misuse, diversion, or dissipation of the whole or any part of the seized, sequestered and frozen bank deposits, placements, trust accounts, assets and records of a person suspected of or charged with the crime of terrorism or conspiracy to commit terrorism shall suffer the penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment.

Q. INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF DETAINED PERSONS (Sec. 44)

Any public officer who has direct custody of a detained person under the provisions of this Act and who by his deliberate act, misconduct, or inexcusable negligence causes or allows the escape of such detained person shall be guilty of an offense and shall suffer the penalty of: (a) twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment, if the detained person has already been convicted and sentenced in a final judgment of a competent court; and (b) six (6) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment, if the detained person has not been convicted and sentenced in a final judgment of a competent court.

R. UNAUTHORIZED REVELATION OF CLASSIFIED MATERIALS (Sec. 46)

The penalty of ten (10) years and one day to twelve (12) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person, police or law enforcement agent, judicial officer or civil servant who, not being authorized by the Court of Appeals to do so, reveals in any manner or form any classified information under this Act.

S. FURNISHING FALSE EVIDENCE, FORGED DOCUMENT, OR SPURIOUS EVIDENCE (Sec. 47)

The penalty of twelve (12) years and one day to twenty (20) years of imprisonment shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly furnishes false testimony, forged document or spurious evidence in any investigation or hearing under this Act.

XII. PENALTY OF BANK OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES

Defying court authorization (Sec. 37)

Fried.

2010-08-01T22:25:00.000+08:00

Yes, they are. Sure their usefulness and pervasiveness might lull you into thinking they're the only completely dependable constants in your life until you practically live and breathe technology, whether it be your trusty desktop or (if you're a sucker for hype) the effin' cool new iPad, but mark my words, they are evil. They will lure unsuspecting victims into relying on them for almost anything (mind you, that includes bathroom calisthenics), and then they will randomly and utterly fail to work, FOR NO APPARENT REASON, other than 'oh, did I push the wrong button?' And no amount of fixing and kicking and begging (with real tears!) will revive the blasted things. You are doomed. You are doomed. You are so doomed I have to type the same sentence thrice. That is, unless you are willing to develop muscles in all the wrong places as you haul the whole thing, brains, intestines and all, to the service technician whose office is. of bloody course, located far, far away.

Well, booger.

Long story short, this bog is on hiatus while my computer is being repaired at the service center.

United Airlines vs. Uy

2010-07-28T07:36:00.000+08:00

G.R. No. 127768, Nov. 19, 1999

INTERNATIONAL LAW: Applicability of the Warsaw Convention: the Convention's provisions do not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of damage. Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger and preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said Convention. Likewise, we have held that the Convention does not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is found or established

FACTS:

October 13, 1989 – Respondent Willie Uy is a passenger of petitioner United Airlines, bound from San Francisco to Manila. While in San Francisco, it was found that one piece of his luggage was over the maximum weight allowance of 70 kg. per bag. A United Airlines employee rebuked him and in a loud voice, in front of the milling crowd, ordered him to repack his things accordingly. Wishing not to create a scene, Willie did as asked. Unfortunately, his luggage was still overweight so the airline billed him overweight charges. Willie offered to pay the charges with a Miscellaneous Charge Order (MCO) or an airline pre-paid credit but the same employee, and an airline supervisor, refused to honor it, contending that there were discrepancies in the figures. Thus, Willie was forced to pay the charges with his American Express credit card. Upon arrival in Manila, Willie discovered that one of his bags had been slashed and its contents, amounting to US$5,310.00, stolen.

October 16, 1989 – he sent his first letter of demand to United Airlines. The airline did not refute Willie’s allegations and mailed a check representing payment of his loss based on the maximum liability of US$9.70 per pound. Willie, thinking the amount to be grossly inadequate to compensate him for his losses as well as for the indignities he was subjected to, sent two more letters to petitioner airline, one dated January 4, 1990 and the other dated October 28, 1991, demanding out-of-court settlement of P1,000,000.00.

June 9, 1992 – Willie filed a complaint for damages before the Philippine courts. He had two causes of action: (1) the shabby and humiliating treatment he received from petitioner’s employees at the San Francisco Airport which caused him extreme embarrassment and social humiliation; and (2) the slashing of his luggage and the loss of personal effects amounting to US$5,310.00.

For its part, United Airlines moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was filed out of time. Under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention, the right to damages shall be extinguished if an action is not brought within 2 years. However, the second paragraph of the said provision stated that the method of calculating the period of limitation shall be determined by the law of the court to which the case is submitted. It is Willie’s position that our rules on interruption of prescriptive period should apply. When he sent his letters of demand, the 2-year period was tolled, giving him ample time to file his complaint.

The trial court ordered the dismissal of the case, holding that Art. 29(2) refers not to the local forum’s rules in interrupting the prescriptive period but only to the rules of determining the time in which the action was deemed commenced (meaning “filed”). Willie filed his motion for reconsideration of the order of dismissal only on the 14th day. The trial court denied his motion and 2 days later Willie filed his notice of appeal. United Airlines this time contended that the notice of appeal was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period and should therefore be dismissed. The CA, however, took cognizance of the case in the interest of justice and ruled in favour of respondent. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action for damages is barred by the lapse of the 2-year prescriptive period under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention

HELD:

Supreme Court held that although the 2-year prescriptive period under the Warsaw Convention has lapsed, it did not preclude the application of other pertinent provisions of the Civil Code. Thus, the action for damages could still be filed based on tort which can be filed within 4 years from the time cause of action accrued. As for the action pertaining to the loss of the contents of the luggage, while it was well within the bounds of the Warsaw Convention, the Supreme Court found that there was an exception to the applicability of the 2-year prescriptive period – that is when the airline employed delaying tactics and gave the passenger the run-around.

Applicability of the Warsaw Convention: Courts have discretion whether to apply them or not

Within our jurisdiction we have held that the Warsaw Convention can be applied, or ignored, depending on the peculiar facts presented by each case. Thus, we have ruled that the Convention's provisions do not regulate or exclude liability for other breaches of contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of damage. Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger and preclude recovery therefor beyond the limits set by said Convention. Likewise, we have held that the Convention does not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if willful misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is found or established.

Respondent's complaint reveals that he is suing on two (2) causes of action: (a) the shabby and humiliating treatment he received from petitioner's employees at the San Francisco Airport which caused him extreme embarrassment and social humiliation; and, (b) the slashing of his luggage and the loss of his personal effects amounting to US $5,310.00.

While his second cause of action - an action for damages arising from theft or damage to property or goods - is well within the bounds of the Warsaw Convention, his first cause of action -an action for damages arising from the misconduct of the airline employees and the violation of respondent's rights as passenger - clearly is not.

Action for damages arising from the misconduct of the airline employees and the violation of the respondent’s rights as passengers is covered under the Civil Code

Consequently, insofar as the first cause of action is concerned, respondent's failure to file his complaint within the two (2)-year limitation of the Warsaw Convention does not bar his action since petitioner airline may still be held liable for breach of other provisions of the Civil Code which prescribe a different period or procedure for instituting the action, specifically, Art. 1146 thereof which prescribes four (4) years for filing an action based on torts.

Exception to the Application of the 2-year prescriptive period: When airline employed delaying tactics

As for respondent's second cause of action, indeed the travaux preparatories of the Warsaw Convention reveal that the delegates thereto intended the two (2)-year limitation incorporated in Art. 29 as an absolute bar to suit and not to be made subject to the various tolling provisions of the laws of the forum. This therefore forecloses the application of our own rules on interruption of prescriptive periods. Article 29, par. (2), was intended only to let local laws determine whether an action had been commenced within the two (2)-year period, and within our jurisdiction an action shall be deemed commenced upon the filing of a complaint. Since it is indisputable that respondent filed the present action beyond the two (2)-year time frame his second cause of action must be barred. Nonetheless, it cannot be doubted that respondent exerted efforts to immediately convey his loss to petitioner, even employed the services of two (2) lawyers to follow up his claims, and that the filing of the action itself was delayed because of petitioner's evasion.

Verily, respondent filed his complaint more than two (2) years later, beyond the period of limitation prescribed by the Warsaw Convention for filing a claim for damages. However, it is obvious that respondent was forestalled from immediately filing an action because petitioner airline gave him the runaround, answering his letters but not giving in to his demands. True, respondent should have already filed an action at the first instance when his claims were denied by petitioner but the same could only be due to his desire to make an out-of-court settlement for which he cannot be faulted. Hence, despite the express mandate of Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention that an action for damages should be filed within two (2) years from the arrival at the place of destination, such rule shall not be applied in the instant case because of the delaying tactics employed by petitioner airline itself. Thus, private respondent's second cause of action cannot be considered as time-barred under Art. 29 of the Warsaw Convention.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals reversing and setting aside the appealed order of the trial court granting the motion to dismiss the complaint, as well as its Resolution denying reconsideration, is AFFIRMED. Let the records of the case be remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings taking its bearings from this disquisition.

SO ORDERED.

Laurel vs. Garcia

2010-07-27T07:32:00.000+08:00

G.R. No. 92013, July 25, 1990

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Before determining whether it is domestic or foreign law that should be applied, one must first determine whether a conflict of laws situation exists.

FACTS:

The Roppongi Property is one of the four properties in Japan acquired by the Philippine government under the Reparations Agreement, as part of the indemnification to the Filipino people for their losses in life and property and their suffering during WWII. The Roppongi property became the site of the Philippine Embassy until the latter was transferred to another site when the Roppongi building needed major repairs. Due to the failure of our government to provide necessary funds, the Roppongi property has remained undeveloped since that time. After many years, the Aquino administration advanced the sale of the reparation properties, which included the Roppongi lot. This move was opposed on the ground that the Roppongi property is public in character. For their part, the proponents of the sale raised that Japanese law should apply, following the doctrine of lex loci rei sitae.

ISSUE: Whether or not the conflict of law rule on lex loci rei sitae should apply

HELD:

We see no reason why a conflict of law rule should apply when no conflict of law situation exists. A conflict of law situation arises only when: (1) There is a dispute over the title or ownership of an immovable, such that the capacity to take and transfer immovables, the formalities of conveyance, the essential validity and effect of the transfer, or the interpretation and effect of a conveyance, are to be determined (See Salonga, Private International Law, 1981 ed., pp. 377-383); and (2) A foreign law on land ownership and its conveyance is asserted to conflict with a domestic law on the same matters. Hence, the need to determine which law should apply.

In the instant case, none of the above elements exists.

The issues are not concerned with validity of ownership or title. There is no question that the property belongs to the Philippines. The issue is the authority of the respondent officials to validly dispose of property belonging to the State. And the validity of the procedures adopted to effect its sale. This is governed by Philippine Law. The rule of lex situs does not apply.

The assertion that the opinion of the Secretary of Justice sheds light on the relevance of the lex situs rule is misplaced. The opinion does not tackle the alienability of the real properties procured through reparations nor the existence in what body of the authority to sell them. In discussing who are capable of acquiring the lots, the Secretary merely explains that it is the foreign law which should determine who can acquire the properties so that the constitutional limitation on acquisition of lands of the public domain to Filipino citizens and entities wholly owned by Filipinos is inapplicable. We see no point in belaboring whether or not this opinion is correct. Why should we discuss who can acquire the Roppongi lot when there is no showing that it can be sold?

Tayag vs. Benguet Consolidated, Inc.

2010-07-26T07:32:00.000+08:00

G.R. No. L-23145, Nov. 29, 1968

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Situs of Shares of Stock: domicile of the corporation
SUCCESSION: Ancillary Administration: The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs.
SUCCESSION: Probate: Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary administrator’s right to the stock certificates when the actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.

FACTS:

Idonah Slade Perkins, an American citizen who died in New York City, left among others, two stock certificates issued by Benguet Consolidated, a corporation domiciled in the Philippines. As ancillary administrator of Perkins’ estate in the Philippines, Tayag now wants to take possession of these stock certificates but County Trust Company of New York, the domiciliary administrator, refused to part with them. Thus, the probate court of the Philippines was forced to issue an order declaring the stock certificates as lost and ordering Benguet Consolidated to issue new stock certificates representing Perkins’ shares. Benguet Consolidated appealed the order, arguing that the stock certificates are not lost as they are in existence and currently in the possession of County Trust Company of New York.

ISSUE: Whether or not the order of the lower court is proper

HELD:

The appeal lacks merit.

Tayag, as ancillary administrator, has the power to gain control and possession of all assets of the decedent within the jurisdiction of the Philippines

It is to be noted that the scope of the power of the ancillary administrator was, in an earlier case, set forth by Justice Malcolm. Thus: "It is often necessary to have more than one administration of an estate. When a person dies intestate owning property in the country of his domicile as well as in a foreign country, administration is had in both countries. That which is granted in the jurisdiction of decedent's last domicile is termed the principal administration, while any other administration is termed the ancillary administration. The reason for the latter is because a grant of administration does not ex proprio vigore have any effect beyond the limits of the country in which it is granted. Hence, an administrator appointed in a foreign state has no authority in the [Philippines]. The ancillary administration is proper, whenever a person dies, leaving in a country other than that of his last domicile, property to be administered in the nature of assets of the deceased liable for his individual debts or to be distributed among his heirs."

Probate court has authority to issue the order enforcing the ancillary administrator’s right to the stock certificates when the actual situs of the shares of stocks is in the Philippines.

It would follow then that the authority of the probate court to require that ancillary administrator's right to "the stock certificates covering the 33,002 shares ... standing in her name in the books of [appellant] Benguet Consolidated, Inc...." be respected is equally beyond question. For appellant is a Philippine corporation owing full allegiance and subject to the unrestricted jurisdiction of local courts. Its shares of stock cannot therefore be considered in any wise as immune from lawful court orders.

Our holding in Wells Fargo Bank and Union v. Collector of Internal Revenue finds application. "In the instant case, the actual situs of the shares of stock is in the Philippines, the corporation being domiciled [here]." To the force of the above undeniable proposition, not even appellant is insensible. It does not dispute it. Nor could it successfully do so even if it were so minded.

I give a crap

2010-07-21T21:20:00.000+08:00

Yes. That icon text. Still here, still alive. Will continue with the usual updating schedule: Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday.

Wow, 12 followers. Thanks for continuing to visit this blog.

Vda. De Perez vs. Tolete

2010-07-21T07:04:00.000+08:00

G.R. No. 76714, June 2, 1994

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Reprobate of Foreign Wills: Requirement of Notices

FACTS:

Dr. Jose Cunanan and his wife, Dr. Evelyn Perez-Cunanan, who became American citizens and residents of New York, each executed a will also in New York, containing provisions on presumption of survivorship (in the event that it is not known which one of the spouses died first, the husband shall be presumed to have predeceased his wife). Later, the entire family perished in a fire that gutted their home. Thus, Rafael, who was named trustee in Jose’s will, filed for separate probate proceedings of the wills.

Later, Evelyn’s mother, Salud Perez, filed a petition for reprobate in Bulacan. Rafael opposed, arguing that Salud was not an heir according to New York law. He contended that since the wills were executed in New York, New York law should govern. He further argued that, by New York law, he and his brothers and sisters were Jose’s heirs and as such entitled to notice of the reprobate proceedings, which Salud failed to give.

For her part, Salud said she was the sole heir of her daughter, Evelyn, and that the two wills were in accordance with New York law. But before she could present evidence to prove the law of New York, the reprobate court already issued an order, disallowing the wills.

ISSUE: Whether or not the reprobate of the wills should be allowed

HELD:

Extrinsic Validity of Wills of Non-Resident Aliens

The respective wills of the Cunanan spouses, who were American citizens, will only be effective in this country upon compliance with the following provision of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

Art. 816. The will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place in which he resides, or according to the formalities observed in his country, or in conformity with those which this Code prescribes.

Thus, proof that both wills conform with the formalities prescribed by New York laws or by Philippine laws is imperative.

Evidence for Reprobate of Wills Probated outside the Philippines

The evidence necessary for the reprobate or allowance of wills which have been probated outside of the Philippines are as follows: (1) the due execution of the will in accordance with the foreign laws; (2) the testator has his domicile in the foreign country and not in the Philippines; (3) the will has been admitted to probate in such country; (4) the fact that the foreign tribunal is a probate court, and (5) the laws of a foreign country on procedure and allowance of wills (III Moran Commentaries on the Rules of Court, 1970 ed., pp. 419-429; Suntay v. Suntay, 95 Phil. 500 [1954]; Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610 [1930]). Except for the first and last requirements, the petitioner submitted all the needed evidence.

The necessity of presenting evidence on the foreign laws upon which the probate in the foreign country is based is impelled by the fact that our courts cannot take judicial notice of them.

On Lack of Notice to Jose’s Heirs

This petition cannot be completely resolved without touching on a very glaring fact - petitioner has always considered herself the sole heir of Dr. Evelyn Perez Cunanan and because she does not consider herself an heir of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, she noticeably failed to notify his heirs of the filing of the proceedings. Thus, even in the instant petition, she only impleaded respondent Judge, forgetting that a judge whose order is being assailed is merely a nominal or formal party (Calderon v. Solicitor General, 215 SCRA 876 [1992]).

The rule that the court having jurisdiction over the reprobate of a will shall "cause notice thereof to be given as in case of an original will presented for allowance" (Revised Rules of Court, Rule 27, Section 2) means that with regard to notices, the will probated abroad should be treated as if it were an "original will" or a will that is presented for probate for the first time. Accordingly, compliance with Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 76, which require publication and notice by mail or personally to the "known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines" and to the executor, if he is not the petitioner, are required.

The brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan, contrary to petitioner's claim, are entitled to notices of the time and place for proving the wills. Under Section 4 of Rule 76 of the Revised Rules of Court, the "court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator, . . . "

WHEREFORE, the questioned Order is SET ASIDE. Respondent Judge shall allow petitioner reasonable time within which to submit evidence needed for the joint probate of the wills of the Cunanan spouses and see to it that the brothers and sisters of Dr. Jose F. Cunanan are given all notices and copies of all pleadings pertinent to the probate proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Santos III vs. Northwest Orient Airlines

2010-07-20T06:56:00.001+08:00

G.R. No. 101538, June 23, 1992

INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention is constitutional, a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.
INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention, when applicable: To all "international transportations of persons by aircraft for hire." Whether the transportation is "international" is determined by the contract of the parties, which in the case of passengers is the ticket. When the contract of carriage provides for the transportation of the passenger between certain designated terminals "within the territories of two High Contracting Parties," the provisions of the Convention automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the airline and its passenger.
INTERNATIONAL LAW: Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction: Place of Destination vis-a-vis Agreed Stopping Place: The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure and ending with the ultimate destination. The use of the singular in this expression indicates the understanding of the parties to the Convention that every contract of carriage has one place of departure and one place of destination. An intermediate place where the carriage may be broken is not regarded as a "place of destination."

FACTS:

Petitioner is a minor and a resident of the Philippines. Private respondent Nortwest Orient Airlines (NOA) is a foreign corporation with principal office in Minnesota, U.S.A. and licensed to do business and maintain a branch office in the Philippines. The petitioner purchased from NOA a round-trip ticket in San Francisco, U.S.A. In December 19, 1986, the petitioner checked in the at the NOA counter in the San Francisco airport for his departure to Manila. Despite a previous confirmation and re-confirmation, he was informed that he had no reservation for his flight for Tokyo to Manila. He therefore had to be wait-listed. On March 12, 1987, the petitioner sued NOA for damages in RTC Makati. NOA moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 28 (1) of the Warsaw Convention is in accordance with the constitution so as to deprive the Philippine Courts jurisdiction over the case

HELD:

Art. 28. (1) An action for damage must be brought at the option of the plaintiff, in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before the court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of business, or where he has a place of business through which the contract has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.

Constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention

The Republic of the Philippines is a party to the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, otherwise known as the Warsaw Convention. It took effect on February 13, 1933. The Convention was concurred in by the Senate, through its Resolution No. 19, on May 16, 1950. The Philippine instrument of accession was signed by President Elpidio Quirino on October 13, 1950, and was deposited with the Polish government on November 9, 1950. The Convention became applicable to the Philippines on February 9, 1951. On September 23, 1955, President Ramon Magsaysay issued Proclamation No. 201, declaring our formal adherence thereto. "to the end that the same and every article and clause thereof may be observed and fulfilled in good faith by the Republic of the Philippines and the citizens thereof."

The Convention is thus a treaty commitment voluntarily assumed by the Philippine government and, as such, has the force and effect of law in this country.

Does the Warsaw Convention apply in this case?

By its own terms, the Convention applies to all international transportation of persons performed by aircraft for hire.

International transportation is defined in paragraph (2) of Article 1 as follows:

(2) For the purposes of this convention, the expression "international transportation" shall mean any transportation in which, according to the contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a transshipment, are situated [either] within the territories of two High Contracting Parties . . .

Whether the transportation is "international" is determined by the contract of the parties, which in the case of passengers is the ticket. When the contract of carriage provides for the transportation of the passenger between certain designated terminals "within the territories of two High Contracting Parties," the provisions of the Convention automatically apply and exclusively govern the rights and liabilities of the airline and its passenger.

Since the flight involved in the case at bar is international, the same being from the United States to the Philippines and back to the United States, it is subject to the provisions of the Warsaw Convention, including Article 28(1), which enumerates the four places where an action for damages may be brought.

Does Article 28(1) refer to Jurisdiction or Venue?

...where the matter is governed by the Warsaw Convention, jurisdiction takes on a dual concept. Jurisdiction in the international sense must be established in accordance with Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention, following which the jurisdiction of a particular court must be established pursuant to the applicable domestic law. Only after the question of which court has jurisdiction is determined will the issue of venue be taken up. This second question shall be governed by the law of the court to which the case is submitted.

Was the case properly filed in the Philippines, since the plaintiff’s destination was Manila?

The place of destination, within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention, is determined by the terms of the contract of carriage or, specifically in this case, the ticket between the passenger and the carrier. Examination of the petitioner's ticket shows that his ultimate destination is San Francisco. Although the date of the return flight was left open, the contract of carriage between the parties indicates that NOA was bound to transport the petitioner to San Francisco from Manila. Manila should therefore be considered merely an agreed stopping place and not the destination.

Article 1(2) also draws a distinction between a "destination" and an "agreed stopping place." It is the "destination" and not an "agreed stopping place" that controls for purposes of ascertaining jurisdiction under the Convention.

The contract is a single undivided operation, beginning with the place of departure and ending with the ultimate destination. The use of the singular in this expression indicates the understanding of the parties to the Convention that every contract of carriage has one place of departure and one place of destination. An intermediate place where the carriage may be broken is not regarded as a "place of destination."

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. vs. NLRC

2010-07-19T06:55:00.000+08:00

G.R. No. 129584, December 3, 1998

LABOR LAW: Disease as Ground for Dismissal, requisites: (1) the disease must be such that employee’s continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees; and (2) there must be a certification by competent public authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of 6 months with proper medical treatment.
LABOR LAW: same; The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employee’s illness and thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor.
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Lex Loci Contractus: Established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines.
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: Law of the Forum vis-a-vis Public Policy: Settled is the rule that the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. Here in the Philippines, employment agreements are more than contractual in nature. The Constitution itself, in Article XIII Section 3, guarantees the special protection of workers.

FACTS:

Osdana, a Filipino citizen, was recruited by Triple Eight for employment with the latter’s principal, Gulf Catering Company (GCC), a firm based in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The employment contract (originally as “food server” but later changed to “waitress”) was executed in the Philippines but was to be performed in Riyadh. Once in Riyadh, however, Osdana was made to perform strenuous tasks (washing dishes, janitorial work), which were not included in her designation as a waitress. Because of the long hours and strenuous nature of her work, she suffered from Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, for which she had to undergo surgery. But during her weeks of confinement at the hospital for her recovery, she was not given any salary. And after she was discharged from the hospital, GCC suddenly dismissed her from work, allegedly on the ground of illness. She was not given any separation pay nor was she paid her salaries for the periods when she was not allowed to work. Thus, upon her return to the Philippines, she filed a complaint against Triple Eight, praying for unpaid and underpaid salaries, among others.

The LA ruled in her favour, which ruling NLRC affirmed. Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Osdana was illegally dismissed
If so, whether or not she is entitled to award for salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract

HELD:

The petition must fail.

Disease as a Ground for Dismissal

Under Article 284 of the Labor Code and the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, for disease to be a valid ground for termination, the following requisites must be present:

The disease must be such that employee’s continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees
There must be a certification by competent public authority that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of 6 months with proper medical treatment

In the first place, Osdana’s continued employment despite her illness was not prohibited by law nor was it prejudicial to her health, as well as that of her co-employees. In fact, the medical report issued after her second operation stated that “she had very good improvement of the symptoms.” Besides, “Carpal Tunnel Syndrome” is not a contagious disease.

On the medical certificate requirement, petitioner erroneously argues that “private respondent was employed in Saudi Arabia and not here in the Philippines. Hence, there was a physical impossibility to secure from a Philippine public health authority the alluded medical certificate that public respondent’s illness will not be cured within a period of six months.”

Petitioner entirely misses the point, as counsel for private respondent states in the Comment. The rule simply prescribes a “certification by a competent public health authority” and not a “Philippine public health authority.”

If, indeed, Osdana was physically unfit to continue her employment, her employer could have easily obtained a certification to that effect from a competent public health authority in Saudi Arabia, thereby heading off any complaint for illegal dismissal.

The requirement for a medical certificate under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employee’s illness and thus defeat the public policy on the protection of labor. As the Court observed in Prieto v. NLRC, “The Court is not unaware of the many abuses suffered by our overseas workers in the foreign land where they have ventured, usually with heavy hearts, in pursuit of a more fulfilling future. Breach of contract, maltreatment, rape, insufficient nourishment, sub-human lodgings, insults and other forms of debasement, are only a few of the inhumane acts to which they are subjected by their foreign employers, who probably feel they can do as they please in their country. While these workers may indeed have relatively little defense against exploitation while they are abroad, that disadvantage must not continue to burden them when they return to their own territory to voice their muted complaint. There is no reason why, in their own land, the protection of our own laws cannot be extended to them in full measure for the redress of their grievances.”

Which law should apply: Lex Loci Contractus

Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical certificate requirement by contending that since Osdana was working in Saudi Arabia, her employment was subject to the laws of the host country. Apparently, petitioner hopes to make it appear that the labor laws of Saudi Arabia do not require any certification by a competent public health authority in the dismissal of employees due to illness.

Again, petitioner’s argument is without merit.

First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and other laws affecting labor apply in this case. Furthermore, settled is the rule that the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the forum’s public policy. Here in the Philippines, employment agreements are more than contractual in nature. The Constitution itself, in Article XIII Section 3, guarantees the special protection of workers.

This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because to allow foreign employers to determine for and by themselves whether an overseas contract worker may be dismissed on the ground of illness would encourage illegal or arbitrary pre-termination of employment contracts.

Award of Salaries granted but reduced

In the case at bar, while it would appear that the employment contract approved by the POEA was only for a period of twelve months, Osdana’s actual stint with the foreign principal lasted for one year and seven-and-a-half months. It may be inferred, therefore, that the employer renewed her employment contract for another year. Thus, the award for the unexpired portion of the contract should have been US$1,260 (US$280 x 4 ½ months) or its equivalent in Philippine pesos, not US$2,499 as adjudged by the labor arbiter and affirmed by the NLRC.

As for the award for unpaid salaries and differential amounting to US$1,076 representing seven months’ unpaid salaries and one month underpaid salary, the same is proper because, as correctly pointed out by Osdana, the “no work, no pay” rule relied upon by petitioner does not apply in this case. In the first place, the fact that she had not worked from June 18 to August 22, 1993 and then from January 24 to April 29, 1994, was due to her illness which was clearly work-related. Second, from August 23 to October 5, 1993, Osdana actually worked as food server and cook for seven days a week at the Hota Bani Tameem Hospital, but was not paid any salary for the said period. Finally, from October 6 to October 23, 1993, she was confined to quarters and was not given any work for no reason at all.

Moral Damages granted but reduced

Now, with respect to the award of moral and exemplary damages, the same is likewise proper but should be reduced. Worth reiterating is the rule that moral damages are recoverable where the dismissal of the employee was attended by bad faith or fraud or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public policy. Likewise, exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent manner.

According to the facts of the case as stated by public respondent, Osdana was made to perform such menial chores, as dishwashing and janitorial work, among others, contrary to her job designation as waitress. She was also made to work long hours without overtime pay. Because of such arduous working conditions, she developed Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. Her illness was such that she had to undergo surgery twice. Since her employer determined for itself that she was no longer fit to continue working, they sent her home posthaste without as much as separation pay or compensation for the months when she was unable to work because of her illness. Since the employer is deemed to have acted in bad faith, the award for attorney’s fees is likewise upheld.

How not to get caught while sleeping

2010-06-25T22:08:00.000+08:00

When Hapontukin sets in I...

1. Sit Down

Pfft. This is by far the simplest and requires the least effort from you. I've tried this dozens of time already during my stint at a call center. My supe was not quite tolerant of reps falling asleep in their chairs, even though there aren't that many calls coming in. I developed this technique simply because I didn't like sleeping at the sleeping room during lunch hour. So what to do?

Just sit there, place both your arms on the armrest, and close your eyes. If there's no armrest, cross your arms over your chest. Don't slouch because that's always a dead giveaway that you're sleeping. Instead, just sit with your back straight and close your eyes. Believe me, they won't even give you a second glance.

2. Drop-Your-Pen Act

Now, this reqiures a little bit of effort but don't worry the method is quite simple. All you need is a pen (a pencil will do, too). Be sure your pen is just an ordinary pen (not pilot) so it won't mess up when you try writing with it after employing this method of creative sleeping. The first thing you do is sit there in class. Make every appearance that you're paying attention to the lecturer or your professor (if you're in class). Taking down notes will even make it more convincing. So ok, while you're busy taking down notes, you "accidentally" drop your pen. Lean down as though to pick it up but instead of coming up, don't. Stay there and doze for a bit.

3. Four-Eyed Bean Pole

You need a prop. A pair of eyeglasses, in fact. In a typical lecture hall, the lights always come from the front. The lecturer or your professor will most likely be using a projector or LCD screen for his visual aid. Now, with eyeglasses, the glass is concave which means the light will bounce right off it, which further means that you can just close your eyes and your lecturer won't even notice anything amiss. All he sees is you sitting there, your eyeglasses and oily forehead reflecting the light from the projector. Wahahah! Ok, on to the next tip.

4. Cover Up

This one is a little bit complicated and needs some help from a trusted friend. First, make sure you're sitting beside your friend or a close acquaintance (the kind you can ask favors from without feeling embarassed). During the lecture, make as though you're talking to your friend. Look at him/her but use your hand to cover half of your face, primarily the eyes. Ask your friend, "Wake me up when he's done talking" and then sleep for the duration of the lecture.

5. Pray

This is classic. I've tried this a couple of times. This works best when you're in the library where sleeping's simply not aloud. Place both your hands on top of the table and rest your forehead there. Note that it will really appear as though you are sleeping (which you really are) but when the librarian approaches you or when she wakes you up rudely, make the sign of the cross quickly and then smile politely, "Yes?" She'll think she disturbed you from your path to heaven and will feel properly embarassed.

I'm sure there are lots more ways to sleep creatively. But let's leave the rest to more creative minds.

Book List for Bar Review

2010-04-22T20:55:00.001+08:00

These are the books that I used for my review. TIP: It's advisable to use the books you've been using all through your entire four years of law school. The advantages are: (1) you are already familiar with it; (2) you've probably already noted the more important passages and added in some text of your own; and finally (3) you can save your money for more important things, like your plane tickets to and accommodation in Manila for the exam month.

Political Law

Nachura's Outline/Reviewer in Political Law
1987 Constitution of the Philippines codal (with LGC, Omnibus Election Code, etc.)
Personal notes (with updated jurisprudence)

Labor Law and Social Legislation

Azucena's Everyone's Labor Code
Full text of social legislations
Personal notes (with updated jurisprudence)

Civil Law

Jurado's Civil Law Review
Civil Code of the Philippines codal
Personal notes (with updated jurisprudence)

Taxation Law

Vitug's Tax Law and Jurisprudence
Personal notes (with updated jurisprudence)

Commercial Law

Sundiang's Commercial Law Reviewer
Personal notes (with updated jurisprudence)
Materials provided by my professor in Commercial Law Review

Criminal Law

Reyes' Criminal Law Books I & II
Personal notes (with updated jurisprudence)

Remedial Law

Regalado's Remedial Law Compendium Vol. 1
Rules of Court codal
Personal notes (with updated jurisprudence)

Legal Ethics

Sample forms
Memory aids
Rules of Court codal

For the Saturdays before the exam, I no longer went through my review materials but instead read past Bar Exam questions and answers in order to school myself on the form of questions to be expected and the proper way to answer them.

Hiatus Extended

2010-04-05T22:10:00.003+08:00

This blog's hiatus is extended for I don't know exactly how long. Changes shall be announced so keep posted right here.

In the meanwhile, you might notice the shiny new "read more" link after some posts. I've decided to install that particular code because I want to display 5 posts a page without killing your eyes entirely. It's a tedious process as I have to go back to all my old posts and manually edit them. Be patient.

Also, on a different note, I've decided to try out in-text advertising for this blog. I'm referring to those green-colored double underline hyperlinks you see all over my posts. If you hover your mouse over those links, a box-shaped bubble will appear containing content from an advertiser. If you want the bubble to disappear, just hover your mouse somewhere else. By the way, clicking on those links will direct you to the advertiser's landing page. I want to emphasize that YOU ARE NOT required to click any of those links.

Holy Week 2010

2010-03-29T06:00:00.000+08:00

This blog is on hiatus for this week. Returning to the regular schedule after the week-long solemn celebration.

2009 Philippine Bar Exam Results

2010-03-26T22:39:00.004+08:00

It's out. Congratulations to all my fellow new lawyers (although if we have to be technical, and according to my Legal Ethics professor, we're not yet lawyers until we sign our names on the Roll)

1. ABANTE, Maria Evitha A.
2. ABAQUITA, Allan C.
3. ABARQUEZ, Leandro E.
4. ABARQUEZ, Paolo E.
5. ABDULLAH, Anzarullah Zhadradi A.
6. ABELLA, Harve B.
7. ABELLAR, Eleanor Agnes F.
8. ABENOJAR, Irene U.
9. ABIBICO, Mona Liza D.
10. ABIERA, Stephanie E.
11. ABLAÑA, Lindy Andre P.
12. ABOGANDA, Alexander D.
13. ABRASALDO, Wilson C.
14. ABRUGAR, Vanessa Q.
15. ABUEDO, May Flor C.
16. ABUTAN, Leah C.
17. ACAS, Althea Barbara E.
18. ACOSTA-QUIROS, Annemarie
19. ADAOAG, Janice M.
20. ADASA, William Chino T.
21. ADDUG, Fredelyne H.
22. ADEVA, III, Daniel A.
23. AGATON, Jonathan R.
24. AGNES, JR., Jerry P.
25. AGRAVIADOR, Karisma Ivee L.
26. AGUHAYON-ESCOLAR, Ghenee Rose C.
27. AGUIHAP, Beverly D.
28. AGUILA, Mildred R.
29. AGUINALDO-BALUYA, Ranelle R.
30. AGUIRRE, Leandro Angelo Y.
31. AHAJA, Yasmin Ayesha K.
32. ALABAN, Daniel B.
33. ALAGAR-BERNARDO, Rowena E.
34. ALAGCAN, Angeli A.
35. ALARILLA, Jeffrey John S.
36. ALARILLA, Maria Angela I.
37. ALASKA, Hazel Mae A.
38. ALAZAS, Adrianne Marie C.
39. ALAZAS, Beatriz Irina Denise C.
40. ALBAN, Beethoven M.
41. ALBANO, Wyndel P.
42. ALBERTO, Ruby Ann Theresa L.
43. ALBORES, Melanie F.
44. ALCERA, Aimee Marie B.
45. ALDAY, Arlene D.
46. ALEGARBES, Augustus M.
47. ALEGRE, Adrian B.
48. ALEJANDRO, Eduardo Jerome T.
49. ALEJO, Judith Ann C.
50. ALESNA, Sheena A.
51. ALESON, Melanie F.
52. ALFECHE, Claribelle Jane A.
53. ALIBANG-SALUD, Jocelyn M.
54. ALICUMAN, Abelardo C.
55. ALINDATO, Diane Angela O.
56. ALIVIO, Kenneth O.
57. ALMAJOSE, Maricar C.
58. ALMERO, Leo Rey F.
59. ALMERO, Marie Beth S.
60. ALMOITE, Wilma M.
61. ALO, Jennifer Karen L.
62. ALPASAN, Roumelia B.
63. ALQUIROZ, Jason B.
64. ALQUISADA, Pamela Joy L.
65. ALURA, Maricris O.
66. ALVAREZ, Jeanette S.
67. ALVAREZ, Riza Gloria V.
68. ALVARICO, James Roulyn R.
69. ALZATE, Kimberley Joy T.
70. AMANO, Rachel O.
71. AMARGA, Lizanilla J.
72. AMARILLA, Romela T.
73. AME, Valentino Alvin C.
74. AMORANTO, Sarah Jane SJ.
75. AMORES, Luvim D.
76. ANCIADO, Pilar C.
77. ANCIANO, Frederick I.
78. ANDAL, Maria Bernadeth S.
79. ANDALIS, JR., Roberto C.
80. ANDAMAN, Margaret Raizza A.
81. ANDAMO, John Paul A.
82. ANDOLANA, Christ May V.
83. ANDRES, Paraluman D.
84. ANG, Anna Margarita G.
85. ANGELES, Francisco B.
86. ANGWAY, Cohleen Dianne SJ.
87. ANORE, Marlon DL.
88. ANSELMO, Duchess Veneru J.
89. ANTONIO-LADISLAO, Bianca Cecilia B.
90. APALING, Allen D.
91. APOLINAR, Anna Luisa P.
92. APOLINARIO, Floreida A.
93. APOLONIO, Joseph O.
94. AQUINO, Benedict Benigno A.
95. AQUINO, Mary Joy S.
96. AQUINO, III, Leopoldo D.
97. AQUINO, JR., Rodrigo F.
98. ARANDIA, Erwin F.
99. ARANETA, Henry O.
100. ARAOS, Tessa Mae L.
101. ARBOLADURA, Magelio S.
102. ARCEGA, Garnet Eneli Mae M.
103. ARDIENTE, Rochelle S.
104. ARDINA, Elmarie C.
105. ARENAS, Jose Lemuel S.
106. ARIAS, Alma Alyn O.
107. ARICAYOS, Crisale B.
108. ARIOLA, Reynaldo A.
109. ARLES, Maria Estelita B.
110. ARMECIN, Jhomel M.
111. ARNESTO, Tristan G.
112. AROMAS, Camille Khristine I.
113. ARPON, Renold C.
114. ARTIFICIO, Aileen R.
115. ASADON, Baltazar C.
116. ASTAÑO, Imelda L.
117. ASUNCION, Hirou Glenn A.
118. ATANACIO-FACUN, Mary Ann S.
119. ATIENZA, Shermaine M.
120. ATIENZA, JR., Edgardo P.
121. AUMAN, Evangeline C.
122. AUSTRIA, Mary Evangeline J.
123. AVENGOZA, Ma. Rhoda J.
124. AVILA, Mae Lizbeth I.
125. AVILA, Mark Gregory R.
126. AWKIT-BAN-EG, Alice L.
127. AYONG, Juris Iris M.
128. AYSON, Aldin C.
129. AYUYANG, Helga Anne Treasure L.
130. AZUCENA, Michael David B.
131. AZUR, Marita Lourdes S.
132. AÑOVER, Josephine Ann W.
133. BABALCON, Julius P.
134. BABIA, Jose Marcos A.
135. BACANI, Philip Jorge P.
136. BADDIRI, Jurmobin T.
137. BADILLA, Reynaldo R.
138. BAGASIN, Gladys Sarah R.
139. BAGRO, III, Herminio C.
140. BAGSAO-MANALANG, Liza Lorena C.
141. BAINTO, Naealla Rose M.
142. BALAGOT, Anthony Quin A.
143. BALAIS, Jason P.
144. BALANGKIG, Glynmar C.
145. BALBASTRE, Kristoffer Gil P.
146. BALBASTRE, III, Juanito H.
147. BALDERAMA, Gilberth D.
148. BALDOMAR, Ceezaye A.
149. BALDRIAS-SERRANO, Lorybeth R.
150. BALISACAN, Ryan Hartzell C.
151. BALIÑA, Elsa T.
152. BALLESTEROS, Danilo C.
153. BALSICAS, Noel D.
154. BALTAZAR, Ben Joshua A.
155. BANA, Aldous Januarius S.
156. BANDAY, Christine Joy B.
157. BANDERADO, Theodore P.
158. BANDILLA, Enrico G.
159. BANDONG, Therese Lynn R.
160. BANGUIS, Joseph L.
161. BANQUERIGO, Mark Christoffel L.
162. BAQUIAL, Cheryl L.
163. BAQUIANO, Randolph P.
164. BAQUIRAN, Giovani Gio G.
165. BARBA, Ria Karla A.
166. BARENG, Christian P.
167. BARENG, Jezer G.
168. BARIMBAO, Maria Rainelda L.
169. BARIT-CARIG, Ayn Marie Grace G.
170. BARLIS, Lanie Lee Marie A.
171. BARODI, Norhabib Bin Suod S.
172. BAROLA, Sherwin Gardner A.
173. BARROA, III, Guillermo B.
174. BARRON, E. Patrice Jamaine T.
175. BARTOLOME, Ryan Philipp L.
176. BARZAGA, Kristian G.
177. BASAR, Jamaloden A.
178. BATALA, Ngiyan P.
179. BATAN, Timothy John R.
180. BATHAN, Joseph Patrick Byron M.
181. BATHAN, Marygrace DC.
182. BATINGANA, Nicole R.
183. BATINGANA, Nikko R.
184. BATONAN, Elizabeth O.
185. BAUTISTA, Antonette L.
186. BAUTISTA, Deodar Lovell C.
187. BAUTISTA, Gino Marco P.
188. BAUTISTA, Jennifer L.
189. BAUTISTA, Ma. Carmencita P.
190. BAUTISTA, Roderick L.
191. BAUTISTA-ALDAVE, Maria Minerva T.
192. BAUZON, Edward R.
193. BAYHON, Margret D.
194. BAYOT, Armi Beatriz E.
195. BAÑAL, Gilemi L.
196. BAÑARES, Marcus Aurellius M.
197. BELENO, Efren B.
198. BELGICA, Jeremiah B.
199. BENIPAYO, Lourdes P.
200. BERANGO, Joan Abigail B.
201. BERNARDO, Arly Christine S.
202. BERNARDO, JR., Lester F.
203. BEROL, Ronald S.
204. BERONQUE, Al L.
205. BETITO, James Anthony D.
206. BILGERA, Ma. Corazon B.
207. BILLONES, Cherrie Lou H.
208. BINALDO, Julie M.
209. BINUYA, Mary Dian Grace N.
210. BLANCO, Janess A.
211. BOGACON, Melissa W.
212. BOGNEDON, Jado Rafael A.
213. BOLAÑO, Richie John D.
214. BOLAÑOS, Ma. Julie C.
215. BOLISAY, Bernard James S.
216. BONIFACIO, Gherwin S.
217. BORNAS, Renier Joy Nonito B.
218. BORRES, Mark D.
219. BORROMEO, Carlo C.
220. BORROMEO, Maria Lilia Gemmilyn M.
221. BORROMEO, II, Noel T.
222. BORROMEO-SY, Ruth G.
223. BOSI, Christine Joy D.
224. BOY, Allen Blair B.
225. BRAVO, Hanna Lee E.
226. BRIASA, Gerardo S.
227. BRILLANTE, JR., Bayani B.
228. BRION, Valery Joy A.
229. BRUAL, Johannes Angelo L.
230. BUENAFE, Roy L.
231. BUENVIAJE, Rickson M.
232. BUMAGAT-NACPIL, Journalyn S.
233. BURGOS, Aileen Grace H.
234. BUSLIG, Jenny Vi B.
235. BUTED, Kristine Angeline R.
236. CAABAY, Herminia E.
237. CABADING, III, Mauro Anthony B.
238. CABALONGA, Ella A.
239. CABANSAG, Jasmin S.
240. CABAYAN, Maria Theresa P.
241. CABEZA, April D.
242. CABIGAS, Chato A.
243. CABRAL, Fernan H.
244. CABRERA, Nathaniel G.
245. CABRIDO, Jorge Christian A.
246. CADIO, Joan O.
247. CAFE, Dominador
248. CAGAS, Den Ryan R.
249. CAGUIOA, Arvin M.
250. CAJARA, Marian L.
251. CAJARDO, Monique E.
252. CAJIPO, Karen C.
253. CALABIO, Garri T.
254. CALACAL, Roda K.
255. CALAOA, Elizabeth B.
256. CALDERON, Arnel T.
257. CALEJESAN, Roldan G.
258. CALLEJO, Marc Karlo N.
259. CAMAZO, Lawrence S.
260. CAMBA, John Rainier T.
261. CAMPILAN, Kristine Esther F.
262. CAMPOS, Maria Paz Geraldine J.
263. CAMTUGAN, II, Francis Rae G.
264. CANAPI-OTGALON, Marites A.
265. CANIOS, Charisma Eden N.
266. CANLAS, Jerome D.
267. CANO, Maricel D.
268. CANTO-HERNANDEZ, Rosalyn C.
269. CANTUBA-SINGSON, Daria B.
270. CAPISTRANO, Armand P.
271. CARBO, Ramon Q.
272. CARDENAS, Marites G.
273. CARDENAS-EJERCITO, Aileen Mary S.
274. CARIÑO, Materno Marcos Ma. G.
275. CARO, Danna Wylene R.
276. CARPIO, May Flor C.
277. CARRANZA, Kamille Joyce E.
278. CARRASCO, Angeline Marie T.
279. CARRASCO-AZUCENA, Maria Bernadette R.
280. CARREON, Cresilda B.
281. CARTUJANO, Mariblithe A.
282. CASES, Katharina C.
283. CASIPIT, Jekereen Joy R.
284. CASTELLANO, Janice P.
285. CASTILLO, Chrisgene A.
286. CASTILLO, Dyann O.
287. CASTILLO-ABENALES, Aivy Lou P.
288. CASTILLO-CANDIDO, Hope Jan D.
289. CASTRO, Easter Princess U.
290. CASTRO, Meliecar R.
291. CATAHAN, Emmanuel D.
292. CATALAN, Kelly Eusebio P.
293. CATAMEO, Marizon C.
294. CATAPAT, Maria Nenita D.
295. CAYLAO, Christian Ferdinand R.
296. CAYOD-ONG, Ma. Angelica M.
297. CAÑARES, Marlon T.
298. CAÑAS, Vicente B.
299. CAÑERO, Marvin P.
300. CAÑETE, Maria Floren S.
301. CAÑETE, Vincent Ryan Y.
302. CEBUJANO, Ceasar Augustos E.
303. CENIZA, Deonhar M.
304. CEPILLO, Kenelyn DG.
305. CERVANTES, Maria Patricia R.
306. CHAM, Edward C.
307. CHAN, Rochelle T.
308. CHARCOS, Katheri Ann L.
309. CHAVEZ, Stephanie R.
310. CHING, Diane Madelyn C.
311. CHING, Wilbert H.
312. CHIONG, Chiole L.
313. CHU, Allan Christopher S.
314. CHUA, Joana Olivia L.
315. CHUA, Jose L.
316. CHUA, Robinita P.
317. CHUA, Sheryl Lyn T.
318. CIPRIANO, Ma. Dominique Christine S.
319. CLAR, Edgar Bonette B.
320. CLAVERIA, Kathleen Karinina R.
321. CLEDERA, Tristan Jiff B.
322. CLORIBEL, Michael P.
323. CLOSA, Felippe Mart E.
324. CO, Jillian Marie B.
325. CO, Maria Theresa C.
326. COLAGO, John Paul G.
327. COLIAMCO, Cherry C.
328. COLLADO, Jo Ellaine L.
329. COMPE, JR., Graciano C.
330. CONCEPCION, Haidee M.
331. CONCEPCION, Mark Nette E.
332. CONCEPCION, Rowena L.
333. CONDAT, Ariel B.
334. CONEJOS, Antonio Esteban G.
335. CONSTANTINO, Aiza B.
336. CONSTANTINO, Arturo Jose M.
337. CONSUL, Jurist Castrence R.
338. CORDERO, Antonette B.
339. CORDERO, JR., Jose I.
340. CORPUZ, Marichelle G.
341. CORRO, Arlyn T.
342. CORSIGA, Joachim Florencio Q.
343. CORTEZ, Elmo R.
344. CORTON, Gabriel P.
345. CREAG, Mary Joyce Roselle P.
346. CREER, Eleanor M.
347. CRISTALES, Inban Q.
348. CRUCIO, Gina A.
349. CRUZ, Mary Grace G.
350. CRUZ, Richard Leonard A.
351. CRUZ, JR., Jessie A.
352. CU, Lourdes Clarissa Donnatilla K.
353. CUANSING, Edward Joseph C.
354. CUARTERO, Floritz G.
355. CUEVAS, Dolly Angeli M.
356. CUEVAS, Faith A.
357. CULIMA, Riza Ann Donalyn B.
358. CUNANAN, Earvene Jared S.
359. CUNANAN, Myron C.
360. CUNTAPAY, Ana Florence S.
361. DACAWI, Joseph-hans B.
362. DACPANO, Jeannette M.
363. DADIS, Joel P.
364. DALANGIN, Aysac V.
365. DALAWAMPU, Louie Mark M.
366. DALIGCON, Mumar T.
367. DAMASCO, Elmer P.
368. DANAO, JR., Camilo N.
369. DANGLI, Florimae L.
370. DAPULA, Katrina C.
371. DARBIN, Billy Joe Ivan D.
372. DARE, Katrina S.
373. DAUS, Christopher B.
374. DAVIDE, JR., Jorge S.
375. DAY, Tzadhi C.
376. DAYANGHIRANG, Rochelle A.
377. DAYAO, Vincent M.
378. DAYO, Jesus Frederick D.
379. DE CASTRO, Maureen B.
380. DE GRACIA, Elinor E.
381. DE GUIA, Eugenie Celie A.
382. DE GUZMAN, Cara Martha R.
383. DE GUZMAN, Jacquelyn L.
384. DE GUZMAN, Jason B.
385. DE GUZMAN-ALINAO, Kristina D.
386. DE JESUS, Allelu N.
387. DE JESUS, Darren M.
388. DE JESUS, Jennyvive L.
389. DE KEYSER, Evee Eunice P.
390. DE LEON, Cindy A.
391. DE LOS REYES, Maricor V.
392. DE VERA, Coney Rose M.
393. DE VERA, IV, Felipe Geoffrey K.
394. DE VILLA, Lezel E.
395. DECANO, Ronald John B.
396. DEGUIÑO, Aileen M.
397. DEKIRE, Samrollah M.
398. DEL ROSARIO, Katrina Elsa D.
399. DEL CASTILLO, Xavier Paolo R.
400. DEL PILAR, Jovill C.
401. DEL PUERTO, Laurence Edgardo A.
402. DEL ROSARIO, Maria Katrina G.
403. DEL ROSARIO, Rafael Celestino D.
404. DELA CALZADA, Jo Feliz Marie M.
405. DELA CRUZ, Lenielyn S.
406. DELA CRUZ, Roderick C.
407. DELA CRUZ, Walter Magnum D.
408. DELA FUENTE, Kim Ceasar P.
409. DELA PEÑA, Eleanor P.
410. DELA PEÑA, Nikki Rose L.
411. DELA ROSA, Arnel A.
412. DELANTAR, Eleanor S.
413. DELAS ALAS, Noel A.
414. DELEGIRO, Janet L.
415. DELES, Karla Grace J.
416. DELEÑA, Ryan B.
417. DELFIN, Diana Jane F.
418. DELFIN, Gerri Ann C.
419. DELOS SANTOS, Benito Jose L.
420. DEMAFELIS, Jo Anne S.
421. DEMANO, Mary Pauline R.
422. DENILLA, Resly Ann M.
423. DEPASUCAT, Hope Marey B.
424. DESINGAÑO, Ritchelle M.
425. DETICIO, Farid Eshwer C.
426. DEVELOS, V, Esperidion Augustus O.
427. DIAZ, Ana Charissa D.
428. DIAZ, Daniel L.
429. DIAZ, Ferdinand Arthur B.
430. DIAZ, Ma. Hiyasmin N.
431. DIAZ, Romano M.
432. DIAZ, JR., Honorio T.
433. DICHAVES, Kenny Roy S.
434. DICKPUS, Charisma Anne O.
435. DIESTRO-DESLATE, Gwendolyn
436. DIETA, Don G.
437. DILLA, Marlon A.
438. DIMARUCUT, Ivy C.
439. DIOKNO, Michael William T.
440. DIWA, Wilhelmina M.
441. DIZON, Betheena C.
442. DIZON, Jeifan-ira C.
443. DIZON, Mark Anthony P.
444. DIZON, Peter Michael G.
445. DOBLADA, Marife C.
446. DOBLE, Francis R.
447. DOFELIZ, Auxillador Avitus D.
448. DOGELIO, Jairus Anthony D.
449. DOLIGON, Daniel C.
450. DOMINGO, Katrina Frances M.
451. DOMOGAN, Janice Marie N.
452. DOOLANI, Sunita G.
453. DOQUILLA, Rubylin G.
454. DRILON, Catherine Marie D.
455. DUEÑAS, Odyssa A.
456. DUJUNCO, Raquel R.
457. DUKA, Annabelle B.
458. DULIG, Amethyst L.
459. DUMALIANG, Jana A.
460. DUMPIT, Donna Diana R.
461. DY, Samantha Paula G.
462. EBARLE, Emanuelle A.
463. ECLAR, Catherine M.
464. EDULAN, Charles Ceasar L.
465. ELBANBUENA, Kahlil Paolo O.
466. ELTANAL, Karen Mae G.
467. EMBIDO-BUENAVENTURA, Crystal Dei L.
468. ENAGE, Kim Boysie A.
469. ENCANTO, Melissa R.
470. ENCARNACION, Vincent Joseph T.
471. ENCINARES, Marife E.
472. ENERIA, Celeste E.
473. ENRILE, Christy Irene D.
474. ENRIQUEZ, Marizza P.
475. ENRIQUEZ, III, Juan Jose P.
476. ENTREDICHO, Delima S.
477. ESCALA, Lyndon D.
478. ESCALANTE, JR., Felix M.
479. ESCALANTE, JR., Vic T.
480. ESCANDER, Abdel Jalil A.
481. ESCIO, Madonna Gay L.
482. ESCOLANO, JR., Benjamin V.
483. ESCOLAR, Ahmad Clay C.
484. ESCUBIO, Jessica Guia E.
485. ESPALDON, Ruel H.
486. ESPARRAGO, Janice C.
487. ESPEJO, Bernadette B.
488. ESPEJO, Edwin M.
489. ESPEJON, Charisse B.
490. ESPERANTE, Jason C.
491. ESPINAS, Jeshiree D.
492. ESPINO, Franco P.
493. ESPINOSA, Kristine M.
494. ESPUELAS, Haide T.
495. ESTAÑO, Liza Jane B.
496. ESTEBAN, Sheena E.
497. ESTORNINOS, Jamil V.
498. ESTUR, Mark Julius C.
499. EUSTAQUIO, Karldon M.
500. EVANGELISTA, Anna Tricia P.
501. EVANGELISTA, Ma. Rebecca G.
502. EVANGELISTA, Roberto P.
503. FAJARDO, Juan Paolo F.
504. FALCON, Lyndon D.
505. FAMOR, Pacholo S.
506. FARAON, Redeemer B.
507. FAUNI, Peter Joseph L.
508. FELIX, Melchor M.
509. FERNANDEZ, Clint M.
510. FERNANDEZ, Dick F.
511. FERRER, Anthony G.
512. FETILO, Aires R.
513. FILARMEO, Charmaine Joy P.
514. FLORES, Divina M.
515. FLORES, Erickson A.
516. FLORES, Judith T.
517. FONTANILLA, Psyche Rizsavi B.
518. FORNOLLES, Angelo Vegie A.
519. FORTICH, Farrah N.
520. FRANCISCO, Valerie E.
521. FRIAS, Ma. Karla Denise M.
522. FUENTES-DUMLAO, Camille Rose D.
523. FUNTILA, Karla A.
524. GABATO, Vien Lawrence S.
525. GABINETE, John Warren P.
526. GABRILLO, Jenifer M.
527. GABUYA, Ademar A.
528. GAFFUD, Jovilyn M.
529. GALANG, Arman Jason M.
530. GALANG, Marianette A.
531. GALARRITA, Kathryn A.
532. GALIMA, III, Epifanio Delbert G.
533. GALLARDO, Jeffrey G.
534. GALURA, Maria Ofelia B.
535. GALVEZ, Grace A.
536. GAMALO, Castor A.
537. GAMAS, Godwin B.
538. GAMBOA, Jufran A.
539. GAMBOA, Mark Anthony M.
540. GAN, Hansen P.
541. GANAN, Mark Anthony N.
542. GANDAMRA, Khanini B.
543. GANDIONCO, Barbara Anne A.
544. GANZON, Leo Theodore A.
545. GARCE-MEJIA, Racquel F.
546. GARCELLANO, Anita B.
547. GARCIA, Andrea Lou J.
548. GARCIA, Charlie S.
549. GARCIA, Irvin L.
550. GARCIA, Leamor B.
551. GARCIA, Ronaldo M.
552. GARCIA, JR., Alberto C.
553. GARCIA, JR., Jose Melandro H.
554. GARCIANO, Suzette L.
555. GARIANDO, Cesar C.
556. GARRAEZ, Albert C.
557. GARRIDO, Maica C.
558. GATCHALIAN, Oliver R.
559. GATMAITAN, Rowena B.
560. GAUDIEL, IV, Bibiano Marc P.
561. GAVIOLA, Bryan O.
562. GAVIOLA, Maria Christina E.
563. GAVIOLA, Mark Anthony P.
564. GAYAGAY-APALING, Catherine B.
565. GEALAN, Noel Francis L.
566. GELLADO-CARREON, Maricon M.
567. GENCIANOS, Eden Rachel M.
568. GENERAL, Jose Martin O.
569. GENERAL, Maria Francina Louise O.
570. GENERAL, Marianne C.
571. GENOVA, Carmi Rose M.
572. GENOVESA, Katherine A.
573. GENTUGAYA, Norman Vincent O.
574. GEPOLONGCA, Josecor S.
575. GERONIMO, Krystine B.
576. GERONIMO, Maria Ilyn C.
577. GERONIMO, Michelle N.
578. GEROY, Mylen C.
579. GERSAVA, Socrates T.
580. GESMUNDO, Joseph Benedict G.
581. GEÑOSO, Al An E.
582. GIGANTONE, Alexander G.
583. GIGAWIN, Ma. Kristina R.
584. GINGO, Rowena G.
585. GITGANO, Lylani A.
586. GLORIA, Laila May A.
587. GO, Sheila Abigail O.
588. GOCHANGCO, Jose Marie V.
589. GODORNES, Janice A.
590. GOMEZ, Gian Franco R.
591. GOMEZ, Ma. Krizna S.
592. GONZALES, Antonio G.
593. GONZALES, Jesus Nathaniel Martin B.
594. GONZALES, Nichole D.
595. GONZALES, Ricel M.
596. GONZALES, Ulysses L.
597. GONZALES, III, Emilio R.
598. GONZALES-DIEGO, Maria Victoria M.
599. GONZALEZ, Yves-randolph P.
600. GOZE, Gilbert C.
601. GREGORIO, Carlo O.
602. GUALBERTO, Rhett Matthew S.
603. GUANZON, Kathlyn Joy M.
604. GUAZON, Rhea A.
605. GUELOS, Orchid Marie D.
606. GUERRA, Marvin Jasper B.
607. GUIAM, Joseph E.
608. GUIANG, Sandra Therese Christine C.
609. GUINOCOR, Rysan C.
610. GUIRAO, Nerissa G.
611. GUMALING, JR., Robert N.
612. GUTIERREZ, Alvin A.
613. GUTIERREZ, Chiara Feliz C.
614. GUTIERREZ, Melina Rose E.
615. GUTIERREZ, Rowena M.
616. GUZMAN, Carl Stephen A.
617. GUZMAN, Cristina Amelia R.
618. HAIRUN-NATIVIDAD, Jhihann C.
619. HALILI, Madonna F.
620. HAMOY, Jim A.
621. HERMOSO, Rosa Christina R.
622. HERMOSURA, Glenda V.
623. HERNAEZ, III, Rosendo Emilio R.
624. HERNANDEZ, Juan Carlo B.
625. HERNANDEZ, Katrina P.
626. HERNANDEZ, Mary Catherine T.
627. HERNANDEZ, Michael Gerard S.
628. HERNANDO, Harold Kim C.
629. HERRERA, Pamela Joy T.
630. HILADO, Jessica Kristine F.
631. HILARIO, Alen Fredd L.
632. HIPOL, Aurora Catalina M.
633. HIRANG, Gemelee G.
634. HOLLERO, Valerie Anne H.
635. HONTUCAN-QUIJANO, Vanessa A.
636. HUMARANG, Michael John M.
637. IBAOC, Cherry P.
638. IBAÑEZ, III, Manuel Joseph B.
639. IGNACIO, Erik Donn
640. IGNACIO, Vanessa Grace M.
641. ILAGAN, Ma. Criselda D.
642. ILAHAN, Benjan B.
643. ILANO, Helen Grace O.
644. IMPERIAL, Jonas Luis P.
645. INES, Benedict Vincent L.
646. INFANTE, Philippe Lauren M.
647. INGUITO, Lora Mae T.
648. INVENTOR, Angelo T.
649. IPAC, Jay-R C.
650. IRASGA, Matthew N.
651. IRORITA, Jay M.
652. JACOBA, Anthony Raphael V.
653. JAGMIS, Richander G.
654. JALA, Gena B.
655. JALAD, Andrew S.
656. JAMBALOS, Johanna V.
657. JANIYA, Shalom P.
658. JARDELEZA, Maria Carmen L.
659. JARENCIO, Cherylle E.
660. JAVELLANA, Gerardo B.
661. JAVIER, Maureen Seymour D.
662. JAVIER, IV, Eugene C.
663. JAVIER-JIMENEZ, Cristina Marie Eugenie R.
664. JAVINAR, Donato B.
665. JIMENEZ, Arianne Vanessa Josephine T.
666. JIMENEZ, Jasmine M.
667. JIMENEZ, Thea Marie B.
668. JIMENO, Nikki Sarah V.
669. JORDAN, Roma Joy R.
670. JORNADA, Ryan Rene C.
671. JORVINA, Karmela H.
672. JOSON, Joanna Marie O.
673. JOVEN, Suzette C.
674. JUBAN, Rowell G.
675. JULIAN, Cherry Amor A.
676. JUNIO, Irene May I.
677. KABATAY, Rodrigo Jose A.
678. KANAPI, Erwin Bryan S.
679. KAPUNAN, Armina Dielle R.
680. KATALBAS, Jubert P.
681. KO, Kevin L.
682. LABADAN, Leah Theresa L.
683. LABANEN, Argyle Karen M.
684. LABAO, Daisy Jane L.
685. LABITAD, Tarcisio Z.
686. LABRO, JR., Edwin Valente Z.
687. LACANILAO, Redgeanald S.
688. LACUATA, Daniel Christian B.
689. LACUESTA, Andrea Patricia R.
690. LAGMAY, Nikko G.
691. LAGOS, Caroline P.
692. LAGUESMA, Gabriel Russel B.
693. LAGUINDAM, Arvin E.
694. LAINEZ, Marco Gregorio L.
695. LAITA, Rainier F.
696. LAMANILAO, Stephen A.
697. LAMAYAN, Gretchen D.
698. LAMBINO, Marie Claire Therese C.
699. LAMEYRA, Ericson D.
700. LAMINATO, Claryl-anne D.
701. LAPUZ, Anson T.
702. LAPUZ, Jesusa R.
703. LARON, Richard E.
704. LASAM, Ma. Katrina A.
705. LASSITER, Bryan A.
706. LASTIMOSO, Arthur J.
707. LATAWAN, Wade A.
708. LATO, Lesley Norreen G.
709. LAVA, Ma. Glaiza L.
710. LAYSON, Reinier B.
711. LAYUG, Marilet S.
712. LAZA, Rely D.
713. LAZARO, Paul Ernest M.
714. LEE, Everlene O.
715. LEE, Judith Z.
716. LEGASPI, Melvin I.
717. LEQUIGAN-PIOL, Milagros C.
718. LERIOS, Edmar D.
719. LEYNES, Jerome Christopher G.
720. LIANZA, Mellicent C.
721. LIBERATO, Allen A.
722. LIBUTAQUE, Jenny G.
723. LICAROS, Anna Theresa L.
724. LIGUTAN, Amando Virgil D.
725. LIM, Aldean Philip A.
726. LIM, Bernadette C.
727. LIM, Charmian D.
728. LIM, Dianne A.
729. LIM, Elnathan C.
730. LIM, Janette T.
731. LIM, John Paul T.
732. LIM, May Abigail T.
733. LIM, Shelly T.
734. LIMBONHAI, Katrina Anne T.
735. LIMPOT, Marcelina C.
736. LIN, Chin C.
737. LINDONGAN, Arnel A.
738. LIONG, Frederick G.
739. LIPORADA, Isagani S.
740. LIQUETE, John Henry C.
741. LIRA, Jimmy Lyn F.
742. LIZANO, Jennifer M.
743. LIZASO, Marina Elenita S.
744. LLAMEDO, Lecel R.
745. LLASOS, Ma. Paz A.
746. LLAVE, Jose Fernando G.
747. LLEDO, Precious Angela L.
748. LLESOL, Kristine Jolly S.
749. LLOSA, Ruben M.
750. LOBO, Allan C.
751. LOBO, Alvin C.
752. LOGRONIO, Nelson U.
753. LOMBOY, Alex Norman B.
754. LONTOK, Benito M.
755. LOPEZ, Jess Raymund M.
756. LOPEZ, Nastasja Karina J.
757. LOPEZ, Precious Czar A.
758. LOPEZ, Sarah Jane D.
759. LOPEZ, Welson M.
760. LORENZO, Rochelle V.
761. LORENZO, III, Andres D.
762. LOZANO, JR., Ernesto S.
763. LOZARE, Allan C.
764. LUBRIO, Maria Cristina L.
765. LUCERO, Arlene O.
766. LUCILA, Marguerite Therese L.
767. LUGO, Marylois C.
768. LUMAGUE, Ma. Cecille D.
769. LUMAUIG, Timothy Joseph N.
770. LUMAWAG, Joan O.
771. LUNA, Hans Roger S.
772. LUNA, Reymund F.
773. LUNDANG, Lynneth T.
774. LUPOS-GERALE, Lyn N.
775. LUZUNG, Fred C.
776. MABANSAG, Ulidia B.
777. MABUTE, Neddejohn L.
778. MACABATA, Michael S.
779. MACAGAAN, Sittie Aleah C.
780. MACALABO-ABDUL, T'hasmin P.
781. MACALINTAL, Ma. Jinel G.
782. MACAM, JR., Cezar A.
783. MACAPAS-GAGARACRUZ, Leah Meih S.
784. MACAPAYAG, Neliza N.
785. MACAPILI, Judelyn T.
786. MACASAET, Bhong Paulo A.
787. MACASAET, Julius Caesar Junior I.
788. MACLANG, Cisco Franz S.
789. MADARCOS, Rachelle G.
790. MADERAZO, Gail Stephanie C.
791. MADRID, Dianne Ricci DC.
792. MAGALLOSA, Jan Rey E.
793. MAGAT, Edward S.
794. MAGCAMIT, Eric Jay A.
795. MAGLANQUE, JR., Abelardo P.
796. MAGLASANG, Chevrolie E.
797. MAGLUNOG, Tiffany Kim R.
798. MAGMANLAC, Joysha D.
799. MAGSANO, Rexie May E.
800. MAGUGAT, Jenny Vi H.
801. MAGUIGAD, Vanessa Q.
802. MAILOM, Mariel A.
803. MAIQUEZ, Kristine Anne L.
804. MALABANAN, Melvin C.
805. MALALUAN, Joseph S.
806. MALANG, Kristine Margret M.
807. MALAPITAN, Elmar H.
808. MALINAO, Rose A.
809. MALLETE, Elbert R.
810. MALLILLIN, Bryan Joseph L.
811. MALLILLIN, Maria Rea A.
812. MALVEDA, Patrick John V.
813. MANAHAN, Elson B.
814. MANAHAN, Geline Joy C.
815. MANALANG, Jerry L.
816. MANALO, Eric N.
817. MANANES, Edward Martin M.
818. MANCOL, Creschic C.
819. MANDAP, Charity P.
820. MANGAMPO, Mark Philip C.
821. MANGUERA, Aris S.
822. MANGUERA, Erwin C.
823. MANINGAS, Peter Kate C.
824. MANLANGIT, Constantino U.
825. MANLAPAZ, Benedicto G.
826. MANLAPAZ, Raian Joy G.
827. MANTICAJON, Ian Vincent C.
828. MANZANO, Catherina N.
829. MAPULA, Paolo Marco R.
830. MAQUIRAYA, Mark Albert Gregory B.
831. MARAJAS, Camille Suzanne R.
832. MARALIT, Maricon Z.
833. MARASIGAN, Michael Jobert M.
834. MARASIGAN, Nicholas S.
835. MARAÑON, III, Emilio L.
836. MARIANO, Charlen Masha A.
837. MARIANO, Karmina A.
838. MARISTAZA, Ryan F.
839. MARISTAZA, JR., Romulo T.
840. MAROHOMSALIC, Aliya L.
841. MARQUEZ, Carlo B.
842. MARQUEZ, Jemil Christian B.
843. MARTIN, Marilou C.
844. MARTINEZ, Joseph L.
845. MARTINEZ, Ken Emery B.
846. MARTIZANO, Giuseppe G.
847. MARZAN, Kareen Silver P.
848. MAS, JR., Emmanuel N.
849. MATIAS, Michael Drake P.
850. MATIB, Erwin G.
851. MATOZA, Jason T.
852. MATULOY, Rhandell Alvin B.
853. MAUHAY, Gisela Cecilia A.
854. MAUNTING, Aisa (Bruneiry) G.
855. MAZO, Rosalie T.
856. MEDEL, Edward B.
857. MEDEZ, Rosanne Chriselle S.
858. MEDRANO, Ryan P.
859. MEER, Francis James E.
860. MELCHOR, Jennifer M.
861. MENCHAVEZ, Estrella G.
862. MENCHAVEZ, Llewelyn P.
863. MENDIGUARIN, Donna D.
864. MENDIOLA, Dana Paula B.
865. MENDOZA, Bernadette C.
866. MENDOZA, Felix Glenn C.
867. MENDOZA, Josephine Marie B.
868. MENDOZA, Julie Aylene DV.
869. MENDOZA, Marco T.
870. MENDOZA, Rizaldy L.
871. MENDOZA-MACROHON, Iris May T.
872. MERACAP, Charlemaigne L.
873. MERCADO, Aissa C.
874. MERCADO, Ronald Crisanto P.
875. MERIN, Iris Victoria U.
876. MESA, Reina L.
877. MESINA, Bridget Rose M.
878. MESINA, Rita Marie L.
879. MIGRIÑO, Joseph R.
880. MIGUEL, Filamer D.
881. MIJARES, Cecil Joy T.
882. MIMBALAWAG, Ibrahim M.
883. MINA, Marita Anna C.
884. MIRANDA, Francis E.
885. MIRANDA, Hazel May P.
886. MIRANDA, Maricel C.
887. MIRASOL, Rommel Jan T.
888. MOCNANGAN, Tom P.
889. MODESTO, Katherine Joy R.
890. MOHAMETANO, Gift S.
891. MOLDEZ, Maria Cecilia A.
892. MOLINA, Chenellyn S.
893. MOLINA, Mat J.
894. MOLINA, Rosana M.
895. MOLO, Junalit G.
896. MONCERA, Ana Marie N.
897. MONDEZ, Thomas Elliot A.
898. MONFERO, Deane Ruth S.
899. MONJE, Johannes S.
900. MONSOD, Eunice Zuleika N.
901. MONTEALTO, Beverly V.
902. MONTECILLO, Conchita D.
903. MONTEFALCON, Donna April G.
904. MONTEMAYOR, Patrick G.
905. MONTENEGRO, Nabi Karl Bayani O.
906. MONTERO, Froilan A.
907. MONTERO, II, Jose Voltaire B.
908. MONTESA, Cyrus Richard A.
909. MONTEZA, Evangeline C.
910. MONTIBON, Gemmini N.
911. MONTILLA, Aris R.
912. MORAL, Leah Marie A.
913. MORALDE, Ginalyn O.
914. MORALES, Maria Liberty D.
915. MORALES, Maria Teresa G.
916. MORALES, Rhea Joy M.
917. MORANDARTE, Ian E.
918. MOREÑO, J. Ricardo H.
919. MOSCARE, Daisy Lily O.
920. MOSQUERA, Joanne Lenny M.
921. MUAÑA, Cara S.
922. MUTIA, Rowena F.
923. MUÑIZ, Sheila DM.
924. MUÑOZ, Jo Ann Marie A.
925. NADUMA, Mat Kieven T.
926. NAMUAG, Maria Roana O.
927. NARIDO, Eleuterio C.
928. NATIVIDAD, Cynthia C.
929. NATIVIDAD, Peter Paul T.
930. NAVAL, Bodie Edward D.
931. NAVAL, Vanessa O.
932. NAVALLO, Michael Jobert I.
933. NAVARRO, Analissa V.
934. NAVARRO, F.J. Edmund Jensen S.
935. NAVARRO, Herbert C.
936. NAVERA, Angeline Z.
937. NEDIC, Riya Adelaida C.
938. NER, Alexander D.
939. NICANOR, Morgan R.
940. NICOLAS, Jeneline N.
941. NICOLAS, Jona Liza F.
942. NIERE, Sheila Simonet G.
943. NIERVA, Carmela B.
944. NOCOS, Gent Paul A.
945. NOLASCO, May Rachel S.
946. NUEVE, Thea Gicela C.
947. NUGUIT, Mark Anthony M.
948. NUÑEZ, Rene John V.
949. OANDASAN, Nelia O.
950. OASAY, Jenny F.
951. OBILES, Jayson
952. OBLIGACION, Romelyn A.
953. OBON, Maureen Rose T.
954. OBSUM, Shaun Hassen C.
955. OCAMPO, Analita E.
956. OCAMPO, Angelique Michelle Irene L.
957. OCAMPO, Kenneth Z.
958. OCAMPO, Lovereal Joy M.
959. OCAMPO, Ma. Sarah Kay N.
960. ODERO, Rhoda N.
961. OFENDA, Giovanni C.
962. OGOY-BERNARDO, Sherryl B.
963. OJEDA, Susana Grace L.
964. OLAN, Rodolfo M.
965. OLANO, Alisa Trena R.
966. OLERIANA, Caress L.
967. OLITOQUIT, Leila C.
968. ONA, Maricar L.
969. ONCOG-ALBANO, Rosa Theresa A.
970. ONG, Edward T.
971. ONG, Vic Ruskin M.
972. ONTALAN, Frances Mae Cherrie K.
973. OQUINDO-GONZAGA, Maria Karina B.
974. ORDONEZ, Lady May F.
975. ORILLA, Donna Marie G.
976. OROLA-ABAYGAR, Elnora J.
977. ORPIADA, Mary Jane N.
978. ORTEGA, Sarah T.
979. PAALA, Eumaida C.
980. PABALAN, Mary Grace A.
981. PABELLANO, Joycee M.
982. PABLEO, Ann Marie Teresa B.
983. PACHECO, Peter John Raymund B.
984. PACLEB, Kathleen Carisa C.
985. PADILLA, Agnes L.
986. PADILLA, Dexter V.
987. PADILLA, Patrick A.
988. PADILLA, Rafael Angelo M.
989. PADILLA, II, Victor Luis Q.
990. PADKIW, Appasan K.
991. PADULLO, JR., Macario C.
992. PAGAYANAN, Claire Eufracia P.
993. PAGUE, Kristine Jane B.
994. PAGUNSAN, Pampross J.
995. PALACAO-CONDAT, Cheryl M.
996. PALAD, Dennis M.
997. PALIC, Anabelle S.
998. PALLARCA, Cecilia S.
999. PALOMA, Eileen C.
1000. PAMINTUAN, III, Alberto D.
1001. PANDOY, May R.
1002. PANES, Shirley S.
1003. PANGANIBAN, Jasmin P.
1004. PAPA, Ma. Leonila P.
1005. PARAS, Joyce D.
1006. PARCIA, Mark Anthony M.
1007. PARDUCHO, Nestle Lyn M.
1008. PAREDES, Annabel M.
1009. PAREDES, Mark Allen M.
1010. PARGAS, May Chrysaliz E.
1011. PARROCHA, Rodan G.
1012. PASAGUI, Ryan Rey L.
1013. PASAMONTE, Jan Philip O.
1014. PASANA-TURGANO, Princesita C.
1015. PASCO, Lyle Filomeo C.
1016. PASCO, Maria Rosario B.
1017. PASCUA, Elmer G.
1018. PASCUA, Sherwin P.
1019. PASCUAL, Kalvin Henson C.
1020. PASCUAL, Rafael Allan P.
1021. PASCUAL, Rosemary T.
1022. PASTOR, Mark Steven C.
1023. PASTOR-CORPUZ, Gizelle R.
1024. PASTORFIDE, Grace C.
1025. PATALITA-ARCOLAS, Nelsie V.
1026. PATANGAN, Al-may Sair F.
1027. PATDU, Ivy D.
1028. PATRIARCA, Judith P.
1029. PAUDAC, Hasminah D.
1030. PAULINO-GOGOLIN, Edna C.
1031. PAZ, Ma. Patricia B.
1032. PE LIM, Alfred John C.
1033. PEDROSA, Arnel M.
1034. PELAEZ, Joseph Paul B.
1035. PELAYO-ALUTAYA, Marlou
1036. PELEA, Emmanuel E.
1037. PENADOS, Faith C.
1038. PENSOY, Randolf C.
1039. PEPITO, Charisse Faith T.
1040. PEPITO, Isar O.
1041. PERALTA, Xandrix J.
1042. PERANDOS, Mitos Shiela J.
1043. PERDIGUERRA-MUÑOZ, Divina Lea A.
1044. PEROLA, Melissa Grace T.
1045. PETEROS, Rosarie A.
1046. PEYRA, JR., Monico L.
1047. PEÑA-MALLANAO, Ana May Concepcion C.
1048. PEÑAFLOR, Maria Christina P.
1049. PICAR, Rianne M.
1050. PICO-ELUMBA, April Joan B.
1051. PIJO, JR., Reynaldo M.
1052. PINATARA, Nadjer D.
1053. PITAHIN, Ferdinand Emmanuel C.
1054. PITPIT, Froilan B.
1055. PIZARRO, January C.
1056. PIZARRO, IV, Zacarias L.
1057. PLATA, Kristine C.
1058. PLOTEÑA, Vivian T.
1059. PONCE, Rebecca Carla M.
1060. PONIO, IV, Amelia S.
1061. POSIO, Jake Patrick P.
1062. POZON, Ira Paulo A.
1063. PRADAS, Liza D.
1064. PRESTOZA, Anthony G.
1065. PUA, Maricris Connie B.
1066. PUACHE, Melojean M.
1067. PUERTO, Ofelia R.
1068. PULICAY, Rey B.
1069. PUNAY, Arceli C.
1070. PUNO, Vincent I.
1071. PUNSALAN, Enjl D.
1072. PURGANAN, Anthony J.
1073. PUSPUS, Archie B.
1074. PUZON, Dominique Jose S.
1075. PUZON, Jocelyn V.
1076. QUEROL, Marah Victoria S.
1077. QUEVENCO, Jesus Ramon M.
1078. QUIJANO, Mia Antonette M.
1079. QUILAQUIGA, Sharina C.
1080. QUIMPO, Nancy Aurora D.
1081. QUINIO, Patrick Joseph M.
1082. QUINTANILLA, Czarina G.
1083. QUINTON, Larry M.
1084. QUIOC, Marina Luz P.
1085. QUIOGUE, Marie Antonette B.
1086. QUIPSE, Isabel Milagros L.
1087. QUIRANTE, Aileen L.
1088. QUIÑONES, Charlie A.
1089. RABANAL, Diana F.
1090. RACOMA, Monica Rose B.
1091. RAFOLS, Jeanny Mae H.
1092. RAGOJOS, Michael A.
1093. RAMIREZ-CAÑETE, Margaux Angeli R.
1094. RAMIRO, Tanya Faye O.
1095. RAMOS, Frances Lynn C.
1096. RAMOS, Kristian Lorenz B.
1097. RAMOS, Lanie B.
1098. RAMOS-TEJADA, Elsiemarie B.
1099. RANCES, Katherine May N.
1100. RAPATAN, Neil Jerome A.
1101. RAVANERA, Ilya Kristine R.
1102. RAYOS DEL SOL, Juan Fermin D.
1103. REANTASO, Maria Celeste A.
1104. REBADOMIA, Venice Cyrus M.
1105. REBUGIO, Dani Jay G.
1106. RECTO, Rolando R.
1107. REDOBLADO, Bea Carla C.
1108. REDOBLE, Luisito D.
1109. REGALA-PAVIA, Alma Renee C.
1110. REGALADO, John Christian Joy A.
1111. RELAMPAGOS, Janris Jay G.
1112. REMIGIO, Frederick Jay E.
1113. REQUIÑO, II, Claudio G.
1114. RESARI, Steve G.
1115. REVAMONTE, Vanessa G.
1116. REY, Mark Ryan B.
1117. REYES, Cherrie Lynne May P.
1118. REYES, Irene Mischele B.
1119. REYES, Jennylyn V.
1120. REYES, John Philip L.
1121. REYES, Julius Christian L.
1122. REYES, Leslie Ann A.
1123. REYES, Mariflor V.
1124. REYES, Mark Anthony P.
1125. REYES, Mary Kristine C.
1126. REYES, Mary Ann H.
1127. REYES, Remus Romano A.
1128. REYES, JR., Arsenio C.
1129. REYNOSO, Jay Paolo A.
1130. RICABLANCA-PARGAS, Sonia Philipa M.
1131. RIMANDO, Rhiza Lee D.
1132. RISMA, Ace Victor F.
1133. RIVAS, Amy S.
1134. RIVERA, Lordaliza R.
1135. RIZON, Maria Theresa V.
1136. ROBINO, Leif John L.
1137. ROBLES, Margarita Angela B.
1138. ROBREDILLO, Jose Ruther P.
1139. ROCAMORA, Timothy John G.
1140. RODAS, Carlo D.
1141. RODENAS, Jason G.
1142. RODRIGUEZ, Jay Y.
1143. ROJAS, Aileez C.
1144. ROJO, Alejandro N.
1145. ROLDAN, Maria Theresa A.
1146. ROMERO, Anna Leah T.
1147. ROMERO, Ginalin Joy C.
1148. ROMERO, Maria Paula G.
1149. ROMERO, Ryan V.
1150. RONDARIO, Christina Eden M.
1151. RONULO, Jonathan B.
1152. ROQUE, Patricia Marie Regina V.
1153. ROSACIA, Diane Christie A.
1154. ROSALES, Rose Anne P.
1155. ROSOS, Mya Analene D.
1156. ROXAS, JR., Almario H.
1157. RUBINOS, Danielle-anne O.
1158. RUBIO, Ophelia Pilar E.
1159. RUEDAS, Ronald P.
1160. RUFO, Ivy G.
1161. RUFON, III, Jose Athanasius S.
1162. RUIZ, Kathleen Joy M.
1163. RUSELL, Rosemarie A.
1164. SABADO, Kathryn S.
1165. SABINO, Sheila May S.
1166. SAC, Abbiegail D.
1167. SACAY-HWANG, Emmeline A.
1168. SACLOLO, Sharon N.
1169. SACRAMENTO, Allan M.
1170. SAGADAL, Darius L.
1171. SAGCAL, Michael Arthur C.
1172. SAID, Johaira B.
1173. SALADA, Mary Ann T.
1174. SALAMAT, Aimee Abigail E.
1175. SALANGA, Yolanda A.
1176. SALAVER-VILLALINO, Audrey A.
1177. SALCEDO, R Epicurus Charlo S.
1178. SALCEDO, Vera Shayne G.
1179. SALES, Rodante A.
1180. SALIGUMBA, Dyan Kristine R.
1181. SALLIDAO, Debie K.
1182. SALONGA, Rowena Fatima M.
1183. SALUD, Jose Victorniño L.
1184. SALVA, JR., Nelson C.
1185. SALVADOR, Christopher Sam S.
1186. SALVADOR, Jana Rebekah A.
1187. SALVADORA-ASPERIN, Melamy A.
1188. SALVE, Maria Edbiesa B.
1189. SAMPER, Yvette H.
1190. SAN DIEGO, Larina DG.
1191. SAN DIEGO-QUIJANO, Celine Muriel C.
1192. SAN JUAN, Leika P.
1193. SAN MIGUEL, Melisa L.
1194. SAN PEDRO, Fraulein B.
1195. SAN PEDRO, Kristin C.
1196. SANA, Elias Omar A.
1197. SANCHEZ, Angelo Albert T.
1198. SANCHEZ, Jennifer DL.
1199. SANCHEZ, Maruli Ali G.
1200. SANCHEZ, Olive B.
1201. SANCHEZ, Reinhard C.
1202. SANCHEZ, Richard P.
1203. SANCHEZ, JR., Jacinto C.
1204. SANCHEZ-LLORITO, Livian May
1205. SANDALO, Winlove Apple R.
1206. SANDOVAL, Edouard Y.
1207. SANGALANG, Ela A.
1208. SANIDAD, Dick R.
1209. SANIDAD, JR., Pablito F.
1210. SANTIAGO, Evangeline A.
1211. SANTIAGO, Glendale R.
1212. SANTIAGO, Marco P.
1213. SANTIAGO, Ronacyn P.
1214. SANTIAGO, JR., Eugenio M.
1215. SANTO, Carissa E.
1216. SANTOS, Ayesa Theresa S.
1217. SANTOS, Darwin B.
1218. SANTOS, Deborah B.
1219. SANTOS, Lea D.
1220. SANTOS, Nikki Neil R.
1221. SANTOS, Ryan V.
1222. SANTOS, Sheila A.
1223. SANTOS, Verna Kate B.
1224. SANTOS-MONTEBON, Arlyn S.
1225. SAPALO, Ignacio A.
1226. SAQUING, Claudette Michelle T.
1227. SARMIENTO, Frances Jeanne L.
1228. SAROMINES, Jonathan L.
1229. SARONA, Jazzie M.
1230. SARZA, Maneeka A.
1231. SAURA, III, Ramon A.
1232. SAYAS, Gerard M.
1233. SAYAT, Jenny H.
1234. SAYSON, Frances Lynette V.
1235. SEARES, Raphael Joseph B.
1236. SEDILLA, Jasmin P.
1237. SEGUERRA, Candy P.
1238. SENCIO, Suzanne Margaret T.
1239. SEREDRICA, Rodolfo M.
1240. SERGIO, Oliver Jhones R.
1241. SERILO, Rowena L.
1242. SERRANO, Jennifer J.
1243. SEVILLA, Hanniyah P.
1244. SEÑA, Raymund B.
1245. SIAO, Ronaldo Horacio B.
1246. SILONGAN, Sahara Alia J.
1247. SILVA, Hector C.
1248. SIMUNDAC, Maria Concepcion P.
1249. SINGSON, Wellah R.
1250. SINSON, Katherine G.
1251. SIOSANA, Minerva V.
1252. SISTOZA, Cristian Paulinne H.
1253. SO, Jim Roy D.
1254. SOBREVEGA, Mary Jean Q.
1255. SOLIDEO, Shin Kenneth A.
1256. SOLIMAN, Maria Aurora M.
1257. SOLIS, Rochelle Marie R.
1258. SOLIVEN, Victor Ariel G.
1259. SOLON, JR., Edgardo C.
1260. SOMERA, Aimie D.
1261. SOMERA, Quennie Agnes C.
1262. SONGCO, Christine Dianne V.
1263. SORIANO, Al L.
1264. SORIANO, Octavius G.
1265. SORIANO-AFALLA, Brenda Lyn S.
1266. SOTO, Katherine L.
1267. STA. ANA, Florences G.
1268. STA. ANA, Freznel B.
1269. STA. MARIA, Cicero L.
1270. STA. MARIA, Eunice M.
1271. STA. TERESA, Maria Luz S.
1272. SUAREZ, Marvin C.
1273. SUGANOB, Lynie C.
1274. SULIT, Jam Tristan L.
1275. SULTAN, Abdinsa S.
1276. SUMAGIT, Michael B.
1277. SUMAYOD, Jhoana Marie P.
1278. SUMILE, Barry C.
1279. SURALTA, Maria Doris B.
1280. SUSA, Jose B.
1281. SY, Catherine C.
1282. SY, Khristopher M.
1283. SY, Rachelle T.
1284. SY, Sherwin S.
1285. TABANAY, Ryan D.
1286. TABANDA, Roy Patrick C.
1287. TABERNERO-BUNAG, Vanessa P.
1288. TABIOS, Anna Leah A.
1289. TABIQUE, Katrina C.
1290. TABUNDA, Rod Patrick A.
1291. TACLA, Russell E.
1292. TADEO, Alexie Jane C.
1293. TADEO, Yasmine Lee R.
1294. TADINA-PASIA, Melody F.
1295. TAGALOGUIN, Fritz Z.
1296. TAHIR, Sharina I.
1297. TAJAN, Joy Stephanie C.
1298. TALLUNGAN, Brigida Jeanne T.
1299. TALUCAD, Tatiana Dolores F.
1300. TAMALA, Kenneth O.
1301. TAMAYO, Catherine E.
1302. TAMAYO, Ma. Yvette M.
1303. TAMONDONG, Juan Carlos S.
1304. TAN, Annie U.
1305. TAN, Art Lynson A.
1306. TAN, Eric David C.
1307. TAN, Joyce Melcar T.
1308. TAN, Maria Cristina A.
1309. TAN, Mhedora B.
1310. TAN, Stephanie Michelle C.
1311. TAN, JR., David P.
1312. TANKIANG, III, Eduardo Martin A.
1313. TANQUIENG, Paula Mae B.
1314. TAPALES, Patrick Joseph S.
1315. TAPIC, Charlene Mae C.
1316. TAPIRE, Helen Paulette D.
1317. TAQUED, Gamaliel S.
1318. TAVANLAR, Tomi L.
1319. TAÑGAN, Margret Faye G.
1320. TAÑOLA, Mc Ferlin P.
1321. TE, Meiji Hanna Z.
1322. TEH, Roselle P.
1323. TEMPLORA, Imerson L.
1324. TENAJA, Darwin A.
1325. TENTATIVA, June G.
1326. TERRADO, Marlon C.
1327. TIBAYAN, Irish Kirbee V.
1328. TIOJANCO, Bryan Dennis G.
1329. TIU, Jiecel S.
1330. TO, Joan Mae S.
1331. TOBES, Giselle Jill D.
1332. TOLEDO, Maria Joy O.
1333. TOLENTINO, Lovely V.
1334. TOLOSA, Gretchel L.
1335. TOMAS, Rudolfh M.
1336. TOMBO, Peter Paul M.
1337. TONGCUA, Paulette V.
1338. TORIO, John Ryan P.
1339. TORMON, Alvin A.
1340. TORREMOCHA, Edric P.
1341. TORRES, Ivy Grace O.
1342. TORRES, Maria Melissa G.
1343. TORREVILLAS, Juan Alfonso P.
1344. TRABAJO, III, Aureliano Marcus C.
1345. TRINIDAD, Carlos Vincent C.
1346. TRINIDAD, Chloe Hope B.
1347. TRIVIÑO, Diana Cecilia E.
1348. TRUMPO, Magno T.
1349. TUADLES, Leticia R.
1350. TUAZON, Cecilia M.
1351. TUBILLEJA, Liza T.
1352. TUGADO, Judie Rose P.
1353. TUMALIUAN, Gliricidia C.
1354. TURANO, Earlene Lirio R.
1355. TURANO II, Earl Ligorio R.
1356. TURINGAN, Norman Paul A.
1357. UEDA, Eric O.
1358. UMALI, Ma. Flerida Ruth B.
1359. UNCIANO, Rodel C.
1360. UNTALAN, Maria Rhodora P.
1361. UNTAYAO, Dictador V.
1362. URBANO, Mary Grace M.
1363. URBIZTONDO, Maria Cassandra M.
1364. USON, Anthony B.
1365. UY, Diana Grace L.
1366. UY, Karl Jordan D.
1367. UY, Kenneth T.
1368. UY, Lancaster L.
1369. UY, Michael Dionisio
1370. UY, Rachelle E.
1371. UY, Vismarck S.
1372. VALDEAVILLA, Maria Ermina V.
1373. VALDEZ, Joey N.
1374. VALDEZ, V, Francesco Manuel P.
1375. VALENCIA, Daisy Jane H.
1376. VALENZUELA, Ida Kristina Z.
1377. VALERA, Karla Regina D.
1378. VALERIO, Cristiellane T.
1379. VALEZA, Carlo T.
1380. VALLEJO, Maria Johanna N.
1381. VALMORES, Christopher Rey P.
1382. VARGAS, Michael George Andrew R.
1383. VASQUEZ, Ian Albert M.
1384. VECINA, Leilani P.
1385. VELASCO, Adrian Jay-R A.
1386. VELASCO, Diana A.
1387. VELASCO, Resurrection Florimae C.
1388. VELASCO-LAO, Francesca Marie R.
1389. VELMONTE, Rovelson R.
1390. VELUZ, Trixie Hazel C.
1391. VEN, Arlene A.
1392. VENTURA, Charleen L.
1393. VENTURA, III, Manuel Angelo B.
1394. VERALLO, Ivan B.
1395. VERANO, Toni Joy C.
1396. VERDIDA, Pete Uliver O.
1397. VERGA, Ma. Venarisse V.
1398. VERGARA, Doris R.
1399. VICTORIANO, Joni-Ross
1400. VILLACASTIN, Dandel Rose P.
1401. VILLAHERMOSA, Michelle Ann T.
1402. VILLALON, Rivah J.
1403. VILLANUEVA, Arjay Karlo F.
1404. VILLANUEVA, Elvin B.
1405. VILLANUEVA, James E.
1406. VILLANUEVA, Marc A.
1407. VILLANUEVA, Rafael Archie E.
1408. VILLANUEVA, Tessa Marie S.
1409. VILLAPANDO, Dorothy Grace R.
1410. VILLAR, Wilhenry M.
1411. VILLARAMA, Carlo D.
1412. VILLARIAS, Carlyn L.
1413. VILLAROMAN-FIEL, Madel P.
1414. VILLAROYA, Errol L.
1415. VILLARTA, III, Romeo P.
1416. VILLARUEL, Ma. Carmela S.
1417. VILLASENDA, Emee M.
1418. VILLASTER, Michael Hanz D.
1419. VISTA, Maria Viola B.
1420. VITERBO, Llonil R.
1421. VIVAS, Darlene R.
1422. WAHAB, Johaira C.
1423. WAKAN, Edd Mark O.
1424. WARREN, Luis Anthony K.
1425. WEE, Sonia Bea L.
1426. WONG, Jerlyn M.
1427. YAMBAO, Reslyn M.
1428. YAN, Benjamin C.
1429. YANEZA, Yvette T.
1430. YANTO, Sofia C.
1431. YAP, Anna Marie D.
1432. YAP, Francis Sol S.
1433. YAP, German Lyndon O.
1434. YAP, Yellen B.
1435. YBAÑEZ, Serena Mae S.
1436. YEBRA, Reinier Paul R.
1437. YEUNG, Kurt Glen T.
1438. YLAGAN, Immaculada Concepcion C.
1439. YU, Ma. Karina P.
1440. YU, Margarita F.
1441. YU, JR., Cesar B.
1442. YULDE, Princessita M.
1443. YUMANG, Jose Edmar J.
1444. ZABALA, Reuben U.
1445. ZAFRANCO, Fernan Reagan P.
1446. ZAMBRANO, Jude Francis V.
1447. ZAMORA, Bettina N.
1448. ZANTUA, Maria Felicia T.
1449. ZARAGOZA, Ma. Edelyn A.
1450. ZERRUDO, John Paul C.
1451. ZULUETA, Amber June M.

From SC website.

Elections: Pre-Proclamation Controversy

2010-03-24T07:32:00.001+08:00

Sec. 241, B.P. 881: A pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political party or coalition of political parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233 (delayed lost or destroyed), 234 (material defects), 235 (tampering or falsification) and 236 (discrepancies in election returns) in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns.

Q: When is a pre-proclamation case allowed?
A: It is allowed in cases involving elective provincial, city or municipal officers. Pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice-, Senator, Congressman and Party-List are not allowed on matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns or certificates of canvass. But the canvassing board may correct manifest errors in the Certificates of Canvass or Election Returns, motu propio or upon verified petition of an interested person. (sec. 15, R.A. 7166)

WHO CAN FILE: candidate, registered political party or coalition

WHERE FILED: Board of Canvassers or COMELEC in division

Is the COMELEC in a pre-proclamation case allowed to go beyond the face of the election returns?

Belac v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 145802, April 4, 2001
The Supreme Court held that Diasen’s petition pertains to a pre-proclamation controversy. Specifically, it alleges that the votes for petitioner Belac were all padded through “Operation Dagdag”; the election returns for him (Diasen) was tampered, falsified and manufactured; and that the election returns were already prepared even before the counting of votes. But Diasen did not say that the alleged irregularities appear on the face of the election returns. Obviously, they came from external sources and, therefore, not manifest on the election returns.

In a pre-proclamation controversy, the COMELEC, as a rule, is restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate election irregularities. The prevailing doctrine is that as long as the returns appear to be authentic and duly accomplished on their face, the Board of Canvassers cannot look beyond or behind them to verify allegations of irregularities in the casting or the counting of the votes. The reason is that determination of the result of the election must be arrived at as quickly as possible on the basis of the canvass.

A party seeking to raise issues resolution of which would compel or necessitate COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns, which appear prima facie regular on their face, has his proper remedy in a regular election protest. By their very nature, and given the obvious public interest in the speedy determination of the results of elections, pre-proclamation controversies are to be resolved in summary proceedings without the need to present evidence aliunde and certainly without having to go through voluminous documents and subjecting them to meticulous technical examinations which take up considerable time.

Issues That May Be Raised

Sec. 243, B.P. 881: The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy:

Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers:
When majority or all members of the canvassing Board do not hold legal appointments or are in fact usurpers
When the canvassing has been a mere ceremony that was pre-determined and manipulated to result in nothing but a sham canvassing as were: (1) there was convergence of circumstances of precipitate canvassing; (2) there was terrorism; (3) there was lack of sufficient notice to the members of the canvassing Board; (4) disregard of manifest irregularities on the face of the questioned returns/certificates in appropriate cases
The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of this Code
The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic
When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.

Q: May there be other issues which may be properly subjects of a pre-proclamation controversy?
A: No, because the enumeration under sec. 243 is restrictive and exclusive. NEVERTHELESS, the Commission has authority to correct manifest errors in the tabulation or tallying of the results during the canvassing and such errors could not have been discovered during the canvassing despite the exercise of due diligence and proclamation of the winning candidate had already been made (filed directly with the COMELEC en banc not later than 5 days from date of proclamation, impleading all candidates who may be adversely affected). HOWEVER if the manifest error was discovered before proclamation during canvassing, then its correction may be filed with the canvassing Board.

Q: What issues must be raised with the Board at the first instance and not directly with the COMELEC?
A: Matters raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the elections returns.

WHEN PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSIES FILED DIRECTLY WITH COMELEC

Canvassing Board begins to act as such
At the time of the appointment of the member whose capacity to sit as such is objected to if it comes after the canvassing of the board
Immediately at the point where the proceedings are or begin to be illegal. In which case, the canvassing board shall not commence, proceed or resume the canvass unless otherwise ordered by the COMELEC

WHEN TO FILE WITH THE BOARD

Canvassing board begins to act as such
Immediately at the point where the proceedings are or begin to be illegal

NOTA BENE: If an appeal from the ruling of the Board is taken to the COMELEC, the canvass shall be immediately suspended during pendency of appeal until the COMELEC orders continuation or resumption.

PROCEDURE BEFORE CANVASSING BOARD ON GROUND OF ILLEGAL COMPOSITION/PROCEEDING:

Make a ruling, with notice to the petitioner, within 24 hours from the filing of the petition
Appeal to the COMELEC within 3 days after the ruling with proper notice to the canvassing Board
Hearing by COMELEC en banc with due notice to the parties
Decide the case within 5 days from filing thereof

Defects in form not a ground for pre-proclamation controversy

Bandala vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 159369, March 7, 2000
The absence of inner paper seals, although illegal, the paper seals being required in the conduct of proper canvassing of election returns, is not a proper subject of pre-proclamation controversies because such absence does not affect the authenticity or genuineness of the subject election returns. They are merely defects in form which do not warrant the exclusion of the questioned returns.

Excluded Issues

No exclusion if returns are regular on its face

Ocampo vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 136282, Feb. 15, 2000
“To check and double check” if it were true that the contested election returns were tampered with, altered or falsified, the COMELEC en banc examined two separate copies of the election returns: (1) the copy for the Municipal Board of Canvassers and (2) the COMELEC copy, and found that the defects alleged are merely formal defects. Specifically, the findings are as follows:
no number of registered voters in the precinct, actual number of votes cast and number of valid votes cast: formal defect is not a ground for exclusion
no thumb mark of the chairman on page 4 and of members of the board of election inspectors on page 3 of the election returns: a mere oversight that did not vitiate the validity of the votes nor destroy the integrity of the election return
one “missing” vote with 153 voters who actually voted and one candidate receiving 152 votes but zero for the other candidate: this does not necessarily mean that 1 vote is missing because it could also mean that one voter desisted from casting his vote or may have voted but his vote was not credited because it was stray or just illegible; not a ground for exclusion

That the election returns were obviously manufactured must be evident from the face of said documents. In the absence of strong evidence establishing spuriousness of the returns, the basic rule that the election returns shall be accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of the results of the count of the votes for canvassing and proclamation purposes must perforce prevail.

The bare fact that candidates for public office had received zero votes is not enough to make the returns statistically improbable.

For as long as the election returns which on their face appear regular and wanting of any physical signs of tampering, alteration or other similar vice, such election returns cannot just be unjustifiably excluded. To look beyond or behind these returns is not a proper issue in a pre-proclamation controversy as in the case at bar.

Comelec may rule on “manner of preparation” of the returns, but no exclusion, just recounting if integrity of ballots was violated

Dagloc vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154442-47, Dec. 10, 2003
Dagloc is questioning the ruling of the COMELEC en banc to exclude certain election returns for being spurious due in part to the alleged disqualification of some members of the board of election inspectors (BEI) and that the BEI committed illegal acts, such that the votes reported in the subject returns do not reflect the true will of the electorate. However, in arriving at the resolution, the COMELEC en banc also gave great weight to the affidavit of the BEI members which were supposed to prove the regularity of the BEI’s assigned task. The COMELEC en banc found that these affidavits lacked signatures of the BEI members.

The Supreme Court held that pre-proclamation controversies are limited to: (1) challenges directed against the composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers (not the BEI), or (2) challenges related to election returns to which a party must have made specific objections. This case falls under the second category (2) and that the COMELEC en banc’s findings on the nine election returns are anchored on “the manner of their preparation,” which it found to be a sham. This ground is a pre-proclamation issue under sec. 241 and 243 in relation to sec. 235.

Furthermore, the doctrine that “as long as the returns appear to be authentic, and duly accomplished on their face, the Board of Canvassers cannot look beyond or behind them to verify allegations of irregularities in the casting and counting of the votes,” is not applicable in this case due to the following reasons: (1) the COMELEC has authority to review the rulings of the Board of Canvassers in a pre-proclamation controversy; (2) the COMELEC en banc found that the nine election returns are fraudulent in the manner of their preparation; and (3) the allegations of irregularity is not in the casting and counting of votes but in the preparation of the election returns (tampered, falsified and were prepared under duress, threats, coercion and intimidation).

Given this factual finding, doubt is cast on the authentic appearance of said returns. Hence, the subject election returns cannot be accorded prima facie status as genuine reports of the results of the counts of votes.

However, the proper remedy in case of spurious election returns is not outright exclusion on the ground that they were fraudulently prepared by some members or non-members of the BEI. Doing so would disenfranchise the voters. What the COMELEC should have done is to ascertain whether the integrity of the ballots was violated. If it was not, then a recounting of ballots is in order and Board will use new returns. If it was violated, then the COMELEC need not recount but should seal the ballot box and order its safekeeping.

COMELEC has no jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies in presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and congressional elections; Correction of Manifest Error in the Statement of Votes may be filed directly with COMELEC en banc

Sandoval vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133842, Jan. 26, 2000
The case involves the elective office of congressman of one legislative district, which is contested on the ground of manifest error arising from the non-inclusion of 19 election returns in the canvass, thus making the same incomplete.

While the COMELEC has exclusive jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies, the exception to the general rule can be found under sec. 15 of RA 7166 which prohibits candidates in the presidential, vice-presidential, senatorial and congressional elections from filing pre-proclamation cases.

The prohibition aims to avoid delay in the proclamation of the winner in the election, which delay might result in a vacuum in these sensitive posts. The law, nonetheless, provides an exception to the exception. The second sentence of Sec. 15 allows the filing of petitions for correction of manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns even in elections for president, vice-president and members of the House for the simple reason that the correction of manifest error will not prolong the process of canvassing nor delay the proclamation of the winner in the election.

Correction of a manifest error in the Statement of Votes may be filed directly with the COMELEC en banc (rule 27, sec. 5, 1993 Rules of the COMELEC). This is another exception to the rule that pre-proclamation controversies must first be heard and decided by a division of the Commission.

In determination of the case, the COMELEC must observe due process of law since this involves the exercise of its quasi-judicial power.

GROUNDS FOR CORRECTION OF MANIFEST ERRORS IN THE TABULATION/TALLYING OF RESULTS DURING CANVASSING:

Where a copy of the election returns or certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once
Where two or more copies of the election returns of one precinct were tabulated separately
Where there was a mistake in the copying of the figures from the election returns to the statement of votes by precinct or from the municipal/city Certificate of Canvass to the Statement of Votes by municipality; or from the Provincial/City Certificate of Canvass to the Statement of Votes by province/city
Where there was a mistake in the addition of the votes of any candidate

PROCEDURE BEFORE THE CANVASSING BOARD:

Correct the manifest errors motu propio or upon verified petition by any candidate, political party, organization, coalition, after due notice and hearing
Order of promulgation which must be in writing
Appeal to the COMELEC within 24 hours from the promulgation
No proclamation of winning candidate during pendency of appeal, UNLESS the votes are not affected by the appeal
Appeal must implead as respondents the canvassing Board and all parties who may be adversely affected
Clerk of Court of COMELEC issues summons, with copy of the appeal to the respondents
Clerk sets appeal for hearing
COMELEC decides en banc

Distinguished from Other Remedies

Pre-proclamation controversy vs. Failure of Election

Ampatuan vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 149803, Jan. 31, 2002
This case involves the election of provincial officials which are claimed to be “completely sham and farcical.” The ballots were filled up en masse by a few persons the night before election day, and in some precincts, the ballot boxes, official ballots and other election paraphernalia were not delivered at all. There was also an allegation of massive fraud and terrorism. Consequently, a petition with the COMELEC for the annulment of election results and/or declaration of failure of elections was filed. The question is whether or not declaration of failure of elections is the proper remedy.

The Supreme Court ruled that a pre-proclamation controversy is not the same as an action for annulment of election results or failure of elections. While, however, the COMELEC is restricted, in pre-proclamation cases, to an examination of the election returns on their face and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind them and investigate election irregularities, the COMELEC is duty bound to investigate allegations of fraud, terrorism, violence, and other analogous causes in actions for annulment of election results or for declaration of failure of elections. Thus, the COMELEC, in the case of actions for annulment of election returns or declaration of failure of elections, may conduct technical examination of election documents and compare and analyze voters’ signature and thumbprints in order to determine whether or not the elections had indeed been free, honest and clean.

In this case, the proper remedy was annulment of election results and/or declaration of failure of elections which is cognizable under the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC.

Pre-proclamation Controversy vs. Election Contest

Sarangani vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 155560-62, Nov. 11, 2003
This case involves two rulings of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, signed by only two of its members. The rulings excluded Certificates of Canvass from the municipalities of Wao and Bubong on the ground that they were manufactured and falsified. Consequently, the COMELEC directed an investigation to be conducted on the two members of the Provincial Board of Canvassers for any culpable violation of the election laws which they might have committed by the following acts: (1) their failure to appear on the scheduled hearings/meetings in the instant cases after the suspension of the canvass despite their assurances and legal duty to do so; (2) their having issued the alleged written rulings excluding the COCs from Wao and Bubong without giving the Vice-Chairman the opportunity to participate and take part in the deliberations; and (3) their unprecedented act of deliberating and/or issuing the written rulings by themselves and of clandestinely submitting or turning over the said rulings to the Office of the COMELEC Secretary for promulgation without setting any hearing or giving notice to the Vice-Chairman and/or to the herein parties.

The Supreme Court upheld the findings of the COMELEC during its investigation that the alleged tampering and falsification in the Certificates of Canvass were duly accounted for and did not affect the integrity of the ballot.

In a pre-proclamation controversy, the board of canvassers and the COMELEC are not required to look beyond or behind the election returns which are on their face regular and authentic. Where a party seeks to raise issues the resolution on which would necessitate the COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns which are prima facie regular, the proper remedy would be a regular election protest and not a pre-proclamation controversy.

Pre-proclamation Controversy is summary in nature

Lucman vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 166229, June 29, 1995
In this case, the objections initially raised before the Municipal Board of Canvassers were proper in a pre-proclamation controversy, i.e. the election returns are obviously manufactured and/or falsified, it is not authentic, it contains alterations. However, in the appeal to the COMELEC, it was further alleged that the elections held in the precincts were tainted with massive election irregularities, such as “massive substitution of voters, snatching of ballots from the voters and filling them (ballots) up against the will of the voters by force or coercion, threats, intimidation, casting of votes by double registrants in the same precincts and flying voters.”

These allegations pertain not only to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns, but to the conduct of the elections as well.

Pre-proclamation controversies are limited to challenges directed against the Board of Canvassers and proceedings before said Board relating to particular election returns to which private respondent should have made specific verbal objections subsequently reduced to writing. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to an examination of the election returns on their face. It is beyond the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to go beyond the face of the returns or investigate election irregularities.

The proceedings in a pre-proclamation controversy are summary in nature. Reception of evidence aliunde is proscribed. Issues such as fraud or terrorism attendant to the election process, the resolution of which would compel or necessitate the COMELEC to pierce the veil of election returns which appear to be prima facie regular, on their face, are anathema to a pre-proclamation controversy. Such issues should be posed and resolved in a regular election protest, which is within the original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In a regular election protest, the parties may litigate all the legal and factual issues raised by them inasmuch detail as they may deem necessary or appropriate.

Procedure for Raising Objections

Sec. 20, RA 7166: Procedure in Disposition of Contested Election Returns. -

(a) Any candidate, political party or coalition of political parties contesting the inclusion or exclusion in the canvass of any election returns on any of the grounds authorized under Article XX or Sections 234, 235 and 236 of Article XIX of the Omnibus Election Code shall submit their oral objection to the chairman of the board of canvassers at the time the questioned return is presented for inclusion in the canvass. Such objection shall be recorded in the minutes of the canvass.

(b) Upon receipts of any such objection, the board of canvassers shall automatically defer the canvass of the contested returns (also indicate the date and time of receipt) and shall proceed to canvass the returns which are not contested by any party (i.e. the votes for President, Vice-, Senators, Congressmen and party-list).

(c) Simultaneous with the oral objection, the objecting party shall also enter his objection in the form for written objections to be prescribed by the Commission. Within twenty-four (24) hours from and after the presentation of such an objection, the objecting party shall submit the evidence in support of the objection, which shall be attached to the form for written objections. Within the same period of twenty-four (24) hours after presentation of the objection, any party may file a written and verified opposition to the objection in the form also to be prescribed by the Commission, attaching thereto supporting evidence, if any. The board shall not entertain any objection or opposition unless reduced to writing in the prescribed forms.

The evidence attached to the objection or opposition, submitted by the parties, shall be immediately and formally admitted into the records of the board by the chairman affixing his signature at the back of each and every page thereof.

(d) Upon receipt of the evidence, the board shall keep up the contested returns, consider the written objections thereto and opposition, if any, and summarily and immediately rules thereon. The board shall enter its ruling on the prescribed form and authenticate the same by the signatures of its members.

(e) Any part adversely affected by the ruling of the board shall immediately inform the board if he intends to appeal said ruling. The board shall enter said information in the minutes of the canvass, set aside the returns and proceed to consider the other returns.

(f) After all the uncontested returns have been canvassed and the contested return ruled upon by it, the board shall suspend the canvass. Within forty-eight (48) hours, therefrom, any party adversely affected by the ruling may file with the board a written and verified notice of appeal; and within an unextendible period of five (5) days thereafter an appeal may be taken to the Commission.

(g) Immediately upon receipt of the notice of appeal, the board shall make an appropriate report to the Commission, elevating therewith the complete records and evidence submitted in the canvass, and furnishing the parties with copies of the report.

(h) On the basis of the record and evidence elevate to it by the board, the Commission shall decide summarily the appeal within seven (7) days from receipt of said record and evidence. Any appeal brought before the Commission on the ruling of the board, without the accomplished forms and the evidence appended thereto, shall be summarily dismissed.

The decision of the Commission shall be executory after the lapse of seven (7) days from receipts thereof by the losing party.

(i) The board of canvassers shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the latter has ruled on the object brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation made in violation hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the election.

Q: What remedy does one have if a proclamation is made pending pre-proclamation petition/appeal?
A: A petition to annul proclamation filed with the COMELEC.

Q: What is the remedy if the pre-proclamation petition/appeal is finally dismissed by the COMELEC and the opposing candidate is proclaimed?
A: Election protest filed within 10 days from the date of proclamation.

Elections: Certificates of Candidacy and Campaign Period

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Certificates of Candidacy

WHO MAY FILE:

citizen
registered voter
read/write Filipino
1-yr. residence

WHEN TO FILE: not later than the day before the date legally fixed for the beginning of the campaign period (90-45-15)

WHERE FILED: Comelec (5 legible copies)

HOW FILED: personally filed or by duly authorized representative

EFFECT OF FILING (Comelec Resolution No. 6520, Jan. 6, 2004; RA 9006)

Prior to Reso. 6520, any elective official running for public office other than the one he is currently holding in permanent capacity is considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. However, after the COMELEC Resolution was passed, elective officials are now no longer deemed resigned should they run for office
RA 9006 repealed Sec. 67 but maintained Sec. 66 of the Omnibus Election Code so that now, only appointive officials running for elective office are deemed resigned upon filing of certificate of candidacy

Waiver of permanent resident status in a foreign country

Gayo vs. Verceles, G.R. No. 150477, Feb. 28, 2005
Verceles is running for mayor and was subsequently proclaimed as the winner in that election. Her proclamation was however questioned for the reason that she is a greencard holder and has not complied with the residence requirement.

Supreme Court held that when Verceles abandoned her “greencard holder” status when she surrendered her alien registration receipt card before the Immigration and Naturalization Service of the American Embassy in Manila prior to her filing for certificate of candidacy. Thus, when Verceles filed her certificate of candidacy, she was no longer disqualified to run as an elective official because of such waiver of permanent resident status in a foreign country.

Residence - imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention

ELEMENTS OF ACQUISITION OF NEW DOMICILE:

residence or bodily presence in the new locality
intention to remain there
intention to abandon the old domicile - animus manendi + animus non revertendi

NOTA BENE: The purpose to remain at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinitive period of time; change of residence must be voluntary; and residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

En Masse Filipinization under the Philippine Bill 1902

Tecson vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161434, March 3, 2004
This is a petition to deny due course or to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Fernando Poe Jr. (Ronald Allan Kelley Poe) on ground that he is not a natural-born citizen of the Philippines because his parents were foreigners: Bessie Kelley Poe (American) and Allan Poe (Spanish national, son of Lorenzo Pou who was a Spanish subject). It is their contention that FPJ, being an illegitimate child, follows the citizenship of his mother, who was an American.

The Supreme Court held that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902; that such citizenship, if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe. FPJ, having been born during the effectivity of 1953 Constitution, follows the citizenship of his father who is a Filipino citizen, the law not having made any distinction as to legitimacy of the child.

A beach house is not a place of residence

Tess Dumpit-Michelena vs. Boado, G.R. No. 163619-20, Nov. 17, 2005
Dumpit-Michelena is running for mayor in the municipality of Agoo, La Union. Her disqualification was sought on the claim that she is a resident and was a registered voter of Naguilian and not Agoo, La Union. Dumpit-Michelena countered that she already acquired a new domicile in Agoo when she purchased a residential lot there, designating a caretaker of her house. Supreme Court held that Dumpit-Michelena failed to comply with the 1-yr. residency requirement in the place where she intends to be elected.

REQUIREMENTS FOR A CHANGE OF DOMICILE:
(1) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
(2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one
(3) acts which correspond with the purpose

Dumpit-Michelena failed to establish that she has abandoned her former domicile. Evidence shows that her house in Agoo is beach house and a beach house is at most a place of temporary relaxation. It can hardly be considered a place of residence. Moreover, her designation of a caretaker only shows that she does not regularly reside in the place.

DISQUALIFICATIONS (Sec. 68, BP 881)

given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy
spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by law
solicited, received, or made any prohibited contributions
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country, UNLESS he waives such status

Effect of disqualification: no proclamation of the second placer

Trinidad vs. COMELEC, 315 SCRA 175, G.R. No. 135716
Sunga and Trinidad are both running for mayor in Iguig, Cagayan. Trinidad won so Sunga filed a letter-complaint for disqualification against Trinidad, accusing him of using 3 local government vehicles in his campaign and committing acts of terrorism, threats, intimidation, and other forms of coercion. Sunga also moved that, on account of Trinidad’s disqualification, he be declared as Mayor. While case is pending final resolution, Trinidad’s mayoralty term has expired.

Supreme Court held that the issue has been rendered moot and academic by the expiration of petitioner’s challenged term of office. Also, Sunga cannot claim any right to the office even if Trinidad was disqualified for the reason that “to simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. xxx To allow the private respondent, a defeated and repudiated candidate, to take over the mayoralty despite his rejection by the electorate is to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the importance and meaning of democracy and the people’s right to elect officials of their choice.”

Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy (Sec. 78, BP 881; Sec. 5 & 7, RA 6646)

WHO CAN FILE: any party

HOW: petition to deny due course or cancel certificate of candidacy under oath

WHEN: any time not later than 25 days from filing of certificate of candidacy

WHERE: COMELEC must decide the case not later than 15 days before election (period is not mandatory however)

EXCLUSIVE GROUND: material misrepresentation

What constitutes material misrepresentation

Salcedo II vs. COMELEC, 312 SCRA 447
Neptali Salcedo married Agnes Celiz. Without dissolving his first marriage, he married Ermelita Cacao. In the May 11, 1998 elections. Ermelita and Salcedo II both ran for mayor of Sara, Iloilo. Salcedo II filed a petition for cancellation of Cacao’s certificate of candidacy on ground of false representation because Ermelita, not being legally married to Neptali, still used the surname “Salcedo.”

The Supreme Court held that the material misrepresentation contemplated by sec. 78 refers to qualifications for elective office, such as citizenship, legal age, residence. The misrepresentation must be so grave that it would prevent the candidate from running, or if elected, from serving, or enough to prosecute him for violation of election laws.

False Representation - deliberate intent to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible to run for elective office; intention to deceive the electorate

ELEMENTS FALSE REPRESENTATION:

Materiality
Intention to mislead

REMEDIES AGAINST DISQUALIFIED CANDIDATES

Before Election (sec. 78) - petition to deny due course or cancel certificate of candidacy
After Election (sec. 253) - petition for quo warranto on ground of ineligibility or disloyalty to the Philippine Republic

Q: What is the effect if the petition to deny due course has been granted?
A: If it has already attained final judgment, the election of that candidate is suspended and the votes cast in his favor are not counted. However, if after the election is finished pending resolution of the case, the votes cast in his favor are counted but the COMELEC may suspend the proclamation.

Nuisance Candidate

- a candidate whose filing of the certificate of candidacy has been shown to put the election process in mockery or disrepute or to cause confusion among the voters by the similarity of the names of the registered candidates or by other circumstances or acts which clearly demonstrated the candidate has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed and thus prevent a faithful determination of the true will of the electorate (Sec. 69, BP 881)

WHO MAY FILE DISQUALIFICATION CASE AGAINST NUISANCE CANDIDATE:

Motu propio by the Comelec
Verified petition by any registered candidate

PROCEDURE (sec. 5, RA 6646)

file verified petition within 5 days from last day of filing of certificate of candidacy
upon receipt, within 3 days, COMELEC issues summons
verified answer within 3 days from receipt of summons
hearing (summary in character) - by COMELEC official who is a lawyer; RECOMMENDATION: within 5 days from submission of evidence; DECISION: within 5 days from receipt of recommendation
Final and executory after 5 days from receipt by parties of the decision, UNLESS stayed by Supreme Court
DISSEMINATION: within 24 hours through the fastest available means

Equal access to opportunity for public service is a privilege subject to limitations

Pamatong vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 161872, April 13, 2004
Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong ran for president. COMELEC denied due course on ground that he is a nuisance candidate: he cannot wage a nationwide campaign and/or not nominated by a political party or not supported by a registered by a political party with a national constituency. Pamatong contended that his right to equal access to opportunity for public service was violated.

Supreme Court held that “equal access to opportunity for public service” is not a constitutional right but a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Sec. 26, Art. II neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to an enforceable right. The aforesaid provision forms part of the “Declaration of Principles of State Policies,” which is generally considered non- self-executing and are merely guidelines for legislative or executive action, and not operative because in the absence of legislation, it lacks proper definition of its effective means and reach. As long as limitations are applied equally without discrimination, the equal access clause is not violated.

“The rationale is that the State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective and orderly. The poll would be bogged by irrelevant minutae covering every step of the electoral process, most probably posed at the instance of these nuisance candidates. Owing to the superior interest in ensuring a credible and orderly election, the State could exclude nuisance candidates and need not indulge in ‘their trips to the moon on gossamer wings.’”

Substitution

Sec. 77, BP 881: Candidates in case of death, disqualification or withdrawal of another – If after the last day for the filing of certificate of candidacy, an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party dies, withdraws or is disqualified for any cause, only a person belonging to, and certified by, the same political party may file a certificate of candidacy to replace the candidate who died, withdrew or was disqualified. xxxx”

Q: Can independent candidates be substituted in any of the instances mentioned above?
A: While the law specifically mentions that candidates who are party members may be substituted, the law nevertheless does not expressly prohibit the substitution of independent candidates. The law being silent on the matter, this cannot be perceived as a prohibition.

Substitution is allowed in barangay elections

Rulloda vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 154198, Jan. 20, 2003
Romeo Rolluda and Remegio Placido are contending candidates for barangay chairman. Romeo died and his wife (Betty) makes a letter-request to substitute her husband. Betty won but Remegio was declared the barangay captain because Betty’s votes were not counted on the ground that her substitution was invalid.

The Supreme Court held it is non sequitor to say that sec. 77 allows only substitution in partisan elections. It is Rolluda’s contention that barangay elections being non-partisan, substitution does not apply. But the Supreme Court said that this would be tantamount to ignoring the purpose of election laws which is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. In case of doubt, political laws must be so construed as to give life and spirit to the popular mandate freely expressed through the ballot. The absence of provision governing substitution of candidates in barangay elections can’t be inferred as a prohibition.

Substitution not allowed when certificate was denied due course

Ong vs. Alegre, G.R. No. 163295, Jan. 23, 2006
Ong (incumbent) and Alegre are both running for mayor. Ong’s certificate of candidacy was denied due course on ground of violation of three-term rule. Thus, he was substituted by Romeo Ong. Was the substitution valid?

The Supreme Court held that “while there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a registered or accredited political party may substitute for a candidate of the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does not include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the person to be substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under sec. 78 of the Code.

Expression unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated the occasions where a candidate may be validly substituted, there is no mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid substitution for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they could have so easily and conveniently included those persons whose certificates of candidacy have been denied due course and/or cancelled under the provisions of sec. 78 of the Code.”

NOTA BENE: A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered as a candidate, much the same as one who has no certificate of candidacy. And because Ong is not a candidate, then he cannot be substituted because substitution presupposes that the person to be substituted is a candidate.

Campaign and Election Propaganda

Q: What is the campaign period?
A: For President, Vice-President and Senators, the period begins 90 days before the day of election. For Congress and other elective officials, it begins 45 days before the day of election. Violation of the period constitutes an election offense.

NOTA BENE:

This presupposes that the person is already a candidate – i.e. he has filed his certificate of candidacy. But if the person has not yet filed his certificate of candidacy and has started campaigning for votes even though the campaign period has yet to start, this cannot be considered an election offense.
Automated Election Law, or Republic Act 8436, provides that a person who has filed a certificate of candidacy is not a candidate until the campaign period starts.
Penera vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 181613, November 25, 2009: What the law (RA 8436) says is “any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period.” The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful.

Q: What is the importance of having a campaign period?
A: To provide the candidates with a chance to prepare for the election through partisan political activities that promote the election or defeat of a candidate.

Q: What are the limitations as to the manner or conduct of an election campaign?
A: Authorized expenses, observance of truth in advertising, and prohibited forms under Sec. 85, BP 881.

Q: Do these limitations run counter to freedom of expression?
A: Distinguish between the two kinds of limitation of freedom of expression. If the restriction is content-neutral, then the measure of the restriction is some government interest. If the restriction is content-based, then the measure of the restriction is the clear-and-present-danger rule.

Q: What are the limitations as to extent?
A: The amount of money you can spend for the campaign is limited. Each candidate is required to submit a sworn statement of expenses and contribution to the COMELEC within 30 days after the day of the election. If the candidate does not submit, sec. 111 of BP 881 shall stand (the candidate cannot enter into office)

Elections and the Right to Vote

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Constitutional Basis

ART. II, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution: “The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them.”

Q:Why make a distinction between “democratic” and “republican?”
A: There are two kinds of democracy: direct democracy (pure) and indirect democracy (representative/republican). The Philippines follows both forms of democracy – republican because the people express their sovereignty through the ballot, voting for candidates who will represent them in government, but also democratic because of initiative and referendum, which express the direct will of the people through plebiscite.

People vs. San Juan, 22 SCRA 505
“Each time the enfranchised citizen goes to the polls to assert this sovereign will, that abiding credo of republicanism is translated into living reality. If that will must remain undefiled at the starting level of its expression and application, every assumption must be indulged in and every guarantee adopted to assure the unmolested exercise of the citizen’s free choice. For to impede, without authority valid in law, the free and orderly exercise of the right of suffrage is to inflict the ultimate indignity on the democratic process. As numerous as they are insidious are long-standing techniques of terror and intimidation that have been conceived by man – in derogation of the right of suffrage – which we have repeatedly and unqualifiedly condemned. When the legislature provided in section 133 of the Revised Election Code an explicit and unequivocal guarantee of a voter’s free access to the polling place, it could have intended no purpose other than to maintain inviolate the right to vote by safeguarding the voter against all manner of unauthorized interference and travesty that surveyors of fear can devise. Every unlawful obstacle, by whatever means or method, interposed to the free entry of a voter into the polling place to cast his vote, strikes at the very heart of the right of suffrage.”

Philosophical Bases

Puno’s Separate Opinion, Macalintal vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003
PLATO - rejected democracy as “tyranny of the majority” (numerical superiority) and supported the “philosopher-king rule”

ARISTOTLE - democracy is desirable but only under certain conditions and of the upper class; “will of the enlightened many”

INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION - “social contract theory;” the people exercise their sovereignty and creates a government to which they consent

Who May Exercise the Right to Vote

ART. V, Sec. 1, 1987 Constitution: “Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.”

Qualifications

Puno’s Dissenting Opinion, Tolentino v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 148334, Jan. 21, 2004
Citizenship - Suffrage is a political right appertaining to citizenship; reserved only to Filipinos whose allegiance to the country are undivided; each individual qualified to vote is a particle of popular sovereignty
Age (18 years) - Voting is an act of choice and involves prescience; familiarity and maturity
Residence - For the vote to be more meaningful, more than a passing acquaintance with the country’s problems and prospects is required

“One year residence in the Philippines” - refers to “domicile,” the place to which whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return

ELEMENTS OF DOMICILE:

Physical presence
Animus manendi (intent to return permanently)

“Six months residence in the place where one intends to vote” - refers to “temporary domicile”

PURPOSE OF 6-MONTH RESIDENCY:

Determine the place where the voter will register
Determine the place where voter will vote

CLASSES OF DOMICILE:

Domicile of Origin - place of birth
Domicile of Choice - replace the domicile of origin
Domicile by Operation of Law - applies to infants, incompetents and other persons under disabilities that prevent them from acquiring a domicile of choice

Electoral System

- free and open party system; distinguished from a multi-party system because in free and open party system, a unicameral or bicameral system is possible (ART. IX (c) (6), Sec. 6, 1987 Constitution)

OTHER MODES OF DEMOCRACY

Plebiscite - a system by which the people exercise their sovereignty by approving or rejecting any amendments or revisions of the Constitution prepared by the legislative

Initiative - power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact legislation through an election called for the purpose

REQUISITES FOR AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION BY INITIATIVE:

The people must author and thus sign the entire proposal
As an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition

Referendum - power of the electorate to approve or reject legislation

Amendment - changing a few provisions of the Constitution

WHO MAY AMEND THE CONSTITUTION:

Constitutional convention
Constitutional assembly (Congress)
People on Initiative

Revision - a total overhaul of the Constitution; changing the substance

People’s initiative: the amendment must be directly proposed by the people

Lambino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006 (read digest)

An initiative petition is filed to change the 1987 Constitution, among such proposed changes is to shift the present Bicameral-Presidential system to Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Supreme Court denied the petition on ground of failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution for conducting a people’s initiative: the amendment must be directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition.

“Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the draft of the proposed constitutional amendment should be ready and shown to the people before they sign such proposal. xxx The framers also envisioned that the people should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must prepare that proposal and pass it around for signature.”

2 ELEMENTS:
(1) The people must author and thus sign the entire proposal.
(2) As an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a petition.

“xxx Thus, an amendment is directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a petition only if the people sign on a petition that contains the full text of the proposed amendments.”

ELECTION PROCESS AND/OR PROCEEDINGS

Registration of Voters (System of Continuing Registration)

WHEN: daily during office hours; at the office of the Election Officer; personally file application to register as voter; no registration 120 days before regular elections and 90 days before special elections (Sec. 1, RA 8189)

WHO MAY REGISTER: (Sec. 8, RA 8189)

citizens
not otherwise disqualified by law
1-yr. Residence in the Philippines
6-mo. Residence in the place where one will vote

DISQUALIFICATIONS:

Sentenced by final judgment to suffer imprisonment of not less than 1 yr. (Auto-reacquire right to register upon expiration of 5 yrs. after service)
Sentenced by final judgment of crime involving disloyalty to the duly constituted government (rebellion, sedition, violation of firearms laws, crimes against national security, etc.; auto-reacquire upon expiration of 5 yrs. after service)
Insane or incompetent person

Challenges to Right to Register (sec. 18, RA 8189)

Q: Are there limitations to a person’s right to register?
A: Yes. The right to register to vote is not an absolute right but more of a privilege with limitations imposed by law. The COMELEC may motu propio or upon application of any voter challenging the right to register deny a person’s registration application. The Court (MTC), through inclusion or exclusion proceedings, may also limit a person’s right to register.

WHO CAN CHALLENGE: any voter, candidate or representative of a registered political party

WHAT: challenge to right to register in writing, under oath, attached to the application together with proof of notice of hearing to the challenger and applicant

Exclusion and Inclusion Proceedings (Sec. 33)

WHERE: MTC (EOJ), who shall determine the right of voter to be included or excluded in the list; decide within 10 days

APPEAL: within 5 days from judgment to the RTC who shall decide the issue within 10 days

NO MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (Summary)

PROCEDURE: (Sec. 32)

file during office hours
notice of place, date, time of hearing to the Board and the challenged voter
refer to one precinct and Board impleaded as respondent
no costs, EXCEPT: if it is found that the case was filed to harass the adverse party
if the ground for challenging right to register is the person is fictitious, the non-appearance of such person said to be fictitious shall be considered as prima facie evidence
decide within 10 days for both MTC and RTC upon appeal; should not be later than 15 days before the election

Nature and effect of proceedings: No Res Judicata

Domino vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 134015, July 19, 1999
Domino is running for representative of Province of Sarangani but is disqualified for lack of compliance with the 1-yr. residence requirement. Before this, Domino was declared by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in an exclusion proceedings that he was a resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City. Domino contends that the MTC decision is conclusive upon the COMELEC. But the Supreme Court held otherwise because any fact established in an inclusion or exclusion proceedings only applies to that election and not to elections thereafter held. The decision of the MTC does not preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of the candidate’s qualification, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the residency requirement.

The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in character. “xxx Although the court in inclusion or exclusion proceedings may pass upon any question necessary to decide the issue raised including the question of citizenship and residence of the challenged voter, the authority to order the inclusion or exclusion from the list of voters necessarily carries with it the power to inquire into and settle all matters essential to the exercise of said authority. However, except for the right to remain in the list of voters or for being excluded therefrom for the particular election in relation to which the proceedings had been held, a decision in an exclusion or inclusion proceeding, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata. In this sense, it does not operate as a bar to any further action that a party may take concerning the subject passed upon in the proceeding. Thus, a decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be conclusive on the voter’s political status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter in any other election.”

Taxation: Statute of Limitations

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FOR ASSESSMENT: within 3 years after last day for filing of return or if after deadline, then from actual filing; or 10 years from date of discovery if ITR is fraudulent, false or no ITR was filed

NOTA BENE:

The fraud must be proved as a fact. When the CIR fails to impute fraud in the assessment notice or demand for payment, or for failure to allege it in his answer to the taxpayer’s petition for review, fraud is negated and precludes the application of the 10-yr period.
Mere understatement of income in itself does not constitute fraud. To justify the application of the 10-yr prescriptive period, fraud must be the product of a deliberate intent to evade taxes.
But proof of fraud may be dispensed with when the court takes judicial notice of fraud assessments which have become final and executory in collection cases

ADDENDUM: If return was substantially amended, count the period from filing of amended return.

PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE OF FRAUD

taxpayer substantially underdeclares his taxable sales, receipts or income -- amount that he failed to report exceeds 30%
taxpayer substantially overdeclared his deductions -- amount of deduction exceeds 30%

INFORMER'S REWARD, REQUISITES (on Fraudulent Tax Returns)

voluntarily filed confidential information under oath with the Law Division of the BIR alleging therein specific violations constituting fraud
information must not yet be in possession of BIR or refer to a case already pending or previously investigated by BIR
informer must not be a government employee or a relative of the government employee within the 6th degree of consanguinity
information must result to collection of revenues and/or fines and penalties

FOR COLLECTION: within 5 years following the assessment of the tax; or within 10 yrs if the Government’s action is on a BOND which the taxpayer executes in order to secure the payment of his tax obligation

FOR CRIMINAL ACTIONS: within 5 yrs from the day of the commission of the violation, or from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment or from time assessment became final and unappealable

NOTA BENE:

period does not run if the person is absent from the Philippines
interrupted when the proceedings are instituted, to run again once proceedings are dismissed for reasons constituting jeopardy
may be raised even on appeal

Extension of Prescriptive Periods
Government and the taxpayer may enter into mutual agreement in writing PROVIDED THAT:

the agreement must be entered into before the lapse of the 5-yr period
but if the agreement provides that the taxpayer is not merely extending the prescriptive period but renouncing his right to invoke the defense of prescription, then even if the agreement was entered into beyond the 5-yr period, it is still binding

Q: If the 5-yr period has already lapsed and the BIR official failed to collect the tax, may he set-off the tax against a claim for tax refund filed by the taxpayer?
A: Set-off is not allowed in this case. The collecting officer should not be encouraged to be negligent in collecting taxes within the prescriptive period.

Interruption of Prescriptive Period

when the CIR is prohibited from making the assessment or beginning distraint and levy or a proceeding in court and for 60d thereafter
when the taxpayer requests for the reinvestigation which is granted by the CIR
when the taxpayer cannot be located in the address given by him in his return
when the warrant of distraint and levy is duly served upon the taxpayer or his authorized representative or a member of his household with sufficient discretion and no property could be located
when the taxpayer is out of the Philippines

Tax Remedies: Remedies of the Taxpayer

2010-03-16T07:09:00.001+08:00

REMEDIES OF THE TAXPAYER

BEFORE PAYMENT

administrative protest
request for reconsideration
request for reinvestigation
judicial protest

AFTER PAYMENT

claim for tax refund
claim for tax credit

1. Administrative Protest (Protest against Assessment)

WHEN: within 30 days from receipt of final assessment notice (FAN)

WHERE: BIR

HOW: written protest, stating facts, applicable law, rules and regulations or jurisprudence o which his protest is based; if only portions of FAN are disputed, must pay the deficiency tax on undisputed portion

PROCEDURE:

protest against pre-assessment notice (PAN) within 15 days from receipt
protest against FAN within 30 days from receipt
submit relevant documents within 60 days from filing of protest
CIR has 180 days to decide
in case of denial or lapse of 180-day period, taxpayer has 30 days to bring his protest to the CTA en division

WHEN PAN IS NOT REQUIRED:

finding for any deficiency tax is the result of mathematical error in computation of tax as appearing on face of return
a discrepancy has been determined between the tax withheld and the amount actually remitted
taxpayer who opted to claim a refund or credit of excess creditable withholding tax for at taxable period was determined to have carried over and automatically applied the same amount claimed against the estimated tax liabilities for the taxable quarter/s for the succeeding taxable year/s
excise tax due on excisable articles have not been paid
article locally purchased or imported by an exempt person

2. Request for Reconsideration – a plea for re-evaluation of an assessment on the basis of EXISTING RECORDS without need of additional evidence (question of law or fact or both)

3. Request for Reinvestigation – a plea for reinvestigation of an assessment on the basis of NEWLY-DISCOVERED EVIDENCE that a taxpayer intends to present in the reinvestigation (question of law or fact or both)

- in either case, the request must be accompanied by a WAIVER of the statute of limitations in favor of the government

4. Judicial Protest

PROCEDURE

within 30 days from denial of protest by CIR or from lapse of 180-day period, appeal to CTA division
if CTA division denies, motion for reconsideration within 15 days from receipt
within 15 days from denial of motion, appeal to CTA en banc
appeal to SC within 15 days by petition for review (Rule 45)

5. Refund/Credit
- based on the legal principle of quasi-contract or solutio indebiti
- in the nature of an exemption, which cannot be allowed unless granted in the most explicit and categorical language
- strictly construed against the claimant (proof of claim must be established)
- partial payment of a tax cannot be the basis for a tax refund
- interest on taxes refunded may not be paid by the Government to the taxpayer, UNLESS: (a) the CIR acted with patent arbitrariness (inexcusable or obstinate disregard for legal provision); and (b) in the case of income taxes withheld on the wages of employees, which must be refunded within 3 mos from April 15

Tax Refund vs. Tax Credit

R: takes place when there is actually a reimbursement of the tax
C: the Government issues a tax certificate or tax credit memo covering the amount determined to be reimbursable, which can be applied after proper verification against any sum that may be due and collectible from the taxpayer

Requisites for Recovery

there was an actual collection and receipt by the Government of the tax sought to be recovered (factual proof)
legal basis for the granting of refund or credit, including verification of compliance with the statutory requirements relative to the filing of claims within the reglementary 2-yr period
in case of corporations, must signify whether to avail of tax refund or tax credit in the corporate income tax return

Q: Are income tax returns actionable documents which must be specifically denied by the Government, otherwise it would constitute an admission to the allegation that payment has in fact already been made and therefore the taxpayer no longer has to submit proof of claim of refund?
A: Income tax returns are not actionable documents because the action is not based on the income tax returns but on the entitlement of the taxpayer to tax refund. Therefore, his claim for refund must be supported by proof.

NOTA BENE: If proof of claim for refund is established, the BIR should refund without any unreasonable delay

Q: Is tax deficiency assessment a bar to tax refund or credit claim?
A: Yes. The deficiency assessment creates a doubt as to the truth and accuracy of the return. Said return cannot therefore be the basis of refund or credit.

Statutory Requirements for Refund/Credit Claims

written claim for refund or tax credit must be filed by the taxpayer with the CIR
the claim must be a categorical demand for reimbursement
both administrative and judicial claims for refund/credit must be filed within 2 years from date of payment regardless of any supervening cause (in case of corporations, the 2-year period is counted from the date final adjusted return was filed at end of taxable year)

Q: Suppose A filed his claim for tax refund with the BIR within the 2-yr reglementary period but it is only after two years have lapsed before BIR rendered a decision and it is one of denial. A now files an appeal of the BIR’s decision with the CTA within the 30-day period to appeal. Will A’s action prosper?
A: No, A’s action will not prosper. Although A filed his claim for refund with the BIR within the 2-yr prescriptive period, he failed to file the same within the same period with the CTA. The rule is that the taxpayer need wait for the action of CIR on his claim for refund before he can take his claim to the CTA. The 2-yr period must be complied with in both the BIR and CTA, regardless of any supervening cause.

WHEN 2-YR PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD SUSPENDED

there is a pending litigation between the two parties
the CIR in that litigated case agreed to abide by the decision of the SC

WHY WRITTEN CLAIM IS NECESSARY:

to afford CIR an opportunity to correct action of subordinates
to notify Government that taxes sought to be refunded are under question and that, therefore, such notice should be borne in mind in estimating the revenue available for expenditure

GR: Government is not liable for interest on tax refund, UNLESS:

CIR acted with patent arbitrariness
int eh case of income taxes withheld on wages of employees, which must be refunded within 3 months from April 15

PRINCIPLE OF EQUITABLE RECOUPMENT – allows a taxpayer whose claim for a refund has been barred due to prescription (lapse of more than 2yrs counted from date of payment) to recover said tax by setting off the prescribed refund against a tax that may be due and collectible from him; NOT ALLOWED in the Philippines because it puts a premium on the taxpayer’s neglect to enforce or assert his rights under the law