All businesses registered with the Wisconsin Department of Revenue received a notice (see below) that county and stadium taxes must be remitted beginning October 1st, 2009. Wineries shipping into Wisconsin are subject to this change. For all orders that were taken after October 1st and shipped to Wisconsin residents, wine shippers must remit the appropriate county and stadium taxes.

When filing the Wisconsin sales and use tax return, form ST-12, Schedule CT should be used to report these additional local taxes. The first sales and use tax return with local taxes is due for monthly filers in November for the month of October. For quarterly and annual filers, the first report with local taxes will come due on January 31st, 2010. Because this new rule became effective on October 1st, annual filers need only to pay the 5% state sales tax rate for the first nine months of the year, but should pay state tax and local tax for the final three months.

All Registered Retailers Must Collect Sales and Use Taxes for All Wisconsin Counties and Stadium Districts

Effective October 1, 2009, all retailers that are registered in Wisconsin to collect and remit the 5% Wisconsin state sales and use tax are also required to collect and remit the applicable county and stadium sales and use taxes for any sales that are sourced to a county or stadium district that has adopted the applicable county or stadium sales or use tax. This provision applies regardless of whether the retailer is “engaged in business” in the county or stadium district to which the sale is sourced.(Section 77.73 (3), Wis. Stats., as created by 2009 Wisconsin Act 2 and amended by 2009 Wisconsin Act 28)

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The much-anticipated entrance of Amazon.com into the wine industry has come to an end before it ever got off the ground. The prospect of Amazon’s wine site sent a wave of excitement throughout the industry as small and medium sized domestic brands with limited distribution saw an opportunity to get exposure through Amazon’s enormous book of active customers. For foreign brands, the opportunity seemed even more attractive since imported brands don’t have the same rights to ship wine directly to consumers as U.S.-produced brands do. The Amazon program, in theory, would have provided access to a broad selection of wines from all regions of the world in a reliable, cost-effective approach to consumers in many states across the country.

As the 2009 holiday season (a time when most wineries make a significant share of their sales for the year) approaches, many will be nervous and disappointed to see Amazon exit the wine industry. At the same time, wineries should be excited about taking advantage of the brand building that they have done and finding innovative ways to connect to customers and sell their fabulous products. Furthermore, 2009 was a banner year for wine shipping legislation as three states (Kansas, Tennessee, and Maine) opened up their borders to direct shipment where shipping had previously been prohibited, bringing the total of available “offsite” (states that allow Internet, mail, phone, fax and club orders) states to 37. Although these are not among the top wine consuming states in the country, every consumer counts in this sluggish economy. Free the Grapes! hailed 2009 as the “best vintage since 2005” in terms of direct shipping legislation, and there is no reason to believe that this trend will not continue right into 2010.

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On September 30, a federal district judge in a New Mexico suit brought by US Airways to free it from state regulation of beverage service ruled that the 21^st Amendment prevents the federal government from preempting state regulation of alcoholic beverage service aboard federally regulated carriers. The decision leaves New Mexico regulators free to treat airliners in their airspace as if they were local taverns with respect to licensing, server training and over-service.

Although the case does not deal directly with wine distribution, it is a significant addition to the “weak Granholm” viewpoint, which lends support to trade barrier proponents in the second wave of wine access litigation now in the lower federal courts.

Supremacy

Judge Armijo’s opinion in US Airways, Inc. v. O’Donnell introduces some legal elements that may be unfamiliar to industry observers, but it represents a reading of 21^st Amendment jurisprudence that is well worth examining. Examination will involve a little more detail about the Supremacy Clause of the federal constitution than has appeared to date in most public discussion of Granholm issues, but that will be unavoidable as post-2005 beverage law develops.

In the subject area of access by wine sellers to consumers and retailers in other states –that is, the development of a national market in direct distribution and direct retail sales and shipment– the recurring theme has been alleged incompatibility of state-imposed restraints with the Commerce Clause, which famously forbids permitting in-state wineries to sell and ship directly to consumers while denying that privilege to out-of-state wineries. That principle is said to arise under the “dormant” Commerce Clause, because it operates in an area, interstate commerce, where Congress holds exclusive power to legislate and has elected not to exercise it, thereby leaving the area federally unregulated and off-limits to state statutory restraints.

Supremacy Clause cases address the non-dormant side the Commerce Clause coin, where Congress has in fact exercised its power to legislate over a subject within its constitutional authority. A key question in Supremacy Clause litigation is whether existing federal legislation occupies the field being regulated, thereby invoking the Article VI declaration that laws passed by Congress “shall be the supreme Law of the Land … any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding,” to invalidate (i.e., “preempt”) the challenged state enactment. The answer is found by ascertaining the intent of Congress from the text of the statute.

Federal statutes may be found preemptive in more than one manner. The principal division is between (1) express preemption, i.e., a direct statement in the federal statute, denying states concurrent jurisdiction to legislate on the subject, and (2) implied preemption, i.e., a clear implication of that intent arising from the statutory text as a whole. Implied preemption further subdivides into “field preemption,” when the scope of the federal statutory scheme displays an intent fully to occupy the particular subject area, and “conflict preemption,” when regulated persons cannot comply with both the federal statute and the state law in question. The New Mexico case involves questions of express preemption and field preemption in the subject area of alcoholic beverage service on federally regulated air carriers.

In US Airways the federal legislation under consideration was the 1978 Airline Deregulation Act, which charges the Federal Aviation Administration with the duty to prescribe “regulations and minimum standards for other practices, methods, and procedure the Administrator finds necessary for safety in air commerce and national security.” Pursuant to that directive, the FAA adopted a regulation stating that no carrier under its jurisdiction “may serve any alcoholic beverage to any person aboard any of its aircraft who … [a]ppears to be intoxicated.”

The state had adopted a far more extensive set of regulations, including requirements for licensure and server training and penalties for over-service. Following a collision on a New Mexico highway involving multiple fatalities and a driver who was allegedly over-served on a US Airways flight to the state, the regulatory authorities ordered the airline to cease serving alcoholic beverages to passengers on flights arriving in or departing from locations within the state, without licensing as a retail outlet and compliance with regulations applicable to retail licensees.

Simple Question, Different Answers

The Airline Deregulation Act expressly provides that states “may not enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the force and effect of law related to a price, route, or service of [a federally regulated] air carrier.” Thus, the square one question was whether the suit were a simple case of express preemption, taking beverage service to be a “service” of US Airways.

As the meaning of “service” in the Act controls the outcome of the case, it is not surprising that the parties advanced different definitions. The state’s position was that the sentence in which the term appears deals with transportation services, so the term must be restricted to things like frequency of flights. That is a conclusion reached by one of the five federal appellate courts in separate circuits that had interpreted the Act (none of them the 10^th Circuit, where New Mexico is located).

An alternative reading begins with observing that the statutory phrase is equivalent to “a price, a route or a service,” because the introductory indefinite article is placed to modify each of the following nouns. The implication of “a service” is that there are various services and that the express preemption applies to all of them. The reading urged by US Airways, in which the sentence applies to food and beverage service, is supported by the other four appellate decisions.

All five Circuit Court opinions apply recognized principles of statutory construction and dissect the text with well-sharpened scalpels. There is, however, a cleaver at hand.

Cutting Through Complexity –or Not

What makes US Airways worthy of discussion here is its use of the 21^st Amendment to resolve a Supremacy Clause issue.

Rather than come to a conclusion as to which of the other circuits had reasoned correctly, Judge Armijo declared that the choice is forced, because interpreting the Act to apply to alcoholic beverage service would render it unconstitutional as a limitation on states’ rights preserved by § 2 of the 21^st Amendment. Section 2 is, of course, the constitutional provision declaring unlawful the importation of intoxicating liquor into a state contrary to the state’s laws. Granholm adds the proviso that the state law claimed to trump a federal interest be “valid,” opening the floor to debate over how one tests for validity.

At the heart of the validity issue is the question whether parts of the constitution other than the 21^st Amendment operate on state liquor laws in the same way as on state laws regulating ordinary goods. If they do, then the § 2 states’ right to venture into interstate commerce far enough to control wine importation at their borders applies only to laws that first pass muster under, e.g., the dormant Commerce Clause prohibition of discrimination against interstate commerce (as Granholm says) and under the Supremacy Clause (which US Airways ultimately excludes in the case at hand).

In finding state regulation valid, US Airways presents a somewhat convoluted syllogism, in which Congress did not intend to regulate liquor service because it could not constitutionally do so, but the federal statute might preempt the subject of liquor service anyway, if (a) the court found the federal interest in regulating liquor service outweighed the state’s interest in regulating the same subject and (b) the state laws had a significant impact on Congress’s objectives.

Imbalance

Judge Armijo implied that her decision was based in part on inadequate presentation of the airline’s case.

On how Supremacy Clause interests weigh in the balance, she wrote that US Airways “makes no argument and presents no evidence” that the state laws violate specific parts of the federal constitution, thus taking application of Granholm beyond the dormant Commerce Clause off the table. On the element of impact, she noted that the airline had not shown the state regulation “would have an adverse effect on competition and airfare.” She characterized the plaintiff’s contentions on effect as “speculative” and as taking too little account of unspecified “judicial and administrative relief under New Mexico law.”

Summing Up

After thus disposing of express preemption, the court might have had little to say about implied preemption; if the 21^st Amendment would invalidate express preemption in a given subject area, it should also preclude inferring preemption in that area from Congressional occupancy of the field. However, in ruling against implied preemption, the opinion goes on to articulate two points that may prove controversial.

First, the court appears to view field preemption as requiring Congressional intent specifically to occupy a field consisting of the very subject addressed by the regulation in question, rather than to occupy a field broad enough to encompass that subject. Ascertaining implied intent is inevitably a process of divination with considerable discretion in the trial court, but the standard in US Airways may be unduly restrictive.

More significant is the second point, with which the opinion closes. The court declares that even if the subject requires “an extensive and uniform system of federal regulation,” a state may nevertheless assert a 21^st Amendment right to exercise “virtually complete control” over how to structure distribution of liquor, entitling it to apply its panoply of retail licensee regulation to the federal carrier. It would be difficult to fashion a clearer expression of pre-Granholm law. The question is whether, in contexts that are not exact duplicates of the facts of Granholm, it is also a statement of current law.

Those who have followed this subject will recognize the “virtually complete control” phrase as part of a dictum from Midcal, quoted by Scalia in North Dakota v. U.S., where it was also dictum, and quoted again in Granholm, where it was dictum yet again and, as a dissenter correctly saw, incompatible with the holding. Ironically, the US Airways court cites Granholm for the control point. (For an explanation of the difference between holdings and dicta, see the blog post, Discrimination Against Out-of-State Retailers After Granholm.) Some dicta prove more substantial than the decisions that transmit them; whether that will be true of this one is the central question of current 21^st Amendment litigation.

by R. Corbin Houchins, CorbinCounsel.com

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The direct shipping applications for Maine are now available on the Wine Institute website. The direct shipping permit allows wineries to ship up to 12 nine liter cases of wine to a recipient’s address each year. The Department of Public Safety, Liquor Licensing and Inspection Division has confirmed that there are no prohibited shipping areas at this time. The annual permit fee is $200 plus an additional $100 filing fee. Applicants will have to register with Maine Revenue Services to pay sales and use taxes before submitting their permit application. Maine Revenue Services will send applicants a Retailer’s Certificate to confirm that their sales tax account has been established. There is no fee to register with Revenue Services and the tax registration forms can be sent in via U.S. mail or electronically. The processing time for electronically filed applications is significantly shorter. Only sections 1 and 5 of the tax registration form must be completed.

Once wineries have received their Retailer’s Certificate they can submit their completed direct shipper application to the Liquor Licensing and Inspections Unit, along with a copy of their federal basic permit and application fee. The direct shipper application must also be notarized. Once wineries receive their direct shipping permit they will be responsible for paying excise tax to the Department of Public Safety and sales tax to Revenue Services. In addition, a direct shipping report must be filed twice a year. Reporting forms will be posted on the Wine Institute website once they become available. Should you have any questions please contact Annie Bones in Wine Institute’s State Relations Department at abones@wineinstitute.org.

Annie Bones, State Relations – Wine Institute

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The Montana Dept. of Revenue, Liquor Control Division recently confirmed that consumers in Montana are prohibited from receiving direct wine shipments under the Federal Onsite provision (sec. 11022 of Public Law 107-273). Montana law only allows consumers with a connoisseur’s license to receive direct wine shipments. However, the common carriers, FedEx and UPS, have NOT approved Montana for shipment of direct-to-consumer sales, because Montana law requires a consumer to obtain a license to receive such direct shipments.

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In an action supported by Washington Wine Institute, the Washington State Liquor Control Board adopted a new policy on wine label approval. Effective August 19, 2009, the WSLCB will accept the federal Certificate of Label Approval (COLA) as label approval for beer and wine to be sold in the state of Washington. Producers will no longer be required to apply for state label approval, but as WSLCB confirmed today, wineries will still need to file their COLA’s with the Board. Alcohol and keg products that do not require Federal label approval are also approved to sell immediately.

- Jean M. Leonard, Esq. – Executive Director, Washington Wine Institute

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The Maine Bureau of Liquor Enforcement has indicated that direct shipping license applications will be available on September 12, 2009, the same day the direct shipping law becomes effective. Wineries should contact Lori Nolette, the contact for liquor licensing and compliance at the Bureau, for a copy of the application once it becomes available. The direct shipping licensees will be able to ship up to 12 cases of wine to each consumer each year. The initial license fee is $200 with an annual renewal of $50. Wineries must have a license in order to ship on-site and off-site transactions to Maine consumers beginning September 12, 2009. Wine Institute will post any updates about the direct shipper license application on the Wine Institute website as soon as it becomes available.

-Annie Bones, State Relations – Wine Institute

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Wineries are now able to apply to the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission for a Direct Shipper license. Direct Shipper licensees may ship no more than 1 case (9 liters) of wine to a Tennessee consumer during a calendar month and total shipments to each consumer may not exceed 3 cases (27 liters) of wine during a calendar year. Only Tennessee consumers located in a wet region are allowed to receive wine shipments, and common carriers will not deliver shipments to an address that is located in a jurisdiction that has not authorized the sale of alcoholic beverages. A complete list of jurisdictions that have approved sales of alcohol is available on the Wine Institute website.

The first step in the direct shipper application process is registering to pay taxes, by submitting an “Application for Registration” to the Department of Revenue. The “Application for Registration” form must be completed by hand (Do Not file online version of the application.) Direct Shippers should select “Wholesale Gallonage” and “Sales and Use Tax” in section 1 and describe their business activity as “direct shipping” in section 15. Direct Shipper’s are not required to post a bond.

Once the Department of Revenue has processed the application for registration the direct shipper applicant should receive two documents: a “Certificate of Registration” and a letter confirming the tax registration process has been completed. Do not submit the Direct Shipper License application to the Alcoholic Beverage Commission before receiving these documents. The confirmation letter issued by the Department of Revenue must be submitted with the Direct Shipper License application. Direct shipper license applicants must pay a one time non-refundable fee of $300.00 and an annual license fee of $150 to the Tennessee Alcoholic Beverage Commission before receiving their license. Payment totaling $450.00 should be included with the application packet. In addition, the following documents should be submitted with the direct shipper’s license: copies of contracts with common carriers shipping wine to Tennessee consumers (also known as “Alcohol Shipping Agreement”), a copy of the applicant’s organizational document, and a copy of the applicant’s federal basic permit.

The direct shipper’s license is valid for 1 year from the date of issue. Direct shipper’s must file reports, pay a state sales tax of 9.25% and pay excise tax. The Department of Revenue will send the appropriate reporting forms and instructions to licensees based on their filing status. The application forms and instructions are available on the Wine Institute website. Wineries should remember that shipping to consumers in Tennessee without a license is classified as a felony. Should you have any questions please contact Wine Institute’s State Relations Department at 415-356-7530 or abones@wineinstitute.org.

-Annie Bones, State Relations – Wine Institute

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New rules in Texas should benefit Lone Star consumers, and also make life a little easier for wineries. On June 19th, Texas Governor Rick Perry signed into law HB 1084, which will take effect on September 1st, 2009. Under the new rules, three different volume limits replace the existing set of two limits for licensed shippers.

Currently, licensees may ship up to three gallons of wine within “any 30-day period”. This rule was perhaps the most difficult, and most commonly violated rule in a compliance check out of all state limitations. First, three gallons translates to just over 15 standard 750 mL bottles, whereas most states stick to a standard case or two-case limit. More importantly, the “rolling” 30-day period was very problematic to track for wineries that did not use an automated compliance solution. The majority of state volume limits are tracked on a calendar (month or year) basis, but this effectively created 365 different 30 day periods to track.

The new bill establishes three different volume limits for direct shipments to Texas:

1. No more than nine gallons (46 bottles)  to the same consumer within any calendar month
2. No more than 36 gallons (181 bottles) to the same consumer within any 12-month period
3. No more than 35,000 gallons (14,721 cases) to  all Texas consumers annually

Although some coverage of the changes has highlighted a “tripling” of the volume limit (from 3 gallons to 9 gallons), the annual consumer limit actually stays the same at 36 gallons. According to the House Research Organization’s bill analysis,

Increasing from three to nine gallons the maximum amount of shipments to the same consumer within a month would acknowledge the unique seasonal requirements of wineries as well as the realities of Texas summers. Wine is a perishable product that spoils at temperatures above 75 degrees Fahrenheit, so many out-of-state wineries are reluctant to ship to Texas, especially during July and August.

CSHB 1084 would not increase the overall amount of wine that a winery or out-of-state shipper could ship to the same consumer per year. In fact, it would codify in statute the current limit of 36 gallons per year, which is based on the existing restriction of no more than three gallons per month. It simply would allow wineries to ship somewhat larger quantities of wine to Texas consumers during the cooler seasons of the year.

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On September 1, 2009, excise tax rates for wine will increase in Illinois and North Carolina.

Governor Pat Quinn approved Illinois House Bill 255 on July 13, 2009. The bill increases Illinois’ excise tax on wines from $0.73 to $1.39 per gallon of wine under 20% ABV. An updated tax form for Direct Wine Shippers to report sales made on or after September 1, 2009, is already available on Illinois’ website.

Excise tax increases on alcohol were included in North Carolina’s budget bill this August. Starting September 1, North Carolina’s excise tax rates on wine will increase from $0.21 to $0.2634 per liter for wines 16% ABV and under; and from $0.24 to $0.2934 per liter for wines 16% and 24% ABV. The B-C-786 is used by licensed wine shippers use to report sales of wine and report taxes. Thie new report is not yet available online, but check North Carolina’s website on September 16 for the updated form.

As part of both states’ tax legislation, malt beverages and distilled spirits taxes will also increase next month.

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