Sri Lanka Guardian

SARATH FONSEKA: HISTORIC CONFLUENCE OF TWIN PROCESSES

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Sat, 26 May 2012 04:44:00 +0000

| BY D.B.S. JEYARAJ

Courtesy: Daily Mirror, Colombo

( May 26, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The “release” of Sarath Fonseka Former Army commander and erstwhile contender for the 2010 Presidential stakes from jail due to remission of his prison sentences by President Mahinda Rajapaksa has infused fresh excitement into the Sri Lankan Political scenario.

The Sarath Fonseka phenomenon therefore has to be seen as the logical outcome of this process of politicisation of the military. He is not the sole cause but only a significant consequence of this long process.

Vociferous discussions are on about the pros and cons of this event and various theories are afloat as to why the President chose to act in this manner at this juncture. Speculation is also rife about the political course likely to be followed by Sarath Fonseka.

Whatever the nature and course of this speculative debate there is little doubt that very little love has been lost between the Rajapaksas and Fonseka. The current “turn” is only another episode in the ongoing political feud among the sturdy sons of Ruhunu hailing from beyond the Bentara river.

Instead of focusing specifically on the current situation at this point of time this column would like to wander down memory lane a bit and trace the genesis of this crisis with particular emphasis on two vital elements central to the narrative. Firstly the underlying causes behind the deterioration of relations between the Rajapaksas and Fonseka and secondly the creeping politicisation of the military in Sri Lanka.

It was these two reasons which led to the situation of Sarath Fonseka challenging Mahinda Rajapaksa for the presidency in 2010. Subsequent events affecting Fonseka have a direct link to this act of political defiance. The current “release” is only a twist in this dramatic political drama. It is also important to recognise that the Fonseka phenomenon is only the outcome of a long drawn out process through which the military has been gradually politicised. Fonseka is a creature of this creeping politisation of the military.

There is no doubt that there is a groundswell of sympathy for Sarath Fonseka on account of his incarceration. Rightly or wrongly the ex-army chief is perceived by many as having been victimised. This perception however should not prevent the spotlight being turned on events that had transpired earlier where the conduct of Fonseka made profound impact and has had a bearing on the present situation.

The present scenario of Fonseka being regarded as the primary political foe of the Rajapaksa regime is a result of two developments. One was the deteriorating relationship between the Rajapaksas and Fonseka. The other is the ongoing politicisation of the military. Both developments converged in the form of the Fonseka phenomenon. Against this backdrop the future direction of Sri Lankan politics is extremely uncertain and difficult to predict.It is however essential to delve deep into the recent past to understand the rapidly flowing political currents, cross currents and undercurrents. This column drawing substantially from past writings will engage in a brief re-run of events preceding the defining moment of the 2010 Presidential poll.

It was in May 2009 that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam(LTTE)met its waterloo by the waters of Nandhikkadal lagoon, the lion’s share of credit for the victory against the tigers was apportioned to a triad at the helm.

TRIUMVIRATE

The triumvirate comprising President Mahinda Rajapaksa, Defence secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Army chief Sarath Fonseka was hailed for providing political, administrative and military leadership respectively in the triumphant war against the Tigers.

Barely six months later this triumphant triumvirate lay fractured as Lt. Gen Sarath Fonseka crossed swords with the other two in a bitter, divisive political battle fought fiercely.

It was as if Bernard Montgomery had contested against Winston Churchill after World war two or Sam Manekshaw competed with Indira Gandhi after the Bangladesh war!

Mahinda Rajapaksa was elected executive president on November 18th 2005. Despite being elected through an enforced boycott by the tigers it soon became apparent that Medamulana and Valvettithurai were on a collision course.

President Rajapaksa made two crucial appointments at the onset of his presidency in anticipation of a savage war with the LTTE. One was to make his younger sibling Gotabaya Rajapaksa Defence secretary. The other was to appoint Sarath Fonseka as Army commander and extend his tenure.

Gotabaya an old soldier himself held Lt. Colonel rank when he quit the army in 1991 and migrated to the United States of America. Although a US citizen Gotabaya returned to serve his brother and country with a missionary zeal. His objective was to defeat and destroy the LTTE and rid Sri Lanka of a menace plaguing it for decades.

It was at Gotabaya’s behest that Sarath Fonseka was made army chief. He was scheduled to retire as he would have reached the mandatory age 55 on December 6th 2005. But Gotabaya persuaded his brother to make Sarath army chief because Fonseka was the best man to lead the army at that point of time.

The serving commander Maj-Gen Shantha Kottegoda was sent to Brazil as ambassador and Fonseka brought in. Thereafter his term was extended each year in December.

There is unanimous opinion that Sarath Fonseka is a tough soldier and astute commander. He is a man of tremendous courage and remarkable military acumen. But there were other aspects to his character and military record that negated his prospects of being Army commander earlier.

Chief among them was an inflated ego of gigantic proportions. This resulted in a lot of friction earlier between Fonseka and his contemporaries. The long standing rivalry between Fonseka and his Naval counterpart Wasantha Karannagoda was legendary. So too was the intra-army strife with another top notch soldier Maj-Gen Janaka Perera.

ARROGANCE

There was also Fonseka’s colossal arrogance. He fancied himself as a combination of Hannibal, Alexander, Julius Caesar, Napoleon & Rommel.In Sarath Fonseka’s self-perception he was Sri Lanka’s greatest military treasure and all glory was due to him alone. It was the “I, me., myself alone” syndrome.

Most contemporary officers resented the cantankerous bullying and crowing of Sarath Fonseka. They admired him as a professional but disliked him at a personal level. But Fonseka was highly popular among the rank and file. He always looked after their welfare and earned their respect and regard.

There were also other ignoble traits.As a hawkish soldier his human rights record was abysmal. In 1990 for example there were large scale massacres of Tamil youths in the Amparai district which was under his command.Even recently Fonseka’s hand was suspected in some attacks on journalists. Sarath Fonseka like Janaka Perera had been “fingered” in many reports by reputed Human rights organisations as well as those by Commissions of Inquiry. Though they hated each other Janaka and Sarath were both in the same boat. Both President Chandrika Kumaratunga and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe at different times were reluctant to appoint them earlier as army commanders.

Despite their positive military credentials their negative attributes stood in the way of achieving highest military office. Another reason contributing to this was the suspicion and fear about ulterior motives. There was paranoia (unfair perhaps) that Sarath and Janaka could bring about a coup d’etat. This is a perpetual concern of successive regimes since the 1962 abortive coup. For all these reasons, Sarath Fonseka was denied what he felt was his rightful place as Army commander. It was said that President Rajapaksa was also reluctant to appoint Sarath but Gotabaya got his brother to go ahead . Apparently the President relied on his brother’s guarantee that Sarath would be “managed” by him (Gota).

This was how Sarath became Army chief. After the first year Mahinda wanted to let Sarath go but again Gotabhaya intervened and stayed his brother’s hand. In the early stages Gotabhaya evolved a satisfactory working relationship with Sarath and set the military juggernaut rolling forward.

ANANDIANS

Both had a lot in common as they were fellow Anandians and more or less of the same age. Sarath got into the army as part of the third intake while Gotabhaya was of the fourth intake. They served together in crucial battlefronts like that of Vadamaratchy in 1987. Both played a role in the “midnight express” evacuation exercise of Jaffna Fort in 1990. Sarath was Colonel and Gotabaya Lt. Colonel when the latter quit the army.

Another bond between both was their common intention of destroying the LTTE. The reverse of this was that the LTTE also was determined to kill both as the tigers realised that the death of this duo would cripple the war effort beyond redemption.

Sarath Fonseka was seriously injured in a woman suicide bomber attempt within army headquarters but miraculously survived and bounced back in what was perhaps a medical marvel. This was another revelation of the man’s grit and stamina.

There was a near successful attempt on Gotabhaya too when a three- wheeler exploded near his convoy at the “Pithala” junction on Greenpath. Gotabhaya was not injured but again escaped death by a hair’s breadth.

The fact that both survived LTTE attempts to kill them drew them closer and strengthened their resolve to fight the war to the finish. Initially there was a lot of camaraderie between both.

The war progressed and the nation as well as world at large witnessed the LTTE being slowly driven back and the armed forces advancing. But the Sarath- Gotabhaya equation was getting strained. According to defence establishment insiders the greater share of blame for this was Sarath’s.

There was a time when a uniformed Gotabaya saluted his superior officer Sarath Fonseka. Now Gotabaya was in civils but entitled to salutes from Sarath as Defence secretary. Though Sarath saluted Gotabaya and addressed him as “sir” in public, the egoistic Fonseka had been unhappy at this turnabout.

To the average military officer anyone in “civvy street” was an object of contempt. This was so in the case of Sarath who was now perceiving Gotabhaya as a civilian boss. Gotabhaya to his credit did not play “soldier” and indulge in antics like Anuruddha Ratwatte . He conducted himself as a civilian in authority refusing to wear uniform or be made “General”.

GOTABAYA

Nevertheless there were several instances of Sarath Fonseka shooting his mouth off about how galling it was for himself to salute Gotabaya his junior in the army. Given the penchant for tale-carrying in Sri Lanka these comments were duly conveyed to Gotabaya. But Gotabaya stomached them and continued to work with Sarath as he felt that Fonseka was the best person to prosecute the war with the LTTE. It must be remembered that Gotabhaya was a man with a mission and was prepared to sup with even the devil till “mission accomplished”.

There is no doubt that ultimately war’s are won on the actual battlefield and that the role of the infantry is crucial at decisive stages but the problem with Sarath Fonseka was that he regarded the army and the army alone as being pivotal and the sole repository of all kudos. In this there was something puerile in Fonseka. Unfortunately the power he wielded made him an “enfant terrible”.

There was much inter-service strife. So great was the animosity against the Army commander and by extension the army that it required herculean efforts to get the Navy and Air Force cooperate with the army. Ideally this coordination should have been the task of former Air Force chief and Chief of Defence staff Donald Perera. But Fonseka paid scant regard to Donald Perera.

It was therefore the onerous duty of Gotabaya to manage tensions and coordinate matters when the war was on. He liaised between the Army and navy and Army and Air Force. He smoothed ruffled feelings and secured the cooperation of all. Fonseka and Karannagoda the navy chief were not on speaking terms. Relations were rather strained though not ruptured between Air force chief Gunatilleke and Fonseka.

The Navy had played an important role by destroying many LTTE ships and interdicting supplies to the tigers. The naval cordon too had been very effective curtailing sea tiger movement to a very great extent. Likewise the Air Force had conducted several successful strikes on LTTE installations demolishing many tiger arms dumps. The aerial attack that killed LTTE political commissar Suppiah Paramu Thamilselvan was a significant achievement.

But all these were apparently not acknowledged by Fonseka in discussions within the corridors of power. Discussions like those of the National Security council were turned into colleague haranguing monologues by Sarath Fonseka. Still Gotabaya managed to keep the war going by deftly striking a balance among all three services. Both Mahinda and Gotabaya treated Sarath as a “prima donna” throwing occasional tantrums. As far as Sarath Fonseka was concerned he went on like a spoiled brat causing havoc. A latter day Dennis the menace! Gotabhaya was alike to a tolerant mother cleaning up the mess made by her recalcitrant child. There was also Sarath’s selfishness that created a lot of heartburn within the Army too.

PROMOTIONS

Sarath Fonseka departed from tradition by withholding promotions and transferring officers whom the army chief regarded as not being efficient or up to the mark. In a noteworthy deviation from accepted norms several junior officers who proved themselves in battle were given rapid promotions. Fonseka justified these actions as promoting the “strong” and penalising the “weak” in the army so that the force could be transformed into a formidable fighting machine. This unorthodox approach was rather successful in extracting frontline results and had the support of Gotabaya in principle.

But the downside of this was growing discontentment against Fonseka among many officers. Several officers were deprived of rightful promotions and sullenly harboured resentment. Again it was Gotabaya’s lot to soothe hurt feelings.

These feelings were exacerbated by the naked favouritism displayed by Fonseka towards certain officers and unconcealed antipathy towards some others.

For instance Parakrama Pannipitiya the “conqueror” of the east was transferred and then removed from his post despite his military triumph. This was simply because he had fallen foul of Fonseka.

Pannipitiya was treated very shabbily and denied security. He had to go to Courts to get it restored. Later Pannipitiya was “framed” on a frivolous treasure hunt charge and penalised. He was restored to grace after Fonseka’s fall from grace.

On the other hand blue-eyed boys of Fonseka like Samantha Sooriyabandara were not subjected to penalties in spite of an abysmal military record as 53 division commander. Sooriyabandara suffered many reversals in his ill-fated attempts to break through LTTE defences along the Mhamaalai axis but was not axed. Eventually he got a plum assignment as defence attaché to the Washington embassy.

The growing disenchantment within military officers towards the conduct of Sarath Fonseka was best encapsulated in a pithy comment attributed to battle-hardened General Sumith Rajaguru. “If we go to the front there is Johnny and if we fall back there is Fonny”. Johnny refers to the LTTE’s anti-personnel mine and Fonny of course is Fonseka.

ILLUSTRATION

A glaring illustration of Fonseka’s tendency for self-aggrandisement on the one hand and denying honours to subordinate-colleagues was visible in 2007 when the Vishista Seva Vibushanaya (VSV) awards were conferred. The VSV is regarded as equivalent to the Distinguished Service order.

In the case of the Army all officers above Lt.Col rank with 30 years of unblemished service were eligible for this. Incidentally Sarath Fonseka who completed 30 years in 2000 was yet to be awarded a VSV due to perhaps the operative requirement “unblemished”.

What the Army chief did in 2007 was to refrain from recommending any serving officer other than himself for the VSV. He also proposed that only retired or serving army commanders be given the VSV. To his credit Gotabaya disagreed.

Regulations forbade the recommendations of the army commander being disregarded in the case of serving officers. But the Defence secretary ensured that 11 retired army officers got the VSV. This infuriated Fonseka.

Irritants between Sarath and Gotabaya were not restricted within the defence establishment alone. Sarath Fonseka in media interviews would drop very heavy bricks causing adverse fall-out. On one occasion he called Tamil Nadu politicians “jokers in the pay of the LTTE”. When New Delhi remonstrated Fonseka was asked to issue an apology. He refused. It was left to Gotabaya to patch up by issuing an apology for no fault of his own.

Then there was the infamous interview given to the Canadian newspaper “National Post”. Fonseka said Sri Lanka belonged to the majority Sinhalese and that the minorities can stay but have no say.He was asked to do some damage control by clarifying matters in another interview to a state controlled newspaper. In that he was even worse, saying the minority communities could not make “undue demands” like federalism.

Sarath Fonseka’s “attitude” was resented but accommodated because he was considered crucially important to the war effort. He was humoured greatly but when the war ended and Fonseka was perceived as exceeding his limits the Rajapaksa regime came down heavily on him. This situation was compounded by paranoia on the one hand and pique on the other.

Sarath Fonseka had been regularly boasting about his prowess in prosecuting the war successfully as the battles were in progress.He saw himself as a latter day Dutu Gemunu and even had at one stage a picture of Gemunu on an elephant before whom a cowering Elara was kneeling. A foreign journalist who saw this “art” said that the face of Gemunu resembled Sarath.

POPULARITY

When Fonseka went on beating his “Rohana” drum, the Rajapaksas were annoyed but tolerated him till the task was done. He was also allowed to derive popularity mileage due to the war. Even President Rajapaksa basked in reflected glory with some posters showing Mahinda and Sarath marching together towards victory.

But the president was growing increasingly insecure about Sarath’s growing popularity among the people. This was akin to Ranasinghe Premadasa’s resentment and fear over Denzil Kobbekaduwe. But Rajapaksa was confident that brother Gotabaya would not let things get out of hand. On the other hand Fonseka was resenting the fact that he had to “share” popularity gained through war victories with the president and government. For example he was irritated by the delay in announcing the fall of Sampoor in order to coincide with the SLFP convention. Fonseka was openly critical of politicians and politics and referred to them derisively. This resentment on the part of Fonseka to the President getting praised for war victories was manifested during the demise of Velupillai Prabhakaran. The president who was abroad at the time was misinformed that the LTTE leader was no more on May 16th. A jubilant Rajapaksa returned on 17th and kissed the tarmac in an exhibition of patriotic glee. He learnt later that Prabhakaran was not yet reported dead but was very likely to be encircled and finished off very soon. An address to the nation was scheduled by the president for the morning of May 19th to announce the tiger supremo’s death.

But to Mahinda’s chagrin Fonseka refused to confirm the death and the president’s anticipated announcement did not materialise. But after the presidential address was concluded the Army chief announced to the nation that Prabhakaran had been killed. Sarath Fonseka and not Mahinda Rajapaksa made the historic announcement.

RESENTMENT

This heralded the floodgates opening for waters of resentment in Rajapaksa ranks to flow towards Fonseka. The army chief aggravated the situation by glorifying himself as the sole cause for victory. The contribution of other officers, other defence services, the defence secretary and President were overlooked or ignored.

Several newspaper articles singing paeans of praise to Sarath Fonseka began appearing in the media. Victory celebrations extolled the martial virtues of Sarath. Fonseka blew his own trumpet lustily in media interviews. Media persons close to Sarath wrote books giving too much credit to the army chief. The president and defence secretary were eclipsed.

While the role played by Sarath Fonseka in the war is certainly praiseworthy the part played by Gotabaya also deserves much credit. It was he who planned out the military strategy and implemented it by coordinating and directing the entire military effort. He was the lynchpin that linked the defence establishment with the political executive. Gotabaya secured military assistance from diverse sources and channelled them productively. He, Basil Rajapaksa and Lalith Weeratunge were responsible for winning over India. The full cooperation of the armed forces were secured by Gotabaya despite the stumbling blocks placed by Sarath Fonseka.

Likewise President Rajapaksa provided leadership at a very high level. He fully backed the war effort resisting tremendous pressure from powerful quarters to call off the war. He stood resolutely against mounting international criticism about how the war was being conducted. The president gave a free hand and unlimited support to the armed forces to finish the job. Under these circumstances President Rajapaksa also deserved praise for the war success. Besides President Rajapaksa was relying heavily on war victory euphoria to gain victories in the political arena. Fonseka’s attempt to hog all credit impacted on these plans.

Another evolving divergence was about re-settlement of Wanni IDP’s. President Rajapaksa had given assurances to the UN,IMF , western nations and India on this account and had obtained aid from the IMF predicated on these guarantees. But the hawkish Fonseka was of a different opinion. He wanted prolonged detention of IDPs to identify and eradicate tigers masquerading as civilians.

Fonseka also wanted the army’s strength to be increased to 300,000 and at least 100,000 deployed in the Wanni. He had elaborate plans of settling army families in cantonments in the Wanni thereby changing the demography in the north. Fonseka had once stated in an interview about attacks from “Tamils” during his childhood in Amparai district. For him the war was not over.

OUTLOOK

There was also a perceived shift in Sarath Fonseka’s outlook. The adulation received from the masses was affecting him. From being a person who spurned politics and ridiculed politicians the army chief began hinting at a political role for him in the future.

On “spirited” occasions the General fires off like loose cannon. Fonseka began talking of himself as the man who defeated the Tamils like the son of Ruhunu and began querying from friends and acquaintances in bantering tones “Why can’t I be the next president?”

He was also critical of sycophantic attempts to project Mahinda as the great emperor who won the war and saved the country. As far as Sarath was concerned it was he and not Mahinda who won the war and saved the country.

As news of this changed attitude was conveyed to the Rajapaksa brothers the alarm bells started ringing. A real or imaginary threat to the president’s political fortunes was perceived.

At least three separate intelligence reports were officially and unofficially commissioned. The essence of these reports stated that Fonseka was nursing political ambitions and that he enjoyed equal if not more popularity among the masses than Mahinda Rajapaksa himself.

There was thus a re-alignment within the triumvirate. The Rajapaksa brothers saw an emerging threat in Sarath Fonseka. On the one hand Mahinda saw Sarath as someone who could usurp his political leadership. On the other Gotabaya was miffed by the crudely blatant efforts of Fonseka to deny the important role played by the defence secretary. The Rajapaksa regime that mollycoddled Sarath Fonseka and tolerated all his past idiosyncrasies and foibles was no longer prepared to do so. There came a rule by the defence secy that no service chief could give media interviews without permission or monitoring. This effectively restricted the media monopoly of Fonseka.

Then came a swift transformation of public posters. The earlier ones with Mahinda and Sarath gave way to new ones with Mahinda, Gotabaya and Basil. The old trinity was replaced with the new one based on blood ties.

There also continued various irritants between the Rajapaksa’s and Fonseka. Some of the noteworthy ones included the one where first Lady Shiranthi Rajapaksa and elder son Namal were stopped by the army on a journey to the north and were delayed unduly for hours. This was seen as being done at the behest of Fonseka himself.

On July 9th 2009 Fonseka spoke at a book launch about the war in which he heaped compliments upon himself lavishly. Token lip service was paid to the President’s role. Gotabaya was virtually ignored. According to Sarath he and he alone had won the war with the President’s support. It was a one-man show. This implied that Sarath and not Mahinda was the saviour of the nation.

AMBALANGODA

Another incident was the felicitation ceremony at Dharmasoka College , Ambalangoda on July 10th. All traffic was stopped along the Galle road for hours. There were massive security arrangements made arbitrarily by Sarath’s security personnel causing much hardship to people.

Sarath waxed eloquent about his role in winning the war alone to an appreciative “home” audience. In the process he shot himself in the foot by allegedly admitting that tigers who surrendered with white flags were shot dead in cold blood.

There were increasing signs that Sarath and his merrymen in the army were becoming a law unto themselves. It was as if a parallel authority was being exercised by Fonseka in certain spheres.

At one point five journalists who sang Fonseka’s praises in their respective media organs were granted special protection by the army chief. The reason given was that there was a threat to their lives from the Naval chief Wasantha Karannagoda’s men.

Another high-handed incident was the one in which military officials acting under the orders of Fonseka arrested the aide de camp of Jagath Jayasuriya the present army chief. There was even a move to arrest Jayasuriya too but that was thwarted.

In the meantime developments in far off Honduras were impacting on Sri Lanka. Manuel Zelaya the Honduran president was planning a referendum aimed at extending his term of office in a roundabout way. The Courts rejected the referendum proposal but Zelaya in an act of defiance went ahead and ordered the army to begin distributing ballot papers.

The Army chief Gen.Romeo Vásquez Velazquez refused to do so. President Zelaya then sacked Velazquez and went ahead with his plans. On June 28th Velasquez staged a military coup. Zelaya was arrested and packed off to neighbouring Costa Rica. News of this Honduran coup rattled the powers that be and a state controlled newspaper in Colombo gave a lot of prominence to the event.

COUP D’ETAT

Shortly after this coup a friendly country passed an intelligence tip that a military coup was possible in Sri Lanka too. The friendly country suggested that the army chief could enact a coup d’etat with the backing of another country. Both countries concerned were sworn enemies but were friendly towards Sri Lanka.

It was against this backdrop that the government acted. Fonseka was urgently summoned on July 12th and given three days to bow out as army chief and take over as Chief of Defence staff(CDS).

The CDS post had been in existence for decades but in recent times the powers were revamped. As the seniormost service chief Karannagoda was to succeed Donald Perera but Fonseka who regarded the navy chief as his “bete noire” objected vehemently and wanted it himself.

This was granted but Fonseka wanted to take up that position only after the ceremonial functions of the Army’s 60th anniversary were over as Fonseka wanted to be army chief at that time.Another reason for procrastinating was that Fonseka was unhappy about the CDS having to report to the defence secy and not the president. He was seeking an amendment on that count.

But suddenly Fonseka’s world went crashing down. He was summoned and given an ultimatum. Reluctantly Fonseka submitted and relinquished his army chief post and became CDS. His request that his close associate Gen. Chandrasiri be made Army chief was rejected. The Rajapaksa’s were in no mood to appoint someone close to Fonseka. Instead Jayasoriya ranking 9th in seniority was appointed army chief.

Thereafter Fonseka found himself being undermined systematically. Exhibits pertaining to him were removed at the army exhibition. His address at the 60th anniversary function was blacked out in the state and significant sections of the non-state media.

In another development cabinet ministers and non-cabinet ministers started attacking Fonseka indirectly. He was implicitly criticised for having political ambition. There was also constant paranoia that a coup was being planned. There was also suspicion that Fonseka was engaged in negotiations with opposition parties though a journalist emissary.

While all this controversy was raging Fonseka himself kept silent holding his cards close to his chest. This itself amounted to making a virtue out of necessity as Fonseka could not make public statements without permission while in the service.

But the divide became very visible when Sarath Fonseka visited the US in October 2009 to renew his green card. When Fonseka informed Colombo about a potential interview with US dept. of homeland security there was widespread panic resulting in Foreign minister Bogollagama staging a press conference to protest. This indicated very clearly the breakdown in relations between the governmed and its ex-army chief.

RESIGNATION

After Fonseka’s return to the country speculation increased that he would quit the army soon and enter politics by contesting against Mahinda Rajapaksa if a presidential poll was held.

On November 6th 2009 Sarath Fonseka met with Ranil Wickremesinghe, Rauff Hakeem, Mano Ganesan and Mangala Samaraweera. It is believed that a decision was arrived at then for these parties to support Fonseka but no one has explicitly confirmed or denied it.

On Wednesday November 11th 2009 the commander-in-chief of the armed forces had a one to one meeting with his erstwhile Army chief at “Temple Trees”. In a candid conversation Fonseka told the president that due to “erosion of trust and confidence” he was compelled to quit.

President Rajapaksa responded by saying that Fonseka’s resignation would be accepted promptly if and when submitted.

Gen .Sarath Fonseka then submitted his resignation coming into effect from December 1st to Presidential secretary Lalith Weeratunga at 1.30 pm on Thursday November 12th.

The three-page letter outlining 17 reasons for quitting was promptly accepted as President Mahinda Rajapaksa had given clear instructions that the resignation should be accepted if and when Fonseka submitted it.

Then came the Presidential election. Fonseka was the common candidate of opposition parties like the UNP, JVP, SLMC, DPF and SLFP (M). Fonseka also signed a memorandum of understanding with TNA leader Rajavarothayam Sampanthan that helped garner Tamil voter support.

SHOWDOWN

The showdown at the Presidential elections was the result of brewing discontent between the Rajapaksas and Fonseka over a long period of time. While these tensions were managed and contained during the war they exploded openly after the war victory. In a sense the strife was all about who deserves the greater credit and reward for fighting and winning the war.

The publicised Presidential election results stated that Rajapaksa had defeated Fonseka. Then emerged the tale of a possible coup d’etat. This was followed by the undignified arrest of Sarath Fonseka and protracted imprisonment under various ways and means. Now he has been released but still undergoes trial in another case.

Essentially the Rajapaksa-Fonseka feud was a personality clash devoid of differences in principle or policy. Extreme paranoia, seething passions, jealousy, vengeful thinking and wounded pride exacerbated the situation. Attempts by one side to put down perceived political challenges and efforts by the other side to counter them created a situation where diametrically opposite forces reconfigured themselves as political bedfellows.

There was lamentable absence of firm policy and a complete abandoning of principle. A no holds barred political expediency seemed to be the order of the day. This tug of war has now reached another phase with Fonseka’s release.

On another level the current situation is also the culmination of a long process of militarisation of Sri Lankan society and a gradual politicisation of the military.

There has been a creeping militarisation that has eroded civic, democratic values. The military was afforded an unhealthy paramountcy over the years.

Despite denials the politicization of the military is along with a militarization of politics albeit to a lesser extent.

Communist party stalwart and cabinet minister DEW Gunasekera referred to this process explicitly while addressing a seminar in Jaffna on Jan 2nd 2010.

Comrade DEW observed thus:

SPECTRUM

“With the entry of General Fonseka to politics, a new element has been introduced to our spectrum of politics which will lead not only to militarization of politics but also politicization of the military”.

While agreeing with DEW on the question of militarization of politics and vice versa this column disagrees with him about it being entirely due to Sarath Fonseka’s political entry.

The process of our military being politicized has been going on for decades. The militarizing of politics too has been on to a lesser extent.The Fonseka phenomenon is the outcome of these processes.The entry of Sarath Fonseka into politics is arguably their logical culmination.

Nevertheless Fonseka’s entry into politics has accelerated and expanded these processes in a way never seen before.

It should be recognized that the twin processes of Politicisation of the military and militarisation of society and politics has to a certain extent become inevitable. Just as nature abhors a vacuum, “politics” cannot be avoided in certain spheres. But one would like some spheres to be kept “uncontaminated” by politics in the larger interests of the country. The armed services are institutions that should be “de-politicised” for the well-being of the nation.

There have been structural changes and systematic developments over the past years that render the concept of the armed forces being immune from politics an impossible task.Even before the war escalated the politizisation of the military has been going on.

The influence of the Army has been impacting heavily on Society and even re-shaping norms and values. The army has not only pervaded society but has become a very dominant force in society.

CONFLUENCE

We have witnessed the politicisation of military process and militarisation of political process proceeding steadily in the country. Both processes reached a controversial confluence in the form of Sarath Fonseka.

The progressive politicisation of the military resulted in an Army chief throwing his “beret” in the ring of a presidential contest. The progressive militarisation of society and politics enabled the polity to be broadly receptive to the notion of a general invading electoral politics and challenging his former commander in chief politically.

Sarath Fonseka therefore is the historic meeting point of these processes. He is the product and personification of these processes. At the same time his entry into politics has transformed the political environment in new directions. The politicisation of the military has gathered terrific momentum. The political fall-out of such phenomena will be with us for a long time.

Sadly as a result of these developments the military gets mired in politics and politics gets mixed up with the military. But as stated before this unhealthy trend did not begin with the entry of Sarath Fonseka into politics. It will not end with him either.

The presidential poll 2010 and subsequent events have demonstrated clearly that the advent of Sarath Fonseka on the political horizon has not only transformed but will also continue to transform the politics of Sri Lanka drastically in the days to come.

PM should gift generators to Myanmar

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Sat, 26 May 2012 03:52:00 +0000

| by B.Raman

( May 26, 2012, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) Reports from Myanmar indicate that during his visit to Myanmar next week, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh will be meeting Aung San Suu Kyi at Yangon (Rangoon) on May 29,2012. She has reportedly re-scheduled a visit to Bangkok, her first visit abroad since her release from house-arrest, in order to be available at Yangon for meeting our Prime Minister.

2. This gesture of hers is indicative of the importance attached by her to Myanmar’s relations with India despite her past unhappiness over India’s close relations with the military junta that ruled the country till the end of 2010.

President of Burma U Thein Sein received

a full state welcome at the Presidential palace

in New Delhi, India, on Oct. 14, 2011.

Photo by Raveendran, AFP/Getty Images

3. The Prime Minister’s visit comes at a time when there are reports of spreading public unrest over severe power-cuts in many towns. The unrest in the form of street demonstrations first started in Mandalay and from there has since spread to Pegu, Monywa and Yangon.The protesters have not taken the permission of the Police for holding demonstrations which is an offence, but the Government has chosen to ignore the violation of the law in order not to provoke them further. The protesters have been using their restricted access to Facebook and Twitter to call upon people in other towns to demonstrate.

4.It is not yet clear whether the street demonstrations are spontaneous or have been instigated by anti-democracy hawks in the Army to weaken the position of the Thein Sein Government which has been steadily moving towards greater political reforms and opening-out to the world.

5. However, in an attempt to project the demonstrations as spontaneous, the protesters have accused the former military government of selling off natural gas reserves to China and pocketing the profits, while 75 per cent of the local people have no access to electricity. Electricity consumption in Myanmar averages 104 kilowatts an hour per person—one of the lowest in the world.

6.Speaking during the opening of a local office of her National League For Democracy (NLD) on May 22,2012, Suu Kyi said that the power shortages were the direct result of government mismanagement and called upon the Government to give priority to increasing the power supply and to creating jobs for the unemployed youth.

7.The Government announced on May 23 that it was purchasing six generators from U.S.-based Caterpillar Inc., which will be air-freighted within a week, and two 25-megawatt gas-turbines to be bought from General Electric Co. The Government has blamed the Kachin insurgency for severely damaging electricity production and distribution.

8.During his visit, our Prime Minister should offer to help the Myanmar Government on an emergency basis to increase the power supply and also gift a plane-load of generators of the required capacity needed by the Government. The Prime Minister could also offer a special credit to enable the Government to repair the damages to the power infrastructure.

( The writer is Additional Secretary (retd), Cabinet Secretariat, Govt. of India, New Delhi, and, presently, Director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai, and Associate of the Chennai Centre For China Studies. E-mail: seventyone2@gmail.com Twitter : @SORBONNE75 )

A politically charged society is bound to stagnate

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Sat, 26 May 2012 01:36:00 +0000

| by N.S.Venkataraman

( May 26, 2012, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) The problem with democratic countries is that there is too much of politics in them. With no entry barrier for people to get into politics, the politics has become an activity free for all. While those with value systems and public spirited attitude may get into politics, the ground reality is that most of them who get into politics are those with criminal background, exploitative mindset and those with greed to get into power by any means. As a result, politics has largely become a discredited activity commanding low public esteem.

In the case of dictatorship, a small group of people with greed for power and even with criminal mindset seize power and destroy the opponents brutally and by adopting any means. In this case, only a small group of people are involved.

In the democratic systems , there are many people with criminal mindset and greed for power who are in the fray and they try to outdo each other . However, like the dictators, they cannot openly destroy their opponents and can do so only by clever maneuvering and schemes that may often be unethical. People with public spirited attitude often find it difficult to compete with the greedy politicians in winning elections and often such elections become an unequal battle between those with principles and those who do not care for principles so much. The net result is that it is found that the democratic countries are also in the grip of those with criminal background and adopting unethical ways to sustain themselves in power, though they do so under the garb of democracy.

The democracies in south east Asia are now undergoing this sort of scenario ,where corruption and nepotism have become the order of the day and the people holding power are accused of lack of personal morals and having political dishonesty.

In such sad scenario, the citizens living in the so called democratic countries find that the conditions are nearly as oppressive as in countries under dictatorship. The citizens in democracies also often live with fear of government and the so called freedom of speech often mean nothing. The independent minded media often find it difficult to survive and the media with partisan attitude and willing to compromise often become successful and their “business” flourish.

Therefore, we see not progressive democracies but chaotic democracies with several groups of political outfits fighting with each other in the name of people’s cause but actually for their own cause. The common men remain disconnected.

Such politically charged democratic countries are bound to stagnate, with the development projects and social welfare schemes suffering, with atleast 20% of the government funds earmarked for the infra structure and other projects being siphoned away by the politicians, bureaucrats and business men who form an unholy alliance. Inefficiency and dishonesty in execution of the projects result in loss of resources for the country and suffering and loss of benefits for the people.

For all the corruption and inefficient administration by the politicians in power in democracies, the citizens have to pay by way of heavy tax and high cost for services.

In such circumstances, we hear desperate common men wondering aloud whether dictatorship which would be exploitation by the small group of people could be better than the democracies which have unfortunately become the exploitation of many group of political outfits and political families.

The feelings of many Sri Lankan citizens cannot be different.

Universalizing freedom and self determination

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Sat, 26 May 2012 01:31:00 +0000

| by Osita Ebiem

( May 26, 2012,Abuja/ New York City, Sri Lanka Guardian) By every definition, Nigeria has failed as a state. The fact still remains that the various peoples within it were forced to surrender their sovereignty and pretend allegiance to a union that failed from inception. Nigeria continues to prove to be incapable of delivering on any of the promises inferred to or explicitly made at its beginning. After more than half a century the state has not kept any part of the contractual agreement that should exist between it and the peoples within its borders. As a result the country has remained in a permanent state of anomie. Law and order, the basis and justification of the existence of any such union is totally absent. The extant one-Nigeria as we have it is incapable of working any social system because it lacks the most important element: Freedom. Nigeria is chained down and will never function because it is the forced union of very unwilling associates. We must emphatically assert here that forcing any kind of unity on any unwilling people is a criminal act that the subjugated people have every right to resist. Any forced unity is a heinous crime against humanity.

(Photo: Reuters)
Despite the country's growing wealth, most Nigerians live on less than $2 a day.

In order to right the wrong and make Nigeria work, the unjustly chained nations must be set free and allowed to go their separate ways using the principles of Self Determination.

Since the end of the Cold War a new world order began. No one is left in doubt about the leading roles the United States, Britain, France and others play in helping to consolidate the gains of this new arrangement which is; more freedom for more people around the world. As a result of freedom to once oppressed peoples around the world, it seems we have made more progress in the short years since the complete meltdown of the iron curtain and the depolarization of world politics than in the many years of the old order. Freedom, Democracy and Self Determination is emphasized today more than at any other time, and the world is better off for it.

It is not by accident therefore that this era in world’s history is rightly called the era of Freedom and Self Determination. It is only natural to assume that the more freedom and confidence people have in themselves the more creative they become and are able to effectively contribute positively to the world’s commonwealth and collective aspirations. Today peoples around the world are encouraged to creatively define and assert themselves. In doing so they are able to bring to humanity new and unique perspectives and solutions to the many problems facing the world. We do not have to stretch our imagination to know that a world where peoples and individuals are turned into amorphous and defused entities is a dangerous place. When a people are violently compelled to assume strange identities, they engage in an unending struggle; fighting to find their lost selves and in so doing pose a threat to the overall wellbeing of the world.

Today Northern Nigeria is in total crisis not because of poverty as is being touted by some countries like the US and Britain. The north of Nigeria as well as the rest of the country is in disarray because the peoples are suffering under a serious identity crisis and they are trying to find themselves. There is a serious conflict of selves, hence the name Boko Haram: The repudiation of Western culture or Western identity. Northern Nigeria wants an Islamic sharia identity (culture) and one-Nigeria is denying them that inalienable right to choose how they want to live, worship and be governed. The world community cannot expect that if they continued to naively acquiesce to the false notion of a one-Nigeria that they will permanently escape the scourge of Islamic Boko Haram.

The solution to the problem lies in encouraging the various entrapped civilizations to embrace the principles of Freedom and Self Determination. Through breaking up of the present one-Nigeria tensions will cease and the world will have peace, prosperity, progress and security from that part of the world.

True relationships are only those based on mutual trust and respect and are usually complementary where each individual brings unique qualities that enrich the union. The present Nigerian union is an absolute contradiction rather than complementary and can never work. It clearly shows that an uncaring world (United States and Britain, because of oil) is trying to forcefully fuse into a “cancerous one unit” peoples with dangerously opposed characteristics, worldviews, religions and cultures. This sort of union can only succeed as cancerous cells (the various parts of the “one body” [country]) that destroy and kill off one another. Who benefits and who suffers from insisting on saving such incurably diseased parts? Precious lives can be saved by severing the parts that would not work in harmony with the body. Dividing Nigeria today will end the current Islamic bigotry, hatred, antagonism and intolerance of Igbo/Biafra people; the Boko Haram scourge. No one leaves a progressively decaying part of the body attached waiting for the “one day” that a cure would be found. This becomes even more absurd when experiences like those of Sudan and South Sudan, India and Pakistan, the former Soviet Union, etc. show very clearly that cutting off the gangrened part/s would mercifully end the pain and suffering, and a world’s eyesore that is one-Nigeria.

Today, because the world community places great emphasis on Freedom and Self Determination, individuals and societies are beginning to benefit from the fallout by becoming more prosperous and wealthy and the peoples within Nigeria can benefit too. We have today in the world the largest number of millionaires and billionaires than we have ever had. It is also quite noticeable that more places around the world that have embraced the principles of freedom and self-determination have experienced more prosperity across the larger spectrum of their population than they had ever had. So freedom does not only liberate the mind from the shackles of unfounded fears, tensions and psychological limitations it also enriches the people with creativity and material abundance. Freedom therefore is good for all and should never be withheld from any section of the world for any reason whatsoever. But it is unfortunate for it seems from the policies of such countries like US and Britain that freedom is being withheld from the various peoples who are held down with the iron grip of one-Nigeria. And we must clearly state that just as freedom is good for American and British citizens, it is also good for Igbo/Biafrans and the other peoples unjustly locked down in the ill-fated one-Nigerian union.

Experiences continue to show, as we have already noted, that we should never use different yardsticks for different parts of the world in the application of Freedom and Self Determination. When we do the price for such decision becomes too high to pay. Should we hope for a more peaceful and secured world, freedom and self-determination must not just become abundant but must be reachable to all peoples everywhere. Today’s world has become too interconnected to ignore this very important wisdom. Events around the world are continually proving to us that the lack of freedom of any kind (religious, cultural or political) in any part of the world does have direct impact on other parts.

In this regard several examples come to mind of not just the futility of a one-Nigeria effort but the clear danger that such oppressive arrangement poses to the rest of the world. In Nigeria there is a serious lack of sociocultural freedom. The people’s freedom is severely curtailed because the US and Britain due to oil are forcing into one place, in one-Nigeria, the most antagonistic diverse cultures, and civilizations. As a result of this damning decision, the one-Nigeria continues to boil and spill over to the rest of the world. A ready instance is the Nigerian Underwear Bomber (Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab) of Delta Airline of December 25, 2009 and the suicide bombing of the United Nations headquarters in Abuja in August 26, 2011.

Another argument that is often touted is that Nigeria contributes to peacekeeping efforts in the West African sub region and elsewhere and that is why the one-Nigerian status should remain. But what is the use of keeping peace in other lands when they cannot maintain the same thing in their own home. And should a one-Nigeria be encouraged to help prevent the killing of innocent peoples abroad when the same state kills innocent Igbo/Biafrans at home? The next point is just as laughable. When people talk of Nigeria as the most populous country in Africa and for this reason its unity should be preserved. Such reasoning casts the advocates in the light of those who do not care about the sanctity of human life. Nigeria as a failed state is incapable of providing security, healthcare, utilities, etc. for that population. It is a clear example of the unreason of a ballooned population of a people with a doomed fortune and destiny. Who can ever forget that only one year ago Sudan was also touted as the biggest country in Africa for all the wrong reasons as well? Sudan continued to pride itself in its monstrous size while it also committed genocides and other crimes against humanity on its own citizens. Today, Nigeria is committing crimes against humanity and genocides against its citizen while maintaining a one-Nigeria at all costs and the status of the most populous country in Africa. Thousands of Igbo/Biafrans are being killed and millions of others displaced for the absurd idea of keeping Nigeria as the most populous country. We think that the world can be more humane and reasonable than this.

In the new world order, the United States, Britain and people everywhere who work for a better world would like to see a world where democracy, freedom and self-determination are the rule rather than the exception. In the context of the new order when the people become conscious enough, the preservation of freedom easily becomes more important than the preserving of subjugated lives. When there is serious lack of freedom and human dignity, life even if lived in any condition of relative comfort becomes worthless. In a people’s life it will reach a point when they would rather perish than live as slaves. And it is not difficult to see that Igbo/Biafra people are at that stage right now. They would rather be free of every attachment with Nigeria than prosper as part of the one-Nigerian union.

We want to note here that it is not just the Igbo/Biafran people who have come to this stage of impatience with the slavish one-Nigeria mentality. Boko Haram jihadists take it a step further. They would rather go on suicide mission where they know that certain death await them than continue to live under the rule of secularism in Nigeria. For them, freedom consists in the practice of the sharia in a theocratic Islamic state. It therefore amounts to denial of their fundamental human right to continue to subjugate them and insist that they remain in an un-Islamic country of one-Nigeria. The terroristic violence of the Islamic fundamentalists, Boko Haram is just their way of putting it in a more dramatic language. It’s just foolhardiness and insensitivity to continue to detain the Islamic North of Nigeria in an unworkable one-Nigeria. Boko Haram is a fight against one-Nigeria.

Finally we must ask: Is the concept of Freedom the exclusive right of citizens of the West? In Europe and America Freedom is such a fundamental human right and everyone has an inalienable right to it. It is for this reason that even the wishes of children in these societies are inviolably respected. Hence they go by the name Free World. Why then should Europe and America continue to champion the enforced unworkable union of one-Nigeria on irreconcilably diverse ethnic nationalities that constitute Nigeria against their wishes? Does that agree with the West’s understanding of Freedom and Self Determination? That is absolute breach and vitiation of the concept of Freedom by any honest standard. Have people of other nationalities no right to this Freedom? Why must the subjugated peoples of one-Nigeria not be granted the forum and opportunity to exercise their fundamental human rights to Freedom and Self Determination?

It even seems that animals in Europe and America have more rights to Freedom than the entrapped nations in one-Nigeria. Why must that be so? Whose interests does the confiscation of these people’s Freedom serve? Freedom and Self Determination is an urgent matter that must be taken seriously in the present Nigerian situation. Biafrans and other ethnic nationalities must urgently be set free from the chains of the current one-Nigeria. They must be allowed to express their true desire now in a referendum. Let them cast votes to demonstrate how they want to live and leave the current bloody debacle going on in Nigeria. Lies and deceit serve no purpose. We are living in the era of Freedom and Self Determination, and this Freedom is an inalienable right of every human person, including Igbo/Biafrans. And Freedom and Self Determination like most words should have universally acceptable definitions.

( Osita is a Biafranist who believes that: Human beings have an infinite capacity to improve when they are honest, sincere and determined. And they can achieve great things and attain excellence.)

Guided democracy

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Sat, 26 May 2012 01:06:00 +0000

| by Shanie

"In the Renaissance of my life

the cries of the damned crowded my ears.

the curses of the damned poisoned my mouth,

the arms of the damned demolished my verse,

the guilt of two generations hit like the plague

and boarded up the town,

in the Renaissance of my life."- Peter Scharen

(a Sri Lankan who emigrated to Australia where he established himself as a poet of renown)

( May 26, 2012, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) Last week, Sri Lanka kept two anniversaries. One was the fortieth anniversary of Sri Lanka becoming a Republic. That was when the Sirimavo Bandaranaike Government promulgated a new Constitution on 22nd May 1972 severing the constitutional links we had with our former colonial rulers. The Government of Sri Lanka and the state media chose to largely ignore that anniversary. Instead, the defeat of the northern insurgents three years ago was celebrated with much fanfare. President Rajapaksa called it the third anniversary of a ‘humanitarian’ victory. This is one of two buzz words the President is fond of using regularly. The other being ‘home-grown’. The defeat by the security forces of a terrorist organization was certainly a successful and welcome military effort. But it certainly can by no means be called a humanitarian operation. No war, civil or international, can be called a humanitarian war, particularly when hundreds of thousands of civilians are killed, maimed, displaced or go missing during military operations. But talk of ‘humanitarian interventions’ are not new. In the immediate pre-second world war era, Mussolini and his black shirts invaded Ethiopia in 1935 and called it a humanitarian intervention. Hitler in Nazi Germany did likewise when he annexed Sudetenland in 1938.

President Rajapaksa has also referred to the long tradition of democracy in Sri Lanka from 1931 when universal suffrage was incorporated into the Donoughmore constitutional reforms. This certainly is a proud record for our country when for the first time all adults over the age of 21 were allowed to vote at the election to the State Council – it was a first for Asia as well. But this was not a home-grown reform. It was recommended by a British Parliamentary Commission headed by the Earl of Donoughmore. The Commission not only recommended universal suffrage but also the abolition of communal electorates which had been a feature of elections to previous Legislative Councils.

These far reaching reforms were not the result of any home-grown proposal. In fact, no group or political association in the country asked for it. Indeed, the largest of them, the Ceylon National Congress, opposed the extension of the franchise. The proposed reforms were subject to a heated debate in the Legislative Council and barely managed to be accepted by a majority of two votes. The reason for the opposition to the reforms by the political elite of that time was perhaps because they felt threatened by the widening of the electorate and the possible loss of power. But the Donoughmore Commissioners stuck to their recommendations; they had the support for nthis from the Secretary of State for the Colonies Sidney Webb. So it was to the benevolence of our colonial rulers that we owe our long tradition of participatory democracy. There was nothing, absolutely nothing, home-grown about it.

Home Grown Solutions

President Rajapaksa and his faithful followers, including sadly the leaders of the old Left, now go about repeating the need for a home-grown solution to the National Question as if it were a mantra discovered by President Rajapaksa the other day. Ever since the ethnic problem came up in the mid-nineteen fifties, we have had several attempts by our political leaders to arrive at a reasonable settlement with justice to all communities – ‘a home grown solution’ if that is the phrase that the present government understands. The first was the agreement that the liberal-minded S W R D Bandaranaike, then Prime Minister, worked out in 1957 with the equally liberal-minded S J V Chelvanayakam, then the leader of the largest party representing the minorities of the North and East. If that agreement had been allowed to be implemented, the country would have avoided over fifty years of bloodshed. But extremist elements within Bandaranaike’s party goaded by the political opportunism of J R Jayewardene who was now leading the opposition UNP, would not allow that to happen, calling the agreement a betrayal of the nation. As Professor Ludowyk noted, ‘the racial forces unleashed by the (1956) election campaign were too strong to be brought to heel, and besides the defeated party (the UNP) was now professing a programme of violent communalism’.

The situation today is similar. A small group of extremists are able to hold the country to ransom and prevent a solution to the National Question that will fair and just by all communities. For some inexplicable reason, President Rajapakse seems to go along with these small extremist groups. In 1956, the demand for the official recognition of Sinhala, Professor Ludowyk again states, was a rational one. It was intolerable that the majority of people who did not know English should have been penalized on this account. But campaigning for Sinhala only (and against any concession to the Tamils) were extremists who distorted the case they presented. To quote Professor Ludowyk: ‘The situation got out of hand because of these small groups. And as the election had been fought it was easy to see how thin were the partitions dividing rational demands from irrational fears. Both the MEP and UNP did not scruple to break through them to secure political advantage.’

The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact was the first opportunity to effect a permanent settlement of the National Question. There were other home-grown opportunities. The agreement between Dudley Senanayake and Chelvanayakam, the constitutional proposals formulated following all party-talks during the Presidency of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, the report presented by the Experts panel appointed by President Rajapaksa himself and finally the report of the all-party committee headed by Tissa Vitarana which was also appointed by President Rajapaksa. From all this, it now seems that it is not a home-grown solution that the President is looking for but a solution that will be acceptable to the small group of extremists who surround him. Commissions and Committees are appointed and they spend several months listening to representations and debating among themselves. They finally produce a report which would have cost an enormous amount of public funds and the report and recommendations are not even tabled for public discussion. It seems that the these committees and commissions (the Udalagama Commission and the LLRC are further examples) and Parliamentary Select Committees will continue to be appointed only as face-saving devices to meet pressure from some quarter but with no intention of even releasing them for public discussion, let alone implementing them, if the recommendations do not meet the political needs of the President and the small group around him.

The Case of Sarath Fonseka

It is not only in respect of establishing peace and reconciliation between all communities where the government is floundering. Crushing the terrorism of the LTTE is not a slogan that can be carried indefinitely. It has to be replaced by good governance and an adherence to the Rule of Law ensuring that justice is meted out equally to all. Very few will believe that Sarath Fonseka has received justice, despite his ‘convictions’ by military tribunals and by the judiciary. One has to question whether the ‘crimes’ for which he was charged and the lightening speed with which he was tried and convicted was in the normal course of justice in our country. Contrast his case with those of politicians charged with murder still remaining free and continuing their political activities.

The Attorney General has made clear that Sarath Fonseka has not been pardoned but that only the balance period of prison sentence has been remitted. He therefore still remains without civic rights to contest elections or to sit in Parliament. The Attorney General has also made it clear that there are other cases pending against him which have not been withdrawn. His release from prison is therefore on probation. If he continues to be a thorn in the flesh of the government and his popularity is seen as affecting the fortunes of the government, he could be slapped again in prison on the pending charges and any further charges that may be brought against him. Incidentally, the state media has chosen to ignore Sarath Fonseka’s release from prison.

Sarath Fonseka is undoubtedly a popular hero. The harassment that he has had to undergo at the hands of the government has only increased his popularity. So far as any reasonable citizen can see, nothing he had said or done over the years has broken any law or caused any damage to the reputation and good name of Sri Lanka. Perhaps, if he was a seasoned politician and not a military officer, he may have said or done the things he said or did in a different way. But that is Sarath Fonseka and every person has his own way or talking and acting. Fonseka was sentenced to serve nearly ten years in prison. If he was guilty of any crime, some of our politicians are guilty of more despicable crimes and will need to spend a lifetime in prison.

Politicisation and Democratic Rights

Namini Wijedasa, a young but experienced woman journalist gave the keynote address this week at the annual meeting of the Citizens’ Movement for Good Governance. Wijedasa pulled no punches at the untenable attitude that prevails today. ‘If you criticise the way foreign relations are conducted, you’re being bribed by the West. If you speak about human rights abuses, you are a grasping NGO agent. Either way, you are embroiled in a certain conspiracy to topple the government…..

‘If you criticise your rulers, you’re just downright ungrateful because they won the war—and that should suffice for the next several decades. Indeed, "if you are not with us, you are against us". Still. Three years after the war ended.

‘This bigotry and intolerance is untenable. It is wholly detrimental to the free thought, free speech and the advancement of society. Why in this day and age is a government afraid of a diversity of views? Why do they feel so threatened by detractors and critics that they feel it necessary to classify them as conspirators or traitors?’

Wijedasa lamented that ‘our public institutions have lost every semblance of independence and are completely and wholly controlled by the executive. And this includes the judiciary. When the judiciary depends on the executive for survival and career advancement, and the executive is of the type that expects complete subservience, what hope does this country have?’

She concluded her address with a call for people at all levels, particularly at the village level and the women’s groups to be conscious of their rights. We have a right to demand good governance from those who run our country – the government and the opposition. Indeed, people at these levels taking a stand for good governance is the only hope for a return to democratic values in our country.

Fonseka’s second war

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Sat, 26 May 2012 01:02:00 +0000

| by Col R Hariharan

( May 26, 2012, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) The presidential pardon to General Sarath Fonseka (officially it is ‘ex-General’ as he has been stripped of his hard earned rank) after he completed only two years of a three-year jail sentence should come as no surprise.

As things happen in the Island nation, the idea touched off speculations on when and how he will be released. Of course, there was a lot of build up before it really happened with the perennial political go-between Tiran Alles MP took up the General’s case for pardon with his one time pal - the President. And the former Army Chief comes up once again in national focus with the speculation on what is he going to do?

President Mahinda Rajapaksa chose to show his benevolence to the General around the third anniversary of victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and bestowed his pardon. In a sense it was as the hapless General had gained national accolade for leading the Sri Lankan forces to victory in the Eelam War IV. But he committed the mother of all sins no military man should commit and escape reprisals – crossing swords with politicians – that too President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who brooks no opposition. The hounding of the General after he chose to contest against the President, who wanted to cash in his moment of victory by winning a second term in office, will remain a black chapter in the country’s presidential history.

The Green Card-holding General’s release had been one of the minor items in the long list of demands the U.S. had been thrusting on Sri Lanka ever since their relations went South in the last stages of the Eelam War. It started as an irritant with Rajapaksa government’s studied disregard human rights concerns of the U.S. and the West on the happenings in Sri Lanka.

However, the breaking point came when Sri Lanka trashed the U.S. plan to dramatically intervene in the last stages of war (with all the Hollywood dramatics of Marines landing in the battle zone to rescue a Prabhakaran and his pals in distress). It made the U.S. agenda suspect in Sri Lankan eyes, and the U.S. demand for release of Fonseka added to the suspicion as allegations of Sri Lanka war crimes were piling up in international forums.

So the release of the former Army Chief probably added a dime’s worth to the reputation of Prof GL Peiris, External Affairs Minister, who on a mission impossible trip to the U.S on "how to make friends with the U.S." The news of the General’s pardon gathered timely momentum around the weekend Prof Peiris was meeting with the U.S. Secretary of State Mrs Hilary Clinton. During the meeting he made a lot of promises on Sri Lanka’s game plan (as usual verbally) to the Secretary of State who had insisted on his plans to meet the requirements of UNHRC resolution.

President Rajapaksa’s pardon also satisfies the President’s right wing Sinhala admirers (he has aplenty it seems) and coalition partner Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU), the monks party, as they had been clamouring for Fonseka’s rehabilitation in the pantheon of Sinhala war heroes.

But the General’s release is not without its strings (or stings?). According to Attorney General Eva Wanasundara the former Army Commander has been granted a conditional release as he has received a remission of his three-year sentence. He cannot contest an election for seven years, although she clarified in an interview that he had the right to vote in elections. She also reminded that the General has one more case pending against him in the court for harbouring army deserters.

So both the main opposition parties – the United National Party (UNP) and the Left Wing Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) - smelling a possible political opportunity in have called for the removal of restrictions imposed on Fonseka after his release. More voices are likely to be added to this as Fonseka has his own constituency outside the political spectrum; and this had helped him emerge as a common opposition candidate against President Rajapaksa in the last presidential poll.

President Rajapaksa used to have an uncanny sense of timing his political moves during his first term in office when the enemy was physical and tangible. After all, the LTTE had painted itself as the national enemy No. 1. But in recent times, his gut feeling appears to be letting him down. In this situation, what will be the impact of Fonseka on Rajapaksa’s future moves?

I have great deal of respect for the former Army Commander for his military competency. He gave form and content to what many Sri Lankans thought of as an impossible dream. As an old soldier I sympathise with him for his plight after working so hard for three decades for the country. Notwithstanding this, he has glaring short comings if he decides to take on President Rajapaksa once again.

With the amount of introspection during his prison days, I expect him to be aware of these. In his last political outing his performance was below par as the vote-count showed in the presidential poll. Before, during, and after the presidential contest, he came out as a novice in the ‘live and let die’ game politicians play all the time. His economic agenda was grandiose and vague, long on promises galore and not much on how he will go about it. His wooing of the Tamil votes came out as a measure of political expediency, as it contradicted his strong ‘Sinhala first’ credentials gathered over the earlier years.

During his army days, Fonseka was not good at winning friends; his ability to influence others came from his professional acumen rather than personality. So it is extremely doubtful if he can morph into a political leader of universal charisma who can galvanise all political elements opposed to Rajapaksa and lead them to success. His not so good performance even at the height of his national popularity in the presidential poll could discourage this from happening.

Politicians make friends only with winners; so as of now Fonseka’s political rehabilitation will depend upon their agenda and choosing. Both the UNP and JVP are mired in internal power struggle. Ranil Wickremesinghe’s UNP leadership is constantly hounded at the heels and he has to keep an eye on his rear guard. The UNP leader has nothing much to gain by forming an alliance with the JVP which lost its fair-weather supporters after the electoral drubbing. It is also suffering from a strong bout of typical Marxist internal contradictions. Theoretically, even if they come together can they meaningfully pose a worthy opposition to Rajapaksa? I have my reservations.

However, if Fonseka gathers enough public support and sympathy, he may become a focus of convergence for an opposition alliance. And for it to happen there has to be a political a situation where the opposition can have a chance of success. Such a clear cut situation does not appear to be coming up in the horizon, except for a parliamentary or presidential election. And both of them are due only in 2016 unless the term of either is ended earlier or popular compulsions of the Arab Spring kind emerge.

It is safe to rule out an Arab Spring happening in Sri Lanka. Despite its aberrations in governance, President Rajapaksa’s government is politically stable as his party – the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) – has overall majority in parliament on its own steam. Despite this he has opted to rule the country with a 17-party coalition; this has provided enough space for all shades of opinion from the Right, Centre and Left parties to share power. This has minimised the chances of disparate elements coming together to start a mass movement against him.

That leaves economic chaos taking over the country as the only other potential destabiliser. Despite clocking 8 percent growth last year, Sri Lanka is in for tough times as global recession and rising oil prices are affecting most of the economies. Even Sri Lanka’s major trading partners China and India though less affected so far have started feeling its impact. With Sri Lanka’s Western clients and the U.S. already in an economic tailspin, the country is unlikely to escape the economic aftershock. So the future does not augur well for any government in Sri Lanka.

Given this setting, can the UNP and JVP which have diametrically opposite economic agendas come together to form a coalition under the leadership of Sarath Fonseka? Even if this happens, Fonseka with limited political credentials and no economic agenda of his own is unlikely to inspire public confidence.

Being an army man Fonseka must be in a defiant mood after his release. He must be raring to get back into the political act to vindicate himself and rally the opposition against Rajapaksa. But as man with sufficient military campaign experience, he will also know his options to successfully do so are very limited.

So it is safe to presume that his immediate efforts will be to get the existing case against him dropped; and that will cooperation from the government. Any rapprochement with Rajapaksa looks out of question. If at all it comes, it would be at Rajapaksa’s terms resulting in a big loss of face for the General; and politically, it would be suicidal for the General. He might be hoping to bring some international (meaning the U.S. and the EU) pressure. But can he count on this?

Now that he is out of the prison, what could inspire the U.S. and the EU to take up the rehabilitation of the General? If former U.S. ambassador to Colombo Patricia Butenis cable (courtesy Wikileaks) of January 2010 is any indication, the U.S. did not set great store on Fonseka to effectively take on President Rajapaksa even in the last parliamentary poll. As the political compulsion of elections is not there, the U.S. and its allies are likely to focus on issues much bigger than Fonseka’s immediate woes in their dialogues with Sri Lanka.

So we can expect a decent pause before Fonseka makes any major move. And even that would come after he gets the political pulse of his supporters, and opposition parties. As the General’s friend Tiran Alles said in an interview, "the government and the president knew that Fonseka would not keep quiet once he was out. But one day or another it had to happen. Now we will wait and see how things shape out. In politics it is difficult to predict the future, but in the light of all that has happened, it is tough to see Fonseka and Rajapakse call a truce. So we will rule that out." That almost sums up the present situation.

But it is equally difficult to predict when and how Fonseka will fire the first political salvo of his second war. If at all it comes through his second war is going to be tougher than the one he fought against the LTTE.

(Col. R Hariharan, a retired Military Intelligence specialist on South Asia, served as the head of intelligence of the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987-90.He is associated with the South Asia Analysis Group and the Chennai Centre for China Studies. E- mail:colhari@yahoo.com)

In the name of “Democracy” the West stands guilty of killing Political Leaders

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Sat, 26 May 2012 00:57:00 +0000

| by Shenali Waduge

( May 26, 2012, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) Throughout almost 60 years, the US has been involved in covert operations that have overthrown over 50 democratically elected popular foreign leaders and placed dictators and tyrants as US puppets. How can Africa and Asia or Latin America produce good leaders committed to the welfare of the masses when the US ends up gunning these leaders down and installing local agents who are ever ready to allow the West to pilfer the nation while they too do the same? The story of Congo’s Patrice Lumumba is one such assassination wherein several western nations conspired to kill Congo’s first independent Prime Minister simply because he was a nationalist.

The killing exposed not only the savagery and hypocrisy of US imperialism, it illustrated the hollowness of so-called independence for the African nations, whose absurd boundaries have created unprecedented strife.

Does the American Congress and the American people know an iota of what its intelligence agency is upto overseas? Do Americans not wonder about the legality and morality of unmanned drones that fire missiles upon wedding parties, funerals and can these citizens accept the US Government’s excuse that they have killed “terrorists”. Are these unnecessary killings not making people hate America and Americans?

Africa has been subject to numerous assassinations over the years. In Algeria sixteen assassinations have taken place. Angola, Namibia and Murkina Faso accounts for two assassination while Burundi accounts for the assassinations of 5 of its Prime Ministers. Cameron, Gambia, Guinea and Chad had their leaders gunned down. Comoros also saw three of its heads killed. Fifteen leaders of Egypt including President Anwar Sadat. Four leaders of Guinea Bissau. Seven leaders of Kenya. Two presidents of Liberia. The King of Madagascar and its President. Mozambique leader allegedly killed by Portuguese branch of Gladio. In 1999 President of Niger was ambushed and killed while Nigeria lost nine leaders including a Prime Minister. Rwanda saw the deaths of four leaders including that of Habyarimana whose plane was shot down triggering the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. Senegal lost a minister/mayor in 1967 while Somalia lost 5 leaders including its interior minister Hassan Farah in 2011. South Africa has lost eight leaders since 1828 (King of Zulu). Sudan has had three assassinations including that of Jimmy Lemi Milla in 2011 South Sudan Government Minister. In 2008 Swaziland lost its opposition leader Gabriel Mkhumane. Tanzania lost its first vice President and Togo lost its first President of independent Togo in 1963. Tunisia saw two assassinations while in Uganda the Chief Justice and Archbishop was killed and in Zimbabwe the left-wing Malawian politician was killed. The latest killing has been that of Libya’s President Gaddafi. In all these murders the West had a hand.

Let us look at just one leader – Patrice Lumumba Congo’s first Prime Minister after Congo gained independence (1959) and shot dead after being tortured for days on 17th January 1961. He was just 35 when he died.

Why would the West who favors democracy want to get rid of a man loved by the masses? While Lumumba was loved by the masses he was also a nationalist who opposed the West’s plan to transform Congo from a colony (white rule and military occupation) into a neo-colony (black rule according to white interests). Both Lumumba and the Congolese people were aware that the West were walking away with Congo’s rich natural resources - coltan, diamonds, copper, zinc and cobalt. Moreover, Belgium troops had killed over 10million Congolese over 20 years for failing to meet rubber collection quotas.

As with all colonial countries there came a time when citizens were becoming fed of being second class citizens in their own country. Sadly in the case of most African nations the white oppressors were replaced with black oppressors. However, Lumumba was different and his charisma annoyed the West so much that two interrelated plots by the US/UK and Belgium was planned to kill Lumumba.

Documents reveal how US President Eisenhower gave orders to the CIA to assassinate Lumumba (1960 August National Security Council meeting minutes). British Foreign Office notes reveal how the UK too wanted Lumumba killed because of their interests in neighboring Rhodesia. The plot to kill Lumumba was called “Operation Barracuda” and Colonel Louis Maliere bought millions of francs. Unknown to Lumumba, his secretary and Army Commander Mbotu was turned into an agent of the West. Mobutu became the West’s main Cold War ally in Africa. He was a close ally of Jacques Chirac, he sat next to the Queen, was close friends with George Bush Snr and was a close friend of the Belgian King. Mbotu was to rename Congo as Zaire and ruled it until removed by Rwandan and Ugandan forces in 1997.

True to form as seen even in the present the Western media was quick to declare targeted leaders as “dictators” “tyrants” “despots”….these being to prepare the public for the real plan that is to follow. We all know the scenario in the present context.

Lumumba, close associates Maurice Mpolo and Joseph Okite were taken by plane to Katanga province where they were shot by a firing squad commanded by Belgian officers. Belgian commander of the Katanga police force, Gerard Soete were tasked with destroying the bodies which were chopped up and dissolved in acid and kept Lumumba’s teeth as souvenirs. Soete had said “We did things an animal wouldn’t do.” This is just an example of how the West, the supposed champions of human rights had treated fellow humans.

The mystery of Lumumba’s murder lives on despite a Belgium parliamentary investigation in 2001 falling short of admitting responsibility for his murder. Despite evidence of US involvement, the US too has never made any attempt to officially acknowledge its accountability. Whatsmore the UN is also accused of watching Lumumba beaten and paraded through the streets. The guilt of the UN is established in the Belgian sociologist Ludo de Witte who has uncovered proof of the Belgian Government’s and the UN’s complicity in the killing of Lumumba having analyzed 8000 telegrams exchanged between Congo and New York UN diplomats.

The last letter addressed by Lumumba to his wife is poignant:

My dear companion,

I write you these words without knowing if they will reach you, when they will reach you, or if I will still be living when you read them. All during the length of my fight for the independence of my country, I have never doubted for a single instant the final triumph of the sacred cause to which my companions and myself have consecrated our lives. But what we wish for our country, its right to an honorable life, to a spotless dignity, to an independence without restrictions, Belgian colonialism and its Western allies-who have found direct and indirect support, deliberate and not deliberate among certain high officials of the United Nations, this organization in which we placed all our confidence when we called for their assistance-have not wished it.

They have corrupted certain of our fellow countrymen, they have contributed to distorting the truth and our enemies, that they will rise up like a single person to say no to a degrading and shameful colonialism and to reassume their dignity under a pure sun.

We are not alone. Africa, Asia, and free and liberated people from every corner of the world will always be found at the side of the Congolese. They will not abandon the light until the day comes when there are no more colonizers and their mercenaries in our country. To my children whom I leave and whom perhaps I will see no more, I wish that they be told that the future of the Congo is beautiful and that it expects for each Congolese, to accomplish the sacred task of reconstruction of our independence and our sovereignty; for without dignity there is no liberty, without justice there is no dignity, and without independence there are no free men.

No brutality, mistreatment, or torture has ever forced me to ask for grace, for I prefer to die with my head high, my faith steadfast, and my confidence profound in the destiny of my country, rather than to live in submission and scorn of sacred principles. History will one day have its say, but it will not be the history that Brussels, Paris, Washington or the United Nations will teach, but that which they will teach in the countries emancipated from colonialism and its puppets. Africa will write its own history, and it will be, to the north and to the south of the Sahara, a history of glory and dignity.

Do not weep for me, my dear companion. I know that my country, which suffers so much, will know how to defend its independence and its liberty. Long live the Congo! Long live Africa!

Patrice

Malcolm X, speaking at a rally of the Organisation of Afro-American Unity in 1964, described Patrice Emery Lumumba as “the greatest black man who ever walked the African continent. He didn’t fear anybody. He had those people [the colonialists] so scared they had to kill him. They couldn’t buy him, they couldn’t frighten him, they couldn’t reach him.”

We are being repeatedly preached by these same Governments who are committing grave crimes across the world. These incidents should give us the smaller nations the strength to finally demand that they stop this charade of pretending to be human rights saviors when we know too well that they have been and continue to commit crimes against humanity each day.

Washington’s Hypocrisies

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Sat, 26 May 2012 00:35:00 +0000

| by Paul Craig Roberts

( May 26, 2012, Washington DC, Sri Lanka Guardian) The US government is the second worst human rights abuser on the planet and the sole enabler of the worst–Israel. But this doesn’t hamper Washington from pointing the finger elsewhere.

The US State Department’s “human rights report” focuses its ire on Iran and Syria, two countries whose real sin is their independence from Washington, and on the bogyman- in-the-making–China, the country selected for the role of Washington’s new Cold War enemy.

Hillary Clinton, another in a long line of unqualified Secretaries of State, informed “governments around the world: we are watching, and we are holding you accountable,” only we are not holding ourselves accountable or Washington’s allies like Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and the NATO puppets.

Hillary also made it “clear to citizens and activists everywhere: You are not alone. We are standing with you,” only not with protesters at the Chicago NATO summit or with the Occupy Wall Street protesters, or anywhere else in the US where there are protests. (ref)

The State Department stands with the protesters funded by the US in the countries whose governments the US wishes to overthrow. Protesters in the US stand alone as do the occupied Palestinians who apparently have no human rights to their homes, lands, olive groves, or lives.

Here are some arrest numbers for a few recent US protests. The New York Daily News reports that as of November 17, 2011, 1,300 Occupy Wall Street protesters were arrested in New York City alone. Fox News reported (October 2, 2011) that 700 protesters were arrested on the Brooklyn Bridge. At the NATO summit in Chicago last week, 90 protesters were arrested (Chicago Journal).

In the US some protesters are being officially categorized as “domestic extremists” or “domestic terrorists,” a new threat category that Homeland Security announced is now the focus of its attention, displacing Muslim terrorists as the number one threat to the US. In September 2010, federal police raided the homes of peace activists in Chicago and Minneapolis. The FBI is trying to concoct a case against them by claiming that the peace activists donated money to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. As demanded by Israel, the US government has designated the PFLP as a terrorist group.

In Chicago last week, among the many arrested NATO protesters with whom the State Department does not stand are three young white americans arrested for “domestic terrorism” in what Dave Lindorff reports was “a warrantless house invasion reminiscent of what US military forces are doing on a daily [and nightly] basis in Afghanistan.” If the US government, which stands with protesters everywhere except in America, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Palestine, can make this into a terrorism case, the three americans can be convicted on the basis of secret evidence or simply be incarcerated for the rest of their lives without a trial.

Meanwhile the three american “domestic terrorists” are being held in solitary confinement. Like many of the NATO protesters, they came from out of town. Brian Church, 20 years old, came from Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Jared Chase, 27, came from Keene, New Hampshire. Brent Betterly, 24, came from Oakland Park, Florida. Charged with providing material support for terrorism, the judge set their bail at $1.5 million each.

These three are not charged with actually throwing a Molotov cocktail at a person or thing. They are charged with coming to Chicago with the idea of doing so. Somehow the 16 federal intelligence agencies plus those of our NATO puppets and Israel were unable to discover the 9/11 plot in the making, but the Chicago police knew in advance why two guys from Florida and one from New Hampshire came to Chicago. The domestic terrorism cases turn out to be police concoctions that are foiled before they happen, so we have many terrorists but no actual terrorist acts.

Two other young americans are being framed by their Human Rights Government. Sebastian Senakiewicz, 24, of Chicago is charged with “falsely making a terrorist threat,” whatever that means. His bail was set at $750,000. Mark Neiweem, 28, of Chicago is charged with “solicitation for explosives or incendiary devices.” His bail is set at $500,000.

This is human rights in america. But the State Department’s human rights report never examines the US. It is a political document aimed at Washington’s chosen enemies.

Meanwhile, Human Rights america continues to violate the national sovereignty of Pakistan, Yeman, and Afghanistan by sending in drones, bombs, special forces and in Afghanistan 150,000 US soldiers to murder people, usually women, children and village elders. Weddings, funerals, children’s soccer games, schools and farmers’ houses are also favorite targets for Washington’s attacks. On May 25 the Pakistani Daily Times reported that Pakistani Foreign Office spokesman Moazzam Ali Khan strongly condemned the drone attacks: “We regard them as a violation of our territorial integrity. They are in contravention of international law. They are illegal, counter productive and totally unacceptable.”

The US reportedly funnels money to the Iranian terrorist group, MEK, declared terrorists by no less than the US State Department. But it is OK as long as MEK is terrorizing Iran. Washington stands with MEK’s protests delivered via bombs and the assassin’s bullet. After all, we have to bring freedom and democracy to Iran, and violence is Washington’s preferred way to achieve this goal.

Washington is desperate to overthrow the Syrian government in order to get rid of the Russian naval base. On May 15 the Washington Post reported that Washington is coordinating the flow of arms to Syrian rebels. Washington’s justification for interfering in Syria’s internal affairs is human rights charges against the Syrian government. However, a UN report finds that the rebels are no more respectful of human rights than the Syrian government. The rebels torture and murder prisoners and kidnap civilians wealthy enough to bring a ransom.

NATO, guided by Washington, went far outside the UN resolution declaring a no-fly zone over Libya. NATO in blatant violation of the UN resolution provided the air attack on the Libyan government that enabled the CIA-supported “rebels” to overthrow Gadhafi, killing many Libyan civilians in the process.

Under the Nuremberg standard (principle VI.a.i), it is a war crime to launch a war of aggression, which is what Washington and its NATO puppets launched against Libya, but, no sweat, Washington brought Libya freedom and democracy.

Assassinating foreign opponents is the West’s preferred diplomacy. The British were at ease with it, and Washington picked up the practice. In his book, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, Cambridge University historian Piers Brendon, the Keeper of the Churchill Archives, reports from the documents he has at hand, that in the build up to the “Suez Crisis” in 1956, British Prime Minister Anthony Eden told Foreign Office minister Anthony Nutting, “I want him [Nasser, Egypt’s leader] murdered.”

Brendon goes on to report: “Doubtless at the Prime Minister’s behest, the Secret Intelligence Service did hatch plots to assassinate Nasser and to topple his government. Its agents, who proposed to pour nerve gas into Nasser’s office through the ventilation system, were by no means discreet.” The secret agents talked too much, and the scheme never came to fruition.

Last week in Malaysia a war crimes tribunal found George W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld and their legal advisers, Alberto Gonzales, David Addington, William Haynes II, Jay Bybee, and John Choon Yoo guilty of war crimes. (ref)

But don’t expect Washington to take any notice. The war crimes convictions are merely a “political statement.”

UN starves one million Somalis on 10 Cents a day

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Fri, 25 May 2012 10:27:00 +0000

| by Thomas C. Mountain

( May 25, 2012,Asmara- Eritrea, Sri Lanka Guardian) The UN announced its budget for feeding the over one million Somali refugees under its care for the next year and have allocated less than 10 cents a day to do so.

Anthony Lake, once nominated to head the CIA, now UNICEF supremo, held a press conference in April 2012 to declare a budget of $35 million for the next year to feed the Somali refugees in its care, over one million and growing by the day.

And all the while the UN is funding the 20,000 man strong African Union army “pacifying” Mogadishu to the tune of over $350 million, $30 million a month and counting.

The UN created these refugees in the first place, sending in the Ethiopian army in 2006 to bring fire and sword to newly peaceful Somalia, followed by the UN dispatched relief forces, now over 15,000 from Uganda, ever since 2008.

Half a million Somali refugees created by the Ethiopian army, another half a million created by the UN/AU “pacification” of Mogadishu and now, following the worst drought and famine in 60 years, less than 10 cents a day to feed the lot.

Talk about cold blooded. Upon hearing this shouldn’t one automatically think mass murder by starvation, genocide even? Just as the US Army used to do to American Indians, drive them from their land into “refugee camps” and then starve them to death?

Just as the USA did to the Filipino people when it colonized the Philippines in the early 20th Century? The same again in Vietnam in the 1960’s?

The War on Terror in Somalia is none other than the War on the Somali people and the UN is the instrument used to commit Pax Americana’s crimes. A million$ a day for the War on the Somali People, 10 cents a day to feed the victims of that war.

I can still remember when the government here in Eritrea kicked out all the UN “peacekeepers” and how good it felt to see them go.

Here is to the day all of Somalia sees the end to the UN, the AU, Ethiopia, the USA or any foreign military presence, both overt and covert.

Until that day blood will only continue to be spilt and children starve and war, the war on the Somali people, will continue.

Thomas C. Mountain is the most widely distributed independent western journalist in Africa, living and reporting from Eritrea since 2006. He can be reached at thomascmountain at yahoo dot com.

Misrepresenting the Sri Lankan War, 2009-2012

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Fri, 25 May 2012 05:16:00 +0000

| by Michael Roberts

( May 25, 2012, Melbourne, Sri Lanka Guardian) The recent UNHCR resolution sponsored by USA and directed at the government of Sri Lanka was the culmination of a campaign that began during the last stages of Eelam War IV. Since 2010 articulate circles in the West have been convinced that there had been “40,000 civilian deaths” during this phase. In contrast Rohan Gunaratna asserted that there were 1400 civilian deaths, of which 200 were inflicted by the LTTE. Both calculations are erroneous. Estimates provided by three moderate Tamils who have had regular access to the Tamil personnel who were on the ground indicate that the death toll, inclusive of Tamil Tiger personnel, was in the range 10,000 to 16,000, in circumstances where it was impossible to differentiate in all cases between those Tiger, those recently conscripted as auxiliaries and those truly civilian.

It is towards the clarification of these specific circumstances and a criticism of the claims presented by a variety of human rights agencies, moral crusaders and media engines that this essay is directed. The campaign has been sustained by a mixture of lies and half-truths amidst truths, compounded further by a wilful blindness to the manner in which the LTTE utilised the Tamil populace in its domain as labour pool, protective shield and bargaining chip meant to induce a ”humanitarian intervention.” The massaging of death toll figures, therefore, is just one facet of a massive propaganda heist.

Death Toll, January-May 2009

As the SL Army advanced on three fronts, the LTTE lost control of the A9 arterial road and its administrative capital at Kilinochchi by 1 January 2009. Thereafter, its forces and the people they had herded together were trapped in the Vanni Pocket, namely, the north eastern corner of the island between the A9 and the coast, a district-size chunk of territory that shrank continuously as the government forces advanced till the Tigers and remaining civilians – roughly 200,000 in crude estimate -- were sandwiched into 42 square kilometres in mid-April.

After the remaining Tiger terrain was captured by mid-May 2009, the first estimates of the numbers killed that were presented by Holmes, the UN representative, in Colombo, was 7,721. Further down the track his former media officer at that time, Gordon Weiss appeared before the ABC and claimed that the death toll was between 10,000 and 40,000. Even as late as June 2011 the Times in London referred to 20,000 civilian dead in the course of a summary review of the Sri Lankan war.

However, the UN Panel of Experts appointed on his own initiative by Ban Ki-Moon presented their report (the Darusman Report) in March 2011 and stated that the original figure of 7,721 was at the lower end of the scale and there could have been “as many as 40,000 deaths.”

In next to no time this speculation became hard fact in news items from prestigious media chains. Thus, Kerry O’Brien of ABC asserted that “40,000 civilians were killed” and spoke of the “brutal slaughter of humans.” The widespread acceptance of this type of claim was largely the product of the emotional appeal of the Channel 4 documentary called “Killing Fields.” Gordon Weiss chipped in by highlighting his position under the rubric “Sri Lanka’s “Srebenica Moment.”

The imagery associated with these two moments of state-organised genocide in Kampuchea and Serbia had the impact they were designed to arouse. Despite its weak evidential foundation and explicit surmise, the figure of 40,000 became an established fact in some minds. Also occluded was the character of the UN panel under Darusman and the appalling analytical capacities displayed within its report.

The Shortcomings of the Darusman Report

It is remarkable that Ban Ki-Moon selected three individuals from a legal background to undertake a survey of a military campaign in a land with which they had limited geographical knowledge and no cultural familiarity. The absence of military expertise and social science capacities are immediately apparent in its coverage.

Independent academics working with the Marga Research Institute in Colombo have shown that there was “a large lacuna [in this] information gathering exercise”; that many sources were not divulged and that significant omissions meant that the Panel relied “on a one-sided body of sources.” Indeed, the “adversarial stance” taken by the Darusman Panel resulted not only in findings marred by internal contradictions, but also revealed a failure to comprehend “the formidable challenge which the government faced.”

This was a failure of contextualization and proportionality. A balanced review cannot focus on death estimates without placing the figure beside the number of Tamils, both Tiger and genuine civilian, who survived. We now know that at around 280-290,000, including roughly 11,000 deemed Tiger, emerged alive from the crucible of the Vanni Pocket between January and mid-May 2009.

By mid-April 2009 about 60,000 had reached the safety of government territory by sneaking through on land or sea. On the 19-23 April the army breached the LTTE”s last redoubt in a remarkable operation. State media images on TV and print revealed streams of people, including Tigers who had downed arms, struggling across lagoon and dune to safety. As Reddy from India described the scene, “an international and local media team that visited the area on a military-conducted tour saw for itself the terror-stricken faces.” This mass has been variously estimated as 103,000, 106,000 and even 120,000, but it included many Tiger fighters and such leading LTTE functionaries as Daya Master and George Master.

The Darusman Report’s failure to give weight to such events is quite remarkable. This shortcoming is compounded by its refusal to give adequate weight to the character of the LTTE regime.

The LTTE War Machine

Prabhakaran has been described by former colleagues as well as Tamil dissidents as a person who believed in the pre-emptive strike and the killing of individuals who stood in his way. The LTTE had spurned the opportunity of self-determination via negotiation in both 1995 and 2006. Throughout the ceasefire-period 2002-06 it built up its military capacities. This preparation included paramilitary training for civilians

When the LTTE initiated Eelam War IV in July 2006 it was confident of success. Matters turned out different. By late 2007 their military capacity in the Eastern Province had been reduced to nil. By January 2008 they lost control of the north western coastline which had enabled a supply of arms from India. Outgunned and outmanned, their troops were forced into a retreat that moved from west to east for the most part. They used landmines, bunds, trenches and booby traps to slow down the government forces.

The LTTE also increased its conscription of civilians to build these defences and replenish its troops. At the same time the civilian population were induced to retreat en masse ahead of the battle lines – moving from west to east. Though subject to multiple displacements, these people faced limited danger at the outset in 2008. But from January 2009 they were in increasing danger of being submerged in the crossfire.

This was the LTTE’s intent. The civilians were, now, not only a source of labour and conscripts; they were also hostages shielding the Tigers and providing a concern for humanitarian agencies which intervened and sought a ceasefire from the warring parties. Since the LTTE had no intention of releasing the Tamil people or respecting any ceasefire, such interventions were in fact a form of military aid for the LTTE. The humanitarian outcry raised by AI, HRW, ICG as well as some Western leaders was also a potential escape route that would have enabled the LTTE leadership to return to the fight another day.

The reasoning of the LTTE leadership was revealed subsequently by Kumaran Pathmanathan (their principal logistics man abroad): “when I reflect upon the past I think the LTTE leadership also had no choice. If they released the people first, then only the Tigers would be left there. Thereafter all of them could have been wiped out.”

The shielding capacity of the mass of civilians was all the more because, from 2008 if not earlier, most Tigers were fighting in check-shirts, trousers, shorts and sarongs. The SL army’s night operations and the success of their snipers as well as the exigencies of retreat encouraged such a policy. As General Fonseka told an investigator one aspect of the LTTE military tactics at this point was to mingle with fleeing Tamil civilians in order to infiltrate army lines and wreak havoc from within.

In a communiqué on the 9th March 2009 Blake, the US ambassador in Colombo, noted that “the LTTE maintains the fiction that civilians do not want to leave. All evidence points to the contrary: several civilians have been shot trying to escape, many others have escaped.” Anna Neistat of HRW was equally adamant on this point in March 2009 after meeting Tamils in refugee camps who had fled the war zone.

Though Weiss and the Darusman Report mention such facts, their overall reviews downplay the significance and focus largely on the government’s role in the injury of “civilians” through indiscriminate shelling. Their estimates of the civilian dead simply gloss over the difficulty of distinguishing civilian and Tiger; and attach little weight to the fact that the LTTE was the creator of this circumstance: the sandwich situation in which their own Tamil populace was placed and their use as so many sandbags.

Channel 4 went further in manufacturing a lie: they asserted that the Tamil “civilians were driven from their homes by government forces.” Amidst numerous sources, the writings of the Hindu correspondent as well as the Tamil journalist DBS Jeyaraj provide conclusive evidence against such calumny. In a passionate essay in April 2009 Jeyaraj, a senior Tamil journalist writing from Toronto, spoke of the situation of his Tamil people under the LTTE as “an open prison” and celebrated the escape “from bondage” of 103,000 “entrapped” people that was secured by an army operation between the 19th and 23rd April 2009. In noting that some civilians may have died in the course of the war, he contended that those who reached safety had gained that “most important human right, namely the right to life;” while adding that “it is a matter of record that soldiers involved in the evacuation have been deeply touched by the tragic situation of civilians.”

Summary

What we have seen in the last four years therefore is a tale of successful dissimulation that has built on half-truths by the addition of lies and the wilful neglect of significant factors. The 40,000 figure on death toll is a surmise that has gained a definitiveness that it cannot bear; while disregarding the extent to which people died through natural causes exacerbated by the starvation diet forced upon them, the high incidence of death by snake bite during journeys through jungle (highlighted by Anandasangaree, the veteran Tamil politician); and failing to enumerate the 600 or so dissident Tamil prisoners executed by the LTTE once they found them a burden.

Such details have been conveniently forgotten by the media outlets. Since sensational news is their bread and butter this is not surprising. But the moral crusaders have no such excuse. It would seem that emotion and a tendency to evaluate complex scenarios in black and white terms have clouded their judgment. They have also tended to draw upon data provided by Sri Lankan Tamil expatriates who are driven by emotion of a different character: that of vengeance for the discrimination suffered by their people over the last forty years. Such individuals as Daran in England and Jegan Waran in Australia have supplied politicians and media agencies with one-sided and questionable data.

Revenge has likewise promoted the activities of Sinhalese journalists and other who have fled in the face of intimidation from the Rajapaksa government in recent years. Westerners such as Benjamin Dix who have worked in LTTE territory and developed ideological attachments towards the cause of Eelam also seem to have gone overboard in their testimonies.

Such combinations have revealed a capacity to mount an effective propaganda war that has captured the high ground. It is only “high ground” in terms of power exerted. As I have argued, its neglect of detail and its mixing of lies and exaggerations with elements of truth means that its heights are not those of elevated ethics.

SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bavinck, Ben 2011 “Pirapaharan as uncompromising killer prone to vengeance: testimonies from the Jaffna heartland, 1989-91,” http://thuppahi.wordpress.com/2011/11/01/as uncompromising killer prone to vengeance: testimonies from the Jaffna heartland, 1989-91.

Blacker, David 2011 [Extended blog comment in} “The Wrong Photograph?” http://groundviews.org/2011/07/02/photographic-evidence-of-war-crimes-in-sri-lanka-or-not/.

De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei 2009a “Political and Security Implications of Sri Lanka’s Armed Conflict,” Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, Feb. 2009, Vol. 35/1, pp. 20, 22-24.

De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei 2009b “The Battle for the Vanni Pocket,” Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, March 2009, Vol. 35/2, pp. 17-19. http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/aulimp/citations/gsa/2009_157395/156554.html

De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei 2009e “Good Education. Sri Lankan Military learns Counter Insurgency Lessons,” Jane’s Intelligence Review Dec. 2009, pp. 3-7.

De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei 2010b “Information Warfare and the Endgame of the Civil War,” Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter, May 2010 30/4: 35-37, http://www. asiapacificdefencereporter.com/articles/40/Sri-Lanka

De Silva-Ranasinghe, Sergei 2010b “The 13th Amendment to the Constitution must be properly implemented”: Dharmalingam Siddharthan,” 22 Dec. 2010, http://transcurrents.com/tc/2010/12/ the_13th_amendment_to_the_cons.html.

Flickr 2009a “Times Aerial Images, NFZ, 23 May 2009,” http://www.flickr.com/photos/thuppahi/ sets/72157626922360092./

Flickr 2009b “Indian Reporter Pics at NFZ Last Redoubt -14-to-18 May 2009,” http://www. flickr.com/photos/thuppahi/sets/72157626797805167/

Groundviews 2009 “Would killing 50,000 civilians to finish off the LTTE bring peace?” http://groundviews.org/2009/05/03/would-killing-50000-civilians-to-finish-off-the-ltte-bring-peace/

Gunaratne, Rohan 2011 “Govt should have invited the Darusman Panel,” http://www.dailymirror.lk/news/14807-govt-could-have-invited-experts-panel.html.

Hoole, Rajan 2001 Sri Lanka: The Arrogance of Power. Myths, Decadence and Murder, Colombo: Wasala Publications for the UTHR.

HRW 2006 “Funding the Final War,” 13 March 2006, http://www.hrw.org/node/11456/ section/8.

Iyer, Ganeshan 2012a “Military Training in the German Nazi Mould amidst Internal Dissension in the early LTTE, late 1970s,” trans by Parames Blacker, in http://thuppahi. wordpress.com/2012/01/30/military-training-in-the-german-nazi-mould-amidst-internal-dissension-in-the-early-ltte-late-1970s/.

Jeyaraj, D. B. S. 2009 “Wretched of the Earth break Free of Bondage.” Daily Mirror, 25 April 2009, http://dbsjeyaraj.com/dbsj/archives/380.

Mango 2011 “Jim Macdonald of AI boxed into corner by Mango in 2009,” 10 August 2011, http://thuppahi.wordpress.com/2011/08/10/3133/

Marga Team 2011

Narayan Swamy, M. R. 2003 Inside an Elusive Mind. Prabhakaran, Colombo: Vijitha Yapa Publications.

Narayan Swamy, M. R. 2009 “Prabhakaran: from Catapult Killer to Ruthless Insurgent,” IANS, 18 May 2009 – see http://twocircles.net/node/148596 [reprinted in The Tiger Vanquished, pp. 165-67].

Ragavan 2009a “Interview with Ragavan on Tamil Militancy (Early Years),” http://kafila.org/2009/02/16/interview-with-ragavan-on-tamil-militancy-part-i/

Rajasingham, Narendran 2009 “Rise and Fall of the LTTE — An Overview,” Sri Lanka Guardian, 7 Feb. 2009.

Reddy, B. Muralidhar 2009 “Multiple Displacements, Total Loss of Identity,” http://www.hindu.com/2009/05/27/stories/2009052755811500.htm

Roberts, Michael 2009a “Dilemmas at War’s End: Thoughts on Hard Realities,” 10 Feb. 2009, http://groundviews.org/2009/02/10/dilemmas-at-wars-end-thoughts-on-hard-realities/.

Roberts, Michael 2009b “Dilemma’s at War’s End: Clarifications and Counter-offensive,” www.groundviews.org.

Roberts, Michael 2009c “Realities of War,” Frontline, 26/10, 9-22 May 2009.

Roberts, Michael 2011a “People of Righteousness march on Sri Lanka,” The Island, 22 June 2011 and http://thuppahi.wordpress.com/2011/06/27/people-of-righteousness-target-sri-lanka/

Roberts, Michael 2011b “Amnesty International reveals its Flawed Tunnel-Vision in Sri Lanka in 2009,” 10 Aug. 2011, http://thuppahi.wordpress.com/2011/08/10/amnesty-international-reveals-its-flawed-tunnel-vision-on-sri-lanka-in-2009/

Roberts, Michael 2011c “The Tamil Death Toll in Early 2009: A Misleading Count by Rohan Gunaratna,” 23 November 2011, http://transcurrents.com/news-views/archives/6285.

Roberts, Michael 2012 “Blackmail during the endgame of Eelam War IV,” 12 April 2012, http://thuppahi.wordpress.com/2012/04/12/blackmail-during-the-endgame-in-eelam-war-iv/

Samarajiva, Indi 2012 “Channel 4’s – A Review,” The Nation, 18 March 2012, http://www.nation.lk/edition/feature-viewpoint.

SRHRL 2012 “High-Resolution Satellite Imagery and the Conflict in Sri Lanka,” http://srhrl.aaas.org/geotech/srilanka/srilanka.shtml.

Tammita-Delgoda , S. 2009 Sri Lanka. The Last Phase in Eelam War IV. From Chundikulam to Pudukulam,” New Delhi: Centre for Land Warfare, Manekshaw Paper No. 13, 2009.

Tekwani, Shyam 2009 ‘The Man who destroyed Eelam,” http://www.tehelka.com/home /20090523/default.asp.

UN Panel of Experts 2011 “Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Sri Lanka,” http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Sri_Lanka/POE_Report.

UTUBE 2009 “Sri Lanka Genocide And Tamil Canadian,” 11March 2009, involving Robert Buerk of BBC and Anna Neistat Lenin benedict and a spokesman for the Tamil Canadian, https://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=OJsAa7s4Asg

Wijesinha, Rajiva 2012 “Benjamin Dix’s Paranoia, and the subtle effectiveness of Guy Rhodes in abusing aid in Sri Lanka,” http://rajivawijesinha.wordpress.com/2012/05/23/benjamin-dixs-paranoia-and-the-subtle-effectiveness-of-guy-rhodes-in-abusing-aid-in-sri-lanka/#more-4898.

Wijesinha, Rajiva 2012a “Frances Harrison, Daran of Channel 4 claims, and the ‘othering’ of Arun Tambimuttu” Daily news 22 may 2012

Modernisation of national security apparatus

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Fri, 25 May 2012 05:05:00 +0000

| by B.Raman

( May 25, 2012, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) The Government of India has taken the first important step towards the modernisation of our national security apparatus by commissioning a study of the apparatus as it stands today and as it ought to be to counter likely future threats from other States and non-State actors.

Defence Minister A K Antony

2.The exhaustive study, lasting nearly 10 months, was undertaken by a special Task Force headed by Shri Naresh Chandra, who has had the distinction of having served as the Defence Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Cabinet Secretary as well as the Governor of Rajasthan and our Ambassador to the US during the critical period following our nuclear tests of 1998. He is, therefore, no stranger to the internal and external aspects of national security and to the linkages between national security and national strength. The report of the Task Force was submitted to the Prime Minister on May 23,2012.

3. The exercise has now moved into the second and even more important step of implementation. Any exercise of this nature, however comprehensive, will be fruitful only if the acceptable recommendations are quickly identified and prioritised and action taken for their timely implementation.

4. The exercise entrusted by the Government to the Task Force was not a post-mortem necessitated by any national security failure or set-back. It was a forward-looking exercise meant to visualise the likely national security tasks of the future keeping in view the evolving threats to national security as well as our requirements as a major power in the years to come.

5. The exercise undertaken by the Task Force had its tactical as well as strategic components. The tactical component related to identifying the gaps and deficiencies of today in national security management and recommending measures to remove them.

6. The strategic component had an element of vision about it. How is the security scenario likely to evolve in the foreseeable future? What kind of new threats and vulnerabilities are likely to arise for which we have to be prepared? How to create a modern national security apparatus befitting India’s status as a major power and how to find the resources for it? These were some of the questions that have been sought to be addressed by the Task Force.

7. Such exercises are undertaken regularly in the US and other Western countries every time a new Head of State or Government assumes office. This is the first time that such an exercise has been undertaken in our country since we became independent in 1947. It is to be hoped that this will become a regular feature and that such an exercise to ensure a steady modernisation of our national security apparatus will be undertaken at least once in 10 years.

8. National strength and national security go hand in hand. Without comprehensive national strength there cannot be comprehensive national security and vice versa. Resource priorities for the modernisation of the national security apparatus in a developing country like India cannot be the same as in Western developed countries.

9. In a country like ours the requirements of the people have to have the first priority. Even while not neglecting this, one has to find the resources for constantly upgrading our national security apparatus. How to do this? That is a difficult and complex question to which the answer has to be found by the political leadership on the basis of the various options identified by the professional experts---serving and retired. It is important to work towards a national political and intellectual consensus on the need for a time-bound modernisation of our national security apparatus and for finding the required material and human resources even while not overlooking the priorities for the common man.

10. While it is for the Government to decide on the drill to be followed for the implementation of the Task Force report, three aspects to be kept in view may be underlined:

Firstly, the need to take the public into confidence to the extent possible on the main features of this exercise so that it has broad public support.
Secondly, the need to ensure institutional and political consensus at every stage of the implementation.
Thirdly, the need for a standing mechanism to monitor the implementation process.

11. It would be neither possible nor advisable to make the entire report of the Task Force available in the public domain. Its assessment of the external security scenario is sensitive and could have a negative impact on our diplomacy if made available in the public domain. But its assessment of the internal security scenario and resource constraints could be made available in the public domain after suitable editing.

12. The implementation process cannot be satisfactory unless all Government departments and institutions that might be affected by the implementation positively or negatively co-operate in the implementation exercise. If they co-operate only in respect of those recommendations that are favourable them and oppose those that are not favourable, the implementation will be half-hearted. A political consensus at the central level and between the Centre and the States would smoothen the implementation process.

13. The monitoring of the implementation by the National Security Council Secretariat or by any other suitable mechanism would ensure that the recommendations do not fall in limbo.

Evidence is mounting for Sri Lanka's war crimes

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Fri, 25 May 2012 00:36:00 +0000

UN probe gathers momentum

| by Pearl Thevanayagam

(May 25 2012, London, Sri Lanka Guardian) The ICC (International Criminal Court) elected a new chief from Gambia and she is known for her candidness. US declared that it stands by its resolution presented to the UNHRC against the government. And Amnesty International issued a damning report on Sri Lanka that three years after the war ended there is a culture of impunity in unexplained disappearances, abductions and killings of dissenters, suppression of human rights, curtailment of freedom of expression and overall blatant violation of laws.

These do not bode well for the government. Most frequent flying miles earner, External Affairs Minister Prof. G.L.Peiris, was patting himself on his back that he charmed US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton into believing the government is taking concrete steps to implement LLRC recommendations during his recent visit and public speaking at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Obviously hi diplomatic tete-a tete with Clinton did not cut much ice and US is standing by its a stubborn stance taken in March at the UNHRC.

General Sarath Fonseka is equally responsible for the massacre of over 40,000 Tamil in Wanni as much as defence secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. Neither can shed their Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism nor could the government. The lives of Tamils were sacrificed for the sovereignty of a Sinhala nation.

But the government is teetering on the brink of losing mass support since its vacuous promises even to the Sinhalese who voted it to power are but just empty rhetoric as the populace is feeling the pinch of the rising cost of living while mega showcase projects are under way; well beyond the nation's means.

I reproduce here an article I wrote to Sri Lanka Guardian in February 2011.

Sri Lanka on the docks: War crimes allegations close in

| by Pearl Thevanayagam

(February 13, London, Sri Lanka Guardian) Crucial times are ahead for Sri Lanka. On the one hand the ICC (International Criminal Court) cannot touch Sri Lanka since it is not a signatory to the Rome Statute to prosecute individuals for serious war crimes but on the other it is possible for the ICC to investigate and prosecute war crimes if the UN Security Council was to refer Sri Lanka to the ICC which has been accomplished by the UNSG report.

File Report

Also there is the clause that individual countries may investigate and prosecute alleged culprits over whom they have jurisdiction, such as those with dual nationality. Therein lies the catch. Palitha Kohonna, Sarath Fonseka, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa et al cannot escape ICC trial and with reputed Human Rights INGOs muscling in on their findings of war crimes Sri Lankan leadership stands open to public scrutiny and possible trials for war crimes. Also, US Secretary of State has warned that US would support war crimes probe and this is not to be scoffed at.

In May 2009 17 countries (Argentina, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Canada, Chile, France, Germany, Italy, Mauritius, Mexico, Netherlands, Slovenia, Slovakia, South Korea, Switzerland, Ukraine, Uruguay, and the United Kingdom) attempted to get the 11th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) to investigate war crimes in Sri Lanka.

They put forward a resolution that deplored abuses by both the Sri Lankan government forces and the Tamil Tigers, urged the government to co-operate fully with humanitarian organisations and to provide protection to civilians and displaced persons, and made an appeal to the Sri Lankan government to respect media freedom and investigate attacks against journalists and human rights defenders.[33] This was thwarted after the Sri Lankan government received support from China, Russia, India and developing countries.

The UNHRC instead passed resolution A/HRC/S-11/L.1/Rev.2 on 27 May 2009 which commended the Sri Lankan government's actions, condemned the Tamil Tigers and ignored allegations of violations of human rights and humanitarian law by government forces. This resolution was passed by 29 votes to 12 votes with 6 abstentions.

The UN expert panel report published in April 2011 has, based on its findings, recommended that the Human Rights Council reconsider resolution A/HRC/S-11/L.1/Rev.2.

Between 14 and 16 January 2010 the Permanent Peoples' Tribunal held a Tribunal on Sri Lanka in Dublin, Ireland to investigate allegations that the Sri Lankan armed forces committed war crimes and crimes against humanity during its final phase of the war, and to examine violations of human rights in the aftermath of the war and the factors that led to the collapse of the 2002 ceasefire.[55] The tribunal's 11-member panel of judges consisted of François Houtart (chair), Daniel Feierstein, Denis Halliday, Eren Keskin, Mary Lawlor, Francesco Martone, Nawal El Saadawi, Rajinder Sachar, Sulak Sivaraksa, Gianni Tognoni and Oystein Tveter. The tribunal received reports from NGOs and human rights groups, victims’ testimony, eye-witness accounts including from members of the Sri Lankan armed forces, expert testimony, journalistic reports, video footage and photographs. Parts of the tribunal were held in camera to protect the identity of witnesses. The tribunal found the Sri Lankan government guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity.[56]

The tribunal found numerous instances of human rights violations committed by the Sri Lankan government. Violations between 2006 (end of the ceasefire) and 2009 (end of the war) included: bombing civilian objectives like hospitals, schools and other non-military targets; bombing government-proclaimed ‘safety zones’ or ‘no fire zones’; withholding of food, water, and health facilities in war zones; use of heavy weaponry, banned weapons and air-raids; using food and medicine as a weapon of war; mistreatment, torture and execution of captured or surrendered Tamil Tiger combatants, officials and supporters; torture; rape and sexual violence against women; deportations and forcible transfer of individuals and families; and desecration of the dead.[57] Violations committed in the IDP camps included: shooting of Tamil citizens and Tamil Tiger supporters; forced disappearances; rape; malnutrition; and lack of medical supplies.[57] There was also evidence of forced “disappearances” of targeted individuals from the Tamil population during the ceasefire (2002–2006).[57]

The tribunal concluded that the human rights violations during the war (2006–2009) "clearly constitute war crimes committed by the Sri Lankan Government, its security forces and aligned paramilitary forces, as defined under the Geneva Conventions and in the Rome Statute (Article 8)."Sri Lanka is a signatory of the Geneva Convention but not the Rome Statute. The tribunal found that war crimes were committed irrespective of whether the civil war was considered to be an international conflict or as an internal armed conflict.[The tribunal also found that human rights violations committed in the in the IDP camps and the forced disappearances during the ceasefire (2002–2006) "clearly constitute crimes against humanity" as defined under Article 7 of the Rome Statute. The tribunal could not find enough evidence to justify the charge of genocide but it requested that a thorough investigation be held as some of the evidence it had received indicated "possible acts of genocide". The tribunal could also not find enough evidence to justify the charge of crimes against the peace. The tribunal stated that the crimes committed by the Sri Lankan government against the Tamil Tigers could not be justified because "neither war crimes, nor crimes against humanity would be justified by any act committed by the victims". The tribunal found that the USA and UK undermined the ceasefire by pressurising the EU into designating the Tamil Tigers as a terrorist organisation. This allowed the Sri Lankan government to re-start the war and thus commit the human rights violations.

The tribunal made a number of recommendations to the Sri Lankan government, UN and international community, including that a UN special rapporteur be appointed to "investigate and identify responsibilities for human rights violations, violations of humanitarian law and war crimes committed by all parties in conflict". The tribunal's findings were completely rejected by the Sri Lankan government.

The LLRC appointed in the aftermath of the conclusion f the war against the LTTE failed to placate the international community on many fronts.

First of all it failed to add to its final report the evidence of first-hand witnesses who are victims during the last stages of war who made submissions of rape, abductions and murders at the hands of the government security forces. Instead it chose to take evidence from retired government servants, media personnel who had never sighted the war during its last stages government servants who were compelled to protect their skins or else face arbitrary abductions and murders.

Compounding their predicament the witnesses who could have come forward were constrained by lack of witness protection. Not unlike the Kokkadicholai massacre by the government security forces those who gave evidence such as the Grama Sevaka (village headman) of Mahiladicholai was found murdered after he gave evidence at the BMICH in Colombo in 1992 the witnesses restrained themselves from giving evidence.

But there is only so much the populace can tolerate and the time is now ripe to put human rights in Sri Lanka in some sort of order. Law and order has become the prerogative of the Rajapksas. Impunity, corruption and nepotism have taken over democratic governance. If Maldives is anything to go by, the end of this anarchy in Sri Lanka could spell the doom for an upstart of a puerile family of the Rajapaksas who tend to rely on astrological predictions and their own short-lived ascendency as pseudo-monarchs. No amount of patriotism and Sinhala Buddhist reliance can save the dynasty except truth and justice.

An elected President is but a trustee of his nation. Unfortunately the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime believes the country is its own family's fiefdom and the citizens' priority is to keep this family enthroned for life.

So, what is in store for the country's future? A ruling regime reviled by the international community barring Russia and China and a few African and South American countries. Clearly the government's strategy of sending disinformation counsellors to several nations has not worked since they are more interested in their nouveau diplomatic perks to be arsed with carrying out disinformation campaign as can be seen in the recent Tamara, Dayan, and Mahinda Samarasinghe kefuffle at UNHCR not to mention that diplomat who pilfered a clock from his host in Japan.

Then there is the joker in the pack Rajiva Wijesingha, actor and Arts Council patron turned VC at Sabaragamuwa University for a short while who made a right asshole of himself a few days ago at Frontline Club, a trust left for war correspondents by Graham Greene, the veteran journalist during the second World War and author of many books including The Quiet American.

At least Mervyn Silva would have stood by the President and tied any dissenters to trees and Weerawansa would publicly go on fast unto death knowing fully well he would be placated with a glass of Thambili by Gota and even go to the extent of boycotting US goods including Google.

All in all, the government stands a hope in hell trying to mask its war crimes committed three years ago from the UN probe. And this is a fact not to be overlooked.

The writer is Asia Pacific Journalism Fellow at UC Berkeley Graduate School of Journalism, California and a print journalist for 22 years. She can be reached at pearltheva@hotmail.com)

Wimal should know, facing war crimes is not a contract but true patriotism

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Fri, 25 May 2012 00:29:00 +0000

| by Robin hood

( May 25, 2012, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) During yesterday ( May 24) media briefing, the leader of the National Freedom Alliance and the Minister, Wimal Weerawansa accused Gen. Sarath fonseka as to whose contract he is prepared to give evidence if the government is ready to help for an international war crime investigation. He further said Gen. Fonseka has nothing to give evidence as he was not in Sri Lanka during the last few days of the war. It was a known fact that Gen. Fonseka was in touch with senior commanders in the army and giving instructions on mobile how to carry on operations during the last few days when he was in China.

Minister Wimal Weerawansa who is on hunger protest

unto death protests to dissolve the expert panel which

is originated by the United Nation Organization

Secretary in regard to Sri Lanka war crimes. Wimal

Weerawansa, a political opportunist and a street thug,

who must have killed himself long ago for the

goodness of his people and his country, is too late to dye.

( File Photo)

Wimal weerawansa should know that Gen, Sarath Fonseka is the General of Sri Lanka army during the war and not an ordinary minister who give statements to the gallery behind the curtains. Gen. Fonseka is capable enough to face the allegations of war crimes and refute all charges against Sri Lanka army. Further he will not indulge in gallery activities protesting in front of the US embassy to show his disagreement. Wimal Weerawansa should know that facing the war crimes is not a contract but it is true patriotism which minister like Weerawansa don’t has. Gen Fonseka is a true patriotic who can defend Sri Lanka army for alleged war crimes.

It appears that Wimal Weerawansa does not want to clear the allegations against the Sri Lanka army for alleged war crimes. Minister Weeranwansa should know that refusing allegations and fasting in front of the UN is not civilized act and not going to clear the charges against SL army.

I wish to ask Wimal Weerawansa except fasting in front of UN and speaking to the gallery, boasting about patriotism what actions has he taken as a patriotic minister stooping to the Rajapakse government to clear the charges of war crimes against SL army?

By the way Gen Sarath Fonseka is well conversant in English language to face the international war crimes.

We wish him all the best

SPECIAL: US State Dept. report on HR in Sri Lanka issued

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Thu, 24 May 2012 16:56:00 +0000

| State Department, USA

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

( May 24, 2012, Washington DC, Sri Lanka Guardian) Sri Lanka is a constitutional, multiparty republic. President Mahinda Rajapaksa, who was reelected to a second six-year term in January 2010, and the parliament, which was elected in April 2010, share constitutional power. The government is dominated by the president’s family; two of the president’s brothers hold key executive branch posts as defense secretary and minister of economic development, while a third brother is the speaker of parliament. A large number of other relatives, including the president’s son, also serve in important political or diplomatic positions. Independent observers generally characterized the presidential and parliamentary elections as problematic. Both elections were fraught with violations of the election law by all major parties and were influenced by the governing coalition’s massive use of state resources. There were instances in which elements of the security forces acted independently of civilian control.

The major human rights problems were unlawful killings by security forces and government-allied paramilitary groups, often in predominantly Tamil areas, which led many to regard them as politically motivated, and attacks on and harassment of civil society activists, persons viewed as Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) sympathizers, and journalists by persons allegedly tied to the government, which created an environment of fear and self-censorship.

Other serious human rights problems included disappearances, as well as a lack of accountability for thousands who disappeared in previous years. Security forces tortured and abused detainees, poor prison conditions remained a problem, and authorities arbitrarily arrested and detained citizens. A number of suspects detained by police or other security forces died under questionable circumstances. Lengthy pretrial detention was a problem. Denial of fair public trial remained a problem, and the judiciary was subject to executive influence. The government infringed on citizens’ privacy rights. There were some restrictions on freedom of speech, press, assembly, association, and movement. Infringement on freedom of movement was less frequent than in 2010. While citizens were generally able to travel almost anywhere in the island, police and military checkpoints were still widespread in the north and east, and numerous high security zones and other areas remained off-limits to citizens. Authorities harassed journalists critical of the government and self-censorship was widespread. The president used his authority under the September 2010 18th Amendment to take greater control of appointments to previously independent public institutions that oversee the judiciary, the police, and human rights. The president now holds the authority to name all members to the Constitutional Council and its subsidiary councils, with only the requirement to “seek advice,” but not approval, of parliament. Doubts remained about the fairness of both the 2010 presidential and parliamentary elections due to election law violations and government influence. Lack of government transparency was a serious problem. Violence and discrimination against women were problems, as were abuse of children and trafficking in persons. Discrimination against persons with disabilities and against the ethnic Tamil minority continued, and a disproportionate number of victims of human rights violations were Tamils. Discrimination against persons based on their sexual orientation and against persons with HIV/AIDS were problems. Limits on workers’ rights and child labor remained problems.

The government prosecuted a very small number of officials implicated in human rights abuses but had yet to hold anyone accountable for alleged violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law that occurred during the conflict. Official impunity for a wide range of human rights abuses, particularly in cases of police torture, corruption, and attacks on media institutions, was a problem.

During the year unknown actors suspected of association with progovernment paramilitary groups committed killings, assaults, and intimidation of civilians. There were persistent reports of close, ground-level ties between paramilitary groups and government security forces.

Section 1. Respect for the Integrity of the Person, Including Freedom from:

a. Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life

There were a number of reports that the government, its agents, or its paramilitary allies committed arbitrary or unlawful killings, but reliable statistics on such killings were difficult to obtain because past complainants were killed and some families feared reprisals if they filed complaints.

Among these arbitrary or unlawful killings, there were increased reports of suspects detained by police or other security forces who died under questionable circumstances. For example, on July 3, Neluwa Priyantha died in the custody of members of the Special Task Force (STF) while he was showing them a house where he hid weapons.

There were several instances in which police were held accountable for unlawful killings. On September 29, trishaw driver G.A. Gayan Rasanga was arrested in Dompe on theft charges and reportedly tortured to death by the police. A Criminal Investigations Department (CID) investigation into the incident resulted in the arrest of five police officers. The police were prosecuted, and the case continued in a magistrate’s court at year’s end.

According to official accounts, security forces took some suspects to the scenes of their alleged crimes and then shot and killed them while they allegedly were trying to escape. On October 3, Lalith Susantha, a suspect in the killing of a police officer, allegedly drowned in the Bolgoda Lake while showing the police where the murder weapon was hidden.

The overall number of extrajudicial killings decreased from the previous year. Nevertheless, during the year, and particularly in the beginning of the year, unknown actors suspected of association with progovernment paramilitary groups committed killings and assaulted civilians. These included the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal, associated with former LTTE eastern commander and now Deputy Minister of Resettlement Vinayagamurthi Muralitharan, alias “Karuna,” as well as Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, alias “Pillaiyan,” in the east, and the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP), led by Minister of Social Services and Social Welfare Douglas Devananda, in Jaffna. These and other progovernment paramilitary gangs and parties also were active in Mannar and Vavuniya. All of these groups endeavored to operate political organizations, some with more success than others, and there were persistent reports of close, ground-level ties between paramilitary groups and government security forces. Whereas these groups served more of a military function during the war, often working in coordination with security forces, during the year they increasingly took on the characteristics of criminal gangs as they sought to solidify their territory and revenue sources in the postwar environment.

While some killings were criminal acts, others appeared to be politically motivated, targeting persons believed to be LTTE sympathizers. For example, on June 26, Jaffna residents found former LTTE combatant Balachchandran Satkunarasa hanged from a soccer goal post.

On December 29, an army soldier manning a checkpoint post in Poonakari reportedly shot and killed a traveler after he refused to hand over his motorbike to the soldier. The soldier was killed in a confrontation with fellow soldiers following the incident.

Britain’s Channel 4 broadcast a report in 2009 on events at the end of the war, followed by a more extensive documentary made available worldwide on the Internet June 14 entitled “Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields,” which purported to show graphic evidence of army forces committing human rights violations, including footage of extrajudicial executions. The government claimed that its investigations showed that the video was a fake, and that those filmed were actually LTTE members wearing uniforms to impersonate army soldiers while carrying out the executions. The UN special investigator into extrajudicial killings in Sri Lanka, Christof Heyns, told the UN Human Rights Council on May 30 that forensic and technical experts concluded that the video was authentic and that the events reflected in the video occurred as depicted. The report of the domestic Lessons Learned and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC), publicly released December 16, questioned the findings of the UN-commissioned experts and recommended that the government “institute an independent investigation into this issue [the video]… and take action in accordance with the laws of the land.”

On May 12, former army intelligence officer Kandegedara Priyawansa told a magistrate that a Terrorist Investigation Division (TID) officer in charge instructed Priyawansa to claim that a top army official was involved in the 2009 killing of the former chief editor of the Sunday Leader newspaper, Lasantha Wickrematunga, by four assailants. The main suspect in Wickrematunga’s killing, Pitchai Jesudasan, reportedly died of a heart attack in Colombo on October 15. The suspect was in jail for more than two years and was apprehended for allegedly possessing Wickrematunga’s subscriber identity module (SIM) card. Human rights observers expressed skepticism about the significance of any role Jesudasan had in Wickrematunga’s death.

b. Disappearance

Enforced and involuntary disappearances continued to be a problem, although the number of such disappearances appeared to decline from previous years. Many disappearances appeared to be politically motivated, but during the year there also were increasing reports of disappearances connected with extortion and other criminal activity, sometimes involving government actors.

Local residents blamed abductions in the Jaffna Peninsula on security forces or members of the EPDP. Some disappearances appeared to be politically motivated, targeting civil society activists and persons believed to be LTTE sympathizers. On December 9, Lalith Kumar Weeraraj and Kugan Muruganandan, two activists from the dissident section of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) opposition party, disappeared in Jaffna after leaving their residence. Muruganandan’s motorbike was later found by the police. Weeraraj had been active in raising human rights concerns faced by the Tamil people, such as disappearance and detention issues. He had been threatened, assaulted, and detained by security forces on previous occasions. On December 15, cabinet spokesperson Minister Keheliya Rambukwella told the media that the two activists had not disappeared but that “they are here” without specifying a location. The activists remained missing at year’s end.

There were reports of abductions and beatings of released former combatants. For example, Jaffna University student and ex-LTTE combatant Vetharaniyam Lathees was abducted on November 27 following a candlelight vigil in commemoration of LTTE “Martyrs’ Day” and released the following day. As of year’s end, he had not disclosed who abducted or released him.

In July a police official told the media that a report compiled by the police department found that 1,700 persons were abducted in 2009-10, including 926 abducted in 2009 and 774 abducted in 2010. According to police, most of the abductions appeared motivated by extortion. Police took legal action in 275 cases, while 202 suspects were yet to be identified. In its annual report released January 26, the UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances noted 5,653 outstanding cases from Sri Lanka as of the end of 2010.

The LLRC stated in its December report to the president that it was “alarmed by a large number of representations made alleging abductions, enforced or involuntary disappearances, and arbitrary detention” and stated that the government is therefore “duty bound to direct the law enforcement authorities to take immediate steps to ensure that these allegations are properly investigated into and perpetrators brought to justice.”

There was no significant progress made with regard to the thousands of disappearances from past years. There was an instance where an investigation into a disappearance clarified the fate of the missing person: on July 28, police found the body of the managing trustee of the nongovernmental organization (NGO) Community Trust Fund (CTF), Pattani Razeek, who had disappeared in February 2010. Police arrested a former CTF employee Shahabdeen Nowshaadh on July 8 and another suspect, Ismail Mohamed Musdeen, on July 13. Nowshaadh was released on bail, and Musdeen remained in Mahara Remand Prison at year’s end. The case was scheduled to be heard in court in February 2012.

There was no significant progress in the case of Prageeth Ekneligoda, a journalist and cartoonist for Lanka-e-news, who disappeared in January 2010, just before the presidential election. On August 22, a court of appeal directed the Homagama Magistrate to inquire into Ekneligoda’s disappearance and present its findings in January 2012. On November 11, Mohan Pieris, the senior legal advisor to the cabinet and former attorney general, claimed in a question-and-answer session following a presentation to the UN Committee against Torture (CAT) that Ekneligoda was alive, had secretly left Sri Lanka, and was living abroad. A November 15 news Web site report alleged, however, that United Peoples Freedom Alliance (UPFA) member of parliament (MP) Duminda Silva’s assistant, Dematagoda Chaminda, told CID officers that he and his associates dumped Ekneligoda’s body in the sea at the direction of Silva, under orders from Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. Chaminda had been arrested in connection with the October 8 killing of a former MP, Bharata Lakshman Premachandra (see section 3).

On July 11, the Ministry of Defense published the results of a UNICEF report on the work of the Family Tracing Unit. The unit received nearly 2,500 tracing requests since its establishment in 2009, of which 676 concerned children. Approximately 10 percent of these children later were matched with children’s names found in hospital and other records. According to UNICEF data, 64 percent of the children had been recruited by the LTTE prior to their disappearance. In July the government authorized UNICEF to establish additional family tracing units in the north of the country. UNICEF still had a caseload of 1,373 missing children recruited by the LTTE during the cease-fire period.

Aside from the Razeek case, the government did not publish the results of any investigations into past disappearances, nor did it publish information on any indictments or convictions of anyone involved in cases related to disappearances.

There was no progress in solving the 2009 disappearance of Stephen Sunthararaj, project manager at the Center for Human Rights and Development. Sunthararaj was held by police without charges beginning in February of that year and was abducted by four persons in a white van wearing army uniforms shortly after he was released on a court order.

c. Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

The law makes torture a punishable offense and mandates a sentence of not less than seven years’ imprisonment. However, there were credible reports that security forces tortured and abused citizens.

The CAT considered the combined third and fourth periodic reports of Sri Lanka on November 8 and 9 and adopted its concluding observations on November 22 and 23. The committee expressed serious concern “about the continued and consistent allegations of widespread use of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of suspects in police custody.” Other concerns included the lack of information on the implementation of the Convention against Torture; failure to uphold judicial and procedural safeguards of detainees; reports of secret detention centers; enforced disappearances; the replacement of the Emergency Regulations with problematic Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) regulations; intimidation and harassment of human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists, and others; overcrowding and poor conditions in prisons; impunity for acts of torture; and a lack of witness protection.

The Freedom from Torture (FFT) submission to the CAT for its examination of Sri Lanka concluded based on evidence in medico-legal reports that “torture perpetrated by state actors within both the military and police has continued in Sri Lanka after the conflict ended in May 2009 and is still occurring in 2011.” It also found that those at particular risk of torture include Tamils who had an actual or perceived association with the LTTE.

No accurate publicly released statistics on reported torture cases were available. The Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) compiled 1,500 cases of police torture between 1998 and 2011 and issued a report in June summarizing 323 of the most serious cases. As of October the AHRC had received 102 reports of police torture.

Former TID detainees at Boosa Prison in Galle confirmed reports of torture methods used there. These included beatings, often with cricket bats, iron bars, or rubber hoses filled with sand; electric shock; suspending individuals by the wrists or feet in contorted positions; abrading knees across rough cement; burning with metal objects and cigarettes; genital abuse; blows to the ears; asphyxiation with plastic bags containing chili pepper mixed with gasoline; and near-drowning. Detainees reported broken bones and other serious injuries as a result of mistreatment.

In the east and the north, military intelligence and other security personnel, sometimes working with armed paramilitaries, were responsible for the documented and undocumented detention of civilians suspected of LTTE connections. Detention reportedly was followed by interrogation that frequently included torture. There were reports that detainees were released with a warning not to reveal information about their arrest or detention, under the threat of rearrest or death.

Human rights groups alleged that some security forces believed torture to be allowed under specific circumstances. Several former LTTE combatants released from rehabilitation centers reported torture or mistreatment, including sexual harassment, by government officials while in rehabilitation centers. Responding to questions on reports of torture and abuse, a police spokesman told the media in June that police training suffered during the war. The police endorsed incorporating a full human rights curriculum and lesson plan developed by UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights into the police training curriculum during the year.

Members of the security forces beat and otherwise abused criminal suspects and others. For example, Devarathnam Yogendra alleged that police officers abducted, beat, and threatened him January 15, following a complaint he made in a bribery case against a Hatton Police Station inspector.

While the government has categorically denied the existence of unacknowledged detention facilities, there were credible allegations from national and international NGOs of undisclosed government facilities where suspected LTTE sympathizers were taken, tortured, and sometimes killed. The CAT examined such allegations and noted in its findings that it was “seriously concerned about reports received from nongovernmental sources regarding secret detention centers run by the Sri Lankan military intelligence and paramilitary groups where enforced disappearances, torture and extrajudicial killings have allegedly been perpetrated.”

In recent years human rights organizations reported that, while not actively arresting and prosecuting lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (LGBT) persons, police harassed and extorted money or sexual favors from those persons and assaulted gays and lesbians in Colombo and other areas. This led to underreporting of crimes against members of the LGBT community.

There were reports that individual cases of gender-based violence perpetrated by members of the security forces occurred in areas with heavy security force presence, but others stated that military officials were responsive to reports of such incidents and showed a willingness to prosecute the offenders. The government did not release any details about prosecutions or punishments for such offenses, and some observers suggested that there was reluctance by victims to report such incidents in northern and eastern areas where security forces were prevalent. Statistics on numbers of such cases also were unavailable because few victims reported such incidents.

There have been a number of credible reports of sexual violence against women where the alleged perpetrators were armed forces personnel, police officers, army deserters, or members of militant groups. A number of women did not lodge official complaints out of fear of retaliation. In its November 7 “Out of the Silence: New Evidence of Ongoing Torture in Sri Lanka” report, the FFT reviewed 35 medico-legal reports of detainees and found evidence of rape, sexual assault, and violence to sexual organs. The reports states: “Of the 27 male cases in the sample overall, 15 experienced sexual violence (55 percent) and of the eight female cases in the sample, six experienced sexual violence (75 percent). All but one of the episodes of physical violence to sexual organs (all male) and sexual assault (both male and female) are reported to have taken place during torture and interrogation sessions for both men and women. While all instances of rape (both male and female) are reported to have been perpetrated in cells by guards or by officers usually at night, sometimes repeatedly and sometimes by more than one individual.”

Prison and Detention Center Conditions

Prison conditions were poor and did not meet international standards due to overcrowding and the lack of sanitary facilities. In many cases prisoners reportedly slept on concrete floors and often lacked natural light or sufficient ventilation. According to prison officials and civil society sources, prisons designed for approximately 11,000 inmates held an estimated 32,000 prisoners. More than 13,000 of these prisoners either were awaiting or undergoing trial. There were approximately 1,400 female prisoners. In some cases juveniles were not held separately from adults. Pretrial detainees often were not held separately from those convicted. Petty criminals and sexual offenders often were incarcerated with perpetrators of more serious crimes. Female prisoners were held separately from male prisoners and in generally poor conditions. For example, in Welikada Prison 650 female prisoners occupied a ward built for 150, with 75 female inmates sharing two bathrooms. Authorities acknowledged poor prison conditions but noted a lack of space and resources as determining factors. The government planned to relocate and expand several prison facilities and was working with the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to modernize its prison system.

Aside from those held in informal detention facilities, prisoners and detainees were allowed access to family members. Prisoners and detainees were permitted religious observance. There were no ombudsmen to handle prisoner complaints. There were alternatives to incarceration for nonviolent offenders, including community service and community-based corrections alternatives. Community-based corrections included elements of rehabilitation and counseling in addition to community service work.

Magistrates were mandated to visit prisons once a month to monitor conditions and hold private interviews with prisoners. In practice this regularly did not happen as the backlog of cases in courts made it difficult for magistrates to make prison visits. The government permitted independent human rights observers and the ICRC to visit regular and remand prisons. The government did not provide access to any detention facilities operated by military intelligence, stating that none existed. The ICRC was not allowed to visit suspected illegal detention facilities operated by paramilitary groups.

d. Arbitrary Arrest or Detention

The law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, in practice such incidents frequently occurred. There were frequent reports throughout the year of victims randomly selected by police to be arrested and detained on unsubstantiated charges. For example, on October 17, Chulani Thilakaratne was allegedly assaulted and arbitrarily arrested by two drunken plainclothes officers. His wife and several relatives came to the police station that evening and complained to the officer-in-charge, who released Thilakaratne to them.

Under the arrest and detention standards imposed by the Emergency Regulations and the PTA, the law does not clearly define what constitutes an arbitrary arrest. Although parliament allowed the Emergency Regulations to lapse August 31, many of the Emergency Regulations’ powers could be found in the PTA. The PTA has similar sweeping powers of search, arrest, and detention. It allows for detainees to be held for up to 18 months and indefinitely pending trial. Many detainees thus continued to be held arbitrarily for prolonged periods without charge, including in irregular places of detention. On August 30, the day before the Emergency Regulations lapsed, the president issued new regulations under the PTA incorporating into it aspects of the Emergency Regulations that the PTA did not already include. Among the regulations were measures proscribing the LTTE as a terrorist organization and keeping surrendered persons under rehabilitation.

Human rights groups estimated that approximately 5,000 to 6,000 LTTE suspects were in regular detention centers. An unknown additional number of unidentified detainees, estimated by some organizations to be as high as 3,000, were thought to be held in police stations, the CID, the TID, army or paramilitary camps, or other informal detention facilities on suspicion of involvement in terrorism-related activities. Many of these detainees were detained incommunicado without charge or trial.

Of the approximately 11,600 LTTE combatants who surrendered at the end of the war, reports indicated that 10,200 had been rehabilitated and released and approximately 700 remained in rehabilitation centers. Authorities considered 700 “hardcore” former combatants to be potentially criminally liable and transferred them to the criminal justice system. Reintegration of former combatants released from rehabilitation remained challenging due to intensive surveillance by the military, social stigma (some people were afraid to associate themselves with ex-combatants who regularly had to report to the army), employment difficulties, and psychological trauma. Several released ex-combatants reported torture or mistreatment, including sexual harassment, by government officials while in rehabilitation centers.

Role of the Police and Security Apparatus

The inspector general of police (IGP) is responsible for the nearly 90,000-member Sri Lanka Police Service (SLPS). The SLPS conducts civilian police functions, such as enforcing criminal and traffic laws, enhancing public safety, and maintaining order. The IGP reports to the secretary of the Ministry of Defense (in a separate chain of command from that of the armed forces and other military units). The nearly 6,000-member paramilitary STF is within the structure of the SLPS, although joint operations with military units in the past led to questions among observers about who actually was directing the STF. Throughout the year the president repeatedly used the Public Security Ordinance to call out the armed forces, maintaining the military’s prominent role in police functions. There was no independent authority to investigate complaints.

Few police officers serving in Tamil-majority areas were Tamil, and most did not speak Tamil or English, although the government began hiring and training ethnic Tamils in an effort to improve this situation. In January 320 Tamil men and 16 Tamil women were inducted into the police. In December government officials stated that there were more than 600 Tamils in the police force. The LLRC report acknowledged the recruiting of Tamil-speaking police officers, but noted with regret that its 2010 interim recommendation – that public offices have interpreters to facilitate communication until long term programs are put in place – had not been implemented. In its final report, the LLRC stated that government officers should possess language skills to serve in any part of the country and recommended that police stations have bi-lingual officers on duty on a 24-hour basis.

Widespread impunity persisted, particularly for cases of police torture, corruption, human rights abuses, and attacks on media institutions. For example, the government consistently failed to solve attacks on journalists, such as the 2009 killing of Sunday Leader editor Lasantha Wickrematunge, the January 2010 abduction of Prageeth Ekneligoda (see section 1.b.), and the July 29 attack on Uthayan news editor Gnanasundaram Kuhanathan (see section 2.a.). The failure of police to apprehend the assailants in such cases highlighted the high level of impunity in an environment in which law enforcement possessed widespread powers of detention and surveillance but failed to solve cases of attacks on those critical of the government. Evidence of serious violations of international humanitarian law and international human rights law in the final stages of the war continued to mount, but the government refused to acknowledge credible allegations that members of the armed forces were involved in such incidents.

The government did not conduct any further inquiries into the high-profile cases investigated by the 2006 Presidential Commission of Inquiry (COI), including the 2006 killing of 17 local staff of the French NGO Action Against Hunger (ACF) in Mutur. The COI was disbanded in 2009 without issuing a public report, and with reports that the commission had blamed ACF for allowing its workers to be in an unsafe location, at the same time exonerating all government security forces from any possible involvement in the killing of the aid workers.

A separate commission set up under retired Supreme Court justice Mahanama Tillekeratne to investigate abductions, disappearances, killings, and unidentified bodies was to submit a final report to the president early in 2010. Although the commission gave an interim report to President Rajapaksa in February 2010, and the commission’s mandate ended in March 2010, there was no indication that a final report was given to the president.

The government prosecuted a small number of security force personnel who allegedly committed human rights abuses, but it generally did not seek to identify the great majority of those responsible for such abuses or bring them to justice. Case law generally failed to uphold the doctrine of command responsibility for human rights abuses.

Arrest Procedures and Treatment While in Detention

Under the law authorities are required to inform an arrested person of the reason for arrest and bring that person before a magistrate within 24 hours, but in practice several days and sometimes weeks or months elapsed before detained persons appeared before a magistrate. A magistrate could authorize bail or continued pretrial detention for up to three months or longer. There were restrictions on bail for security detainees, as judges needed approval from the Attorney General’s Office to authorize bail for persons detained under the PTA. In practice judges normally did not grant bail in PTA-related cases. Police do not need an arrest warrant for certain offenses, such as murder, theft, robbery, and rape. In the case of murder, the magistrate is required to remand the suspect, and only the High Court can grant bail. In all cases suspects have the right to legal representation; however, there is no legal provision specifically protecting the right of a suspect to demand legal representation during interrogations in police stations and detention centers. There were credible reports that detainees often did not have a lawyer present at the time of interrogation. Counsel is provided for indigent defendants in criminal cases before the High Court and courts of appeal, but not in other cases.

Police could detain a person for a period of not more than one year under detention orders issued by a deputy inspector general of police or by the defense secretary. The defense secretary extended some detentions beyond one year under the PTA.

An unidentified inmate at Anuradhapura Prison told the media that he witnessed prison guards shooting at prisoners protesting prison conditions January 24. The guards killed one person and injured 24 others, according to hospital authorities.

Arbitrary Arrest: NGOs and individuals complained that the armed forces and their paramilitary allies detained suspected LTTE sympathizers and did not surrender them to the police, blurring the line between arrests and abductions.

Credible reports alleged that security forces and paramilitaries sometimes tortured and killed those arrested rather than follow legal safeguards, although this appeared to diminish after the end of the war.

Pretrial Detention: The judicial process moved slowly, and more than half of those in prison either were awaiting or undergoing trial. More than 1,000 prisoners awaiting trial had spent over two years in remand. Trial delays often were caused by lengthy legal procedures, large numbers of detainees, judicial inefficiency, and corruption. Legal advocacy groups asserted that it was common for the length of detention to equal or exceed the sentence for the alleged crime. On July 9, a group of prisoners detained for years without trial in Vavuniya Prison began a hunger strike, demanding that their cases be brought before a court.

Those under administrative detention did not enjoy the same rights as those awaiting trials. For example, lawyers were required to apply for permission from the TID to meet clients detained at the Boosa Detention Centre and were not able to meet detainees without police presence. Pretrial detainees did not have the right to legal counsel during questioning by the police.

Persons convicted and undergoing appeal did not receive credit towards their original sentence for time served in prison while the appeal continued. Appeals often took several years to resolve.

Amnesty: The president granted amnesty to a number of prisoners throughout the year, sometimes for national holidays or other occasions. For example, on February 4, the president granted amnesty to 1,669 inmates convicted of minor offenses.

e. Denial of Fair Public Trial

Following the September 2010 passage of the 18th amendment, executive influence over the judiciary significantly increased. The 18th Amendment repealed the 17th Amendment and eliminated the Constitutional Council, a multiparty body created to name members of independent judicial, police, human rights, and other commissions. In place of the Constitutional Council, the 18th Amendment established the Parliamentary Council, which submits nonbinding advice on appointments to the president, who has sole authority to make direct appointments to the commissions. The president also directly appoints judges to the Supreme Court, High Court, and courts of appeal.

There were trials during the year where the outcomes appeared predetermined. For example, on November 18, a Colombo High Court found former army commander and opposition presidential candidate Sarath Fonseka guilty of spreading the “white flag” rumor, which “could arouse communal feelings,” under the now lapsed Emergency Regulations and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment. There was widespread recognition that the trial was politically motivated (see Political Prisoners and Detainees section below for more information on the Fonseka case).

There was no procedure in place to address the legal status of former LTTE combatants held in rehabilitation centers. Lawyers who defended human rights cases sometimes were under physical and verbal threats.

Trial Procedures

Defendants are presumed innocent. In criminal cases juries try defendants in public. Defendants are informed of the charges and evidence against them, and they have the right to counsel and the right to appeal. There are no formal procedures for ensuring how quickly arrested persons may contact family or a lawyer; in practice they are allowed to make calls on their mobile phones to such persons. The government provides counsel for indigent persons tried on criminal charges in the High Court and the courts of appeal but not in cases before lower courts. Private legal aid organizations assisted some defendants. Juries were not used in cases brought under the PTA, but defendants in such cases had the right to appeal. Defendants had the right to confront witnesses against them, present witnesses and evidence, and access government-held evidence, such as police evidence.

Confessions obtained by coercive means, including torture, are inadmissible in criminal courts, except in PTA cases. Defendants bear the burden of proof, however, to show that their confessions were obtained by coercion.

The law requires court proceedings and other legislation to be available in English, Sinhala, and Tamil. In practice most courts outside of Jaffna and the northern parts of the country conducted business in English or Sinhala. A shortage of court-appointed interpreters restricted the ability of Tamil-speaking defendants to receive a fair hearing in many locations, but trials and hearings in the north were in Tamil and English. Few legal textbooks existed in Tamil.

Political Prisoners and Detainees

During the year the government detained and imprisoned a number of persons for political reasons. The government permitted access to such persons on a regular basis by international humanitarian organizations.

Most prominent among political prisoners was the main opposition candidate in the 2010 presidential election, former army commander Sarath Fonseka. The military detained Fonseka in February 2010, and he remained in detention. The accusations made against Fonseka after he initially was detained were vague, with suggestions by government officials that he had been plotting a coup. After more than a month, formal charges were brought under two courts-martial on corruption in military procurement and violating military regulations by engaging in politics as a serving military officer. Fonseka later was charged in civil court under the PTA for allegedly fomenting civil unrest by making statements in 2009 to the press about Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa’s alleged order that surrendering LTTE cadres be shot (the “white flag” incident). Fonseka denied making these claims.

In August 2010 the two courts-martial found Fonseka guilty of the corruption charges and of engaging in politics while in the military and sentenced him to 30 months in prison. He also was stripped of his rank and pension and his parliamentary seat; in addition, all references to Fonseka on military plaques, etc., were ordered expunged. On November 18, the Colombo High Court found Fonseka guilty of spreading the “white flag” rumor and sentenced him to three years’ imprisonment, to be served after the completion of the courts martial sentence. Fonseka’s appeal against the courts martial sentence was dismissed by the Court of Appeal December 16. The court found that Fonseka failed to prove his charges that the members of the second court martial were biased.

A number of human rights organizations accused Fonseka of being involved in a wide range of human rights abuses during the war, including extrajudicial killings, disappearances, and indiscriminate firing on civilians in the war zone. Nevertheless, many independent observers concluded that Fonseka was detained, prosecuted, and sentenced for political reasons, because of the initial lack of clarity in the allegations against him, the fact that no formal charges were brought against him for more than a month after his detention, the selective way in which laws ultimately were applied (some progovernment military officers spoke publicly in favor of the president during the campaign and were not charged or punished similarly), and the disproportionate nature of the sentences in the courts martial, which appeared to be designed to humiliate Fonseka.

Authorities arrested 22 other individuals involved with Fonseka’s campaign, most in connection with the allegations of a coup attempt. By November 2010, however, all 22 were released from detention with no charges pending, leaving only Fonseka in prison.

There were other cases in which persons were detained for what appeared to be simply their opposition to the government and its top leaders. For example, on May 26, military police arrested seven JVP members for putting up posters critical of the government.

Civil Judicial Procedures and Remedies

Citizens were allowed to file fundamental rights cases to seek redress of human rights violations. The judiciary exhibited some independence and impartiality in adjudicating these types of cases, and plaintiffs were awarded damages in a number of instances. Observers cited bureaucratic inefficiencies in this system, leading to delays in the resolution of many cases. Where damages were awarded, there were relatively few problems in enforcing the court orders.

Property Restitution

The military seized significant amounts of land during the war to create security buffer zones around military bases and other high-value targets, which the government called high security zones (HSZs). The declaration of HSZs displaced large numbers of persons, particularly in the Jaffna Peninsula, who did not receive restitution for their lands. A degree of progress was made in reducing the size of the HSZs during the year, with some lands being demilitarized. Many of those affected by the HSZs continued to complain, however, that the pace of these returns was too slow and that the government was holding back on the return of lands it might see as economically valuable. The government cited the need to conduct careful demining prior to the handover of these lands, but questions persisted about whether land cleared of mines was always returned immediately to its original owners. Although there was no legal framework for HSZs following the lapse of Emergency Regulations on August 31, they still existed and remained off-limits to civilians.

Residents of an area of Sampur Special Economic Zone, which partly overlapped with an HSZ, were denied access to 2,795 acres of land demarcated for a coal power project. On October 21, Economic Development Minister Basil Rajapaksa declared in parliament that residents would be allowed to resettle into the area once land acquisition for the project was complete. He added that the government would pay compensation for the lands to be acquired, although residents had not received compensation at year’s end.

On November 9, parliament passed the “Revival of Underperforming Enterprises and Underutilized Assets” bill, which empowered the government to take over the assets of 37 firms. The bill had been printed and presented to parliament one day earlier, on November 8, providing little time for debate in parliament or in public on the bill. Although most of the companies targeted were defunct, several were operating, including the profitable Sevenagala Sugar Industries owned by Daya Gamage, a prominent member of the opposition United National Party. In presenting the budget to parliament in November, President Rajapaksa identified 91,420 acres of tea plantation land the government was considering taking over under the Underutilized Assets law.

The LLRC report acknowledged that some HSZs had been reduced, but it noted that a large number of persons continued to be displaced. The LLRC recommended that all families who had lost lands and/or houses due to formal HSZs, or to other informal ad hoc security related needs, be given alternate land and/or compensation paid according to applicable laws.

f. Arbitrary Interference with Privacy, Family, Home, or Correspondence

The law provides for the right to privacy; however, the government infringed on these rights, particularly when conducting cordon and search operations in Tamil neighborhoods. Security forces conducted searches of property and engaged in wiretapping and surveillance of private citizens with little judicial oversight. Seizure of private lands by various actors remained a problem across the country.

Land ownership disputes between private individuals in former war zones also escalated during the year, as many former residents began returning to areas they had left many years before. Multiple displacements occurred in the northern and eastern areas over the many years of war, and land often changed hands several times. Documentation of land claims was difficult for a number of reasons. Many persons who had been displaced multiple times were not able to preserve original land deeds as they moved and some official government land records were damaged or destroyed during intense fighting between government and LTTE troops. On July 29, the Ministry of Land and Land Development issued a circular establishing a process to collect and adjudicate land claims in the north and east. NGO observers questioned the effectiveness of the framework proposed due to its lack of substantive criteria for how cases should be adjudicated, its complex claim form, and its reliance on decision-making bodies composed of government and military officials with no training and, at best, a limited background in land adjudication. The Court of Appeal suspended implementation of the circular November 9 for reconsideration, and it was scheduled to hear the case again in January 2012.

There were reports of government-aided resettlement of Sinhala families from the south into traditionally Tamil areas. For example, the military helped move 165 Sinhala families into the village of Kokkachchaankulam in Vavuniya, and these families were issued land permits. There also were reports that the government had taken measures to resettle Sinhala families on Tamil lands in Batticaloa District, including 170 families in Kevuilyamadu and 230 families in Kachchakkodi Chuvaamimalai. Tamil members of parliament raised concerns about such resettlements in parliament, alleging a process of “Sinhalization” had begun in the north and east.

On December 7, the government withdrew an amendment to the Town and Country Planning Ordinance that would have broadened the power of authorities to acquire private lands, including within municipal and urban areas, for economic, social, historical, environmental, and religious purposes. The amendment’s stated goal was to promote and regulate integrated planning and development for infrastructure. The government withdrew the bill following a Supreme Court determination that the legislation could not be enacted without the approval of provincial councils.

Section 2. Respect for Civil Liberties, Including:

a. Freedom of Speech and Press

Status of Freedom of Speech and Press

The law provides for freedom of speech, including for members of the press, but the government did not respect these rights in practice. Government officials criticized, pressured, harassed, and arrested members of the media, and most journalists practiced self-censorship.

The LLRC report stated that it was “deeply disturbed by persistent reports concerning attacks on journalists and media institutions and killing of journalists and the fact that these incidents remained to be conclusively investigated and perpetrators brought to justice…[a]ny failure to investigate and prosecute offenders would undermine the process of reconciliation and the [r]ule of [l]aw.” The LLRC recommended steps be taken to prevent harassment and attacks on media personnel and institutions and priority be given to investigate and prosecute those responsible for such incidents.

Freedom of Speech: The constitution protects the right to free speech. However, it is subject to a host of restrictions including public morality and national security. The government attempted to impede criticism through the year, including through harassment, intimidation, violence, and imprisonment. The government monitored political meetings, particularly in the north and east. There also were credible reports that civilian and military officials questioned local residents and groups who met with foreign diplomats regarding the content of their meetings.

Freedom of Press: The government owned one of the country’s largest newspaper chains, two major television stations, and a radio station. However, private owners operated a variety of independent newspapers, journals, and radio and television stations. The government imposed no political restrictions on the establishment of new media enterprises. However, the government restricted the construction of transmission towers in the north. It built a new tower in the Vanni but blocked private stations from building towers.

Violence and Harassment: National and international media freedom organizations and journalists’ associations expressed concern over restrictions on media freedom and were sharply critical of the government’s role in harassing and intimidating journalists.

Senior government officials repeatedly accused critical journalists of treason and often pressured editors and publishers to print stories that portrayed the government in a positive light. This pressure reportedly was exerted sometimes directly through threats and intimidation. For example, international media reported that President Rajapaksa personally telephoned the chairman of The Sunday Leader, Lal Wickrematunge, on July 19, about an article reporting that China had given money to the president and his son to be used “at their discretion.” Approximately 100 posters with the words “Do not lie!” and “The gods will punish you” appeared on the walls of the newspaper’s headquarters.

Although no journalist was reported killed or abducted during the year, frequent threats, harassment, and attacks on media personnel continued. Statements by government and military officials contributed to an environment in which journalists who published articles critical of the government felt under threat.

At an event in Katunayake on November 20, Public Relations and Public Affairs Minister Mervyn Silva stated that there were “lowly so-called journalists who insult important persons” and that they should book coffins for themselves.

In a September 1 telephone conversation, UPFA southern provincial council member Aruna Gunaratne threatened to kill Daily Mirror Matara correspondent Krishan Jeewaka Jayaruk if he published a story about Gunaratne. Jayaruk recorded the conversation and filed a complaint regarding the death threat with the Matara police.

On July 29, unidentified men attacked news editor Gnanasundaram Kuhanathan of the Jaffna-based Uthayan newspaper with iron rods. On August 15, police arrested two suspects, including one described as a “major underworld figure,” although some expressed doubts about the suspects. The case was filed in the Jaffna Magistrate’s Court, and at year’s end the Attorney General’s Office was considering filing charges against the suspects. Uthayan came under attack repeatedly in past years, and several of its journalists were killed.

On January 31, unknown perpetrators firebombed the premises of pro-opposition news Web site Lanka-e-news. While numerous observers implicated government agents in the attack, state media suggested that the staff of Lanka-e-news was responsible. Authorities arrested Lanka-e-news editor Bennet Rupasinghe and journalist Shantha Wijesooriya and subsequently released them in the following months, and a magistrate’s court suspended Lanka-e-news operations from April 28 to May 12 because of a contempt case pending against Wijesooriya.

There was no progress in the investigation of the July 2010 arson attack on the Siyatha television premises.

Censorship or Content Restrictions: Police, under the authority of the Ministry of Defense, reportedly maintained a special unit to monitor and control all references in the media to members of the Rajapaksa family. Official pressure reportedly was exerted sometimes through orders to government and private firms to cease advertising in critical newspapers. While media could operate freely, independent and opposition media practiced self-censorship. Media freedom suffered from severe government pressure throughout the island, and most journalists practiced self-censorship, particularly on the issues of accountability and criticism of government officials.

A popular Sinhala language political satire, And Company,which portrayed the government as a company, received threats early in the year. The producer and main actor were threatened by a group in a white van and subsequently removed the character Chinthana (representing President Rajapaksa) from the program.

Libel Laws/National Security: In 2009 the government officially reactivated the Press Council Act of 1973. This act, which includes power to impose punitive measures including fines and lengthy prison terms, proscribes the publishing of articles that discuss internal communications of the government, decisions of the cabinet, matters relating to the military that could affect national security, and details of economic policy that could lead to artificial shortages or speculative price increases.

Nongovernmental Impact: Progovernment paramilitary groups/gangs inhibited freedom of expression, particularly in the north. Members of the EPDP allegedly were involved in harassment and attacks on journalists, including the July 29 attack on Uthayan’s Kuhanathan.

Internet Freedom

The government restricted access to the Internet, including Web sites it deemed pornographic as well as Web sites it deemed critical of the government. There were suspicions that the government was behind the blocking of Internet access to several Tamil news Web sites, including the pro-LTTE TamilNet. On October 18, major Sri Lankan telecom companies Sri Lanka Telecoms and Mobitel blocked access to lankaenews.com, a sensationalist news Web site critical of the government. On June 20, the government temporarily blocked citizen journalism site groundviews.org; groundviews’ Sinhala partner site, vikalpa.org; Transparency International Sri Lanka’s Web site; and news aggregator infolanka.com. Some observers believed the one-day shutdown to be a warning to the sites. On November 5, the Ministry of Mass Media and Information announced that it requires all Web sites carrying Sri Lankan news to register. It based its action on “complaints” about material published by certain Web sites that were “injurious to the image of the country, the head of the state, ministers, senior public officials, and other important persons.” The ministry began blocking sites carrying news critical of the government. Of the five sites blocked, four remained blocked at year’s end.

Academic Freedom and Cultural Events

There were allegations that university officials, in many cases from the ranks of academia, prevented professors from criticizing government officials. Some academics noted that the environment of intimidation led to self-censorship. There also were concerns of military encroachment into universities. For example, on September 22, a group of academics issued a statement protesting a decision by the Higher Education Ministry to hand over the security of universities to Rakna Arakshaka Lanka Ltd, a government-owned commercial security venture established under the Ministry of Defense and under the direct supervision of the defense secretary. Observers also expressed concerns regarding a mandatory week-long leadership training program held in army camps around the country for students who qualified to enter universities. The training program began May 23 and was conducted by the military under the supervision of university authorities. On June 3, the Supreme Court rejected without trial five petitions that requested the annulment of the leadership training program.

On October 16, in Jaffna an unidentified group assaulted Jaffna University Students’ Association leader Subramaniyam Thavapalasingham with iron rods. The attackers reportedly asked him whether he wanted a separate state. Another student, Rajavarothayan Kavirajan, who had protested against the assault of Thavapalasingham, was allegedly attacked by a military intelligence unit in Kilinochchi October 24. He was seriously injured and admitted to the Intensive Care Unit of the Jaffna Teaching Hospital. At year’s end the investigation into the attack had identified no suspects.

b. Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and Association

Freedom of Assembly

The law provides for freedom of assembly, but the government did not respect this right in practice, and some restrictions existed. The government required that army representatives be present at public assemblies in the north. There were a number of cases in which security forces restricted participation in demonstrations. On December 10, police detained a group of 42 human rights defenders and political activists from the south in Jaffna and prevented them from attending a protest to mark International Human Rights Day. Police reportedly responded with excessive force to violent protests in Dambulla and Bandarawela following a December 12 government regulation to make plastic crates compulsory when transporting vegetables and fruits.

On August 22, police arrested 102 protesters demonstrating against a series of attacks on women by “grease devils,” elusive figures who reportedly greased themselves to avoid capture and, for several months during the year, assaulted and robbed victims, predominantly in the north and east. Police assaulted many of those arrested following an attack on an army detachment in which two military vehicles were damaged. Army officials dropped the charges against those arrested. On September 27, the Supreme Court supported a fundamental rights case filed by petitioners who were arrested during these reprisals. The hearing date was scheduled for February 2012.

There were informal barriers to assembly on a number of occasions. For example, on June 23, a large military contingent obstructed a demonstration in Kilinochchi in support of missing persons.

In the weeks leading up to the July 23 local council elections, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) filed four complaints with the election commissioner against security personnel who threatened candidates and detained persons to prevent them from attending election meetings. On June 16, approximately 50 army personnel assaulted TNA MPs and their supporters at the first local government election campaign meeting held by the TNA near Jaffna. While the military commander in Jaffna initially expressed regret over the incident, an official inquiry claimed that the incident was the result of a clash between the army and the ministerial security division personnel protecting the TNA MPs. The government did not take further action on the case by year’s end.

Freedom of Association

The law provides for freedom of association, but the government did not always respect this right in practice. Some restrictions existed, such as those under the Emergency Regulations before their lapse. The government often used informants to target individuals for arrests and interrogation based on their association.

c. Freedom of Religion

See the Department of State’s International Religious Freedom Report at www.state.gov/j/drl/irf/rpt.

d. Freedom of Movement, Internally Displaced Persons, Protection of Refugees, and Stateless Persons

The law grants every citizen “freedom of movement and of choosing his residence” and “freedom to return to the country.” In practice, however, the government restricted this right on multiple occasions.

The government generally cooperated with the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations; however, it restricted access to the north by NGOs and some international organizations, requiring them to obtain authorization for projects and access from the Presidential Task Force. While the UN and its organizations were given fairly effective access, other international NGOs had difficulty operating projects they saw as needed. There were reports in November that the military was asking for project reports from humanitarian agencies in Kilinochchi and Batticaloa, despite an earlier agreement that the agencies would interface only with the civilian administration.

In-country Movement: The government restricted in-country movement through widespread police and military checkpoints in the north and east, which made it difficult for many to travel even short distances, particularly at night. The number of such checkpoints in Jaffna, however, appeared to decline during the year. The number of temporary checkpoints, as well as formal, stationary checkpoints, in Colombo also appeared to decline from the previous year.

On July 13, the government lifted the requirement for foreign passport holders to obtain Ministry of Defense clearance for travel to the north. The government continued security checks on movements in all directions north of a key junction near Medawachiya, although there were fewer than during and immediately after the war.

Limited access continued near military bases and the HSZs where civilians could not enter. The HSZs extended in an approximately 2.5-mile radius from the fences of most military camps and restricted access to those trying to earn their livelihood, unfairly affecting Tamil agricultural lands, particularly in the Northern Province.

Exile: The government did not expel citizens from one part of the country to another, nor did it forcibly exile any citizens abroad, but it allowed citizens to leave the country under self-exile unless they were accused of breaking the law. More than a dozen journalists, having received physical threats, were in self-exile due to safety fears.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

The country had a significant population of IDPs. Almost all IDPs were ethnically Tamil, although approximately 80,000 of the total displaced population were Tamil-speaking Muslims displaced by the LTTE in 1990. The government made steady progress by year’s end in resettling all but approximately 7,000 of the 288,000 IDPs who were displaced in the last year of the conflict. Many in this group of IDPs were from areas in the Mullaitivu District, which remained heavily mined due to intense conflict during the final stages of the war and were unlikely to be opened to returnees for years.

In addition to this group of newer IDPs, there were an estimated 157,000 displaced Tamils displaced prior to the last major offensive by the military in 2008. It was unclear at year’s end how or when they might return to their places of origin, or whether some would prefer to settle permanently at their current location after being displaced for many years. Some returns of pre-2008 IDPs occurred throughout the year.

Among the long-term displaced were approximately 73,000 Muslims evicted from Jaffna, Kilinochchi, Mullaitivu, Mannar, and Vavuniya in 1990 by the LTTE, many of whom spent nearly 20 years in IDP camps in and around Puttalam. Many of these IDPs wanted to stay in Puttalam, where they had spent much of their lives and which was more developed and nearer to Colombo than their families’ districts of origin. A significant number of Muslim IDPs who had returned to Mannar reportedly had gone back to Puttalam after a short period.

While all IDPs had full freedom of movement, some who were able to return to their home districts were nevertheless unable to move back onto their own property due to uncleared land mines, restrictions that designated their home areas as HSZs, lack of documents to verify land ownership, and other war-related destruction. Living conditions for these persons were often difficult.

On November 24, approximately 230 IDPs were moved from Menik Farm, where the remaining 7,000 persons displaced in the last year of the war were camped, to a newly constructed transit camp in Kompavil, nearer to their original homes. The resettlement was part of a plan announced by the government August 3 to close Menik Farm and relocate IDPs living there to Kompavil. It remained unclear at year’s end whether IDPs resettled in Kompavil would be allowed to return to their areas of origin after demining was completed or whether they would permanently be relocated to Kompavil. Observers and international donors expressed concern that the resettlement disregarded protocols regarding internal displacement. Specifically, the plan might force IDPs to move, and the government did not inform IDPs of their options or give them a choice of destination.

Coordination between the army, local government agents, and humanitarian agencies on resettling IDPs improved compared to the prior two years. Improvements largely stemmed from decreased numbers coming out of IDP camps and improved cooperation on the ground between the army, UNHCR, and Government Agent Office functionaries charged with registration of IDPs returning to their areas of origin.

Protection of Refugees

Access to Asylum: The country’s laws do not provide for the granting of asylum or refugee status, and the government does not have a system for providing protection to refugees. In practice the government provided protection against the expulsion or return of refugees to countries where their lives or freedom would be threatened on account of their race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.

Stateless Persons

According to the UNHCR, the country does not have habitual residents who are legally or de facto stateless. Citizenship is obtained by birth within the territory of the country and from a child’s parents if born to citizen parents overseas.

The 2003 Grant of Citizenship to Persons of Indian Origin Act recognized the nationality of previously stateless persons, particularly hill-country Tamils. The government passed laws in 2009 to grant citizenship to hill-country Tamils living among other Sri Lankan ethnic Tamils in refugee camps in India’s Tamil Nadu, but progress on finding and registering these persons and granting them citizenship was slow. By December 2010 approximately 20,000 hill-country Tamils in the country lacked identity cards and citizenship documents, compared with 30,000 at the beginning of 2009 and 70,000 in 2008. Those lacking identity cards were at higher risk of arbitrary arrest and detention, but there were no reports of such incidents during the year.

Section 3. Respect for Political Rights: The Right of Citizens to Change Their Government

The law provides citizens the right to change their government peacefully, and citizens exercised this right in practice through periodic elections held on the basis of universal suffrage.

Elections and Political Participation

Recent Elections: The president, who was reelected in January 2010 for a second six-year term, holds executive power, while the 225-member parliament, elected in April 2010, exercises legislative power. The government is dominated by the president’s family; two of the president’s brothers hold key executive branch posts, as defense secretary and minister of economic development, while a third brother is the speaker of parliament. A large number of other relatives, including the president’s son, also serve in important political or diplomatic positions. Independent observers generally characterized the 2010 presidential and parliamentary elections as problematic. Both elections were fraught with violations of the election law by all major parties and were influenced by the governing coalition’s massive use of state resources. Elections had not been held for the Northern Provincial Council since the Northern Province was separated from the Eastern Province in January 2007, and the Northern Province remained centrally governed at the end of the year. The president stated that the elections would be held in 2012.

The government held staggered local council elections during the year, which independent observers characterized as fraught with election law violations by all major parties and during which the governing coalition used state resources to sway the voters.

Political Parties: Political parties largely were free to operate, organize, stand for elections, seek votes, and name candidates as they wished. Trusted ruling party stalwarts allegedly received favoritism for high-ranking government and business positions (see section 4).

On October 8, during local council elections, a convoy of ruling Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) MP Duminda Silva clashed with a convoy of Baratha Lakshman Premachandra, a former SLFP MP and presidential adviser on trade union affairs. Four persons, including Premachandra, were killed by gunfire, while Silva was seriously injured and hospitalized. Several suspects were arrested in relation to the incident, including two who fled to India. The CID, which investigated the case, refused to list Silva, a protege of Defense Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, as a suspect in the murder case. On November 1, Silva left for Singapore for medical treatment without any hindrance from the law enforcement authorities or a court order authorizing his transfer. On November 16, a Colombo magistrate’s court ordered the CID to arrest Silva and produce him in court. He remained abroad at the end of the year.

Participation of Women and Minorities: There were no laws that prevented women or minorities from participating in political life on the same basis as men or nonminority citizens. Some cultural and social barriers to women participation included the gun culture in politics and financial constraints. There was no provision for, or allocation of, a set number or percentage of political party positions for women or minorities.

Section 4. Official Corruption and Government Transparency

The law provides criminal penalties for official corruption; however, the government did not implement the law effectively, and officials in all three branches of the government frequently engaged in corrupt practices with impunity.

The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption was recommissioned in May following the expiration of the terms of the commissioners in March 2010. The commission does not have powers to initiate corruption investigations and must await a formal complaint before investigating reports of corruption, which members of the public were reluctant to put forward because of a lack of whistleblower protections. The commission has yielded only five prosecutions (three acquittals and two convictions). No high-ranking official or politician has ever been prosecuted for corruption or abuse of power while serving in office.

Corruption and general mismanagement were common in many state institutions and state-owned companies. Nepotism and cronyism continued to be a concern, and trusted ruling-party stalwarts allegedly received favoritism for high-ranking government and business positions. Corruption watchdogs claimed that corruption reached the highest levels of government. For example, a July 17 news article alleged that China gave the president $9 million as a grant in March to use “at his discretion.” According to the article, China also made a substantial payment in June 2010 to the president’s son, Namal Rajapaksa.

Senior officials served as corporate officers of several quasi-public corporations, including Lanka Logistics and Technologies, which the government established in 2007 and designated as the sole procurement agency for all military equipment. Critics alleged that large kickbacks were paid during the awarding of certain defense contracts.

Although MPs are asked to complete financial disclosure reports upon their election, there was no follow-up to ensure compliance, and little or no reporting ultimately was done.

There is no law providing for public access to government information. An opposition-proposed Right to Information bill was defeated June 21 by the government majority in parliament. The government and its supporters explained defeat of the bill as defense of national security, but many opposition politicians and commentators argued the government did not want to expose corruption.

Section 5. Governmental Attitude Regarding International and Nongovernmental Investigation of Alleged Violations of Human Rights

A number of domestic and international human rights groups continued to investigate and publish their findings on human rights cases, despite government restrictions and physical threats to their work. The government often criticized local NGOs critical of government actions, failed to respond to requests for assistance, and put pressure on those that sought such assistance. The NGO Secretariat was moved from the Social Services Ministry to the Ministry of Defense in June 2010 and remained under the Ministry of Defense at the end of the year. Several NGOs noted a lack of clarity in Ministry of Defense procedures and enforcement of regulations.

The government remained apprehensive of NGO activities in certain areas of advocacy. It particularly scrutinized organizations critical of the government on issues such as governance, transparency, and human rights.

NGOs that proposed undertaking projects in northern and eastern areas to address such matters as psychosocial counseling, good governance training for local citizens, and legal aid often had difficulty obtaining government work permits. Government officials sometimes made generic criticisms of local NGOs that accepted funding from international sources.

International personnel of NGOs often had trouble getting visa renewals to continue working in the country. For example, the Non-Violent Peace Force, an NGO with international and domestic staff, which provided protection to civil society activists and others under threat, was forced to close down operations December 31 after the government systematically refused visas to the international staff.

UN and Other International Bodies: The government continued to refuse the request by the UN’s Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights for an expanded mission and an independent presence in the country.

In June 2010 UN Secretary General (SYG) Ban Ki-moon appointed a three-member panel of experts to advise him on “the implementation of the commitment on human rights accountability” made in the joint statement issued by President Rajapaksa and the SYG during the latter’s visit in May 2009. According to the UN, the panel was to look into the “modalities, applicable international standards, and comparative experience with regard to accountability processes,” taking into account the nature and scope of any alleged violations. The panel was to complete its work in four months, but the SYG extended the mandate until March 3. Although the panel of experts intended to visit the country and meet with the LLRC and other officials with accountability roles, the UN and the government were unable to come to agreement on the modalities of the visit.

The report, which the panel of experts provided to the SYG on April 12, and through him to the government, stated that there were credible allegations of serious human rights violations by the government, including large-scale shelling of “No Fire Zones,” systematic shelling of hospitals and other civilian targets, and summary execution, rape, and torture of those in the conflict zone. The report also highlighted a number of credible allegations against the LTTE, including using civilians as a strategic buffer, forced labor (including children), and summary executions of civilians attempting to flee the conflict zone. Including victims on both sides, the report estimated that there could have been as many as 40,000 civilian deaths. The report also describes the government’s LLRC as “a potentially useful opportunity to begin a national dialogue on Sri Lanka’s conflict” but as “deeply flawed” and not meeting international standards for an effective accountability mechanism. The LLRC Report had not been published during the course of the panel’s work.

The panel of experts’ report recommended, among other steps, that the government immediately begin genuine investigations into alleged violations of international law committed by both sides in the conflict, and that the government issue a public, formal acknowledgment of its role in and responsibility for extensive civilian casualties during the final stages of the war. The report also recommended that the SYG immediately establish an independent mechanism to monitor and assess the extent to which the government was carrying out an effective domestic accountability process, as well as independently to investigate credible allegations, and to collect and safeguard information relevant to accountability for the final stages of the war.

On April 25, the UN made public the panel of experts’ report and urged the government to respond constructively to its recommendations, which included the establishment of an international investigation mechanism. The government had opposed strongly an international investigatory commission and did not respond formally to the report; officials strongly criticized the report’s findings.

The ICRC closed its Jaffna offices in February and its Vavuniya offices in March at the request of the government. The government denied the ICRC access to former LTTE combatants held in rehabilitation centers (see section 1.d.), and the ICRC was unable to fulfill its protection mandate. It was nonetheless able to conduct a number of its functions, including prison visits and other monitoring from Colombo.

Government Human Rights Bodies: The Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka (HRCSL) held its first session as constituted under the 18th Amendment on February 22. It has jurisdiction to inquire into human rights violations. If an allegation were established, the HRCSL could make a recommendation for financial compensation to the victim and/or refer the case for disciplinary action or to the attorney general for prosecution. If an HRCSL order were not followed, a summons could be sent to both parties for explanation. If the parties continued in noncompliance, the HRCSL could report the case to the Supreme Court as a matter of contempt, a punishable offense. The Investigation and Inquiry division of the HRCSL recorded 3,116 complaints by the end of September, 664 of which did not fall within the mandate of the commission.

By statute the HRCSL has wide powers and resources and may not be called as a witness in any court of law or be sued for matters relating to its official duties. However, in practice the HRCSL rarely used its powers, and there were reports of a large backlog of cases with virtually no action by the commission during the year. In its concluding recommendations, the CAT noted its concerns “about the difficulties the HRCSL has had in carrying out its function owing in part to the lack of cooperation from other State party institutions, limited human and financial resources, which has reduced its ability to investigate specific incidents and make recommendations for redress, and failure to publish the reports of its investigations.” Rather than taking an investigative approach to determining the facts and details of human rights cases, the HRCSL took a more tribunal-like approach, weighing only the evidence brought to it in deciding whether to pursue a case. Observers expressed concerns with the HRCSL’s lack of independence and transparency, particularly with the passage of the 18th Amendment, which granted greater power to the president to oversee HRCSL appointments. In 2007 the International Coordinating Committee of National Human Rights Institutions downgraded the HRCSL to observer status, citing government interference in its work. The committee upheld its decision in a 2009 review, asserting that the HRCSL was not in compliance with the Paris Principles relating to National Human Rights Institutions.

In May 2010 the government established the LLRC, a presidential commission mandated to inquire into the breakdown of the cease-fire with the LTTE and report on lessons learned. An eight-member panel of commissioners, including one Tamil and one Muslim, was appointed to collect information and take testimony and present a report to the president. International observers criticized the country’s lack of witness protection, the limited scope of the LLRC--which did not have an explicit mandate to investigate alleged war crimes--and the alleged bias of its chairman, C.R. de Silva, who they believed was responsible in part for the failure of a previous commission of inquiry. The UN panel of experts’ report described the LLRC as “a potentially useful opportunity” to begin a national dialogue on the country’s conflict but added that it was “deeply flawed” and did not meet international standards for an effective accountability mechanism. Following two six-month mandate extensions, the LLRC handed its report to the president November 20.

On December 16, the LLRC report was tabled in parliament and posted on a government Web site. The government did not make the report available in Sinhala or Tamil in its entirety. The report made observations and recommendations for government action on issues related to the breakdown of the ceasefire agreement, security forces operations during the final stages of the war, international humanitarian law, human rights, land, restitution, and reconciliation. It acknowledged important grievances that contributed to the war, and many international and civil society groups found the report made important recommendations for government action to address serious political, cultural, social, and human rights concerns in the country. Some such recommendations included calling on the government to: phase out security forces from civilian affairs and activities; delink the police department from institution dealing with the armed forces; investigate and hold accountable those responsible for abductions, disappearances, and attacks on journalists; implement recommendations of past domestic commissions of inquiry; disarm and prosecute illegally armed groups; provide better access to detainees; ensure the right of information; implement the official trilingual policy; depoliticize the process to collect and adjudicate land claims; devolve power to local government institutions; and enact legislation to criminalize enforced or involuntary disappearances.

Many international and national observers stated that the LLRC did not adequately address accountability for alleged war crimes committed by the government and the LTTE during the final months of the conflict. The LLRC report acknowledged that hospitals were shelled and that there were considerable civilian casualties during the final stage of the conflict and recommended investigations into “possible implications of the security forces” in specific instances of civilian death or injury. Prominent international NGOs, however, stated that the LLRC report exonerated the government of any wrongdoing. They noted that the report found no systematic government wrongdoing on issues such as the “white flag” incident of the alleged killing of surrendering LTTE fighters, extensive shelling of No Fire Zones, systematic shelling of hospitals, and the withholding of humanitarian supplies from civilians entrapped by the LTTE. The report also limited its analysis of the Channel 4’s “Sri Lanka’s Killing Fields,” which contains video footage of purported Sri Lankan soldiers executing bound prisoners and making lewd comments while mishandling partially clothed female bodies, to a technical discussion of the video’s authenticity (see section 1.a.).

The cabinet approved the National Action Plan for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights (NAPHR) on December 14. The five-year plan was developed per the government’s May 2008 pledge under the Universal Periodic Review to draft a human rights action plan. The NAPHR presents recommendations in eight areas: civil and political rights; economic, social, and cultural rights; prevention of torture; rights of women; labor rights; rights of migrant workers; rights of children; and rights of IDPs. It also provides timelines and assigns stakeholder ministries to implement the recommendations. The plan presents a number of specific and practical recommendations, including legislation ensuring the right to information, punitive measures against officers found by the HRCSL to be guilty of torture, and a substantive criminal offense on disappearances. Civil society activists criticized its recommendations and timelines as unrealistic for not taking into account financial or resource constraints and said many of their contributions were excluded from the final version of the plan.

Section 6. Discrimination, Societal Abuses, and Trafficking in Persons

The law prohibits discrimination based on race, gender, disability, language, or social status, and the government generally respected these rights in practice; however, there were instances where gender and ethnic-based discrimination occurred.

Women

Rape and Domestic Violence: The law prohibits rape and domestic violence, but it was not enforced effectively. Sexual assault, rape, and spousal abuse were pervasive societal problems. The law specifically addresses sexual abuse and exploitation, and it contains provisions in rape cases for an equitable burden of proof and stringent punishments. Marital rape is considered an offense only in cases of spouses legally separated. Domestic violence was thought to be widespread, although discussion of the problem was not common.

While in theory the law could address some of the problems of sexual assault, many women’s organizations believed that greater sensitization of police and the judiciary was necessary to see progress in combating these crimes. The Bureau for the Prevention of Abuse of Women & Children (BPWC) within the police conducted awareness programs in schools and at the grassroots level, prompting women to file complaints. The police also established women’s bureaus in police stations throughout the year. The BPWC held awareness programs for males in state and private organizations and awareness programs targeted at passenger transport personnel.

According to the police, 1,636 incidents of rape were reported during the first 11 months of the year, but reported incidences were unreliable indicators of the degree of this problem, as most victims were unwilling to file reports. Police officials reported an increase in statutory rape cases compared with previous years, and girls between the ages of 13-16 were particularly vulnerable. There were rape cases where victims dropped charges due to pressures on them or their families. For example, the Colombo High Court discharged UPFA MP Duminda Silva from rape charges March 24 after the victim’s attorney told the court that the victim was suffering from depression because of the incident and did not want to take part in further legal proceedings.

Services to assist victims of rape and domestic violence, such as crisis centers, legal aid, and counseling, were generally scarce due to a lack of funding.

Sexual Harassment: Sexual harassment is a criminal offense carrying a maximum sentence of five years in prison. Some observers acknowledged sexual harassment to be widespread. As with domestic violence, discussion of the problem was not common.

Human rights groups in northern districts alleged that widows of men who were killed as a result of the conflict often became victims of prostitution because of their economic vulnerability.

Sex Tourism: During the year the National Child Protection Authority (NCPA) issued a warning of an increase in child sexual exploitation due to the rapid growth of tourist arrivals. The government’s tourist police and NCPA conducted island-wide awareness programs focusing on children, travel guides, and the coastal community close to tourist destinations. There were limited reports of child sex tourism in isolated areas during the year.

Reproductive Rights: Couples and individuals were free to decide the number, spacing, and timing of their children. An estimated 40 percent of the population used modern contraceptives, and skilled attendance during childbirth was estimated at approximately 97 percent of births. According to 2008 UN estimates, the maternal mortality rate in the country was 39 deaths per 100,000 live births. Women appeared to be equally diagnosed and treated for sexually transmitted infections.

Discrimination: The law provides for equal employment opportunity in the public sector. In practice women had no legal protection against discrimination in the private sector, where they sometimes were paid less than men for equal work and experienced difficulty in rising to supervisory positions. Although women constituted approximately half of the formal workforce, according to the Asian Development Bank, the quality of employment available to women was less than that available to men. The demand for female labor was mainly for casual and low-paid, low-skill jobs.

Women had equal rights under civil and criminal law. However, adjudication according to the customary law of each ethnic or religious group of questions related to family law, including divorce, child custody, and inheritance, resulted in de facto discrimination. The government drafted a National Action Plan for Women designed to address women’s rights that was under review at the end of the year and was expected to be approved in 2012.

Children

Birth Registration: Citizenship is obtained by birth within the territory of the country and from a child’s parents if born to citizen parents overseas. Births were registered immediately, and failure to register resulted in denial of some public services, such as education.

Child Abuse: Under the law the definition of child abuse includes all acts of sexual violence against, trafficking in, and cruelty to children. The law also prohibits the use of children in exploitative labor or illegal activities, or in any way contrary to compulsory education regulations. It also defines child abuse to include the involvement of children in war. The BPWC conducted investigations into crimes against children and women. The penalties for sexual assault of children range from five to 20 years’ imprisonment and an unspecified fine.

NGOs attributed the problem of exploitation of children to the lack of enforcement, rather than inadequate legislation. The NCPA received more than 7,000 reports of child abuse in the first 10 months of the year. Most of the complaints were reported on the NCPA’s national telephone hotline to report child abuse and included children being sexually abused or molested by their parents, guardians, or people known to the victims.

Sexual Exploitation of Children: The government advocated greater international cooperation to bring those guilty of sexual exploitation of children to justice. Although the government did not keep records of particular types of violations, the law prohibits sexual violations against children, defined as persons less than age 18, particularly in regard to child pornography, child prostitution, and the trafficking of children. Penalties for violations related to pornography and prostitution range from two to five years’ imprisonment.

The NCPA estimated in 2009 that approximately 1,000 children were subjected to commercial sexual exploitation, although some NGOs believed the actual number was higher. There was little solid data to elucidate these reports, and the problem of child sexual tourism was much less prevalent than approximately 10 years ago, although there were regular reports of underage girls involved in prostitution. The Department of Probation and Child Care Services provided protection to child victims of abuse and sexual exploitation and worked with local NGOs that provided shelter. The NCPA ran an undercover operation in the southern coastal region to identify sexual tourism perpetrators and victims. As a preventive measure, the NCPA also implemented an awareness program conducted at all schools.

Displaced Children: Children in the IDP camps and resettled areas were exposed to the same difficult conditions as adult IDPs and returnees in these areas. Many school facilities were in poor condition and lacked basic supplies. Medical care in these areas was limited, but improvements continued throughout the year.

International Child Abductions: The country is a party to the 1980 Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction.

Anti-Semitism

The Jewish population remained very small, and there were no reports of anti-Semitic acts.

Trafficking in Persons

See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip.

Persons with Disabilities

The law forbids discrimination against any person with physical, sensory, intellectual, or mental disabilities; however, in practice discrimination occurred in employment, education, and provision of state services. On April 27, the Supreme Court reinforced a 2009 directive that steps be taken to provide easy access for persons with disabilities to public buildings, but there was little progress by year’s end. There were regulations on accessibility, but in practice accommodation for access to buildings for persons with disabilities was rare. On May 11, the government appointed a consultant on accessibility in health sector buildings to implement these regulations more effectively.

The government took steps to support participation by persons with disabilities in civic affairs. For example, on July 10, the Election Department announced a provision for a disabled person to be accompanied by another when voting in elections.

Persons with disabilities faced difficulties due to negative attitudes and societal discrimination. In some rural areas the belief of many residents that physical and mental disabilities were contagious led to long-term isolation of such persons, who in some cases rarely or never left their homes.

National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities

Both local and Indian-origin Tamils maintained that they suffered long-standing, systematic discrimination in university education, government employment, and other matters controlled by the government. On February 22, TNA parliamentarians filed a fundamental rights violation petition complaining of purported forced registration of residents in the predominantly Tamil Jaffna and Kilinochchi districts. On March 3, the Supreme Court terminated the proceedings after the attorney general informed the court that the army would stop the registrations. Nevertheless, reports continued throughout the year of army registrations in the north. Tamils throughout the country, but especially in the north and east, reported frequent harassment of young and middle-age Tamil men by security forces and paramilitary groups.

Indigenous People

The country’s indigenous people, known as Veddas, by some estimates numbered fewer than 1,000. Some preferred to maintain their traditional way of life and were nominally protected by the law. There were no legal restrictions on their participation in political or economic life. However, the lack of legal documents was a problem for many. Vedda communities complained that they were pushed off their lands by the creation of protected forest areas, which deprived them of traditional livelihoods. Government officials announced plans in August to build approximately 500 houses for Veddas according to the specifications of their community to protect their identity and culture, and construction was in progress at year’s end.

Societal Abuses, Discrimination, and Acts of Violence Based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity

The law criminalizes homosexual activity, but it was not enforced. Some NGOs working on LGBT problems did not register with the government. The CID visited a gay-rights organization called Companions of a Journey October 10 and 12 and reportedly searched its offices, questioned the staff present, and took some information of clients. Police reportedly assaulted, harassed, and extorted money or sexual favors from LGBT persons (see section 1.c.).

There were LGBT organizations, and several events were held throughout the year, including an LGBT pride festival week in July. In addition to pressure, harassment, and assaults by police, there remained significant societal pressure against members and organizations of the LGBT community. There were no legal safeguards to prevent discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity. There were reports that persons undergoing gender reassignment procedures had difficulty in amending government documents to reflect those changes.

Other Societal Violence or Discrimination

There was no official discrimination against those who provided HIV prevention services or against high-risk groups likely to spread HIV/AIDS, although there were reports of societal discrimination against these groups.

Section 7. Worker Rights

a. Freedom of Association and the Right to Collective Bargaining

The law allows workers to form and join unions of their choice without previous authorization, with the exception of members of the armed forces, police officers, judicial officers, and prison officers, who may not unionize. The law provides for the right to conduct legal strikes for workers in nonessential services and for the right to collective bargaining, except for workers in public service unions. Seven workers may form a union, adopt a charter, elect leaders, and publicize their views; however, a union must represent 40 percent of workers at a given enterprise before the employer legally is obligated to bargain with it. By law public sector unions are not allowed to form federations or represent workers from more than one branch or department of government, although the law generally was not enforced.

The law provides all workers, other than police, armed forces, prison service, and those in essential services, with the right to strike. The president has broad discretion to declare sectors “essential,” which may include “any service which is of public utility or is essential for national security or for the preservation of public order or to the life of the community and includes any Department of the Government or branch thereof.” The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) stated that in the past the government misused its power to declare an industry “of public utility” to make strikes illegal. No sectors or services were declared essential services during the year. The law prohibits retribution against strikers in nonessential sectors.

All collective bargaining agreements must be registered with the Ministry of Labor. Collective agreements generally lasted for three years.

Antiunion discrimination was prohibited by law and violations could results in a fine of 20,000 rupees ($176). On September 6, parliament passed a regulation to increase the fine to 100,000 rupees ($878). Employers found guilty of antiunion discrimination are required by law to reinstate workers fired for union activities but could transfer them to different locations. Domestic workers in third-party homes and informal sector workers were not covered by the country’s labor laws. While the law allows unions to conduct their activities without interference, in practice the government enforced the law unevenly. The Labor Ministry worked to improve the process for union registration during the year, although administrative delays continued.

Freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining were often, but not always, respected in practice. Numerous unions were active in the country, although it was difficult for some to organize in private factories. Unions represented workers in large private firms, but workers in small-scale agriculture and small businesses usually did not belong to unions. The Employers’ Federation of Ceylon, the apex employers association in Sri Lanka, assisted its member companies in negotiating with unions and signing collective bargaining agreements. Approximately one quarter of the more than 525 members of the Employers’ Federation of Ceylon were unionized. Some of them (including a number of foreign-owned firms) were bound by collective agreements or had signed memorandums of understanding with trade unions. Most public sector employees belonged to unions. In practice the right of association was impeded by the management of individual factories.

Union activists and officials remained subject to harassment, intimidation, and other retaliatory practices. There were reports that employers arbitrarily transferred union members, and there were numerous reports of unfair dismissals of union members.

While some unions in the public sector were politically independent, most large unions were affiliated with political parties and played a prominent role in the political process. The Labor Ministry was authorized to cancel a union’s registration if the union failed to submit an annual report for three years.

Only the Labor Ministry has standing to pursue an unfair labor practice case, including for antiunion discrimination. Since 1999 the ministry has filed three cases against companies for unfair labor practices under the Industrial Disputes Act. The courts dismissed one case due to insufficient evidence, one case was unsuccessful, and the last continued at year’s end. Citing routine government inaction on alleged violations of labor rights, some unions continued to press for standing to sue, while others did not want that ability, citing the cost of filing cases. Workers brought some labor violations to court under various other labor laws, such as the Wages Board or Employees Provident Fund Acts. Several employers were under investigation under these statutes.

Unions alleged that employers often indefinitely delayed recognition of unions for collective bargaining. The ITUC and the International Labor Organization (ILO) reported that employers used these delays to postpone or prevent the formation of a union, decrease support for unionization, and identify, terminate, and sometimes assault or threaten union activists. To address these concerns, the ministry issued a circular March 1 that requires labor commissioners to hold union certification elections within 30 working days if there is no objection and within 45 working days if there is an objection. No union elections were held under the new labor circular by year’s end.

b. Prohibition of Forced or Compulsory Labor

The law prohibited all forms of forced or compulsory labor and the government effectively enforced such laws. There were reports that in practice children were subjected to debt bondage in dry-zone farming areas, on plantations, and to a lesser extent in the fireworks and fish-drying industries. Debt bondage reportedly occurred in the agriculture, mining, and rope-making sectors. In many of those cases, parents incurred a debt and then sent their children to work in order to repay the loan (see section 7.c.). Situations similar to forced labor occurred in the employment of children ages 14 to 18 and women working as domestic workers in some third-party homes as they worked as live-in workers, and there are no specific regulations governing their employment, wages, or work hours. Labor ministry inspections do not extend to domestic workers.

Also see the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip.

c. Prohibition of Child Labor and Minimum Age for Employment

The minimum age for employment is 14, although the law permits the employment of younger children by their parents or guardians in limited family agriculture work or technical training. In March the government issued regulations prohibiting the employment of persons under the age of 18 in 51 types of work considered to be hazardous. The law limits the work hours of 14- and 15-year-olds to nine hours per day, and those of 16- and 17-year-olds to 10 hours per day. The government published a plan in June 2010 for the elimination of the worst forms of child labor by 2016. This plan was developed with assistance from workers’ representatives, the ILO, and UNICEF. The Labor Ministry made some progress on the plan during the year. For example, it held a training program for labor officials and three programs for law enforcement officers. The ministry also held an awareness raising program for social partners in five districts.

The NCPA was the central agency for coordinating and monitoring the protection of children, with the specific mandate to enforce laws on all forms of child abuse. The Ministry of Labor has the specific mandate to enforce laws on child labor and hazardous child labor. The Department of Probation and Child Care Services, and the police, which operated a specially designated Children’s and Women’s Bureau to enforce child labor laws, are also responsible for the enforcement of child labor laws. From January to December, the Labor Ministry carried out 237 inspections of child labor situations and found 13 cases of child labor violations. Agencies charged with child labor law enforcement, including the Labor Ministry, noted lack of adequate resources.

The largest sector for child labor, both legal and illegal, was agriculture, where children under 18 were employed both in plantations and in nonplantation agriculture during harvest periods. In addition to agriculture, the majority of working children worked as street vendors; domestic helpers; and in mining, construction, manufacturing, and transport. Children engaged in dangerous work in the tile, fishing, construction, and mining industries. Children displaced by the war were more vulnerable to being employed in hazardous labor.

Sources indicated that many thousands of children between 14 and 18 were employed in domestic service in urban households. Child domestic workers reportedly were subjected to physical, sexual, and emotional abuse, and there were also reports of rural children in debt bondage in urban households. Child employment was also common in family enterprises such as family farms, crafts, small trade establishments, restaurants, and repair shops.

Also see the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/tda.htm.

d. Acceptable Conditions of Work

While there was no national minimum wage, 43 wage boards established by the Ministry of Labor’s Relations and Manpower Office set minimum wages and working conditions by sector and industry in consultation with unions and employers. The minimum monthly wage in the areas of the private sector covered by wage boards was 6,900 rupees ($61) plus an extra allowance of 1,000 rupees ($9), for a total of 7,900 rupees ($70). The minimum wage in the public sector is 18,166 rupees ($160). Workers in sectors not covered by wage boards, including informal sector workers, were not covered by any minimum wage laws. The official estimate of the poverty income level was 3,028 ($26.60) per person per month, although the validity of this was questioned by some analysts.

The law prohibits most full-time workers from regularly working more than 45 hours per week (a five-and-a-half-day workweek). In addition the law stipulates a rest period of one hour per day. Regulations limit the maximum overtime hours to 15 per week. Overtime pay is 1.5 times the wage and is paid for work done on either Sundays or holidays. The law provides for paid annual holidays and limits overtime work.

The government set occupational health and safety standards. However, health and safety regulations did not fully meet international standards. Workers have the right to remove themselves from dangerous situations, but many were unaware of such rights or feared that they would lose their jobs if they did so. The Labor Ministry’s efforts to enforce occupational safety and health standards were inadequate. There was a need to improve occupation health and safety in the rapidly growing construction sector, including on infrastructure development projects such as port, airport, and road construction projects.

Labor Ministry inspectors checked whether employers were providing complete pay to employees and were contributing to pension funds as required by law, but unions questioned whether the inspections were effective. The ministry’s Labor Inspectorate consisted of 618 officers. The punishment for nonpayment of wages and pension contributions is negligible, ranging from 100 rupees (88 cents) to 250 rupees ($2.20) for the first offense and 500 rupees ($4.40) to 1,000 rupees ($8.80) and/or a jail term of 6 months for the third offense. A fine of 50 rupees (44 cents) per day is charged if the offense continues after conviction. The labor inspectors did not monitor wages or working conditions for informal sector workers.

Click here to read full report

Sri Lanka does not need new political party but only needs new political culture

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Thu, 24 May 2012 14:25:00 +0000

| by N.S.Venkataraman

( May 24, 2012, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) Fonseka, after his release, has now announced that he will form his own political party. Asked about the fate of the DNA after Fonseka would form his own party, it was said that DNA was a broader political front and Fonseka would continue to lead DNA while leading the new party. Many Sri Lankans would have been confused after reading this announcement and perhaps, the ruling party in SriLanka would feel very happy about this.

What people are looking at is whether Fonseka has the capability and commitment to fill this political vacuum in Sri Lanka.

In any case, this announcement makes one suspect that Fonseka has not understood the expectations of the Sri Lankans, who are already tired of the multiple number of political parties. What they want from Fonseka is not a new political party but a new political culture. It is surprising that Fonseka and his friends give an impression that they have not grasped this mood of the average Sri Lankan.

As I have repeatedly said in the columns of this esteemed and well respected newspaper, Fonseka now has a unique position with millions of Sri Lankans thinking that he has been unjustifiably put behind the bars. People are willing to view his movements with sympathy. But, Fonseka’s actions must reflect their moods.

Let him not march in beaten track. A military man may march forward or backward depending on the orders of the superiors without thinking about it. But, Fonseka is no more a military man and his boss are the people for whose interests he has to serve. Therefore, he has to march as per the desires of the people. Certainly, it is not the desire of the people that Fonseka should add one more political party in Sri Lanka.

What is needed for Sri Lanka is a political movement, that would represent new political culture where the political leaders behave responsibly and honestly in transparent manner and accountable all the time to the people for their actions. In this respect, there is a huge vacuum in Sri Lanka today, which Fonseka should try to fill. What people are looking at is whether Fonseka has the capability and commitment to fill this political vacuum in Sri Lanka.

A political party can win elections by several methods such as alliance of convenience between various political groups, extending false promises particularly to the poor people and even adopting unethical methods. But, winning the heart of the people is much more difficult task , requiring honest, self less and sustained work and making necessary sacrifices for the sake of truth and probity in public life. By simply forming yet another political party, Fonseka gives an impression that he is trying to win election and not the hearts of the people.

Unwittingly, Fonseka is falling into the temptation of getting into political turbulence without realizing that in the process ,he would lose the only asset that SriLankan government has given to him by putting him behind bars and in the process creating swell of sympathy for him across the nation.

Fonseka should have long term objectives of lifting SriLanka to great heights economically, socially in the international arena and creating an image of Sri Lanka as a cultured and ethical nation. Fonseka should rise upto the occasion instead of slipping back as an average discredited politician.

INDIA: Judgments cannot replace good governance

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Thu, 24 May 2012 12:17:00 +0000

| by Bijo Francis
( A statement issued by the Asian Human Rights Commission )

( May 24, 2012, Hong Kong/ New Delhi, Sri Lanka Guardian) India will be evaluated at the United Nations' Universal Periodic Review in Geneva, Switzerland today. The three countries (Troika) involved in the review are Kuwait, Mauritius and Mexico. That these countries have worse records of human rights in comparison to the country they would collectively review suggests how firmly, and perhaps blindly, such processes are at the UN. Yet the UPR may still be considered beneficial because it at least presents recurring opportunity at the UN for human rights organisations to flag their concerns about the country under review.

India has submitted its National Report to the UPR Working Group, which is available here. Other documents concerning India relevant to the UPR process are also available here.

"Incidents left inadequately investigated due to the absence of an independent investigating agency in the country and the unwillingness of the government to create one has resulted in gross human rights abuses wherever this draconian law is in use."

The national report places overwhelming emphasis upon the jurisprudence developed by the Supreme Court on human rights. In page 3 of the report, the government claims that the Court has initiated a "revolutionary interpretative evolution" of fundamental rights in India. It is true. What is false, however, is the affirmation that the Court's initiative is "fully supported by the [g]overnment". The evolution of the Court's interpretation of Article 21 of the Constitution encompasses the right to housing, against forced eviction, right to education, clean environment and against forced labour proves that on each occasion someone had to approach the Court seeking its assistance and writ jurisdiction to 'direct' the government concerned toward what that government had to do. Each one of these cases highlight the failure of the state to fulfil its duties. The Court has also reiterated its authority to review both legislative and executive actions. Within the Constitutional architecture, the government is legally compelled to obey with the Court's directives. Essentially, the government's 'concessionary' claim that it has 'fully supported' the Court's directives possess no inherent merit.

The absence of honesty in the government's claim as to its compliance of the Court's directives is visible from facts on the ground. The first case cited by the government is the Naga People's Movement for Human Rights (petitioners) against Union of India and others (respondents) reported in All India Reporter Supreme Court 431. The Court was called upon to decide the constitutional vires of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act, 1958 in this occasion. While maintaining that the central government had adequate powers to enact the law now held to have had the worse impact on the protection of human rights, the Court drew comparison from the Reserve Forces Act, 1980 of the United Kingdom where the government is empowered to "call upon" its reserve forces when there is a threat to the security of the nation. The Court failed to recognise, however, that the conditions in the United Kingdom (UK) and India are vastly different. The UK could afford to have legislation such as the Reserve Forces Act because its justice institutions are far superior to those of India (in terms of transparency, accountability, resources dedicated to training, solid theoretical and philosophical foundation and an infinitely less corrupt bureaucracy), both then and now. The Court however could not be blamed in totality for this serious omission and disparity since it had not been requested to consider the misuse of the law in the infringement of human rights as it happened then and continues now.

Despite this, jurisprudential wisdom at the time warranted the Court to impose 10 'dos and don'ts', none of which has been followed since then. Given knowledge of the cases of human rights violations available today, one could argue that the Court failed to critically appreciate the nature of the threat the AFSPA was supposed to help diminish, the population upon which the law is thrust upon and the possibility of enforcing discipline upon the armed units which would be protected by the impunity provided them by the law. Today, AFSPA has not merely failed to reduce or contain this violence, but has instead inflamed it. The populations in places throughout India where this law is enforced have further alienated themselves from the national mainstream – this is also due to the discrimination practiced against them by the rest of the country. The number of human rights abuses committed by armed units under the protection of this Act as documented by numerous NGOs and civil society organisations is alarmingly high. This has substantially contributed to the considerable lack of discipline within the country's armed units.

Incidents left inadequately investigated due to the absence of an independent investigating agency in the country and the unwillingness of the government to create one has resulted in gross human rights abuses wherever this draconian law is in use. The unmarked mass graves in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, the countless cases of rape, torture, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial executions reported from states like Manipur stares balefully in the face of the Supreme Court's jurisprudential piety in issuing some obviously ineffective dos and don'ts while deciding the Naga People's case.

They are of such nature that it is worth reproducing here. 1. Action … (b) Power to open fire using force or arrest is to be exercised under this Act only by an officer/JCO/WO and NCO. (c) Before launching any raid/search, definite information about the activity to be obtained from the local civil authorities. (d) As far as possible co-opt representative of local civil administration during the raid. 2. Action during Operation (a) In case of necessity of opening fire and using any force against the suspect or any person acting in contravention to law and order, ascertain first that it is essential for maintenance of public order. Open fire only after due warning. (b) Arrest only those who have committed cognizable offence or who are about to commit cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable ground exists to prove that they have committed or are about to commit cognizable offence or against whom a reasonable ground exists to prove that they have committed or are about to commit cognizable offence. (c) Ensure that troop under command do not harass innocent people, destroy property of the public or unnecessarily enter into the house/dwelling of people not connected with any unlawful activities. (d) Ensure that women are not searched/arrested without the presence of female police. In fact women should be searched by female police only. 3. Action after operation (a) After arrest prepare a list of the persons so arrested. (b) Handover the arrested persons to the nearest Police Station with least possible delay. (c) While handing over to the police a report should accompany with detailed circumstances occasioning the arrest. (d) Every delay in handing over the suspects to the police must be justified and should be reasonable depending upon the place, time of arrest and the terrain in which such person has been arrested. The least possible delay may be 2-3 hours extendable to 24 hours or so depending upon particular case. (e) After raid make out a list of all arms, ammunition or any other incriminating material/document taken into possession. (f) All such arms, ammunition, stores, etc. should be handed over to the police State along with the seizure memo. (g) Obtain receipt of persons arms/ammunition, stores etc. so handed over to the police. (h) Make record of the area where operation is launched having the date and time and the persons participating in such raid. (i) Make a record of the commander and other officers/JCOs/NCOs forming part of such force. (k) Ensure medical relief to any person injured during the encounter, if any person dies in the encounter his dead body be handed over immediately to the police along with the details leading to such death. 4. Dealing with Civil Court (a) Directions of the High Court/Supreme Court should be promptly attended to. (b) Whenever summoned by the courts, decorum of the court must be maintained and proper respect paid. (c) Answer questions of the court politely ad with dignity. (d) Maintain detailed record of the entire operation correctly and explicitly.

Don'ts 1. Do not keep a person under custody for any period longer than the bare necessity for handing over to the nearest Police Station. 2. Do not use any force after having arrested a person except when he is trying to escape. 3. Do not use third degree methods to extract information or to extract confession or other involvement in unlawful activities. 4. After arrest of a person by the member of the Armed forces, he shall not be interrogated by the member of the armed force. 5. Do not release the person directly after apprehending on your own. If any person is to be released, he must be released through civil authorities. 6. Do not tamper with official records. 7. The Armed Forces shall not take back person after he is handed over to civil police.

That the judicial logic behind these directions has failed, and miserably so, is proved by the D. K. Basu (petitioner) against State of West Bengal and others (respondents) reported in All India Reporter Supreme Court, 610. Ironically, the government has cited this case as well in its report to showcase the prowess of the safeguards provided by the judiciary to protect fundamental rights in India. The Court's intervention in this case was due to the repeated instances of blatant violations of prescribed procedures and fundamental by the state police. The argument that the legal guarantees even civilian police fail to provide in peaceful environments and times would be provided by armed units operating in hostile environments is naivety and nothing short of laughable. The present quality of life in places where the AFSPA is enforced is proof of this. That the Supreme Court of India has declared AFSPA constitutional in 1988 should not be an excuse for the government to review, and, if necessary, repeal it.

The government has claimed that it is considering a domestic law against torture. It is true that the law was passed in the Lok Sabha in 2010. The importance the members of the Lok Sabha attributed to this law and informed nature of the debate is apparent from the long discussion on the law in the Lok Sabha. Most members complained in jest that holding them back in the parliament at 9.30 pm is torture and requested that the law be quickly passed. The 625 words-long Bill that failed to even properly define the term 'torture' has today been placed in the Rajya Sabha's deep freezer for the past two years following a review by the Parliamentary Select Committee. Even the members of the parliament do not know the fate of the Bill. No government worthy of its mandate would go to an international body like the UN and state that even though the government is still not serious about this law, "the Supreme Court of India, through its judgments, has … laid down exacting standards on this issue". This statement about the Court laying down exacting standards is false. There is simply no such judgment.

The court has dealt with this issue on several occasions, most importantly in Kishore Singh (petitioner) against the State of Rajastan and on others (respondents) when the court said "...[n]othing is more cowardly and unconscionable than a person in police custody being beaten up and nothing inflicts deeper wound on our constitutional culture than a state official running berserk regardless of human rights". This case is reported in 1981 All India Reporter, Supreme Court 625. Yet torture has not been defined as it is understood in international law. Neither does the offense carry significance particular to crimes against humanity that warrants serious investigation and prosecution. That the D. K. Basu case came 16 years since the Kishore Singh case proves this. Torture is endemic in India and there are painfully few means to change this reality at the moment.

The accolades showered upon the National Human Rights Commission by the government in its report need to be viewed with exceptional caution. Mr. K. G. Balakrishnan, who bears a tainted image concerning his integrity as a judge, heads the NHRC. This was reflected in the NHRC's own consultative process for the UPR. Many consultations were held where members of the army, human rights defenders and victims were invited to the same room. Then the human rights defenders and victims of rights abuses were asked to depose against the army, which they did not due to fear of reprisals. The very same insensitivity of the NHRC while adjudicating claims has attracted criticism so much so that during the accreditation review process the NHRC underwent in 2011, a considerable number of Indian human rights organisations appealed to the International Coordination Committee for NHRIs to degrade the NHRC from its 'A' status. The lobby did not succeed, yet it was one of the most embarrassing moments for the NHRC in its entire history. That the NHRC received near to 100,000 complaints is no surprise owing to the poor human rights standards in India. Admittedly, expecting the NHRC to deal with so many complaints with the present limited infrastructure itself is injustice. That the NHRC disposed off 87,568 cases in two years itself shows the quality of adjudication. This means that, excluding holidays, the NHRC has the unique capacity to adjudicate about 300 cases in each working day. This poses troubling questions about the quality of the adjudication being dealt out.

It is true that State Human Rights Commissions are constituted in 20 states. However, fewer than five among these twenty states possess adequate infrastructure for day-today functioning; these include independent Commissioners. Many Commissions have ceased to function as appointments to office-bearing positions critical to the commissions' operations have not made. That the NHRC has resorted to monetary compensation instead of proper resolution of the cases/grievances suggests that a meagre USD6020 has been used to "buy off" 583 victims. This fails to bring the investigations to the heart of the matter, where institutional failures have occurred and where systemic abuses of human rights have become the norm.

Similar claims made by the government concerning child rights, the right to food and the right to equality are equally questionable. That 42 percent of the children below the age of five in India are severely malnourished places India lower in living standards than all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is not a record that speaks well of any government that 42 percent of its future population might not even live their life to the fullest that already they have suffered substantial and permanent physiological damage that will prevent them from developing their intellectual and physical capacities. For a country to plan an estimated USD40.44 billion outlay not to have means to rescue its children from acute poverty lacks logic. The Supreme Court of India cannot supplement the provision of nutrition with its empty judgments.

Worse still are the accusations laid upon country's civil society by its government in a report concerning the Maoist issue. The government has placed the responsibility upon the civil society organisations to urge the Maoists to join the national mainstream. The question that needs to be asked is which side of the national main stream, whether the increasing number of rich upper middle class or the 42 percent who are destined to starve to death in the coming years that the Maoists are being asked to join. Indeed the country's civil society bears some of the responsibility to urge violent political forces to resort to democratic ways of participation. However this is not possible without the government undertaking to address the root cause of the rebellion. Legislations like the Chhattisgarh Special Public Security Act, 2005 or private militias like the Salwa Judum – which the Supreme Court of India has also held illegal but the government continues to promote – provide no answer to the Maoist concern. If Maoism was the answer to Stalin's snubbing of China, what it fuels today in India is criminal neglect by the government of its people. The answer to this concern lies partially with the government, and it is the honesty, sincerity and humility of that admission which is lacking in the government's report.

The UPR, which will be completed today, will not address any of these concerns. It will remain a reduced space for the country's civil society to articulate and debate concerns about the people of India and their interests. What is required is action by the government on the ground. That would not come about through the government's voluntary pledge to the Human Rights Council or from the government's treaty obligations to international conventions and covenants. Neither can the administrative writ of a government, even supplemented by court judgements, result in improvement of the human rights conditions. In India, well-intentioned but hollow and ultimately ineffective judgements remain a desperately inadequate substitute for the good governance that will systematically and sustainably improve the mechanisms protecting human rights and standards of living.

Stopping the Rot

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Thu, 24 May 2012 05:00:00 +0000

Keynote speech delivered by journalist Namini Wijedasa at the Annual General Meeting of the Citizens Movement for Good Governance on May 23, 2012, held in the auditorium of the Organisation of Professional Associations, Colombo.

Members of the Citizens Movement for Good Governance and friends,

( May 24, 2012, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) This is an honour indeed. And yet, I am more than a little daunted at having to speak before an audience whose experience and memories stretch so back into the past. When Dr. Visvalingam invited me to address you, I was delighted. But as the days flew by, I became more and more uncertain of what I could say to people who already knew so much more than I do. And who have lived much longer than I have.

So I stand before you as an ordinary journalist who makes no pretence about the depth and extent of my knowledge or insight. I present to you my views based on what I have learnt of my country through the exercise of my profession.

I remember visiting a Tiger cemetery once,

during the ceasefire. It was for a story.

Back then we were encouraged to report these

things. A mother and her daughter were laying

flowers out on a grave. The woman said her son

was buried there. He had been 16 at the time

of his death. I saw the same pain in her eyes

that I have seen in the eyes of other mothers,

Sinhalese mothers, Muslim mothers. Sorrow has

no ethnicity, no bias, no race or political preference.

So why do we give it these attributes?

It is the practice today that when somebody presents a view contrary to that which is held by the government and its henchmen, that person and his opinions are loudly denigrated. He must have an agenda, they say. And the word ‘agenda’ is almost always used negatively.

If you criticise the way foreign relations are conducted, you’re being bribed by the West. If you speak about human rights abuses, you are a grasping NGO agent. Either way, you are embroiled in a certain conspiracy to topple the government.

If you oppose the mass ordination of Buddhist children because you think it is not the healthiest way to alleviate poverty or to protect the Buddha Sasana, you’re part of an international religious plot to destroy Buddhism in Sri Lanka. If you eat bread or noodles, you’re a slave to those evil multinational companies—despite the fact that the person making this claim is a noodle himself.

If you criticise your rulers, you’re just downright ungrateful because they won the war—and that should suffice for the next several decades. Indeed, “if you are not with us, you are against us”. Still. Three years after the war ended.

This bigotry and intolerance is untenable. It is wholly detrimental to the free thought, free speech and the advancement of society. Why in this day and age is a government afraid of a diversity of views? Why do they feel so threatened by detractors and critics that they feel it necessary to classify them as conspirators or traitors?

As journalists, we have to avoid all these labels. And yet, you could still be sold out by colleagues who have aligned themselves so closely with this government that they are irreversibly indebted to them. If there are stooges in all other sectors, so it is also with the media. Carrots are certainly more powerful than the stick.

This is not a phenomenon unique to the prevailing regime. Ranil Wickremesinghe had media lackeys who treated as heretics those colleagues who did not blindly follow the leader. So did Chandrika Kumaratunga and no doubt those before her. I may be mistaken but it feels so much worse now. If there is one change I would like to see in the media industry, it is that we do not let our political preferences erode relations among ourselves to the extent that we are unable to tolerate each other in a room.

I have an agenda. That agenda is set by me, based on certain principles, and is not financed by anybody. It comes from wanting a better life for my children. It comes from having made a choice to stay in Sri Lanka when leaving was an attractive option.

As with any journalist, I have had access to many policy and decision makers over the years. I have observed how politicians think, how they work and the difference between the two. I have been able to compare how systems, and the attitudes of those that run them, have changed. I have witnessed half-baked attempts to introduce some semblance of independence to our public institutions through the 17th amendment. Then I saw how easily, and flippantly, even these efforts were reversed through the passing of the 18th amendment.

Having covered the story from the day the law was passed, I will be the first to admit that the 17th amendment was flawed. I remember writing that the law was riddled with more holes than a string-hopper. But it could have been improved for the greater benefit of this country’s citizens and its public officials. Instead, the opposite was done. Our public institutions have lost every semblance of independence and are completely and wholly controlled by the executive. And this includes the judiciary.

When the judiciary depends on the executive for survival and career advancement, and the executive is of the type that expects complete subservience, what hope does this country have?

I don’t have to go into detail here about just how politicised our institutions are. My audience knows it. What is despairing is that it appears to be a bottomless pit. You keep falling, and falling, and falling. The level of submission required is suffocating and even extends to the arts, particularly to the world of film. Since the war ended, Sri Lankans have been allowed to view the conflict only through the eyes of the Sinhalese or through the eyes of the military.

Their story of loss, grief and victory must be told. But what of the others who died, who suffered, who grieve? What about the Tamils? What about the LTTE fighters, many of whom even the government says were conscripted by force? They have a story to tell too. If we don’t tell it, a foreigner will. And then we won’t like it. Then we will whine about it. And somebody out there will join the growing ranks of traitor, of conspirator, of enemy.

I remember visiting a Tiger cemetery once, during the ceasefire. It was for a story. Back then we were encouraged to report these things. A mother and her daughter were laying flowers out on a grave. The woman said her son was buried there. He had been 16 at the time of his death. I saw the same pain in her eyes that I have seen in the eyes of other mothers, Sinhalese mothers, Muslim mothers. Sorrow has no ethnicity, no bias, no race or political preference. So why do we give it these attributes?

Everyone is doing politics everywhere now. The end result is that we don’t get our services. It’s politics at the municipal council, at the police station, in schools, universities and in the health sector. Sportsmen do politics, actors do politics, soldiers, even very senior ones, do politics on behalf of politicians. Politics, politics, everywhere. To prep up a regime, or to topple it. Nothing in between, where the people are.

Then there is this business of how people have come to accept the unacceptable. Some months ago, I walked to the top of our lane with our five-year-old daughter, Anshula. We were heading to the little bookshop near Jubilee Post junction. When we got there, there was police tape around the shop and policemen outside. So we turned back.

I asked some three-wheeler drivers parked at the stand nearby what had happened. As my daughter listened open-mouthed, they described how some men had come the previous evening—not too late—shoved the owner of the bookshop into the inevitable white van and taken him away. They had guns, these drivers said, with great relish. Don’t know where they took him. “Oh well,” I told my daughter, “let’s come some other time”. “Will they find that uncle?” she asked. “I don’t know darling,” I replied, noncommittally. “But there are other bookshops.”

It was only at night that it hit me. My reaction was not normal. It was not normal for me to have accepted the abduction of this man. I don’t know if guns were actually used, but it was also not normal for me to have accepted that a bunch of guys could turn up with guns at the local bookshop. What had happened to me?

But this how it goes. We Sri Lankans are getting so used to things being done wrongly that we forget what the right way is. Does it make me an NGO puppet when I say all this? A traitor? A conspirator? A misguided fool? A plant of the West? An anti-Rajapaksa ingrate? Of course. To some people. But I’m none of those things to me. And that is what matters.

So… how do we reverse the rot? Heck, I don’t know. If the whole distinguished lot of you failed to get it done over the years, what chance do I have of prescribing or enforcing solutions? Most times, the situation seems so hopeless that the worst option seems to be the best option: That is, if you can’t beat them, join them.

But there has to be a way. And here is a little of what I figured out through my interactions as a journalist. First and foremost, we must fight on behalf of institutions and systems while separating personalities and politicians from the same. Politicians, regardless of their parties, have taken ownership of institutions and systems that do not belong to them. The public must bear on politicians to run them in a manner that benefits us.

So often, since the war ended, we have heard that we must be grateful to the government. Yes, we must. But this notion of gratitude has been taken too far. Today, we are expected to be grateful for everything, particularly services that are our entitlement. And those services, too, are delivered so grudgingly, so lackadaisically and so incompetently that it makes you cringe. This is a country that can’t conduct an advanced level examination without a breakdown. Need we look further?

I say that now, three years after the military victory, it is time to stop focusing solely on gratitude. It is time to demand good governance. The regime must be grateful to the people for tolerating its inefficiency thus far. All the international conspiracies in the world can’t mask the fact that things are not right here.

So how does the public know that they are being poorly governed, that politicisation is eating way at the very heart of our systems? The message must go to the grassroots, to the members of local government and provincial councils, of village societies and women’s groups. Teachers, clergy, business people, professionals, agricultural workers, everyone, must be made aware of their rights and entitlements. People must be educated about how proper systems work because we are so entrenched in what we have now that we cannot see or remember a better time.

As a journalist, I have found the public eager to learn about alternatives. I recall a discussion I had with a group of law students at the Colombo High Court last November. It was a vibrant dialogue about the importance of separating the judiciary from the executive. It seemed all the more relevant because we were waiting for the judgement in Sarath Fonseka’s ‘white flag’ case. They, and I, went away more enlightened than when we came in. And I wondered whether the legal education system was today independent enough for similar debates to take place at student level. My guess is, no.

When the message goes to the grassroots, stuff happens. Changes occur. We may not see them now, but things start moving. Politicians get nervous and feel more accountable. If the voices circulate only in the capitals, nothing will change. I had a scheduled interview with a senior VIP government minister recently. I was to meet him at 2 pm. At 1.30 pm, his aide called me and said the minister would be delayed because he was in meetings at Anuradhapura. Two o’clock came and went. I waited because the interview was an important one. We have waited a lifetime for Chandrika to get to places so this was nothing.

At 3.30 pm, I called the aide. So sorry miss, he said. The minister was still at meetings and hasn’t even had his lunch yet. What’s the problem, I asked. “Big problem, miss,” he said. “All the local politicians are fighting with him about so many things and he can’t get away. He’s been stuck since morning.” The minister did not return till late that day. He had been given a tough time by the people that matter.

This pattern needs to be repeated. People from the bottom have to get their rulers to listen. They have to cut through the rhetoric about international and local conspiracies and get to the root of the problem.

But the objective, in my personal view, should not be to topple governments. Any fool can see that the alternatives are not viable. And if the systems remain the same what’s the point in changing a government anyway? Besides, that objective will defeat the purpose. The fight will once again be about personalities and not about systems.

I don’t know whether we can achieve this. I do know that the job can’t be left to journalists alone or to civil society alone or to anybody else alone. Everyone who has the knowledge and the exposure must encourage people at the grassroots to demand more from our rulers. Governing, after all, isn’t the sole prerogative or business of governments, and of particular political parties. The agenda has to be set by us. If we can’t get the people we elected to do their job, then we are responsible for the rot we so despise.

President Rajapaksa’s growth factory

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Thu, 24 May 2012 03:25:00 +0000

| by Victor Cherubim

( May 23, 2012, London, Sri Lanka Guardian) Everybody in Sri Lanka has heard the President proclaim time and again that he wants to turn Sri Lanka into the “wonder of Asia.” Almost everybody in Sri Lanka is in “virtual amasement,” while in the outside world there is “virtual amusement,” whether this is ever possible. Yet like the football fanatics in Britain, including the Chelsea supporters, not to mention the G8 Summit World Leaders, none had ever dreamed that Chelsea will lift the European Championship Cup beating Bayern Munich 4 -3 on penalties after extra time, on their opponents home ground in Munich, Germany.

Likewise, nobody can believe that according to a recent Gallup Poll, 91% of Sri Lankans approve MR’s performance. Sri Lanka’s President has an approval rating above other world leaders coming below Hun Sen of Cambodia with 93% and above Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore at 84%.

This implies that President Mahinda is slowly capturing the hearts and minds of not only the Sinhalese by pardoning Gen. Sarath Fonseka, but has also has won over a large majority of Tamils and Muslims, within three years of his leadership, by what he has said and what he has done quietly.

Whilst the euro zone and Europe as a whole, is caught up in financial turbulence with too many alternatives - growth vs. austerity among others and the Greek election looming over the horizon on the future of the Euro, Sri Lanka is slowly making headway on many fronts.

The President has a personal invitation to attend the Queen’s Diamond Jubilee in London, a plus point for Sri Lanka. Ties between the United States, strained over many years and recently at breaking point by the U.S. sponsored resolution passed by the UN Human rights council in March, has now surely eased. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, once an envoy to Sri Lanka, has said: “attempts to force international investigation on Sri Lanka without the sovereign state‘s permission and bypassing the UN Security Council are absolutely wrong, they also contradict our aspirations in the human rights sphere.” China too has valued Sri Lanka’s friendship by more or less bankrolling development projects. All these point in the right direction.

What is the “dei yogey” magic?

There is not one thing that we can point our finger at, but many things that have come to play. Sri Lankans among others have underestimated the “knitty gritty” of MR, to ride the tide or “the tiger.” By his absolute silence, and by silencing the rhetoric of loudmouths of both the left and the right, the President has contained the Muslim Dambulla incident, the Macdonald’s burger and Coca Cola boycott, the mistrust both inside and outside his government. He has taken sensible security measures to reduce the ever present threat to the nation by getting his siblings to work together. In short, President has transformed the end of each day into the beginning of Sri Lanka’s future.

On the downside, the cost of living has risen, the gripes and grievances of those in public service has risen, the trips of ministers abroad has risen, the number of times contaminated petrol has been imported has risen, whilst the value of the rupee has declined, the number of MP’s crossing over to the Government front and back benches has declined, the incidence of crime particularly “grease yakkas” has also declined. The devaluation of the S.L. Rupee, is a blessing, with more tourists flooding in and our exports more competitive.

The people of Sri Lanka over the past twenty six years of war have got accustomed to one major feature. Their minds and their money wallets have been bulging with the weight of uncertainty. They have thrived with the element of surprise in their everyday life. President Mahinda having assessed the mood of the people has tried every possible way to provide this element of surprise in the actions of his government. He has carried the flag to the four corners of continents. He has opened and closed the import of goods and services. He has played various roles using “more carrot and less stick” and vice versa in his foreign policy. He has courted his foes and cuddled his enemies. He has uplifted the woes of the masses and subdued the role of generals. He himself is the embodiment of a “Growth Factory,” rebooting Ruhunu rata, and opening up the once forlorn and forsaken North and East by his development mantra.

The sense of wonder has been re-kindled in Sri Lanka. The people are eagerly looking forward to it. Reviving curiosity, replenishing the knowledge bank, discovering how to survive in a world of uncertainty and how the world works, is a new challenge. Opening Sri Lanka to the world and the world to Sri Lanka by massive infrastructure projects, exporting not only our labour but our talents and also surplus rice and maize to countries abroad, has been accomplished. The unspoken element of surprise yet to come is national reconciliation.

( The writer can be reached at victorcherubim@aol.com )

Whose duty it is to protect Sri Lankan democracy ?

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Thu, 24 May 2012 03:20:00 +0000

| by N.S.Venkataraman

( May 23, 2012, Chennai, Sri Lanka Guardian) Many Sri Lankans would have been surprised to read the views of Fonseka , which was expressed during his chat with the reporters at his house after his release, that international community have a duty to ensure freedom and democracy in countries where regimes tend to stifle civil freedom. One wonders if this were to be the duty of international community to protect freedom and democracy in Sri Lanka, then what would be the duty of Sri Lankans?

The problem is that the democracy and freedom are threatened in many south east Asian countries in recent times , mainly due to the fact that the rulers are able to take the citizens for granted and they think that the citizens would simply submit themselves to any draconian measures . The rulers are confident that they can hoodwink the people by their manipulative politics and coercive methods. The unfortunate fact is that such rulers have been proved to be correct more often than not, by the reaction and behaviour of the majority of citizens who simply submit themselves readily to the measures of the government unquestioningly.

In any society, there would always be schemers and self centred politicians , who try to seize power and hold on to power by any gimmicks , even within the framework of democratic procedures. The submissive attitude of the silent majority enable them to proceed with their plans with total unconcern about the plight of the people or the fate of the society.

Fonseka’s view that international community should protect the freedom in individual countries reveal lack of pride in the strength and character of the people and lack of confidence that Sri Lankans would be able to fight for their freedom and liberty on their own. History has shown repeatedly that any country which looks to other counties for inspiration and support to chalk out its own future is bound to remain in chaos and confusion.

It is high time that we realize that the battle for the future of democracy in

Sri Lanka should be fought in the minds and hearts of Sri Lankans. The champions of freedom and liberty in Sri Lanka have to assert themselves and demand probity and fairness in public life. It is most likely that the rulers , if they happen to be people without adherence to democratic value systems, would try to put down such champions for freedom and liberty in variety of ways.

The politicians these days have become very clever and calculative. In the olden days, the dissenters would have been straight away put down and arrested under one pretext or the other. But, these days, the politicians in power would adopt subtle and even more cruel ways to drive out and destroy the dissenters.

In such conditions, we need to know that the champions of freedom and democracy should be ready to make sacrifices and put up with harassment, if necessary.

The battle for democracy is not for the weak hearts. If Fonseka were to feel that international community should help democracy to survive in Sri Lanka , one has to conclude that Fonseka thinks that the hearts in Sri Lanka are not strong enough.

Fiscal officers seal off Emdon Seevaratnam’s temple

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Thu, 24 May 2012 03:17:00 +0000

| by A Special Corespondent

( May 23, 20-12, London, Sri Lanka Guardian) The Muththu Maaari Amman temple run by the controversial Emdon Seevaratnam has been officially sealed off by the fiscal officers of the County Court for nonpayment of dues of over £125,000 to the landlord.

The bailiffs and police officers said to be numbering about twenty five persons arrived at the Tooting based Amman Temple on 22 May 2012 and sealed off the premises under a Court Order. Thesam.net website reported that the operation took place at early in the morning at 3.30am.

According to Thesam.Net, the Court ordering the end of the tenancy on 9 February 2011 gave consideration for the relocation of the temple within a short period. But sources said Emdon Seevaratnam failed to pay the rent to create public uproar if closure took place and with the view to accumulate funds to purchase his new ventures of building another temple in Wembley in North London and the relocation of the Amman temple in South London.

The Thesam.Net further reported that:

‘The Tootong Amman temple run under the Sivayogam Trust is involved in all kinds of controversies for many years. The Charity’s founder and its former head N Seevaratnam’s conduct did not fail to create controversies. His role as the one time head of the LTTE fund raising and other issues led to his removal as head of the Charity.

‘At present his son Nirmalan Seevaratnam is a representative of the Trans-national government of Tamil Eelam. It is well known that Seevaratnam’s family attempted to take-over the Eelapatheeswarar Aalayam with the help of the LTTE. On 16 November 2011 the Amman temple Chariot was set on fire. There are contradicting stories that the chariot was burnt down by trouble makers and that it was done to make an insurance claim.

According to information, those who are associated with the Sivayogam charity are engaged in a campaign of collecting funds for the purchase of a new premises for the Amman temple.

75 years old Emdon Seevaratnam throughout out his stay in the UK almost had lived on the Charity’s funds and is accused of buying properties in personal names in Sri Lanka and Tamil Nadu in using his family members names.

Prakash Mohara from Nepal: campaigning against caste-based discrimination

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Thu, 24 May 2012 03:15:00 +0000

| by OHCHR

Prakash Mohara, a participant in the

UN Human Rights office Minorities

Fellowship Programme, is a member

of Nepal’s Dalit minority, a group which

he says suffers discrimination, violence

and exclusion

( May 23, 2012, Geneva, Sri Lanka Guardian) Twenty seven year old Prakash Mohara, a member of Nepal’s minority Dalit community, was one of nine participants in the 2011 UN Human Rights office Minorities Fellowship Programme. According to Mohara, there are 4.5 million Dalits in Nepal, about 20% of the total population.

“Dalit means oppressed, downtrodden, and exploited,” Mohara says. “They are among the poorest in the community and score by far the worst in almost every social development indicator including literacy, child mortality, and life expectancy.”

Dalits face discrimination, violence and exclusion, Mohara says. As a group they are regarded as belonging to the lowest category in the Hindu caste hierarchy, a rigid social structure which is descent-based and hereditary in nature. This view of Dalits as “untouchable” is based on perceptions of purity and pollution, deeply embedded in centuries-old beliefs and practices.

Mohara is currently the Programme Manager and Editor of the Jagaran Media Center (JMC). Founded in 2000, the JMC advocates for Dalits on radio, television, in print and online both inside Nepal and internationally. Through JMC’s programmes, Mohara says, they “raise the voice of the voiceless, and assist in achieving justice for Dalit victims.”

“JMC trains Dalit youths, in order to educate them about different aspects of media and human rights, so that they become champions and future leaders and address the inequities rampant in Nepalese society,” he says.

Mohara is also a board member of Protection Desk Nepal, an organization which provides training in security for human rights defenders in Nepal and he volunteers at the Collective Campaign for Peace, a national organization working for peace, human rights and justice.

Mohara, who holds a Master’s degree in Sociology and Anthropology, wants to build on his experience as a human rights advocate through the Fellowship. He believes that as a result of the experience, he will be better equipped as a human rights advocate to facilitate change by applying internationally recognized human rights theory and practices.

The five-week Minorities Fellowship Programme was launched by the UN Human Rights office in 2005 as a way to offer persons belonging to ethnic, religious, and linguistic minorities an overview of the United Nations system with minority rights as a key component. It accepts both English and Arabic speaking individuals and in 2011includes participants from Canada, Saudi Arabia, Nepal, Iraq, Yemen, Mauritania, Sri Lanka and Serbia.

AG's threat to Hirunika Premachandra

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Wed, 23 May 2012 08:33:00 +0000

| A statement issued by the Asian Human Rights Commission

( May 23, 2012, Hong Kong/ Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) The BBC Sinhala service reported yesterday ( May 22), that during Magistrate's court proceedings relating to Bharata Lakshman Premachandra's murder, the court was informed by counsel that his daughter Hirunika will be charged by the Attorney General’s department for contempt of court for breaking coconuts after court proceedings on a previous day.

According to the report, the learned Magistrate has rightly responded by stating that it is due to the failures of the Criminal Investigations Department (CID) in carrying out his orders to arrest Duminda Silva, an accused in this case, that protests have taken place.

In this case, Bharata Lakshman Premachandra and several others were murdered and several suspects have already been arrested. However, the main suspect in the case, Duminda Silva, has not yet been arrested and produced before the court, despite of the fact that orders have been issued by the court to arrest and produce him in court.

The failure on the part of the CID to arrest Duminda Silva has come under criticism from the lawyers for the aggrieved party as well as the public.

The threat of bringing contempt of court charges on Hirunika for expressing dissatisfaction about the manner in which the CID is conducing this case is clearly an attempt to misuse the judicial process in order to silence the criticism against the political maneuvers to sabotage the criminal proceedings against the alleged perpetrators of the murder of Bharatha Lakshman Premachandra and others.

In fact, it is the CID officers attending to this case that should be prosecuted under the contempt of court charges for the failure to carry out the orders of the magistrate. Their failure to comply with the orders to arrest and produce Duminda Silva amounts to sabotage of the judicial process. The contempt of court is an appropriate remedy in order to ensure compliance with the orders of the judges, whose duty it was to ensure that court proceedings are being conducted according to the law.

However, the threat now is the daughter of the deceased who is demanding justice is to be prosecuted for making such a demand.

It is quite well known that the CID's failure to arrest Duminda Silva is a result of poitical pressures. That powerful politicians have been associated with Duminda Silva and are now trying to protect him is quite well known to the public. Under these circumstances, the threat made to Hirunika will also be perceived, naturally, as a further political maneuver by the powerful lobby that are engaged in the attempt to subvert the process of justice in this case.

The Bar Association of Sri Lanka has for many years demanded and agitated for a contempt of court law. The Bar Association has also submitted a draft law on contempt of court several years back. However, despite promises by the government place this draft law before the parliament, no action has been taken to fulfill these promises.

The Asian Human Rights Commission has consistently protested against the misuse of contempt of court proceedings in Sri Lanka. One of the glaring examples of such misuse was the conviction of Micheal Anthony ("Tony") Fernando for one year's rigourous imprisonment under contempt of court charges. The UN Human Rights Committee, in their final order on the communication filed by Tony Fernando, held that the Supreme Court order for imprisonment amounted to violation of human rights and ordered compensation to be paid to him for illegal imprisonment. The Human Rights Committee also recommended that the government of Sri Lanka should speedily pass a contempt of court law inkeeping with the international norms and standards in order to prevent the reoccurrence of such cases. For details, please find the case herein http://www.alrc.net/doc/mainfile.php/un_cases/351/.

The United Nations Human Rights Committee made the same recommendations again in their findings relating to the communication filed by SB Dissanayake. http://www.alrc.net/doc/mainfile.php/un_cases/520/.

The Asian Human Rights Commission urges the Attorney General's department to desist from the misuse of the contempt of court proceedings for political purposes.

Restore all rights to General Fonseka and release all political prisoners

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Wed, 23 May 2012 08:28:00 +0000

| by Mangala Samaraweera MP

( May 23, 2012, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) While we acknowledge the release of General Sarath Fonseka from prison as recommended by the Minister of Justice to HE the President and approved accordingly, we do register our strongest protest for restricting his civic rights in engaging in political activities, as he chooses and wish to.

As we have come to understand, General Fonseka has been released from prison, given a remission on his sentence under Article 34 of the Constitution, which only means he had been allowed from prison, before serving the full sentence and without restoring any of the rights he was denied by the sentences and due to imprisonment. We stress that he was a “political prisoner” and his release should therefore accept him as a politician, free to involve in politics on his own accord.

We also demand that all other political prisoners including the 234 Tamil youth on hunger strike, who are held in detention and without charges for well over 02 years be released immediately, as the government has so far failed to file any charges against any of them. Filing of charges hereafter would only mean, the government is not prepared to free them and for that purpose, charges that could not be framed for over 02 years are now being framed.

So is the issue of all the security personnel who were victimised and punished for being in association of General Fonseka. They should also be pardoned and their previous status restored immediately.

A government that claims, it is respecting human and civil rights and safeguards democracy, should not only be seen to be so to the world, but must also live to be so for the people of this country to engage with their conscience as free and independent people.

Bloody hell! Can anybody understand this?

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Wed, 23 May 2012 07:02:00 +0000

| by Robinhood

( May 23, 2012, Colombo, Sri Lanka Guardian) During the 3rd year victory commemoration of ending the ethnic conflict the President Mahinda Rajapakse told the people of this country that he made the LLRC report to reintegrate the Tamil and the Singhalese community to bring the communal harmony between the two ethnicities.

Further the president said that there are only certain recommendations in the LLRC report which the government can comply and agree to implement and some of them are already under implementation, which implies some of them are not complied and agreed.

I wish to ask a simple question the LLRC was created by president Rajapakse, The draft was approved by president and made publish and presented to the parliament and made public. It means the president complied and agreed for all the recommendations therein to be implemented so that it was formally approved and publish. In that circumstance why the president is reluctant to implement all the recommendations he has already read and agreed upon.

He also said that he will not allow the LLRC to create a division between the two communities.

It appears President Mahinda Rajapakse do not understand the simple reasoning how the LLRC made by him approved by him and the parliament which was made to reintegrate the communities can divide the two communities?

The bottom line is simply implement; all the recommendations in the LLRC which will help both communities to reintegrate and live in harmony.

“I will not create the LLRC to make a division between the Tamil and Singhalese community.”

So why did the President created the LLRC ?

Bloody hell, can anybody understand this ?

Tamil Sovereignty

noreply@blogger.com (Sri Lanka Guardian) — Wed, 23 May 2012 07:00:00 +0000

| by Gajalakshmi Paramasivam

( May 23, 2012, Melbourne, Sri Lanka Guardian) It is Remembrance time for Tamils. We as a community felt helpless when over three hundred thousand Tamils began going through tragic experiences in May 2009. The loss and pain would weaken some and strengthen others. If the strong amongst us are able to balance our weakened brothers and sisters we are confirming that Tamils had attained nationhood and that what happened in Vanni was an attack and not a defence against alleged terrorism. One who has attained this independent status as a Tamil does not need others to confirm it.

I observe accusations being made by Tamils against the Sri Lankan Government as well as the International Community. I do see value in many of these accusations but the question that arises again and again is ‘where did I fail?’

These days I am more and more conscious that I was born with the ability to be free and independent and that realizing and maintaining this Independence in all aspects of my life is the whole purpose of my life.. A big part of this comes from my connection to my homeland. The environment in which we are born is our home environment. Home is where we feel natural and free. I was born in Jaffna and my sister was born in Colombo. All three children of mine were born in Colombo. All our grandchildren were born in Sydney, Australia. Hence taken as a whole, Sri Lanka and Australia are our homelands. Just as an individual, Jaffna has special powers over me and I over Jaffna. Even at the time of my birth, my family had close connections with Kilinochchi/Vanni – not only through Farming but also through Saint Yoga Swami who added natural strength to Killinochchi through his life there. I do believe that those who truly feel connected to Kilinochchi have the above mentioned power to balance and/or cure the weakened brothers and sisters of Vanni. These are Natural Powers that are shared through our feelings. I believe that this is the power I share with the war victims.

I believe I have strong powers of Independence accumulated from early stages of my life. I felt I was able to help the refugees in the camps of Chettikulam just by being Natural with them. Had I ‘handed out’ money and / or other visible ‘aid’ beyond my assessment of their need, it would have confirmed to me that I was desirous of credit for being with them. This would certainly have confirmed to me my lack of Independence.

Likewise, if the UN or other agencies, had handed out more relief than was needed by the prisoners of war and/or refugees, that would have diluted their powers to be independent. Most of us cannot control or directly influence what happens to us on the outside during war. But all of us have the ability to remain independent and free in our minds – by remaining in our Truth – including in prison.

I do not see much effort from the Tamil side to repair the damaged opportunities to realize independence as a Community. We have the right to defend any attacks on our earned sovereignty. By the same token we have the responsibility to protect others over whom we have power, from any attacks from our side on their earned sovereignty. We do not have the right to attack someone else’s opportunities towards Independence and this includes official structures that confirm such independence. Rights equal Responsibilities in a Sovereign State.

The more we blame others for our woes – the more we confirm our lack of Independence. In democracy we get even – not through revenge but by producing outcomes that confirm our reinforcement of our ability to remain sovereign, including by repairing the damage to the external structures that symbolize our Independence. In autocracy – we reward and punish from a higher level to respectively promote the positives and remove the negatives so we become One. Where there is no common faith – we do not have this moral authority to reward or punish.

Blaming from a distance is punishing. To that extent we need to have demonstrated credits in that activity more than the attacker – in this instance the Sri Lankan Government. Influencing other governments to use their subjective powers by submitting our status from a lower position, takes value away from our powers of Independence. As Gandhi said - that would be like handing over power from the British to the English-Indian leaders. Once we submit – we surrender our right to produce outcomes independently.

So long as we think that the answers are from the ‘outside’ – we would not feel the urge to look within. As a Tamil looking within – I believe that we are self-sufficient – independent including of the UN. We just need to go about our Democratic way and defend any attacks on our opportunities - through our own structured path.