AZ Snakepit

2010 in Arizona: the bullpen

2010-02-08T18:51:27Z

Here's to more of this restrained fist-pumping from Chad Qualls in 2010.

The 2010 pitching staff for Arizona is going to look significantly different from the 2009 incarnation. As we saw last week, the starting rotation will be 60% different from what it was last season, and the level of "churn" we'll be seeing in the bullpen seems likely to be higher. Of the seven relievers with the Diamondbacks on Opening Day last season (Buckner, Gutierrez, Peña, Qualls, Rauch, Schoeneweis and Slaten), it looks like only two - Gutierrez and Qualls - will be in the bullpen on Opening Day 2010. Peña and Rauch were traded in the season, Buckner may well be in the rotation, and our two LOOGYs were found wanting, albeit for radically different reasons. All told, only five of the dozen pitchers we had a year ago seem likely to return.

After the jump, we'll focus on the relief corps. What did we get from them last season [sorry if this brings up bad memories], and is there hope for any better in 2010?

2009 Performance [relief only]
Juan Gutierrez: 65 games, 4.06 ERA, 1.366 WHIP
Jon Rauch: 58 games, 4.14 ERA, 1.362 WHIP
Esmerling Vasquez: 53 games, 4.42 ERA, 1.528 WHIP
Chad Qualls: 51 games, 3.63 ERA, 1.154 WHIP
Clay Zavada: 49 games, 3.35 ERA, 1.373 WHIP
Scott Schoeneweis: 45 games, 7.12 ERA, 1.750 WHIP
Tony Peña: 37 games, 4.24 ERA, 1.529 WHIP
Leo Rosales: 33 games, 4.76 ERA, 1.147 WHIP
Blaine Boyer: 30 games, 2.68 ERA, 1.351 WHIP

Looking at the season numbers for these players, who formed the bulk of our bullpen - 87% of all relief appearances - there's something odd. Seven of the nine, including the top five by innings pitched, had an ERA+ of better than a hundred, ranging from 104 (Vasquez) up to 171 (Boyer), with an eighth only slightly worse (Rosales, 96). Am I the only one who finds this completely at odds with what seemed to be a gurgling vortex of suck for the team in 2009 - particularly in, but not confined solely to, the eighth inning? Was this an illusion?

Not in the first half, when our bullpen posted a line of.280/.353/.419 - the second-worst OPS, .772, of any relief corps in the league. However, those numbers improved markedly after the break: the line of .241/.318/.362, was 92 OPS points better, fourth-best in the NL. A good chunk of the improvement was simply BABIP heading back towards the mean: in the first half, our bullpen BABIP was .329, while in the second, that dropped to .278. The overall figure for the year of .308 was still beaten only by the Astros, so there is some indication that whatever suck happened was, to some extent, bad luck. [Remember 2007 and our "lights-out" bullpen? They had a BABIP of .287 - only two teams were lower that season]

I think the key is to be found in how they pitched in crucial situations. Overall, the bullpen OPS was .734, but in "high-leverage" appearances [see here for how those are calculated], there were a number of our most frequently-used pitchers who seemed to perform worse in the high-leverage situations than in general. For the nine players listed above, the table which follows compares their OPS in such appearances to overall in 2009. [Note: Rosales and Boyer each saw less than 20 "high-leverage" PAs. The others listed had between 54 and 104 such PAs]

Player	High Lev	Overall	Difference
Juan Gutierrez	.591	.659	-.068
Jon Rauch	.844	.736	+.108
Esmerling Vasquez	.926	.737	+.189
Chad Qualls	.555	.683	-.128
Clay Zavada	.807	.688	+.119
Scott Schoeneweis	1.037	.864	+.173
Tony Peña	.916	.766	+.150
Leo Rosales	.450	.678	-.228
Blaine Boyer	.667	.669	-.002

Of those with anything like meaningful numbers, only Qualls and Gutierrez were better than one hundred points worse in critical situations than overall. That is the essence of why our bullpen felt like it sucked. It wasn't so much overall badness, as crapitude when it mattered most.

There's a couple of individual numbers which stand out as well. Seems we made a good decision to trade Tony Peña, as his WHIP looked pretty wobbly. That aspect of his numbers has increased by 30% since 2007, though he did well enough with the White Sox down the stretch, delivering a 2.40 ERA for them in 13 September appearances. It helped that his BABIP dropped thirty points in Chicago. On the other end of the spectrum, Leo Rosales seems to have been the unluckiest man in the pen. He held opposing hitters to a line of .237/.281/.396. hardly deserving of an ERA (just) nearer five than 4.5. Bad luck with the inherited runners he left behind? Could be.

Top Remaining Free Agents
Name	Age	2009 Sal.	2009 OPS+
Kiko Calero	35	$500k	217
Chan Ho Park	35	$2.5m	96
David Weathers	40	$3.5m	107
Scott Eyre	37	$2m	283
Joaquin Benoit	32	$2.75	DNP [rotator[
Chance of AZ free-agent activity: v.low.

2010 Depth-chart and Projections [using ZIPS again]

Chad Qualls: 65.2 IP, ERA+ 130
Juan Gutierrez: 75.2 IP, ERA+ 102
Bob Howry: 66 IP, ERA+ 113
Aaron Heilman: 76.1 IP, ERA+ 106
Clay Zavada: 54.2 IP, ERA+ 128
Blaine Boyer: 64.1 IP, ERA+ 103
Zach Kroenke: 59.2 IP, ERA+ 85
Leo Rosales: 46.2 IP, ERA+ 104
Esmerling Vasquez: 63.1 IP ERA+ 99

Despite the decent overall numbers put up by many of last year's pitchers, the team still went out and added a couple of veteran arms in the shape of Howry and Heilman, and also picked up a Draft 5 choice, Kroenke. The rules state that the latter needs to be kept on the 25-man roster for the entire season, or we risk losing him. Whether that will prove possible depends on his performance: he'll have to show us during Spring Training, that he's a better prospect than last year's Rule 5-er, James Skelton, who didn't even make Opening Day. If not, then we do have a couple of credible candidates to replace him, in Rosales and Vasquez.

At the front of the bullpen, Qualls should be fully recovered from the injury that ended 2009, but behind him, there could be an interesting struggle for roles. Candidates as the set-up man include either of the new arrivals, or it could be Gutierrez who was a perfect 8-for-8 in saves, replacing Q for the last month of the season as the Diamondbacks' closer. It'll be interesting to see how the team uses Zavada. Kroenke is the only other left-hander on the depth-chart, so if he fails to make the team, we may see Zavada shifted, more by need than anything else, into more of a LOOGY role than last season - in 2009, over three-quarters of his appearances were for one or more inning of work.

I think we have the makings of a significantly-improved bullpen in terms of results, if not necessarily much in terms of peripheral statistics, though a more normal BABIP will help. However, this does depend on the high-leverage problem, noted above: if our pitchers can play closer to their overall potential in such situations, that should help stop the eighth inning from proving so nerve-wracking. While that is not by any means a certainty, it does help that three of the five most egregious offenders will not be our problem in 2010. On the other hand, Howry and Heilman were arguably even worse still last season (+.255 and +.178 in high-leverage work respectively), which is why I put Gutierrez ahead of both on the depth chart. I wouldn't go putting away the Maalox quite yet...

Weekend Round-up: Cubs want to club Cactus fans, extension talk for Reynolds and more fan events

2010-02-07T01:30:15Z

"We would love for the Cubs to stay - just not at the expense of our fans. The other 13 teams in the Cactus League feel the same way."
-- Derrick Hall

Been a while since we've done one of these, and there are a good number of things worth mentioning. There's discussion of a contract extension for Mark Reynolds, Webb feeling better, news of a couple of potentially-interesting events as we head towards next weekend's Fan Fest, Derrick Hall's digestive tract, and a disturbing, if Photoshopped picture of Randy Johnson.

Details of all these can be found after the jump. Warning: if you couldn't tell from the logo on the left, it's probably going to get a bit ranty. Get a coffee and a sandwich, there's a lot to read - and not all about the Cubs!

Details of the plan to finance the Cubs new palace in Mesa have come out. And the plan put forward is, it appears largely to let us baseball fans in Arizona foot the bill. According to a bill introduced in the Arizona Legislature this wee, $59 million - more than two-thirds of the estimated cost - would be funded by increased taxation statewide, both on car rentals, and a surcharge on all Cactus League tickets. Yes, folks: it's not enough that the Cubs used extortion with menaces to bludgeon the Mesa lackies into this deal, by threatening to move to Florida. But as soon as next season, the tickets you buy to a Diamondbacks-Rockies game at their new, entirely privately-funded complex in Scottsdale, could be helping to pay for the Cubs' new facility.

Ah, but a report - commissioned by Mesa, so in no way likely to be prejudiced or biased, of course - claims that the departure of the Cubs would cost the state "over $137.8 million dollars" and 1,581 jobs. The report, however, does not say how many of those jobs involve serving alcoholic beverage to the Cubs fans. Probably around 1,570 or so. I'm also not quite sure how they leap to the conclusion that Cubs fans alone spend $75 million here annually. Even charitably assuming that every single person in attendance at HoHoKam - avg. attendance last year, 10,690 - would simply evaporate if the Cubs left, that works out at more than $7,000 per fan, purely on in-state spending, excluding things like flights. It doesn't add up.

The study also conveniently forgets how many Cubs fans already live here. As anyone who has been to Chase for their visits can attest, for such a rabid fan-base, it's amusing how many of them abandoned the city they supposedly hold so dear. The report contains no evidence at all on the number of attendees who actually come in from out of state. Nor does it take into consideration those who would come anyway, to see relatives, say, or simply to escape the shitty Chicago weather. The potential loss of a few hundred minimum wage McJobs is hardly good enough reason to start gouging everyone who attends Spring Training.

But even if we accept the questionable numbers here, there is absolutely no justification given for why we should have to pay, in order to keep the Cubs in Mesa. Going by the bevy of suitors for the AZ/COL facility, and if it actually is the cash-cow its proponents claim, there would surely be no shortage of alternative locations elsewhere in Maricopa County. These would a) give the Cubs the new facilities they apparently desperately need, b) keep their fans (and more importantly, their dollars) here in the state of Arizona, and c) not require one cent to come out of the taxpayer's pocket.

For what was the shortfall in our state budget last year? $2.43 billion, projected to rise to $3 billion in 2011. And yet idiots like House leader John McComish are proposing to raise taxes to fund a practice park for a professional sports team, when we can't even keep open our state parks? You can understand why fiscally-responsible franchises are unimpressed. It's almost enough to make me wish I could vote, simply so that I could recall the jackass. And never mind the irony that a team playing in a ballpark which was built before the Great War, regards the 12-year old facilities at HoHoKam as 'outdated'.

Hey, Cubs! Let's make a deal. Prove you deserve public funding, because otherwise you're just acting like a bratty kid, demanding a new car, when their report card is full of D's and F's. So, win the NL pennant. It's not so hard. That's something 14 of the other 15 clubs in the league have done since the last time you managed it - including seven that didn't even exist the last time the Cubs went to the World Series. I'm not even asking you win there (you haven't managed that in the entire lifetime of Arizona as a state, so let's not expect too much), just get to the final showdown and then we can talk about us funding your shiny new stadium.

And moving on, appropriately, from the Cubs to bleeding ulcers. For club president Derrick Hall made an appearance on local cooking show segment, 12 News Valley Dish last week, and announced that about 18 months ago, he'd been diagnosed with no less than ten of the pesky critters, and had given up eating red meat as a result. Hmmm... 18 months ago? I suspect the cause of the ulcers was perhaps less the diet, than the 52 one-run games in which his team were involved that year. While it's great that he's now healthy, I suspect that more important than forgoing steak, was the decision to trade Jose Valverde at the end of that season. I think this move saved everyone who watched the team a few ulcers...

Is Mark Reynolds going to be the next player the D-backs lock up long-term? He said on Friday that talks are underway: "There are talks. There's years being thrown back and forth right now. No money yet, but it could be anywhere from a two- to three-year deal with a couple of options is what I hear. I think the week of the 15th, there's going to be some formal offers made." Reynolds missed being eligible for arbitration tis year by about a long weekend of service time, so his arb years will be 2011-13. Nick Piecoro doodles numbers on a beer-mat and speculates we could be looking at "a three-year deal in the $14 million-$15 million range." Here's hoping Mark doesn't fall victim to the Curse of the Contract Extension, whose victims include Chris Young, Chad Tracy, Eric Byrnes and Chris Snyder.

The above pic of Brandon Webb playing long-toss, is courtesy of Steve Gilbert, taken with his Blackberry at yesterday's open practice session at Chase Field. He reports Webb reckons he'll be ready for Opening Day, and also has some other interesting tidbits, such as the off-season arrivals in both the Reynolds and Haren families. Also worth a read is his interview with Ken Kendrick, which by coincidence appeared on the same day as the first part of my discussion with Josh Byrnes, so sheds another bit of light on the Diamondbacks' front-office. In particular, he explained the funding for LaRoche. "We thought it was worth making the stretch and spending the extra money. There were a couple of other possibilities, and we were going to be able to do one of them. The LaRoche thing came, and we liked it, and Josh wanted to do it, so we did."

Nick Piecoro also chips in on Webb, our hopeful #1 telling him yesterday that he's looking forward to the bullpen session on Tuesday - even if it's only going to be five minutes or so in length, he'll be throwing off a mound for the first time in about ten months. "I’m excited to get back on the bump... I’m ready to go... It’s going to be a gradual thing still. Today was really good. I feel like I’m building up every day. I haven’t really thrown for a whole year. Even if somebody didn’t have surgery, if you lay off for a whole year it’s going to take a little bit to get your arm strength back and stuff." He hasn't yet broken out the curveball, but has thrown some change-ups.

FanFest next week, which reminds me, must put in my request for a day off for that. However, it is not the only change for fans to meet major-leaguers this month. The night before FanFest, next Friday, Wild Horse Pass Hotel & Casino are hosting an autograph event inside the Ocotillo Ballroom from 6:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. Those taking part will include Mark Reynolds, Miguel Montero, Ian Kennedy, A.J. Hinch and Daron Sutton. There's no admission charge, but you do have to be 21 or over to attend. You can bring one item per person for the participants to sign, but photography will not be permitted

And the Saturday after FanFest (Feb. 20th), the inaugural Spirit of the Game event takes place at Surprise Stadium from 5-8pm. There'll be more than twenty players from 13 clubs present - Diamondbacks, past and present, include Blaine Boyer, Micah Owings, Damion Easley...and Russ Ortiz. I guess the last-named hopes the statute of limitations has expired on his Arizona contract. Instructional clinics will be offered, and open to kids of all ages and available on a first come, first serve basis. Other activities include autograph stations and a kid’s zone with interactive games . Food will be available for purchase. It's free, but bring a non-perishable food item to be donated to St. Mary’s Food Bank, and you'll have a chance to win one of the door prizes. Bring two, and you'll have something to throw at Russ Ortiz. May I suggest a can of tomatos? Anyway, visit the website for more information.

Fangraphs.com had a couple of interesting pieces. One reviews our 2006-09 drafts, and the other talks about our top 10 prospects - though the latter list deliberately does not include any of the 2009 draft picks, presumably due to the shortage of minor-league data on them. However, that does also leave our farm system looking perilously thin in that report, though they acknowledge that eight of this year's picks could be in the current top ten. And in ex-AZ player news, Yusmeiro Petit was DFA'd by Seattle, as a result of their signing of Erik Bedard.

And, as we are almost approaching 2,000 words for this piece, I think that just about wra... Ah, you thought I'd forgotten, didn't you? The Seattle Times has a piece where it uses the Sorting Hat from Harry Potter to decide which cap certain players should wear into Cooperstown. It's quite an amusing bit of writing - and also good to see someone from that corner who does agree that Johnson should go into the Hall of Fame as a Diamondback [regardless of him throwing out the first pitch in Seattle on Opening Day] However...I could certainly have done without the Photoshopped atrocity of the Big Unit in a wizard's hat that accompanied the piece. It's gonna take a great deal of mental bleach to wash that image from my mind.

Have a good weekend. Back Monday with the bullpen preview, and Wednesday with part two of the JB interview.

Here's the video of my chat with the HotStove.com guys this afternoon. I enjoyed it a lot - to the...

2010-02-06T02:05:29Z

Here's the video of my chat with the HotStove.com guys this afternoon. I enjoyed it a lot - to the extent that I lost track of time and was late back from lunch! Hey, paid employment... It's vastly over-rated... ;-)

Who was the "greatest" single season home-run hitter of all time?

2010-02-05T15:45:09Z

Jim O'Rourke - the second-best home-run season of all-time?

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After our previous piece on how many bombs Mark McGwire might have hit without using steroids, there was a good discussion over who should be considered the "greatest" single-season home-run hitter of all time. If we cross McGwire and his druggie buddies off the list, what about the benefits gained by Babe Ruth, who had only to face pitching of his own color? But then, they also did it without access to the training and nutrition methods available to modern hitters. What about expansion? The increased pool of overseas players?

Let's be honest. There is no "apples to apples" comparison possible, as Flo might say. Can't do it. Not at all. No, sirree. Fuhgedaboutit.

After the jump, of course, that's exactly what we'll be trying to do.

Or, at least, trying to take a couple of wobbly steps down the path, by attempting to filter out a couple of the most obvious road-bumps. Home-run frequency for the era, and number of games played. One of the first things is to appreciate how much more common HRs are these days. Despite the drastic rule modifications that have taken place, you'd be surprised how little the main stats of BA, OBP and SLG have changed over the decades - all three are still within 10% of the figures they were, all the way back in 1871. The graph below plots five: BA (Bordeaux - hey, that's what the spreadsheet calls it!), OBP (Black), SLG (Green), OPS (Dark Violet) and HR per game (Red), for each season from 1871-2009.

But see that red line, rising up like the national debt? [Ooh! Political satire!] That's home-runs per game: more than five times as common as they were in 1871, and over seventeen times as common as they were in 1878, when there were a grand total of...twenty-three long balls. Mark Reynolds had more home-runs before the All-Star break last year, than every major-league hitter combined that season. Only one player hit more home-runs in 1878 than Chris Young had in one game: Paul Hines of the Providence Greys, who led the major-leagues with...four bombs.

This dead-ball era extended, more or less, from the birth of baseball through until 1920 A multitude of reasons go into this. Foul balls were not counted as strikes until the early years of the 20th century, and the graph does show a drop in home-runs around this rule modification. Balls were customarily kept in play for 100 pitches or more, gradually becoming softer and more difficult to hit out. This eventually changed after the 1920 fatal beaning of Roy Thomas, which also led to the banning of the spitball. There were also some insane ballparks, such as the Huntington Avenue Grounds in Boston, where center-field measured 635 feet. On the other hand, at Lakefront Park in Chicago, the distance to the foul poles was only 200 feet.

As an aside, such a lack of power in the game led to one of the more ironic, by modern standards at least, player nicknames in history. Frank Baker, one the best players of the dead-ball era, earned the nickname of "Home Run" Baker for hitting just two home runs in the 1911 World Series. Although he led or tied the American League in home runs four consecutive years, from 1911 to 1914, the most he hit in a season was 12, and he finished with a total of 96 home runs for his career - less than Tim "Not so Home-Run" McCarver.

To describe the methodology, what I did was the take the home-run leader for each season and run a series of adjustments to the raw home-run number posted, to come up with a number I call HR+. Firstly, I compared the number to the home-ruin rate for the year. The baseline was the 2008 season, when the rate was, conveniently, 1.00 home-runs per game. For example, if you hit a home-run when the rate was 0.90. it would be worth 1/0.90 = 1.11 "adjusted" homers. The next adjustment is for number of games in the season. While I has been at least 150 for most of the last century, that hasn't always been the case. The 1871 Philadelphia Athletics won the league by playing only 28 games, so we scale their champion hitter by a factor of 162/28. Finally, we adjust for the park factor, using BR's multi-year hitting number.

Note: this does not mean that Babe Ruth would have hit X home runs in the modern game. It is simply an effort to provide a comparative number, based on his performance relative to the era, adjusting for

Player	Year	HR	HR rate	Gms	Park	HR+
Babe Ruth	1920	54	0.26	154	104	210.08
Jim O'Rourke	1875	6	0.06	79	103	199.09
Charley Jones	1879	9	0.09	84	102	189.08
Babe Ruth	1919	29	0.20	137	94	182.34
Babe Ruth	1927	60	0.37	154	97	175.77
Lip Pike	1872	6	0.10	54	106	169.81
Ned Williamson	1884	27	0.22	112	108	164.37
Babe Ruth	1921	59	0.38	153	102	161.18
Fred Pfeiffer	1884	25	0.22	112	108	152.19
Gavvy Cravath	1915	24	0.17	152	101	148.97

The list is dominated by players from the early era, when home-run hitting was, it appears, much harder than it is now. The last player to reach even an HR+ of a hundred, was Jimmie Foxx in 1933, whose 48 home-runs was good for a mark of 115.84. Hank Greenberg came fairly close in 1938 (95.04), and again in 1946 (89.06), but the best number in modern times is Frank Howard's 74.36 for Washington in 1968. That was a season in which pitching dominated - the overall ERA in the National League that year was below three, the only time that has happened since the dead-ball period. For reference, the numbers in some other historic seasons were: Roger Maris (1961), 64.21; Mark McGwire (1999), 56.46; and Barry Bonds (2001), 70.09. Albert Pujols' MLB-leading total from last year has an HR+ of just 45.65.

Babe Ruth has three of the top five HR+ numbers. It's difficult to over-state just how much he dominated the game, but in that 1920 season where he had 54 HR, Ruth hit more long balls by himself, than any other team in the American League. The next most by another other batter that season0 was less than twenty - Ruth had 24 in just May and June. His slugging percentage was more than 217 points higher than the second-placed hitter; as a yardstick, in 2001 Bonds' SLG was "only" 126 point better than the #2 in the league. While Ruth would have seasons where he would hit more home-runs, it's hard to argue that his 1920 campaign was the most impressive of all time. Oh, and he made a spot-start for the Yankees, winning that game on the mound. I think it's safe to say we'll never see a year like that again.

Ruth in the 1920 silent movie, Headin' Home

I should say a bit about some of the other players on the list, in particular, Jim O'Rourke, whose total of six home-runs for the 1875 Boston Red Stockings comes out as the second-best HR+ mark of all-time. That's because O'Rourke, by himself, hit 15% of all home-runs that season. Much like Ruth, ten of the twelve other teams managed less in total, than O'Rourke did alone. Hell, six teams hit no balls out at all, including the St. Louis Browns who played 68 games that year. I'm not sure there has ever been a team more dominant than the Boston one on which O'Rourke played. They posted a record of 71-8, pitched to glory by future HoFer Al Spalding - yes, he of the sporting goods store. Spalding started 63 games, came out of the bullpen in nine more, and went 55-5, with eight saves.

Anyway, back to O'Rourke. Despite his homer prowess, he didn't lead his team in OPS or even SLG. He finished fifth in both categories, which went to Cal McVey's .355/.356/.517 - McVey only had three home-runs, but his 36 doubles were almost three times O'Rourke's. Jim did, however, lead the team in walks - with nine. He played mostly the outfield, but also saw duty at 1B, 3B, and even as catcher. O'Rourke's career continued until 1893, then, after a hiatus, with a last hurrah in 1904; at the age of 54, he became the oldest man to hit safely in major-league history. Known as "Orator Jim" because of his law degree, according to his grandson, he "confused the heck out of umpires when he challenged a call. The umpire went all to pieces because he couldn’t understand what [Jim] was saying."

Charley Jones, #4 on the list, is perhaps most notable because there's no record of his death. [I assume it happened, as otherwise he's be 150 in April.] During the 1879 season, the top two career home-run hitters were on the same team - Jones and Lip Pike, more of whom later. That has only happened twice since, the last time being in 1934 when Ruth and Lou Gehrig were with the Yankees. Jones was the first player to hit two home-runs in one inning (on June 10, 1880), but lost the subsequent two seasons, being blacklisted as the result of a dispute over salary payment. Charley was also a professional model and the clothes he accumulated as a result, led to him being called "The Knight of the Limitless Linen." They don't have nicknames like that any more.

Lip Pike was the first famous Jewish ballplayer, and - entirely coincidentally - the first to be openly recognized as a professional. He was also renowned for his speed - in August 1873, he beat a trotting horse called Clarence in a 100-yard race, posting a time of 10 seconds flat to win $250. Despite being slightly-built by modern standards - at 5'8" and 158 lbs, he was about Augie-sized - the distance of his home-runs was a source of wonder at the time. One travelled 360 feet, hitting a metal bar on top of a pagoda, 40 feet off the ground at that point, with enough force to bend it. Before the formalization of the sport, it's recorded he hit six home-runs during a single game in July 1866, though in those days the game resembled slow-pitch softball more than the sport we know now.

Ned Williamson and Fred Pfeiffer must have possessed a time-machine, and traveled forward to the late 1990s to acquire some PEDs. For how else to explain their 1884 season? Williamson's 27 homers was three times as many as any other campaign. Indeed, in the rest of his twelve season career, he only hit 37. Similarly, Pfeiffer's 25 was far and away his best: only one other time did he have more than eight. But it wasn't just them. That year's Cubs boasted seven of the league's top ten home-run tallies, and the team as a whole were responsible for 44% of all long-balls hit in the NL. There is a very good reason: Lake Front Park.

As noted, it was extremely short down the lines, and for most of the time the Cubs played there, the ground rules declared that balls hit over the fence down the line were only scored as doubles, regardless of distance. In left-center and right-center were two additional poles, and to get credit for a home-run, the ball had to go between them, where the distance was more respectable. In 1884, however, that rule was abandoned. As a result the team doubles total dropped from 277 to 162, while homers almost eleven-fold, from 13 to 142! The resulting park factor of 109, is comparable to Coors Field last season. Only two of Williamson's 27 blasts came on the road, but his single-season mark would stand for 35 years, until the Babe surpassed it in 1919.

Finally, there's Gavvy Cravath - born Clifford Cravath, the name "Gavvy" was allegedly given to him in his days playing in the PCL, after he hit a ball that killed a seagull - "gaviota" in Spanish - in flight. [On this basis, I anoint the Big Unit as "Pally" Johnson, since a dove is "paloma"] He was a mine of marvellous lines, such as "I steal bases with my bat," or "There is no advice I can give in batting, except to hammer the ball." But he still cultivated a talent for hitting to the opposite field: while in Minneapolis, he allegedly shattered the same nearby store window, three times in a single week. That skill also served him well in his time with Philadelphia, whose right-field line measured only 272 feet, leading to his 1915 season - 19 of his 24 homers came at home. In the World Series that year, the opposing Phillies respected his power so much, they didn't pitch their young left-hander. That was some guy called Babe Ruth.

I have to say, I really enjoyed writing this piece. Not so much for the number-crunching - though you know me, when I die, I expect my gravestone to show a Win Probability chart for my life (ending at 0%, naturally). No, it was digging up the historical trivia on the old-timers that was fascinating, and I want to give particular credit to the fabulous SABR Baseball Biography Project, which is a great resource and a great waste of time. I'll close with another quote from Cravath, which seems a fitting way to end this celebration of some sluggers from yesteryear:

"I do not claim to be the fastest man in the world, but I can get around the bases with a fair wind and all sails set. And so long as I am busting the old apple on the seam, I am not worrying a great deal about my legs."
-- Gavvy Cravath

Poll

Who do you regard as the single-season home-run record holder?

The 2010 Interview with Josh Byrnes, Part One

2010-02-03T13:35:49Z

More photos » Paul Connors - AP

Josh Byrnes, left, and Colorado Rockies GM Dan O'Dowd, right, look over the desert view prior to MLB meetings last month in Paradise Valley. Either that, or they were pointing at the Giants' offense, and laughing.

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As promised last week, we are delighted to announce that on Monday, we got to sit down with Arizona General Manager Josh Byrnes for an interview, and the first part of that discussion is published here. The second section will follow here next Wednesday, and I'll have a piece analyzing both parts, a little after that. Why, yes, I am going to get as many stories out of this as possible, thank you for asking...

It was a fascinating discussion, covering a wide range of areas and after the jump, we'll get things started with topics including last season's under-par performance by the Diamondbacks, the firing of Bob Melvin, and some of the signings and trades made by Arizona during the winter.

AZ SnakePit: It's been a year since we last spoke, with a good bit of water under the bridge for the team. It's fair to say 2009 was disappointing,. Clearly, the loss of Brandon Webb and Conor Jackson were significant factors in that, but what other reasons do you think were responsible for the team not performing up to expectations?

Josh Byrnes: Those were two big issues, losing Webb and Jackson, but we hadn't played particularly well going back into the 2008 season. I felt that, relative to our talent-level, we should have been better than an 82-win team in 2008. So I was curious how we were going to look in spring training, how we started the year, both in terms of results and how we looked, and it just wasn't there - it wasn't a very crisp spring.

You take a longer view of our teams than most teams. I think we have enough talent to give us a chance, but I don't think that we have so much talent, that we can be sloppy and win. Taking a longer view over 2009, we made too many errors, which led to too many unearned runs, our situational hitting with runners in scoring position, at various times our bullpen - the things you need to do to win games, to win close games, we just weren't very good at it.

AZ: It wasn't long into the season before Bob Melvin was fired. Does this tie into what you said about us underachieving in 2008? Or what changed between Opening Day and 29 games in, that led to the release of Bob Melvin?

JB: Certainly Bob deserves a lot of credit for all the success we had here in 2007 - our success that year probably took people by surprise. And how we won, it's ironic, because some of those attributes that lead to winning close games, one of which you could argue is luck, just didn't repeat in 2008 and 2009. I think 2008 was disappointing. Internally, both with Bob and me, and with others, we had a lot of discussion, what went wrong and why. Not only was the division more winnable than we would have expected, but to win 82 and play the way we did was disappointing.

There were no ultimatums going into 2009, but there was certainly an expectation that we needed to reverse this trend of how we were playing. And I didn't sense that it was reversing, so felt that it was necessary to make a change.

AZ: Were you prepared for the criticism that followed your hiring of AJ Hinch?

JB: I think the degree was maybe a little more than I expected, the "nastiness" of it. I didn't expect it to be a popular move, but maybe it's the era were in. Guys like Joe Torre and Jim Fregosi, how they entered into the manager's chair wasn't totally different, but it was a different era, a different age of scrutiny. And then there's the timing of it. I just felt that at that point we'd played about a calendar year of sub-standard baseball.

To the extent that one of the things AJ lacked was experience, it would 'throw him into the fire', and learn a lot of lessons, in the context of a season that was borderline unsalvageable at the point we made the change. The silver lining in it all is that you need to deal with, obviously, 25 players, but more constituents than that to be an effective manager, and in his first go-around, he was very battle-tested.

AZ: I think it was clear AJ did "grow into" the position as the season went on. From your viewpoint, what did you see him learning, and what are you expecting from him, going into his first full season as a manager?

JB: In any job, you want to have a certain skill-set. I think AJ is very bright, very fair, and tough - I think those who want to test his resolve will generally not be very successful. He's competitive, but not a high-ego type of person. Ultimately, the players are the ones mostly responsible for winning, but as I've said many times with hiring AJ, it's not just his interaction with the players - it's his coaches, it's the front-office, medical staff, fans and media, etc. He's driving the performance of the players, but he's involved with a lot of people, to do his job at the maximum level. It's a bit of a cliche, but I think AJ is very effective at building relationships, building trust, and the job he has been asked to do, building a sense of accountability and high standards. That process is ongoing: we're anxious to see 2010, and to see if we have made any progress. I think we have.

AZ: Arizona had a important draft in June, with a lot of high picks. Now that you've had a chance to see them in action, which of those picks are you happiest with so far?

JB: It's funny. We had eight of the first 95 and are certainly happy with who we got and their initial performance. But like a lot of drafts, maybe you have someone deeper down, who turns out to be a guy who carries the torch for that draft. I think Ryan Wheeler deserves a lot of credit, for coming out as a fifth-rounder and performing as he did. He certainly has a good swing, good approach, very good makeup, so we're excited about what he has shown so far. 2003 in Boston, we had a lot of extra picks - and our fourth-rounder was Jonathan Papelbon. So maybe that premium pick isn't one of your first. In Colorado, we went through the Matt Harrington ordeal - then took (Clint) Barmes in the 10th round, (Brad) Hawpe in the 11th round and (Garrett) Atkins in the 5th round. So, who knows? But Wheeler certainly showed quite a bit in his first summer.

AZ: Last season, the team struggled against left-handed starters, going 17-30. Given the offensive arrivals this year, like LaRoche, are left-handed bats, do you expect that to improve next year?

JB: That's an interesting one. I think Upton led major-league baseball in OPS against left-handed pitching; Conor Jackson has a long history of that and we'll have him; Ryan Roberts showed it can be one of his strengths; Mark Reynolds; Chris Young still hits lefties at a very high rate. So one of our issues was, our left-handed hitters were pretty defenseless against left-handed pitching last year, with the exception of Montero.

We talked a lot about our left-right balance. LaRoche, his 09 wasn't great, but his history is not an exaggerated platoon split. Kelly Johnson has hit left and right equally well, Tony Abreu is a switch-hitter. That allows us to mix and match Roberts, Parra, those kind of guys, into favorable match-ups - Chris Snyder will be back healthy too. It's one of those things: it shouldn't be a vulnerability, in fact it could be a strength, because our right-handed hitters are so good against left-handed pitching. Even the in-game match-ups, we might have a guy or two on the bench who can concern the other manager, maybe a right-handed bat who could step in and match up. I'd like to think that what was a weakness, will turn into a strength.

AZ: So is platooning something we'll see more of in 2010? Will we have one standard line-up against LHP and a different standard lineup against RHP?

JB: Probably, just because we have 12-13 position players we want to play, and I don't know if it's going to be easy to have a standard line-up. It's probably easier to conceptualize one against right-handers, right now. But take Stephen Drew. He broke in and hit left-handed pitching very well, but in recent years, he has struggled. Certainly, there's a case to be made, he should hit lead-off against right-handed pitching, but you can't go sub-.600 OPS and lead-off against left-handed pitching. We'll have to get a feel for it - and, a lot of times, when creating a line-up, you want to see what kind of bench does that leaves you with, and how you can match-up in-game.

AZ: This time last year, we were in a free-agent market that was seriously hit by the economic downturn. What's your take on this winter's market? Do you think it recovered?

JB: At a macro level, the 30 clubs' payrolls in 2008 was pretty close to 2009, and it appears that might be the same in 2010. Historically, the market is built on inflation and free-agency as drivers and there hasn't been inflation, so it has shifted back to supply and demand being a huge determining factor in outcomes. Added with that, a lot of clubs are not afraid to give young players jobs - it's certainly economic, but it's also philosophical, and it's how the market has evolved in the last two years. We want to be adaptable. We didn't sign free-agents for a couple of off-seasons, but we signed several, to short contracts in the last two. It's probably something that's a little more attractive to us than it was a couple of years ago.

AZ: It's interesting you talking about younger players. There was an article at Fangraohs.com where David Cameron said older players might be the new market inefficiency, because "everyone" is trending young. Any thoughts as to whether that might be the case?

JB: Maybe - I think there's always a pendulum in the game. There was probably an exaggerated taste for college players in the draft a few years ago, and when that happens, it makes high-school players more valuable. The fifth high-school player drafted or tenth high-school player drafted, maybe "should" go in the twenties, and now he was getting pushed to the second-round. That's really the story of this whole decade. People chasing defensive metrics now, or young players. Is there a point at which the pendulum swings too far? It's why, as information-savvy as we think we are, we're generally not the organization espousing the newest philosophy and going, "Dammit, we'll show you how smart we are." We'll probably take a longer view, and understand where our opportunities are in the marketplace to get the right players.

AZ: Some people think the off-season moves the Diamondbacks made mean the team is in "Win Now" mode. Is that the case, and if so, is the organization concerned the fans won't support the team if they fail to deliver this season?

JB: I read somewhere where someone made that point, in a very questioning manner, and I guess I'd respond, I don't think you win by accident. You have to make an attempt to win. That being said, again, there are some major responsibilities: one, is a budget, two, is having a talent-base available for future years. I think we've always tried to balance that; I don't think we've ever gone into a season hedging our bets, "Well, if nine out of ten things work in our favor, then we might win." I do think you have to operate in the off-season as if you are trying to win, but being responsible to your longer-term interests, and your financial decisions along the way. So, if we're trying to win - guilty as charged!

With any market, winning is important. You and I have talked about it: there's been a lot more winning baseball than not in this market. But nobody - none of those who worked here, me included, or the fans - enjoyed 2009 very much, so we are determined to have that be the exception, not the rule.

AZ: Do the signings of Johnson and LaRoche indicate that too, or just a belief that Abreu and Allen are not yet ready for the majors?

JB: It was tough with both those guys. You think of some of those off-season choices at first- or second-base, we had a lot of trade ideas or free-agents knocking on our door. We felt like we had to get enough of an upgrade to justify, what's very important to us, which is letting our young players finish their development to the major-league level.

Talking about Brandon Allen and Tony Abreu - yes, we think they're talented, we think they're future major-league starting players, and they've sort of done everything that you can do at Triple-A. That should deliver them an opportunity, but we felt that getting Adam LaRoche and Kelly Johnson obviously do help us win more now, and in turn, give us quite a bit of depth, which is important to deal with things that might go wrong in a season - injury or performance.

It was not something we took lightly. We think a lot of Brandon Allen and Tony Abreu. So in order to sign free-agents at those positions, we really felt it had to be the right player at the right value, in order for it to make sense.

AZ: Both LaRoche and Johnson mentioned that one of the things attracting them to Arizona was its reputation as a good hitting park. Is this something you pitch to free agent hitters?

JB: Yes, but not necessarily in that respect. It's funny, we're aware of the ballpark, park factors, how it affects the outcomes of OPS+ or ERA+. On the other hand, there's also watching how it turns out. I think it's a good offensive ballpark: I don't think it's a bandbox, it does help singles, doubles, triples and homers, but it's not an exaggerated park as some are.

The flip side is, our road environment is very, very difficult on our hitters. We play in a division that's had great pitching, we play nine series a year in California, at least, so it's going to create a divide. Playing for the Diamondbacks, yes, home games, perfect weather, good ballpark to hit in. That's great - but our road schedule is difficult or an offensive player.

Talking to those two guys, we talked much more about our team, our environment, and we felt like our capabilities of winning. Those were the points we were trying to make and I think those factored into their decisions too.

AZ: In the three-way deal with the Tigers and Yankees, the general opinion is that we got the short end of the trade. Presumably, you don't think so. Why was this a good move for the Diamondbacks and how much did concern over Scherzer's shoulder factor into his decision?

JB: I think I said on the radio at the time, when we drafted Max and gave him a pretty aggressive bonus, people thought we were nuts - and then, when we traded him, people thought we were nuts. He's a unique talent. He's a great make-up guy, got a lot better during his time here and has a unique fastball that makes major-league hitters swing and miss. But the ingredients of being a starting pitcher - the pitch development, the pitch efficiency, the projected durability - were questions that are somewhat unanswered at this point. There's a chance he can clear these hurdles, there's a chance he can't. I don't think it's unique to Max: it is hard to be a major-league starter, and go 200+ innings with quality, and do so consistently. Not many guys do that.

It's no real knock on Max. He's at a point in his career where to get to that next level, would be something he'd have to go out and prove. Edwin Jackson has gotten there and, again, Ian Kennedy, we feel like we got six years of a very solid starting pitcher. Not a decision we took lightly, but I think we've shown, ever since we've been here, that we put a lot of resources, trade and financial, into starting pitchers' innings, and the quality associated with that. It certainly guided this deal too.

AZ: How does a complex three-way trade like that come together?

JB: I was on the phone with (Tigers GM) Dave Dombrowski and then, probably a day later with (Yankees GM) Brian Cashman. Hatching the idea, the fundamentals of the idea - we probably got 90% of the way there, quickly. Then it was about a month of staring at each other and seeing if there were another deal, improvements or alternatives out there either club liked. I think it's like a lot of trades. You can probably create an idea that makes sense very quickly - but then, will someone actually do it? There's usually some patience involved with that.

[Part two will follow next week, with topics including our starting rotation, the rest of the West, and what remains to be addressed in Spring Training]

Non-roster invitees announced for Diamondbacks spring training

2010-02-02T18:54:17Z

More photos » Lenny Ignelzi - AP

Drew Macias tumbles after missing a diving catch when with San Diego. Now he's part of the Arizona spring-training team, along with 16 other non-roster invitees.

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The Diamondbacks announced seventeen non-roster invitees to spring training. They'll join the 40-man roster in Tucson in a couple of weeks.

Pitchers: RHP - T.J. Beam, Josh Ellis, Barry Enright, Kyler Newby, Rodrigo Lopez, Wes Roemer, Bryan Shaw and Matt Torra; LHP - Tommy Layne.
Catchers: Carlos Corporan, Sean Coughlin and Konrad Schmidt.
Infielders: Jeff Bailey and Mark Hallberg.
Outfielders: Collin Cowgill, Evan Frey and Drew Macias.

More details and analysis of the 17 men in question can now be found after the jump - and, no, I didn't read ~~Zephon's~~ I Hate South Bend's comments before writing my report...

Pitchers:

T.J. Beam - Born in Scottsdale, Beam was drafted by the Yankees in 2003. Over seven seasons in the minors, he has a decent 3.35 ERA, but got torched in Las Vegas last year with the Jays AAA affiliate. Has made 52 MLB relief appearances over two seasons, with a 5.37 ERA.
Josh Ellis - Ellis moved up from Mobile to Reno after posting a striking 1.94 ERA at Double-A. However, in 15 games for the Aces, he allowed 17 ER in 19.1 IP. Overall, he gave up 20 homers in 61 innings of work last year. Went 3-0 with a 3.44 in Venezuela this winter, so no rest for him.
Barry Enright - One of the mainstays of the Mobile rotation in 2009, Enright made 27 starts for them, going 10-9 with a 3.98 ERA. A 2007 second-round pick, see Zephon's exhaustive profile on both him and Roemer, from this site in July 2008
Kyler Newby - Kinda remarkable N00b is still about, having been the 1,485th pick of the 2004 draft [though #1,496 has made it to the majors, Chris Davis being the Rangers' regular 1B last year]. K-rate dipped sharply with his promotion to Mobile this year, and his HR rate regressed to normal too.
Rodrigo Lopez - Certainly a possible contender for the #5 spot in the rotation, and not lacking in experience with 166 starts in the majors since his 2000 debut. A career 92 ERA+, and at age 34, probably should not really be expected to get much better than "serviceable."
Wes Roemer - One of our supplemental sandwich picks from 2007, Roemer started the year at Visalia (High-A), but six solid outings and a 2.05 ERA later, he was promoted to Mobile. He made 22 starts for them, going 9-9 with a 4.28 ERA. Has a Twitter account.
Bryan Shaw - As Shaw has yet to face anyone above A+ ball, this seems more like a courtesy invite than anything else That's especially the case, as he didn't exactly light up the mound, with a 4.70 ERA over 102.2 innings of work, both as a starter and in relief.
Matt Torra - Seems to have been about forever, and after spending half of 2008 in Triple-A, was back down in Double-A for the whole of 2009. Got to like a K:BB ration better than 4:1, but turns 26 in June, and is now getting old for his level.
Tommy Layne. The sole left-hander on the list has had a busy winter. He appeared in the Arizona Fall League, and then jetted off to make two starts for Criollos de Caguas in the Puerto Rican Winter League. However, those didn't go too well, as he allowed ten hits and six walks in 5.1 innings.

Catchers:

Carlos Corporan - The guy has a 439 OPS+ in the majors! Ok, what this actually means is, he hit a single in his only at-bat to date, for the Brewers in May last year, but small sample size be damned! Pay no attention to the .244 average over seven minor-league seasons...
Sean Coughlin - Had a rather good year with the bat, in particular at Mobile, where he hit 304 with a .917 OPS, the highest numbers by any player there with 150+ PAs. The player so nice, we picked him twice: first in the 42nd round of 2006, and then again up in the 13th round of the '07 draft.
Konrad Schmidt - Despite the name, he was born in Santa Rosa, California. Was the main catcher for Visalia, where he batted (what are the odds?) .304, getting him a cup of coffee in Reno. I'm thinking probably back in Mobile for 2010.

Infielders:

Jeff Bailey - Before the arrival of LaRoche there was some discussion as to Bailey's potential value as a platoon partner for Brandon Allen. Now, he's more likely to be a substitute, though still has a shot at the 25th spot on the major-league roster.
Mark Hallberg - Saw time at both 2B and SS for Mobile. Seems to be a farm version of Augie Ojeda, with solid defense (five errors in 113 games at those two positions), but little offensive pop - a .648 OPS, with his OBP actually higher than his SLG.

Outfielders:

Collin Cowgill - Another polite invitation, given this 5th-round pick was in High-A all of last season. After tearing up short-season ball in 2008 [11 HR in just twenty games], Cowgill regressed a bit at Visalia, but stil hit .277 there, while playing both in center and right.
Evan Frey - Don't expect power from this center-fielder; after three years and 323 minor-league games, he has just four home-runs. Does have some wheels, with 81 SB in that time, though a .686 OPS in Mobile suggests he'll be there again when the season starts.
Drew Macias - Played 51 games for the Padres last year, though mustered only 90 PAs and a .197 average in that time. Didn't do much better (.232) in Triple-A, and has to be considered a long shot to be any more than Reno roster filler, unless bubonic plague hits the 40-man roster.

2010 in Arizona: Starting Pitching

2010-02-01T15:45:09Z

More photos » Ross D. Franklin - ASSOCIATED PRESS

As Webb goes, so goes our 2010?

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When Arizona has had success in the past, it has tended to be built on good starting pitching, whether the tandem of Johnson and Schilling in the early 00's, or Webb's Cy Young-worthy performance in 2007. The loss of Brandon proved disastrous for the team in 2009: while Haren stepped up, especially in the first-half of the year, our lack of rotational depth was certainly cruelly exposed. With the loss of Garland and Davis this winter, the front-office made a blockbuster trade which sent Scherzer and reliever Daniel Schlereth to Detroit, and brought in a pair of starters to fill out the middle of the Diamondbacks' rotation.

After the jump, we'll take a look back at what transpired in the year gone by, and see what we might expect in 2010, given that 60% of our rotation will have changed from Opening Day 2009.

2009 Performance
Dan Haren: 33 starts, 229.1 IP, 14-10, 3.14 ERA, 1.003 WHIP
Doug Davis: 34 starts, 203.1 IP, 9-14, 4.12 ERA, 1.505 WHIP
Max Scherzer: 30 starts, 170.1 IP, 9-11, 4.12 ERA., 1.344 WHIP
Jon Garland: 27 starts, 167.2 IP, 8-11, 4.29 ERA, 1.431 WHIP
Yusmeiro Petit: 17 starts, 89.2 IP, 3-10, 5.82 ERA, 1.517 WHIP
Billy Buckner: 10 starts, 77.1 IP, 4-6, 6.40 ERA, 1.591 WHIP

The list above is important as much for who isn't on it, as who is. Brandon Webb, who had pitched more innings in the National League than anyone else over the preceding five years, managed one start and four innings in 2009, before being shutdown - initially temporarily, then permanently, leading to surgery on his shoulder in August. His replacements did not fare well. Over a total of 37 starts, the Five-Headed Beast of Webb Replacement [Petit, Buckner, Bryan Augenstein, Daniel Cabrera and Kevin Mulvey] went 7-20 with a combined ERA of 6.11. However, Buckner fared significantly better at the end of the year, after adding a cut fastball to his repertoire.

Haren had a brilliant first three months of the season and was arguably unfairly overlooked to start the All-Star Game for the National League. However, his BABIP regressed strongly in the second-half, in part leading to an ERA of 4.62 after the break, compared to just 2.01 before it. Davis was... Well, Doug was Doug, allowing far too many base-runners, but somehow surviving. In the new millennium, three qualifyiing pitchers in the majors had a season WHIP of 1.5 or above and an ERA+ better than 110. Davis is two of them (2007 and 2009) - while, curiously, the third also played for us (Webb in 2004). Over three years here, Davis had a WHIP of 1.542 and an ERA+ of 110. No-one else, over this time with a 110 ERA+ and 300 IP, even had a WHIP at 1.4.

Scherzer certainly blossomed this year, becoming a full-time starter in the majors and striking out more than a batter per inning. He did continue to have an issue with pitch-count: his average of 4.14 per batter faced trailed only Clayton Kershaw (4.31) in the majors among qualifying starters. Finally, Jon Garland delivered a solid year, pretty much in line with what we expected from him, making 27 starts with an ERA+ of 107, before being traded to the Dodgers - in the middle of a game against them. All told, there weren't many teams in the majors who could boast four starters with 150 innings and an ERA+ of 100+ [the Cubs and Giants did too, while the Rockies had five]. However, a large part of that work was undone every fifth day, by our sub-replacement level Webb stand-ins.

Top Remaining Free Agents
Name	Age	2009 Sal.	2009 OPS+
Erik Bedard	31	$7.75m	154
Jarrod Washburn	35	$9.85m	63
Pedro Martinez	38	$1m	117
John Smoltz	42	$5.5m	69
Braden Looper	35	$4.75	77
Chance of AZ free-agent activity: v.low.

2010 Depth-chart and Projections

Dan Haren: 34 starts, 3.04 ERA, 17-7
Brandon Webb: 26 starts, 3.50 ERA, 12-7
Edwin Jackson: 34 starts, 4.07 ERA, 13-10
Bryan Augenstein: 21 starts, 4.97 ERA, 6-8
Ian Kennedy: 16 starts, 5.00 ERA, 3-5
Rodrigo Lopez: 21 starts, 5.00 ERA, 6-9
Billy Buckner: 29 starts, 5.05 ERA, 9-13

[I used ZIPS for these, as I don't have access to the Hardball Times projections for all the above - which is why the starts add up to more than 162 games] I think it probably isn't too much an exaggeration to say the Diamondbacks 2010 season hinges more on the returning Brandon Webb than any other player on the roster. If he comes back to full form - and though it's early days, the signs are hopeful - then the team's rotation could be the equal of just about anyone else in the league. A 1-2 punch of Webb and Haren provides a foundation upon which any team would be happy to build. However, an ineffectual or injured Webb would mean Jackson moves up to become our #2...and let's just say, things get decidedly murky after that. We'll be watching Opening Day on pins and needles.

With Haren, the question is going to be, whether he can sustain himself for the entire season. After 187 starts, and more than 1,200 innings, the table below gives Dan's splits for each month as we go through the year. As you'll see, he's brilliant through June, but then regresses sharply to the mean. Is it stamina? Or just chance? The latter is suggested because Haren's BABIP is consistently well below .300 for the first three months (ranging from .238 to .273), but is then above it for the last three months (.307-.340). That's odd, given this is generally supposed to be something largely outside a pitcher's control.

Split	ERA	GS	IP	H	ER	HR	BB	SO	WHIP
April/March	2.99	27	177.2	145	59	19	41	145	1.047
May	3.42	28	189.2	168	72	18	39	157	1.091
June	2.61	31	210.1	158	61	22	46	172	0.970
July	3.57	32	207.0	209	82	17	48	172	1.242
August	4.58	35	228.0	253	116	40	45	204	1.307
Sept/Oct	4.29	34	214.0	242	102	24	51	185	1.369

Perhaps almost as key as Webb will be the two new arrivals, Jackson and Kennedy, who are likely to be the #3 and #4 starters. The former is perhaps more of a known quantity, with 110 major-league starts under his belt. He certainly seemed to put it together last year in Detroit, but isn't that far removed from a poor 2007, going 5-15 with a 5.72 ERA for Tampa. He did walking a lot less people now, however, and the move to the NL should also help, though the projection systems are distinctly unimpressed - CHONE and Marcel are in the 4.3 range, with Bill James all the way up at 4.75. We'll be hoping for better than that: and in particular, that he avoids the Harenesque fall in the second half of the year, which he showed in 2009 [ERA going from 2.52 to 5.07]

The wild-card is Kennedy, who has made only 12 major-league starts, and missed a lot of playing time last season with an aneurysm in his right armpit. That shouldn't trouble him going forward, but he remains unproven. The minor-league numbers are good - 2.14 ERA over 22 starts in Triple-A - but how will he play out against major-league hitters? The final spot in the rotation appears to be Billy Buckner's at this point, based on his good form after returning from the minors in September. However, Augenstein and Lopez are other candidates, and if the latter can live up to expectation (in the 4.7 to 5.0 ERA range), would not be a bad emergency option to have in Reno.

Overall, there is the potential for Arizona to have a starting rotation second to none in the league, though this would require a lot of pieces to fall into place: Webb to be healthy, Haren avoids the second-half slump, Jackson to reproduce the form of last season, Kennedy to show he can handle major-league pitching, Buckner's cut fastball is the weapon he needed in his locker, etc. On the other hand, there is also the potential for a complete meltdown, if things go the opposite way. The reality, as in most things, is likely somewhere in the middle, but it all seems to hinge on Webb's arm. Until April, that's going to remain a huge question-mark; however, when the seasons starts, we should fairly quickly get a feel for how much our hopes have a solid foundation.

Poll

Who will be the DBacks' #5 starter for the beginning of the 2010 season?

THT's Top 10 prospects for 2010: Arizona Diamondbacks

2010-01-29T16:07:20Z

THT's Top 10 prospects for 2010: Arizona Diamondbacks

1. Jarrod Parker / SP / For Parker, everything hinges on a successful recovery from Tommy John surgery. Before the surgery he was one of the more dominant pitchers in the minor leagues. Parker has, of course, been severely downgraded, but he still fits in near the bottom of my top-100 list and at the top of Arizona's top 10.

[Please check out the link for the remainder of the top ten]

Bad Lieutenant - the only NC-17 baseball movie?

2010-01-29T15:45:10Z

About as far as imaginable from the warm fuzziness of Rookie of the Year, Abel Ferrara's tale of depravity and (somewhat) redemption none the less has baseball as a crucial component. The un-named police officer of the title (Harvey Keitel) is on a downward spiral of drugs, gambling and degeneracy, which has left him deep in debt to some very unsavory characters. A window out of his personal hell opens, in the vicious rape of a nun on the altar of her church. The $50,000 reward would solve a lot of the lieutenant's problems; but the victim doesn't want to co-operate, choosing instead to forgive her assailants.

Where does the baseball come in? Because the lieutenant is betting on the outcome of a playoff series between the Dodgers and the Mets. The Dodgers won the first three games, and he is betting on them to close out the series. The Mets, however, are no co-operating, and every victory for them, doubles the depth of the hole for the Lieutenant. I mean, we may think we have a lot invested in the Diamondbacks, but for him, "invested" is much more literal. It's not just a spiritual or mental thing: his very life actually depends on the Dodgers winning. This would certainly explain his extreme reaction when they don't. Witness the clip below [NSFW, due to language]. I'm sure we all felt the same at some point last season:

More analysis of the baseball in the film after the jump.

Despite the use of real baseball footage, featuring real players [must have been a trip explaining that to the MLB Licensing department!], the movie contains an entirely fictitious series. The film was made in 1992, a season both the Mets (72-90, 5th) and the Dodgers (63-99, 6th) will be happy to forget. And while it's generally short on period detail, it doesn't seem to be set in the past, with the Lords of Acid making an appearance on the soundtrack in a nightclub scene. At that point, the only time the Dodgers and Mets had faced off in the post-season was the 1988 NLCS. That series did go seven, but was won by the Dodgers, and neither team led by more than one game at any point. [As an aside, it's amusing how many film reviews refer to the baseball as the "World Series." Obviously, with both teams being National League, that could never happen]

The key figure in the series is Darryl Strawberry, the Dodgers slugger (he moved there, from the Mets, before the 1991 season) on whom the Lieutenant pins his hopes. This is a particularly-ironic and somewhat eerie choice, in the light of Strawberry's subsequent personal problems - in particular his own battle with drug addiction, which in some ways mirrors the Lieutenant's. At the time, however, all that was yet to come, and he was an eight-time All-Star. Just not in the Lieutenant's eyes, as Strawberry's performance is awful when it needs to be great, and great when it doesn't matter e.g. hitting a three-run homer when his team is down by eleven.

This almost willful disregard has lead some reviewers to equate Strawberry with Satan, tormenting the Christ-like figure of the Lieutenant, as he goes through his own Passion. [Nominations for the role of Satan on the 2009 Diamondbacks are now open] However, from a baseball fan perspective, the punishment is just. The Lieutenant's support of Los Angeles is impure: even as he tells his colleagues to bet on the Mets, he's betraying the local team for what he hopes will be mercenary gain. As we all (should) know, the baseball gods frown upon such shallow motives, and their wrath subsequently flows like Bud Light at a minor-league park on Nickel Beer Night. If only he'd made an offering to St. Penelope instead, he'd have been alright...

Ferrara does a very good job when it comes to fabricating the illusion of a series. The film opens with the credits rolling beneath Mike 'Mad Dog' Russo's unmistakeable voice, delivering his patented rant, saying the series ain't over till it's over. Meanwhile, one of the play-by-play announcers for the fictitious games is Hall of Fame broadcaster, the late Bob Murphy, who worked on broadcasts for the Mets from their inaugural season in 1962 all the way up until 2003. If you pay really close attention, you can occasionally spot cases where the footage and commentary do not quite match - when Strawberry hits his three-run homer, there's a flash of the scoreboard, and it doesn't tally with what the commentary say - but you really need to be paying attention.

Let's be clear: the film fully deserves its NC-17 rating. There is a lot of drug-use, with unflinching sequences of Keitel doing crack and heroin with Ferrara's co-writer, Zoe Lund (a long-term fan of both drugs, who'd not last the decade). There's also the scene where he wanders naked around his apartment, which leaves very little to the imagination, and an appallingly-sordid traffic-stop scene that I can't even describe here. I have to say, our reaction to some of the scenes was laughter - but it was a uncomfortable, defensive laughter, born of an awareness that Keitel is holding absolutely nothing back in his performance.

It is, certainly, the only baseball movie which features lengthy scenes of the central character shooting up with illegal drugs. Well, at least until they make The Barry Bonds* Story, starring Lil' Bow Wow as the young Bazza, and Michael Clark Duncan as the post-steroids one...

PECOTA projects AZ to be tied for the NL wild-card

2010-01-28T23:32:16Z

PECOTA projects AZ to be tied for the NL wild-card

Baseball Prospectus has released their PECOTA projections, which have Arizona at 85 wins. That's second in the NL West, two games back of the Dodgers, and tied for the wild-card with the Braves. If you look at the individual numbers for Arizona, it loves Upton, LaRoche, and perhaps surprisingly, Kennedy, who is projected for a 3.72 ERA. Now, admiitedly, IIRC, last year, they had us in the high-80 wins, and we know how that worked out. But for now I'll have another cup of that KoolAid.

Q+A With Josh Byrnes v2.0

2010-01-28T15:34:39Z

Q+A With Josh Byrnes v2.0

I'm pleased to report that, following up on last year's interview with D-backs GM Josh Byrnes, we'll hopefully be repeating the event next week. Already got plenty of topics to cover - quite a lot has happened since our last talk! - but please feel free to submit your questions, and I'll try to squeeze as many of them in.

Luck and the Diamondbacks

2010-01-27T15:45:09Z

More photos » Matt York - AP

Miguel Montero is tagged out by Pirates catcher Ryan Doumit after trying to score on a throwing error by Steve Pearce. That's the kind of "luck" we can do with less of in 2010.

Browse more photos »

"Nature creates ability; luck provides it with opportunity."
-- François de la Rochefoucauld

Saying the 2009 Diamondbacks' season was "unlucky" seems like a cop-out. You might counter the quote above with one from Jefferson: "I'm a great believer in luck, and I find the harder I work, the more I have of it." But there does seem to be objective evidence which suggests that misfortune between the lines cost Arizona a significant number of wins last year. After the jump, we'll look at this, and the ways in which one can try to judge some of the impact of luck on a season overall, including the Diamondbacks' record in one-run games, clutch performance, and batting average on balls in play.

Pythagorean Winning Percentage
What is it? And why should we care? I'll start with the second, since if I began with the formula, I'd have to pepper the article with Megan Fox pictures to regain people's attention. To quote baseball-reference.com, "The rationale behind Pythagorean Winning Percentage is that, while winning as many games as possible is still the ultimate goal of a baseball team, a team's run differential (once a sufficient number of games have been played) provides a better idea of how well a team is actually playing... A team's actual W-L record will approach the Pythagorean Expected W-L record over time, not the other way around." Put another way, going forward from any given point, a Pythagorean WP is a better forecaster of future performance, barring personnel issues such as injuries or trades, than their actual Win Percentage.

So, what is it? It's a formula that uses the runs scored and allowed (RS and RA) by team to work out their expected Winning Percentage. It's one of Bill James' greatest inventions - it's called 'Pythagorean', because in its most well-known form, it uses the square of RS and RA.

It works on other sports too, if you change the exponent - for basketballl's three-figure scoring, you have to use about the power of 15, not two. Also, the best fit is not exactly two; it depends on the era, and is about 1.85 now. However, you needn't worry about the specific math: this will not be on the end of year test, and it can be found on mainstream resources like ESPN's expanded standings. Below are tables for 2009 in each league which give a team's actual record, runs scored and allowed, their Pythagorean projected record based on those, the difference between the two ("Luck" - that's B-R.com's term, not mine) - and also the team's record in one run games, which we'll talk about later.

Rk	Tm	W	L	R	RA	pythWL	Luck	1Run
1	LAD	95	67	4.8	3.8	98-64	-3	28-22
2	PHI	93	69	5.1	4.4	92-70	0	24-21
3	COL	92	70	5.0	4.4	90-72	1	23-20
4	STL	91	71	4.5	4.0	90-72	0	24-21
5	SFG	88	74	4.1	3.8	87-75	0	21-22
6	FLA	87	75	4.8	4.7	83-79	3	30-20
7	ATL	86	76	4.5	4.0	90-72	-4	27-25
8	CHC	83	78	4.4	4.2	84-77	-1	16-22
9	MIL	80	82	4.8	5.0	78-84	1	20-23
10	CIN	78	84	4.2	4.5	76-86	1	19-20
11	SDP	75	87	3.9	4.7	67-95	7	23-18
12	HOU	74	88	4.0	4.8	68-94	5	24-23
13	NYM	70	92	4.1	4.7	71-91	-1	19-24
14	ARI	70	92	4.4	4.8	75-87	-5	20-27
15	PIT	62	99	4.0	4.8	67-94	-5	12-22
16	WSN	59	103	4.4	5.4	66-96	-7	22-24
	Avg	80	81	4.4	4.5	80-82		22-22

Rk	Tm	W	L	R	RA	pythWL	Luck	1Run
1	NYY	103	59	5.6	4.6	95-67	7	22-16
2	LAA	97	65	5.5	4.7	93-69	3	27-18
3	BOS	95	67	5.4	4.5	94-68	0	22-17
4	TEX	87	75	4.8	4.6	84-78	2	19-18
5	MIN	86	76	5.0	4.7	86-76	0	23-20
6	DET	86	76	4.6	4.6	81-81	4	28-21
7	SEA	85	77	4.0	4.3	76-86	8	35-20
8	TBR	84	78	5.0	4.7	86-76	-2	20-25
9	CHW	79	83	4.5	4.5	81-81	-2	19-27
10	OAK	75	87	4.7	4.7	81-81	-6	15-23
11	TOR	75	87	4.9	4.8	83-79	-8	21-28
12	CLE	65	97	4.8	5.3	74-88	-9	19-21
13	KCR	65	97	4.2	5.2	65-97	0	16-25
14	BAL	64	98	4.6	5.4	69-93	-5	17-22
	Avg	81	80	4.8	4.8	82-80		21-21

What does it tell us about the '09 Diamondbacks? That they won fewer games than teams with their number of runs scored and allowed, normally do. The team was out-scored by 0.4 runs per game - the Padres, who went 75-87, were outscored by twice as much. On the highest level, it doesn't matter: winning is what matters, and you don't get any more credit in the standings for a blowout than a squeaker. However, let's look in a little more depth at why Arizona might have underperformed.

One-run Games
After 2007, and the sterling record of the Diamondbacks in one-run games, I tended to the belief that this was the result of Bob Melvin's managerial prowess rather than blind luck. Subsequent events showed the error of those ways, as the 12-game advantage we had in one-run games during our run to the NLCS evaporated entirely in 2008; the team went 22-23 and performed exactly at their Pythagorean expected record. The trend continued in 2009, with the D-backs a disappointing 20-27 in one-run games, and with a Pythagorean record five games better than actual, at 75-87.

Might this one-run record reflect Arizona's poor play? After all, their WP there (.426) was right in line with their overall number (.432). However, it seems that isn't so. According to Tom Ruane, "How a team does one year in close games is absolutely no use in predicting how it will do the next. Things like that are usually called "the breaks of the game" or, more succinctly, luck." As virtual coin-flips, then are near-worthless as a measure of how "good" a team is. Two of the best in baseball history were the 1974 Padres and 1955 Kansas City A's, who went 31-16 and 30-15 in one-run games respectively. Their overall records? 60-102 and 63-91.

The top three teams in one-run baseball in 2008 - the Rays, Brewers and Angels - all won fewer games in 2009, in part because their one-run records all dropped (not by much in Anaheim's case, admittedly). Conversely, the worst three teams - Braves, Padres and Mariners - all won more games. Obviously, the more extreme the record, the greater the chance for regression to the mean. But even at Arizona's -7 record, history tells us odds are we'll pick up several games next year, simply by the law of averages. Looking at the chart above, I'd be taking the "under" for the 2010 Angels, Mariners and Marlins, while the Royals, Pirates and A's were the cruelest playthings of the baseball gods this time around.

Clutch hitting
This is one Mythbusters should probably cover. Certain players have a reputation of being 'clutch' - for coming through in high-pressure situations. However, study after study has shown that there is no such trait detectable in the numbers. This doesn't mean it doesn't exist - just that the random variation which is inevitable in baseball stats, is enough noise to drown out the evidence. Any player who appears clutch is basically the result of small sample size. If one hundred .280 batters get 50 at-bats in a given situation, odds are fourteen of them will hit .360 or better (18-for-50); four of them will bat .400 (20-for-50). It doesn't make them 'clutch'; it's just blind chance.

So there is no real evidence that hitting with runners in scoring position is a significantly different skill from hitting generally. Numbers will vary in any situation, as noted above, but hitters will tend to regress towards their normal numbers: if they better than their normal numbers with RISP one year, they're not likely do so the next. Conversely, if they fail with RISP, relative to their usual stats, odds are they'll do better the following season. Which brings us to the 2009 Diamondbacks. Across the NL as a whole, OPS with RISP was 23 points higher than with no-one on base, mostly due to increased walk-rate; the Diamondbacks were 12 points lower, mostly because they hit less. They were even worse with RISP and two outs, batting a mere .220.

As with one-run games, this kind of thing is probably not likely to continue. It appears that the offense generated by the Diamondbacks 'should' have created more runs. There's a number called "second-order wins" - I defer to Wikipedia on explaining this one. "To further filter out the distortions of luck, sabermetricians can also calculate a team's expected runs scored and allowed... given their total singles, doubles, walks, etc. [This] helps to eliminate the luck factor of the order in which the team's hits and walks came within an inning." When those expected RS and RA are plugged into Pythagoras, the results are called second-order wins.

Again, don't worry about the specifics. Baseball Prospectus have done the legwork, creating adjusted standings. The second-order wins are W2, and the difference to the 'actual' record is D2. For Arizona, W2 is all the way up at 79.2, a gap surpassed in the majors only by Washington, mostly because of a sharp drop in the runs we allowed. Third-order wins (W3) also adjust for strength of schedule, and give Arizona 80 victories. Now, I'm sure the usual parties will continue to sneer at all evidence the 2009 D-backs didn't suck so much as they proclaim. But I'm not the one doing the math, or who wrote,: "Second- and third-order winning percentage has been shown to predict future actual team winning percentage better than both actual winning percentage and first-order winning percentage."

Batting Average on Balls in Play
The final element in the chain is Batting Average on Balls in Play. Purple Row had a really good piece on what this is, and why it matters, but in brief: three out of ten balls put in play i.e. not home-runs will become hits. This number is surprisingly close to constant, especially for pitchers: you can beat the odds in the short-term, but the longer you go on, the tougher it gets. Case in point: remember Dan Haren's brilliant first-half? His BABIP was .233 - basically, he was getting a large leg-up from random chance. His BABIP in the second-half regressed all the way back to .315, and we know how that ended.

On the pitching side, AZ hurlers saw a BABIP of .303 - that may seem only slightly worse than the league average of .298, but only one team (Houston at .317) were above .305. So it seems this was, to at least a small degree, another area where Lady Luck was not being ladylike to Arizona. As an aside, the Los Angeles pitching staff were easily the "luckiest", with a BABIP all the way down at .280. The Dodgers are not only going to have to replace Randy Wolf, they'll also have to cope with a likely regression of that BABIP number to more normal levels. The Giants were second, at .284, so their pitching staff may also have to work a bit harder in 2010.

The situation isn't quite the same for hitters, who do have a greater degree of control over what happens after they hit the ball [Ichiro has a career BABIP of .357, compared to MLB average last year of .300]. Line drives become hits at a much greater rate (BABIP of .718 for the 2009 NL) than fly-balls (.142) or ground-balls (.235). Hit lots of line-drives, and you'll have a good BABIP. That's why it's necessary to go further than "Arizona's overall hitting BABIP was exactly at the league average," since that doesn't tell the whole picture.

If you split our hits down into the same three categories, you'll find that - hallelujah! - the Diamondbacks finally got some luck going their way. Ground balls became hits at a .252 clip, seventeen points above average, while line-drives were eleven points higher, at .729. Only fly balls were lower than average, and only by one point at .141. So, given this, how did we end up being so close to the mean overall? One big reason, courtesy of Eric Byrnes and Chris Young in particular, is that we had a lot of pop-ups, which virtually never become hits. 14% of our fly-balls never got out of the infield. No team in the National League had a higher rate, and it knocked our BABIP down significantly.

Summary, and going forward into 2010
It would, obviously, be ridiculous to claim that bad luck is all that separated the Diamondbacks from challenging for a playoff spot last year - even the W3 number has us still sitting about ten games out in the wild-card race. But there is a credible case that, even with a myriad of problems, the 2009 Diamondbacks were significantly better than their final W-L record indicated. While BABIP doesn't seem to have been a major factor, the runs they scored and allowed "should" have resulted in more wins, and their performance "should" have resulted in the opposition scoring almost forty fewer runs.

Now, you could argue that this doesn't matter: as my signature says, "Win or die", and last year, we did a good deal more of the latter than the former. However, if you accept the W3 numbers as the 'true' difference in talent between us and the wild-card Rockies, it was only 9.8 games, rather than the 22 games shown in the standings. This then suggests that closing the gap in 2010 is not such a monumental task as it first appears. Certainly, the current Vegas odds - 66/1 against the Diamondbacks winning the World Series - seem a lot better value for Arizona than those for Colorado (14/1) or San Francisco (16/1).

While still an "if", Brandon Webb returning to the average form he showed from 2006-08 (19-8, with a 3.13 ERA), would likely take care of the bulk of that gap, without taking into account any other changes or requiring further improvements. Should that happen, we may not need much good luck this season: a simple absence of bad luck could be all that's necessary for the Diamondbacks to be competitive.

Over on Beyond the Box Score, they have just done the DiamondView charts for Arizona. Each player's...

2010-01-26T22:12:40Z

Over on Beyond the Box Score, they have just done the DiamondView charts for Arizona. Each player's projection in four areas - power, OBP, base-running and defense - is graphed on a scale of 0 to 100, to create a diamond that's a nice visual representation of a player's strengths and weaknesses. Tthe gray diamond lurking in the background shows the average rating at that position.

Diamondbacks' Justin Upton to host live video chat

2010-01-26T20:58:18Z

Diamondbacks' Justin Upton to host live video chat

adidas and Eastbay have partnered to host a live online chat with Arizona Diamondbacks star Justin Upton on Wednesday at 4 p.m. Arizona time. Fans will have the opportunity to ask the 2009 National League All-Star questions on any topic and view his live responses via video at http://www.eastbay.com/adidas. adidas and Eastbay will also host gear giveaways during the live chat.

2010 in Arizona: The Bench

2010-01-25T21:57:49Z

More photos » Ross D. Franklin - AP

Ryan Roberts prepares to start a double play on June 11.

Browse more photos »

Having recovered from the sheer exhaustion brought about by the film festival [we're now in the post-event "Thank God that's over" stage, though from past experience, this will be replaced in about two weeks by the "When's the next one?" phase], it's back to baseball. This time, we're looking at the Arizona bench: this wasn't originally scheduled to be a piece on its own, since we've covered most of the contenders when looking at the individual positions. However, the departure of Eric Byrnes leaves us with a spot on the roster up for grabs.

After the jump we'll take a look at the four men whose butts - good health permitting - are likely to be most acquainted with the planks for the Diamondbacks in 2010, and the options open as far as the 25th man goes.

2009 Performance
Gerardo Parra: 120 games, .290/.324/.404
Ryan Roberts: 110 games, .279/.367/.416
Augie Ojeda: 103 games, .246/.340/.345
Alex Romero: 66 games, .248/.306/.338
Chris Snyder: 61 games, .200/.333/.352

The Diamondbacks' bench spots were hard to designate in 2009, with Parra and Roberts basically everyday players by season's end, while original starter Snyder had been benched in favor of Miguel Montero. Chris's year to forget was thanks to a combination of injury and (possibly related) ineffectiveness, so we'll let him off the hook for further analysis as a result of that. Of the others above, Roberts and Ojeda certainly justified their roster spots and salaries, contributing 2.0 and 1.5 WAR respectively - Parra (0.3 WAR) and Romero (0.0), not so much.

One area where we definitely failed to produce was in the pinch-hitting department. Our men off the bench posted a collective feeble line of .190/.283/.345: even without adjusting for park factors, the resulting OPS of .628 was raned 13th in the National League. This may explain why we used twenty-five different pinch-hitters in the 267 PAs, including three-fifth of our starting rotation. Chad Tracy led the way with 33, and was the most effective semi-regular in the role, hitting .276/.364/.621. Roberts was the only other person with more than 25 PAs as a pinch-hitter; least-effective in the role was probably Romero, who went 5-for-24 with one walk and no extra-base hits. [Though in ten pinch PAs, Parra made ten outs, one a sac. fly]

2010 Prospects
There isn't really the concept of a "depth chart" here, since it's not as if Gerardo Parra and Chris Snyder are going to be competing for playing-time. So, in lieu of what I've done with the other positions, we'll just list the players in alphabetical order, discuss where they'll play on the field, and how they might be used.

Augie Ojeda.
Likely positions: SS, 2B, 3B. Projection: .250/.332/.336
There was some discussion earlier this winter as to whether Ojeda might be traded, speculation which reached a peak after the signing of Kelly Johnson, which appeared to push Augie out of a role. However, the team has no need to trade Ojeda, and it seems the offers that have come Arizona's way to date, have fallen short of acceptable, so it looks likely he will be part of the team, at least through spring-training. Since coming to Arizona, has spent more time at second than anywhere else. At the moment, however, he is close to the sole back-up of proven major-league quality to Stephen Drew, Tony Abreu being largely untested at the position. His defense will be his main strength again, and Augie may see more work as a late-inning replacement, than as a pinch-hitter.

Gerardo Parra
Likely positions: CF, LF, RF. Projection: .272/.321/.381
The return of Jackson and departure of Byrnes means that, all being well, Parra should return to a role as the Diamondbacks' fourth outfielder in 2010. That may not mean too much of a reduction in his playing time, since he has the capacity to play all three spots, and is the only left-handed bat in the bunch. So he should still see his share of starts - just not against left-handed pitching, until he shows he can handle it. This is something he certainly failed to do last season, though age is certainly still on Parra's side at this point. Another factor in how much we see of Parra will be Chris Young's performance: if good Chris (or, at least, semi-decent Chris) doesn't turn up, Young may find himself placed in a platoon role with Parra, and only seeing southpaws.

Ryan Roberts
Likely positions: 2B, 3B, LF. Projection:.250/.333/.379
Going into the off-season, Roberts looked to have a good chance of being Arizona's starting second-baseman in 2010, having done sterling work (a second-half line, in 52 starts, of .290/.374/.465) after taking over from Felipe Lopez at the position. The arrival of Johnson has changed that, returning Roberts to an anticipated role of a utility guy. He'll back up Johnson, and also can cover for Mark Reynolds at third. Roberts killed left-handed pitching last season (.325/.406/.547, albeit in a small sample-size), and this will likely govern when he replaces the left-handed Johnson. It's also possible that the team may try to get his bat in the line-up in the outfield, moving Conor Jackson to first and playing Roberts in left, where he performed credibly enough in 2009.

Chris Snyder
Likely position: C, 1B? Projection: .233/.333/.410
Nick Piecoro recently floated the idea of trading Snyder to the Mets, giving both the cases in favor and against that move. At this point, I'm inclined to hold onto Snyder: the pitching that's available for the money we'd save from Snyder, doesn't feel like it's an automatic upgrade over Billy Buckner v2.cutfastball, and Snyder's defensive skills and rather more proven ability than Montero to hit lefties, are worth keeping. Earlier this winter Zephon floated the idea of trying Snyder out at first: this was, of course, before the arrival of Adam LaRoche to replace Brandon Allen, which has certainly lessened the need for such a move. It still might prove marginally worth considering - we did see Snyder at first for four innings last year, also one of the four games where Dan Haren PH'd - but seems unlikely.

The 25th spot
As noted above, the departure of Byrnes gives the team a little more flexibility with regard to the last spot on the roster. They could even abandon position players entirely, and go with an eighth arm in the bulpen. They did this last season, for quite some time - and given how little playing time the 13th position player is likely to get i.e. not very much, there is certainly something to be said for going the other way. This is, of course, providing that we have an additional bullpen pitcher that's good enough, but with the arrival of Bob Howry and Aaron Heilman, we do seem to have more depth than in 2009.

If we decide to stop with seven relievers, then there's still flexibility to be had. With the Parra the only full-time outfielder, one may want to lean towards backing him up with Cole Gillespie. However, Roberts' ability to play LF may be deemed sufficient to start with. We don't have anyone immediately obvious to spell LaRoche at first - not without causing a hole elsewhere e.g. moving Reynolds from third, or Jackson from left, so the highly-touted (by CHONE, anyway), Jeff Bailey may be used as a right-handed alternate. Or, we could even add Tony Abreu to the roster as another option on the middle-infield. It's likely nothing will be decided until well into spring training.

Poll

What kind of player gets the 25th spot?

A 1B backup e.g. Allen, Bailey

24 votes

A middle-infielder e.g. Abreu, Ryal

92 votes

An outfielder e.g. Gillespie

16 votes

A relief pitcher e.g. Rosales, Vasquez

66 votes

198 votes | Poll has closed

All Dbacks SGA bobbleheads

2010-01-24T17:18:13Z

I finally managed to finish my collection (thanks to some dummy selling a Gonzo for 10 dollars on eBay). Not bragging of course, just thought Dbacks fans would like to check it out.

Back to front, left to right: Johnny Estrada (2006), Brandon Webb (2006), Richie Sexson (2004), Bob Brenly (2002), Randy Johnson (2001), Chad Tracy (2006), Steve Finley (2002), Curt Schilling (2002), Randy Johnson (2002 Cy Young version), Tony Womack (2001), Junior Spivey (2003), Matt Williams (2001), Craig Counsell (2003), Luis Gonzalez (2002 Home Run Derby Champ version), Luis Gonzalez (2001), Baxter (2003), Mark Grace (2001, player).

Back to front, left to right: Orlando Hudson (2007), Carlos Quentin (2007), Randy Johnson (2007), Micah Owings (2008), Chris Young (2008), Bob Melvin (2008), Eric Byrnes (2008), Dan Haren (2008), Justin Upton (2009), Stephen Drew (2009), Chris Snyder (2009), Mark Reynolds (2009), Augie Ojeda (2009), Mark Grace (2007, broadcaster), Brandon Webb (2007 Cy Young version), Conor Jackson (2007)

According to my research, these should be all of them (excluding the Johnson-Schilling double feature, but it was only available to season ticket holders, hence not a "true" SGA). If I happen to be missing any, please let me know.

Also, taking bets on who is going to be immortalized this year, assuming

How do you mend a broken sports heart?

2010-01-24T05:00:26Z

Pretty silly question:

As those who know me can tell, this off season has become the "Break mrssoco's heart" off season, where I can't help but think that they lurk my blog, find who I like and then axe em as soon as possible. (This tin-hat goes with my eyes, don't you think?)

But I'm not experienced with this! And soco's helpful, "That's the game" attitude aside I am really pretty bummed. If Byrnes signs with the Brewer's I might just be doomed. What's going on here folks? I don't even know half the players and the players I do know interest me about as much as a room full of flattened cardboard boxes. How do you manage that? In your past experiences what have you done to mend an albeit silly but sports related broken heart? How do you stay with a team that you love with all your heart when the players that matter to you aren't there anymore?

What are some of the players/ seasons (for any sport) that have left you feeling the team "blues"?

[OT] 1/23: Phoenix Fear Film Festival moves to Tempe

2010-01-22T23:56:29Z

[OT] 1/23: Phoenix Fear Film Festival moves to Tempe

In case you missed the ongoing plug in the side-bar, here's another gratuitous and off-topic mention of where Mrs. SnakePit and I will be spending all of tomorrow, watching over our little gore-splattered baby... If it's anything like the previous two events, should be a lot of fun, but it might be a while before we want to see any more films...

Justin and B.J. on MLB Network

2010-01-22T22:04:41Z

Justin and B.J. on MLB Network

This is my first fanshot...maybe I'll quit lurking and start posting.

Evaluating baseball managers - a chat with Chris Jaffe

2010-01-22T15:45:08Z

More photos » Gene J. Puskar - AP

Tony La Russa - the best current manager?

Browse more photos »

As we saw in Arizona last year, managing a baseball team is not the most secure of professions. Indeed, the managers of both teams in the 2007 NL Championship Series, lauded for taking their mid-market outfits as far as they did, found themselves out of work during the first half of the 2009 season. It's probably fair to say that managers get a lot of credit with regard to things for which they are not responsible. Yet, equally, they get blamed for things over which they have little or no control. Is it possible to be more rigorous with regard to analyzing a manager's performance?

Chris Jaffe, best known for his work on The Hardball Times, thinks so. His new book, Evaluating Baseball's Managers, takes a look at 89 managers, most of whom managed ten seasons or more as a team's primary manager. He uses various metrics to establish a manager's tendencies - fan of small ball or prefers to wait for the three-run homer? - and then discusses the approaches they used, along with some of the key issues faced during their tenure, and an analysis of how well they were handled. It's an approach that does break new ground on one of the less-explored areas of sabermetric research, and Jaffe was kind enough to answer a few questions on his work for the SnakePit.

Where did the idea come from?
In the summer of 2005 I attended SABR’s annual conference in Toronto. While there, I saw a presentation by a sabermetric researcher named Phil Birnbaum, who had assembled a database which determined how teams over/underachieved in the course of a single season.

The parts of his database that really caught my eye were two algorithms he’d created to figure if a player under/overachieved in a given season by looking at how he did in the surrounding season.

Say you wanted to figure how Luis Gonzalez’s 2001 performance compared with the surrounding seasons. First, take his performances in 1999, 2000, 2002, and 2003, and calculate Runs Created for them and adjust those numbers for park and league average. You use them to figure how he should have done in 2001 by taking a weighted average of those seasons. (By weighted I mean the inner years – 2000 and 2002 in this example – are worth twice as much as the outer ones, 1999 and 2003 here). Then regress to the mean, adjust for Gonzalez’s playing time in 2001 and it says he overachieved by 40 runs in 2001.

Phil had a similar formula for pitchers, based on another Bill James stat – Component ERA. James described this stat as the Runs Created against a particular pitcher, and that’s pretty much what it is, thus a good one to use alongside Runs Created itself. The algorithms are by no means perfect, but they give a dang good quick’n’dirty idea how a player over/underachieved. As an added bonus, since Birnbaum’s formula uses previous and succeeding seasons, the player’s course on the aging curve is accounted for. (Not perfectly accounted for, but acceptably so).

These formulas struck me as brilliant. I’ve had the sense that in-depth baseball analysis has missed a lot of what made managers important. I’ve seen numerous terrific studies of managers looking at their ability to fill out a lineup card, or the feasibility of bunting or many other similar factors. The ability to handle in-game strategic notions has been the best analyzed part of the game, in part because it’s the easiest to analyze.

That’s struck me as a bit off, though. My contention is that managers are primarily managers of men, and only secondarily of the game. Aeons ago, Rob Neyer wrote a column as ESPN where he asked a GM or two what they discuss when interviewing would-be managers, and was told communication was the top item of interest. At SABR’s 2008 convention, Cleveland GM Ron Shapiro said the most important parts of the job were communication, self-awareness, and prioritization. All of those things deal with the clubhouse, not the in-game strategy. I don’t think any of these insights are particularly shocking, but it’s still worthy of note – the behind the scenes stuff matters the most, even though it’s the hardest for us to study or quantify.

I think the Birnbaum Database gives us an insight to this, however. It can teach you about both coaching individual players and handling the overall roster.

That said, one key bit of irony exists: Phil called his database the "Luck Database." His presentation in SABR 2005 used it to determine what are the luckiest teams ever. I think luck clearly plays a role, but think it’s incorrect to say all variation is luck. For example, if you look at teams run Earl Weaver or Bobby Cox in the database (Phil has been nice enough to share his full results with me), they constantly overachieve. Alternately, Don Baylor’s teams always do terribly. Some results are surprising, but there is a sense that managers matter.

I actually ran a quick test to see if there was any evidence the Birnbaum Database (I call it that because I think it covers more than just luck) tells us anything about managers. I took the entire run of the database – from the 1890s until the 21st century – and divided all games into four categories: 1) games where the team’s skipper lasted 2000+ games in his career, 2) those helmed by a manager who lasted 1000-1999 games, 3) 500-999 game managers, and 4) 499 or less.

My contention was simple: if the Birnbaum Database indicated managerial skill, it would look different than if it indicated luck. In both cases, the 499s would do worst – they were either terrible or unlucky. However, if it’s skill, the 2000s should be best. If it’s luck, they should be the most even. After all, to manage 2000 games is a 13+ season sample size – and 2000 games is just the minimum requirement for making the group. If it’s skill, the gap between 500s and 1000s should be the smallest. They’re the two most average groups of managers. If it’s luck the 2000s/1000s gap should be smallest – it’s sample size.

All the above rests on one assumption: there is some sort of correlation between length of tenure and skill of manager. As assumptions go, that’s one I feel extremely safe in making. Some real dogs last a long time and some short-career guys should have lasted longer, but on the whole the 2000s are a lot better than the 499s. The results came back verifying the notion that the Birnbaum Database indicates managerial skill.

What tools do you use to separate a manager’s performance from other causes?
Actually, I start from the premise it’s impossible to separate a manager perfectly from his environment. In fact, I think it’s a fundamentally false notion to do so. A manager’s value is less about himself as a singular individual and more about how he works in his given environment.

There are a bunch of numbers in the book – from the Birnbaum Database, from my own creation called the Tendencies Database (which looks at how managers handled specific portions of the game), from various other places – but none of the numbers inform us exclusively about the manager. I think this is one reason why there has been limited sabermetric focus on managers aside from in-game tactics. It’s tough to get a perfectly clear view. I can accept that because imperfection is not a synonym for useless.   Heck, the Birnbaum Database itself was first created to look at luck, not managerial skill. And in fact, when looking only at one season, it does tell us far more about luck than anything else.

If I can’t separate a manager from other influences, I can at least try to limit it. One way I try to do this is with sample sizes. As noted above, one Birnbaum’ed season mostly tells you about luck. So I rarely look at just one season’s worth of data in it. I look at career length info. When you have 2000 or so games for someone like Davey Johnson and it shows he got a lot out of his individual hitters, that’s a bit more meaningful. Sample sizes come in especially handy when using the Tendencies Database. I’ll only run a manager through it if he lasted at least ten seasons as a primary manager.

I’ll also mostly look at the extreme results at either end. A manager who ranks third best ever with individual hitters or pitchers probably has some luck going for him – but more than that he must have been doing a heckuva job with those men. Mostly, though, I try to limit the noise from the signal by just being aware of possible complicating factors. I’ve always been a firm believer that the analysis really starts after you have the numbers, not in coming up with the data.

You say managers are first and foremost managers of men. Managing the game is only a secondary job function. Were you able to take this into account in your analysis? Is it possible to measure objectively the former skill?
It’ll never be possible to perfectly analyze managing’s "softer skills side" (for lack of better way of putting it). A certain degree of uncertainty and inexactitude will forever remain. Personally, I’m more interested in the broad picture than the exact details, though. It’s more a matter of dealing with the static than eliminating it.

Could you detect any common patterns in the approaches taken by good and/or bad managers?
It’s like I tell my students when they ask me if they have a good idea for a paper: any idea can go wrong, and any halfway decent idea can go right. You can find small ball managers and take’n’rake-rs. Those that lead with pitching and those with offense. Bullpen backers and heavy users of their rotation. Some use their bench and others rely on their starters. Any particular approach can be used successfully. And they can all be used unsuccessfully.

In his book on managers, Bill James says that the only indispensable quality for a manager to have is the respect of the players. I’d agree with that. Heck, I'd better – that quote begins the book, just before the acknowledgments page.

You said of former Arizona manager Buck Showalter that he "does not like small ball: his batters do not bunt and his runners do not steal," while noting that he had the worst record in one-run games among ten-year managers since 1920. Do you think these are connected?
It could be, but I’m a bit skeptical. He’s 220-244: if you flip a dozen of those 464 games, he’s at .500. A lot times, the info I put in the "Team Characteristics" section of each manager’s commentary (which is where the Buck Showalter 1-run game thing can be found) are merely interesting tid-bits. One of my favorite ones is noting that Lou Piniella presided over more 50-double performances than any manager in history. It isn’t terribly important, but it’s fun.

Arizona got a lot of flak last season for hiring for hiring AJ Hinch, a man without previous experience. How much did your studies show that experience makes a difference to managerial success?
It’s always better to have experience, but then again everyone’s got to get started somehow. The only real problem I can see is if it costs him the respect of players. If he has enough personal qualities, that shouldn’t be an issue, and it might not be anyway depending on the mix of men they have in the clubhouse. You and all your readers would know more about this than I would for the Arizona squad.

Looking across history, being a manager without experience is more a matter of the era. Way back in the day, managers were often player-managers, and not always particularly old players, either. Fred Clarke was less than 25 when he first filled out a lineup card, for instance. I’m not sure any team would dare try that now. A team can always veer from the norm in hiring managers (in some ways its an advantage if you think the norm doesn’t mean too much), but coming with it will be some extra baggage that will have to be dealt with.

In terms of games won or lost per year, how much difference do you think a good manager now makes over a bad one?
In general, a few/couple games. Most managers aren’t that wildly different from each other. That said, it could potentially be more.

Well, sort of. What I mean is that a manager can be worth more based on how he interacts with the team. In and of himself he isn’t worth more than what I said above, but he can make a substantially larger impact than that. Get the right man in the right situation, and you can see a Billy Martin-esque improvement. Alternately, the wrong man in the wrong slot can kill a team.

Who is the best manager, both all-time and currently?
Easy one: Joe McCarthy. He may not be as closely associated with the job as John McGraw, but there was none finer than McCarthy. In over 20 seasons of managing, he never had a losing season - not even in his partial seasons. That's almost impossible. In comparison, among the dozens of guys with more than five seasons managed, only one other guy always had a winning season. McCarthy was over 20 years. He had a plan to win, implemented it as effectively as possible, and kept doing it year after year, with more than one franchise.

Tony LaRussa is the best manager since World War II. He's been consistently among the best managers in the game for almost three decades now, continually getting the most out of his players year after year, team after team. At this point he's managed more games than John McGraw: did anyone ever think they'd see a manager do that?

Evaluating Baseball’s Managers
A History and Analysis of Performance in the Major Leagues, 1876–2008
by Chris Jaffe
ISBN 978-0-7864-3920-1
tables, appendices, bibliography, glossary, index
333pp. softcover (7 x 10) 2010
Price: $39.95 - Buy from publisher

For more information and some excerpts, please check out the book's website.