Beyond the Box Score

Anthony Rizzo, Balk Rule, Troy Tulowitzki, Baseball Politics, and More - Rob's Mailbag, Episode 5

2012-05-24T18:40:14Z

Anthony Rizzo, Balk Rule, Troy Tulowitzki, Baseball Politics, and More - Rob's Mailbag, Episode 5

Why the Phillies Should Trade Cole Hamels

2012-05-24T13:00:18Z

It’s almost the end of May and the Philadelphia Phillies sit in last place of the NL East. Their record isn’t horrible, and their offense has been crippled by injuries to Ryan Howard and Chase Utley, but their slow start has caused Ruben Amaro, Jr. to make some surprising comments to the media about the July trading deadline, "We just have to get on track. But if July comes and we’re playing like this, we’ll be sellers." If the Phillies’ struggles continue and they end up actually selling come late-July their star left-hander, Cole Hamels, who will become a free agent after this season, could be a valuable piece to move.

It has been rumored that Hamels’ agent has asked the Phillies for a 7-year contract extension. The claim of that particular rumor is that the Phillies agreed to the annual salary, but not the 7-year length. My best guess for the deal Cole is looking for probably has an AAV of around $20 million, as Roy Halladay and Cliff Lee’s contracts have AAV’s in that range. A 7-year deal may seem preposterous to Philadelphia right now; however, we don’t know what the climate of the baseball world will be like this off-season, as some of baseball’s biggest spenders have had rough starts. If big spending teams don't make the playoffs, some crazy money could end up being thrown around in free agency, making a 7-year contract to a pitcher like Hamels well within the spectrum of possibility.

Signing any player into his mid-30's for over $100 million is a risky move for any baseball organization. Barry Zito's 7-year $126 million contract with San Francisco is enough to make any organization wary of making the same mistake. Zito signed that deal prior to his age-29 season, the same age Hamels will be in 2013. However, Hamels is a much safer bet than Zito was at the time of his contract. Hamels is still in the middle of his age-28 season, but currently in his career he has amassed 1223.2 IP (189 career starts) with 79 ERA-, 84 FIP-, 81 xFIP-, good for a total of 24.8 fWAR. When Zito signed with the Giants he had 1430.1 IP (222 career starts) a 80 ERA-, 95 FIP- for a total of 24.2 fWAR. Since xFIP data became available (2002), Zito's xFIP- makes him look even worse, as his xFIP- from 2002 until he signed with the Giants was 105, 24 points worse than Hamels. The numbers show that Hamels has been a much more effective pitcher than Zito was before signing his massive contract, but is just being better than Zito enough to justify a 7-year contract?

Of course not, in order for a team to give Hamels a 7-year/$140 million deal, they would have to believe that he would at least be a 4-win player for the first half of the deal and a 3-win player at the back-end.

Hamels became a full time starter, in 2007, and since then he's been a 4-win pitcher (based on fWAR) on average, with his best season coming last year (his age-27 season) when he posted a WAR of 4.9. In his contract year, this season, he’s pitching better than ever. His current ERA (2.17) is better than he’s put up in any season and his xFIP (2.89) and SIERA (2.77) show that his very low ERA is pretty legitimate, and will in all likelihood stay below-3. Hamels' 2012 K-rate (9.53) and K/BB ratio (5.08) are both above his career highs, this is due in large part to the second highest swinging strike rate of his career (13%), and the highest among all qualified starters in baseball at the moment.

All signs point to Hamels being in his prime, right now; which is what we would expect from a pitcher during his age-27 to 30 seasons. A contract of seven years in length, would run through Hamels' age-35 season; thus, paying for past-prime decline seasons. In order to be a 3-win player at the back-end of my projected contract, Hamels would have to make adjustments in his approach, as any good, but aging, pitcher must. The main adjustment he'll have to make will deal with the inevitable decrease in his velocity as he ages. As shown in the impressive research of Bill Petti and Jeff Zimmerman, the steepest decline in velocity occurs for pitchers during the ages that Hamels is looking to be signed for. Hamels will need to offset this decrease in velocity with good location and movement. I'm no scout, but I wouldn't be surprised if Hamels is smart enough to make those adjustments and still be an above-average starter in his mid-30's.

Hamels is really good right now, and in my opinion he's going to continue being very good as he crosses the age-30 threshold. But that shouldn't stop the Phillies from moving him.

The Phillies are in last place of the NL East and are the only team currently below .500 in that division. Baseball Prospectus' adjusted standings have the Phillies in third place, which is obviously better than last, but their playoff odds are only 34.3%. A one in three chance of making the playoffs isn't very good at all, and is probably what has caused Amaro to make comments about selling at the deadline.

Even if the Phillies are a playoff contender, or even are a lock to make the playoffs, I still think trading Hamels during this season makes sense for two reasons.

The Phillies offense isn't good enough to win in the playoffs even if they make it. Just making the playoffs is not enough for Philadelphia fans; they expect a World Series or the season was a complete bust. Currently their team wRC+ is 96 and wOBA is .313; which is slightly worse than their offense last season, which wasn't strong enough to get out of the NLDS. A (possible) return of Utley and Howard, might be enough to put Philadelphia into the playoffs, but not enough to make them a championship team, because those players are mere shells of their former selves at this point.

Keeping Hamels in Philadelphia instead of trading him does not make sense financially, which is even more important than whether or not the Phillies make the playoffs. The 2008 World Series championship turned the Phillies from above-average spenders to a super-power among MLB payrolls. The Phillies' average payroll for the four seasons prior to 2008 ('04-07) was $91,387,845, while their average payroll in the four seasons since that championship is over $60 million higher ($155,021,356). Phillies currently have the third highest payroll in baseball, just over $172 million, which is the highest payroll in the history of their organization. In 2008, they had the 12th-highest payroll in baseball (just over $100 million). In each season since, they've never had a payroll lower than fourth-highest. This massive increase in spending has left Philadelphia with some serious payroll obligations for the next five seasons.

Below I've posted a chart with with the payroll obligations for the Phillies from 2013-17, based on four different scenarios:

	Phillies Payroll Obligations
Year	No Options/No Hamels	Options/No Hamels	No Options/Hamels	Options/Hamels
2013	$112.636 million	$127.136 million	$132.636 million	$147.136 million
2014	$74 million	$94 million	$94 million	$114 million
2015	$68 million	$74 million	$88 million	$94 million
2016	$37.5 million	$52.5 million	$57.5 million	$72.5 million
2017	$10 million	$23 million	$30 million	$43 million

The first two columns show how much money the Phillies already owe to players if Hamels were to sign with another team in 2013, with the first showing their obligations if they do not exercise any club options, and the second has their obligations if all of those options were exercised. The players with options are: Ty Wigginton (2013), Carlos Ruiz (2013), Jose Contreras (2013), Halladay (2014), Jimmy Rollins (2015), Lee (2016), Jonathon Papelbon (2016), and Howard (2017). I assume Philadelphia will exercise a good majority of these options, and in the cases of Rollins, Lee, Papelbon, Halladay the options become automatic if those players accumulate a certain amount of playing time, so Philly won't really have a choice.

The final two columns reflect their obligations if Hamels is signed to a 7-year $140 million contract, the third column again with no options being exercised and the fourth with all eight becoming effective. The crazy aspect of these numbers is that the obligations are extremely high, yet do not include Hunter Pence's 2013 final year of arbitration, or any arbitration years of Phillies' youngsters, such as Antonio Bastardo, Kyle Kendrick, John Mayberry, Jr., and Vance Worley. Also, the numbers on the table show payrolls before any new free agent signings, or re-signings of current players when they become free agents again over these five seasons.

The Phillies have a ridiculous amount of money committed to a small numbers of players for the next couple of seasons. An extension or re-signing of Hamels could push their payroll to even higher levels than their franchise record payrolls of the past four seasons. Keeping Hamels around for five to seven more seasons would seriously handcuff their front office, in terms of going after free agent talent, unless they would be willing to cross the $200 million dollar payroll plateau and reach spending heights that only the Yankees understand.

Matt Swartz wrote a brilliant article for Fangraphs, about how much of Major League team's WAR comes in the form of NM WAR (non-market WAR), or from cost-effective players who have yet to become eligible for free agency. Swartz discusses how important the combination of a high payroll and a good farm system is to being a playoff team. This seems pretty obvious, but the Phillies should understand this as much if not more than any other team. Their 2008 World Series team had a fairly high payroll, but was flushed with home grown talent.

Four of the top six hitters (Howard, Utley, Rollins, and Pat Burrell) on that team, in terms of WAR, were drafted by the Phillies, and the other two players, Jayson Werth and Shane Victorino were acquired before they had compiled enough Major League service to be eligible for free agency. Hamels was their most valuable pitcher, by far, that season, and he also was a product of Phildelphia's farm system, who made just $500k that season.

Yet, the Phillies' current organization does not seem to understand this winning formula, as their farm system is well below-average. Their system ranks 20th on Fangraphs, 24th according to minorleagueball.com, and probably the most respected name in prospects, Baseball America, has them ranked 27th best in baseball. The Phillies want to reach their fans' lofty expectations, and in order to do that I think it's time to start reloading that system, and Hamels is the trade candidate who gives them the best opportunity to help begin that process.

In my opinion, the 2010 trade of Lee from the Seattle Mariners to the Texas Rangers is a solid comp to the current situation with Philadelphia. Lee's Mariners were expected to compete for the title in 2010, but were underwhelming (to say the least) that season. Lee also was becoming a free agent after the 2010 season, and there was a good chance that Seattle and Texas would not sign him, but were still able to workout a trade. That off-season Lee would sign a six-year contract, with Philadelphia, worth either $132.5 or $147.5 million, depending on whether or not Lee's option for 2016 is bought out or exercised.

This sounds fairly similar to what is going on with the 2012 Phillies and Hamels. While Lee was becoming a free agent at age 32, three years older than Cole would be when (if) he hits free agency, their similarities are closer than you'd expect. Lee had1300.1 career MLB IP when he was traded, and Cole projects to have about 1270 IP at this seaon's deadline. So despite the three year difference in age, they had similar major league "mileage" on their arms. In July of 2010, Lee he had a career WAR of 26.9, at the trade deadline this season Cole should have about a career WAR around 26, as well. Hamels may even be a better than Lee was at that time, as his career ERA-, FIP-, and xFIP- are better than Lee's before he was traded in 2010.

In that deal, Seattle sent Lee and Mark Lowe for Justin Smoak, Blake Beavan, Josh Lueke, and Matt Lawson. The names of those then-Texas prospects may not jump out at you, but at the time Smoak was the centerpiece of that trade. Before 2010, Kevin Goldstein ranked Smoak as a five-star prospect, and he was baseball's 13th-best prospect, according to Baseball America, ahead of names like Madison Bumgarner, Starlin Castro, Jeremy Hellickson, Aroldis Chapman, and many more. Smoak hasn't turned into the great player he was expected to be (a career 94 OPS+ at 1B isn't going to cut it in the majors), but he's only 25 and still has time to mature into a solid ballplayer.

Beavan was the Rangers' 16th best prospect at the time and has posted a 4.60 SIERA and 4.57 xFIP in 23 career MLB starts for Seattle, and he's only 23. Lawson is now out of baseball, while Lueke was flipped for catcher John Jaso. The key to this trade was not only that Smoak was supposed to be the future franchise 1B for Seattle (which he still could be), but mainly because the Mariners received young cost-effective talent for a pitcher that they could not afford in free agency, and they had no (real) use for during the second half.

Philadelphia is probably not a true contender and trying to resign Hamels does not make financial sense, thus the Phillies' organization would be smart to make a similar deal. It's been rumored that the Toronto Blue Jays have inquired about Hamels. They're looking for starting pitching help, they've asked about Zack Greinke and Matt Garza as well, to help compliment Brandon Morrow and Ricky Romero as they attempt to make the playoffs for the first time since they beat the Phillies in the '93 World Series. Toronto has a better than usual chance at making the playoffs, with the Yankees and Red Sox both looking weaker and the new wild card system. Hamels could give them a serious boost, and the Jays have the prospect depth to make a move similar to the Lee deal happen.

Toronto has a loaded system, ranking 2nd, 1st and 5th at Fangraphs, MIB.com, and Baseball America, respectively. The Phillies' organization seriously lacks hitting prospects, and Toronto's top two prospects are C Travis d’Arnaud and OF Anthony Gose. D'Arnaud and Gose are both former first/second round picks of Philadelphia that were traded in packages for Halladay and Roy Oswalt, respectively. With Ruiz and Victorino set to become free agents in either 2012 or '13 a move to bring one these top prospects back in a package of other low-cost youngsters could be the first major step for Phillies to rebuild a bad farm system, and get back on track for World Series contention.

My final point is about the uncertainty surrounding this situation. Philadelphia doesn't seem to be comfortable giving Hamels a 7-year contract, which will probably lead to Hamels hitting the open market. And if he does hit the open market and Philadelphia still wants to bring him back, no matter how much it could hurt their financial future, there's a chance that they still won't sign him. Two examples of this I could easily see happening are the Red Sox organization being desperate enough to give Hamels seven years, or he signs a six-year deal with a team who offered more money than Philadelphia.

Then Philadelphia would be stuck with a bad farm system, that has three or four less players than it should have, one less ace, a huge payroll, and what would they have to show for it?

Only one meaningless half-season from Hamels that did not result in a World Series trophy.

All Statistics from Fangraphs. All Contractual Information from Baseball Prospectus' Compensation tables and Cot's Contracts.

Poll

Would the Phillies be smart to trade Cole Hamels?

Wins Above Replacement: Distribution and Rarity of Talent 2011

2012-05-23T18:59:57Z

73% of all players produce between -1 and +1 WAR. Still.

Breakdown after the jump.

Way, way back in November of 2010, I posted a little saber-graphic that was created in an effort to find the commonality of one-win-above-replacement players. To find a coherent answer, the question had to be broadened to find the general distribution of players across the spectrum of WAR, since the number of players at any single integer is actually quite small (in 2010, there were exactly twelve one-WAR players).

The result of the study showed that the majority of all players (73%) fell between negative one and positive one wins above replacement, while players earning more than one WAR were surprisingly rare.

Revisiting that study with data from 2011 (courtesy of our friends at Fangraphs) shows the same. This time, I've included positional-only and pitcher-only graphics (both below) and a total distribution graphic (featured above), whereas last time the study only included positional players.

All players (more than zero IP and zero PA) are included.

The players above 6 WAR: Ellsbury, Kemp, Bautista, Pedroia, Braun, Kinsler, M. Cabrera, Granderson, Gordon, Votto, Zobrist, A.Gonzalez, J. Upton, Tulowitzki, J. Reyes, Longoria, B. Phillips.

The players above 6 WAR: Halladay, Sabathia, Verlander, Kershaw, Lee, Haren.

Ideas for future study (outside of the parameters of this) could be to compare WAR distribution to salary distribution with the goal of constructing a WAR-optimized roster at the lowest cost, which is itself somewhat futile since most high-WAR/low-salary guys will be at or before arbitration. But still, it's probably worth noting that the majority of value is between 1 and 4. Until next time.

A PITCHf/x Look at Eight Rookie Relievers

2012-05-21T16:01:22Z

Last week, I took a look at the PITCHf/x results for eight of the most prominent rookie starting pitchers in 2012. This week, I’m going to delve into the PITCHf/x of eight rookie relievers. All of these guys have thrown at least twelve innings this season, and four of them also got some late-season work in in 2011, so while the sample size is still quite small, it’s large enough that we can start to get a feel for what the members of this octet bring to the mound.

If you’re curious about other rookie pitchers, feel free to ask me about them in the comments.

Kelvin Herrera

Herrera has the incredible distinction of being the hardest thrower in MLB right now and ranking second in changeup usage (to Jared Burton). That’s not a combination that one expects to see, but it has led to exceptional results for the young righthander, who gets strikes on right around 2/3 of his fastballs and changeups, with the latter offering also generating swinging strikes a quarter of the time.

Herrera throws his fastball anywhere from 96-102 mph, and it has some riding life up in the zone. The changeup comes in at 84-89, featuring plus-plus movement and velocity separation. To top it all off, Herrera also tosses a 79-83 mph curveball with bigtime two-plane movement. This pitch takes a backseat to the elite fastball/changeup combo, but it certainly looks like it could emerge as a third weapon for the flamethrower if he cares to further incorporate it.

Two less favorable trends that are worth watching with Herrera—his release point:

And his locations:

It seems that Herrera drops his arm on the changeup, something batters will pick up as time goes on. He also could stand to work more to the glove side, particularly with his fastball.

With guys like Joel Zumaya and Stephen Strasburg being prominent examples, it appears that many pitchers working at this velocity tend to run into injury problems, and Herrera has a checkered past in that regard himself; however, as long as his arm stays attached, he should be very effective. Even if he loses a bit of his velocity over time, the changeup and curve will be more than enough to complement any velocity that starts with a ‘9.’ Herrera has a 4.35 ERA and 4.32 FIP thus far, but that’s mostly because he’s flukily allowed four homers in spite of a 59.7% groundball rate. His 2.74 xFIP is a better indicator of where he is right now, and he should only improve from there.

Nate Jones

Jones is another power arm; one of his pitches crossed the 100-mph mark this year. Unlike Herrera, he’s rather reliant on his fastball, unleashing it at a 68% clip. The pitch features good armside run from his ¾ arm slot, with Jones’ 6’5" frame creating some nice plane on the offering as well. With upper-90s velocity (averaging 97), deception (from Jones’ awkward, long arm action), movement, and command, the pitch has absolutely terrorized batters thus far, with a 69% strike rate and an 11.6% whiff rate.

Jones’ second pitch is an 85-89 mph slider with good two-plane movement. He doesn’t get too many strikes with it (53.5%), but many of those strikes are swings and misses (18.3%). Played off the fastball when he is ahead in the count, it can be a useful pitch.

Jones also tosses an 82-88 mph straight changeup and a 78-81 mph sweeping curveball, though neither pitch is a major part of his arsenal, and as with the slider, he doesn’t get a whole lot of strikes with either pitch, using them mainly as changes of pace.

With the dominant fastball in tow, Jones has rushed out to a 1.33 ERA; certainly, he appears to be a pitcher with a bright future. However, he’s not perfect. The main issue with Jones going forward is that he has yet to master the command of his fastball. Sure, he throws it for strikes, but look at where the ball is:

On one hand, throwing 95-99 with movement is going to be tough to hit in any location, which is why Jones has been successful. But he seems to still be at the stage where he’s just trying to get strikes by aiming down the middle of the zone. As the league sees him a few times, they’re going to start sitting on the fastball in the center of the plate, and Jones is going to need to either a) spot the pitch on the corners with more frequency or b) come up with offspeed pitches that can better disrupt batters’ sequencing and find the zone with some frequency themselves.

I can see Jones having an Aaron Crow 2011 sort of year, where he’s electric in the first half but slumps down the stretch. Still, though, some struggles are to be expected—Jones skipped Triple-A, after all. There’s plenty here for Jones to carve out a long career as a very effective fireballer.

Rhiner Cruz

I know the Rule 5 Draft is really inconsequential, but every year I get really worked up over the selections. With the Rule 5, I strongly advocate selecting either a) players that would have figured to step into the majors immediately anyway or b) players with very high upside. Therefore, it’s always maddening to me when a team picks a player who isn’t major-league ready and only has the upside of a middle reliever or utility player.

At the time of the most recent Rule 5, Cruz was one of these problematic selections. He was coming off a season in Double-A where he had a 4.40 ERA, 4.58 ERA, and 1.25 K/BB, and he’s a relief pitcher. Not only was he picked in the draft, he was picked first; needless to say, I saw this as a misstep by the organization after they made perhaps the most astute 2010 Rule 5 selection with Aneury Rodriguez.

But then, I guess that’s why Jeff Luhnow runs a team and I don’t, because while many of the Rule 5 picks have been returned, Cruz remains with the Astros, and he hasn’t seemed out of place in a middle relief role, posting a 2.57 ERA and 3.18 FIP.

What makes Cruz interesting, and what got him picked at the top of the Rule 5, is that he brings a fastball in the mid-90s from a low-three-quarters arm slot with a deceptive motion.

Cruz works the fastball anywhere from 92-97 mph. Like most low arm slot guys, he gets good sink on the ball, though he lacks the big running action one would expect. The ball really seems to jump on hitters at the plate thanks to his deception, so the pitch gets a healthy 9.6% whiff rate. Belying his wild reputation, he’s managed a credible 62.4% strike rate with the pitch, and in fact, he has a first-pitch strike rate of 67.4% overall.

He’s thrown only four changeups all season, so Cruz works mostly with his fastball and his hybrid breaking pitch, a big, sweeping offering he’ll throw anywhere from 78-84. It is with this pitch that his wildness manifests itself, as he has gotten strikes on just 34 of the 67 he’s thrown. Ten of those strikes were whiffs, so the pitch clearly has bat-missing potential.

Given that he’s a fastball/slurve guy with a low arm slot, it’s surprising that Cruz actually has a significant reverse platoon split this year. Of course, we’re talking about a 14-inning sample, which is totally inconsequential, but it’s worth noting his fastball has gone for strikes just 54.9% of the time to righties but 72.2% of the time to lefties. If that’s for real at all, then Cruz can definitely be more than a situational guy.

While the Astros have done a nice job cleaning up Cruz’s mechanics, which formerly looked like a more exaggerated version of Jose Valverde’s already exaggerated delivery, he still seems to struggle with keeping his front shoulder closed at times. That leads to his arm occasionally dragging through release and causing the ball to fly up and to the arm side. This is quite visible looking at his location chart—just think how many of these pitches would send a righty batter running for cover:

So, there’s still more work that needs to be done here, as his 39.8% Zone Percentage attests. Furthermore, he has a similar issue to Herrera, using a different arm slot for his two pitches:

Certainly, though, there are encouraging signs that Cruz can step into a high-leverage role with more seasoning. The strides he’s made from last year to this campaign are quite impressive.

Ryan Cook

Speaking of guys who improved from 2011 to 2012, Cook allowed six runs in 7 2/3 innings with Arizona last year, but has allowed zero in 20 2/3 innings with Oakland this season. He’s also allowed only four (!) hits, while striking out a quarter of the batters he’s faced.

Cook seems to have junked the splitter that served as his secondary offering last year, instead turning almost exclusively to his slider to support his fastball. Like Cruz, he parks his heater at 92-97 with a touch of sink, and its strike rate (61.3%) and swinging strike rate (9.4%) are very similar to Cruz’s. Also like Cruz, his slider comes in with bigtime drop and horizontal sweep, almost looking like a curveball at times. Cook’s breaker is the superior pitch, however, because it arrives with more convincing velocity, at 82-86 mph. Also, he gets strikes 63.9% of the time with it, including a stellar 19.3% whiff rate.

As with Cruz, that makes for a nice two-pitch mix, and it’s enough to make Cook playable against lefties as well as righties despite his limited repertoire. However, his scoreless run doesn’t suddenly make him one of the game’s top relief pitchers—he’ll need to get first-pitch strikes a lot more than 44.4% of the time if he is to join that elite group. It’s not even that he doesn’t hit the strike zone—his 44.3% Zone% is fine—but he’ll need to get ahead of batters more reliably as time goes on, as his ten walks attest.

Overall, there’s a lot to like about Cook, but he’s another guy who will need to make adjustments his second and third time around the AL.

Steve Delabar

Delabar was a nice story in 2011, right out of the Bobby Cramer "nobody expected him to be here" files, but it didn’t seem like he had any staying power, at least to me. I mean, sure, he threw hard, but he also walked 26 batters in 30 2/3 innings as a 28-year-old…in Double-A.

But here he is for a second time; not only was he not DFA’d in the offseason, but he made the Mariners’ Opening Day roster. And not only did he make the Mariners’ Opening Day roster, he’s racked up 24 strikeouts and only six walks in 19 1/3 innings thus far. In spite of that, he has a 5.12 ERA and 5.92 FIP, mostly because six of the 21 fly balls he’s allowed have left the ballpark.

Like Cook, Delabar has struggled to get ahead of batters, getting a first-pitch strike just over half the time. He’s another guy who basically owns just two pitches, though in his case it’s a 92-97 mph fastball and 85-90 mph splitter. He mixes in a mid-80s slider on very rare occasions.

With just a fastball and a splitter, there’s not a whole lot of horizontal movement in Delabar’s arsenal, which makes his vertically-oriented location pattern make a lot of sense:

Generally, Delabar’s pitches are either a) in the zone, b) a fastball up above the zone, c) below the zone, or d) just off the corners, and that’s quite sensible given his arsenal.

Delabar’s fastball gets strikes 61.5% of the time, which is acceptable but certainly not optimal; however, he does get a nice 8.8% whiff rate. It’s the splitter that truly shines, however, with a 62.7% strike rate and a ridiculous 30.1% whiff rate. No wonder he’s punching out 30% of opposing batters.

As long as he’s getting strikes over 60% of the time with both of his offerings, Delabar should be effective. One can even make some Jose Valverde comparisons.

Rafael Dolis

Dolis has risen to the closer role in Chicago this year with four saves, but he’s perhaps more notable for his ineffectiveness. After all, this is a guy who has walked eleven batters while striking out just nine in 24 innings. He has gotten grounders at a 50.7% clip, but his 4.80 FIP and negative WAR paint the picture of a hurler who needs a lot of fixing.

Dolis is pretty easy to analyze from a PITCHf/x standpoint—he’s basically a sinker guy, throwing his running, sinking fastball a whopping 90.1% of the time. His other pitch is a 79-83 mph breaking ball with similar movement to Cruz’s.

Not only does Dolis have only one pitch, he also has one main location:

Yes, the ball is 92-97 with bigtime movement, but a batter stepping in against Dolis doesn’t have to worry about what pitch is coming nor where it’s coming; he merely needs to decide whether he wants to swing at it or not. And when batters do decide to swing at Dolis’ fastball, they only swing through it 4% of the time. They occasionally swing through the breaking ball (four times in 33), but that’s only enough to kick Dolis’ overall SwStr% to 5.1%, a paltry number.

He might be able to get away with that as a double-play specialist if he was constantly pounding the zone a la Bartolo Colon, but Dolis only gets strikes with his fastball 59.1% of the time. Perhaps if he got some absurd groundball rate, it might mask these deficiencies somewhat, but right now, Dolis isn’t much more than a harder-throwing Scott Munter.

Tony Watson

Tony Watson actually threw 41 innings for the Pirates in 2011, but nobody noticed. Or, at least, I didn’t notice, and since I follow baseball fairly closely, I’ll bet a lot of non-Pirates fans also didn’t notice. Those who did notice probably wish they hadn’t, as Watson racked up -0.4 WAR in those 41 innings.

He’s back for Round 2 anyway this year, so perhaps it’s time to unmask this guy. Watson’s a big lefty with a smooth and slightly deceptive motion who brings a sinker/slider mix out of the pen. His sinker is more of a running fastball with a bit of sink than vice versa, but the point is that it moves, and at 90-94 from the left side, it can get on hitters quickly. Problem is, he lives too high in the zone with it:

He’s in the zone enough to get a 65.1% strike rate with the pitch, and its 6.2% whiff rate is decent (hey, better than all of Dolis’ pitches combined), but this is why Watson has allowed eight homers in 55 1/3 MLB innings.

Watson relies on the fastball heavily, throwing it over three quarters of the time. His second pitch is a short 81-86 mph slider. He works the pitch exclusively to the glove side:

Still, because he throws the pitch so rarely, it can surprise when he does turn to it, and 25 of his 33 sliders have gone for strikes, including five swinging strikes.

If he could just get the fastball down more and use the slider a bit more, Watson could be a top LOOGY; the control problems that led to an elevated walk rate in 2011 don’t seem to be recurring, and he’s got two nice pitches. He’ll stay a fringe option until he learns how to get the ball down, though; even with careful situational usage and the benefit of a .231 BABIP in his career, he’s barely kept his ERA under 4.00.

Robbie Ross

Unlike the other seven pitchers, Ross actually has a chance of graduating from the bullpen to a major league rotation someday, perhaps even this year, though one wonders how the Rangers are going to make room for him as a starter. He was a starter throughout his minor league career, but he’s being broken into the majors as a reliever after skipping Triple-A.

It’s largely been a successful introduction, as he’s walked just four batters in 21 innings while posting a 2.14 ERA. Ross always had strong walk rates in the minors, so it comes as little surprise that he’s continued to avoid free passes in the majors; however, he hasn’t gotten a ton of strikeouts.

Ross operates mostly with a cutter/slider combination, occasionally throwing some sort of hard changeup/splitter that is close enough to his fastball velocity that PITCHf/x often mistakes it as a fastball. Like Watson, he works with his 90-94 mph fastball—though Ross’ cuts while Watson’s runs—around ¾ of the time, getting credible results, in this case a 65.7% strike rate and 8.5% whiff rate. Unlike Watson, however, Ross pounds the bottom part of the zone, and also runs a lot of his pitches to the extreme glove side of the zone:

As a result, Ross has a fantastic 66% groundball rate.

Ross’ other pitch is an 82-86 mph slider with average movement that hasn’t been especially effective. It won’t play especially well off of Ross’ fastball, because it’s essentially just a bigger, slower version of the cutting fastball, so it doesn’t really change a batter’s eye level.

Clearly, the cutting fastball should give Ross an effective career as a groundballing bullpen specialist. One can dream of him being an Al Leiter-esque starter, though it’s fair to question how effective he’ll be if his velocity slips in that role and he can’t come up with a reliable pair of offspeed offerings. Still, though, we shouldn’t forget that this guy barely saw the upper minors, so it’s pretty neat that he’s found major league effectiveness already, regardless of role.

~~~~~~~~

Again, none of this work would be possible without the great Pitch F/X databases at Texas Leaguers, Brooks Baseball, and FanGraphs.

Beautiful colorization attempt for Willie Mays' catch - h/t reddit

2012-05-21T15:32:41Z

Beautiful colorization attempt for Willie Mays' catch - h/t reddit

Who Gets the Scoop? Major League Reporters, Ranked. 2011-12 Edition

2012-05-21T13:01:17Z

Another off-season, another set of scoops standings ranking baseball's best reporters based on their success reporting major league deals. In using MLB Trade Rumors' fantastic resources to figure out who scooped what, and who scooped who, I've yet again put together a stat board but, instead of it being for players, it's for those who work around the players. Baseball's team and national reporters put in countless time day after day attempting to break news and report deals to their readers but, aside for simply being credited for breaking a particular story, they rarely get ongoing recognition for their work. Although this formula and thought process is far from perfect, it does just that.

Let me unveil a few thoughts on why I feel these stats aren't ridiculously crazy.

Sure, all this formula does is prove that one reporter was first to tweet about a signing that occurred during the off-season, when in fact another reporter could have lacked phone service, was occupied doing something else or just didn't have a connection who could provide such info. Scoops standings to me are just a fun way of compiling information that would be otherwise considered unusual, simply because no one searches deep into the archives of MLBTradeRumors.com to find out whether the Jason Kubel signing news (for instance) was broken by Ken Rosenthal or Jon Heyman.

Indeed, it's not as if they are predictive stats such as the ones we glance at on FanGraphs.com every now and then. They are just tallies, and absolutely nothing more.

However, I have spent lots of time doing research and attempting to find ways to in fact make this information useful and worthwhile. Because many have brought up the fact that accuracy might be more important than quantity of deals broken -- because, sure, reporters often leak news that ends up not being true or simply just not gaining steam -- I thought it would be nice to put that into consideration and determine the importance of accuracy.

The reason, at least for me, why breaking deals is so special is because it means that the sources who leak such info are either very well connected or that a certain reporter has plenty of sources. Either way, developing and cultivating sources can be very difficult and, if anything, takes a long time to gain that level of friendship to the point where a baseball exec or agent is constantly texting you, letting you know of a deal that's potentially taking place. Also, it's hard to make a big deal about accuracy when beat writers cover a team that's very active in their acquisition making, whereas a reporter of a team standing pat wouldn't have that opportunity.

Additionally, reporters are always given information from credible sources, such as general managers even, who could eventually make an opposing or changed decision which, although isn't the reporter's fault, does seem somewhat odd to readers and fans considering he or she initially reported much different news. But my intent is to not put as much thought into these standings as some have in the past. Whether it's WAR, FIP, wins and losses or whatever the statistic is, there will always be people questioning different formulas and theories. This set of rankings just so happens to be my theory on a different and unusual way to look at baseball data.

If Lance Berkman Retires...

2012-05-21T01:18:47Z

...he should go down as the third-best switch-hitter of all time. And if that is the case, as I'd argue, it's all the more impressive given that he's 36th among switch-hitters in plate appearances. Berkman was an incredible force at the plate for ten consecutive years though, as he posted a 148 OPS+ across the decade from 2000 to 2009. Over that period, he averaged over 30 home runs and nearly 100 walks per season, all while hitting exactly .300.

With the bulk of his production coming from that decade of dominance, Berkman has maintained a career OPS+ of 146 -- and an equally impressive wRC+ of 146. Despite only reaching 150 games in seven seasons, Berkman has been good enough with the bat to rack up +425 batting runs, which is the third highest mark by a switch-hitter, ever. He has a slight advantage over Chipper Jones in both OPS+ and wRC+, but that's negated by the fact that Jones has had many more plate appearances.

The real question is whether or not Berkman has provided more value with the bat than Eddie Murray, who has a 5000+ PA advantage over Berkman. Berkman has been a markedly better hitter in terms of OPS+/wRC+ (Murray is at 128/129), but is that enough to make up for the difference in longevity? Maybe. The thing is, Berkman had a significantly better peak. Murray had a career-high OPS+ of 159, in his 1990 season with the Los Angeles Dodgers. Berkman bested that mark five times.

What it all comes down to is whether or not you decide to factor in Murray's final two seasons; in 1996 and 1997 (an offensive era), Murray hit .251/.316/.394 (80 OPS+) across 822 plate appearances, which accounted for -28 batting runs. Should he really be docked credit for sticking around beyond his usefulness? If you simply remove those two seasons, Murray comes to a total of ~420 batting runs, which puts him neck and neck with Berkman.

Then again, Berkman still has the slight edge, and I'd be inclined to give him a bit more of a bump because of his superior peak.

Anyway, if Berkman does indeed retire, it's worth admiring the scope of his accomplishments -- and what could have been, for that matter. I mean, he's still only 36, and he was off to a hot start this season after hitting .301/.412/.547 (164 OPS+) in 2011. Whether or not he's the third best switch-hitter of all time, he's had a remarkable and arguably underappreciated career.

So, what say you? Where do you think Berkman ranks among the top switch-hitters of all time?

A Graphic Look at Josh Reddick vs this Offseason's FA

2012-05-18T20:38:38Z

The A's have been carried offensively in the early part of the season by contributions from various new acquisitions; first Yoenis Cespedes (before the DL stint), some sparks from Jonny Gomes, Brandon Inge (also before his DL stint), and now, Josh Reddick. In the month of May, he's been producing: 0.439 wOBA and 6 HR. Currently, if you look at the Fangraphs May leaderboards, he's comparable to Andre Ethier (0.434 wOBA) and Matt Holliday (0.451 wOBA). Not too shabby of company to be in.

As the A's go into their 40th game, and close to the quarter mark of the season. how does Josh Reddick compare to other OF options the A's could have possibly gone after this offseason?

At the league minimum, he's been an incredible bargain; a steal. Carlos Beltran and Michael Cuddyer weren't in the range in terms of salary, but I had thought Josh Willingham was not only a decent gamble, but fan favorite. Using Fangraphs Dollars metric, Reddick's production is currently worth $7.2 M in FA.

On this list, Michael Cuddyer is obviously playing far below his value, but can Josh Reddick with a full season of PA's continue to produce near top-10 OF numbers (currently 11th in wOBA)?

Check out more infographics on FUNGraphs or follow me on @cobradave