Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College

A Case Study in Security Sector Reform: Learning from Security Sector Reform/Building in Afghanistan (October 2002-September 2003

Tue, 03 Nov 2009 05:00:00 GMT

This paper provides a case study to help explain the SSR concepts that were recently formalized in U.S. Army Field Manual 3.07, "Stability Operations Doctrine." It provides insights into how the military interacts with host-nation governments, the United Nations, the State Department, and national embassies to solve today’s complex problems. The author’s experience revealed many pitfalls in security sector building and international team-building that we are trying to avoid today. The author points out the synergy that was lost because of a lack of coordination and understanding between government officials and nongovernmental organizations like aid groups, academia, and think tanks.

Schools for Strategy: Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict

Wed, 28 Oct 2009 04:00:00 GMT

All would-be strategists would benefit by some formal education. However, for education in strategy to be well-directed, it needs to rest upon sound assumptions concerning the eternal nature yet ever shifting character, meaning, and function of strategy, as well as the range of behaviors required for effective strategic performance. The author emphasizes the necessity for strategic education to help develop the strategic approach, the way of thinking that can solve or illuminate strategic problems. He advises that such education should not strive for a spurious relevance by presenting a military variant of current affairs. The author believes that the strategist will perform better in today's world if he has mastered and can employ strategy’s general theory.

Talent: Implications for a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy

Wed, 28 Oct 2009 04:00:00 GMT

In our proposed Army Officer Corps Strategy, we established the interdependency of accessing, developing, retaining and employing talented leaders. Before exploring each of those functions in greater detail, however, we must first define “talent.” In our view, talent is something possessed by everyone. In fact, each individual has a unique distribution of talent across three dimensions—skills, knowledge, and behaviors. Effective organizations understand this. They successfully access and retain a depth and breadth of talent that can be developed and employed against current and future requirements.

The Army's Professional Military Ethic in an Era of Persistent Conflict

Tue, 06 Oct 2009 04:00:00 GMT

As the character of conflict in the 21st century evolves, the Army’s strength will continue to rest on our values, our ethos, and our people. Our Soldiers and leaders must remain true to these values as they operate in increasingly complex environments where moral-ethical failures can have strategic implications. Most of our Soldiers do the right thing--and do it well--time and again under intense pressure. But we must stay ever vigilant in upholding our high professional standards, mindful of the strains that accompany repeated combat deployments in the longest war our country has fought with an all-volunteer force. We must think critically about our Professional Military Ethic and promote dialogue at all levels as we deepen our understanding of what this time-honored source of strength means to the profession today.

Guide to Rebuilding Public Sector Services in Stability Operations: A Role for the Military

Tue, 06 Oct 2009 04:00:00 GMT

The guide is designed to provide peacekeepers with a thorough and nuanced understanding on the policy, planning, cultural and ethnic implications, tradeoffs, and options for public services reconstruction. It takes the position ultimately that the host government is responsible for public goods. Stability actors and host country governments can cooperate on policy, resource allocation, and service planning, even when the majority of services may initially be provided by nonstate or external actors, but the host country is in the lead. Issues addressed include control of corruption, administration of public services, policy, resource allocation and joint budgeting for restoration, reconstruction, and maintenance. Immediately after a conflict, the flight of skilled professionals may have left little capacity for public services restoration, making it a critical priority to rebuild capacity in engineering, planning, budgeting, and maintenance as well as to reestablish the revenue generation to sustain these services. The role for stability actors is broad and critical in this effort, as they seek to restore the ability of a government to meet the expectations of its citizens and restore legitimacy and stability to a nation.

A "New" Dynamic in the Western Hemisphere Security Environment: The Mexican Zetas and Other Private Armies

Fri, 25 Sep 2009 04:00:00 GMT

This monograph is intended to help political, military, policy, opinion, and academic leaders think strategically about explanations, consequences, and responses that might apply to the volatile and dangerous new dynamic that has inserted itself into the already crowded Mexican and hemispheric security arena, that is, the privatized Zeta military organization. In Mexico, this new dynamic involves the migration of traditional hard-power national security and sovereignty threats from traditional state and nonstate adversaries to hard and soft power threats from professional private nonstate military organizations. This dynamic also involves a more powerful and ambiguous mix of terrorism, crime, and conventional war tactics, operations, and strategies than experienced in the past. Moreover, this violence and its perpetrators tend to create and consolidate semi-autonomous enclaves (criminal free-states) that develop in to quasi-states—and what the Mexican government calls “Zones of Impunity.” All together, these dynamics not only challenge Mexican security, stability, and sovereignty, but, if left improperly understood and improperly countered, also challenge the security and stability of the United States and Mexico’s other neighbors.

Dealing with Political Ferment in Latin America: The Populist Revival, the Emergence of the Center, and Implications for U.S. Policy

Fri, 25 Sep 2009 04:00:00 GMT

The current political dynamics in Latin America is analyzed, and their meaning for the United States is evaluated. The author argues that references to a uniform “left turn” in the region are misleading, and that Latin America is actually witnessing a dynamic competition between two very different forms of governance. Represented by leaders like Hugo Chávez, Evo Morales, and others, radical populism emphasizes the politics of grievance and a penchant for extreme solutions. Moderate, centrist governance can be found in countries like Chile, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, and Uruguay. It stresses diplomatic pragmatism, the protection of democratic practices, and the need to blend macroeconomic responsibility with a social conscience. To the extent that the United States can strengthen the centrists while limiting the damage caused by radical populism, the author argues it can promote integral growth, democratic stability, and effective security cooperation in Latin America. A clear understanding of the trends discussed is essential to devising appropriate U.S. policies toward that region.

Russian Elite Image of Iran: From the Late Soviet Era to the Present

Wed, 16 Sep 2009 04:00:00 GMT

Since the late Soviet era, the presence of Iran has loomed large in the minds of the Russian elite. Soon after the end of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)—and even before—increasing numbers of Russian intellectuals became disenchanted with the West, especially the United States, and looked for alternative geopolitical alliances. The Muslim world became one of the possible alternatives. Iran became especially important in the geopolitical construction of Eurasianists or neo-Eurasianists who believed that Russia’s alliance with Iran is essential for Russia’s rise to power. Yet, by the middle of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s tenure, increasing tension with the Muslim community and the rise of Russian nationalism had led to more complicated views of the Russian elite on Iran. At present, the Russian elite does not mind using Iran as a bargaining chip in its dealings with the West, especially the United States, and as a market for Russian weapons and other goods and services. However, the dream of a Russian-Iran axis is apparently abandoned for good.

Alien: How Operational Art Devoured Strategy

Wed, 16 Sep 2009 04:00:00 GMT

The publication of the 1982 version of Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, introduced to the English-speaking world the idea of an operational level of war encompassing the planning and conduct of campaigns and major operations. It was followed 3 years later by the introduction of the term “operational art” which was, in practice, the skillful management of the operational level of war. This conception of an identifiably separate level of war that defined the jurisdiction of the profession of arms was, for a number of historical and cultural reasons, attractive to U.S. practitioners and plausible to its English-speaking allies. As a result, it and its associated doctrine spread rapidly around the world. The authors argue that as warfare continues to diffuse across definitional and conceptual boundaries and as the close orchestration of all of the instruments of national power becomes even more important, the current conception of campaigns and operations becomes crippling. To cope with these demands by formulating and prosecuting “national campaigns,” the authors propose that the responsibility for campaign design should “actually” return to the political-strategic leadership of nations supported by the entirety of the state bureaucracy. This would mark the return of the campaign to its historical sources. If the United States and its allies fail to make this change, they risk continuing to have a “way of battle” rather than a “way of war.”

Escalation and Intrawar Deterrence During Limited Wars in the Middle East

Wed, 16 Sep 2009 04:00:00 GMT

A central purpose of this monograph is to reexamine two earlier conflicts for insights that may be relevant for ongoing dangers during limited wars involving nations possessing chemical or biological weapons or emerging nuclear arsenals. These conflicts are the 1973 Arab-Israeli War and the 1991 Gulf War. Both of these wars were fought at the conventional level, although the prospect of Israel using nuclear weapons (1973), Egypt using biological weapons (1973), or Iraq using chemical and biological weapons (1991) were of serious concern at various points during the fighting. This monograph will consider why efforts at escalation control and intrawar deterrence were successful in the two case studies and assess the points at which these efforts were under the most intensive stress that might have caused them to fail.

Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq

Wed, 26 Aug 2009 04:00:00 GMT

Dr. Williams looks in detail at major criminal activities, including the theft, diversion, and smuggling of oil, the kidnapping of both Iraqis and foreigners, extortion, car theft, and the theft and smuggling of antiquities. He also considers the critical role played by corruption in facilitating and strengthening organized crime and shows how al-Qaeda in Iraq, Jaish-al-Mahdi, and the Sunni tribes used criminal activities to fund their campaigns of political violence. Dr. Williams identifies the roots of organized crime in post-Ba’athist Iraq in an authoritarian and corrupt state dominated by Saddam Hussein and subject to international sanctions. He also explains the rise of organized crime after the U.S. invasion in terms of two distinct waves: the first wave followed the collapse of the state and was accompanied by the breakdown of social control mechanisms and the development of anomie; the second wave was driven by anarchy, insecurity, political ambition, and the imperatives of resource generation for militias, insurgents, and other groups. He also identifies necessary responses to organized crime and corruption in Iraq, including efforts to reduce criminal opportunities, change incentive structures, and more directly target criminal organizations and activities. His analysis also emphasizes the vulnerability of conflict and post-conflict situations to organized crime and the requirement for a holistic or comprehensive strategy in which security, development, and the rule of law complement one another.

Toward a Risk Management Defense Strategy

Tue, 11 Aug 2009 04:00:00 GMT

This monograph offers key considerations for DoD as it works through the on-going defense review. The author outlines eight principles for a risk management defense strategy. He argues that these principles provide “measures of merit” for evaluating the new administration’s defense choices. This monograph builds on two previous works—Known Unknowns: Unconventional “Strategic Shocks” in Defense Strategy Development and The New Balance: Limited Armed Stabilization and the Future of U.S. Landpower. Combined, these three works offer key insights on the most appropriate DoD responses to increasingly “unconventional” defense and national security conditions. This work in particular provides DoD leaders food for thought, as they balance mounting defense demands and declining defense resources.

New Partnerships for a New Era: Enhancing the South African Army's Stabilization Role in Africa

Wed, 24 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT

Since emerging from the mire of its apartheid past, South Africa has become a key player in Sub-Saharan Africa. The challenge of creating a truly national military, during a period in which South Africa has also wrestled with tough internal socio-economic problems, has left the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) in a weakened state. Despite this, they have in recent years made a considerable contribution to efforts to bring peace and stability to the African continent. A critical step in building a capable and confident future South African Army has been the commencement of the SA Army’s Vision 2020 forward planning process. Recent political changes in both the United States and South Africa have opened up a new window of opportunity for developing a productive partnership between the two nations. This monograph outlines ways in which the United States can contribute to the SA Army’s Vision 2020 program to help optimize South Africa’s potential contribution to the emergence of a peaceful and stable Africa.

Guide to Rebuilding Governance in Stability Operations: A Role for the Military?

Thu, 18 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT

In October 2008, the U.S. Army issued Field Manual 3.07, Stability Operations Doctrine, which identified five key sectors as components of an integrated approach to stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations—security, justice and reconciliation, humanitarian assistance and social well-being, participatory governance, and economic stabilization and infrastructure. Government, or governance, has a central role in assuring the successful end-states for transition in each of these sectors. This guide focuses on the military’s role in rebuilding and establishing a functional, effective, and legitimate nation-state; one that can assure security and stability for its citizens, defend its borders, deliver services effectively for its populace, and is responsible and accountable to its citizens. Neither a handbook nor a checklist, the document provides a comprehensive approach to planning and implementing a program to rebuild governance by U.S. peacekeeping forces during stability operations. Recognizing that the extent of U.S. Government and military involvement is determined by the mandate, the mission, the level of resources and most importantly, the host country context, this guide provides options and trade-offs for U.S. forces in executing these operations.

Challenges and Opportunities for the Obama Administration in Central Asia

Mon, 01 Jun 2009 04:00:00 GMT

President Obama has outlined a comprehensive strategy for the war in Afghanistan which is now the central front of our campaign against Islamic terrorism. The strategy strongly connects our prosecution of that war to our policy in Pakistan and internal developments there as a necessary condition of victory. But the strategy has also provided for a new logistics road through Central Asia. The author argues that a winning strategy in Afghanistan depends as well upon the systematic leveraging of the opportunity provided by that road and a new coordinated nonmilitary approach to Central Asia. That approach would rely heavily on improved coordination at home and the more effective leveraging of our superior economic power in Central Asia to help stabilize the region so that it provides a secure rear to Afghanistan. In this fashion we would help Central Asia meet the challenges of extremism, of economic decline due to the global economic crisis, and thus help provide political stability in states that are likely to be challenged by the confluence of those trends.

State and Nonstate Associated Gangs: Credible "Midwives of New Social Orders"

Fri, 22 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

The monograph examines contemporary populism and neopopulism, 21st century socialism, and a nonstate actor (al-Qaeda) seeking regional and global hegemony. They are: first, paramilitary gang permutations in Colombia that are contributing significantly to the erosion of the Colombian state and its democratic institutions, and implementing the anti-system objectives of their elite neo-populist sponsors; second, Hugo Chavez’s use of the New Socialism and popular militias to facilitate his populist Bolivarian dream of creating a mega-state in Latin America; and, third, al-Qaeda’s strategic and hegemonic use of political-criminal gangs to coerce substantive change in Spanish and other Western European foreign and defense policy and governance. Lessons derived from these cases demonstrate how gangs might fit into a holistic effort to force radical political-social-economic change, and illustrate how traditional political-military objectives may be achieved indirectly, rather than directly.

Mexico's Narco-Insurgency and U.S. Counterdrug Policy

Thu, 07 May 2009 04:00:00 GMT

In late 2007, the U.S. and Mexican governments unveiled the Merida Initiative. A 3-year, $1.4 billion counternarcotics assistance program, the Merida Initiative is designed to combat the drug-fueled violence that has ravaged Mexico of late. The initiative aims to strengthen the Mexican police and military, permitting them to take the offensive in the fight against Mexico’s powerful cartels. As currently designed, however, the Merida Initiative is unlikely to have a meaningful, long-term impact in restraining the drug trade and drug-related violence. Focussing largely on security, enforcement, and interdiction issues, it pays comparatively little attention to the deeper structural problems that fuel these destructive phenomena. These problems, ranging from official corruption to U.S. domestic drug consumption, have so far frustrated Mexican attempts to rein in the cartels, and will likely hinder the effectiveness of the Merida Initiative as well. To make U.S. counternarcotics policy fully effective, it will be imperative to forge a more holistic, better-integrated approach to the “war on drugs.”

Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions other than Taiwan

Thu, 30 Apr 2009 04:00:00 GMT

SSI and NBR conducted a book launch event for this book. Audio is available on the NBR site.

While preventing independence likely remains the central aim of the PLA vis-a-vis Taiwan, Chinese foreign policy objectives worldwide are rapidly growing and diversifying. This volume analyzes the PLA’s involvement in disaster and humanitarian relief, United Nations peacekeeping operations (UNPKO), counterterrorism and border defense, security in outer space and cyberspace, and the level of activity in regional “joint” operational contingencies. On the whole, the volume provides a discerning analysis of these varied PLA developments and how they affect policy towards both Taiwan and the entire Asia-Pacific region. While the significance of China has long been understood, the nation’s rise to prominence on the world scene is becoming more acutely felt. An understanding of the PLA’s growing roles both within China and internationally is of critical importance to the United States.

New NATO Members: Security Consumers or Producers?

Wed, 22 Apr 2009 04:00:00 GMT

This monograph examines the burden-sharing of new members in NATO. Qualitative and quantitative methods are used to test the hypothesis that new NATO members are burden-sharing at a greater rate than older NATO members. An analysis of the burden-sharing behavior of NATO’s 1999 wave of new members reveals that new NATO members have demonstrated the willingness to contribute to NATO missions, but are often constrained by their limited capabilities. However, new member contributions to NATO have improved and, in comparison to older NATO members, the new members are doing quite well. The United States should focus on improving the capabilities of the new members while encouraging its older allies to increase their own contributions to the alliance where feasible.

The New Balance: Limited Armed Stabilization and the Future of U.S. Landpower

Mon, 06 Apr 2009 04:00:00 GMT

The author takes a critical look at the mission assignment and orientation of U.S. landpower. He calls for an unconventional revolution in U.S. land forces that optimizes them for intervention in complex and violent crises of governance and security in states crippled by internal disorder. In the end, he argues that the armed stabilization of states and regions in crises will be not just equivalent in importance to traditional warfighting in future land force planning but instead the primary land force mission for the foreseeable future.