1. Writing and strategy are communal affairs. We exist to develop a community of thinkers and writers who seek to improve the level of discussion in these areas.

2. By creating this community, we will support the authorship of quality content in the areas of policy, strategy, and military affairs.

3. By creating this community, we will also create networks of individuals that support current thinkers and practitioners, as well as support the development of future leaders in these areas.

4. Forever in our sight should be the development of the next generation of thinkers and practitioners in the realm of strategy.

We believe these principles to be as true today as they were when written a decade ago. The Strategy Bridge built an amazing community and helped shape an online publication world that looks remarkably different. We hold great faith in the next generation of strategy thinkers and practitioners. While we fervently believe that there remains much work to be done, we also believe that the time is right for that work to occur elsewhere.

Just as strategy must change and adapt, so too must its practitioners determine when the strategy has run its course. The Strategy Bridge’s journal will remain online and it will remain free as it always has, a repository of the work of our community, as a resource for future research, and as a marker on the path to our community’s development and the development of those who will come next.

Strategy requires deep study, rigorous thinking, deliberate writing, and honest debate. It has been our absolute honor to have participated in this project with you for so many years. We look forward to continuing the conversation in other ways, through the sustainment of our Strategy Bridge Podcast and our in-person strategy sessions, and perhaps in new ways in the future. 

Strategy is always about positional advantage, about ensuring an opportunity for another move, a next step, a follow-on decision. We look forward to watching our community’s next moves.

The Strategy Bridge Journal has been brought to you by our Managing Editors, Dr. Heather Pace and Dr. Katherine Voyles and our Editors Robert Mihara, Brett Friedman, Jo Brick, Marc Milligan, Nicole Dean, and Ryan Waddle; delivered by our Communications Team Daniel Clark, Rowan Wise, and David Retherford; and supported by our Assessments Team Katherine Batterton and Kimberly Hale. The Strategy Bridge Board of Directors are Richard Ganske, Mikhail Grinberg, Tyrell Mayfield, and Eric Murphy.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: Quebec City Bridge, Quebec City, Canada 2018 (Olivier Piquer).

The Russian invasion of Ukraine continues, and examining Russian culture is still a minefield since Russia launched its February 2022 Special Military Operation. Concerts featuring the music of famous Russian composers came under fire.[1] Ballet tours were shuttered.[2] Russian art and cultural exhibitions were questioned, postponed, or canceled.[3] Russian food and drink came under scrutiny, with bar owners dumping bottles of vodka into storm drains for social media.[4] Competing images of stalwart Russians supporting Putin and the Russian occupation saturated Russian state media over the last year. But there is dissent in modern Russia, as should be expected given the rich history of dissent among Russian artists who historically challenged oppression and the ruthless activities of authoritarian regimes.[5] These Russian artists and artworks deserve consideration by national security and defense professionals to understand an adversary’s political and social undercurrents.

One such Russian who provides an ideal case study at this moment in history is Vasily Vereshchagin, an artist whose works were so jarring and raw that even German Field Marshall Helmuth von Moltke the Elder barred his soldiers from viewing Vereshchagin’s Berlin exhibition in 1890, out of frustration and concern that Vereshchagin’s monumental Apotheosis of War might instill confusion in the newly unified German military.[6] Today, Vershchagin’s work offers insight into the complexities of Russian military culture, highlighting a long history of friction between political expectations of victory and the realities of violent warfare in distant lands. Vereshchagin’s art protests war and promotes peace through accurate and brutal depictions on canvas, whether we choose to look or not.

The Apotheosis of War, the famous painting of piled skulls on a barren field and notorious confuser of German generals, was painted in the aftermath of the 1868 siege of Samarkand, one of countless bloody battles during the two-year long  Russian campaign to occupy the region of Bukhara in Central Asia. Based on accounts of an ancient Mongol army piling the skulls of its vanquished enemies outside of conquered cities as a warning against resistance to Mongol occupation, history repeated with the equally violent Russian occupation. Tongue-in-cheek, Vereshchagin dedicated his painting "to all great conquerors, past, present and to come.”[7] Today, the Tretyakov Gallery in Moscow displays Apotheosis, and it is the cover art for countless military strategy and history textbooks, sometimes ironically and sometimes not. Apotheosis is a  reminder to military and political leaders that violent actions in foreign lands rarely result in a peaceful occupation.

Vereshchagin’s unconventional approach to political critique mirrors his unconventional life. Born in a family of minor nobles in October of 1842, Vasily Vasilyevich Vereshchagin was groomed for military service at a young age, attending the Tsarskoe Selo military academy and entering the Sea Cadet Corps like many aristocratic Russian sons. Despite the outward incongruence of a military life and an artistic nature, young Vereshchagin sketched and painted throughout his initial military apprenticeship. Once complete, he enrolled in the Imperial Academy of Fine Arts to refine his talents.[8] By his own admission, he was unmoored and restless.[9] Military obligations and art school complete, he joined the Russian diplomatic corps in his twenties, looking for an opportunity to travel and paint. Vereshchagin was posted throughout Central Asia, and his artistic skills matured.[10] It was there that the young painter first experienced the military operations that influenced his battle art for years to come. Detailing his thoughts and experiences in travel journals that would later be published as his memoirs, Vereshchagin compared the Russian Imperial occupations throughout Central Asia to similar Western European military presences around the world. “Until we set ourselves deliberately and systematically to colonize the country, Russian Turkestan, I am convinced, will be Russian in name only,” he noted, continuing with, “Our position in Turkestan is like that of the French in Algeria; the only way to prevent the people from constantly rising against us it to colonize the country.”[11] He also observed abuses against local people and their beliefs by Imperial Russian soldiers and occupiers, detailing the outward disdain of Central Asian people toward their oppressors.

Traveling with the Russian diplomatic corps between Turkestan, Siberia, and western Europe throughout the latter half of the 1860s, Vereshchagin painted detailed works of Central Asian life. Also keen to expose the harsh realities of foreign occupation, some of his artwork countered Imperial Russia’s image of military prowess and inherent nobility. Russian violence and atrocities during the 1868 Siege of Samarkand would inspire Apotheosis, Vereshchagin’s most famous work. Flush with paintings and sketches by the end of his diplomatic tour, Vereshchagin’s Turkestan Series became a solo exhibition in the 1873 London Crystal Palace art show.[12] The exhibition showcased a blend of regional landscapes, local people in daily life, and controversial scenes of Russian occupation and oppression. When the exhibition traveled to Russia the next year, military and political elite were immediately critical. Not only would Apotheosis of War be denied exhibition in his homeland during the 1874 St. Petersburg show, but so would another controversial piece: Left Behind, a jarring image of a dying soldier deserted by his fellow soldiers.[13] Despite his artistic talent and the stark honesty of his artwork, Russian censorship prevailed. To escape the controversy, Vereshchagin was back on the road and painting his way through the Himalayas, India, and Tibet by the end of the year.

Two years later, Vereshchagin returned to Russia and the growing regional instability that was edging toward open conflict in the Caucasus and Balkans. He requested to join the Russian Army staff as a volunteer, bound for campaigns against Turkish forces in Plevna, Shipka, and other battles throughout the Tundzha Valley region, which runs through modern-day Bulgaria along the Edirne River and empties into modern Turkey.  As both a staff officer and artist, Vereshchagin drafted sketches during the war for paintings that became some of the most definitively critical images of the war and Imperial Russian Army. In his memoirs, Vereshchagin wrote, "[a]s soon as the war was finished I returned to my studio, and began to transfer my impressions to canvas—impressions of battles, wounds, disease, and all sorts of misery, the inevitable attendants of every war. The result was such that people would not believe me; they said that I lied, that my pictures were the work of my imagination.”[14] With all of his recent experiences and sketches in hand, the Russian artist would paint some of the most subversive protest art of the century.

Vereshchagin’s protest and bleak artistic depiction of Russian military operations was not unfounded. A stagnation and rot within the aristocratic ranks of the imperial officer corps had been brewing for decades and would not change even in the wake of the Balkan and Caucasus campaigns.[15]

[E]verything related to the health of the troops … [was] completely to the integrity of the brigadier-generals, who in turns related on the colonels of the regiments; and the result was that in reality there was no control whatever… [following reports from a doctor about missing supplies]… The officer in command of the division acted in extremely patriarchal fashion, for he questioned the colonel of the regiment, and in consequence removed the doctor from his post, ascribing his damaging statement to his personal dislike of the colonel.[16]

His critical stance on the care of soldiers, wounded, and prisoners became more pointed with the loss of two siblings during the campaign.[17] The roots of institutional incompetence and lethargy were systemic throughout the later half of the nineteenth century, even in the wake of vast military reforms sponsored by Dmitrii Miliutin, the Minister of War from 1861 to 1881.[18] Drinking, gambling, and graft were entrenched, and social stratification prioritized honor and noblesse over efficiency and effectiveness, particularly in the officer ranks.[19] Training conscripted troops focused almost exclusively on drill and ceremony and eschewed maneuver-focused adaption.[20]  Mired in the red tape of a regimental economic system that left procurement of supplies up to the infantry regiments themselves, company bookkeeping and expenditures documentation undermined formation even further.[21] “The behavior of senior officers—factionalism, cliquishness and a notorious inability to coordinate operations—may be interpreted as a logical outgrowth of their experiences as junior officers and commanders of regiments (when, as proprietaries of estates, they had no need for and gain no experience in coordination).”[22] In success or defeat, the Russian military steadily permitted a culture of willful negligence and Vereshchagin witnessed it all.

Two paintings from this era provide a unique platform to examine both Vereshchagin’s skill with oil and canvas and his talent for political critique. A Resting Place for Prisoners and The Road of War Prisoners both depict events following the Imperial coalition’s victory at the Battle of Plevna in the winter of 1877. In Resting Place, a snowstorm pushes up waves of snow across the center of the canvas. Between wispy drifts, glimpses of Turkish prisoners and their Russian captors on horseback appear. The hoofs of a dead horse and the wheels of a broken carriage protrude from a snowdrift in the foreground. A line of squatting prisoners, exposed to the elements, is visible in the distance. The Road of the War Prisoners depicts the same storm’s aftermath. Blue skies have replaced the stormy darkness. Contrasting sharply with the white snow and pale blue sky, black crows perch atop telegraph wires and wander between lifeless bodies left on either side of the road. Vereshchagin painted both pieces at the height of the European Impressionist movement, as painters experimented with visible brushstrokes to evoke shifting light and shadow and to reflect the human experience of nature. As an artist that could paint both striking detail and ephemeral sunlight in the same artwork, Vereshchagin’s paintings from the Russo-Turkish War highlight his talent for blending both Realism and Impressionism to create striking, shocking artworks. Both paintings—part of the collection of the Brooklyn Museum curated to be viewed together—provide a complete statement on actions and consequences.[23]

From a cursory glimpse, the Russo-Turkish War appears to be a victory for Imperial Russia and its coalition over the Ottoman Empire. Like leaning toward a painting for a closer look, a deeper examination of the conflict, however,  reveals more details on the war’s impact on Kurdish, Bulgarian, Armenian, and countless other peoples. The campaigns exacerbated regional violence towards Armenian and Jewish communities throughout the Caucasus and Balkans. British observers recounted atrocities and ethnic cleansing by both Russian and Ottoman forces.[24] Violence in the wake of a victory is, sadly, not uncommon, but the voracity of the Russian troops left an indelible mark on Vereshchagin, echoing in his portrayals of soldiers, prisoners, and civilians impacted by the warring factions.[25] His work was decidedly antiwar, portraying death with a level of clarity that was unwelcome to the Russian aristocracy.[26] In fact, both A Resting Place for Prisoners and The Road of War Prisoners were offered originally for acquisition to the czar’s private collection and rejected, despite Vereshchagin’s commissioning as an imperial war painter. With no prospect for purchase in his homeland, he sold both canvases to New York collectors in 1891.[27]

There is no shortage of war, and no shortage of anti-war art, in the world. In countries where authoritarian regimes ruthlessly sensor artists, social media has continued to smuggle art and messages out to the wider world. Throughout history, certain anti-war artists or political protesters have enjoyed a rare kind of privilege stemming from relationships with the very same political leaders they depict. Vasily Vereshchagin was one of these rare individuals. As an aristocrat, he was protected. As an artist, he walked a fine line by honestly portraying the Imperial Russian military as unethical and unprofessional. Vereshchagin recognized this and sought new paths and places to share his views through art.

I already knew from the stories told by other members of my profession what disagreeable treatment artists are exposed to in some regions, especially on the part of the preservers of order, and how they are generally taken for revolutionists and agitators… I said to myself more than once that it would be well to curtail my visits to my native plains, and to go to some country which, with fewer endearing associations, offered greater liberty of action.[28] 

Vereshchagin died on April 13, 1904, aboard the Russian battleship Petropavlovsk when it struck sea-mines near Port Arthur. He was 61 and still painting battlefields. His last work, a picture of Admiral Stepan Makarov presiding over a war council, was recovered from the wreck almost undamaged. His artistic efforts to promote peace through an honest representation of war lives on today, whether we chose to boycott it or accept it. Examining Russian art may seem challenging for the foreseeable future, but it is imperative that defense and national strategy professionals seek out dissenting voices and amplify them. Anti-Putin artists have emerged from both the Ukrainian and Russian art worlds, all facing the same threat of political persecution if caught. Over the last two decades, 78-year old Russian pensioner and former art teacher, Yelena Osipova, has been protesting Putin and holding up her artworks in public spaces around St. Petersburg. Others remain anonymous. The underground artist simply known as Koin began painting and sharing graphic depictions of Russian political leaders on social media when opposition leader Alexei Navalny was arrested in 2021. Since then, their series of portraits of Russia’s politicians and elites as grotesque vampires and monsters has also been shared across social media. Pressure from the international art community can provide a measure of protection, ensuring that dissenting artists do not simply disappear, but that is only if an artist is well-known and recognized. Looking at historic Russian anti-war art can provide an excellent start to examine today’s artists, and the works of Vasily Vereshchagin could be that point of departure. After all, if it is shocking enough to make Moltke the Elder clutch his medals, maybe we should all take a peek before it is too late.

Nikki Dean is a seemingly perpetual graduate student with the University of Kansas and is a recently retired U.S. Army Aviation officer. Her research focuses on art looting, illicit markets, curation, and collections management in war. She tweets into the void from @doctrinatrix_C2 and Instagrams randomly @doctrinatrix. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect those of the University of Kansas, U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: Suppression of the Indian Revolt by the English (Vasily Vereshchagin/Wikmedia)

Notes:

[1] Matthew Weaver, “Cardiff Philharmonic removes Tchaikovsky performance over Ukraine conflict,” The Guardian, March 09, 2022, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2022/mar/09/cardiff-philharmonic-orchestra-removes-tchaikovsky-over-ukraine-conflict?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other.

[2] Emma Pinedo, “Madrid’s Opera House cancels Russian’s Bolshoi ballet show after Ukraine invasion,” Reuters, March 04, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/madrids-opera-house-cancels-russias-bolshoi-ballet-show-after-ukraine-invasion-2022-03-04/.

[3] Sophia Kishkovsky, “London’s Saatchi Gallery cancels Russian-organised show of Ukrainian art social media backlash,” The Art Newspaper, August 17, 2022, https://www.theartnewspaper.com/2022/08/17/londons-saatchi-gallery-cancels-russian-organised-show-of-ukrainian-art-after-social-media-storm.

[4] Yahoo Entertainment (@yahooentertainment), original video content from Evel Pie. “#Vegas bar protests Russian invasion by allowing customers to purchase $300 bottles of Russian-produced #vodka to dump out,” TikTok, February 28, 2022, https://www.tiktok.com/@yahooentertainment/video/7069823352277601582?lang=en.

[5] “Russian Art & Soviet Nonconformist Art,” accessed June 10, 2023, Zimmerli Art Museum of Rutgers University, https://zimmerli.rutgers.edu/collections/russian-art-soviet-nonconformist-art.

[6] David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, “Vasilij V. Vereshchagin’s Canvases of Central Asian Conquest,” Chaier d’Asie central 17/18, (2009), 182, https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/224150223.pdf.

[7] Clayton Schuster, “The Apotheosis of War,” Sartle, accessed June 10, 2023, https://www.sartle.com/artwork/the-apotheosis-of-war-vasily-vereshchagin. Originally noted and discussed by Russian biographer, Fedor I. Bulgakov in 1905 in his work V.V. Vereshchagin i ego proizvedenija [V.V. Vereshchagin and his Works].

[8] van der Oye, 186.

[9] van der Oye, 187.

[10] Vassili Verestchagin, Soldier-Painter-Traveler, Autobiographical Sketches, Volume I,

translated from German and French by FH Peters (London, UK: Richard Bentley & Son: 1887), 99-103.

[11] Ibid, 144-145.

[12] van der Oye, 182. The show itself was discussed in the April 7, 1873 London Times article, “Central Asia at the Crystal Palace.”

[13] van der Oye, “Vasilij V. Vereshchagin’s Canvases of Central Asian Conquest,” 202.

[14] Vassili Verestchagin, Soldier-Painter-Traveler, Autobiographical Sketches, Volume II,

translated from German and French by FH Peters (London, UK: Richard Bentley & Son: 1887), 275.

[15] Maureen P. O’Connor, The Vision of Soldiers: Britain, France, Germany, and the United States Observe the Russo-Turkish War, War in History 4, no. 3 (July 1997), 267-271.

[16] Verestchagin, Soldier-Painter-Traveler, Autobiographical Sketches, Volume II, 137.

[17] Ibid, 210-220.

[18] John Bushnell, “The Tsarist Officer Corps, 1881-1914: Customs, Duties, Inefficiency,” The American Historical Review 86, no. 4 (October 1981), 754 – 755.

[19] Ibid, 754.

[20] Ibid, 764.

[21] O’Connor, “The Vision of Soldiers,” 267-276.

[22] Bushnell, 773-774.

[23] “A Resting Place of Prisoners” and “The Road of War Prisoners,” European Art, Collection Menu, Brooklyn Museum, accessed June 10, 2023, https://www.brooklynmuseum.org/opencollection/objects/4630.

[24] O’Connor, “The Vision of Soldiers,” 279-280, 288.

[25] Verestchagin, Soldier-Painter-Traveler, Autobiographical Sketches, Volume II, 187, 275.

[26] Verestchagin, Soldier-Painter-Traveler, Autobiographical Sketches, Volume II, 275.

[27] “A Resting Place of Prisoners” and “The Road of War Prisoners,” European Art, Collection Menu, Brooklyn Museum, accessed June 10, 2023, https://www.brooklynmuseum.org/opencollection/objects/4630.

[28] Verestchagin, Soldier-Painter-Traveler, Autobiographical Sketches, Volume II, 330.

Here at The Strategy Bridge, we feel very much the same way about the study of strategy, and we work hard to realize this width, depth, and context in the books we review each week.

We believe the study of strategy is a broad one, encompassing a host of topics, ranging from the explicit study of the long sweep of military history to analysis of the possibilities for war and warfare in the future, from the use of air power in the Falklands to the use of artillery in the desert and to modern naval operations, and from China to Russia to Africa. You’ll find this width—and much more—in our reviews and our reviewers from 2023.

Some destinations in the intellectual landscape of strategy, national security, and military affairs deserve repeated visits, repeated efforts to unpack their complexities, and just as we’ve used #Reviewing to explore the width of the intellectual landscape, so have we plumbed some of its depths in 2023. Leadership is an area rich in its depth, for example, and we’ve looked to lessons from Admiral Chester Nimitz, Major General Samuel Curtis, President Ronald Reagan, and even from science fiction. Strategic questions of race affecting the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy, and American society have been much on our minds, as have critical questions of civil-military relations past and present raised by recent history.

And just as Michael Howard advises, we have explored the interactions between strategy, national security, and military affairs and the societal contexts within which they operate. We looked at the emergence of the Geneva Conventions and their influence on the norms driving how we fight wars. We’ve looked at the influence of economics and the marketplace on national security. We’ve even looked at how technological, biological, legal, economic, psychological, sociological, and political issues will shape the future of humanity as we explore and settle in outer space.

Our explorations have been varied in 2023—width, depth, and context go hand in hand—and we’ve enjoyed and learned from it all! Thanks to all of you for coming on the journey with us this year!

#TheBridgeReads

Paths of Dissent: Soldiers Speak Out Against America's Misguided Wars. Edited by Andrew Bacevich and Daniel A. Sjursen. New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2022.

Read a review from Tim Bettis here:
Despite its omissions, Paths of Dissent is an exceptionally substantive and moving book for anyone interested in personal accounts at the intersection of ethics and military service…As America exits another costly decades-long counterinsurgency era  into an uncertain future, it  requires courageous dissenters…to avoid national security malpractice. It is only by capturing the perspectives of those who are willing to make personal sacrifices in informing the public’s understanding of war that principled countries can avoid waste and hypocrisy in its conduct.

An Army Afire: How the US Army Confronted Its Racial Crisis in the Vietnam Era. Beth Bailey. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2023.

Read Daniel Sukman’s review here:
An Army Afire offers lessons for leaders throughout the joint force in how to approach and solve complex and seemingly overwhelming problems. Bailey’s work is an important addition to the historical record of the U.S. military, and, more specifically, the U.S. Army. Innovative ideas and novel courses of action are necessary for combat and institutional actions. The military that fought in the 1991 Gulf War, and later in Afghanistan and Iraq were more than the product of combat platforms, the Goldwater-Nichols Act, and AirLand Battle; it was a force composed of a diverse set of men and women who stood on the shoulders of those who suffered and fought to change a system of inequality.

Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations: Military Society, Politics and Modern War. Edited by Lionel Beehner, Risa Brooks and Daniel Maurer. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2020.

Read Chiara Ruffa’s review here:
Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations shows how the various views of civil-military relations have transformed in a dramatic fashion, but also how much we rely on old conceptual tools to study new phenomena. It definitely shifts existing conversations about civil-military relations, allowing us to imagine that it is possible to move beyond Huntington…Moving past Huntington's model means recognizing complication and fluid boundaries. This departure from Huntington could also build better military and civilian expertise to understand and navigate civil-military relations, rather than dangerously assuming superiority in a military class that is isolated from democratic society.

A Short History of War. Jeremy Black. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022.

Read a review from Jean-Michel Turcotte here:
A Short History of War will certainly be welcomed by a larger public interested in military history. Not only has Black remarkably explored multiple facets of the global history of war, but he also highlights complex elements regarding the evolution of warfare over a long period of time. In addition, the volume is written in a language accessible to a general public unfamiliar with the field of war history which helps to democratize debates and discussion about the nature of war.

Inheriting the Bomb: The Collapse of the USSR and the Nuclear Disarmament of Ukraine. Mariana Budjeryn. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2023.

Read Shawn Conroy’s review here:
Inheriting the Bomb looks at the diplomatic process that led to the removal of nuclear weapons on the territories of newly independent Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, with a focus on the latter.  Inheriting the Bomb contributes to a resurgence of interest in Ukraine’s denuclearization in the wake of Russia’s first invasion of Ukraine in 2014. Mariana Budjeryn highlights the complexity (a myriad of factors) rather than contingency (one factor) that affected Ukraine’s denuclearization.

Fighting the Fleet: Operational Art and Modern Fleet Combat. Jeffrey R. Cares and Anthony Cowden. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2021.

Read Tyler A. Pitrof’s review here:
Fleets, Cares and Cowden argue, have four functions—striking, screening, scouting, and basing—and proper naval operational art is the ability to defeat an opponent by appropriately combining all four. While Cares and Cowden make no bones about the fact that this work is a math-heavy textbook intended for current naval officers, the two retired captains nevertheless succeed in crafting an accessible entryway into the world of modern naval command and planning in a text that is a spare 101 pages, plus technical appendices.

Is Remote Warfare Moral? Weighing Issues of Life and Death from 7,000 Miles. Joseph O. Chapa. New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2022. 

Read a review from Christine Sixta Rinehart here:
Is Remote Warfare Moral? Weighing Issues of Life and Death from 7,000 Miles by Joseph O. Chapa is a thoughtful and necessary contribution to the literature on RPA warfare. The book’s biggest contribution is that of a primary source from a seasoned veteran and RPA instructor in the United States Air Force. The book also elucidates some of the ambiguity surrounding RPA warfare.

The American Way of Irregular Warfare: An Analytical Memoir. Charles T. Cleveland and Daniel Egal. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2020.

Read M.T. Mitchell’s review here:
While satisfied with the U.S. military’s tactical performance in irregular warfare, Cleveland rejects the argument that special operations can raid their way to victory or capture enough terrain. Cleveland uses the strategic failures of the U.S. in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan to argue the U.S. military must focus on its failure to structurally, doctrinally, and militarily invest in irregular warfare to succeed.

Autumn of Our Discontent: Fall 1949 and the Crises in American National Security. John Curatola. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2022.

Read David W. Bath’s review here:
Curatola’s most important accomplishment is creating a comprehensive look at how the United States changed its perspective on national security policy during 1949 by identifying and highlighting the importance of the lesser known national security issues that may have been hidden by the creation of the nuclear bomb.

The Wandering Army: The Campaigns that Transformed the British Way of War. Huw J. Davies. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2022.

Read Brandon Bernick’s review here:
The Wandering Army offers a new and powerful perspective on debates surrounding the British way of war. By suggesting observational and experiential learning in previous wars led to experimentation and knowledge diffusion throughout the officer class, Davies challenges previous views on an old subject. As such, he makes a great contribution to the field of military history and is one that should be considered of interest to experts as Davies crafts a very interesting book that furthers opportunities for study and debate.

Backfire: How Sanctions Reshape the World Against U.S. Interests. Agathe Demarais. New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2022.

Read Gregory Brew’s review here:
In a series of short, engaging, and clearly written chapters, Demarais breaks down why the U.S. found sanctions such an appealing policy instrument; how their widespread use in the 1990s and 2000s triggered changes and upheavals, as countries around the world coped with the issues of challenges of compliance; and, finally, how sanctions implementation has generally backfired, imposing costs on the U.S. and its allies while encouraging targeted states towards policies and strategies designed to insulate their governments and economies from U.S. pressure.

The Lone Leopard. Sharifullah Dorani. Bedford, England: S&M Publishing House, 2022.

Read Matthew C. Brand’s review here:
In his novel The Lone Leopard, Sharifullah Dorani provides a sweeping view of the struggle that Afghans endured under the burden of foreign influence, ethnic and religious seams, and the clash between traditional conservative cultural norms versus more modern liberal western ideals. The book does an excellent job of bringing the reader into the complicated societal mosaic that makes Afghanistan so unique.

Writing Wars: Authorship and American War Fiction, WW1 to Present. David F. Eisler. Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 2022.

Read a Jared Young’s review here:
Simply put, Writing Wars is necessary reading for scholars and writers working at the intersections of literary, military, and American studies. The interdisciplinary nature of the book also makes it well suited for a variety of classes. In addition to American Literature and History courses, select chapters on higher education’s influence on the genre and the ethics of authorship would make for insightful reading in creative writing classes that consider the history of writing programs or how identity politics figures into the ethos of storytelling. This potential widespread readership of Writing Wars is timely. With the ongoing military conflict in Ukraine and the reverberating effects of the U.S. campaigns in the Middle East, there is a need for a new wave of war fiction and, perhaps more importantly, a diverse collection of voices to tell such stories. Eisler’s book emphasizes the critical importance of this need and illuminates how those diverse voices can effectively address it.

The Future of Decline: Anglo-American Culture at its Limits. Jed Esty. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2022.

Read a review from Katherine Voyles here:
Esty’s slim book charts what he terms “declinism” to powerful effect, distinguishing declinism from decline: “Decline is a fact; declinism is a problem. American decline is happening, slowly but inevitably. It is a structural and material process. Declinism is a problem of rhetoric or belief.” This story of America on a downhill slide that Esty tells is not self-consciously set in opposition to today’s national security concerns—whether they are framed as integrated deterrence, multi-domain operations, or large-scale combat operations—but the implications of Esty’s account are profound for what America might look like on the backside of decline.

Victor in Trouble. Alex Finley. Athens, Greece: Smiling Hippo Press, 2022.

Read a review from Nicole E. Dean here:
Finley’s work is part of a long and glorious tradition of satire in the world of military and foreign affairs. Her books are a welcome mental break for modern audiences, but the wellspring of military and diplomatic satire was already deep. For autocratic societies, where censorship is a defining characteristic, satirists walk fine lines to say quiet thoughts out loud.

Strategiya: The Foundations of the Russian Art of Strategy. Edited by Ofer Fridman. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2021.

Read B.A. Friedman’s review here:
A shroud of myth and legend surrounds Russian strategy. As far back as the 1980s, the U.S. began looking at the widespread use of precision-guided munitions and other associated technology because the Russians had an allegedly more advanced conception of their potential. In 1982, the operational level of war debuted in U.S. doctrine, allegedly because it existed in Soviet doctrine. The only way to combat such misconceptions is to take the Russians at their word. Specifically, by reading their words. Strategiya: The Foundations of the Russian Art of Strategy, edited by Dr. Ofer Fridman, Lecturer at King’s College London, is one of the best weapons available.

A Republic in the Ranks: Loyalty and Dissent in the Army of the Potomac. Zachery A. Fry. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2020.

Read Kathryn Angelica’s review here:
Zachery A. Fry reimagines the camps and battlegrounds of the Army of the Potomac as focal points of ideological debate. Enlisted men not only reflected partisan divides of the broader Northern public but directly engaged in the political process through correspondence, voting, and political resolutions. This book sheds light upon mobilization within the ranks to reframe notions of political space and activity during the Civil War. 

Putin’s Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine. Mark Galeotti. Oxford, UK: Osprey, 2022.

Read a review from Andrew Forney here:
Labeled an acute threat by the U.S. Department of Defense in its 2022 National Defense Strategy, the Russian military in Ukraine revealed itself as the flimsiest of paper tigers, a modern-day Potemkin army meant to prop up a faltering regime and its neo-imperialist visions. Where were the unmanned vehicles and the modernized tanks and the fire strikes employed in eastern Ukraine in 2014? Was that army actually a mirage, with the real army now being bled dry eight years later? There was no way that two disparate things, two photo negatives of each other, could exist at the same time. Can two divergent ideas—or two opposite armies—both be true?

Space Civilization: An Inquiry into the Social Questions for Humans Living in Space. James Gilley. London, United Kingdom: Lexington Books, 2020.

Read Brian Green’s review here:
In Space Civilization: An Inquiry into the Social Questions for Humans Living in Space, political science professor James Gilley provides an ambitious interdisciplinary overview of the social factors, from the interpersonal to the international levels, that will affect humanity’s ability to become a truly interplanetary species. In its relatively short format, the book moves briskly through many of the broad technological and biological, legal, economic, psychological, sociological, and political issues that will shape the future human exploration and potential settlement of outer space.

The Turkish Arms Embargo: Drugs, Ethnic Lobbies, and U.S. Domestic Politics. James F. Goode. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2020.

Read a review from Bob Beach here:
Goode’s corrective to the history of this incident is an important work in the study of U.S. foreign policy entering its last phase of the Cold War. Goode skillfully places the embargo in a new light, emphasizing the role of ethnic lobbies, the U.S. war on drugs, and the political negotiations on Capitol Hill. Long considered a failure of U.S. foreign policy in a time of executive turmoil and legislative assertiveness, Goode suggests the episode was a demonstration of the dynamics of political processes in a functioning representative society.

Reagan’s War Stories: A Cold War Presidency. Benjamin Griffin. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2022.

Read Chris Booth’s review here:
Highly engaging and thought-provoking, Griffin has put together an insightful book that leaves the reader with an improved understanding of pop culture’s impact on Reagan in not only leading the nation through the Cold War, but in the totality of his life as well.

Flying Camelot: The F-15, the F-16, and the Weaponization of Fighter Pilot Nostalgia. Michael W. Hankins. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2021.

Read Luke Truxall’s review here:
In Flying Camelot: The F-15, the F-16, and the Weaponization of Fighter Pilot Nostalgia, Michael W. Hankins argues that starting as early as the 1960s, a group of fighter pilots and reformers sought to change the procurement process for aircraft to emphasize the importance of the fighter pilot and air superiority missions. Hankins states that this resulted in the development and acquisition of the F-15 and F-16 fighters by the United States Air Force. Hankins further asserts that these reformers sought to change how fighter pilots were trained to emphasize the importance of dogfighting and air superiority campaigns over other aspects of air combat.

Armies in Retreat: Chaos, Cohesion, and Consequence. Edited by Timothy G. Heck and Walker D. Mills. Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Army University Press, 2023.

Read Marshall McGurk’s review here:
Military leaders and policy makers would be foolish to believe that war with a peer adversary would not involve some form of retreat or retrograde. Retreats can lead to routs, or they can provide critical time to rally forces for new campaigns or counteroffensives. Routs must be avoided, but such disaster may befall those who fail to study the history of armies in retreat.

The Digital Silk Road: China’s Quest to Wire the World and Win the Future. Jonathan E. Hillman. New York, NY: Harper Business, 2021.

Read Christopher D. Booth’s review here:
This short, yet comprehensive, and extensively documented examination of the Digital Silk Road and the Chinese Communist Party’s efforts to develop world-dominating technology (through collaboration between the military, state-owned enterprises, and closely associated parastatal private companies), will be of interest to policymakers, national security professionals, and hopefully U.S. and Western business leaders.

Rise of the Rocket Girls: The Women Who Propelled Us, From Missiles to the Moon to Mars. Nathalia Holt. New York, NY: Back Bay Books, 2017.

Read Amy E. Foster’s review here:
Nathalia Holt’s book on the women of JPL and their contributions to the United States’ history in space is a welcome addition. JPL is only one of twenty NASA centers. The women and their contributions at each NASA center deserve attention and recognition. What Nathalia Holt has done with this book is remind readers that women’s work for NASA did propel us to the Moon and Mars.

Mastering the Art of Command: Admiral Chester W. Nimitz and Victory in the Pacific. Trent Hone. Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 2022.

Read a review from Lewis Bernstein here:
Hone’s study shows Nimitz understood command is an art based on collaboration that relies on effective personal relationships to extract ideas and understand new opportunities. He adopted his subordinates’ ideas and made them part of his own plans. Nimitz never backed away from difficult decisions and when appropriate was as bold as any commander. He relied on unified command with decentralized execution combined with the continual consideration of options; the figures and tables Hone provides show this in operation.

The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan, the Cold War, and the World on the Brink. William Inboden. New York, NY: Dutton, 2022.

Read Laren Turek’s review here:
The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan, the Cold War, and the World on the Brink takes up the banner of attributing the end of the Cold War to the foreign policy acumen and foresight of Ronald Reagan. Indeed, it suggests that Reagan possessed a remarkable perspicacity that allowed him to perceive the world's historic changes on the horizon well before others did, and that this, plus his innate optimism, helped him lead the United States toward a better future.

To Boldly Go: Leadership, Strategy, and Conflict in the 21st Century and Beyond. Jonathan Klug and Steven Leonard, Eds. Haverton, PA: Casemate, 2021.

Read Brett Swaney’s review here:
Drawing on a universe of science fiction franchises including The Expanse, Star Wars, Star Trek, Ender’s Game, Starship Troopers, Dune, Earthseed, The Murderbot Diaries, and many more, a wonderful array of authors, who are strategic thinkers in their own right, offer fresh perspectives in 35 chapters that span 6 major themes: leadership and command; military strategy and decision making; ethics, culture, and diversity; cooperation, competition, and conflict; the human relationship with technology; and toxic leaders.

Military Alliances in the Twenty-First Century. Alexander Lanoszka. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2022.

Read a review from Davis Ellison here:
In this welcome addition to the literature on alliances, international relations scholar Alexander Lanoszka makes an optimistic case for the continued salience of the U.S.-led alliance system. In his two-hundred-page study, he reviews the most common areas that past studies have focused on: alliance formation, fears of entrapment and abandonment, burden-sharing, warfare, and alliance termination.

Cinema and the Cultural Cold War: U.S. Diplomacy and the Origins of the Asian Cinema Network. Sangjoon Lee. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2020.

Read Ben Griffin’s review here:
The book primarily examines how during the first two decades of the Cold War, the Asia Foundation utilized funding from the Central Intelligence Agency to support the work of, and establish connections between, anti-communist filmmakers throughout east Asia…Cinema and the Cultural Cold War is a welcome addition to the growing historiography on how Cold War belligerents actively sought to influence popular culture both domestically and abroad.

The Big Picture: The Cold War on the Small Screen. John W. Lemza. Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2021.

Read Peter Molin’s review here:
The subject of John W. Lemza’s scholarly study The Big Picture: The Cold War on the Small Screen is a U.S. Army-produced documentary television series called The Big Picture that ran from 1951-1971 on network, local, and educational stations, as well as on the Armed Forces Network of overseas stations. Lemza’s study is relevant to our own era in which a gaping civil-military divide separates the American public from the military, and in which the military largely fails to communicate a compelling appreciation of its goals, virtues, and activities.

Desert Redleg: Artillery Warfare in the First Gulf War. L. Scott Lingamfelter. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2020.

Read a review from Kevin Woods here:
The book’s title alone might suggest a more general history or analysis of the use of artillery in the Gulf War, but the book is primarily a wartime memoir framed by the experiences of a senior artilleryman whose perspectives were shaped in the Cold War’s final decade. As a memoir, Desert Redleg lands somewhere between the classic campaign and sentimental forms. In an appendix, the author dedicates a chapter to lessons of the war gleaned from a broader military and geo-political perspective.

Wars of Revelation: The Transformative Effects of Military Intervention on Grand Strategy. Rebecca Lissner.  New York, New York: Oxford University Press, 2018.

Read Christi Siver’s review here:
Reconsideration of U.S. grand strategy is critical in the context of the ongoing war in Ukraine alongside rising tensions with China. Rebecca Lissner’s Wars of Revelation makes a compelling argument that past U.S. military interventions have played an important role in shaping U.S. grand strategy.

Our Best War Stories: Prize-winning Poetry & Prose from the Col. Darron L. Wright Memorial Awards. Edited by Christopher Lyke. Johnston, Iowa: Middle West Press, 2020.

Read a review from Scott Noon Creley here:
This collection is remarkable because, whether or not everything in each story is strictly speaking factual, everything is true. If you’re interested in military culture, the ongoing cultural change in the armed forces, or just looking for excellent writing from veterans and their families, this is a book that belongs on your shelf.

Tales from the Cold War: The U.S. Army in West Germany 1960-1975. Michael D. Mahler. Dahlonega, Georgia: University Press of North Georgia, 2021.

Read Kevin Li’s review here:
Knowing the Cold War historical context, namely the necessity of, and the paradoxical relations between the deterrence mission in Europe and the mission of fighting limited wars around the globe is indispensable for understanding Mahler and his comrades’ experiences in U.S. Army Europe.

Master Negotiator: The Role of James A. Baker, III at the End of the Cold War. Diana Villiers Negroponte. Bloomington, IN: Archway Publishing, 2020.

Read Javan David Frazier’s review here:
The title of Negroponte’s book nicely sums up her work. Her first four segments explore questions and themes related to James Baker’s overall time as secretary of state. She explores the real goal for the foreign policy review initiated by the National Security Council and how it affected all aspects of President George H.W. Bush’s administration; the challenges of German reunification and Germany’s admission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); the response of the United States to the June 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre; and the aftermath of Saddam Hussein’s August 1990 invasion of Kuwait.

Military History for the Modern Strategist: America’s Major Wars since 1861. Michael E. O’Hanlon. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2023.

Read J.P. Clark’s review here:
Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, is an influential advisor to the national security elite with a reputation for deep expertise and careful judgment. Though O’Hanlon is a political scientist, he argues that military history can usefully inform current policy debates. His latest work, Military History for the Modern Strategist: America’s Major Wars since 1861, attempts to do just that through a survey of over 150 years of U.S. military history.

On Killing Remotely: The Psychology of Killing with Drones. Wayne Phelps. NY, NY: Little, Brown and Company, 2021.

Read Caleb Miller’s review here:
To date, moral injury remains a syndrome, that is, a group of symptoms lacking clear definition or cause. Phelps exemplifies a possible way ahead in On Killing Remotely. In terms of quantifiability, Phelps makes room for analyzing a new arena for moral injury without stretching the term past its breaking point. In terms of severity, Phelps clarifies that stakes can be high without involving immediate personal danger, thus opening up discussions of comparable scenarios with the potential to morally injure. In terms of technology, Phelps distinguishes between kinds of unmanned or remote aerial technology, sketching a taxonomy and noting the unique stressors of each tool or mission.

Waging a Good War: A Military History of the Civil Rights Movement, 1954-1968. Thomas E. Ricks. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2022.

Read Christopher G. Ingram’s review here:
Ninety years after the abolition of slavery in the United States, Blacks faced a dominant caste system in the 1950s that used the violence and power of the state to deny equal treatment or opportunity across the deep south. In more general terms, when confronting an imbalance of power, a subjugated people face a choice between submission or finding a way to alter the nature of the fight. To overcome this disparity, the Civil Rights Movement developed a strategy that aligned their actions to their desired change.

Blood/Not Blood Then the Gates: Poems. Ron Riekki. Johnston, IA: Middle West Press, 2022.

Read a review from Zac Rogers here:
Ron Riekki’s new collection of poems Blood/Not Blood Then the Gates is a pitiless, unsentimental, and piercing insight into the legacy of extreme violence on a human being. The volume left me with the strong impression that redemption is neither sought nor expected. What is needed is relief.

The Avoidable War: The Dangers of a Catastrophic Conflict Between the US and Xi Jinping’s China. Kevin Rudd. New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2022.

Read Ian Boley’s review here:
All told, Kevin Rudd’s The Avoidable War is very much worth the time and effort. Through a series of missteps in execution, it takes Rudd a while to get the reader onboard with his topic. Once there, however, the information provided is valuable, and Rudd’s perspective from personal experience does give his words an air of authority in these matters. For those starting out on their journey to understand what is arguably the world’s most important contemporary competition, this book is a fine place to begin.

War Transformed: The Future of Twenty-First Century Great Power Competition and Conflict. Mick Ryan. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2022.

Read a review from Brian Kerg here:
The character of war is rapidly changing. The increasing availability of evolving technology confounds previous frameworks for military operations. Socioeconomic factors and demographic shifts complicate manpower and force generation models for national defense. Ubiquitous connectivity links individuals to global audiences, expanding the reach of influence activities. And a renewed emphasis on strategic competition enhances the scope of military action below the threshold of violence. This is the world that Mick Ryan explores in War Transformed: The Future of Twenty-First-Century Great Power Competition and Conflict.

Union General: Samuel Ryan Curtis and Victory in the West. William L. Shea. Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2023.

Read Lindsey R. Peterson’s review here:
Shea successfully demonstrates that more attention should be paid to this understudied Union general. Curtis’ wartime emancipation policies should shift historians’ narrowed focus away from the Eastern Theater to more thoroughly integrate the trans-Mississippi West into their analyses of wartime emancipation. Hopefully, Union General will inspire other historians to incorporate Curtis into the current historiography on wartime emancipation, the Missouri and Arkansas home front, and Civil War memory. Ultimately, Union General is a worthy addition to the scholarship on military leadership and will appeal to readers.

Air Power in the Falklands Conflict: An Operational Level Insight into Air Warfare in the South Atlantic. John Shields. Philadelphia, Pennsylvania: Air World, 2021.

Read a review from Heather Venable here:
The line between celebrating heritage and creating a fully-rounded history can be a fine one in many institutional histories. Appreciating this tendency, Royal Air Force-insider John Shields reassesses the 1982 Falklands Conflict, seeking to explode multiple myths while also providing a better assessment of the air campaign by focusing on the operational rather than the tactical level of war.

Grand Delusion: The Rise and Fall of American Ambition in the Middle East. Steven Simon. New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2023.

Read Joe Buccino’s review here:
Simon reviews more than four decades of American endeavors in the region from the perspective of eight presidential administrations ranging from Jimmy Carter to Joe Biden. The book’s chapters illuminate cabinet-level thinking on vexing national security issues: Iranian influence in the Levant in the 1980s, the response to the U.S. Marine Corps barracks bombing in Beirut, the Persian Gulf War, the unsolvable Israel-Palestine quandary, and the rise and fall of Saddam Hussein and the resultant chaos in Iraq and Syria.

From Hegemony to Competition: Marine Perspectives on Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations. Edited by Matthew R. Slater. Quantico, VA: Marine Corps University Press, 2022.

Read B.J. Armstrong’s review here:
From Hegemony to Competition: Marine Perspectives on Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations offers thoughtful examinations of important elements of the transition to what the 2018 National Security Strategy called a new era of Great Power competition and how new Marine Corps concepts continue to develop. This book’s great strength is the questions that it is asking, and the rigorous efforts put forth to study them.

Cold War Liberation: The Soviet Union and the Collapse of the Portuguese Empire in Africa, 1961–1975. Natalia Telepneva. University of North Carolina Press, 2022.

Read a review by Charlie Thomas here:
The history of African decolonization is inherently linked with the processes, rivalries, and challenges of the global Cold War. Even those states that saw a pacific removal of colonial authority, such as Ghana or Senegal, did so under the shadow of the rivalry between the capitalist and communist states. However, the process was even more stark in Southern Africa, where the Cold War saw the contests for armed African liberation interpreted as proxy conflicts between the two ideological blocs.

Against All Tides: The Untold Story of the USS Kitty Hawk Race Riot. Marv Truhe. Chicago, IL: Lawrence Hill Books, 2022.

Read B.J. Armstrong’s review here:
The “Kitty Hawk Race Riot'” holds an important place in American naval history. An illustration of the deep and unavoidable connections between the sailors and officers of the Navy and the society they served during the Civil Rights era, it is often mentioned in passing but rarely examined in detail. Marv Truhe’s new book sets out to rectify that oversight and to help readers dive deeply into both the details of the history and the important questions it raises about the Navy of the 1970s as well as the Navy of the 21st century.

Preparing for War: The Making of the Geneva Conventions. Boyd van Dijk. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2022.

Read Brian Drohan’s review here:
International humanitarian law has only appeared to be absent during recent wars in Yemen, Syria, and Ukraine, but Boyd van Dijk’s Preparing for War: The Making of the Geneva Conventions reveals that the 1949 Geneva Conventions have an enduring influence. He shows that the Conventions have retained their legal, moral, and ethical applicability through a contextualized understanding of their history.

Heat + Pressure: Poems from War. Ben Weakley. Johnston, Iowa: Middle West Press, 2022.

Read Marshall McGurk’s review here:
A design draws you in through color or shock; a title intrigues you. Heat + Pressure: Poems From War by Ben Weakley delivers on the initial interest brought about by its unique title that sits in bold letters over the melted green army figure on the cover. Heat + Pressure shows how today’s warriors can become poets and help veterans synthesize war and their reintegration into society.

Mud Soldiers: Life Inside the New American Army.  George C. Wilson. New York, NY: Scribners, 1989.

Read Harrison Manlove’s review here:
Mud Soldiers: Life Inside the New American Army is an examination of the post-Vietnam U.S. Army and the pre-Gulf War Army. It serves as an excellent supplement to recent works on the AVF by authors like Beth Bailey, Bernard Rostker, and William A. Taylor. Author George C. Wilson writes a broad study of Charlie Company, 2nd Battalion, 16th Infantry Regiment (2-16), 1st Infantry Division spanning two generations of soldiers.

The Military and the Market. Edited by Mark R. Wilson and Jennifer Mittlestadt. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2022.

Read Sam Canter’s review here:
Looking beyond more traditionally studied factors such as battlefield tactics, leadership, and military strategy, new studies under the general War and Society umbrella take into account social dynamics such as race, class, and gender in the context of national defense and warfare. In the case of The Military and the Market, the wide scholarly aperture offered by the War and Society approach extends to marketplace and economic factors, adding additional layers of complexity to American military history.

Die Selbständigkeit der Unterführer im Kriege. Karl Woide. Berlin: Eisenschmidt, 1895.

Read a review from Panagiotis Gkartzonikas here:
In pre-nineteenth century wars with linear tactics, initiative existed but was not necessary in the same ways. From the Napoleonic Wars onwards, initiative became imperative, mainly due to the increase in the size of armies. The third chapter examines how we should interpret the principle of initiative. Woide believes that it should be made obligatory for the entire army, its implementation should be formalized and it should be considered a professional duty.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of the The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: Richard Macksey’s home library. (Will Kirk/Johns Hopkins University)

“If I must make war, I prefer it to be against a coalition.”
–Napoleon[1]

Two months after the collapse of Kabul, NATO published a fact sheet on lessons learned from its experiences in Afghanistan that proclaimed, “NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan demonstrates the immense strength of Allies working in pursuit of a common goal.”[2] This statement seems to imply that NATO somehow succeeded in Afghanistan by holding itself together politically. This statement is indicative not just of how coalitions of states conduct war, but more importantly by how multinational organizations do so.

Much of the coalition warfare seen in the past thirty years has not been conducted by coalitions per se, but rather by organizations such as NATO, the UN, and the European and African Unions. While much has been written on this type of warfare from a state-centric, international perspective, little has actually been written from an organizational, multinational perspective. This is especially the case of NATO, which is almost universally dominated by descriptions of U.S.-European bilateral relationships. These organizations, however, have their own internal dynamics that have significant impact on the outcomes of operations. Whether NATO in Afghanistan or the UN in Rwanda, these dynamics center primarily on the relationships between civilian and military authorities.

How can civil-military relations be used as a lens for us to understand the outcomes of wars in which multinational organizations are involved? This piece uses civil-military relations as a guide (rather than a strict framework) and the specific case of NATO to show the benefit of applying this approach. It shows, using the example of NATO in Afghanistan, how civil-military dynamics within the organization itself structured the campaign and impacted the alliance’s strategy and operations.

Reading Multinational Civil-Military Relations

There is a gap in scholarship on the relationships between the civilian and military authorities within multinational organizations. Few studies on civil-military relations theory consider NATO, and few studies of NATO explicitly explore its civil-military dynamics. This lacuna has created an ahistorical impression that such relationships either do not really exist, or that they are far less consequential than the bilateral relationships that exist within organizations.

Civil-military theorists since the middle of the twentieth-century have largely ignored NATO. Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz make a few references in their foundational studies, while more recent studies by Peter Feaver or Risa Brooks make no substantive reference at all.[3] Indeed, the most recent Routledge Handbook of Civil-Military Relations contains no substantive treatment of NATO, the UN, or any other organization. This despite their near constant presence in every conflict since the end of the Cold War. An excellent, though dated, exception to this is Canadian author Douglas Bland’s theoretical work and historical study of  the NATO Military Committee.[4]

Conversely, much of the literature on NATO is heavily focused on state-centric sources that essentially reduce the history of the alliance to a presidential history of the United States. Some of this can be ascribed to the largely unquestioned presumption that what happens in Washington is what happens in NATO. Both in practice and in the literature this is untrue. Additionally, there is a dearth of sources on NATO’s internal dynamics. The NATO Archives are far behind most national archives in terms of disclosures. The historical office of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) has not made any documents available past 1958. From personal research experience, however, this is only an excuse, as numerous national declassified and released sources provide detailed and lengthy considerations on NATO’s internal work, though that is itself often only until the mid-1990s. Again, exceptions to this include Ryan Hendrickson’s 2006 book on the role of the NATO Secretary General, which explicitly includes civil-military relations in its analytical frame.[5] The work, however, is outdated and some cases are now contradicted by more recently available archival sources.

In both the theoretical and empirical literature, there is also a significant U.S.-centrism. Hew Strachan lamented this in his own considerations on civil-military relations, noting how the near-ubiquitous Huntingtonian constitutional framework of civil-military relations is predicated on the unique situation of the United States in the early- to mid-1950s. Timothy Andrews Sayle’s 2019 book on NATO, while comprehensive in its coverage of the Cold War, is almost exclusively focused on Anglo- and Franco-American relations (with some added German focus as well).[6] While certainly consequential, this largely misses the role of the integrated, multinational staffs that work(ed) on a permanent basis both in Europe and North America. Focusing on the disputes between Charles de Gaulle and Lyndon Baines Johnson or Tony Blair and George W. Bush hardly scratches the surface of NATO.

Fully comprehending the civil-military relations of multilateral organizations requires accessing and understanding a broader array of primary sources. Importantly, this involves comparative and cross-archival research between national and international sources. For example, one internal NATO study on organization received only short mention in U.S. and NATO documents, but has a fully detailed folio available within the UK National Archives at Kew. Such is also seemingly the case for the UN and other organizations. This also puts a particular premium on conducting new interviews with officials from these organizations, an urgent effort by scholars of NATO and other organizations as archival sources will begin to wear thin in the coming decades. Indeed, there is a risk of a digital dark age in studying these organizations as the avalanche of digital evidence is either automatically destroyed or held behind classification barriers in perpetuity.[7]

Applying the New Prism: The Case of NATO in Afghanistan

A particularly apt case for the application of the civil-military lens is the NATO missions in Afghanistan. Why did NATO fail in Afghanistan? Most look to failings in Washington or London, or maybe to the failures of interagency processes inside the country itself. Few have looked to NATO itself, the organization that did in practice command a significant portion of the Afghan efforts, particularly training. An excellent example of some coverage on this front has been the Danish scholar Sten Rynning’s work on NATO’s organizational learning during and after the war.[8] There is room for more.

Applying the lens of NATO’s civil-military relations lends a new angle on understanding the alliance’s failure to defeat the Taliban. Both the Washington Post’s “Afghanistan Papers” release, newly conducted interviews by this author, and underutilized secondary literature paint a picture of an alliance that overly deferred to the optimistic (and sometimes untruthful) military authorities in Kabul and elsewhere, both on strategy development and in operational-level information related to Afghan troop readiness.

In the development of NATO strategy, the civil-military divide is especially clear. NATO largely deferred to Washington in the strategic direction of the Afghan campaigns, though on at least one notable occasion there was an attempt by NATO civilian staff in Brussels to assert some control over the alliance mission. The development of the Comprehensive, Strategic Political-Military Plan (CSPMP), led by the NATO International Staff between 2007 and 2008, aimed to provide a comprehensive set of multinational objectives around which the NATO staff in Kabul could cohere their efforts. As it was ultimately a product agreed upon by all of the NATO countries, it was bureaucratically quite the achievement in Brussels.[9]

There was one small issue. When the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) commander at the time, General Stanley McChrystal, received the CPMSP, he and his staff considered it useless and did not take it into account when setting strategy for the ISAF mission. Theo Farrell’s work on the war states frankly: “McChrystal’s team found the NATO strategic plan to be pretty useless as a source of guidance for their redrafting of the ISAF campaign plan.”[10] The seeming casualness with which a military commander in the field dismissed the political strategy agreed by his civilian superiors would, in most national contexts, likely lead to accusations of insubordination or an inappropriate flexing of military power. This was not the case in NATO.

Would McChrystal or his followers embracing the CSPMP made any significant difference in the outcome in Afghanistan? It is unlikely. The CSPMP is only one indicative episode in which the relationship between Kabul and Brussels was deeply and structurally flawed and lacked effective civilian oversight. It also highlights a reluctance for field commanders to engage with senior civilians who are not in theater on matters of strategy. There is little evidence, however, that the military commands in Kabul would have found a capable partner in Brussels. As the next example shows in clear form, the military effort vastly outweighed the civilian in terms of staff sizes and authorities.

On Afghan readiness reporting, the situation was little better than in the formulation of strategy. Primary source evidence shows a clear and lengthy pattern of overly-optimistic and occasionally outright false reporting to Brussels from the military missions in Kabul. For a number of reasons, be it careerism or simply naivete, the ISAF and Resolute Support Mission (RSM) commands passed flawed or false information up the chain of command from Kabul to Joint Force Command-Brunssum, to SHAPE, which would then be agreed by the Military Committee, which would only then be presented to the civilian authorities in the North Atlantic Council and the supporting International Staff. By this stage, the reporting had been massaged and pushed into an acceptable form by the military authorities of NATO, while it was received by a NATO Operations Division staff of often fewer than five staffers. In Kabul itself the NATO Special Civilian Representative for Afghanistan (SCR), notionally the civilian counterpart to the ISAF commander, played no role in overseeing the content of the periodic reports sent to Brussels. There was, in effect, no civilian control of the NATO ISAF and RSM missions.

This dynamic has since been confirmed by NATO’s former Assistant Secretary General for Operations John Manza, writing that “reports from the field were often overly optimistic and watered down as they climbed the chain of command.”[11] Official reports from the UK, the Netherlands, and from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction all confirm the same trend.[12] Past field research at ISAF headquarters also suggests the same.[13] What becomes abundantly clear from this evidence, and considered within a civil-military perspective, is that NATO officials were hugely deferential to military officers and did not adequately oversee the Afghan missions. This failure by NATO’s political leadership, both in Kabul and in Brussels, to adequately hold military reporting to account and oversee the development of the Afghan forces directly contributed to the collapse of Afghan forces in 2021.

A Call for More

This piece is only a small corner of the author’s ongoing research in applying a civil-military lens to NATO’s history. It is as readily applicable to strategy development in the early Cold War as it is to studying operational control during the 2011 Libya intervention. Beyond NATO, such an approach would be useful in exploring the strategies and operations of the UN, EU, AU, or any other structured multinational organization with both civilian and military components. Each of these organizations sits on a trove of underutilized primary sources, sources that are vital to understanding their internal dynamics and how they shaped the course and outcome of any number of conflicts.

Beyond the wider application of the analytical frame, there remains the urgency in collecting as much data as possible on these organizations as time goes on. As already noted, a digital dark age is coming, if it is not already here, that will stymy research into multinational organizations for years. Oral history projects with adequate attention (and funding) will be vital to circumvent the byzantine and outdated declassification standards of these large organizations. Without such structured collection, there will not be enough evidence to apply a civil-military lens to in the first place.

Davis Ellison is a PhD Candidate in the King’s College London Department of War Studies and a Strategic Analyst at The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. His research is on civil-military relations within and between NATO’s institutions.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: NATO Flags at North KIA, Kabul Afghanistan, 2017 (Tyrell Mayfield).

Notes:

[1] Ole R. Holsti, P. Terrence Hopmann, John D. Sullivan, Unity and Disintegration in International Alliances (New York, NY: Wiley, 1973), 22.

[2] “Foreign Ministers address lessons learned from NATO’s engagement in Afghanistan”, NATO, December 1 2021, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_189512.htm?selectedLocale=en.

[3] Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 1957), 357; Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1960), 314–17; Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005); Risa Brooks, Reconsidering American Civil-Military Relations: The Military, Society, Politics, and Modern War, ed. Risa Brooks and and Daniel Maurer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020).

[4] Douglas L. Bland, The Military Committee of the North Atlantic Alliance: A Study of Structure and Strategy (New York: Praeger, 1990).

[5] Ryan C. Hendrickson, Diplomacy and War at NATO: The Secretary General and Military Action After the Cold War (St. Louis, MO: University of Missouri, 2006).

[6] Timothy Andrews Sayle, Enduring Alliance: A History of NATO and the Postwar Global Order (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2019).

[7] Matthew Connelly, The Declassification Engine: What History Reveals about America’s Top Secrets (New York: Pantheon Books, 2023), 347–75.

[8] Sten Rynning and Paal Sigurd Hilde, “Operationally Agile but Strategically Lacking: NATO’s Bruising Years in Afghanistan,” LSE Public Policy Review, May 2, 2022, 1–11; Sten Rynning, “Still Learning? NATO’s Afghan Lessons beyond the Ukraine Crisis,” in NATO’s Return to Europe: Engaging Ukraine, Russia, and Beyond, Edited by Rebecca R. Moore and Damon Coletta (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2017).

[9] Diego Ruiz Palmer, “NATO Review - NATO’s Engagement in Afghanistan, 2003-2021: A Planner’s Perspective,” NATO Review, June 20, 2023, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/2023/06/20/nato-s-engagement-in-afghanistan-2003-2021-a-planners-perspective/index.html.

[10] Theo Farrell, Unwinnable: Britain’s War in Afghanistan 2001-2014 (London: Vintage, 2017), 284–85.

[11] John Manza, “I Wrote NATO’s Lessons from Afghanistan. Now I Wonder: What Have We Learned?,” Atlantic Council (blog), August 11, 2022, https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/i-wrote-natos-lessons-from-afghanistan-now-i-wonder-what-have-we-learned/.

[12] “Missing in Action: UK Leadership and the Withdrawal from Afghanistan, First Report of Session 2022–23” (London: UK House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, May 17, 2022), https://committees.parliament.uk/publications/22344/documents/165210/default/; “Between Wish and Reality: Evaluation of the Dutch Contribution to Resolute Support” (The Hague, Netherlands: Ministry of Foreign Affairs Policy and Operations Evaluation Department, March 2023), https://english.iob-evaluatie.nl/publications/reports/2023/05/19/dutch-contribution-resolute-support; Krisanne Campos, “Lessons Learned Record of Interview - Unnamed NATO Official” (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, February 23, 2015), background_ll_01_xx_brussels_02232015, The Washington Post’s “Afghanistan Papers,” https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2019/investigations/afghanistan-papers/documents-database/.

[13] Farrell, Unwinnable: Britain’s War in Afghanistan 2001-2014, 374.

How should senior military officers in democratic states influence their domestic political environments? The flippant answer is that they should not; they should do as they’re told. The American civil-military relations literature, written largely in the shadow of Samuel P. Huntington’s myth of an apolitical military, has consistently downplayed the positive role officers play in politics, to such a degree that we have only a dim outline of what constitutes appropriate and effective political influence by officers Thus, in practice, we fear that too many officers find their professional military education fails to prepare them for the realities of being a commander. They discover to their chagrin that there is no neutral ground available; even doing nothing is a willful political act, rife with significance, which is easily turned against them. We do not believe that officers can remove themselves from politics by “playing the neutral card.” Apolitical neutrality often seems prudent from a traditional perspective, but can fail spectacularly when applied in practice. We argue instead for a new theoretical posture, for soldiers and scholars alike, that foregrounds the political agency of officers. We call this the military politics approach.

Mark Milley and the Neutral Card

The fundamental problem with playing the neutral card was underscored when President Donald Trump told Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley to join him for a short walk (which ended up taking them to Lafayette Square).[1] When told to come, Milley played the neutral card and went. One week later Milley reflected, “My presence in that moment and in that environment created a perception of the military involved in domestic politics.”[2]

What should Milley have done, if doing nothing is also doing something? Milley’s answer provides no great insight: “We must hold dear to the principle of an apolitical military…and that is not easy.”[3] Milley’s misstep and his subsequent frustration were not surprising. Officers are not educated in how to navigate complex political environments, not least because there is so little research done on this topic. Whatever the cause, there is no structured means to develop political competencies, and indeed most officers in democratic countries spend their careers being told that they are and must remain apolitical.[4]

We see a need for a  new theoretical language to describe the ways officers do politics, and for a more open discussion, particularly in military education, for what constitutes effective and appropriate political influence. Consider Stanley McChrystal’s reflections on the politics of the military: “The process of formulating, negotiating, articulating and then prosecuting even a largely military campaign involved politics at multiple levels that were impossible to ignore.”[5] Indeed, we would turn the dominant argument, captured in McChrystal’s formulation, on its head. By denying that officers can, should, and do seek political influence, we (practitioners, scholars, educators) are collectively guilty of a grand deception, elevating officers to a position of enlightened disinterest that is false and untenable. The truth is that officers are powerful and their words have an impact—and so does their silence. The question is not whether one should speak or remain silent, but which tactics of influence can be deemed appropriate (and inappropriate) given the situation the senior officers find themselves in.[6] Our approach is, admittedly, discordant with the dominant traditions in American civil-military relations scholarship. Indeed, it is so far beyond the pale that we find it easier to make the case by pivoting to an alternate frame, military politics. 

The Problems with Civil-Military Relations

Civil-military relations and military politics have long co-existed in the global literature, although the former has almost entirely eclipsed the latter in the American context. Civil-military relations was introduced in 1940 to broadly encompass any research “bearing upon those problems of public policy which were posed by the prospect of a continuing high mobilization even in peacetime, and by the continuing necessity for a careful coordination of military, diplomatic, and industrialization policy.”[7] A little over a decade after the term was introduced, several efforts were launched to reappraise American civil-military relations.[8] Amid this flurry of activity, the young Samuel P. Huntington, working closely with the sociologist Morris Janowitz, achieved a theoretical breakthrough by using the theory of professions as the primary explanans for military effectiveness and subordination to civilian authority.[9]

The breakthrough established what became the civil-military relations subfield as we know it, coalescing (in the U.S.) around Huntington’s distinctive vision of civilian control. Peter D. Feaver and others disrupted the field in the late 1990s, giving rise to several alternative paradigms.[10] Feaver notably abandoned the use of the military profession as an explanatory variable, and shifted instead to a principal-agent model.[11] This tradition explored the gaps that separate civilian and military policy preferences. Unfortunately, both earlier and later traditions are marked by serious theoretical problems that severely limit their conceptual coherence and predictive value. Let us briefly summarize their limitations.

Huntington asked why some militaries succeed in being both effective and subordinate? And he answered: because those militaries have a professional officer corps and lack civilian meddling in military affairs. This works because a professional officer corps has monopolized expert knowledge, has a collective identity, and internalizes a sense of responsibility to the client (the state). In other words, some militaries are effective (expert) and subordinate (responsible) because they are professional (which means, in part, expert and responsible). This is equivalent to saying that to succeed, you need to be successful.[12]

Feaver asked the same question. His answer: some militaries succeed in being both effective and subordinate because they are closely overseen by civilian masters who make credible threats to keep them working. They succeed (are effective and subordinate) because they are successful (are effective and are subordinated). But why would we assume that such a tightly managed military is committed to or capable of ensuring the security of the state? Logically, we would expect almost any other outcome. Indeed, militaries run by officers who are primarily motivated by their fear of civilian punishment and who are at all times conscious of civilian oversight seem more likely to become good at buffering from civilian oversight and satisfying civilian preferences than to become good at achieving military security or wielding the military instrument.[13]

David Pion-Berlin and Andrew Ivey have argued for “scrutiny or revision” of American civil-military relations theory based on counter-indications from Latin American states, noting military dissent “has garnered no new powers for the military, nor has it eroded civilian supremacy,” but has effectively checked certain forms of corrupt behavior by civilian leaders.[14] Indeed, as Risa Brooks has argued in her analysis of the “paradoxes of professionalism”, there is still lively scholarly debate among American civil-military relations scholars concerning what constitutes effective and appropriate political influence by American officers.[15]

From Civil-Military Relations (Back) to Military Politics

Huntington in the early 1960s still seemed uncertain about the name for the field he dominated. In an influential article published in 1961, he used “military politics” and “civil-military relations” interchangeably, and chose the former for the name of a widely reviewed edited volume he published in 1962.[16] Eventually, he dispensed with the “military politics” language, and indeed the term was abandoned by the core of the field by the early 1960s, although it was retained by scholars studying militaries overtly involved in domestic politics (mainly in authoritarian states).[17]

The military politics subfield we propose is, by contrast, primarily concerned with military-political behavior in democratic contexts. This emerging subfield foregrounds the role of military actors, institutions, and events in explaining political realities, focusing particularly on the active role played by officers in shaping their political environments.[18] This literature guides officers to become reflexive practitioners in their domestic political arenas. Here Roennfeldt has argued for “wider officer competence,” specifically in managing politically dilemmas; Allen proposed that the field adopt the “political savvy” scale to describe the political attributes that officers need to succeed; Coletta and Crosbie have argued that officers should be encouraged to develop not just wisdom but also virtù.[19] What these suggestions share in common is the idea that our scholarship should help officers be more effective in their political engagement, not to advance the interests of the military, but rather to achieve better democratic outcomes.

Although rarely communicated to officer-students, many specific methods of political influence have been noted in the literature. Best known is perhaps the “resign in protest” debates of 2017-2018.[20] Less noted have been forms of military voice ranging from Sarkesian’s “enlightened advocacy” to Feaver and Kohn’s categories of insist, advocate, advise and “be neutral” to Brooks’s observations of officers directly appealing to the public, grandstanding, shoulder-tapping, politicking and so on, or the notions of engaging in a continuous or iterative dialogue. We could logically also consider theories of social influence originating from literatures beyond the military domain, including influence tactics such as pressure tactics, legitimating tactics, coalition tactics, personal appeals, ingratiation, inspirational appeals, consultation, rational persuasion, and collaboration.[21] In this sense, officers never stand powerless before their civilian masters, for they are always armed with the tools of influence (whether they have refined these tools or not).

Let us reconsider Milley’s position from a perspective of military-political agency. Milley was directed to join the president in what turned out to be a partisan photoshoot. Through inaction, Milley believed he unintentionally brought the military into domestic politics. What we argue is that the military was (and always is) already fully inside domestic politics. What went wrong was that Milley, by playing the neutral card, chose an inappropriate tactic for the situation. A range of tactics could have been considered (and perhaps where) including advising, advocating, or insisting on a different course of action, pressuring the president, building a coalition to oppose the president’s directive, or ingratiating himself with the president in an attempt to exert a softer form of influence.[22] Those were also potential choices, and future officers who find themselves in Milley’s position would be better served considering the full banquet of options, and their appropriateness for the given situation, rather than view themselves as forced to play a losing card.

As a final word, we believe it is important to acknowledge that this theoretical intervention carries with it a risk to democracy. By following our suggestions, unethical officers may find inspiration in how to improperly influence their political environments. It is justified because it addresses what we consider to be a greater risk: another generation of ethical officers expected to muddle through the political landscape they are required to inhabit. By refining our language to better approximate how these relations really work in practice, we aim to provide civilians and military professionals alike with valuable new tools to navigate these very challenging environments. Sunlight, in this case, is the best disinfectant.

Thomas Crosbie is an Associate Professor in the Institute for Military Operations at the Royal Danish Defence College. He is the editor of the Military Politics book series with Berghahn Books.

Anders Klitmøller is an Associate Professor in the Institute for Leadership and Organization at the Royal Danish Defence College.

The views expressed are the authors’ alone and do not reflect those of the Danish Ministry of Defence, the Royal Danish Defence College, or the Danish Government.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley, Pentagon, Arlington Virginia, 2019 (Spc. Keisha T Brown).

Notes:

[1] Robert Kagan provides an extensive discussion of the incident. He asserts that “the military remains as wedded as ever to the tradition of military abstention”, despite Milley’s misstep, in Robert Kagain, “The Battle of Lafayette Square and the Undermining of American Democracy” Brookings, June 6, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/the-battle-of-lafayette-square-and-the-undermining-of-american-democracy/. Also, Kori M. Schake has argued in traditional civil-military relations terms that Milley’s behavior was apolitical and appropriate in Kori M. Schacke, “The Military and the Constitution Under Trump” Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 62 (2022) https://doi.org/10.1080/00396338.2020.1792096

[2] David Welna, “Gen. Mark Milley Says Accompanying Trump To Church Photo-Op Was A Mistake,” NPR, June 11, 2020, https://www.npr.org/sections/live-updates-protests-for-racial-justice/2020/06/11/875019346/gen-mark-milley-says-accompanying-trump-to-church-photo-op-was-a-mistake

[3] Ibid.

[4] We draw a significant distinction here between “structured” and “unstructured”. Officers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Warrant Officers who rise to the top of their fields will have almost certainly benefited from mentors passing on hard-won lessons in political effectiveness. War Colleges, as well as CAPSTONE, and PINNACLE-type courses, likewise create unstructured or loosely-structured opportunities for officers to meet and learn from a variety of politically-savvy actors, in uniform and out. What is missing, and what we call for, is explicit and transparent education in gaining appropriate political competencies. 

[5] McChrystal in the book by Lawrence Freedman, Command: The Politics of Military Operations from Korea to Ukraine (Dublin: Allen Lane, 2022), pp. 513.

[6] For work on influence tactics see: Falbe, Cecilia M., and Gary Yukl. "Consequences for Managers of Using Single Influence Tactics and Combinations of Tactics." Academy of Management Journal 35, no. 3 (1992): 638-52.; for work on ’hard’ versus ’soft’ influence tactics see van Knippenberg, Barbara, Rob van Eijbergen, and Henk Wilke. "The Use of Hard and Soft Influence Tactics in Cooperative Task Groups." Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 2, no. 3 (1999): 231-44.

[7] These civil-military relations were of interest because they had already begun to show signs of stressing America’s democratic institutions. See William T.R. Fox, “Civil-Military Relations: The SSRC Committee and Its Research Survey”, World Politics 6, no. 2 (1954): 278-288.

[8] See pages 22-23 of Thomas Crosbie “What is Military Politics?” in Military Politics: New Perspectives ed. Thomas Crosbie, (Berghahn Books, 2023).

[9] Damon Coletta and Thomas Crosbie, “The Virtues of Military Politics” Armed Forces and Society 47:1 (2021): 3-24.

[10] Peter D. Feaver, “The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian Control” Armed Forces and Society 23:2 (1996), pp. 149-178; and Peter D. Feaver Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Harvard University Press, 2003); and Rebecca L. Schiff, “Civil-Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance” Armed Forces Society Vol. 22, No.1 (Fall 1995), pp. 7-24; and Deborah Avant “Conflicting Indicators of “Crisis” in American Civil-Military Relations” Armed Forces & Society” (April 1998).

[11] See Suzanne C. Nielsen “Civil Military Relations Theory and Military Effectiveness” in Handbook of Military Administration ed. Jeffrey A. Weber and Johan Eliasson (New York: Routledge, 2007); See also Deborah D. Avant “Are the Reluctant Warriors Out of Control? Why the U.S. Military is Averse to Responding to post-Cold War Low-Level Threats” Security Studies 6:2 (1996/1997), pp. 51-90, since Avant also used the Principal-Agent framework.

[12] Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Harvard University Press, 2003); and Thomas Crosbie “What is Military Politics?” in Military Politics: New Perspectives, ed. Thomas Crosbie (Berghahn Books, 2023), pp. 27-30.

[13] This argument is expanded in Thomas Crosbie “What is Military Politics?” in Military Politics: New Perspectives ed. Thomas Crosbie (Berghahn Books, 2023) pp. 27-30.

[14] David Pion-Berlin and Andrew Ivey, “Military dissent in the United States: Are there lessons from Latin America?” Defense & Security Analysis, Taylor & Francis Journals, Vol 37(2) (April 2021), pp. 36-37.

[15] Risa Brooks, “Paradoxes of Professionalism: Rethinking Civil-Military Relations in the United States,” International Security 44(4) (2020), pp. 7-44.

[16] Samuel P. Huntington, Changing Patterns of Military Politics, (Free Press, 1962)

[17] See Thomas Crosbie “What is Military Politics?,” in Military Politics: New Perspectives ed. Thomas Crosbie (Berghahn Books, 2023) pp. 30-33, for a summary of this literature.

[18] Thomas Crosbie, “Military Politics as Research Program” in Military Politics: New Perspectives, ed. Thomas Crosbie (Berghahn Books, 2023), pp. 246-252

[19] Carsten F. Roennfeldt “Wider Officer Competencies: The Importance of Politics and Practical Wisdom,” Armed Forces and Society 45:1 (2019), pp. 59-77, and; Charles D. Allen “Military Officers Need to Be Politically Savvy,” Australian Journal of International Affairs (2018) – The attributes noted by Allen are social astuteness, interpersonal influence, networking, and apparent sincerity. See also Damon Coletta and Thomas Crosbie, “The Virtues of Military Politics,” Armed Forces and Society 47(1) (2019): 3-24.

[20] James M. Dubrik, “Taking a ‘Pro’ Position on Principled Resignation,” Armed Forces and Society 43:1 (2017), pp. 17-28; and Peter D. Feaver, “Resign in Protest? A Cure Worse than Most Diseases,” Armed Forces and Society, 43:1 (2017), pp. 29-40; and Richard H. Kohn, “On Resignation,” Armed Forces and Society, 43:1 (2017), pp. 41-52; and Don M. Snider, “Dissent, Resignation, and the Moral Agency of Senior Military Professionals,” Armed Forces and Society, 43:1 (2017), pp. 5-16.

[21] see Falbe and Yukl (1992) see also Lee, Soojin, Soojung Han, Minyoung Cheong, Seckyoung Loretta Kim, and Seokwha Yun. "How Do I Get My Way? A Meta-Analytic Review of Research on Influence Tactics." The Leadership Quarterly 28, no. 1 (2017): 210-28.

[22]  see van Knippenberg, van Eijbergen, and Wilke (1999)

CNN’s coverage of the first night of bombings in Iraq drew an audience of similarly epic size, particularly impressive for a new network. Almost 60 million watched on the network itself and 225 independent affiliates simulcasting CNN’s coverage.[3] The network’s continuous coverage of the conflict established it as essential viewing and sped the decline of network news in favor of cable, sparking the creation of rivals Fox News and MSNBC by the late 1990s. As the U.S. military celebrated its victory in Operation Desert Storm, it numbered around two million uniformed service members, enjoyed a sprawling defense industrial base, and an adult population of whom 31% were veterans.[4] As the Cold War ended, military life was interwoven into that of the average American.

As the U.S. sought to move past the Cold War, its efforts to cash in the resulting peace dividend severed many of the most prominent links between the military and the broader population. Massive defense-related spending cuts led to fewer bases, servicemembers, and industry jobs, causing the military to vanish from many communities and leaving only ghost facilities to mark its past relationship. The reduced size of the force meant fewer having served, resulting in fewer veterans to share their experience and be part of local communities. Only one in eight  men and one in 100 women today have experience serving in the military, a number the Census Bureau projects will fall to one in 14 men with women remaining at the same level.[5] The smaller military consolidated onto fewer bases over five rounds of Base Realignment and Closurec—ommonly known by its acronym, BRAC. Between 1988 and 2005, over 130 installations across 33 states and territories closed or saw drastically reduced usage.[6] These closures left both economic and environmental devastation in their wake, as clean-up costs potentially exceeded the savings from closing the installation.[7] Reduced military spending also roiled the defense industrial base, leading many contractors to either go out of business or merge. The number of aerospace and defense prime contractors went from 51 in 1990 to five today. Contractors for ground vehicles and tanks went from nine to three.[8] Communities reliant on the industrial base ended up suffering in many of the same ways as those that saw BRAC closures. The loss of jobs led to significant economic downturns and drastically altered the identity of many communities.

Despite this severing of the military from other parts of civil society, the public continued to support the military, placing more confidence in it than other public institutions. Today, even though the overall response is near an all-time low, 60 percent of those polled expressed a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the military, placing it only behind small business in the Gallup poll.[9] A Reagan Foundation poll in 2022 painted a bleaker picture, with only a plurality of those surveyed expressing a great deal of confidence in the military and only 13 percent of 18-29 year old respondents were extremely or very willing to serve with 25 percent somewhat.[10] The disparity between support and interest in serving is a predictable outcome of a process started during the Reagan administration and carried through each administration since that equates to simply supporting the troops with the fulfillment of a patriotic duty.[11] Understanding or direct engagement was not a requirement, something that afforded political and military leaders broad latitude in using the military and avoiding serious inquiry on strategic missteps.

The recent decline in support paired with a crisis in recruiting reveals the fragility of the late Cold War civil-military dynamic and exposes how little the military has done to make itself relatable to society or understandable to most Americans. Similarly messaging does little to counter inaccurate depictions that take root in the popular imagination, such as that all veterans are simultaneously heroic but also nearly irreparably damaged. In a recent study looking at veterans in the workplace, Daniel Peat and Jaclyn Perrmann Graham found there was a “sense of stigmatization for nearly every veteran” they interviewed due to mental health perceptions.[12]

To combat this, a growing refrain to the force from military leadership is for individuals to be more active in telling their service stories. While this storytelling can be a good thing, it shifts much of the burden of communication from the institution to an already overtaxed force and presumes the message will be framed in a manner that reflects favorably on the service. It also  overlooks that the reach of recent veterans and those currently serving is much smaller than it used to be. Finally, this communication has also already been occurring for years, which is why as of 2022 nearly 60 percent of recruits have a family member in the military, with 30 percent having a parent in the service.[13] A Wall Street Journal article this summer highlighted how this reliable “pipeline is now under threat” as well.[14] Given the size of the military is not likely to grow and old bases are not going to come back, the volume of storytellers and their reach will continue to diminish. To repair its relationship with the American public, the military needs to do more to leverage traditional and new media to amplify the stories of servicemembers and communicate better both what life in the military is like and what it does. This should not be a recruitment campaign, but rather a reintroduction. Recruitment campaigns contain a clear ask and rely on the assumption the audience has familiarity with the military. Given the separation between the military and the public this assumption is faulty. The military needs to reach out and show the American people what it actually does to support the nation and rebuild the foundation on which recruitment rests.

In the early years of the Cold War, the Army found itself in a similar position. It struggled to explain its utility on the assumed nuclear battlefields of the future to both policymakers and the American public. To bridge this perception gap, the Army turned to an innovative technology and growing communication medium: television. Beginning in 1951 and running for twenty years, the Army produced and distributed a show called The Big Picture. Initially debuting in primetime on ABC before moving to a syndication model, the half hour show highlighted a wide array of topics related to the Army. With over eight hundred episodes, the show is among the longest running in television history, won an Emmy, and was a launching pad for many who would find success in the broader television and movie industries. Historian John Lemza notes The Big Picture was a point of contact between the Army and the American people and “a mediating point between the Army’s internal image-makers and the wider world of public opinion.”[15]

Beginning as a showcase for the Army in the Korean War, the show expanded, covering the service’s history, special initiatives and technology, soldier experiences, and the roles of different branches and units. Ideas for episodes came from a variety of places and shifted frequently, allowing it to show “mud-level GI perspective, complementing it with a broader understanding of events.”[16] The show ended in 1971 amid rising concerns about its budget, around three-quarters of a million dollars annually, and accusations, most prominently from Senator Fulbright, that it attempted to influence foreign policy.[17] As it went off the air, it was still reliably carried by over 350 stations in the U.S. as well as 50 tied to the Armed Forces Radio and Television Service.[18] In Lemza’s telling, the cancellation meant the U.S. Army “surrendered a key piece of media terrain that might have served it well into the future as it continued to defend its relevance with the American public.”[19]

Reacquiring this terrain should be a focus of the military as it seeks to close the civil-military gap. While the media environment is vastly different, today making a literal return of The Big Picture an unlikely solution, the content-hungry nature of contemporary mass media should create opportunities for partnership. As with The Big Picture, doing so would require an investment in both people and capital. Many in uniform are trying to take their stories to a broader audience via social media, publishing on sites like this one, and public speaking around military communities. However, these efforts tend to stay within the increasingly small military and military-adjacent audiences. The resources available to the Department of Defense could help push them onto a larger stage. The benefit of reintroducing the American people to what their military does for them makes it a worthy effort. Reversing the chasm between the public and their military is too important to wait for another unlikely convergence of a popular war, mega pop star and a Bills Super Bowl appearance.

Ben Griffin is an Army officer and the chief of the Military History Division in the History Department at the United States Military Academy. He is also the author of Reagan’s War Stories: A Cold War Presidency from the Naval Institute Press and is currently working on a follow up, Imagined World Orders: Tom Clancy and U.S. National Security. He can be found on Twitter/X at @BenGriffin06. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Military Academy, U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: U.S. Air Force Honor Guard Ceremonial Flight, Washington, DC, 2017 (Sgt. Kalie Frantz).

Notes:

[1] Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, & U.S. Interests in the Middle East since 1945, (Berkeley; University of California Press, 2005), 252.

[2] “Super Bowl Ratings History (1967-present)” Sports Media Watch, accessed December 3, 2023,  https://www.sportsmediawatch.com/super-bowl-ratings-historical-viewership-chart-cbs-nbc-fox-abc/.

[3] Variety Staff, “CNN Reigns in Desert Storm,” Variety January 20, 1991, accessed December 3, 2023, https://variety.com/1991/more/news/cnn-reigns-in-desert-storm-99128411/.

[4] Jonathan Vespa, “Those Who Served: From World War II to the War on Terror”, Report ACS-43, US Census Bureau, June 2, 2020, accessed December 3, 2023, https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2020/demo/acs-43.html.

[5] Vespa.

[6] “Base realignment and Closure (BRAC) Sites by State,” Environmental Protection Agency, accessed December 3, 2023, https://www.epa.gov/fedfac/base-realignment-and-closure-brac-sites-state

[7] Ralph Vartabedian, “Decades Later, Closed Military Bases Remain a Toxic Menace,” New York Times October 2, 2023,  accessed December 3, 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/09/27/us/military-base-closure-cleanup.html.

[8] “State of Competition with the Defense Industrial Base,” Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment, February 2022, accessed December 3, 2023, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Feb/15/2002939087/-1/-1/1/STATE-OF-COMPETITION-WITHIN-THE-DEFENSE-INDUSTRIAL-BASE.PDF.

[9] “Confidence in Institutions,” Gallup, accessed December 3, 2023, https://news.gallup.com/poll/1597/confidence-institutions.aspx.

[10] “Reagan National Defense Survey” Ronald Reagan Institute, November 2022, accessed December 3, 2023, https://www.reaganfoundation.org/media/359970/2022-survey-summary.pdf.

[11] Benjamin Griffin, Reagan’s War Stories: A Cold War Presidency, (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2022), 172.

[12] Daniel M Peat and Jaclyn Perrmann-Graham, “Where Do I Belong? Conflicted Identities and the Paradox of Simultaneous Stigma and Social Aggrandizement of Military Veterans in Organizations” in The International Journal of Human Resource Management, VOL 34, NO 17, (September 2022): 3410.

[13] Jonathan Ahl, “Most Military recruits Come From Families of People Who Served. Experts Say That’s Not Sustainable,” The American Homefront Project, June 2, 2022, accessed December 3, 2023, https://americanhomefront.wunc.org/news/2022-06-02/most-military-recruits-have-family-members-who-served-experts-say-thats-not-sustainable.

[14] Ben Kesling, “The Military Recruiting Crisis: Even Veterans Don’t Want Their Families to Join,” The Wall Street Journal, June 30, 2023, accessed December 3, 2023, https://www.wsj.com/articles/military-recruiting-crisis-veterans-dont-want-their-children-to-join-510e1a25.

[15] John Lemza, The Big Picture: The Cold War on the Small Screen, (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2021), 36. Many of the episodes of The Big Picture are available online through the National Archives.

[16] Lemza, 31.

[17] Lemza, 137, 90.

[18] Lemza 137.

[19] Lemza, 263.

The recent coups in sub-Saharan Africa have ushered in a new era in civil-military relations in the Francophone states of the continent. While military intervention and insurgency have long been a feature of politics in the region since decolonization, the quick succession of regime change and the seizure of power by a new generation of juntas against long standing personalist dictatorships suggests a break in previous political patterns. And this is especially true in light of assumptions that have informed thinking since the Third Wave of Democratization at the end of the Cold War.[1]

Put simply, over the last three decades many states had gone the way of electoral authoritarianism or personalist rule, rather than continue the older and more precarious tradition of military regimes.[2] This state of affairs seems to be changing. Previous studies on coup dynamics can helpfully inform our understanding of this moment, but the new, cascade-like contagion of military-led regime-changes requires an analytic approach that is sensitive to the specific conditions of the geopolitical environment and internal domestic transformations operating in the region today.

To that end, we can shed light on the contemporary phenomenon unfolding in parts of West and Central Africa today by emphasizing two relevant conceptual dimensions that interact with each other. First, the internal guardianship self-perception of institutionalized and semi-institutionalized armed forces in the relevant states.[3] Second, the deep and abiding concentration of multigenerational resentment at foreign influence (in this case, specifically French post-colonial quasi-hegemony).[4]

Self-perceptions of a guardianship role for the armed forces mixed with decades of resentment has crystalized specifically within the officer corps of a range of Francophone African states. And this combination has been, perhaps surprisingly, supported by important elements within the urban poor and middle-classes. Yet this sharply and specifically motivated discontent has only been activated recently, and has been operationalized into critical, regime-defying political expression due to a rapidly shifting geopolitical context. Indeed, broader uncertainty surrounding the international state system and the flagging relative primacy of Western states and institutions has opened a new, political opportunity structure in which non-French alternatives to security have become at least symbolically available.

Intriguingly, all of this can be profitably conceptualized through recourse to the mid-20th century label of praetorianism. The praetorian framework was popularized by the eminent political scientist Samuel P. Huntington, in parallel with several French theorists of the state in the 1950s and 1960s.[5] Concisely put, the praetorian state is one in which political groups fight each other directly for power, rather than through mediating institutions, and in which armed organizations hold a significant advantage due to their relative professionalism and self-conception vis-à-vis weakly institutionalized but mobilized political structures and are able to use independent political power to achieve their aims.[6] As a result, praetorianism is sustained military intervention in civilian politics, unbarred from prior norms of restraint, divide-and-conquer coup-proofing, or either subjective or objective control.

The focus on praetorianism in Africa, which had once been a core concern of political-military analysis in the 1960s and 1970s, receded in the subsequent decades. This diminution in the application of the concept was due to the consolidation of a variety of personalist dictatorships in the wake of military coups and counter-coups of the prior era, as well as the survival and evolution of many former single-party nationalist regimes into dominant-party regimes (which still maintained an overall authoritarian character).[7] The number of coups across Africa declined precipitously after the end of the Cold War, and outside of the Arab world (which continued to experience significant military rule), a transition to either personalist or party-based authoritarianism—or electoral democracy—has been the modal outcome.

The new era represents a return to the praetorian dynamic, in which militaries are intervening ever more frequently in the affairs of sclerotic and underperforming personalist or oligarchic-electoral authoritarian regimes. This article surveys this reality, and suggests that the model of a self-perceived guardianship claim interacting with deep-seated resentment at decades of post-colonial influence from the metropole explains the cascade of regime-changes across Francophone sub-Saharan Africa. Yet this is only possible due to a new political opportunity structure disfavoring long-standing elites and old imperial legacy security provisions.

Inherent Civil-Military Antagonism

In a system with competing power centers, relations can often become antagonistic. Carl Schmitt’s concept of friend/enemy distinction views all political struggles as consisting of a bipolarity.[8] This bipolarity is equally applicable to civil-military relations, especially in cases where one is not unquestionably subordinate to the other. Institutional separations coupled with distinct interests can heighten these antagonistic tensions. One type of enemy is the internal enemy that must be fought and destroyed rather than the enemy that can be negotiated with and tolerated. Civil-military relations can become so strained that the military leadership ends up viewing the civilian leadership as an internal enemy that is unacceptable. In stable regimes, civil-military relations can remain generally rivalrous. In unstable ones, however, this antagonism reaches new heights whereby each ends up viewing the other as an existential threat in what is perceived as a zero-sum competition for power.

In his work The Soldier and the State, Huntington argues, “The one prime essential for any system of civilian control is the minimizing of military power.”[9] However, this creates an inherent contradiction in unstable states, such as those sub-Saharan states that have suffered from terrorism and insurgent warfare:

 “The subjective definition of civilian control presupposes a conflict between civilian control and the needs of military security…The steps necessary to achieve military security are thus viewed as undermining civilian control. On the other hand, the effort to enhance civilian control in the subjective sense frequently undermined military security.”[10]

Weakening militaries, possibly in pursuit of regime survival and wanting to coup-proof their system, makes it harder for civilian elites to manage security challenges effectively, which in turn creates tensions with military officers. Meanwhile, simply being unable to provide security, even if not intentionally seeking to weaken the armed forces, can also produce the same effects.

Resentment can be defined as a subjective feeling of discontent caused by either real or perceived marginalization. Unstable regimes, which are at risk of collapse due to either internal or external pressures, have a smaller reservoir of power that can be shared by their very nature. As with any resource, the less there is of it, the fiercer the competition over it becomes. The greater the instability, the more existential the struggle becomes. In the case of countries like Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, a confluence of factors has meant that civilian conduct and failures have produced resentment. This frustration, coupled with growing terrorist violence, has enabled militaries to seize powers and upend the pre-existing civil-military relationship status quo. Foreign interference, worsening security, and deteriorating civil-military ties all contribute to the shrinking of the reservoir of power, intensifying the battle for authority.

French Hegemony as a Source of Resentment

External actors, whether intentionally or not, can provoke resentment through their mere presence. In Francophone Africa, high levels of dependency on France by political rulers has resulted in the civilian elites being viewed by the military as an oligarchic elite captured by the French or enabling French economic interests to remain dominant, which in turn has generated generational grievances.[11] In the face of entrenched inequalities, whether ethnic or regional or defined by some other identity markers, militaries tend to enable greater levels of social mobility. Upwardly mobile officer classes are particularly susceptible to the feeling of resentment, and the feeling that in an extraordinary situation they can actually do something about it.

The recent spate of coups in the Sahel region have often been accompanied by anti-French sentiments. The new military leaders, as well as a large part of the citizenry, have framed their coups in the context of resentment against French neo-colonialism, often symbolized by the large French military presence in their countries. These coups stand in contrast to previous French-backed ones. In the recent cases of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, the expulsion of French forces is often framed as a reclaiming of national sovereignty. Following France’s President Emmanuel Macron announcement that French troops would leave Niger, Niamey’s new rulers issued a statement noting that “we are celebrating this new step towards Niger’s sovereignty,” describing the departure as “a historic moment.”[12]

Resentment in the region comes in two distinct yet connected forms. French military presence has created discontent but so has the civilian willingness to enable it. In his speech at the second Russia-Africa summit, Burkina Faso’s interim president Ibrahim Traoré expressed his view that “[w]hat is the problem are African heads of state who contribute nothing to these people who are fighting, but who sing the same song as the imperialists, calling us militias, calling us men who don’t respect human rights.”[13]

Seizure of power does not necessarily result in the immediate abatement of resentment, which can in fact carry on and become a guiding force in a military junta’s entrenchment. A recent example has been the debacle surrounding France’s ambassador to Niger. Following the ouster of President Bazoum, the new rulers in Niamey insisted on the departure of French military forces and its ambassador. Instead of accepting the new status quo, Macron refused to recognize the new government and resisted pressure to withdraw his emissary and troops. While Macron eventually relented, this brazen disregard of the military’s wish not only further deepened the military’s resentment but also strengthened popular hatred of all things French, resulting in the military’s resentment becoming widely shared with the general populace.

Guardianship as a Praetorian Prerequisite

Armed forces are often viewed both by themselves and society at large as playing a unique role in society, namely as a guardian.[14] This self-perception has resulted in frequent military interventions in domestic politics.Civilianized governments, by excluding the armed forces from political decision making may risk exacerbating resentment. Exclusion during times of crises in particular can worsen the relationship. This combination of self-perception as protectors of the nation from foreign and domestic threats along with a sense of alienation from civilian leaders creates a particular hostile civil-military relationship. By being cut out from a traditional role that they may have grown accustomed to, the challenge to the military’s power may increasingly seem existential.

In unstable states, existential threats may be confronted through extra-constitutional means. Successful military coups often combine resentments internal to the military and wider social discontent held by the wider citizenry. Oftentimes, such coups can be described, as Nadine Olafsson does, “as acts of social justice.”[15] A defense of the population from the threat or danger that the civilian leadership is seen as posing can be a trigger. In 2023 Mali’s new rulers declared 14 January “National Day of Recovered Sovereignty.”[16] This was a patriotic commemoration of the one year anniversary of popular protests in response to the threat of sanctions by the French-backed Economic Community of West African States. While not explicitly targeting a previous civilian government, albeit neighboring ones, it did build on the idea that national sovereignty was defended by the people and the military, not a civilian authority. It reinforces the notion that even in violating a constitution, the military remains the ideological guardian of the nation. Similarly, the establishment of the Alliance of Sahelian States by Ougadogou, Bamako, and Niamey has further signaled the perceived legitimacy of the military as the ultimate source of sovereignty.

Military juntas, such as those in Latin America, can often be non-ideological or define themselves by their opposition to a particular ideology, such as communism. In Francophone Africa, however, guardianship is itself the ideology, protecting the country from its direct enemies, such as Islamist rebels, or their indirect ones, such as incompetent or self-interested civilian rulers. Following the ousting of President Bazoum, General Abdourahamane Tiani did not declare himself the new president of the Republic of Niger but rather as “president of the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland,” arguing that his civilian predecessor tried to convince the populace that “all is going well… [but] the harsh reality (is) a pile of dead, displaced, humiliation and frustration.” [17]

A military guardian self-identity compels armed forces in unstable states to intervene in politics, producing a praetorian state of affairs. In his article focusing on praetorianism in former British colonies in West Africa, Claude E. Welch found that a key factor was the “precipitous declines in the legitimacy and effectiveness of civilian governments.”[18] This actually creates a reinforcing cycle, since ineffective governments produce resentment while simultaneously becoming more vulnerable to military coups. In the case of contemporary Francophone Africa, civilian failures to combat terrorism while simultaneously often producing non-power sharing regimes have created the necessary conditions and incentives for praetorianism to emerge.

Changing International Environment

While military resentment is by no means new in postcolonial Francophone Africa, changing circumstances both regionally and globally have allowed it to play a significant role in the militaries’ growing assertiveness. Over a century of colonial or neocolonial hegemony has rapidly given way. Unlike before, the region’s military leaders have greater room to maneuver with a smaller risk of backlash. During the Cold War, popular souverainiste political figures like Burkina Faso’s Thomas Sankara or the Congo’s Patrice Lumumba were easily replaced through force, either directly or indirectly, and replaced by more compliant and pro-Western—usually pro-French—leaders.

In the 2020s, however, new actors have appeared on the scene. The Russian Federation along with its Wagner fighters were seen as viable alternatives to the French military.[19] Economically, China’s astonishing development along with its active role in building Africa’s infrastructure without any strings attached to domestic politics has made Beijing more attractive than Paris. Multipolarity, as well as a growing willingness more broadly in the Global South to resist perceived hegemony of the Global North, alters the framework in which resentment is understood. Previously, military leaders may have been resentful but unwilling to act on it due to the absence of a potential support structure, which could manifest itself in the forms of counter-coups or foreign interventions. Now, however, the previous check that maintained the civil-military balance has been removed in favor of the latter.

Despite being governed by a civilian government, the Central African Republic has come to represent a potential pathway that is not dependent on old colonial masters. With Moscow’s backing, Bangui has been able to push back rebels while throwing off the yoke of Paris.[20] The Russian presence has attracted much attention, both by faraway observers as well as neighboring military officers. Notably, neither Russian nor Russian-backed groups have played a direct role in military coups in recent years in Africa. However, their proximity and willingness to aid post-coup governments have changed the internal calculus with direct consequences for civil-military relations.

Roman Emperor Septimius Severus’ final advice for his sons and successors was, “Be harmonious, enrich the soldiers, and scorn all others.”[21] In recent years, however, several Francophone African countries have had governments that were discordant, causing a feeling of scorn among the soldiers while enriching the civilian elites. A failure to recognize the fundamental antagonism that exists in civil-military relations in unstable states while losing legitimacy due to worsening violence and dependency/alignment with France has turned civilian governments into easy targets. An ingrained sense of guardianship, intensified by growing resentment, coupled with a changing international milieu has given military officers across the region both the motivation and the capacity.

Naman Karl-Thomas Habtom is a doctoral student at the University of Cambridge and a former guest researcher at the Swedish Defence University, Université libre de Bruxelles, and the Hans Blix Centre at Stockholm University. His research focuses primarily on post-war military and diplomatic history and he writes widely on contemporary security policy and international affairs.

Dr. Julian G. Waller is a Research Analyst at the Center for Naval Analyses and a Professorial Lecturer in Political Science at George Washington University. His research areas include authoritarian politics, illiberal ideological dynamics, Russian strategic decision-making, and political-military affairs. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of his employers or affiliated institutions.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

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Header Image: Flags of the African Union member states. (GCIS)

Notes:

[1] Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993.

[2] Morse, Yonatan L. "From single-party to electoral authoritarian regimes: The institutional origins of competitiveness in post-Cold War Africa." Comparative Politics 48, no. 1 (2015): 126-151; Bratton, Michael, and Nicolas Van de Walle. "Neopatrimonial regimes and political transitions in Africa." World Politics 46, no. 4 (1994): 453-489.

[3] Kandil, Hazem. “Military, Security, and Politics in Regime Change: Explaining the Power Triangle” In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, 2021.

[4] Hunter, Lance Y, Josh Rutland, and Zachary King, “Leaving the Barracks: Military Coups in Developing Democracies,” Politics & Policy, Volume 48, Issue 6, 2020, pp. 1080.

[5] Huntington, Samuel P., Political Order in Changing Societies, foreword by Francis Fukuyama, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996

[6] ​​Perlmutter, Amos. “The Praetorian State and the Praetorian Army: Toward a Taxonomy of Civil-Military Relations in Developing Polities.” Comparative Politics 1, No. 3, 1969, pp. 382–404.

[7] Bratton, Michael, and Nicholas van de Walle. Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997

[8] Schmitt, Carl. The Concept of the Political: Expanded Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007

[9] Huntington, Samuel P., The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press, 1967, pp. 84

[10] Ibid.

[11] Gerits, Frank, “La France en Afrique: pourquoi les politiques de Macron ont accru la méfiance et la colère,” The Conversation, 7 September 2023, url: https://theconversation.com/la-france-en-afrique-pourquoi-les-politiques-de-macron-ont-accru-la-mefiance-et-la-colere-212988

[12] “Niger : le régime militaire « célèbre une nouvelle étape vers la souveraineté »” Le Point, 25 September 2023, url: https://www.lepoint.fr/monde/niger-le-regime-militaire-celebre-une-nouvelle-etape-vers-la-souverainete-25-09-2023-2536722_24.php#11

[13] ‘“A slave who cannot assume his own revolt does not deserve to be pitied,” says Ibrahim Traoré of Burkina Faso,’ Peoples Dispatch, 2 August 2023, url: https://peoplesdispatch.org/2023/08/02/a-slave-who-cannot-assume-his-own-revolt-does-not-deserve-to-be-pitied-says-ibrahim-traore-of-burkina-faso/

[14]  J. Patrice Mcsherry, “The Emergence of “Guardian Democracy”,” NACLA Report on the Americas, 32:3, pp. 16-24, 1998

[15] Olafsson, Nadine, “When Military Coups d'état Become Acts of Social Justice,” E-International Relations, 17 January 2020, url: https://www.e-ir.info/2020/01/17/when-military-coups-detat-become-acts-of-social-justice/

[16] “Journée nationale de la souveraineté retrouvée,” Secrétariat Géneral du Gouvernement, 2023, url: https://sgg-mali.ml/fr/actualites/90/journe-nationale-de-la-souverainet-retrouve.html,

[17] “Niger's General Abdourahamane Tiani declares himself leader after coup,” France 24, 28 July 2023, url: https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20230728-niger-s-general-abdourahamane-tchiani-declared-new-leader-following-coup-state-tv

[18] Welch, Claude E., “Praetorianism in Commonwealth West Africa,” The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (July 1972), pp. 207

[19] Habtom, Naman Karl-Thomas, “The Potential Consequences for Africa of an FTO Designation of the Wagner Group,” Lawfare, 6 March 2023, url: https://www.lawfaremedia.org/article/potential-consequences-africa-fto-designation-wagner-group

[20] Lechner, John, Are Russian mercenaries bad for the Central African Republic? Responsible Statecraft, 11 April 2023, url: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2023/04/11/are-russian-mercenaries-bad-for-the-central-african-republic/

[21] Cassius Dio, Roman History, Book LXXVII.

In this article, I draw on interviews with current and former officials, officers, and civilian experts to illustrate the civil-military challenge Romania faces. Specifically, I argue that a combination of political consensus, institutional design, and a dearth of civilian expertise allow the military to operate with little meaningful oversight, and that ignoring cases like Romania’s creates important blind spots for policymakers. To conclude, I suggest that the U.S. should adjust the security assistance programs it offers to allies and partners to cultivate robust civilian expertise that is independent of existing military structures and capable of executing effective oversight.

On the Ground in Bucharest

In 2015, Romanian President Klaus Iohannis and representatives of all major parliamentary parties signed a pledge to increase defense spending to two percent of GDP starting in 2017, and to keep spending at this level for at least ten years.[3] Working from the certainty this provided, the Ministry of National Defense (MApN) developed a ten-year investment plan covering force modernization efforts through to 2026.[4] In response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Iohannis pledged to allocate 2.5 percent of GDP to defense spending, and while my conversations in Bucharest did not include politicians directly, the sources I did speak with reliably suggested that defense spending levels are not a live issue in Romanian politics.[5]

But this consensus is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, it ensures funding will remain available for badly-needed force modernization efforts. On the other, it means there has been no serious political debate about how that spending should be undertaken. The military is left alone to plan and implement defense acquisitions, and parliament rarely, if ever, asserts itself over the details of actual defense planning. The military zealously classifies everything, partly to stifle public debate and partly due to the ongoing influence of communist-era practices. And politicians are unable (they lack the knowledge or expertise) or unwilling (defense issues are not a priority for most Romanians) to exercise much oversight.[6]

The institutional design of Romania’s defense acquisition process also favors the military’s decision-making autonomy. This begins with the way planning and acquisition choices are sequenced. Requirements are translated into acquisition programs entirely behind closed doors, and internally to the Ministry of National Defense (Ministerul Apărării Naționale or MApN). With no real public debate, defense staffers execute market studies, evaluate alternatives, and ultimately decide on program specifications and an acquisition strategy. Here, Romanian procurement law exempts government-to-government deals (a category which includes all Foreign Military Sales transactions with the U.S.) from full public tenders, so when the military fears an open procurement may yield an outcome it prefers to avoid, it has the discretion to launch a government-to-government process instead, to ensure it gets exactly what it wants.[7]

Furthermore, only large-scale programs—defined as those valued at more than €100M—require parliamentary approval, but even when parliament is required to weigh in, the Ministry of National Defense decides what they see. I was told at least once that the military prefers to be less than forthcoming about systems’ total expected life-cycle costs, to avoid spooking politicians with an even larger up-front price tag.[8] And for programs valued at less than €100M, there is no explicit need to secure parliamentary approval at all.[9]

Finally, Romania suffers from limited expertise on defense issues in the non-military government bureaucracy, and especially in formats that are independent of the military. The government's main defense think tank, Institutul pentru Studii Politice de Apărare și Istorie Militară (ISPAIM), is subordinated to the Ministry of National Defense. And while the defense college is ostensibly there to train civilian government staff so they can conduct effective oversight, the reality is that the military ends up training the civilians to think like they do.[10]

The Ministry of National Defense also has a direct presence throughout key elements of the Romanian state bureaucracy. One former senior Air Force officer indicated that the defense ministry has its own coordination offices embedded in key national security ministries, e.g. foreign affairs, finance, and economy. If he needed something from the Ministry of Finance, he could call and be sure to reach another military officer.[11]

Some of this is inevitable. The line between “expert who knows how things work on the inside” and “insider with major conflicts of interest” is blurry in the best circumstances, and liaison offices to smooth cooperation across areas of different functional expertise make sense. But even assuming no ill-intent, it is easy to see how the end result is a defense establishment that is essentially being asked to self-regulate.

Ultimately, the cross-party consensus on defense issues, the military’s ability to exploit the institutional arrangements that govern defense policymaking, and the lack of technical civilian defense expertise in non-military organizations have created an environment in which military decision makers are able to design, execute, and implement defense programs in relative isolation, without political input or robust public debate.[12] These programs are then presented to parliament for up-down votes in which the strength of the cross-party consensus on defense issues, and politicians’ reluctance to be seen as denying the military necessary resources, means they are essentially always approved. The result is that American-style defense politics (like legislative committee hearings, politicians writing letters to demand answers from service chiefs, Congress forcing the Air Force to keep the A-10 in service or the Navy to buy more F/A-18s) are essentially non-existent.

Implications for Research & Policy

The Romanian experience holds lessons for researchers and policymakers. They need to pursue more detailed cross-national case studies. By traditional metrics, Romania does not raise civil-military red flags, and it sits in a blind spot for typical academic approaches to the subject. Still, there is ample evidence that its defense acquisition policy lacks robust civilian oversight. But to identify this kind of shortcoming, researchers must look under the hood and trace actual policy processes, map out granular institutional structures, and evaluate how civilian control is exercised on a day-to-day basis, even when questions about the use of force or high-level political stability are not in play. At the policy level, it suggests that American policymakers should not understand supporting defense reform in NATO allies as a purely military-to-military exercise. Rather, the U.S. needs to engage NATO allies in Eastern Europe, like Romania, in the political and social aspects of policymaking, to help foster a new generation of staffers and bureaucrats with the technical expertise necessary to effectively manage defense acquisitions.

To address this, U.S. policymakers could consider a range of options, all of which would be designed to build human capital outside of military institutions, to strengthen civilian and political oversight capabilities. In-country advisory missions could embed technical advisors within allied ministries of defense and focus on training civilian and political staff. It may also be valuable to expand pathways for promising defense and foreign policy professionals abroad to study at American professional military education institutions. By focusing on non-military students, these programs could help cultivate a community of expertise in allies overseas that is better-positioned to execute an oversight function. Finally, the U.S. could consider developing opportunities for foreign non-military staff to embed with Department of Defense or Congressional structures to gain firsthand experience with acquisition planning and political oversight. These opportunities could be modeled on existing congressional fellowship programs which fund opportunities for staff from non-profits and other outside organizations to work directly on Capitol Hill in a policy capacity. Direct legislature-to-legislature working groups, designed to build capacity in defense oversight could also  achieve some of the same goals.

Conclusion

Discussions about civilian control of the military tend to generate mental images of tanks in the streets and coups d’états. Thankfully in Romania this is not a relevant fear. But a close examination of the situation on the ground underscores the need to avoid complacency in evaluating civil-military relations, even countries that are like Romania—staunch NATO allies, EU members, and consolidated democracies.

Here, a combination of political consensus, institutional structures, and limited civilian expertise has afforded the Romanian military the autonomy to execute major aspects of defense policy with little in the way of contested democratic oversight. Luckily, the outcomes this has produced so far have been positive, for Romania and for the United States. Romania is a committed member of the Euro-Atlantic community, a close U.S. ally, and of late a buyer of multiple advanced American-made platforms and systems.

But this is no reason to ignore what the Romanian experience illuminates. Analytically, it is important to capture underlying realities, even when the surface-level picture seems positive; democratically, it is important for civilian political bureaucracy to exercise real oversight over major budgetary decisions. As the war in Ukraine has made clear the necessity of strengthening NATO-member capabilities, the Romanian example can likewise illuminate the challenges that remain with East European allies and that future security assistance can be designed to address.

Eoin Lazaridis Power is a PhD candidate in political science. His dissertation focuses on defense-industrial and maritime security institutions in Europe; other research interests include international financial regulation, Eastern Europe and the Balkans, and field experiments. The fieldwork referenced in this article was conducted in Romania in the summer of 2023, and funded by a State Department Title VIII Research Fellowship with the Middle East Institute’s Black Sea Program.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: Romanian Flag (Romania-Insider.com)

Notes:

[1] Thomas-Durell Young, Anatomy of Post-Communist European Defense Institutions. The Mirage of Military Modernity (London: Bloomsbury, 2017). Yf Reykers and Daan Fonck, “No wings attached? Civil–military relations and agent intrusion in the procurement of fighter jets,” Cooperation and Conflict 55, no. 1 (2020): 66-85.

[2] See Risa A. Brooks, “Integrating the Civil–Military Relations Subfield,” Annual Review of Political Science 22, no. 1 (2019): 379-398 for a helpful overview.

[3] Alina Grigoras, “Pact On Increased Defense Budget Signed,” Romania Journal, January 13, 2015, https://www.romaniajournal.ro/top_news/pact-on-increased-defense-budget-signed/.

[4] George Vișan, “How to Spend on Defense: Romania’s 2 Percent Conundrum,” Eurasia Daily Monitor 14, no. 69 (2017), https://jamestown.org/program/spend-defense-romanias-2-percent-conundrum/.

[5] Cristian Andrei, “Decizii CSAT | Iohannis: Majorăm cheltuielile pentru apărare la 2.5% din PIB, România devine hub al ajutorului umanitar,” Europa Liberă România, March 1, 2022, https://romania.europalibera.org/a/decizii-csat-iohannis-cheltuielile-pentru-aparare-l2-5-din-pib/31730305.html. Independent Defense & Security Analyst. Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (Bucharest), Program Assistant. ISPAIM, Senior Research Analyst.

[6] ISPAIM, Senior Research Analyst. Independent Defense & Security Analyst. HotNews, Editor; in his view there is effectively no parliamentary influence on defense acquisition at all, even via informal channels.

[7] Romanian Land Forces; Chief of Structures & Armament Planning Directorate, (former). Romanian Air Force, Officer (former). MApN, Director General (former). Independent Defense & Security Analyst.

[8] Senior Military Official (former).

[9] Romanian Air Force, Officer (former). MApN, Director General (former). Independent Defense & Security Analyst.

[10] University of Bucharest, Faculty of Business and Public Administration, Professor. ISPAIM, Senior Research Analyst.

[11] MApN, Strategic Planning Directorate, Strategies & Plans Branch, Head (former).

[12] MaApN, Director General (former). Independent Defense & Security Analyst.

In most democracies, legislatures have far less oversight power over their militaries than we might expect. The U.S. Congress and its relationship with the American armed forces is the exception, rather than the rule. Indeed, many legislatures around the world lack some of the basic instruments required to understand what their armed forces are doing, notably security clearances, subpoena power, and adequate staffing. In this article, we address the hypothesized role for legislatures in democratic civil-military relations and then demonstrate that many bodies fall short of what scholars might expect based on theories derived from the American case. We then focus on two key factors that shape whether a legislature will be a relevant actor in a democracy’s civil-military relations: the number and scope of committees charged with defense oversight and executive control over them.

The Role Legislatures Could Play in Civil-Military Relations

Democracies face a common challenge in contemporary international relations: how to ensure transparency and accountability at home while competing against authoritarian regimes.[1] Legislative oversight is one way to finesse this contradiction—that the public may not be able to directly monitor the executive branch, but legislators do so on its behalf, as in the American case. The U.S. Congress matters greatly in American civil-military relations, because it has access to information, the willingness to engage in oversight, and the power to use that information in ways that are meaningful to the executive branch and the armed forces. The U.S. Congress has at least six committees that conduct some form of oversight of U.S. national defense agencies. Committee members have security clearances, sizable staffs composed of experts, and can, in theory, compel witness testimony and subpoena documents. Prior to the dramatic polarization in Congress over the past 20 years, the localized nature of candidate selection and the traditional weakness of party discipline permitted Representatives and Senators to exercise oversight powers.[2] Today, legislative oversight increasingly depends on partisan control of each congressional chamber. Finally, Congress can use the information it gathers to influence the defense budget, alter defense policy through legislation, and confirm or reject the appointment and promotions of military officers and senior defense officials. The latter is getting much attention lately due to Senator Tommy Tuberville’s blocking of hundreds of promotions.[3] The key here is that congressional oversight powers put the Congress into the heads of military officers and those in the Department of Defense before, during, and after they act.

The American case might suggest that significant legislative oversight over the armed forces is normal in democracies, but, as we found in our research, the norm is actually one of much weaker scrutiny by most legislatures.

In a comparison of fifteen democracies in North and South America, East Asia, Oceania, and Europe, we found that only the German Bundestag has a legislature with as much information, interest, and influence as the U.S. Congress. While it may seem obvious that having access to classified information would be necessary for a defense committee to do its job, many members of many defense committees have no access. Most defense committees also have very small staffs compared with the U.S. Congress. Of the democracies we studied, only the Bundestag has an impact on line-items in the defense budget akin to that of the American legislature. When we interviewed members of the Chilean Congress, they were focused on trying to learn how much was being spent on the military, not on influencing the spending. When we asked members of the various militaries if they considered the legislature as an overseer, whether the Parliament or Congress was in their heads when making decisions, most said no or not much.

Our study focused on three attributes that together produce oversight: whether legislators have access to information, whether they are willing to engage in oversight, and whether they could use the information in ways that would get the attention of the military and the executive. The table below summarizes what we found via interviews in each of these countries.

Explaining Legislative Oversight Over the Armed Forces

Our initial hunch was that there were key differences among different types of democracies. We believed that Westminster (British-style) parliaments, European parliamentary systems, and congresses in presidential systems should behave differently. Our research quickly disabused us of that notion. We found significant oversight variation within each regime type, and that two key factors mattered across all of these systems: the number and focus of legislative oversight bodies and executive control of these bodies. In other words, who is supposed to be overseeing the military and how much discretion do they have to do it?

Defense committees are given most of the legislative responsibilities to oversee the armed forces in democracies, but many countries do not have a dedicated defense committee. In several democracies, the relevant committee is a combined Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. This does not necessarily result in weak oversight; the Foreign and Defense Committees of the French and Australia Senates, for instance, conduct greater oversight than does Canada’s dedicated National Defence Committee of the House of Commons. That said, in other cases, defense is often treated as a secondary consideration in these mixed committees, leading to weaker oversight.

In some democracies, legislators do not need to conduct oversight because alternative actors do it for them. The extra-parliamentary Swedish Defense Commission is an example of such an actor. The point is that alternative oversight mechanisms allow parliamentarians to focus on other issues instead of oversight. In such places, there may not be less oversight overall, but it will be performed by unelected agents rather than legislators. In other cases, we found government actors that empowered legislative oversight in a complementary fashion. Germany’s Parliamentary Commissioner for the Armed Forces, for example, is a super-ombuds position selected by the Bundestag’s defense committee with the charge of reporting its findings directly to the committee.

The second question focuses on whether the executive can muzzle legislative overseers, as no President or Prime Minister wants to be exposed to criticism. Strong executive control means weak legislative oversight. This factor helps to explain why presidentialism, systems where the head of government is not selected by the legislature but by the public, did not produce the outcomes we expected from institutional rivalry between the president and legislature. Some presidential systems are actually hyper-presidential, where the executive branch utterly dominates the legislature.[5] We found low oversight in these countries, as is the case in Brazil and Chile. Westminster systems vary more than we expected, as party discipline in Canada and New Zealand usually squelches oversight, whereas greater backbench independence in the United Kingdom and the lack of a government majority in the Australian upper house allows oversight to thrive. Coalition politics in European parliaments produces varying levels of oversight. Parties in a governing coalition will want some oversight if their party does not control the defense portfolio, since scandals will hurt all parties in the coalition. At the same time, they do not want too much scrutiny since any bad news will rebound against them. It is not surprising that many of our moderate cases, such as Belgium, Finland, and Norway, fit into this category.

Conclusion

The big takeaway is that there is far less legislative oversight over militaries around the world than one might expect. Even in those places where military overreach led to catastrophe, such as pre-World War II Japan, there are far fewer legislative guardians guarding the guardians. The American example does not help us understand how civil-military relations works in most democracies, given that the U.S. Congress has more power and influence than other legislatures, save for the German Bundestag. Instead, we found significant variation in legislative oversight across democracies.

Reforms do not have to be heroic to improve legislative oversight. Establishing a dedicated defense committee and granting members access to classified information would go a long way to improving oversight, without involving major constitutional change. For those countries with non-parliamentary oversight institutions, we suggest building connections between those and legislative defense committees so that the latter is empowered rather than disincentivized. Finally, in countries where legislators see themselves as party loyalist first and parliamentarians second, effective legislative oversight may remain frustratingly out of reach. Asking tightly disciplined parties in Canada and elsewhere to loosen their control of committees would likely be fruitless. As partisanship and polarization take over American politics, in fact, our study suggests that even congressional oversight may weaken as a result.[6]

Stephen M. Saideman is the Paterson Chair of International Affairs at Carleton University, Director of the Canadian Defence and Security Network, and co-host of the Battle Rhythm podcast. His address at various social media outlets is @smsaideman. 

Philippe Lagassé is the Barton Chair of International Affairs at Carleton University. He provided independent, third party oversight of major Canadian defence procurements from 2012-2022. 

David Auerswald is a Professor of Security Studies at the U.S. National War College and a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council. This review essay reflects his own views and not necessarily those of the U.S. government or the Department of Defense.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: Flags of NATO Countries (University of Notre Dame)

Notes:

[1] Michael P. Colaresi, Democracy Declassified: The Secrecy Dilemma in National Security (Oxford University Press, 2014).

[2] Linda L. Fowler, Watchdogs On The Hill: The Decline of Congressional Oversight of US Foreign Relations (Princeton University Press, 2015).

[3] To be clear, Tuberville is using this power to push the Biden administration to change its policies regarding abortion, not because he is seeking to correct military misbehavior that he learned via oversight. All the same, he has a power that most legislators around the world do not, as few legislatures have any role in the promotion of senior officers. See Erin B. Logan, “Tommy Tuberville’s Blockade On Military Promotions, Explained,” Los Angeles Times, September 6th, 2023, https://www.latimes.com/politics/newsletter/2023-09-06/tuberville-military-promotion-block-abortion-biden-essential-politics.

[4] For coding, see our article David Auerswald, Philippe Lagassé, and Stephen M Saideman, "Some Assembly Required: Explaining Variations in Legislative Oversight over the Armed Forces," Foreign Policy Analysis 19, no. 1 (2023).

[5] David Samuels and Matthew Soberg Shugart, Presidents, Parties, And Prime Ministers : How The Separation Of Powers Affects Party Organization And Behavior (Cambridge ; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, Presidents And Assemblies : Constitutional Design And Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

http://www.loc.gov/catdir/toc/cam025/91045043.html. Gary W Cox and Scott Morgenstern, "Latin America's reactive assemblies and proactive presidents," Comparative Politics  (2001); and  Marcelo Alegre and Nahuel Maisley, 'Presidentialism and Hyper-Presidentialism in Latin America', in Conrado Hübner Mendes, Roberto Gargarella, and Sebastián Guidi (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Constitutional Law in Latin America (2022; online edn, Oxford Academic, 13 Jan. 2022),.

[6] Linda L Fowler, Watchdogs On The Hill: The Decline Of Congressional Oversight Of US Foreign Relations (Princeton University Press, 2015).

As such, The Strategy Bridge wanted to explore the state of civil-military relations in the United States and beyond for the final quarterly series of 2023. This quarterly’s articles take new perspectives on issues both familiar and unexpected.

In our first piece, provocatively entitled “Legislative Oversight Over the Armed Forces Is Overrated,” Stephen M. Saideman and Philippe Lagassé leave the U.S. behind to take a more global look at civil-military relations. They argue that U.S. legislative oversight over its military is a model that is fruitless to seek around the world, where countless national legislatures lack the same infrastructure, even within democracies. The authors provide practical solutions as to how nations can take small steps to provide more oversight.

Eoin Lazaridis Power then turns our attention to the specific case of Romania, pointing to how it can be problematic to assume civil-military relations are healthy in nations. Romania appears to be a “consolidated democracy” not meriting special attention. But, reiterating a point made by Saideman and Lagassé, serious oversight is lacking that could lead to a myriad of problems. Power proposes that the U.S. expand its security assistance program to provide stronger civilian oversight of the military. 

Our focus then shifts to the continent of Africa to explore a recent string of coups in a specific context. In “Guardianship and Resentment in Precarious Civil-Military Relations,” Naman Habtom-Desta and Julian Waller explore the strong scorn many African militaries have increasingly cast upon their civilian governments, resulting in a rise of coups, especially in former French colonies. These coups have been  partially enabled by the changing context that is the West’s seeming floundering with the simultaneous rise of competing, non-Western models from peer competitors.

From a traditional focus on coups but in a new context, we pivot to how new technology may fundamentally reshape civil-military relations. In “The Normativity of State-Sanctioned Killing: Why the Hard Case against Machine Learning in Military Intelligence Production is Institutional,” Zac Rogers describes the potential results of a “sprawling public-private sector digital ecosystem.” The military’s use of vast amounts of seemingly innocuous information collected on its citizens through machine learning potentially disrupts the foundation of civilian interaction with the military. Where a citizen’s right to obscurity had been assumed before the arrival of the digital age, it now has to be reexamined and secured. Rogers contends that we must engage thoughtfully with this new realm of civil-military relations because it connects each civilian more deeply with the act of killing than has been the case before because of the changing context of a new kind of  digital total war.

The Strategy Bridge then returns to the more traditional realm of civil-military relations, although once again focused on the specific context of today in exploring the relationship of U.S. society to its military. In “Finding a New Big Picture,” Ben Griffin explores the U.S. Army’s past attempts to connect with its civilian stakeholders and suggests how it and the U.S. military as a whole can work to minimize an increasing gap between a professional military and a society increasingly unfamiliar with that professional military. He does that by exploring one of the longest-running television shows in U.S. history, The Big Picture, produced by the Army beginning in 1951.

The next article continues in a similar vein although flipping the script. Thomas Crosbie and Anders Klitmøller, both instructors of professional military education, discuss not what servicemembers should not say but what they should say in ”Beyond the Neutral Card: From Civil-Military Relations to Military Politics.” Pointing out the long shadow of Samuel Huntington’s flawed  insistence on apolitical officers, they argue that there is no shared understanding of what “constitutes appropriate and effective political influence by officers.” They embrace the notion of military-political agency, which relies on the assumption that the military fully operates within domestic politics whether it wants to or not. A more active approach, counterintuitively, may result in healthier civil-military relations than simply seeking to be apolitical at all costs.

Finally, Davis Ellison concludes the series by applying civil-military relations to the specific context of coalition operations in Afghanistan to identify the gap in the literature on  relationships between the civilian and military authorities within multinational organizations. In particular, Ellison argues that General Stanley McChrystal undermined civil-military relations when he discarded NATO’s strategic guidance.

Taken together, the articles in this quarterly series guide the reader through three continents to offer multiple perspectives on civil-military relations. They do so while touching on multiple intersections of Clausewitz’s trinity of the government, military, and society, an arguably more useful and timeless perspective than Samuel Huntington’s increasingly dated ideas. We hope this provides a historically-informed and analytically insightful set of accounts of civil-military relations.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: Champs-Elysees, Paris, France, 2017 (Manu Sanchez).

Notes:

[1] Jessica D. Blankshain, "A Primer on US Civil–Military Relations for National Security Practitioners," Wild Blue Yonder 1, no. 4 (2020): 1-30: 3.

In an age of great power competition, Jed Esty’s The Future of Decline: Anglo-American Culture at its Limits is urgent precisely because it is countercultural to the DoD strategic-level documents that emphasize great power competition. Esty’s slim book charts what he terms “declinism” to powerful effect, distinguishing declinism from decline: “Decline is a fact; declinism is a problem. American decline is happening, slowly but inevitably. It is a structural and material process. Declinism is a problem of rhetoric or belief.”[1] This story of America on a downhill slide that Esty tells is not self-consciously set in opposition to today’s national security concerns—whether they are framed as integrated deterrence, multi-domain operations, or large-scale combat operations—but the implications of Esty’s account are profound for what America might look like on the backside of decline.

To get a sense of what Esty means by declinism, it is helpful to work through one of the early examples he provides. He points to the show The Newsroom, in particular an off-the-cuff speech by Jeff Daniels’s character, Will McAvoy. In a speech McAvoy briefly runs through America’s place relative to other countries to devastating effect, he laments the country’s lost achievement and ambition, before summing up, “America is not the greatest country in the world anymore.”[2] Two ways of measuring declinism are worth lingering on here: the weighing of America’s standing against that of other countries and putting America today in the balance against America in the past to find it wanting. Esty’s examination of declinism within each of those measures is also multifaceted, spanning many arenas—from economic standing, to scientific and technological innovation, to cultural production and cache. I also take it to encompass concerns around how America cares for its people and how the state uses violence in their name.

Declinism looks and feels very different depending on who is deploying its rhetoric. A potent rhetoric that bears some relation to—but is not fully coextensive with—the structural and material conditions of decline, its rhetoric is exercised by people who occupy a wide variety of places on the political spectrum. Broadly speaking, Esty sees two groups employing declinism: “the technocratic center left” and adherents of a “center right pragmatism.”[3]

What interests him far more, however, than this taxonomy is their overlap—he is committed to taking seriously “the wonkish center” that practices “mainstream declinism.” Because it is here that declinism reaches its fullest expression: that America is not in decline but can perch for as long as it wants to at the apex of the global order. Declinism promises that decline can be slowed, halted, and even reversed. Just before his stark assessment of America’s standing in the world, McAvoy says that “[t]he first step in solving any problem is recognizing that there is one.”[4]

A feature of declinism, then, is that it is about talking about talking about the problem of decline and greatness. It is not about the problem itself. Esty’s attention to rhetoric across domains as varied as politics, economics, and culture is a powerful reminder of his expertise in fiction and culture. The facts of decline, its features, causes, and effects, take a backseat to the prevalence of simply talking about an American downward trajectory in the same breath as talking about American greatness.

The contradiction at the very heart of declinism—that American greatness remains and that it has already passed—animates some of the best parts of Esty’s book. Instead of spending his considerable gifts only dissecting the nature of declinism and the forms it takes, he turns his attention to its latent possibilities. An America actually in decline, that can acknowledge itself as such, in Esty’s telling, may be a more just, equitable, and peaceable America than an America characterized by declinism. Esty conjures a vibrant, vital, and globally relevant America on the backside of decline; it is rich with care for those who need it most—children, to be sure, but not only children, and dotted with the new construction of revitalized infrastructure.

Most of all Esty sketches a future free from the anxious push and pull of declinism. Released from that burden, America might transcend the anxiety at the center of and produced by the declinism’s inherent dialectical tension and move into the possibility of creating and fostering new narratives in relationship to its people, and itself in relationship to the world. Esty presents his 10 Theses in a supremely compelling chapter, “After Supremacy.” He holds that:

1. American decline is neither catastrophic nor avoidable.

2. The fate of American capitalism is not the fate of global capitalism.

3. Global success leads to cultural and political stagnation for apex nations.

4. Declinism projects scarcity and austerity, but even on the downslope elite nations and elites within nations retain wealth for generations.

5. Hegemony describes an intranational and international set of relations.

6. Belief in national superiority is part of the moral infrastructure of white supremacy.

7. Rise-and-fall rhetoric reframes the expansion of empire as a masculine adventure.

8. Epic tales of imperial rise-and-fall distort the narrative of national decline.

9. The historical experience of the UK establishes the contours of decline culture, but American patterns will be different.

10. Narratives about decline are more powerful than metrics and statistics.[5]

Declinism is pernicious precisely because it is imbricated in existing structures of racial, economic, gender, national and international inequity, and exploitation of people’s labor and of the planet’s natural resources. Decline, by contrast, opens possibilities of remedy and redress. New forms of sociality within a country and relations between countries are not inevitable on the other side of decline, but they are certainly easier to imagine and realize than under the current conditions of declinism.

The Future of Decline—as its title might suggest—anchors itself in a number of different historical moments. These historical moments act in two ways: they help bring into fuller view the particular features of declinism, and they are examples of how countries organize themselves on the other side of decline. This enormous historical sweep allows Esty to chart America in decline and the particular look and feel of American declinism by placing its trajectory alongside that of the British Empire. A central feature of post-imperial Britain is nostalgia and reverence for a Victorian past, and what’s more the persistence of the values of that era into the twentieth century—the time when the Empire was at its full strength, when Britain was a superpower.

Esty does not find it inevitable that America will do the same, but America’s national attachment to the Cold War may indicate a strain of unwillingness to reimagine America. He writes, “Just as Victorian ruling-class values long held sway over UK culture and politics, now a reverential view of American greatness cuts across class and regions, locked in the amber of an Eisenhower-Kennedy era version of the technical triumph over economic limits."[6]

Culture holds a central place in the book as a whole but receives special attention at the end. Culture matters so much to Esty because it is one feature of declinism; moveover, it expresses the contradiction at the heart of declinism in particular ways. He comments, “Because American optimism is tinged with anxiety, melancholic stories of autumn and twilight, diminishment and collapse—or of Greatness Restored—always seem to command center stage.”[7] Today’s glut of remakes and sequels is an expression of the tug of war that characterizes decline because they either look to the past or rely on previously told stories. New forms of culture, fresh narratives, and novel ways of telling stories will be part of how America resolves its collective feelings about decline.

The very notion of greatness is central to today’s strategic national security, defense, and military documents. But greatness is not the only way that America relates to itself, that America relates to the world, and that Americans relate to one another. Esty’s focus on decline and declinism focuses attention not just on greatness but on the fraught and complicated ways that this idea interacts with greatness. For my own part, I don’t know whether the wager at the center of Esty’s book is right: that an America that actually dealt with its own decline might be more just and equitable than the way it is configured today. Nevertheless, there is something palpable and convincing in the notion that the future is worth our collective attention and that it is not circumscribed only by greatness.

Katherine Voyles holds a Ph.D. in English and serves as the Program Director for the School for Academic Degrees at the Graduate School for Army Chaplain Corps Professional Development in the U.S. Army Institute for Religious Leadership. She writes on issues of national defense in culture and the cultures of national defense. The views expressed are the author’s and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of the The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: Barn Flag, Washington 2018 (Specphotops).

Notes:

[1] Esty, Jed. The Future of Decline: Anglo-American Culture at its Limits. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 2022, 1.

[2] Esty, Decline, 6.

[3] Esty, Decline, 7.

[4] Esty, Decline, 6.

[5] Esty Decline, 33-56.

[6] Esty, Decline, 70.

[7] Esty, Decline, 92.

A Russian General, the First Advocate of Auftragstaktik: Battlefield Initiative from Sedan to Donbas

Is there any value today in reviewing a book published at the end of the nineteenth century? The answer in this case is yes, because the book is still relevant today…and not only on the grounds of history. Firstly, it is the first book to deal exclusively with the concept of Auftragstaktik, or mission command, long before the term was coined. Secondly, the concept is in the limelight because of the war in Ukraine. Many sources, from like the Financial Times, to The Economist, to Mick Ryan have been attributing the Ukrainian military’s success against the Russians to the adoption of the NATO practice of mission command.[1]

While teaching at the Hellenic Military Academy a few years ago, I discovered the Russian General Karl Mavrikievitch Woide’s book On the Initiative of Subordinate Leaders in War. The book had been translated into German[2] and French, and from the French edition[3] it was translated into Greek in 1907 by Major Ioannis Velissariou. My surprise was great for two reasons.

Firstly, Velissariou is a legend in the Greek military and his name has become synonymous with initiative. As the commander of a battalion of Evzones, elite light infantry, during the siege of Ioannina, the largest Greek effort in the First Balkan War, he demonstrated exceptional initiative and leadership qualities.[4] He finally fell fighting in July 1913 while leading his battalion from the front in the Second Balkan War, at the battle of Kresna Gorge.[5]

Secondly, it is remarkable that the first non-German to recognize the concept now called Auftragstaktik, or mission command, was a Russian general. Karl Woide (1833-1905)—whose name appears in French as De Woyde, in German as Woide or Voide, and in Russian as Voide or Vojde—was a prominent military writer. He first wrote a penetrating analysis of the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, The Causes of Victories and Defeats in the War of 1870. His two-volume work was translated into German and French and went through repeated editions.[6] The Russian general wondered what caused the continuous successes of the Germans and the constant defeats of the French. He was the first neutral observer to attribute the German victory to the “officially recognized and obligatory independence of the subordinate leaders.”[7] Furthermore, he considered that the “initiative of the subordinates acted as a force multiplier that increased the drive of the higher command.”[8] The Germans at that time hardly ever used the term Auftragstaktik when discussing issues of command. Rather, they spoke of selbständigkeit, meaning independence, initiative, and autonomy.[9]

Evidently thinking that the subject of initiative was worth separate discussion, Woide wrote the book under review, Die Selbständigkeit der Unterführer im Kriege (On the Initiative of Subordinate Leaders in War), in which he thoroughly examined this issue. Not translated into English, the book remained relatively unknown in the Anglophone world.

The book is divided into eight short chapters. In the first chapter, the introduction, Woide summarizes his conclusions from the experience of the Prussian army in the War of 1870. He argues that “the amazing successes achieved by the German army in the campaign of 1870 are due, in large part, to initiative of subordinates. Because the French were ignorant of it during 1870-71, it gave them the impression of a newly perfected weapon.”[10]

The second chapter deals with how initiative arose in modern wars. In pre-nineteenth century wars with linear tactics, initiative existed but was not necessary in the same ways. From the Napoleonic Wars onwards, initiative became imperative, mainly due to the increase in the size of armies. The third chapter examines how we should interpret the principle of initiative. Woide believes that it should be made obligatory for the entire army, its implementation should be formalized and it should be considered a professional duty. In addition, initiative must be exercised within defined limits because it is a double-edged sword.

In the fourth chapter, the Russian general points out that initiative should not be confused “with the fury of attacking anywhere regardless of the circumstances or marching to the sound of guns.” In other words, true initiative has nothing to do with arbitrary actions. The fifth chapter deals with the recognition and interpretation of the situation, i.e. what we now call situation assessment.

In the sixth chapter emphasis is placed on the fact that subordinates, if they correctly assess the situation, can anticipate the expected orders. Of course the compass that unifies the actions of everything is the common purpose, the superior’s intent as we would say today. In the seventh chapter, the distinction between the execution of orders according to their letter or their spirit is developed. He considers obvious “on the one hand the successful consequences of intelligent insubordination and on the other, the disastrous consequences of literal submission to the order.” It is interesting that “intelligent disobedience” is still in the military discourse today. Indicatively, the American Army Chief of Staff Mark A. Milley in 2017 stated, “a subordinate needs to understand that they have the freedom and they are empowered to disobey a specific order, a specified task, in order to accomplish a purpose.”[11]

In the last and longest chapter, Woide summarizes all aspects of initiative, with the aim of stimulating study and thought, since he considers that cognitive education is necessary for its establishment. He observes that the right of initiative has been recognized and sanctioned in the armies, “but it is far from being exercised everywhere and understood in its proper sense. The good will is not lacking, but it is not sufficiently understood that the implementation of the new principle requires a complete transformation of the command methods”.[12]

Influence

The Germans, who developed selbständigkeit as a command philosophy, analyzed and discussed the subject extensively from 1870 to 1914.[13] Nevertheless, it is interesting that Woide’s books also influenced the German army, where subordinates’ independence took the form of educational principle, which was criticized for its excess and partly attributed to Woide’s input.[14] Germany, with its huge armies, increased lethality, and wide dispersion of forces, was best adapted to the battlefields of the industrial age. To overcome the chaos and fog of war, the German army found the solution to decentralized command by developing the initiative of subordinates at all levels. It was a whole philosophy and not a technique, which gradually evolved and received the name Auftragstaktik.

The most important question is, how much did Woide’s writings on initiative influence the armies of his day? At first, in his own country, although his two books were included in the curricula of the military academies, they failed to influence the entrenched thinking of the leadership of the Russian army.[15] Alexander Solzhenitsyn, in his astonishing blend of fiction and historiography, August 1914, describing the Battle of Tannenberg at the beginning of the First World War, dissects the mentality of the Russian army leadership by emphasizing:

“Provided you stuck to the letter of regulations, orders, and directives, you could make as many blunders as you liked; you could be defeated, you could retreat, be routed, run away—no one would ever blame you and you would not even be called upon to investigate the cause of your failure. But woe to you if you once diverged from the letter, if you ever thought for yourself or acted on your own initiative; then you would not even be forgiven your successes, and if you failed, you would be eaten alive.”[16]

August 1914 is an excellent read about how a petrified army—completely devoid of initiative and where mediocrity reigns—makes war. Some authors believed the Soviet system limited the freedom of tactical commanders while maximizing that of operational level commanders.[17] However, in the ongoing Russo-Ukrainian war, we have not noticed initiative by Russian commanders at either the tactical or at the operational level.

The U.S. Army adopted Auftragstaktik in the 1980s, and while it has officially incorporated mission command in its doctrine, it has been less successful in utilizing it in operations. David Barno and Nora Bensahel maintain that mission command often remains aspirational in practice. The reasons for this failure include excessive bureaucracy, extensive micromanagement, widespread risk aversion, and endemic distrust.[18] Today, mission command is part of NATO doctrine and all western armies have adopted and practice it, or at least that is what they claim.[19]

Turning to recent events, are the successes of the Ukrainians in the war against the Russians due to the adoption of mission command? If that holds true, then there are three explanations. Firstly, a military descendant of Soviet tradition could adopt and practice mission command in a matter of a few years or even months, when other militaries struggle for decades to incorporate it and this is an amazing feat. Secondly, we could probably attribute everything that works in the battlefield to mission command. However, by doing so we run the risk of robbing mission command of its meaning. Thirdly, a military can succeed in the battlefield even without practicing mission command. The Red Army defeated the Wehrmacht; proving mission command is not a silver bullet on the battlefield.[20]

Conclusion

Some authors, such as the historian Robert Citino, argue mission command is not transferable beyond the historical and social context in which it was developed.[21] Many others, such as Martin van Creveld and Stephen Bungay, claim that a non-German Army can emulate this approach despite its unique German cultural roots.[22] In fact, the German concept of Auftragstaktik has spread widely as mission command and been emulated by many militaries, although employing it has been difficult for most Western militaries. But, as Eitan Shamir demonstrated in his excellent study Transforming Command, to successfully exercise this concept, militaries have to overcome two gaps. The first gap is between understanding mission command and putting it into doctrine, that is the interpretation gap; the second one is the praxis gap between doctrine and its practical application during operations.[23] In other words, it is not enough merely to adopt mission command; you must also adapt it to your own particular circumstances. Recently, some other authors such as Conrad Crane and Amos Fox have criticized the cult of mission command and highlighted the flaws of the concept.[24] Eventually, it seems that we need more research on command approaches because they are generally poorly studied, and hence poorly understood.[25]

Major General Panagiotis Gkartzonikas, Hellenic Army (Ret.) is the editor of the military strategy e-journal STRATEGEIN and founder and president of Advanced Battlefield Studies – GREECE.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of the The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: Soldier, Thievpal, France (National Library of Scotland).

Notes:

[1] Ben Hall, ‘’Military Briefing: Ukraine’s Battlefield Agility Pays Off’’, Financial Times, May 26, 2022; ‘’What Is Mission Command? Democracy and Freedom Can Play a Role in Military Effectiveness’’, The Economist, July 25, 2022; Mick Ryan, ‘’A Tale of Three Generals — How the Ukrainian Military Turned the Tide’’, Engelsberg Ideas, October 14, 2022.

[2] Karl Mavrikievitch Woide, Die Selbständigkeit der Unterführer im Kriege (Berlin: R. Eisenschmidt, 1895).

[3] Charles De Woyde, De l'Initiative des chefs en sous-ordre à la guerre (Paris: L. Baudoin, 1895).

[4] Richard C. Hall, The Balkan Wars 1912-1913: Prelude to the First World War (London: Routledge, 2000), 83-5.

[5] Ibid, 121-22.

[6] Woide, Die Ursachen der Siege und Niederlagen im Kriege 1870 (Berlin: Mittler & Sohn, 1894-1896) and in French, De Woyde, Causes des Succès et des Revers dans la Guerre de 1870 (Paris: L. Baudoin, 1899-1900).

[7] Woide, Die Ursachen, Ι, 5.

[8] Woide, Die Ursachen, ΙΙ, 428.

[9] Robert Citino, The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years' War to the Third Reich (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 308-10.

[10] Voide, Die Selbständigkeit, 5.

[11] David Barno and Nora Bensahel, ‘’Three Things the Army Chief of Staff Wants You to Know’’, War on the Rocks, May 23, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/05/three-things-the-army-chief-of-staff-wants-you-to-know/.

[12] Voide, Die Selbständigkeit, 122.

[13] Stephan Leistenschneider, Auftragstaktik im preußisch-deutschen Heer 1871 bis 1914 (Hamburg: Mittler & Sohn, 2002).

[14] Marco Sigg, Der Unterführer als Feldherr im Taschenformat: Theorie und Praxis der Auftragstaktik im deutschen Heer 1869 bis 1945, (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schoningh, 2014), 220-21.

[15] Olaf Rose, Carl von Clausewitz: Zur Wirkungsgeschichte seines Werkes in Rußland und der Sowjetunion 1836-1991 (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995), 61.

[16] Alexander Solzhenitsyn, August 1914 (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1972), 124. See also Christian E.O. Millotat, ‘’Die Schlacht von Tannenberg im Spiegel des literarischen Meisterwerks von Alexander I. Solschenizyn – August 1914, Das Rote Rad, Erster Knoten,’’ Military Power Revue der Schweizer Armee, no. 2 (December 2014): 38-48.

[17] For example Michael Eisenstadt and Kenneth M. Pollack "Armies of Snow and Armies of Sand: The Impact of Soviet Military Doctrine on Arab Militaries," in The Diffusion of Military Technology and Ideas, ed. Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), 68-70.

[18] David Barno and Nora Bensahel, Adaptation under Fire: How Militaries Change in Wartime (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2020), 265-68.

[19] North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Allied Joint Publication-3 (AJP-3), Allied Joint Doctrine for the Conduct of Operations (NATO Standardization Office, 2019).

[20] Robert Leonhard, The Art of Maneuver: Maneuver Warfare Theory and Airland Battle (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1994), 52-8.

[21] Citino, The German Way of War, 310.

[22] Martin van Creveld, ‘’On Learning from the Wehrmacht and Other Things’’, Military Review, Vol. 68, no 1 (January 1988): 70-1; Stephen Bungay, The Art of Action: How Leaders Close the Gaps between Plans, Actions, and Results (London: Nicholas Brealey Publishing, 2011), 76-82.

[23] Eitan Shamir, Transforming Command: The Pursuit of Mission Command in the U.S., British and Israeli Armies, (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 6-7.

[24] Conrad Crane, ‘’Mission Command and Multi-Domain Battle Don’t Mix’’, War on the Rocks, August 23, 2017. https://warontherocks.com/2017/08/mission-command-and-multi-domain-battle-dont-mix/; Amos C. Fox, ‘’Cutting Our Feet to Fit the Shoes: An Analysis of Mission Command in the U.S. Army’’, Military Review, Vol. 97, no 1 (January-February 2017): 49-57.

[25] Martin Samuels, “Understanding Command Approaches”, The Journal of Military Operations, Vol. 1, no. 3 (Winter 2012): 25-29.

If the adage that we as human beings learn more from our failures than from our successes is true, then all would be wise to study how this truism applies in their own professional context by reading Armies in Retreat: Chaos, Cohesion, and Consequence. Military leaders and policy makers would be foolish to believe that war with a peer adversary would not involve some form of retreat or retrograde. Retreats can lead to routs, or they can “provide critical time to rally forces for new campaigns” or counteroffensives.[1] Routs must be avoided, but such disaster may befall those who fail to study the history of armies in retreat.

The Tale of the Tape

Timothy G. Heck and Walker D. Mills have compiled a worthwhile starting point for future scholarship on retreats. Armies in Retreat is one of the longer Army University Press publications, notching a hefty 435 pages. This bulk should not dissuade readers, who can select readings appropriate to their interests, whether ancient Greece, the World Wars, or the thought-provoking cyber warfare chapter.[2] The themes of chaos, cohesion, and consequences easily serve as topics for leader professional development sessions at all echelons. The list of retreats, many not known from popular literature, makes the book all the more compelling for the novice and the professional military historian alike, and can be paired with more well-known retreats like General George Washington’s retreat to Valley Forge or Field Marshal William Slim’s march out of Burma.[3] All of the vignettes deal with the land domain, and thus there is room for scholarship on retreats and retrogrades in the air and maritime domains. Enterprising students and scholars can also explore what retreats and retrogrades might look like in the space and cyberspace domains.

Three Themes: Chaos, Cohesion, and Consequences

The opening salvos of the book provide vignettes from the Napoleonic Wars to World War II about what must be avoided: routs. Throughout the chapters, two themes emerge: first the lack of detailed planning and second the need for decisive leadership. The text shows that  élan does not supplant “local overmatch in numbers, modern weapons, and logistics,” poor task organization, structure, or lack of intelligence.[4] Routed units fracture before combat begins; military units do not come together after shooting starts.

The second section describes cohesive units that execute breakouts, retreats, and rear-guard actions with aplomb. The historical range widens, starting with the Plataean breakout and night raid during the Peloponnesian War and running through to the 3rd Transportation Military Railway Service (3TMRS) during the Korean War.[5] Three themes resonated throughout the eight vignettes. First, the need for competent leaders with the technical skills and experience required to execute the task at hand. Second, detailed planning of the action and its desired aftermath. Third, a willingness to accomplish the mission with the capabilities at hand. It is important to reinforce that morale and mission accomplishment is tied to technical competence and prior training. The American and Korean railroad engineers and logisticians of the 3TMSR and Korean National Railroad were successful primarily through their technical expertise and professional discipline.[6]

Finally, the book reaches what might be the strongest section: consequences. The authors here speak not only of cohesion or disintegration, but of a variety of timely themes such as command climate, civil-military relations, the power of memory in the midst of defeat, and the consequences of poor planning. Policymakers and government professionals should take note of the chapters concerning Lord Cornwallis’ 1781 Yorktown campaign and the evacuation from Gallipoli in 1915-16. Military operations are at the behest of political masters and the government pocketbook. When government and military leadership are not aligned, the outcomes become decidedly bad, especially for soldiers on the ground.

The All-Encompassing Theme: Leadership and Followership

Another theme that resonates throughout all the vignettes: the need for strong leadership and followership.[7] Both require trust, trust built through relationships, competence, training, and oftentimes previous success. The “Fighting 69th” of Bull Run, though forced from their positions, were the last to hold due to strong leadership and training, hence the narrative “we did retreat but we were not beat.”[8] The American IX Corps was less fortunate where a trusted commander was removed, trust in new leaders was poor, and the competence of Corps and Division commanders was constantly in question. The authors suggest such poor leadership competence and lack of trust led to the rout at Chancellorsville, hence the mistrust of German-American soldiers and units throughout the rest of the Civil War. Units with poor command climate and mediocre leadership do not rise to the occasion in any of the examples given in Armies in Retreat; they suffer needless casualties through combat, climate or weather, disease, and capture. This is why training and ruthless accountability for competent leadership matters. When the chips are down, units fall back to the level of their training.

Armies in Retreat provides opportunity for reflection. Indeed, one wonders if studying retreats and retrogrades can bring more warfighting functions to the forefront such as protection and the use of air defense to support a withdrawal. Military leaders can reflect on how they would train their forces to remain cohesive during times of trial. Training in engineering and heavy weapons gains renewed importance when considering a fighting withdrawal. Sustainment, reconstitution of units, and movement mechanisms between frontlines and rear areas require detailed planning that cannot be left to luck or chance.

Perhaps instead of fighting offensive-minded wet gap crossing during exercises, Army brigades might learn more by fighting rearguards, delaying actions, or fighting withdrawals. Readers need only refer to the skill of Hülsen’s 1760 fighting retreat, the bravery of the Provisional Air Corps Regiment at Bataan, or the skill of the 3rd TSMR and KNR to see not only the complex, technical nature of such operations, but the moral and ethical quandaries as well.[9] It is one thing to order a unit to its death to seize an objective; it is another thing entirely to order a unit to fight a delaying action, knowing that a few words “had condemned ten thousand men to death or mutilation.”[10] Armies in Retreat also shows how time-consuming and difficult it is to train rigorously, and it makes the decisive military victories seem all the more remarkable.

A Call to Action

Subtly, Armies in Retreat also serves as a call to action to think critically and creatively about how U.S. forces, allies, and partners could compel adversaries to withdraw or cause a rout. Field Manual (FM) 3-0 Operations speaks of the defeat mechanisms destroy, dislocate, disintegrate, and isolate.[11] Leaders reading Armies in Retreat should reflect, theorize, and war-game how to defeat adversaries in all dimensions and domains. These reflections, paired with more scholarship and discourse, should inform the refinement of joint and allied doctrine and all military training and education. Military professionals and civilian policymakers can learn from recent U.S. failures and see that seizing terrain or winning the population is not enough to achieve victory. Those associated with the application of military power should not be afraid to take failure as a mentor, and extend their study beyond the great victories.

Marshall McGurk is an Army officer and a 2023 graduate of the School for Advanced Military Studies. The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of the The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: “The Retreat” by Louis Eugène Benassit the retreat of General Bourbaki’s army during the Franco-Prussian war in February 1871. (Cardiff Museum)

Notes:

[1] J.D. Work “The Retreat of Cyber Forces after Offensive Operations,” in Armies in Retreat: Chaos, Cohesion, and Consequences ed. Timothy G. Heck and Walker D. Mills (Leavenworth, Kansas: Army University Press, 2023), 401.

[2] An argument could be made for an Army University Press cyber warfare series based on J.D. Work’s chapter alone.

[3] The lesser-known examples are a tribute to the editors and chapter authors who remind us of the richness of the military history field.

[4] Tyler D. Wentzell, “Shattered: The XVth Brigade against Franco’s 1938 Aragon Offensive,” in Armies in Retreat: Chaos, Cohesion, and Consequences (ed. Timothy G. Heck and Walker D. Mills (Leavenworth, Kansas: Army University Press, 2023), 67, and Marcin Wilczek, “Polish Horsemen in the Chaotic Withdrawal of 1939,” in Armies in Retreat: Chaos, Cohesion, and Consequences ed. Timothy G. Heck and Walker D. Mills (Leavenworth, Kansas: Army University Press, 2023), 91.

[5] Jonathan H. Warner, “Fly by Night: Plataean Evacuation and Night-Fighting in the Peloponnesian War,” in Armies in Retreat: Chaos, Cohesion, and Consequences (ed. Timothy G. Heck and Walker D. Mills (Leavenworth, Kansas: Army University Press, 2023), 99, and Eric Allan Sibul, “The Railroad Saved our Neck: United Nations Command Retreat in Korea, Winter 1950-51,” Armies in Retreat: Chaos, Cohesion, and Consequences ed. Timothy G. Heck and Walker D. Mills (Leavenworth, Kansas: Army University Press, 2023), 241.

[6] Eric Allan Sibul, “The Railroad Saved our Neck: United Nations Command Retreat in Korea, Winter 1950-51,” Armies in Retreat: Chaos, Cohesion, and Consequences ed. Timothy G. Heck and Walker D. Mills (Leavenworth, Kansas: Army University Press, 2023), 264-265.

[7] Walker D. Mills, “Conclusion,” in Armies in Retreat: Chaos, Cohesion, and Consequences (ed. Timothy G. Heck and Walker D. Mills (Leavenworth, Kansas: Army University Press, 2023), 427.

[8] Catherine V. Bateson, “‘We Did Retreat but Were Not Beat: The Irish-American Experience at Bull-Run as Told Through Civil War Songs,” in Armies in Retreat: Chaos, Cohesion, and Consequences ed. Timothy G. Heck and Walker D. Mills (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Army University Press, 2023), 327, 338.

[9] Alexander S. Burns, “Hülsen’s Retreat: The Campaign in Saxony, August-October 1760,” and Frank A. Blazich Jr., “Airmen into Infantry: The Provisional Air Corps Regiment at Bataan, January-April 1942” in Armies in ed. Timothy G. Heck and Walker D. Mills (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: Army University Press, 2023)

[10] C.S. Forster, The General (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1936), 230. It is a concise novel with lessons for moral and ethical decisions stemming from WWI combat.  For a non-fiction example, see Paik-Sun Yuip, From Pusan to Panmunjon: Wartime Memoirs of the Republic of Korea’s First Four-Star General (Lincoln, Nebraska: Potomac Books, 1992).

[11] US Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: Government Publishing Office, 2022), 6-21—6-25.

Suddenly thrust into the role of national protectors, Civil War soldiers became intimately entwined with the fate of the Union. Histories of the front lines often detail their encounters with the brutality of the battlefield, miserable conditions, and the cruelty of slavery. A Republic in the Ranks provides a new perspective on this military history by examining the internal political divisions among enlisted men. Zachery A. Fry reimagines the camps and battlegrounds of the Army of the Potomac as focal points of ideological debate. Enlisted men not only reflected partisan divides of the broader Northern public but directly engaged in the political process through correspondence, voting, and political resolutions. This book sheds light upon mobilization within the ranks to reframe notions of political space and activity during the Civil War. 

Part of the University of North Carolina Press’ Civil War America “Landmark Series,” edited by Peter S. Carmichael, Caroline E. Janney, and Aaron Sheehan-Dean, the book contributes to broader scholarship examining how the Civil War transformed the national government and its relationship with the American people. Divided into two sections, A Republic in the Ranks explores how enlisted men debated the meaning of partisan loyalty in the early stages of the war and understood the significance of their political voice and how junior officers in particular directed the political engagement of the ranks. In addition to enlistment and voting records, Fry sifted through mid-to-late war newspaper accounts to reveal soldiers’ participation in both local and national politics. His reliance on a wide range of sources allows this book to trace the evolution of the army’s collective political consciousness throughout the war.

Soldiers simultaneously embraced the independence of military manhood and sought to replicate the comforts of home. Charged with electing their own junior officers, volunteer companies immediately engaged in partisan political processes. A Republic in the Ranks frames the relationship between junior officers and enlisted men as both fraternal and patriarchal. The organization of Union troops contributed to the emerging Republican consensus. Elected officers both directed the military service of their regiment and modeled moral virtue and professionalism for inexperienced soldiers. Loyalty to the Union flag and popular military figures like General McClellan initially fostered unity among men who were otherwise divided by education, ethnicity, and class. As confidence in Union leadership waned, regiments relied upon internal leadership to give voice to mutual complaints. Fry highlights the political awareness of enlisted men who filtered their war-time experiences and trauma through  partisan perspectives.

The year 1863 served as a critical military turning point during the Civil War, and political engagement increased leading up to the 1864 presidential election. After months of exhausting service, soldiers not only confronted the terror of the battlefield and the reality of slavery in the South, but forged deep bonds within individual regiments. Concern about peace-at-any-price measures, pro-Confederate secret societies, and disloyalty in the ranks prompted sixty-one regiments to issue political manifestos in support of the Lincoln administration and Republican policies in 1863. Fry demonstrates the power and impact of these political resolutions, consciously crafted to demonstrate the collective voice of the armed forces. Significantly, nine resolutions with broad regional representation explicitly addressed slavery. Sentiments included endorsements of the Emancipation Proclamation, support for the enlistment of Black soldiers, and declarations that situated the abolition of slavery at the center of the war effort. These political manifestos reflected the ideological unification of enlisted men, and the emergence of the Army of the Potomac as a social and political institution neatly aligned with Republican initiatives.

Fry’s A Republic in the Ranks also explores political campaigning within the Union Army, first through surrogate ballots and later through active engagement in public discourse. Lengthy furloughs allowed soldiers to speak in public meetings, take part in local elections, and encourage support of absentee voting among the armed forces. Debates over whether enlisted men should or could cast ballots in the 1864 presidential election led to sophisticated political campaigning among soldiers and veterans. Fry identifies the formation of veteran’s clubs as an extension of the army apparatus. Pressure from these organizations and enlisted men themselves led to Edwin M. Stanton’s General Order No. 265, which outlined procedures for wartime absentee voting. Through highlighting this process, the book situates the transformation from civilian to soldier at the heart of the political transformations of the Civil War era.

Additionally, Fry provides six detailed appendices that both demonstrate the archival foundation of this book and direct historians to examine underutilized army records. In addition to a methodological essay, these include a bibliography of the 1863 political resolutions, regimental participation in the Philadelphia Free Military School, and voting returns for the 1863 and 1864 elections. The titles of these political resolutions, mostly published in local newspapers, are eye-catching. Reflecting Fry’s assertion of an emerging institutional identity for the Army of the Potomac, they claim to represent “The Loyal Voice,” “Noble Sentiments,” and  “The Patriotism of the Soldiers.”[1] Voting returns from the 1864 election also offer a glimpse into partisan loyalty among enlisted men. Even though thousands of ballots from New York, Connecticut, and Minnesota were never counted, these returns, sometimes published in local papers, represent the public political identities of enlisted men.

Fry addresses the revolutionary enlistment of nearly two hundred thousand men of color into the Union army, particularly the establishment of “candidate schools” to train white commanding officers. However, he leaves space for examining the impact of Black enlistment on the developing political identity of the Union army. Nine of sixty-three resolutions made by white soldiers offered an explicit endorsement of emancipation, but Fry’s analysis does not examine how white enlisted men interacted with enlisted men of color beyond their role as commanding officers. It is not clear to what extent their campaigning reflected burgeoning claims for the expansion of political rights in the post war period. Furthermore, Fry does not consider the unique brand of political consciousness developed within Black regiments themselves. The segregation of the armed forces and the decision to appoint white officers to Black regiments precluded the opportunity for African American soldiers to elect junior officers and enact the political process within their ranks. The decision to enlist alone was an overtly political act, imbued with claims for full citizenship and the extension of political rights. Enlisted men of color participated in the political process and campaigned through actions, if not words, for the right to vote. Reframing African American soldiers’ military participation through Fry’s political lens might open a new avenue of exploration.

Kathryn Angelica is a PhD Candidate at the University of Connecticut. Her dissertation explores Black and white women’s activism in the Civil War era.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of the The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: Union soldiers pose during the Siege of Petersburg in Virginia in 1864. (Library of Congress)

Notes:

[1] Zachery A. Fry, A Republic in the Ranks: Loyalty and Dissent in the Army of the Potomac (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2020), 193.

American overreach in the Middle East since the Iranian revolution is examined by Steven Simon in his new book Grand Delusion: The Rise and Fall of American Ambition in the Middle East.[1] Simon reviews more than four decades of American endeavors in the region from the perspective of eight presidential administrations ranging from Jimmy Carter to Joe Biden. The book’s chapters illuminate cabinet-level thinking on vexing national security issues: Iranian influence in the Levant in the 1980s, the response to the U.S. Marine Corps barracks bombing in Beirut, the Persian Gulf War, the unsolvable Israel-Palestine quandary, and the rise and fall of Saddam Hussein and the resultant chaos in Iraq and Syria.

Simon, a former diplomat and policy advisor with deep experience in American Middle East policy, skewers the catastrophic choices made by one administration after another. The author’s experiences allow him to go  inside many of these decisions, revealing the motivations, assumptions, and often broad confusion underlying the few triumphs and many blunders. Simon’s explanation of the sad specter of America’s war in Vietnam War and its role in shaping policy in the Ronald Reagan and George H.W. Bush administrations is illuminating. Simon served in these administrations and observed the role of American sentiment and memory of that war in adjudicating policy in the Middle East. Simon also cleverly demonstrates, in revealing fashion, the surprising similarities between American presidential administrations in dealing with Iran. Many of the chapters are full of critical analysis and the kind of insight only someone involved in the decision-making can offer. In particular, the author’s insight on the Clinton administration’s development of the Oslo Accords is largely unavailable elsewhere.[2]

In the end, however, the book is not quite the sum of its parts and falls short of delivering a conclusive perspective, a comprehensive view, or a broad set of proposed policies. In focusing on his own observations and role in making decisions about American policy in the Middle East, the author does not go far enough to provide the kind of insight the book proposes to offer. Indeed, the narrow focus and the failure to provide alternative perspectives, particularly regarding the American response to a complex region’s deeply entrenched divides, ultimately diminishes the depth of the book’s insights.

A View of Misguided Ambition in the Middle East

Grand Delusion tends to oversimplify the multifaceted issues facing the Middle East. Simon frequently reduces complex geopolitical, cultural, and historical dynamics to convenient explanations. Some of these reductions seem to be a stylistic decision: Simon appears to want to get in and out of critical moments quickly to move the narrative along. This makes sense, given that there are many books covering in detail the major events he glosses over such as the Iranian hostage crisis, the Persian Gulf War, the rise of ISIS,  and more.  

At times, however, Simon seems to intentionally limit the material presented to that which fits his narrative. This reductive approach hinders the reader's understanding of the intricate and often contradictory motivations behind various actions. For example, he attributes the failure of the Arab Spring entirely to American mismanagement and lack of understanding.[3] This section of the book does not consider the domestic factors, historical legacies, and geopolitical interests that shaped the outcomes of the movement in different countries. By neglecting the complex interplay between external and internal dynamics, Simon's analysis falls short of a full exploration of the events he describes.

Throughout, Simon consistently reinforces his argument that American ambition in the Middle East has been inherently flawed and misguided, even when it does not make sense to do so. For example, Simon dismisses the development of an international coalition that defeated ISIS through a combination of precision airstrikes and ground assaults–a rare and remarkable strategic and operational success.[4] Simon claims, without much exploration, that ISIS’ territorial control was unsustainable irrespective of any opposing counteroffensive.

Similarly, Simon dismisses the Abraham Accords–the 2020 normalization of relations between Israel, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain–in a mere 127 words.[5] The historic series of agreements serves as perhaps the Trump administration's signature diplomatic achievement in the Middle East.[6] By bringing the Israel Defense Forces and Arab militaries together in collaborative deterrence planning, the set of agreements created a new bulwark against Iran and advanced a new regional security architecture organized around shared threats. Indeed, the Abraham Accords represent a significant opportunity for American interests as well as stability in the region and deserve more analysis. Simon derides the agreements because the Emirates are disinclined to partner with Israel in a war with Iran. While this is accurate, the agreements, by fostering trade relations, seek to build a regional deterrence that might preclude a war with Iran. This oversight is consistent with Simon’s narrow perspective on regional complexities.

The book is more memoir than history, and its rigid structure–each of its eight chapters covers the decisions of a single administration–confines its diagnostic scope. Throughout, Grand Delusion focuses on events as they occurred without delving into the historical underpinnings that shaped the region's trajectory. This omission weakens the analysis by neglecting the historical grievances, conflicts, and power dynamics that continue to reverberate in the present.

The first portion of the book especially could use more context. The book’s sweep starts in 1979 and ends with the present-day decisions rendered by the Biden administration. However, an understanding of the American response to regional chaos at the end of the Carter administration must build on a foundation of historical understanding. While earlier presidents generally partnered with Iran, the dynamic shifted with Jimmy Carter. This shift in the region is due almost entirely to the Islamic Revolution and the stunning loss of the Shah–Henry Kissinger’s “king of kings” and champion of American interests in the Middle East.[7] Indeed, Kissinger's empowerment of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi–a policy that helped drive the Shah’s fall, the Iran-Iraq War, and the subsequent spiraling chaos–goes unexamined in the book.[8] While Simon's extensive experience within the U.S. State Department and the National Security Council grants him a unique perspective on the intricacies of U.S. policies and the resultant failures, that perspective was surely rooted in the critical decisions American administrations made about Iran before 1979.[9]

Indeed, the Carter administration itself–which presided over enormous consequential moments such as the Camp David Accords, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s Israeli visit, and the calamitous attempt to rescue American hostages in Tehran–comes in for a mere 17 of the books 422 pages.[10] Worse, Simon makes only passing reference to the 1953 U.S.-aided coup of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, an action with generational impacts on American policy in the region.[11] Indeed, the view of American motivation by not only Iranian hardliners but also many Arab leaders is based, at least in part, on the lingering legacy of the removal from power of Iran’s democratically-elected leader.[12] 

No Solution: A Lack of Policy Prescription

While Grand Delusion effectively highlights the failures and pitfalls of American ambition in the Middle East, it falls short in offering concrete policy prescriptions for moving forward. Critique, while valuable, is only part of the equation; a comprehensive analysis should also explore potential pathways for improved policy-making.

Grand Delusion compels readers to question prevailing assumptions about American motives in the Middle East. By exposing the gap between rhetoric and reality, the book urges us to critically examine the narratives presented by policymakers and media outlets. Simon's retrospective analysis carries valuable lessons for shaping future American foreign policy. However, this book provides no real roadmap for avoiding the pitfalls of unchecked ambition.

Simon’s critique is scathing. Deservedly so. But it is also limited. That’s unfortunate. At a time when Iran’s nuclear enrichment nears weapons-grade levels, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia looks to broker normalization agreements without American involvement, and violence on the West Bank and Gaza continues unabated, the stakes of American policy for the Middle East are too important for criticism without fulsome understanding or an alternative solution.

Joe Buccino served as the Communications Director for U.S. Central Command from April 2021 until July 2023. His book Burn the Village to Save It, about the 1968 Tet Offensive, is due out in the fall of 2024.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of the The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, U.S. President Jimmy Carter, and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin at the White House in 1978. (Diana Walker/Getty)

Notes:

[1] Simon, Steven. Grand Delusion: The Rise and Fall of American Ambition in the Middle East. New York, NY: Penguin Press, 2023.

[2] U.S. Department of State. Accessed August 26, 2023. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/oslo.

[3] Al Jazeera. What Is the Arab Spring, and How Did It Start? Arab Spring: 10 years on News | Al Jazeera, December 17, 2020. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/12/17/what-is-the-arab-spring-and-how-did-it-start.

[4] The Coalition Against ISIS.  The Global Coalition Against Daesh, June 9, 2023. https://theglobalcoalition.org/en/.

[5] The Abraham Accords - United States Department of State. U.S. Department of State, January 13, 2021. https://www.state.gov/the-abraham-accords/.

[6] Daroff, William. Abraham Accords: A Diplomatic Success Story Worthy of US Support. The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com. Accessed August 26, 2023. https://www.jpost.com/opinion/article-735717.

[7] Grandin, Greg. How One Man Laid the Groundwork for Today’s Crisis in the Middle East. The Nation, September 29, 2015. https://www.thenation.com/article/archive/how-one-man-laid-the-groundwork-for-todays-crisis-in-the-middle-east/.

[8] Indyk, Martin. Master of the game: Henry Kissinger and the Art of Middle East Diplomacy. New York, NY: Knopf, 2022, pages 121 – 179.

[9] IISS. Accessed August 26, 2023. https://web.archive.org/web/20130812192055/http:/www.iiss.org/en/persons/steven-s-simon.

[10] U.S. Department of State. Accessed August 26, 2023. https://history.state.gov/milestones/1977-1980/camp-david; Hazaimeh, Hani. “When Sadat Went to Israel.” Arab News, October 6, 2021. https://www.arabnews.com/node/1659751; Bowden, Mark. Guests of the Ayatollah: The first battle in America’s war with militant Islam. New York: Grove Atlantic, 2018, 119 – 147.

[11] Wu, Lawrence, and Michelle Lanz. How the CIA Overthrew Iran’s Democracy in 4 Days. NPR, February 7, 2019. https://www.npr.org/2019/01/31/690363402/how-the-cia-overthrew-irans-democracy-in-four-days.

[12] Gambrell, Nasser Karimi and Jon, ToI Staff, Robert Philpot, Agencies and ToI Staff, Emanuel Fabian, Jacob Gurvis, Afp, et al. 70 Years Later, a CIA-Backed Coup Still Roils Iran-US Relations. The Times of Israel, August 25, 2023. https://www.timesofisrael.com/70-years-later-a-cia-backed-coup-still-roils-iran-us-relations/.

In his new book, Writing Wars: Authorship and American War Fiction, WW1 to Present, David F. Eisler grapples with one of the most complex questions in war fiction studies: Who can and should write a war story? Throughout the 20th century, scholars have maintained that personal experience is essential to an authentic tale of combat and military service. As Samuel Hynes explains, soldiers’ perspectives supersede that of civilians for the simple fact that they were “there, in history.”[1] And while Paul Fussell suggests the “real war is unlikely to be found in novels,” he also maintains that literary representations should be left to the actual “participants.”[2] As leading critics in the field, Hynes and Fussell’s positions have influenced scholarly consensus on the matter of authorship within the genre. Only those who have worn the uniform earned the right—and trust among readers—to fictionalize their experiences.

In Writing Wars, however, Eisler—a veteran himself—views the authority of experience as an outdated premise with serious ethical shortcomings. Instead, he avers that both soldiers and civilians have the ethos to tell war stories, and society at large has a need to read them. While his argument is largely theoretical, tracing how the cultural capital of soldier-authors’ experiences changed over time, it hinges on a critical moment in American military history: the abolition of conscription in 1973. Without a military draft, the all-volunteer force led to a “growing abdication of responsibility” among civilians, thereby increasing the “separation between the military and American society,” which is known as the civil-military gap.[3] Whereas civilians bought war bonds or took factory jobs during earlier campaigns, they could now participate, if at all, to the extent they felt comfortable doing so. As a result, veteran-authors were left to grapple with the social and political implications of their nation’s wars. Through a series of cultural and close readings, Eisler outlines how veterans have responded to this dilemma, slowly relinquishing their cultural capital to let—even encourage—civilian-authors to tell their own war stories. This shift in authorship allows veterans “to share the experiential and interpretative burden of the conflicts with the disconnected population.”[4] Moreover, in addressing the vast ramifications of each war, civilian-authors also take responsibility in narrowing the civil-military gap that has adversely influenced society’s perception of soldiers and the military in recent years.

To this end, Eisler’s book posits a radical intervention among the current debates on the topic. Kate McLoughin and Jennifer Haytock, among others, suggest reading works by noncombatants such as nurses or engineers for a nuanced and diverse portrait of combat and military service. Eisler redefines the boundaries of the necessary experience for writing war stories altogether by accounting for civilians among this group of writers. His argument, then, opens the floodgates for waves of new critical analyses of war fiction old and new, which is a feat only trumped by the stakes of Writing Wars. In finding the historical justification to include civilian works, Eisler likewise finds a way to address the growing fissure between the military and society. Whereas the authority of experience once helped veterans find jobs and publishing opportunities, it has since become counterintuitive, marginalizing those on the other side of the conflict and insulating those with no service experience. Writing Wars shows how the “dispersion” of authority can potentially triage this issue and breathe new life into a genre that many scholars fear was growing stale and myopic.[5]

To realize his argument, Eisler applies pressure to combat gnosticism, a theory developed by Jeffrey Campbell to account for the specific military context of a veteran-author’s ethos. Combat gnosticism first gained traction during the early 20th century when critics assumed soldiers’ experiences translated to more authentic representations in fiction. With more wars came more war stories, and combat gnosticism snowballed into a hallmark that defined the genre. Writing Wars adopts this historical development for its structure and methodology. That is, Eisler dissects the credence attributed to veterans’ experiences through a cultural survey of 20th and 21st century politics, conflicts, and a miscellany of literature. Working chronologically, he deftly elucidates the rise of combat gnosticism in the fiction of World War I and World War II to its gradual destabilization during the Vietnam War years and finally its diminishing relevance in representations of the Global War on Terror. This approach serves Eisler’s culminating argument well, as it contextualizes later readings that examine how veteran and civilian authors have developed narrative techniques to address the civil-military gap. All of this makes for an organic and logical presentation, allowing readers to delve into the nuanced histories and literary analyses laced throughout the book.

The first half of Writing Wars historicizes soldier-authors’ monopolization of war fiction in the 20th century. In the first chapter, Eisler traces the origins of combat gnosticism back to representations of World War I. When several inaccuracies called the integrity of John Dos Passos’ Three Soldiers (1921) into question, veterans were hired to determine the integrity of his novel, which they reviewed favorably on the grounds that he—in some capacity—served in the war. This decision adversely impacted the reception of civilian-authored war stories, which were previously well received by critics and readers, and enshrined combat gnosticism as the paramount qualification in the burgeoning genre. Eisler explores how this preference evolved during World War II in his second chapter. During the mid-century period, creative writing programs touted personal experience as the single most important factor in crafting a story. For thousands of veterans enrolling in such programs on the GI Bill, their military service gave them the ethos necessary to tell war stories. Eventually, their academic networks led to job opportunities in publishing houses and colleges across the country, where they could further act as gatekeepers of war fiction against civilian-authors. In his third chapter, Eisler analyzes how Vietnam veterans consolidated their personal experiences over other forms of knowledge. Through close readings of literature, interviews, and conference proceedings, Eisler explains how soldiers developed formal innovations such as a “rhetoric of trauma” to push back against sordid anti-war narratives and instead help readers get as close as possible to the truth of the war.[6] As a result, “personal experience was no longer the primary source of narrative authority, it was the only source.”[7]

The midpoint of Writing Wars marks a shift in argumentation. Whereas previous and subsequent chapters deftly analyze the implications of authorship within the genre, Chapter 4 is the book’s fulcrum, explicating why there was a theoretical shift away from the preference for veteran-authored fiction following the Vietnam War. The abolition of the draft was likewise the abolition of combat gnosticism. While it seems the turn to an all-volunteer force would only strengthen soldiers’ grip on the genre, Eisler contests that it had the opposite effect. Veteran-authors were now compelled to “share the experiential burden of their memory with the rest of society.”[8] This dispersion of authority served as a counterbalance to the consequences of the all-volunteer force; it invited civilian-authors to grapple with the physical, emotional, and mental hardships of wars from which they were now safeguarded. Additionally, at this point in history, the numerous cultural representations of 20th century wars formed an epistemological archive that imbued civilian-authors with what Eisler describes as the “extratextual sources of authenticity” necessary to pen war stories.[9]

With the theoretical shifts in the authorship of war fiction outlined, Eisler turns his focus in the books’ final chapters to analyzing post-Vietnam literature. In Chapter 5, he explains how civilian-authors relied on their own experiences to tell stories about soldiers’ homecomings. Their representations of characters struggling to reacclimate posed a necessary critique of the nation’s superficial bloviating and thank-you-for-your-service culture. Eisler’s sixth chapter examines how the formal techniques developed by veteran-authors expressed a “more complex ethics of literary representation.”[10] In an effort to include previously overlooked identities, they remediated the “Other”—the marginalized non-U.S. character defined by malevolency or an uncivilized demeanor. Resisting such tropes, veterans illustrated more humanizing portraits, which encouraged readers to think about the consequences of U.S. military interventions and sympathize with those from nations affected by such campaigns. As Eisler argues in the seventh chapter, though, there are consequences to the dispersion of authority. Novels such as Jon Chopan’s Veterans Crisis Hotline depict characters whose only option in life was military service that left them physically and emotionally scarred. These depictions undermine public confidence in its military, framing the armed forces as a social wastebasket that exploits the bodies and minds of outcasts and criminals.

While veteran-authored works such as Roy Scranton’s War Porn posit countervailing narratives, illustrating how civilians’ overzealous contempt of modern wars wears on returning soldiers, Eisler argues more needs to be done. If the genre is to thrive, it must evolve beyond the “metonymic archetypes” of trauma narratives to forward more complex portraits of military personnel and civilians on all sides of a conflict.[11] As messy as it might sound, that approach is the pathway to an authentic representation, a concept that may further ameliorate the current fissure in the civil-military gap.

As successful and thrilling as Eisler’s book is in reaching this culminating reflection on the state of the genre, it falters in a few areas of its execution. At the local level, the literature reviews that preface each chapter—particularly the latter entries—bog down and stall what are otherwise engaging discussions. On a larger scale, Writing Wars struggles to find a balanced narrative through-line. The first three chapters focus on the cultural and historical circumstances that engendered veteran-authors’ monopoly on the genre while drawing measured attention to the primary sources. The last three chapters reverse this dynamic, emphasizing the war literature following Vietnam. As a result, readers make a jarring pivot during the fourth and middle chapter, jumping from the historically based arguments of the first half to the more formal series of close readings in the second. The shifting methodology, at times, creates a sense of unevenness in the reading experience.

These minor flaws, however, do not overshadow the redeeming qualities and overall success of Writing Wars. For one, Eisler avoids retreading familiar ground in his close readings. While the quintessential veteran-authors—names that include Hemingway, Mailer, Jones, and O’Brien—occupy some room, they are not the focus. Rather, Eisler opts for lesser known texts, which makes for a refreshing discussion. What is more, he gracefully synthesizes his materials. Typical in works of scholarship on war fiction, historical miscellany is often used to prop up close readings. In Writing Wars, however, Eisler manages these materials in tandem with the literature, riffing them off of each other. In slowly tracing this dichotomy over the course of the book—from its historically focused first half to his literary centric second half—he illuminates a critical terrain that scholars working along similar lines have gestured toward but never exclusively tackled: War fiction and society are so deeply interwoven at this point in time that they must be discussed in proximity to each other to excavate the varying political critiques underscoring each work.

And perhaps the most remarkable attribute is the book’s readability. As dense as some of the arguments can be, Eisler’s prose remains lucid and precise. Not only does his firm grasp on the written language help him cogently unpack complex theories and ideas, but it also distills the stakes of this argument with sobering clarity: war fiction can play a critical role in closing the civil-military gap that skews society’s perception of the armed forces and their service members’ individual experiences.

Simply put, Writing Wars is necessary reading for scholars and writers working at the intersections of literary, military, and American studies. The interdisciplinary nature of the book also makes it well suited for a variety of classes. In addition to American Literature and History courses, select chapters on higher education’s influence on the genre and the ethics of authorship would make for insightful reading in creative writing classes that consider the history of writing programs or how identity politics figures into the ethos of storytelling. This potential widespread readership of Writing Wars is timely. With the ongoing military conflict in Ukraine and the reverberating effects of the U.S. campaigns in the Middle East, there is a need for a new wave of war fiction and, perhaps more importantly, a diverse collection of voices to tell such stories. Eisler’s book emphasizes the critical importance of this need and illuminates how those diverse voices can effectively address it.

Jared Young is an instructor in the English Department at SUNY Orange. He received his PhD from Oklahoma State University. His interests include 20th century war fiction, disability studies, and modernism. His works has appeared or is forthcoming in the Journal of Literary and Cultural Disability Studies, H-War, and The Mailer Review.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of the The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: The only photo taken during World War II of J.D. Salinger. (Denise Fitzgerald/PBS)

Notes:

[1] Samuel Hynes, The Soldiers’ Tale: Bearing Witness to Modern War (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 1997), 2.

[2] Paul Fussell, Wartime: Understanding the Behavior in the Second World War (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989), 270, 291.

[3] David F. Eisler, Writing Wars: Authorship and American War Fiction, WWI to Present (Iowa City, IA: University of Iowa Press, 2022), 6, 4.

[4] Eisler, Writing Wars, 16.

[5] Eisler, Writing Wars, 5.

[6] Eisler, Writing Wars, 81.

[7] Eisler, Writing Wars, 67.

[8] Eisler, Writing Wars, 85.

[9] Eisler, Writing Wars, 88.

[10] Eisler, Writing Wars, 142.

[11] Eisler, Writing Wars, 185.

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The subject of John W. Lemza’s scholarly study The Big Picture: The Cold War on the Small Screen is a U.S. Army-produced documentary television series called The Big Picture that ran from 1951-1971 on network, local, and educational stations, as well as on the Armed Forces Network of overseas stations. The intent of the television series was to allow the Army to “tell its story” to the American public by offering weekly half-hour vignettes of Army battles, operations, culture, and weaponry, as well as portraits of memorable units and soldiers.[1] Lemza’s study is relevant to our own era in which a gaping civil-military divide separates the American public from the military, and in which the military largely fails to communicate a compelling appreciation of its goals, virtues, and activities. Lemza recovers a historical chapter in which the Army much more successfully married its messages with the possibilities of television technology, the entertainment realm, and the tastes of emerging mass-viewing audiences. The account of how it did so, and why the endeavor eventually collapsed, is full of intriguing insights and historical details.

Billed by the Army as “an official television report to the nation from the United States Army,” The Big Picture series is now largely forgotten, or remembered primarily for its portentously strident tone that relentlessly affirms the value and valor of the Army.[2] But the show was popular in its time and was  long-lasting: over its 20-year run, the Army produced 823 episodes, first broadcast on network television and later syndicated to 426 local commercial, educational, and cable television stations, as well as 51 stations on the Armed Forces Network.

Series episodes combined war footage primarily shot by the Army Signal Corps or images commissioned by the Army Pictorial Center (APC) to serve a particular episode’s needs. In some cases, created scenes were shot in the studios of the Army Pictorial Center. Most episodes were introduced by on-screen hosts, either Army officers and non-commissioned officers in uniform or civilian journalists, to include luminaries such as Walter Cronkite, Edward B. Murrow, and Ronald Reagan. Stirring martial music and stock footage of parades and waving flags highlighted the grandeur and patriotic valence of each episode’s subject. Many episodes, however, also contained graphic combat footage drawn from World War II, Korean War, and Vietnam War archives.

Lemza excels in establishing the 1950s cultural context that engendered The Big Picture series and allowed it to flourish. Especially important was the rise of the television industry as an entertainment medium, the popularity of which was immediately evident. By 1955, for example, 65% of American homes had television sets. Lemza describes how the Army adroitly partnered with the television industry—primarily the big national networks based in New York—to leverage the power of television to influence (while entertaining) viewers. Importantly, Lemza notes that the series was just one of a number of shows in the early 1950s produced by the military in conjunction with the television industry to meet audience appetites. The Army’s series ran alongside similar efforts by the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marine Corps, as well as other productions by the Army.

The branches’ respective efforts to publicize their virtues on network television were more competitive than cooperative, however, because the stakes were high. The Army, for example, worried the other branches were better positioned to curry favor with Washington politicians for funding dollars and with the American public to boost recruitment. As a consequence, The Big Picture episodes frequently promoted the Army’s continuing relevance in an age of high-tech Cold War conflict with Russia. Lemza reports that the shows sponsored by other military branches lasted just a few years at most, so while the Army was not successful in winning every battle for dollars in Washington or recruits among the American populace, it can be said to have won the television war. While not uncritical of some aspects of the show’s production, Lemza asks us to appreciate the overall craftsmanship and savvy of the show’s creators that allowed the series to survive for twenty years while other military-informational shows perished.

Lemza appears to have watched all 823 episodes of the series and helpfully categorizes episodes into three groups. The largest number of episodes are those Lemza deems “historical” and “informational, instructional, and educational.”[3] A second group of episodes asserts the Army’s importance in ensuring America’s safety in Cold War competition with the Soviet Union and its proxy states. But Lemza’s chief interest is in his third category of episodes: those that extoll an exceptionalist vision of American superiority that is both defended by and reflected in the Army.[4] An example of a The Big Picture episode that ties military endeavor with the American way-of-life is “The Right to Bear and Keep Arms.” The episode describes weapon ownership and proficiency as an integral part of American history and identity and salutes the close relationship of the Army and the National Rifle Association. Though many episodes were much more anodyne—for example, those that described the Army’s commitment to community engagement and aiding disaster relief—episodes such as “The Right to Bear and Keep Arms,” as well as others that describe the important role played by chaplains in the military, opened up the series to criticism. The charge, mounted with increasing fervor as the Vietnam War and the cultural battles of the 1960s unfolded, was that the series went beyond objective telling of the Army story to partisan political advocacy and a slanted portrayal of what constitutes essential American characteristics. While acceptable in the 1950s, unquestioning connection of Army endeavor with ideological and political stances became increasingly problematic in the late 1960s and contributed to The Big Picture’s demise.

Lemza also usefully tracks the show’s effort to document the Army’s embrace of social change over the years. Unfortunately, the effort was, in his estimation, spotty. Several episodes highlighted the numbers and roles played by women in the Army, but Lemza asserts the portraits were often patronizing and condescending. African-Americans are featured coincidentally in group shots of soldiers marching and fighting throughout the show’s run, but no episodes were dedicated specifically to highlighting Army opportunities for Black Americans. Unflattering race-related events, such as riots by Black soldiers in Germany in 1955 and 1970, were definitely not addressed by The Big Picture episodes. Even more curious to Lemza is the failure of the series to sing the praises of Japanese-American units such as the 442nd Infantry Regiment and the 100th Infantry Battalion that fought valiantly in World War II, even as the series routinely dedicated many other episodes to heroic exploits by other soldiers and units.

So why did the series end in 1971, even, as Lemza reports, it was being aired on more stations than ever before in its run? Though the show was still widely syndicated, it was not being broadcast in big urban markets and even on the small markets where it still appeared it often was scheduled in non-prime time slots. An early sign that the America viewing public was not completely enthralled with the Army’s overly-serious regard for its own greatness was present even in the early years. In the 1950s, for example, more contrarian–even subversive–portraits of military life were rendered by popular TV comedies such as The Phil Silvers Show, a precursor to later military sit-coms such as Hogan’s Heroes; Gomer Pyle, USMC; and eventually (after The Big Picture’s demise) M*A*S*H. Lemza also notes that the popularity of “serious” war literature such as Catch-22 and Slaughterhouse-Five pointed to a public appetite for representations of war and the military that were not so high-minded and obviously partial.

This growing sentiment fed into the biggest reason for the end of the series’ run: its failure to adjust to growing public disillusionment and cynicism about the military precipitated by the Vietnam War and the draft. The events leading to the final downfall came in the late 1960s, when liberal Washington politicians such as Senator William Fulbright charged the series with political advocacy in support of the Vietnam War and wondered at the dedication of resources to its production.

Lemza touches lightly on liberal vs. conservative political debate, but concurs that by 1971 the series had run its course. He quotes an announcement in the military’s own Stars and Stripes newspaper that suggests the Army felt the same: “There are several reasons for canceling the half-hour show. One is the fact that the Army wanted for some time to come up with something that, it feels, is more relevant to the problems of the service today.”[5] Reflecting on the Stars and Stripes pronouncement, it is interesting that the Army has struggled in the decades since 1971 marketing itself to the American public through collaboration with the entertainment industry and by leveraging media and informational possibilities.

While the Army has occasionally mounted successful recruiting campaigns—the “Be All You Can Be” campaign from the 1980s arguably being the most distinguished—the record of its public relations apparatus over the years cannot be judged as anything but feeble. Thinking especially about the post-9/11 wars, much has been made of the civil-military divide that separated the American people from understanding the nature of military endeavor in Iraq and Afghanistan and the human face of the soldiers, marines, airmen, and sailors who served in those wars. The effort to bridge the divide has consisted largely of novels and memoirs from fighting men and women themselves, reporting by interested journalists, and Hollywood movies of varying fidelity and sympathy. That the military as an institution has not tried harder to manage the impression it makes on the American people is notable.

Lemza is not shy about calling The Big Picture series propaganda, and episodes watched today can feel very one-sided, dated, and square.[6] However, the comment sections on YouTube videos of episodes are full of praise from other viewers who find the series on-point and even inspirational—documentary evidence of an Army that is perceived as once strong and an America that is viewed as once great. The fissure points to the division in outlooks characteristic of America today on virtually every subject and in every realm. The social congruence that united the military, the populace, and the entertainment media in the 1950s is long gone, and new endeavors that draw on The Big Picture’s virtues and capitalize on the lessons learned from its shortcomings seem not to have even been attempted. Lemza’s study invites wonder what a show that tells the Army's story in a way that pleases all factions of American viewing audiences might look like today.

Peter Molin is an Assistant Teaching Professor and Director of Collège Writing and Research at Rutgers University.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

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Header Image: American Forces Network, Incirlik AB, Turkey 2023 (Airman 1st Class Kevin Dunkleberger). The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement.

Notes:

[1] John W. Lemza, The Big Picture: The Cold War on the Small Screen (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2012), 12.

[2] “Exercise Arctic Night: The Big Picture.” Nuclear Vault, YouTube.

[3] Lemza, The Big Picture: The Cold War on the Small Screen, 150, 156.

[4] Lemza, The Big Picture: The Cold War on the Small Screen, 124.

[5] “Army Famed Series Signs Off. ‘The Big Picture’ Fades from TV Screen,” Stars and Stripes (Pacific Edition), 15 July 1971, 3. Quoted in Lemza, The Big Picture: The Cold War on the Small Screen, 189.

[6] Lemza, The Big Picture: The Cold War on the Small Screen, 72.

The best science fiction is about exploring big ideas. It offers a creative vehicle for stimulating an imaginative journey into future scenarios, engaging in an earnest examination of potential technologies and their impact on society, and illuminating the human element in conflict. To Boldly Go: Leadership, Strategy, and Conflict in the 21st Century and Beyond, leans into this tradition by bringing diverse authors together to mine mostly well-known science fiction literature as a springboard for deeper discussions about strategy, leadership, and conflict. 

Jonathan Klug, a professor at the U.S. Army War College, and Steven Leonard, a faculty member at the University of Kansas and senior fellow at the Modern War Institute at West Point, build on a trend in which pop culture offers accessible lessons for national security leaders, strategists, and organizations. Recent examples include Winning Westeros: How Game of Thrones Explains Modern Military Conflicts (2019) and Strategy Strikes Back: How Star Wars Explains Modern Military Conflict (2018). What immediately separates To Boldly Go, however, is the expansive note it strikes. Drawing on a universe of science fiction franchises including The Expanse, Star Wars, Star Trek, Ender’s Game, Starship Troopers, Dune, Earthseed, The Murderbot Diaries, and many more, a wonderful array of authors, who are strategic thinkers in their own right, offer fresh perspectives in 35 chapters that span six major themes: leadership and command; military strategy and decision making; ethics, culture, and diversity; cooperation, competition, and conflict; the human relationship with technology; and toxic leaders.  

From the very first page, it is evident that Klug and Leonard set out to explore the nexus of strategy and science fiction with enthusiasm. A foreword by Major General Mick Ryan, whose book War Transformed examines 21st century conflict, sets the stage by noting how science fiction offers many insights for contemporary military organizations and for preparing future military leaders.[1] Indeed, many military leaders and national security strategists have recommended reading science fiction as an exercise in creative and intelligent thinking about the future. Among the proponents of reading science fiction is Admiral James Stavridis (USN, ret) who once recalled that among the most treasured books in his library was Frank Herbert’s Dune.

Indeed, military and national security professionals have increasingly sought to incorporate science fiction into strategic planning and thinking.[2] In 2013, the Atlantic Council commissioned a project to examine the future of conflict through the use of science fiction which resulted in a unique anthology of short stories. The U.S. Marine Corps has published a series of graphic novels with Marine authors that also creatively explores the character of future warfare. Similarly, the U.S. Army has experimented with its own graphic novel, Invisible Force: Information Warfare and the Future of Conflict.[3] It is also no surprise that Ender’s Game is often a feature of Marine Corps reading lists. The Chief of the Australian Army reading list, the Canadian Defense Force, and the French Defense Innovation agency have also sought to leverage science fiction to think creatively about strategy, warfighting, and technological disruption. Perhaps better known in military sci-fi are Stavridis and Elliot Ackerman’s 2034: A Novel of the Next World War and August Cole and Peter Singer’s Ghost Fleet, which attempt to extrapolate future scenarios based on emerging technologies such as autonomous drones, warships, and quantum computing.    

It is  easy to forget, however, that the potency of science fiction, and perhaps the sub-genre of military science fiction, as a way to imagine or forecast about the character of future conflict is built on an older tradition. During the Franco-Prussian War of 1870, the world was shocked by the rapid and unanticipated German victories against the French. This perpetuated a sense of alarm throughout Europe, particularly in the United Kingdom, and fueled a conversation around future naval battles, the importance of railway systems for transporting soldiers, the revolutionary effect of the electric telegraph, new rifles, and new artillery.[4] Into that revolution in military affairs, The Battle of Dorking: Reminiscences of a Volunteer written by General Sir George Tomkyns Chesney, was published in May 1871. Chesney wrote about a fictional invasion, defeat, and humiliation of England by Germany, and fed a national desire to understand the shape of wars to come. As illuminated by I.F. Clarke in The Tale of the Next Great War, 1871-1914 (1995), an anthology of short stories written during those consequential decades in the run-up to World War I, Chesney’s The Battle of Dorking was the beginning of a flood of future war stories, with all of their forecasts and expectations preserved with an amber-like quality, that whirled right up through the summer of 1914.[5]

In 2023, science fiction remains a useful mechanism for strategists striving to discern trends and anticipate potential futures, convey new ideas, or generate fresh perspectives about the fundamental nature and the evolving character of war and leadership. In that sense, To Boldly Go makes excellent use of its alchemic approach of merging contemporary strategic thinkers with their favorite works of science fiction. While every reader will no doubt find value and favorites among them, a few stand out.   

Rebecca Jensen’s essay, “Calm Men Who Deal Death Wholesale,” is a poignant reflection on trauma.[6] Drawing on Lois McMaster Bujold’s Shards of Honor, Jensen explores the concept of moral injury, the idea that war inflicts more than physical and mental injury on its participants. It is a particularly impactful essay after over a decade of U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Similarly resonant is M. L. Cavanaugh’s “Blood Lessons,” which reflects on the importance of learning from losing battles against superior adversaries.[7] Cavanaugh deploys a Clausewitzian lens to view the range of battlefield-learning, as illustrated by the sci-fi movies and TV series, Battle: Los Angeles, Edge of Tomorrow, and Falling Skies, as a reminder to readers that winning wars is often about learning better and faster than an adversary, even while losing battles. It is a dynamic being witnessed in real-time as Russia continues to prosecute its war against Ukraine, and it is imperative that U.S. military leaders and national security professionals capture, understand, and engage with it in real-time.

Of course, one might expect a fair amount of attention and emphasis on the potential of emerging technologies such as AI, quantum computing, biotechnology, etc., to change the character of warfare, with resultant impacts on leadership and strategy. And while To Boldly Go certainly folds ample discussion of technology into its various chapters, it also provides a balanced take as exemplified by retired Army Special Forces Colonel Liam Collins who strikes a valuable note of caution against the glorification of technology and the overemphasis on hardware in war at the expense of the human element.[8] It is a theme readily observed in Star Wars, Dune, and Starship Troopers, and it is particularly pertinent in a moment when extraordinary excitement, fear, and uncertainty over the potential of artificial intelligence systems abound. Chapters by Theresa Hitchens and Erica Iverson also capture the promise and peril of technological futures by exploring the risks of human expansion into outer space from different, though complementary angles. Hitchens highlights the parallels and risks associated with commercially driven expansion into space, as depicted in The Expanse, while Iverson invokes Star Trek and The Forever War, among others, to comment on the character of space warfare.[9]

Finally, Kathleen J. McInnis’ “Sun Tzu, Ender, and the Old Man” is an important cautionary tale about the risks involved when filtering the world through rose-tinted socio-cultural and political lenses.[10] This form of strategic hubris is the enemy of strategic empathy, the ability to put oneself in the mind of one’s adversaries and allies, which McInnis notes is an area in which the United States appears to be lacking. Intriguingly for military strategists, McInnis points out that the United States tends to overlook really listening to allies and partners, and often de-prioritizes institutions of international diplomacy while empowering the military, even though political discussion is the heart of democracy.[11]

It is McInnis’ essay that might also serve as a bridge to critique this anthology.  While To Boldly Go draws on a healthy mix of science fiction work and worlds from genre behemoths like Star Wars and Star Trek, and the lesser well-known (but no less beloved) universes of Earthseed, the Murderbot Diaries, and Old Man’s War, among many others, the range of science fictions stories mined for their insights are predominantly of Western perspective and flavor. The essayists too, largely hail from either the United States, the United Kingdom, or Australia. For a project that leverages science fiction to think more creatively about military operations, organization, leadership, and strategy, it would have enriched the discussion to have drawn on science fiction works from a broader, perhaps global, perspective.         

Dr. Will Roper, a former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics once said, “We either become sci-fi or become history.”[12] Science fiction is one tool among many for strategists and national security professionals to explore potential futures, ignite creativity, and prompt important questions. It is also about becoming comfortable thinking about futures that will most certainly usher in dramatic technological and societal change. To better prepare for this coming challenge, To Boldly Go is both an engaging and entertaining exploration of strategy, leadership, and conflict through the medium of science fiction. It encourages its readers to discard staid conventions, ossified assumptions, and embrace a creative approach to strategic thinking. While not every essay will necessarily appeal to every reader, there are insights and lessons in equal measure for the novice and expert alike. To Boldly Go is an accessible, creative on-ramp, an effective bridge for deeper considerations of strategy and war in the 21st century.

Brett Swaney is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. The opinions expressed are the author’s alone and do not reflect those of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of the The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: Space Shuttle Orbits Above Earth, 2021 (NASA).

Notes:

[1] Jonathan Klug and Steven Leonard, eds., To Boldly Go: Leadership, Strategy, and Conflict in the 21st Century and Beyond (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2021), vii.

[2] Andrew Liptak, The U.S. Military Is Turning to Science Fiction to Shape the Future of War, Medium, July 29, 2020, available at https://onezero.medium.com/the-u-s-military-is-turning-to-science-fiction-to-shape-the-future-of-war-1b40d11eb6b4

[3] Hannah Graf, ‘Invisible Force’ Graphic Novel Shows the Possible Future of Cyber Warfare, ArmyTimes, July 14, 2020, available at https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2020/07/14/invisible-force-graphic-novel-shows-the-possible-future-of-cyber-warfare/

[4] I.F. Clarke, ed., The Tale of the Next Great War, 1871-1914: Fictions of Future Warfare and Battles Still-to-Come, (Syracuse University Press, 1995), 13

[5] I.F. Clarke, ed., The Tale of the Next Great War, 1871-1914: Fictions of Future Warfare and Battles Still-to-Come, (Syracuse University Press, 1995), 15.

[6] Rebecca Jensen, “Calm Men Who Deal Death Wholesale,” in To Boldly Go, eds. Jonathan Klug and Steven Leonard (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2021), 190.

[7] M.L. Cavanaugh, “Blood Lessons,” in To Boldly Go, eds. Jonathan Klug and Steven Leonard (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2021), 174.

[8] Liam Collins, “Man > Machine,” in To Boldly Go, ed. Jonathan Klug and Steven Leonard (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2021), 223.

[9] Theresa Hitchens, “The Flag Follows Trade,” in To Boldly Go, eds. Jonathan Klug and Steven Leonard (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2021), 128, and Erica Iverson, “The Final Frontier,” in To Boldly Go, Eds. Jonathan Klug and Steven Leonard (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2021), 166.

[10] Kathleen J. McInnis, “Sun Tzu, Ender, and the Old Man,” in To Boldly Go, eds. Jonathan Klug and Steven Leonard (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2021), 92.

[11] Kathleen J. McInnis, “Sun Tzu, Ender, and the Old Man,” in To Boldly Go, eds. Jonathan Klug and Steven Leonard (Havertown, PA: Casemate Publishers, 2021), 97.

[12] Rebecca Kheel, “Air Force uses AI on Military flight for first time,” The Hill, 12/16/2020, available at https://thehill.com/policy/defense/530455-air-force-uses-ai-on-military-flight-for-first-time/

William Inboden’s recent book The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan, the Cold War, and the World on the Brink takes up the banner of attributing the end of the Cold War to the foreign policy acumen and foresight of Ronald Reagan. Indeed, it suggests Reagan possessed a remarkable perspicacity that allowed him to perceive the world's historic changes on the horizon well before others did, and that this, plus his innate optimism, helped him lead the United States toward a better future. This is an argument that invites scrutiny, of course. The book also offers readers a deeply researched, detailed, and comprehensive account of foreign policy making within the Reagan administration, and this is where it makes its most useful contribution to our understanding of this period. Before delving into a more critical assessment, however, a holistic overview of the book is in order.

The Peacemaker proceeds chronologically, beginning a couple of years before the 1980 election campaign and ending with Ronald Reagan’s last day in office. Inboden breaks each chapter up into many short sections, allowing him to weave together multiple stories and to chronicle all of the events, challenges, and conflicts that emerged simultaneously at every given moment of the Reagan presidency. For example, chapter 6, which covers the first part of 1983, moves breathlessly from the issuance of National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 75, to a speech Reagan made to the National Religious Broadcasters, to diplomacy with Japanese Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone, to talks with the Soviets, and then moves on to discussions about the Strategic Defense Initiative, defense exercises in the Kurils, meetings with Afghan rebels, challenges in Suriname, South Africa, and Beirut, and more. Throughout these sections, Inboden does not shy away from covering the conflicts that divided Reagan’s advisors, whether they were petty interpersonal or interagency clashes or more serious philosophical and strategic disagreements. This was a purposeful stylistic approach on Inboden’s part, one that imparts a visceral sense of “the chaos of policymaking as it felt to Reagan and his team,” with the constant churn and crush of events meaning that “no issue could be considered on its own, no decision deferred in the fullness of time, because the world does not wait on the White House Situation Room calendar.”[1] It also makes clear how much personality and contingency can shape policy. While this messy reality is true for any presidential administration, it is an aspect that other narrative approaches might have masked. Embedding this sense of chaos within the structure of the book is very effective at illuminating the challenges of executive leadership and foreign policy decision making. 

Inboden’s granularity does not come at the expense of a bigger picture analysis or thematic thread. Despite the wide range of events, large and small, that Inboden surveys in each chapter, he still fleshes out the core themes that he outlines in his introduction: the fundamental importance of alliances and personal relationships to Reagan’s foreign policy strategy, the role of historical memory in shaping Reagan’s sense of personal and national mission, the paradoxical relationship between force and diplomacy in his “peace through strength” concept, and the set of beliefs about religious faith, freedom, ideology, and tragedy that undergirded his reading of the Cold War conflict and the possibilities for a post-Cold War world.[2] He is especially effective at integrating a discussion of the significant and still understudied role that religion and religious belief played in shaping U.S. foreign relations.

Despite its intellectual and literal heft (it comes in at nearly 600 pages with notes), the book reads quickly due to Inboden’s compelling writing style. A section on the 1985 hijacking of the ship the Achille Lauro is a great example. Even a well-known event in Inboden’s retelling reads like a suspenseful thriller. He moves through the key events—the hijacking, the murder of ship passenger Leon Klinghoffer, the docking of the ship in Egypt, the coordinated escape of the hijackers on EgyptAir 737, the U.S. F-14 Tomcats intercepting the flight and forcing it to land in Italy, and then the U.S. Navy Seals and hundreds of Italian soldiers surrounding the plane on the tarmac—interspersing these action-packed moments with details about the negotiations, discussions, and decisions happening simultaneously within the Reagan White House. He then neatly links the resolution of the incident with one of his core themes. Because the plane had landed in Italy, the Italian government prosecuted the hijackers. Although three of the men were sentenced to lengthy prison terms, Yasser Arafat, Chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization, successfully pressured Italian Prime Minister Bettino Craxi to set the mastermind of the operation free. Inboden notes that this outcome left Reagan “angry for a few days,” yet the president forgave Craxi quickly because he “did not want to risk a rift with a friend on the eve of” the planned summit with the Soviet Union in Geneva.[3] Per Inboden’s argument, alliances and personal relations were paramount to Reagan.

Indeed, there are numerous moments in each chapter where Inboden’s identified themes shine through. This lends considerable coherence despite the “fog of war” narrative approach and on the whole these themes are analytically useful and compelling.

Yet the essential characterization of Reagan that Inboden seeks to present through the book is one that will inspire much debate among historians. Throughout The Peacemaker, Inboden implies that Reagan had a strategy from the outset of his presidency “to win the Cold War without firing a shot” by “extend[ing] one hand in friendship to the Soviet Union while using the other hand to try to bring it down.”[4] Although Inboden does note that the administration did not define a comprehensive grand strategy at the start of Reagan’s first term, he suggests throughout that Reagan had an almost instinctual grand strategy, one that he pursued with dogged focus until he succeeded in triumphing over the Soviet adversary. In one chapter, Inboden argues that while in 1982 “most elite opinion saw the Soviet Union as stable and resilient,” Reagan had a (gut-based) insight that Soviet military spending was unsustainable.[5] Reagan formalized his instincts and ideology through NSDD-32—a policy document that laid out a strategy of “pressuring the Soviet system on every front…not only to exploit its weaknesses, but to produce a reformist leader.”[6] Inboden contends that Reagan then spent “the rest of his first term looking for such a Soviet reformer. In his second term, he would find one.”[7] This suggests much of the agency rested with Reagan. Yet finding that reformist leader in Gorbachev does not mean that Reagan, his advisors, or the strategy of NSDD-32, engineered this outcome. Hope and instinct did not produce this outcome. Historical contingency (including the contingency of the relationship that developed between Reagan and Gorbachev) as well as factors internal to the Soviet Union did, as historians such as Melvyn Leffler, David Priestland, James Wilson, and Vladislav Zubok have demonstrated powerfully in their work.[8]

Inboden’s own evidence makes this reality clear, too. He allows that “Gorbachev’s accession stemmed primarily from larger dynamics within the Soviet system” in concert with “Reagan’s rigid position,” as well as from Gorbachev’s own “vision and shrewd maneuvering.”[9] He describes throughout the internal economic rot and external economic shocks that rocked the Soviet Union, not to mention the Chernobyl disaster and the war in Afghanistan. Inboden also highlights the moments when “Gorbachev seized the initiative,” such as when he released dissident Anatoly Shcharansky or when he called for the elimination of nuclear weapons and announced a unilateral plan to reduce Soviet stockpiles, a move that “caught the Reagan administration off guard.”[10] In discussing U.S.-Soviet arms reduction talks, he acknowledges that Gorbachev was the one that “made a big concession,” that, at a crucial moment, “Gorbachev changed his mind” about leaving a summit after their scheduled time was over and agreed to continue to meet, and that, at a later meeting, Gorbachev backed down from his earlier demands.[11] Internal Soviet politics and Gorbachev’s decision making also played key roles in hastening the collapse of the Soviet Union. Inboden’s assertion that Reagan, “like Franklin Roosevelt…led his nation and its allies in vanquishing a totalitarian empire” oversimplifies the historical record and exaggerates Reagan’s role.[12] Reagan certainly mattered, but his strategy was not the only factor that led to the demise of the Soviet Union; historical works that consider non-U.S. sources tend to offer more balance (and less mythmaking) on this score.

There are other instances in the book where Inboden ascribes more clarity and power to Reagan’s strategy than is perhaps warranted. He suggests nuclear freeze activists did not appreciate that Reagan was actually “the nuclear abolitionist-in-chief” and not the saber-rattling warmonger they saw him as because they did not realize Reagan “detested Soviet communism even more” than nuclear weapons “and remained determined to build up America’s nuclear arsenal in order to bring down both the Soviet Union and the world’s most destructive weapons.”[13] He also asserts Reagan recognized that right-wing dictators “were wasting assets” whose “authoritarianism came at the expense of destabilizing discontent from their citizens and erosion of America’s moral capital.”[14] The Reagan administration, of course, did not eliminate nuclear weapons and it continued to support right wing dictators in Latin America and beyond. Inboden does make the reality clear; he is not uncritical of the administration’s missteps. Yet his framing of Reagan’s strategy tends to downplay most of the unsavory aspects of the Reagan presidency. For example, when he suggests the Reagan Doctrine “helped free Nicaragua, Angola, Afghanistan, and Cambodia from communist misrule but left behind divided, impoverished countries awash in armed factions, instability, and corruption,” he acknowledges but still underplays the culpability for the devastation wrought and the abuses tolerated through U.S. policies.[15]

The Peacemaker is thus an exciting but provocative read. It gives readers what often feels like a front row seat to the inner workings of the Reagan White House as it grappled with an enormous range of foreign policy challenges. The depth and breadth of this coverage is very welcome, as there are few books that provide such a comprehensive study of Reagan’s foreign policymaking process. Inboden is a skilled historian and a captivating storyteller. Yet the book also tends to downplay the significance of the wide range of factors that led to the end of the Cold War and to mythologize Ronald Reagan. It will surely spark much debate among historians for this reason, as it leaves the core question of why and how the Cold War ended as open to historical interpretation as ever.

Lauren Turek is an associate professor of history and the director of the Diplomacy, Security, War, and Peace Studies concentration in the International Studies department at Trinity University in San Antonio, TX, where she teaches courses on modern United States history, U.S. foreign relations, and public history. Her first book, To Bring the Good News to All Nations: Evangelical Influence on Human Rights and U.S. Foreign Relations, was published in 2020 as part of the Cornell University Press U.S. in the World Series. Her articles on religion in American politics and foreign relations have appeared in Diplomatic History, the Journal of American Studies, and Religions and she has contributed chapters to a number of edited volumes.

The Strategy Bridge is read, respected, and referenced across the worldwide national security community—in conversation, education, and professional and academic discourse.

Thank you for being a part of the The Strategy Bridge community. Together, we can #BuildTheBridge.

Header Image: President Ronald Reagan at his desk in the Oval Office, Washington, D.C. 1986 (Carol Highsmith).

Notes:

[1] William Inboden, The Peacemaker: Ronald Reagan, the Cold War, and the World on the Brink (New York: Dutton, 2022), 7.

[2] Ibid, 7-12.

[3] Ibid, 370.

[4] Ibid, 65, 84.

[5] Inboden, The Peacemaker, 135.

[6] Ibid, 139.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Melvyn Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007); David Priestland, The Red Flag : A History of Communism (New York: Grove Press, 2009); James Graham Wilson, The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev's Adaptability, Reagan's Engagement, and the End of the Cold War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014); Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill, NC: UNC Press, 2007); Vladislav Zubok, Collapse: The Fall of the Soviet Union (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2021).

[9] Inboden, The Peacemaker, 329.

[10] Ibid, 382.

[11] Ibid, 412, 414, 431.

[12] Ibid, 478.

[13] Inboden, The Peacemaker, 175.

[14] Ibid, 304-305.

[15] Ibid, 461.