This staggering fact should lead the EU member states to seriously rethink their strategies and methods if they do not want all their efforts to evaporate. With some $75 billion of Official Development Assistant (ODA) to its name, the EU is by far the largest donor in the world, representing over 55% of the total yearly ODA. [1] But the reality is that the European Commission (EC) is entrusted with only one-sixth of the EU member states' aid, while five-sixths is still being channelled by European governments themselves. This article will therefore argue that only a more federal European development policy driven by the Commission will result in the delivery of more, better and faster aid which does trigger genuine economic growth in Africa.

What went wrong?

The main reason for which development policy is sometimes declared to be on the edge of bankruptcy is that EU member states cherished hidden national economic, security or postcolonial agendas far too long. Tied aid required recipient countries to purchase their equipment from companies residing in donor countries; strategically important but corrupt governments squandered money on mega projects that were by no means viable; and short-term technical assistance served as a charity sweetener to prolong influence in former colonies. Aid was centred on the interests of the North instead of those of the South. High officials of national development institutes admit that still too much time and money are being wasted on administrative micro-management and (Western) consultants. [2] Moreover, everybody was involved in everything and the three crucial C's of coordination, complementarity and coherence were totally disregarded. Too many cooks spoil the meal, especially when the recipes are full of flaws and the ingredients have passed their expiry date.

New strategies with fresh ingredients

An excellent recipe with modern ingredients is presented in the 2009 Industrial Development Report from UNIDO “Breaking In and Moving Up” which was co-authored by Professor Paul Collier, who wrote the famous bestseller “The Bottom Billion”. [3] The Report is innovative in proposing that the government partner with the private sector while emphasizing the role of institutions and infrastructure in stimulating a business climate open to trade. It is quintessential that aid is directed toward creating an “enabling environment” for the economy since Africa will need 7% growth on a yearly basis in order to reach the MDGs. [4] But in order for the poor to participate in the growth and for wealth to be redistributed, in other words, for development to be sustainable, aid must be managed by the recipient country. Strengthening country ownership was singled out as the first key issue in the 2008 Accra Agenda for Action because developing countries must obtain the capabilities and capacities to steer their own development. [5]

Now, the 2006 European Consensus on Development has spelled out the Commission's comparative advantage in governance and trade and recognized budget support as a preferential aid modality. [6] The EC should therefore be granted more supranational clout for it is a frontrunner on these best practices:

• Firstly, the EC is the most prominent advocate of budget support which draws on the government's self-management capacities thus drastically reducing paperwork. The grants come with incentives for the state administration to improve its national accountability mechanisms, such as the quality of public financial management and parliamentary capacity for democratic oversight on the executive to avoid corruption and assure good governance. Tranches of funds are only dispersed depending on performance indicators. In well governed states, “MDG Contracts” can be concluded in dialogue with the partner country to support for instance the health or education sectors. In fragile states, investments should be oriented to reforming the security sector, improving the checks and balances between the three branches of government, ensuring the freedom of expression & association for CSOs and strengthening the rule of law for enforceable contracts and guaranteed property rights. For example, in the framework of the 10th European Development Fund, the European Commission is now allocating 44% of its resources to budget support. [7]

• Secondly, the EC is rightly a champion of ever more aid for trade with a view to shift revenues away from levies to production. Aid for trade compensates for incrementally removing tariff and quota barriers and targets the strengthening of trade-related infrastructure (transport, communications, energy supply and storage space) as well as better macroeconomic policy and regulation. It supports small and medium sized enterprise associations (like chambers of commerce) so as to improve the supply-side capacity of the private sector, the investment climate and, eventually, create employment. For example, the Commission is close to allocating €1 billion to aid for trade (which is more than all EU MS together) and the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) aspire to gradually open-up markets to incite regional trade and integration. [8]

New method with less cooks

The cacophony of European aid still puts a tremendous administrative burden on African countries.

In the past, development policy suffered from a proliferation of aid actors, structures and activities which caused overlaps, duplications and boundless bureaucracy. Worse, donors tended to favour their “darling countries” while leaving “aid orphans” behind. That is why the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness calls for donor harmonisation and alignment on the partners' own strategies, in the interest of lower transaction costs. The 2007 EU Code of Conduct on Division of Labour already fulminated against the fact that in each developing country there are, on average, 350 donor missions per year. [9] But the cacophony of European aid still puts a tremendous administrative burden on African countries which could spend their precious resources far more usefully. For the sake of efficiency and effectiveness, pro-federal reforms are required in the institutional set-up of the EU, both at headquarter (HQ) and at field level:

- At HQ level:

• The artificial split between the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states and other countries must disappear in order to centralise all development policy under one single Directorate-General for Development (DG DEV), headed by one single Commissioner, who has to be responsible for the implementation by EuropeAid, too.

• A “Consistency Unit” in DG DEV should oversee the 3 C's in overall EU development action. This Unit should be in charge of coordination with DG Trade regarding the negotiation of the EPAs and the reduction of EU tariffs on imports, of coherence with DG Agriculture to slash trade-distorting subsidies and of complementarity with member states' development policies.

• The intergovernmental European Development Fund (an envelope of currently €22.6 billion) has to be brought into the general budget of the community, so as to increase oversight by the European Parliament and reduce earmarked funding dominated by national interests while still allowing EU member states to co-finance Commission aid programmes.

- In the field:

• In line with the principle of “delegated cooperation”, EC Delegations should (as “lead” donors) negotiate on behalf of the member states (the “delegating” donors) the Country Strategy Papers (CSP) with partner governments, in an effort to rally donors behind one concerted and uniform approach. In such a strategy, the Commission could for instance be tasked with budget support, infrastructure and democratic governance, while the member states take on health and education. Such a division of labour would guarantee more in-country and cross-country complementarity.

• In terms of evaluation, monitoring and auditing, it would cut red tape drastically if recipient countries only had to report back to one single donor and deal with one standard set of rules. CSOs would need to play a crucial role as watchdogs and brief the Commission on progress made.

Raise the level of aid

According to the OECD statistics, only 30% of ODA is channelled multilaterally whereas 70% still goes through bilateral channels. [10] In the name of reducing the costly fragmentation of aid and increasing the predictability and transparency of flows, more aid has to be channelled via the European Commission, the UN or international development banks.

Finally, concerning the “Financing for Development”, the Commission should not only just keep track of member states' performance on a scoreboard but it should start taking measures against EU countries that do not fulfil their commitments enshrined in the 2002 Monterrey Consensus and reiterated in the 2008 Doha Declaration. Since they already promised to spend the symbolic sum of 0.7% of their GDP on ODA back in 1970, they have had more than enough time to reach 0.56% by 2010 and at least 0.7% by 2015. Political leaders are held accountable for not keeping their promises on the national level, but who will hold them accountable for not meeting their obligations towards the developing world?

Conclusion

It always has to be borne in mind that aid is not a goal in itself but only a way of spurring sustainable human and economic development. Development has to be driven by the developing countries themselves and the 2007 Joint EU-Africa Strategy proves that African countries also underline democratic governance and trade amongst their strategic priorities. [11] The European Commission is at the vanguard of supporting these policies, by granting budget support and aid for trade, and strives for a simplified EU aid architecture. The quantity of aid could be improved if the Commission were to be given more authority in assuring that member states stick to their commitments. And the quality and speed of aid could be improved if the Commission were to push for a binding division of labour and assume more competences in delivering aid itself. Unless more powers are shifted to the supranational level, the sum of the parts will always remain smaller than the total.

How long will EU member states continue to think they can dodge sharp criticism? They would do better to federalise their aid policies before they get accused by their citizens of spending billions of taxpayers' money without benefiting the development of Africa at all…

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La Corte di Karlsruhe è infatti considerata un bastione degli irriducibili difensori della sovranità nazionale tedesca dalla vulgata giornalistica. Si è così giudicata la sospensione della procedura d'adozione del trattato derivata dalla sentenza stessa come una nuova battuta d'arresto per l'Europa dopo il referendum irlandese e, se si vuol guardare più lontano, a quelli francese e olandese del 2005.

Restiamo ai fatti. La Corte ha stabilito che l'atto di approvazione del Trattato di Lisbona (Zustimmungsgesetz zum Vertrag von Lissabon) è compatibile con la Legge Fondamentale tedesca (Grundgesetz), mentre appare incostituzionale la legge che accompagna la sua entrata in vigore (Gesetz über die Ausweitung und Stärkung der Rechte des Bundestages und des Bundesrates in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union) perché non garantisce un sufficiente

… sinora ignorata la questione della partecipazione dei parlamenti nazionali alla legiferazione europea …

diritto di partecipazione dei corpi legislativi tedeschi al processo legislativo europeo e alle procedure di emendamento dei Trattati. Ciò significa che il parlamento tedesco dovrà modificare tale legge di accompagnamento prima che la ratifica possa essere completata. Tale procedura non appare particolarmente difficile vista la larghissima maggioranza a sostegno del Trattato di Lisbona esistente nel parlamento tedesco. Il Bundestag, la camera bassa del parlamento, ha già annunciato di aver convocato una sessione straordinaria il 27 agosto per discutere le raccomandazioni della Corte, ed è previsto che l'approvazione finale da parte della seconda camera (Bundesrat) possa aver luogo il 18 settembre, appena prima dello scioglimento delle camere stesse, per le imminenti elezioni federali, e soprattutto del referendum irlandese, previsto per i primi di ottobre. È quindi nostra opinione che, in seguito all'esame della Corte, non sussistano più ulteriori dubbi sulla ratifica del trattato anche in Germania, malgrado gli adempimenti supplementari richiesti.

Il merito della sentenza solleva tuttavia un punto particolarmente importante che sicuramente resterà come un precedente giuridico nella storia del diritto comunitario. La partecipazione dei parlamenti nazionali al processo decisionale europeo è stata sinora una questione totalmente ignorata. In fin dei conti, il processo decisionale europeo, che trova la sua origine nelle proposte della Commissione europea, titolare dell'iniziativa legislativa, coinvolge solo nel 40% dei casi il Parlamento Europeo. Nel 60% dei testi legislativi è il Consiglio (ovvero i governi) ad avere l'ultima parola. Molti altri soggetti, quali rappresentanti di organismi regionali e locali (attraverso i pareri del Comitato delle Regioni) così come le organizzazioni delle categorie economiche e sociali possono intervenire quanto meno indirettamente, mentre nessun ruolo è dato alle Commissioni affari comunitari dei parlamenti nazionali. Tale coinvolgimento non appesantirebbe ulteriormente la procedura (l'esame deve svolgersi in tempi certi e stabiliti), ma stimolerebbe una cooperazione interparlamentare (servono più parlamenti per bloccare, nel caso, un testo).

Paradossalmente i parlamenti nazionali riescono ad intervenire soltanto nella “fase discendente” attraverso

… la richiesta della Corte di Karlsruhe una questione di controllo democratico …

l'adozione delle direttive mentre sono completamente ignorati nella “fase ascendente”, ovvero durante la loro elaborazione. Questo mancato coinvolgimento dei parlamenti nazionali è spesso all'origine dei ritardi, dei blocchi o degli stravolgimenti delle direttive comunitarie così spesso avvenute anche in Italia. Il Trattato di Lisbona aumenta i poteri dei parlamenti nazionali, viste le maggiori competenze dell'Unione Europea su questioni quali la politica estera e di difesa o la giustizia e gli affari interni. In questo senso anche la Commissione Affari Costituzionali del Parlamento Europeo considera i parlamenti nazionali come degli alleati per aumentare il controllo democratico sui governi. Per concludere, la richiesta della Corte di Karlsruhe non deve essere interpretata né come uno sgambetto al Trattato di Lisbona, né come la difesa della sovranità nazionale, ma come il sollevamento di una questione di controllo democratico. Il sistema appare ad alcuni in mano agli “Eurocrati”, quasi fossero dei Mandarini di una Città Proibita e per altri rassomiglia sempre più al modello intergovernativo di ideazione gollista fondato sul Consiglio, il quale peraltro ricorda, suo malgrado, più la Dieta Polacca del settecento che una “Camera degli Stati” efficiente.

L'auspicio è di poter colmare questo deficit proprio attraverso il Trattato di Lisbona che presumibilmente entrerà in vigore l'anno prossimo dopo il nuovo referendum

… un esito positivo per il referendum irlandese affinché la Polonia adempia agli impegni presi …

irlandese che si terrà in ottobre, il quale, se desse esito positivo, spingerebbe gli euro-scettici Vaclav Klaus e Lech Kaczynski a firmare il trattato per adempiere agli impegni presi. Sempre che i conservatori britannici non vincano le possibili elezioni anticipate nel paese, e cerchino di bloccare il trattato, già ratificato dall'Inghilterra nel luglio scorso, sottoponendolo ad un referendum popolare.

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Jusqu'à maintenant, l'Europe fonctionnait avec 30 systèmes de paiement différents et des paiements transfrontaliers très cher, obligeant les citoyens européens concernés (du chef d'entreprise à l'étudiant Erasmus) à détenir un compte bancaire dans chaque pays avec lequel ils souhaitaient opérer des transactions. Avec l'introduction de SEPA, les paiements transfrontaliers seront alignés sur les paiements nationaux, permettant une même rapidité de traitement et un niveau de sécurité identique. Les consommateurs pourront utiliser un seul compte bancaire pour effectuer tous les paiements en euro.

Le secteur privé prend la main pour approfondir le marché commun

Le SEPA est composé de 4 instruments de paiement : le virement SEPA (SEPA credit transfer), le prélèvement SEPA (SEPA direct debit), le paiement électronique ou par carte SEPA (SEPA credit card) et l'argent SEPA, notre euro : il s'appliquera pour tous les paiements électroniques.

Crée à l'initiative des établissements financiers de l'Union Européenne, le SEPA constitue une véritable innovation qui vise à ériger une infrastructure transnationale unique et harmonisée. Le premier objectif de ce système est de rendre plus intégré et donc plus concurrentiel le marché des paiements européens afin de proposer aux consommateurs des produits plus efficaces et surtout des opérations transfrontalières moins chères. Supprimant la distinction entre transaction domestique et transaction transfrontalière, le SEPA donnera à moyen terme un avantage considérable aux citoyens des pays dans lesquels les prix des opérations sont élevés. En Italie, les banques prélèvent en moyenne 252€ par an pour les opérations que le SEPA prendra en compte, alors qu'aux Pays-Bas le coût est de 34€ par an. Ces différences disparaîtront progressivement sous le poids de la concurrence et l'on estime que le coût moyen des services de paiements devrait converger autour de 100€ par an.

Créer des conditions favorables à l'activité économique

Au niveau de la zone euro, on attend du SEPA qu'il favorise un climat économique favorable au commerce. Les entreprises et surtout les multinationales pourront traiter tous leurs paiements et gérer leurs opérations et leurs réserves efficacement via un seul compte SEPA. La gestion de paiement deviendra plus simple puisque tous les paiements – entrants et sortants - auront le même statut. Grâce à la consolidation des paiements les firmes actives dans la zone euro gagneront du temps, et de l'argent. En interne, les entreprises pourront intégrer les changements du SEPA au fonctionnement de leur service comptable, pour la facturation notamment.

Il va de soi que les banques tireront également un bénéfice important à l'instauration du SEPA. On estime pour le secteur bancaire un gain d'environ 10 milliards d'euros tiré de la rationalisation et l'unification des services de paiements européens. 5 milliards supplémentaires devraient être économisés grâce à une moindre utilisation des pièces et billets par les clients des banques, plus enclins à utiliser les divers paiements électroniques. De plus, dans le nouvel environnement SEPA, les établissements financiers pourront étendre plus facilement leurs activités dans toute la zone euro. C'est la liberté de circulation des services, ici bancaires, qui se voient renforcés.

Une transition en 3 temps

Mais avant de constater les effets du SEPA, les banques européennes devront investir massivement afin de préparer la compatibilité de leurs systèmes. La Banque Centrale Européenne (BCE) a estimé que ces investissements devraient coûter entre 5,2 et 7,7 milliards d'euros. La BCE a montré que répercussion des effets du SEPA sur l'économie sont échelonnés sur les 3 phases de mise en place du système : 1ier phase : fonctionnement parallèle du SEPA et des systèmes préexistants ; 2ème phase : substitution du SEPA aux systèmes antérieurs et premiers bénéfices attendus ; et 3ème phase : réduction de l'usage des pièces et billets. Afin d'atteindre au plus vite la 3ème phase, les banques ont très tôt pris conscience de l'importance d'informer leur clientèle sur la mise en place de système.

Selon le calendrier de Conseil des Paiements Européens (EPC), le projet se situe aujourd'hui dans la phase de transition où le SEPA coexiste avec les systèmes antérieurs. Cette phase devrait s'achever en 2012. Chaque pays membre conduit le projet selon ses propres délais de transition sous l'égide de l'EPC qui tient compte des différents niveaux de développement des services bancaires dans les pays concernés par le projet. L'EPC a pour mission de coordonner les efforts de transition afin de respecter le calendrier global du projet.

Le système SEPA s'inscrit d'une part dans les objectifs de dynamisme et de compétitivité fixés en 2000 par le Conseil Européen de Lisbonne, et d'autre part dans la conduite du programme de la Commission européenne E-Europe pour la transition vers l'économie numérique et le développement des nouvelles technologies de la communication et de l'information au niveau européen. Finalement le SEPA prolonge l'achèvement du marché commun, dans la lignée des principes fondateurs de la Convention de Rome. Pour autant, cette révolution bancaire est résolument tournée vers l'avenir, posant les bases d'une utilisation massive des nouvelles technologies dans le domaine bancaire.

SEPA constitue, ainsi, un programme des repères, d'un point, au passe, puisqu' il donne une impulsion aux quartes principes en éliminant les entraves pour le développement du commerce et des investissements et, d'autre point, à l'avenir, vu qu'il pose les bases pour l'exploitation des avantages offerts par les nouvelles technologies aux domaine bancaire.

Unifier-l-espace-bancaire-europeen?lang=fr

Milosevic's reign was marked by war, isolation, lack of freedom and civil rights in almost every way. The Revolution of 5th October 2000 was thought to be a revelation-like event and most of youngsters (including me, even if I was 15 at the time) were expecting a lot…it turns out, a whole lot more.

It has been 9 years since then, so where is Serbia today? Yes, we have pro-European democratic government, we have freedom of speech, we have foreign investments, we even have, officially, gross economic development. We do not have a rule of law (elementary law suits last for, literary, years), social security basically does not exist, we have lousy infrastructure, church is still highly influential in the government, around 10% of the population lives in poverty, around 10 people hold most of Country's economy, bureaucracy is pain-staking complicated, for instance, in Serbia you have to get up at 01:00 AM and go wait in the freezing cold until 07:00 AM in order to submit documents for the passport (and I am not kidding or exaggerating) and we are not even on the ''white Schengen''…and the list could go on forever, but I'll stick to the really important things – corruption and political nepotism.

The government and the parties do not have any sort of long-term-overall-country-beneficial strategies and they are driven mostly by day-to-day political and personal interests.

It is a fact, that 100% of the large public-company managers are assigned directly from currently ruling political parties, regardless of their professional competence and merit. It is a sad, repetitive, straightforward process of putting the ''most appropriate'' members of the ruling parties in charge of important, strategical resources of the Country. The cycle lasts four years, until the next elections. In the meantime, by forcing corruption in the public companies, the political parties earn money through minor and major financial crimes. Alongside the tycoons, this is one of primary mechanisms for Serbian political parties to gain finances.

The brutal truth is that after the fall of Milosevic's regime, political scene did become democratic and that many positive baby-steps have been taken, but also the level of corruption and political nepotism has been absolutely unchanged if not changed for the worse in past nine years. Political parties have complete absence of ideals and the only goal is to stay in the government. Important laws are made so they fit the current political and economical elite (several mentioned tycoons). The government and the parties do not have any sort of long-term-overall-country-beneficial strategies and they are driven mostly by day-to-day political and personal interests. Serbia has constant changes of fundamental laws, rules and even the Constitution is still not stable as it ought to be.

In light of such truths, there is no motivation for young intelligent and prosperous population to engage in any of the current political parties in Serbia, even though there are many who are politically aware of themselves and the situation. The current law basically makes it impossible for anyone to form a new political party without enormous financial support. In addition, the effort in order to struggle with highly developed corruption mechanisms, even for a relatively large group of people, would be equivalent to trying to slay a gigantic corruption-hydra which, sadly, represents the Country itself.

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Le traité de Lisbonne avait été approuvé en Allemagne par une large majorité parlementaire regroupant de nombreuses tendances le 23 mai 2008. Le président de la République Fédérale d'Allemagne Horst Koehler a signé la loi suivant la ratification parlementaire, cependant la saisine de la Cours constitutionnelle n'a pu rendre cette ratification effective.

Pour la Cour il s'agit de juger de la compatibilité du traité avec la Loi fondamentale, la crainte portée par cette saisine était de voir l'Union Européenne transformée en « super Etat » par l'intermédiaire du traité de Lisbonne.

La Cour constitutionnelle : « oui au traité de Lisbonne mais renforcement de la responsabilité du Parlement allemand en matière législative »

La Cour n'a au final pas retenu l'argument estimant que le traité de Lisbonne transformerait l'Union européenne en « super Etat », elle demeure ainsi « une association d'Etats souverains ». Malgré tout, l'aval de la Cour n'est pas direct : selon elle les chambres parlementaires n'ont pas assez de poids dans la procédure législative initiée par Lisbonne. Le traité ne « leur accordent pas assez de droits dans la procédure législative européenne ainsi que dans les procédures d'amendement des traités ».

Les juges constitutionnels demandent donc qu'une loi formalise les droits de codécision du Parlement allemand. Cela en raison, selon eux, d'un « déficit démocratique structurel » de la machinerie européenne. L'objectif de la Cour est bien de contenir toute velléité d'accroissement des domaines de compétence des institutions européennes, là où le Parlement européen excelle lorsqu'il s'agit d'accroître son champ d'action et approfondir une construction européenne plus proche de l'intérêt général européen. Andreas Vosskuhle, vice-président de la Cours constitutionnelle souhaite « garantir l'efficacité du vote » des citoyens allemands tout en veillant à ce que l'Union « n'outrepasse pas les compétences qui lui sont octroyées ».

Suivant les exigences de la Cour pour le vote d'une loi, le Bundestag a été convoqué pour une session extraordinaire le 28 août 2009. Un vote sans surprises est prévu pour le 8 septembre, une large majorité des députés conservateurs CDU/CSU et des sociaux démocrates du SPD s'étaient prononcés en faveurs du traité lors de la première procédure de ratification.

Une décision qui pèsera sur les ratifications Irlandaises, Polonaises et Tchèque

Cette décision devrait avoir une influence indirecte mais réelle sur la suite du processus de ratification. L'Irlande doit en effet organiser un second référendum le 2 octobre 2009, après les garanties apportées à l'Irlande lors du Conseil européen du mois de mai, le gouvernement irlandais reste très attentif quant à la décision de la Cour allemande. En effet celle-ci a relevée que « le traité de permettait pas à l'Union européenne d'utiliser les forces armées des Etats membres sans l'approbation de chacun des Etats concernés ». L'Irlande restant très sensible à sa neutralité, cet argument avait joué un rôle significatif dans le « non » au premier référendum.

Du côté de la Commission, le président José Manuel Barroso a estimé que le « processus de ratification dans tous les pays [sera mené à bien] d'ici à l'automne ». Cependant les présidents polonais Lech Kaczyński et tchèque Václav Klaus, champions de l'euroscepticisme, refuseront de ratifier tant que le peuple irlandais ne se sera pas exprimé.

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Until this day, 30 different payment systems had been operating in the European area, thus rendering cross-border payments more expensive than domestic payments, and forcing European citizens (merchants, students, business) to maintain more than one “electronic wallets” –bank accounts-, one for each country of operation. With the introduction of SEPA national payments are aligned, and cross-border payments are treated in the same way as domestic payments, thus enabling consumers to maintain a single bank account for all Euro payments. SEPA is composed of four payment tools: SEPA credit transfer, SEPA direct debit, SEPA credit cards and SEPA cash, which is none other than the Euro.

The SEPA system is an innovation for the European banking industry, created at its own initiative and applicable to all electronic payments (direct debit, credit cards, credit transfer) of small Euro value. It is, therefore, a banking system aimed at the creation of a common and harmonized pan-European payment structure. SEPA's basic objective is the promotion of European financial integration through a competitive payment market that will provide a higher level of payments, more effective products and cheaper solutions for the realization of cross-border payments. Under the SEPA system, customers will be using a single bank account and a set of standardized means with which they will carry out cross-border payments with the same cost, security and effectiveness as domestic payments, with a substantial profit for all sectors of the economy.

In particular, consumers will benefit as long as all cross-border payments are considered domestic. Payment cost will be reduced to a standard fee structure across Europe, benefiting citizens in countries with high cost. For instance, Italian banks charge 252€ a year for consumer payments whilst Dutch banks charge only 34€ a year. This disparity will disappear, with the expectation that the average cost for payment services for citizens will be around 100€ as a choice and competition amongst financial providers increases. In addition, those citizens who travel or own properties in other EU member states can now manage their requirements through a single bank account with standard charging and fee structures, encouraging more business and commerce across Europe.

Corporations, and especially multinationals, will be able to maintain a single SEPA account through which they will realize all of their payments and manage their assets effectively. The management of payments will be simplified since incoming and out coming payments will have the same form. With the unification of the management of payments, corporations with activities in the Euro zone will save money and time. Services of added value are also in order, such as e-invoicing and e-reconciliation, which will improve corporate accounting systems.

Last but not least, with SEPA, banks will deal with pan-European infrastructures for the clearing and settlement of payments. This will enable banks to reap over €10 billion in savings through the consolidation, rationalization and sharing of infrastructures. A further €5 billion will be saved through reduced cash usage as Europe citizens move towards increasing usage of cards, prepaid or other electronic payment transactions. Banks can also generate new revenue streams by moving towards new products and services. Finally, in this new SEPA environment banks are in position to extend their activities to Euro zone level, as they are able to offer services throughout the Euro zone. The completion is intensified and banks can negotiate with service providers under better terms. The banking market becomes more effective, and European financial integration is enforced.

The banking market becomes more effective, and European financial integration is enforced.

Notwithstanding, as regards to banks, the gain from their participation in the SEPA system will not be immediate. Firstly, the banking industry will be called to invest in its systems, so that they will correspond to those of SEPA. According to an ECB study, these investments will cost 5,2-7,7 billion Euros in total. The economic consequences will also depend on the level of the evolution and assimilation of SEPA, which can be classified as following:

• 1st level: Non-existence of SEPA;
• 2nd level: Parallel function of SEPA and current system;
• 3rd level: Only SEPA products;
• 4th level: Domination of SEPA electronic payments and reduction of the use of bills. Studies have shown that the fourth level of electronic payment domination is the most profitable for banks, contrary to the second level, in which systems co-exist. For this reason banks, following their accession in the SEPA system, developed policies for the publicizing and spreading of SEPA products to their customers.

According to the timetable set by the European Payment Council, the first stage, the stage of design, started in 2004 and has reached completion. The second stage, which concerns the realization, started in 2006 and was completed late 2007. Today, we are in the final stage, the stage of the migration where the SEPA system co-exists with the old national system. It will be complete by the end of 2010, by which time the mass of transactions will have migrated to the SEPA system. However, European states will come under the SEPA systems in different periods, observing the stages mentioned previously. An important factor for the migration of countries to the SEPA system is the state of the current national payment system. Each member state has already developed a timetable for migration to SEPA under the aegis of EPC, which also controls the observation of the timetable.

In other words, the SEPA system responds to targets set in 2000 in Lisbon, that is a more globally competitive European economy. It also responds to the E-Europe program regarding the transition to digital economy, the expansion of electronic commerce, and the use of the Internet and mobile communications, as well as the interconnection of networks on a pan-European basis. It is, therefore, a program with references to the past, as it provides a boost to the four freedoms met in every aspect of everyday lives of European citizens, and the future, by setting the foundation for a widespread exploitation of the advantages of technology in the banking sector.

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Nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg wurden Millionen von Herkunftsdeutschen, die sich seit Jahrzehnten in den damaligen deutschen Ostgebieten niedergelassen hatten, in das besetzte Deutschland vertrieben. Hier muss eigentlich hinzugefügt werden, dass dies nicht nur das heutige Polen betrifft, sondern auch andere osteuropäische Länder wie die Tschechische Republik oder Litauen, wo viele Deutschen in der Vergangenheit gelebt haben.

Wer sind die Heimatvertriebene?

Um zu verstehen, warum die Frage der Heimatvertriebenen heute noch ein politisches Thema ist, muss man erstmal klarstellen, wer sie sind. Nach dem Bundesgesetz über die Angelegenheiten der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge (BGVF) sind Heimatvertriebene diejenigen, die vor dem 31. Dezember 1937 in den Vertreibungsgebieten angesiedelt wurden, und von diesen vor dem 1. Januar 1993 vertrieben wurden. Die Vertreibungsgebiete bedecken einen wesentlichen Teil der heutigen Osteuropas (ehemaliges zweites Deutschen Reich, Österreich-Ungarische Monarchie, Litauen, Polen), was zu massiven Strömen von Vertriebenen geführt hat. Daraus ergibt sich, dass die deutsche Politik sowohl in der Nachkriegszeit als auch heutzutage gegenüber dieser Frage nicht gleichgültig bleiben kann.

Eine wichtige Konsequenz davon ist selbstverständlich die Belastung der deutsch-polnischen Beziehungen. Vor allem befürchten die Polen die Entwicklung einer Art Revisionismus, der zur Beanspruchung der ehemaligen deutschen Besitztume in Polen führen könnte. Hinter dieser wichtigen Frage steht allerdings eine andere Problematik, nämlich die der Vergangenheitsbewältigung, die in Polen anders als in Deutschland erfolgt. Dies kann auch zum Teil die Meinungsverschiedenheiten zwischen beiden Nachbarstaaten erklären.

Um die heutigen Debatte zu analysieren, werden in diesem ersten Artikel die Fakten dieser Vertreibung, die bis heute kontrovers diskutiert werden, angesprochen. In einem nächsten Artikel werden die langfristigen Konsequenzen für das deutsch-polnische Verhältnis analysiert, unter anderem in Bezug auf die frischen Spannungen zu den Themen „Zentrum gegen Vertreibungen“ oder „Erika Steinbach“.

Die Vertreibung

Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus den osteuropäischen Gebieten nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg wird heute noch kontrovers diskutiert. Das Thema ist so politisch aufgeladen, dass sich die verschiedenen Akteure auf die Fakten kaum einigen können. Als Hintergrund muss erstmal daran erinnert werden, dass das österreichisch-ungarische Vielvölkerreich sowie das deutsche Kaiserreich für eine Mischung der Bevölkerungen im Osten Europas gesorgt haben. Aus diesem Grund waren Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts viele Deutschen in Osteuropa, z.B. in Schlesien, im Sudetenland oder in Litauen angesiedelt.

In der Nazizeit im Allgemeinen und in den 40er Jahren im Besonderen wurden die Polen, die im westlichen Teil Polens wohnten, in den östlichsten Teil des deutschen Reichs (sog. Generalgouvernement) vertrieben. Umgekehrt wurden jene Gebiete, die sie verlassen sollten, von Deutschen zwangsbesiedelt, besonders im sog. Warthegau. Es ging damals darum, ein einheitliches deutsches Reich mit einer nach Osten verschobenen Grenze zu schaffen.

Zahlenkrieg um die wilden Vertreibung

Nach dem zweiten Weltkrieg fand als Reaktion auf diese Bevölkerungsbewegungen die Vertreibung der Stammdeutschen aus Osteuropa statt. Diese Vertreibungen haben zuerst als unorganisierte Rachewelle stattgefunden. Vor dem Einmarsch der Roten Armee kam es zum Partisanenkampf in diesen Gebieten, wobei die Herkunftsdeutschen Opfer der Rache der Bevölkerung wurden. Viele wurden enteignet, geprügelt oder ermordet. Wie viele ist allerdings bis heute unklar: man spricht in der Regel von 2,2 Millionen ungeklärten Fällen, die mit Verbrechensopfern gleichgesetzt wurden. 1974 berichtete das Bundesarchiv von mindestens 600.000 Todesfällen in unmittelbarer Folge der Verbrechen im Zusammenhang mit der Vertreibung. Problematisch ist z.B., dass 130.000 Todesopfer für die Tschechoslowakei angegeben werden, während die Deutsch-Tschechische Historikerkommission ihrerseits nur von 15 bis 30.000 Vertreibungsopfer ausgeht.

Vertreibung in „ordnungsgemäßer und humaner Weise“?

Auf der Potsdamer Konferenz im Jahre 1945 wurde die Frage der Vertreibungen besprochen. Schließlich konnten sich die drei Großmächte auf ein Prinzip der Vertreibungen „in ordnungsgemäßer und humaner Weise“ einigen. Die vielleicht etwas überraschende Zustimmung der Engländer und Amerikaner ist darauf zurückzuführen, dass die polnischen und tschechischen Exilregierungen in London seit Jahren die Alliierten darum baten, die Deutschen nach dem Krieg zu vertreiben. Die Teilnehmer der Konferenz vertraten den Standpunkt, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit eines (Bürger-)Kriegs in homogenen Staatswesen niedriger sein würde.

Daraus ergibt sich, dass die Vertreibungen ab 1946 in weniger schlechten Bedingungen erfolgten, weil die Deutschen etwas mehr geschützt waren. Allerdings wurde dadurch natürlich nicht jegliche Rache vermieden.

Nach den wichtigsten Wellen von Vertreibungen befanden sich im Jahre 1950 14 Millionen Heimatvertriebene in den beiden deutschen Staaten. Die Herausforderung, die diese enteignete Bevölkerung, deren es an allem mangelte, für diese Staaten im Aufbau darstellte, ist nicht zu unterschätzen. Nach dem Krieg machten die Vertriebenen circa ein Viertel der Bevölkerung der Bundesrepublik aus.

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If useless bickering has to be avoided, it is important for the European socialists to recognize the collective mistakes made during this campaign. If they do not do so now, they run a double risk: that the disagreements reappear at a less appropriate time, and (worse still) that the same mistakes are made again in the next campaign, which could only results in even more disappointing results. There would be much to say about the identity crisis that socialism in Europe is going through, but it is exclusively on the campaign mistakes that we will focus here. Without mercy, but always keeping the criticism constructive, let's see what these mistakes were.

An over-nationalization of the stakes

This cannot be highlighted enough. Just like a national campaign is fought on national issues, a true European campaign should be focused on European issues. Sadly, most socialist parties went in the opposite direction, going for the easy option. In France for instance, the PS heavily criticized the MoDem for focusing the debate on opposing the president Sarkozy. But the compliment could really have been returned to them. Talking about a “sanction vote” or purely national matters means considering the voters too stupid to understand what is at stake, and further reducing their little interest in European elections. Admittedly, the fault is shared and the socialists weren't the only ones to adopt such a political stance. But they missed a good opportunity to stand out and boost their political visibility by really talking about Europe.

A lack of leadership

This has also been repeated throughout the campaign, but it is worth insisting: the Party of European Socialists (PES) should have proposed a candidate for the presidency of the Commission. Whether Martin Schulz likes it or not (read about this his unconvincing reply to a post criticizing his stance on the issue), the parliament could perfectly have imposed another president to the governments (today this seems extremely unlikely). Anticipating their own defeat, a number of socialist leaders preferred to take the safe bet by announcing their support for Barroso. The results seem to prove them right. Except that this strategy is based on a self-fulfilling prophecy: it is because the socialists failed to appear united and capable of proposing a real alternative that they failed, not the other way around!

Too much focus on the criticism, not enough on the proposals

Criticism is healthy as long as it is used as a springboard to put forward a true alternative. But clearly, in many countries the socialists have not been able or willing to focus on their concrete proposals, preferring to concentrate almost exclusively on criticizing the right and what they have done the past few years. This can only yield counterproductive results, as the right is put at the middle of the campaign and the left gets trapped in the image of the frenzied opponent. This is even more of a pity considering credible proposals (notably an efficient response to the crisis) were to be found in the PES manifesto, which has insufficiently been used.

Unexplored political fields

It is of course logical that in this time of crisis the campaign focused on economic issues, but it is regrettable that the socialists didn't take the initiative to expand the debate to other important topics. For instance, the refusal by the right to expand the maternity leave, or to condemn the pope's shocking declaration were (missed) opportunities for the left to highlight its positions in front of the current conservative climate. Criticizing (ultra-)liberalism is no longer enough: if socialists want to embody tomorrow's progressive force, they must be more daring, and in all political fields.

In spite of those important mistakes, there were also some positive aspects in this campaign: a vigorous criticism, numerous campaign exchanges, and a manifesto largely recognized as excellent. Based on this critical assessment, let's hope the socialists will learn the lessons from this campaign and make the appropriate conclusions. Because in the meantime Europe will not wait, and the challenges are many.

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Aujourd'hui, Barack Obama écrit l'histoire, et nous n'avons pas pris suffisamment la mesure de ce que cela représentait. C'est une victoire de l'Amérique en tant que nation, mais c'est surtout une victoire des États-Unis en tant que système fédéral. Après huit ans de présidence Bush, nous pouvons enfin dire aujourd'hui aux Européens : prenons exemple sur ce qui existe de l'autre côté de l'Atlantique. Prenons exemple sur un système qui n'est pas parfait au point d'éviter les dérives, mais qui permet à une nation de renaître même après les pires épisodes. Prenons exemple sur un modèle politique équilibré, flexible et démocratique, le seul qui puisse convenir à une grande puissance contemporaine.

L'Union européenne ne peut être qu'une étape, et la nécessité de donner une forme plus élaborée à l'intégration politique s'impose chaque jour davantage. Nul besoin, bien sûr, de nous limiter à ce que les États-Unis d'Amérique nous ont appris : nous pouvons nous permettre de perfectionner le modèle, et à bien des égards, celui-ci est effectivement perfectible. Mais il serait tellement plus simple et direct de donner un nom à l'Europe fédérale que nous voulons, et quel nom serait plus efficace que celui des États-Unis d'Europe ?

Des politiciens plus fédéralistes que les fédéralistes ?

Pour mémoire, c'est le 27 mai dernier, lors d'un meeting pour les élections européennes à Rezé, que Ségolène Royal a appelé à la fondation des États-Unis d'Europe, en s'adressant aux députés européens socialistes et de gauche : « À vous de décider que nos prochaines listes seront transnationales. À vous de décider que nous élirons un Président de l'Europe. Et surtout, à vous de décider que le moment est venu de créer les États-Unis d'Europe. »

La fin de son discours, comme le relève Jean Quatremer sur son blog [1], sonne comme un appel pour le Parlement à s'ériger en Constituante : « Saisissez cette occasion, ne la laissez pas passer. Elle sera historique. N'écoutez pas, le moment venu, ceux qui vous diraient que ce n'est pas votre mandat. Les délégués des États généraux n'avaient pas non plus reçu le mandat de décréter les droits de l'homme, et pourtant ils l'ont fait. » Ségolène Royal aurait-elle décidé de promouvoir les résolutions des Jeunes Européens France ?

Plus sérieusement, le discours de Rezé était courageux et devrait sonner comme un appel. Il pose également des questions quant à nos propres engagements : en effet, après avoir eu une longueur d'avance sur le monde politique, les fédéralistes ne sont-ils pas aujourd'hui en train de prendre du retard ? Les raisons pour lesquelles la notion des États-Unis d'Europe, pourtant présente dès 1849 dans un discours de Victor Hugo, a pratiquement disparu de l'argumentaire fédéraliste, sont assez claires : nous ne voulions pas passer pour des utopistes, nous avons préféré rester dans le flou et parler simplement d'Europe fédérale, car le nom des États-Unis d'Europe, très concret, aurait suscité des attaques tout aussi concrètes.

Ce sont, naturellement, de mauvaises raisons. Il est assez étonnant, alors même que nous n'avons jamais refusé la confrontation avec les forces eurosceptiques et souverainistes, que nous ayons tant de mal à nous rassembler sous un étendard qui dirait clairement son nom. Bien sûr, la chute du cours des États-Unis d'Europe pouvait, jusqu'à peu de temps encore, s'expliquer par un autre motif : le refus de s'assimiler aux États-Unis d'Amérique qui sont, sous la présidence Bush, devenus synonymes de force brute et de dérive impérialiste. Mais précisément, la présidence Obama a changé l'ordre des choses aux yeux d'une grande partie des Européens.

Renouer avec un discours plus combatif

Il ne s'agit pas ici de discuter des qualités et défauts comparés de Ségolène Royal ou de Barack Obama, sur lesquels chacun aura son opinion, mais de relever que le discours des fédéralistes pèche aujourd'hui par manque de combativité. Le groupe des conservateurs et réformistes européens, qui s'est formé en ralliant les conservateurs britanniques, polonais et tchèques sur un programme ouvertement antifédéraliste, est aujourd'hui le quatrième groupe du Parlement européen [2]. Comment voulons-nous, désormais, éviter la confrontation ? Les souverainistes ont frappé les premiers : à nous d'organiser la riposte.

Dans une chronique de Libération parue début juin, Bernard Guetta pose très justement les termes du débat : « Les États-Unis d'Europe restent un tel chiffon rouge pour tant de gens dans tant de pays qu'à l'agiter, on ferait tanguer le navire européen mais que vaut-il mieux ? Que le débat s'ouvre et que ses termes se clarifient, ou qu'on en reste à cet entre-deux si pernicieux où l'Union européenne hésite entre être et ne pas être ? Vaut-il mieux le souffle d'une bataille politique ou le désintérêt que suscite aujourd'hui une union qui a, déjà, tant des attributs d'un Etat fédéral mais n'en a ni les politiques ni le gouvernement communs ? » [3]

Et c'est bien d'une bataille politique qu'il s'agit, une bataille que des politiciens comme Ségolène Royal ont déjà lancée, alors que les groupes fédéralistes devraient en être les fers de lance. Plutôt que de nous réfugier dans les demi-mots, nous ferions mieux de rassembler nos compétences européennes pour proposer notre vision des États-Unis d'Europe. Transformer le Conseil européen en un Sénat, élire un Président au suffrage universel… Les idées ne manquent pas pour lancer le débat.

Quelques pistes pour relancer les États-Unis d'Europe

Devant la nécessité pour les fédéralistes de remonter à l'assaut et de brandir leur bannière, nous pouvons oser quelques propositions :

1) Réhabilitons, dans notre discours, la notion des États-Unis d'Europe. Toutes les volontés allant dans le sens d'un fédéralisme européen doivent être encouragées, et si celles-ci s'expriment désormais à travers le nom des États-Unis d'Europe, nous devons soutenir ce mouvement.

2) Lançons la contre-attaque face au groupe des conservateurs et réformistes européens. Nous sommes transpartisans, certes, mais en se proclamant antifédéraliste et hostile à l'Europe politique, ce groupe s'est clairement érigé comme notre adversaire idéologique. Chargeons donc nos canons, et préparons-nous à tirer.

3) Entamons une réflexion sur le fonctionnement que nous pourrions donner aux États-Unis d'Europe : Constituante, Sénat, Président, Ministre des Affaires étrangères, etc. C'est avec des propositions concrètes que nous donnerons de la consistance au projet fédéraliste européen, et que nous éviterons la flambée de l'abstention se poursuivre aux prochaines élections.

Les États-Unis d'Europe ne sont rien de plus qu'un nom concret et riche de référence pour désigner notre projet d'Europe fédérale. Que nous l'adoptions pleinement ou pas, nous ne devons plus, désormais, hésiter à l'utiliser.

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I believe that this election (and the controversy that it has generated) has long term consequences. The fact that the Supreme Leader's authority was and is still being challenged in the streets has important implications. These include that Iranians are fed up with the lack of basic freedoms and human rights, the system of almost divine rule of the Supreme Leader has lost credibility in the eyes of many Iranians and that the system of government has to undergo radical changes to make it less complicated and more transparent and more respectful towards human rights. The theocratic system has lost its credibility and it is clear that Iranians want a major change in the system of government. In my view, the Iranian clerics are going for the wrong option of suppressing by force which could lead to another revolution in the long run… just as what happened to the Shah in 1979. The Shah, during his rule, chose repression and ended up overthrown in a revolution within a few months. The clerics must keep in mind that if they retard change (like the Shah did); they will have to face the hostility of the very people who put them in power 30 years ago. The writing is on the wall, but the clerics do not want to see it. So, I believe that they will manage to suppress the people this time by force but the reform movement will grow stronger until one day it will become strong enough to topple them.

This election generated a lot of enthusiasm compared to the election of 2005. The youths and the women featured very strongly in this election and showed a lot of enthusiasm. The majority of the youths and the women showed that they were displeased under Ahmadinejad. Iran's rulers have to take note of this if they want to stay longer in power. They have to brace themselves for a radical change in the system of almost divine rule by the Supreme Leader and the powerful, unelected Guardian Council. They have to make it more accountable and friendly towards human rights.

The election was accompanied by a high turnout. Some 85% of the eligible voters voted in this election. Hours later, it was suggested that Ahmadinejad got 63% of the vote and Mousavi got just 34% of the vote. This statement was not believed by Mousavi and his supporters. It was time to strike for democracy.

Protests

The protests resulting from accusations of alleged fraud in the election have been the most serious since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. For more than a week, Iranian protesters have been defying the election result attracting considerable international interest. Despite harsh restrictions on the media, Iranians have taken videos on mobile phones and uploaded them on the internet for the whole world to see. Disturbing images and videos of the Basij (a voluntary paramilitary force loyal to the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei) beating protesters and shooting at them have been released. It is amazing how the Iranians are using the internet to defy the authorities: this was something unimaginable a few years ago.

At the Friday Prayers, the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei showed that he was not impartial when the Supreme Leader should supposedly stay above the political fray and take balanced decisions. His stern warning to the protesters shows that he is supportive of Ahmadinejad. But although he has come in the limelight now, the protests have continued and the challenge is against him. Now, Khamenei is under fire.

A young woman called Neda who was killed by a Basij militia member has become a sort of martyr and an icon of the Iranian freedom movement. This will only strengthen the Reform Movement in Iran in the long run. Her widely publicised death will make the challenge to the clerical leadership more serious than ever before. This time the opposition movement is stronger than ever before and it is also organized in the sense that it has clerics and powerful figures in the top leadership supporting the protesters. Important figures such as Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri give the protests strength. This has surely led to serious divides among the clerics (behind closed doors).

Divisions in the Clerical Establishment

These protests are the birth of the freedom and democracy movement in Iran which is getting stronger.

The aftermath of this election has revealed serious disagreements within the clerical establishment. Some clerics such as Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri, who is a strong opponent of Khamenei and Ahmadinejad and favours human rights and democracy in Iran, openly support the protesters. Grand Ayatollah Montazeri had issued warnings in the past to the current clerical establishment to change their anti-democratic ways, or else face the anger of the people who put them in power thirty years ago.

The clerics are at a crossroads now. Either they grant human rights and let democracy work properly or suppress the people's demands through the use of force. The latter prevailed and this will have serious consequences in the long run. These protests are the birth of the freedom and democracy movement in Iran which is getting stronger. The clerics would be extremely foolish to ignore such an important development in Iran's political history. Such a mistake could lead to their downfall in the long term… just like what happened to the Shah in 1979. So, Iran's leaders….Quo Vadis?

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