In terms of background, in mid-2022, Stericycle (an Illinois based medical waste disposal company) resolved a net $59 million parallel DOJ and SEC Foreign Corrupt Practices Act enforcement action (see here and here for prior posts).

In the words of the DOJ: “From in or about and between at least 2011 and 2016, Stericycle, through certain of its employees and agents, knowingly and willfully conspired and agreed with others to corruptly offer and pay approximately $10.5 million in bribes to, and for the benefit of, foreign officials in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina in order to obtain and retain business and other advantages for and on behalf of Stericycle. Stericycle earned approximately $21.5 million in profits from the corrupt scheme and through its corruptly obtained and retained government contracts.”

In February 2024, the DOJ criminally charged Mauricio Gomez Baez based on the same core conduct. (See here for the prior post). As alleged in the information, Gomez Baez (a Mexican citizen and resident of Miami) worked for Stericycle as the Senior Vice President of Stericycle’s Latin American (LATAM) division whose business responsibilities included oversight and management of Stericycle LATAM and certain of Stericycle subsidiaries, including acquisitions, operations, finance, and sales.

The information charged conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions and alleged that Gomez Baez and co-conspirators bribed “Mexican, Brazilian, and Argentinian officials to obtain and retain contracts and other business advantages on behalf of and for the benefit of Stericycle.”

Gomez Baez pled guilty in 2024 and was sentenced to seven months in prison, followed by three years supervised release, and ordered to pay a $250,000 fine.

In March 2024, the DOJ also criminally charged Cigarroa in connection with the same bribery schemes. (See here for the prior post). Cigarroa was charged with one count of conspiracy to violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act’s (FCPA) anti-bribery provisions and one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s books and records provisions.

According to this article, Cigarroa was arrested in December 2025 in Argentina while hiking with his family in Patagonia and earlier this spring Cigarroa was returned to the U.S. to be arraigned and he plead not guilty. A $1.5 million bond was paid and trial was scheduled for June 1st.

However, on May 21st Cigarroa plead guilty to conspiracy to violate the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions. The factual proffer statement in connection with the plea agreement states, in pertinent part:

“[Between 2011 and 2016, Cigarroa] and other employees and agents of Stericycle knowingly and willfully conspired to use, and did use, the mails and means of instrumentality of interstate commerce, including U.S.-based e-mail communications, and travel between Mexico and the United States, to corruptly, offer, promise to pay, authorize the payment of, and pay, approximately $3,489,686 in bribes to Mexican government officials, in order to influence those officials in their official capacities and to secure improper advantages to assist Cigarroa, Stericycle, and others, in obtaining and retaining business in Mexico. Stericycle also paid bribes, with Cigarroa’s knowledge, in Brazil and Argentina to obtain and retain business advantages and to direct business to Stericycle. Stericycle earned approximately $21.5 million in profits from the corrupt scheme. Cigarroa knew that this conduct was unlawful.”

According to the factual proffer:

“[I]n exchange for the bribes, they secured improper advantages in order to obtain or retain business from at least fifteen Mexican state-owned entities. These advantages included manipulating the procurement process to obtain government contracts for medical waste collection, obtaining priority release of payments, allowing Stericycle to overbill its government customers, and permitting Stericycle Mexico trucks carrying hazardous waste to avoid repairs and fines. […] Cigarroa authorized the distribution of funds to the Mexican Vendors, which purported to provide services to Stericycle Mexico, in order to generate funds to make bribe payments to officials employed by state-owned and state-controlled hospitals and other government entities. Bribes were typically paid monthly to these officials and were calculated as a percentage of the customer’s invoice value, a percentage of the amount of waste collected, or as a fix amount. Most of the bribe payments were made in cash and were referred to in code, as “IP” payments.”

The factual proffer also states:

“On March 31, 2016, Cigarroa, in his then role as Financial Controller for Stericycle Mexico, signed a Stericycle Business Unit Representation letter that stated, in sum and substance, that he had “no knowledge of actual or suspected fraud, bribery, or corrupt payments affecting the Business Unit” the previous quarter.”

[…]

“Although Cigarroa was primarily based in Mexico, he also gathered information about and reported on bribes other Stericyle executives paid in Brazil and Argentina.”

According to the court docket, sentencing is set for July 10, 2026 in the S.D. of Florida.

That is was David Corn (the Washington Bureau Chief of Mother Jones and an on-air analyst for MSNBC) did.

However, informed individuals (including FCPA Professor readers) will recognize the following DOJ FCPA developments over the past approximate ten months.

An appeal was filed in the Second Circuit by an FCPA defendant after being found guilty at trial. (See here). No doubt the DOJ will be responding to this brief and the issues presented … in other words the DOJ will continue to pursue this case.

The DOJ filed a Fifth Circuit notice of appeal in an individual FCPA matter in which the defendant was previously found guilty at trial, but the conviction was overturned and the case dismissed by the judge as a result of post-trial briefing. (See here). In other words, by filing the notice of appeal the DOJ is continuing to pursue this case.

An FCPA defendant was arrested in a foreign country and brought to the U.S. to face the charges and subsequently pleaded guilty. (See here).

An FCPA enforcement action against Smartmatic and individuals associated with the company remains in active litigation mode. (See here).

An FCPA defendant was found guilty at trial and sentenced to 8 years. (See here and here).

Comcel resolved a $118 million DOJ FCPA enforcement action concerning alleged bribery schemes in Guatemala. (See here).

An individual pleaded guilty to FCPA offenses. (See here).

An FCPA defendant was sentenced. (See here).

The DOJ filed a criminal indictment and unsealed another alleging that two individuals violated the FCPA in connection with an alleged bribery scheme in Mexico. (See here).

The DOJ criminally charged two individuals with FCPA and related offenses in connection with an alleged bribery scheme involving an employee of an alleged French state-owned and state-controlled public university hospital. (See here).

Balt resolved a $1.2 million DOJ FCPA enforcement concerning an alleged bribery scheme in France. (See here).

An FCPA defendant was found guilty at trial in connection with an alleged bribery scheme in Egpyt and post-trial briefs, as well as sentencing, are pending. (See here).

Another FCPA case against an individual defendant is proceeding to trial. (See here).

Liberty Mutual resolved a $4.7 million DOJ FCPA enforcement action concerning an alleged bribery scheme in India. (See here).

As stated in the DOJ release: “According to court documents and evidence presented at trial, Oztemel […] paid bribes to officials of Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras), the Brazilian state-owned oil and gas company, to obtain lucrative contracts for Arcadia Fuels Ltd. (Arcadia) and Freepoint Commodities LLC (Freepoint). […] With the assistance of others, Oztemel paid and caused the payment of bribes to Petrobras officials for their assistance in helping Arcadia and Freepoint to obtain and retain fuel oil contracts with Petrobras and by providing Oztemel and others with confidential information regarding Petrobras’ fuel oil business. Oztemel and his co-conspirators caused Arcadia and Freepoint to make corrupt payments — disguised as purported consulting fees and commissions — to a third party intermediary and agent, Eduardo Innecco, 74, knowing that Innecco would pay a portion of those funds to Brazilian officials, including to Houston-based Petrobras trader Rodrigo Berkowitz.”

In December 2025, Oztemel was sentenced by Judge Kari Dooley (D. Conn) to 15 months in prison. (See here). Judge Dooley however granted Oztemel’s motion to remain on bond pending appeal of his conviction to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.

The ruling stated:

The Defendant challenges two aspects of the jury instructions given at trial. The first challenge is to the Court’s aiding and abetting instruction as it relates to the FCPA counts and the extent to which the Court “charged out” of the case the issue of “domestic concern.” The second
has to do with the failure to include an anonymity instruction as to which subsection of the FCPA the jury concluded had been violated. These two issues intertwine because the question of which subsection was violated, may in turn, implicate the aiding and abetting charge. While the parties disagree as to the extent to which these issues were properly preserved, the Court is of the view that the issues, in an area of the law that is not well-developed, are substantial.

In granting this motion, the Court does not revisit the decisions it has already made and does not opine on the question of whether the issues were properly preserved. Nor does the Court predict the outcome of the appeal. However, the question of whether the FCPA provides alternative
“means” for committing an offense, as opposed to separate crimes with separate elements, has not been addressed by any Circuit Court of Appeals. And although the Court applied what little guidance there is from other contexts, the outcome on this issue is not obvious. If the Defendant prevails on this issue alone, at a minimum, the case will likely be remanded for a new trial. Similarly, whether the Court’s failure to give an agency instruction in connection with the aiding and abetting charge was error, and if so, whether it was harmless, as found by the Court is also a substantial question. This Court has acknowledged on multiple occasions that the case was factually and legally complicated and raised a number of complex issues, some that had not previously been decided by the Second Circuit.

Having decided that two of the issues raised on appeal are “substantial” the Court turns to whether the questions are integral to the merits of the conviction such that “a contrary appellate holding is likely to require reversal of the conviction or a new trial.’” As discussed above, if the jury instructions were incorrect, either ecause they were required to include an anonymity instruction or because the aiding and abetting instruction was incomplete, misleading or confusing, it appears, a re-trial would likely be required as to all counts of the Indictment.”

Recently, Oztemel’s opening brief was filed in the Second Circuit.

In summary fashion, it states:

“The district judge in this proceeding—where Glenn Oztemel was convicted on Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and money laundering charges—took pains to emphasize that “the case presents several novel issues of law” that “should be addressed by the Circuit.” Many of those issues resulted from legally dubious trial strategy decisions by the government that “injected extraordinary opacity into the trial and the jury charge.” Indeed, even after the district court grudgingly allowed jury instructions that it deemed “incredibly confusing” on six theories of FCPA liability that “conflate[d] all of the different mechanisms by which the Government is seeking to hold Mr. Oztemel liable,” the district court remarked: “If the jury convicts, maybe we’ll hear from the Second Circuit on that.”

For the reasons anticipated by the district court and for several more as well, this Court should reverse the judgment below or, at minimum, grant Oztemel a new trial. This was a sharply disputed case—steeped in the unfamiliar behavioral norms of global fuel oil traders—where the government offered paper-thin evidence that Oztemel participated in an illegal scheme devised by two other people (Eduardo Innecco and Rodrigo Berkowitz). The evidence that he engaged in any unlawful conduct within the statute of limitations was particularly deficient. To compensate, the government devised jury instructions modeled on a Rube Goldberg machine, with two distinct theories of primary liability each attached to two distinct theories of secondary liability, yet without essential guardrails to ensure a sound verdict. The result was an internally conflicting and highly confusing jury charge that contained numerous objective legal errors bearing directly on the main factual disputes at trial. Those instructions, moreover, failed to require unanimity on each element of the offense of conviction and misstated the standard for finding that Oztemel had knowingly joined the charged conspiracies. Separately and in combination, these errors in the jury instructions require vacatur of Oztemel’s convictions, not as a matter of legal technicalities but rather because they created a genuine and intolerable risk that Oztemel was convicted for conduct that was not in fact a crime.

Oztemel’s convictions cannot stand for two more reasons. First, the evidence of criminal conduct within the limitations period was insufficient as a matter of law to convict. Second, the government violated its disclosure obligations under Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), in ways that severely prejudiced the defense in shaping trial strategy and cross-examining the government’s star witness on his key testimony. These errors are disturbing in their own right. And they confirm that when this case went to the jury—a jury whose instructions were flawed on the most crucial points—there was a clear and present danger of a legally unsound outcome.”

The brief highlights three issues presented, highlighted below with a summary statement.

(1) Whether Oztemel is entitled to a new trial based on highly confusing, contradictory, and legally erroneous jury instructions.

(2) Whether Oztemel’s convictions should be reversed because the evidence of criminal conduct within the relevant limitations period was insufficient to allow a rational jury to convict Oztemel beyond a reasonable doubt.

(3) Whether Oztemel is entitled to a new trial under Giglio because the defense did not learn of critical impeachment evidence concerning the government’s key witness until that witness had already taken the stand.

(1) The jury instructions in this case were highly confusing, contradictory, and legally erroneous in crucial respects. These errors, moreover, squarely implicated several of the most sharply disputed, outcome determinative issues at trial. On three separate grounds—the first arising from a failure to properly charge the substantive FCPA counts, the second arising from a failure to properly charge unanimity on the offense of conviction, and the third arising from an erroneous instruction on the legal standard for joining a conspiracy—these instructional errors require reversal.

(2) Independently, the government failed to offer legally sufficient proof that Oztemel engaged in any criminal conduct within the statute of limitations. Nearly all the evidence at trial concerned matters before the limitations period. Zeroing in on the pittance of evidence from within that period makes clear that no rational trier of fact could have properly found Oztemel guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

(3) In addition to advocating legally defective jury instructions and failing to offer evidence of a crime within the limitations period, the government also violated Giglio. Specifically, it withheld vital evidence about Berkowitz’s statements to FBI agents—evidence that would have powerfully shaped trial strategy for the defense, and that cut to the heart of Berkowitz’s credibility in testifying that he had discussed bribes with Oztemel and Innecco. By virtue of this violation, the government substantially prejudiced Oztemel. The proper remedy is to require a new trial.

But how much do you really know?

Do you know why Congress passed the FCPA and the various legislative responses Congress considered in addressing the so-called foreign corporate payments problem? See here for “The Story of the FCPA.”

Have you ever actually read the FCPA statute? It can be found here (in 50 different languages).

Judicial decisions interpreting the FCPA are not very common (in part because of how the DOJ/SEC have chosen to enforce the FCPA), but there are some. If you have not read, at a minimum, the following cases you have some work to do: U.S. v. Liebo, U.S. v. Esquenazi, U.S. v. Carson, U.S. v. Lindsey Manufacturing, SEC v. Straub, SEC v. Steffen, U.S. v. Kay, U.S. v. Hoskins, SEC v. Mattson, U.S. v. Bourke, SEC v. Jackson, U.S. v. Castle, SEC v. World-Wide Coin, and SEC v. SolarWinds.

Have you actually analyzed FCPA enforcement actions? Not just read the DOJ or SEC press releases, but actually read the resolution vehicle (whether a plea agreement, non-prosecution agreement, deferred prosecution agreement, declination with disgorgement, administrative action, etc)? If not here is the DOJ’s FCPA page and SEC FCPA enforcement actions can be found here.

Are you familiar with the various forms of guidance the DOJ and SEC have long provided regarding the FCPA such as the SEC’s 1981 guidance concerning the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions (here), the DOJ’s and SEC’s 2012 FCPA Guidance (here) and 2020 FCPA Guidance (here), DOJ FCPA Opinion Procedure Releases (here), and other various forms of DOJ guidance?

Do you understand how FCPA scrutiny and enforcement may result in various ripple effects (see here) beyond a DOJ or SEC enforcement action?

In short, how much do you really know about the FCPA?

Thus, as highlighted below, an initial learning curve associated with the FCPA is gaining comfort with uncertainty.

For starters, the FCPA is a principle-based statute and not a rule-based statute and because of that learning about the FCPA (let alone conforming one’s conduct to the FCPA) is more difficult.

The analogy is as follows: as a driver it is easier to conform your conduct to a rule-based law (the speed limit is 65) or a principle-based law (the speed limit is to drive reasonable at all times).

Next, when studying and analyzing the FCPA one may have to confront the question of what does the FCPA mean? There should be a simple answer, but in many instances there is not.

Obviously, the FCPA means what legal authority (such as the statute, judicial decisions, and legislative history) say it means, but the problem here is that there is not much judicial authority of precedent construing the FCPA. Moreover, in much of the legal authority that does exist, judges have found various FCPA elements vague or ambiguous (see here for the prior post).

Thus, in learning what the FCPA means (or at least what the FCPA enforcement agencies say the FCPA means) one very soon encounters non-legal sources of information such as actual FCPA enforcement actions (i.e. prosecutorial common law – see here for the prior post), and DOJ/SEC FCPA Guidance including in the form of DOJ opinion procedure releases. The problem with this “stuff” of course is that it is not legal authority.

Combine the above dynamics and in many (but certainly not all) instances of FCPA scrutiny and enforcement one can ask two similar, yet distinct, questions. Indeed, the learning point here is to recognize how the questions are distinct.

The first is whether, given the DOJ’s and SEC’s enforcement theories, the conduct at issue can expose a company to FCPA scrutiny and an FCPA enforcement action? This question can often be answered yes.

The second question is whether Congress in passing the FCPA intended to capture the alleged conduct at issue and whether a court would find the alleged conduct in violation of the FCPA? This question is often unknown.

Obviously business organizations subject to the FCPA are most interested in the answer to the first question. However, at the risk of being called old-fashioned, the answer to the second question is important as well.

Once FCPA learners are over this hump, analysis of the statute begins.

Anything of value – well that is a fairly uncertain term and FCPA enforcement actions have included allegations about golfing, flowers, karaoke bars as well as payments as low as $4.

Foreign official – who the heck is a foreign official? The FCPA statute does not definitely answer this question, legislative history conflicts with current DOJ and SEC interpretations, and even the only judicial decision of precedent on this issue contains a non-exhaustive factor-based test (see here for the prior post).

Obtain or retain business – what does that mean? Well, it certainly means things of value offered or provided to secure foreign government contracts, but beyond that it depends. As highlighted in this article, the government has an overall losing record in cases outside the context of procurement and even in the U.S. v. Kay case which held that certain payments outside the context of foreign government could fall within the FCPA’s anti-bribery provisions the court pointed out that there “there are bound to be circumstances” in which such payments merely increase the profitability of an existing profitable company and thus, presumably does not assist the payer in obtaining or retaining business.  The court specifically stated as follows.

“If the government is correct that anytime operating costs are reduced the beneficiary of such advantage is assisted in getting or keeping business, the FCPA’s language that expresses the necessary element of assisting in obtaining or retaining business would be unnecessary, and thus surplusage – a conclusion that we are forbidden to reach.”

In short, uncertainly there as well.

Next, one encounters the FCPA’s exception for facilitation payments. If one has trouble understanding these provisions, don’t feel bad – federal court judges do as well (see here for the prior post).

Then one reads that the exception specifically mentions “obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country” but also learns that many FCPA enforcement actions concern payments in connection with “obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to qualify a person to do business in a foreign country.”

Just remember those two questions discussed above.

From there, it is on to the so-called “reasonable and bona fide” business expenditures affirmative defense and if there was ever an uncertain term in the FCPA “reasonable” would be it (a term which also appears frequently in the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions).

And then it is on to the third-party payment provisions and learners think they “get it” that business organizations can be exposed to FCPA scrutiny and enforcement based on the conduct of various third parties. Yet, the FCPA (at least as written) is not a strict liability statute, but has a knowledge element embedded in it. However, the FCPA’s definition of knowledge is muddy.

Then one learns that to negate this knowledge element, business organizations often engage in compliance best practices. Yet, the term “best practices” is inherently uncertain. Do due diligence one might say, but what is due diligence and how much due diligence is enough? The FCPA does not answer this question.

And then of course it is on to the FCPA’s books and records and internal controls provisions – likely one of the most generic legal provisions one can find. Indeed, as stated by a federal court judge:

“The main problem with the internal accounting controls provision of the FCPA is that there are no specific standards by which to evaluate the sufficiency of controls; any evaluation is inevitably a highly subjective process in which knowledgable individuals can arrive at totally different conclusions.”

I could go on and on, but I trust you get the point.

When learning about the FCPA, one must first gain comfort with uncertainly. Often times the answers to questions are not legal answers, but risk tolerance answers which are often business judgments.

So when I leave students (whether spending an entire semester with them or just a few days) I often close by saying “well, at least you are now confused on a higher level.”

And that too is a component of learning.

Note: this post uses the term repeat offender to mean a business organization that has resolved more than one FCPA enforcement action regardless of which agency (DOJ or SEC) brought the enforcement action; regardless of the form of resolution (plea agreement, NPA, DPA, administrative order, etc.) and regardless of whether the charges or findings were anti-bribery violations or books and records and internal controls violations in connection with foreign bribery issues. This post does not include instances in which a company resolved an enforcement action concerning foreign bribery and then resolved an action implicating the books and records and internal controls in a so-called non-FCPA FCPA enforcement action. (See here and here for examples). Nor does it include instances in which there was a time gap between a DOJ enforcement action and an SEC enforcement action based on the same core conduct (for instance Las Vegas Sands and Beam).

Three Time Offenders

ABB

• 2022 (net $147.5 million enforcement action concerning conduct in South Africa)
• 2010 ($58.3 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Mexico and Iraq)
• 2004 ($16.4 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Nigeria, Angola and Kazakhstan)

Two Time Offenders

SAP

• 2023 (net $103 million enforcement action focused on conduct in South Africa, Indonesia, Malawi, Kenya, Tanzania, and Ghana.
• 2016 ($3.9 million enforcement action focused on conduct in Panama).

Philips

• 2023 ($62.2 million enforcement action focused on conduct in China)
• 2013 ($4.5 million enforcement action focused on conduct in Poland)

Oracle

• 2022 ($22.9 million enforcement action focused on conduct in Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, and India)
• 2012 ($2 million enforcement action focused on conduct in India)

Tenaris

• 2021 ($78.1 million enforcement action focused on conduct in Brazil)
• 2011 ($8.9 million enforcement action focused on conduct in Uzbekistan)

Credit Suisse

• 2021 ($99 million enforcement action focused on financing deals in Mozambique)
• 2018 ($77 million enforcement action focused on hiring practices in China and the Asia Pacific region)

Deutsche Bank

• 2021 ($123 million enforcement action focused on the company’s relationship with third parties in Abu Dhabi, Saudi Arabia, Italy, and China)
• 2019 ($16.2 million enforcement action in connection with the hiring of relatives of foreign government officials in both the Asia Pacific Region and Russia)

Novartis

• 2020 ($347 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Greece, Vietnam, and South Korea)
• 2016 ($25 million enforcement action concerning conduct in China)

Eni

• 2020 ($24.5 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Algeria)
• 2010 ($125 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Nigeria)

Technip

• 2019 ($87 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Brazil and Iraq)
• 2010 ($340 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Nigeria)

Stryker

• 2018 ($7.8 million enforcement action concerning conduct in India, China, and Kuwait)
• 2013 ($13.2 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Mexico, Poland, Romania, Argentina, and Greece)

Halliburton

• 2017 ($29.2 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Angola)
• 2009 ($177 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Nigeria)

Biomet

• 2017 ($30.4 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Brazil and Mexico)
• 2012 ($22.8 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Brazil, Argentina and China)

Orthofix

• 2017 ($6 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Brazil)
• 2012 ($7.4 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Mexico)

Goodyear

• 2015 ($16 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Kenya and Angola)
• 1989 ($250,000 enforcement action concerning conduct in Iraq)

Marubeni

• 2014 ($88 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Indonesia)
• 2012 ($55 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Nigeria)

Tyco

• 2012 ($26.8 million enforcement action concerning conduct in China, India, Thailand, Laos, Indonesia, Bosnia, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia, Slovakia, Iran, Saudia Arabia, Libya, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Mauritania, Congo, Niger, Madagascar, Turkey, Malaysia, Egypt, and Poland)
• 2006 ($50 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Brazil)(Note: this was largely an accounting fraud enforcement action and the FCPA prong was a relatively minor component).

IBM

• 2011 ($10 million enforcement action concerning conduct in South Korea and China)
• 2000 (cease and desist order concerning conduct in Argentina)

General Electric

• 2010 ($23.4 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Iraq)
• 1992 ($9.5 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Israel)(Note: FCPA as well as related charges)

Lucent / Alcatel-Lucent

• 2010 ($137.4 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Costa Rica, Honduras, Malaysia, Taiwan, Kenya, Nigeria, Bangladesh, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Angola, the Ivory Coast, Burkina Faso, Uganda, and Mali)
• 2007 ($2.5 million enforcement action concerning conduct in China)

Aibel Group / Vetco Gray

• 2008 ($4.2 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Nigeria)
• 2007 ($26 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Nigeria)

Baker Hughes

• 2007 ($44 million enforcement action concerning conduct in Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Angola, Indonesia, Russia, Uzbekistan)
• 2001 (cease and desist order concerning conduct in Indonesia, India and Brazil)

The number of FCPA repeat offenders calls into question whether the FCPA has been successful in achieving its objectives. (See here for the article). But then again, there are two ways to view corporate FCPA repeat offenders. (See here).

Of note, several instances of corporate FCPA repeat offenders involve companies whose first FCPA enforcement action (as well as second) was resolved via an NPA or DPA. For many years the DOJ has advanced the policy position that DPAs (and NPAs) “have had a truly transformative effect on particular companies and, more generally, on corporate culture across the globe.” (See here for the prior post). Specifically in the FCPA context, the DOJ stated that “the companies against which DPAs and NPAs have been brought have often undergone dramatic changes.” (See here for the prior post).

The DOJ also announced that Steven Hunter (a former business development manager at Unaoil) pleaded guilty in August 2018 to one count of conspiracy to violate the FCPA.

As noted in the DOJ’s release, the Ahsanis were scheduled to be sentenced in April 2020 and Hunter was scheduled to be sentenced in March 2020.

However, this August 2022 post highlighted how the defendants still had yet to sentenced and wondered when sentencing would occur.

According to court dockets, sentencing of Cyrus Ahsani and Saman Ahsani was pushed back until October 2020, then February 2021, then September 2021, then December 2021, then June 2022, then December 2022, and then January 30, 2023. Each time sentencing was delayed, there were sealed filings on the court docket.

As highlighted in this prior post, Saman Ahsani was sentenced in January 2023 and the docket entry stated as follows:

“Minute Entry for proceedings held before Judge Andrew S Hanen: Sentencing held on 1/30/2023 for Saman Ahsani (1) as to Count 1 of the Indictment. The Court ruled on pending motions on the record. There being no objections to the PSR, the Court adopted the PSR and sentenced Defendant to the custody of the BOP for a term of 12 months and 1 day; 1 year SRT; no fine; $100 SA. The Court recommended that Defendant be permitted to return to his home country to serve his supervised release. The Court further recommended placement in the facility at Beaumont, Texas. The Defendant may self-surrender at a time and place to be determined by the BOP.”

When will Cyrus Ahsani and Hunter be sentenced?

According to court dockets, Cyrus Ahsani’s sentencing date was pushed back to August 21, 2023, then February 2024, then November 2024, then May 2025, then November 2025, then May 18, 2026, and is currently set for December 1, 2026.

Ahsani’s most recent unopposed motion to continue sentencing (which the court granted in October 2025) stated:

As set forth in the prior motions, Mr. Ahsani has been cooperating with the Australian Federal Police (“AFP”) in their prosecution of David Savage and Russell Waugh in connection with Leighton Offshore Pte Ltd (the “Leighton Defendants”). Mr. Ahsani has already provided live testimony in those proceedings. The Australian prosecutors have now informed counsel that the trial of the Leighton Defendants is expected to be scheduled for the beginning of next year, at which time Mr. Ahsani will be called to testify again in person.

Continuing Mr. Ahsani’s sentencing and related deadlines will benefit both parties in this case, as well as the Australian government and the interests of justice. As stated in the prior motions, Mr. Ahsani wishes to continue fulfilling his commitment to the Australian government, and have his ongoing, truthful testimony considered by this Court at the time of sentencing. Testifying truthfully under oath in a foreign prosecution is a significant form of cooperation that should be fully weighed at sentencing.

This request is not made for purposes of delay, but to ensure that justice is done. Counsel for Mr. Ahsani has conferred with counsel for the United States, who has indicated that the United States is unopposed to this motion.”

In the past six months, there have been five filings relevant to sentencing, but all filings are under seal.

According to court dockets, sentencing of Hunter was pushed back until October 2020, then January 2021, then May 2021, then September 2021, then December 2021, then July 2022, then December 2022, then February 2023, then September 2023, then March 2024, then December 2024, then December 2025, then June 1, 2026, and is currently scheduled for December 14, 2026.  Each time sentencing has been delayed, there are sealed filings on the court docket.

In short, Cyrus Ahsani pled guilty over 7 years ago and still has not been sentenced. Hunter pled guilty approximately 8 years ago and still has not been sentenced.

In late 2023, Kodiak announced its intent to acquire CSI Compressco LP whose customers included various business in several foreign countries including Mexico, Canada, Argentina, and Chile.

This previous post highlighted a 2025 disclosure by Kodiak regarding compliance issues in Mexico.

Kodiak’s most recent quarterly filing (May 11th) states:

“In the first quarter of 2025, the Company received a report regarding certain payments to local government officials in Mexico that commenced prior to the Company’s acquisition of its Mexican business in connection with the acquisition of CSI Compressco LP (the “CSI Acquisition”) that presented potential compliance issues under U.S. law.”

The disclosure continues:

“In response, the Company retained outside counsel to conduct an internal investigation of the reported payments, including whether any payments made may have indirectly benefited individuals associated with certain criminal cartel organizations, some of which may be designated as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGTs) per Executive Order 14157 of January 20, 2025. The investigation determined that certain payments likely were made to persons associated with an organization designated as an FTO or SDGT. The payments appear to have been made in order to protect employees of the Mexican business from threats of harm or harassment, and to ensure access to work sites. The aggregate amount of these payments was not material. The Company sold its operations and legal entities in Mexico on September 30, 2025.

The Company voluntarily self-reported this matter to governmental authorities in the United States, including the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Office of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”), and is cooperating with the investigative steps being taken by the DOJ and OFAC into the matter as a result of the voluntary self-disclosure. The Company also voluntarily self-reported to the SEC and intends to cooperate fully should there be any investigation by the Commission. This matter could result in U.S. governmental authorities seeking criminal and/or civil sanctions, including monetary fines and penalties, against the Company, as well as requiring additional changes to the Company’s business practices and compliance programs. To the extent any of the payments at issue are determined to be illegal in a foreign jurisdiction, it is possible that there could be civil or criminal penalties assessed in that jurisdiction.

Although the Company does not expect the findings from the investigation or actions taken by governmental authorities to have a significant adverse impact on its business, results of operations, financial condition and cash flows, there can be no assurance as to the ultimate outcome of these matters at this time.”

Which makes this recent Morrison & Foerster alert which addressed the recent dismissal in U.S. v. Rovirosa a bit unusual.

First, some background.

In December 2025, Ramon Alexandro Rovirosa Martinez was found guilty after a bizarre trial of various charges in connection with an alleged Mexican bribery scheme. (See here for the prior post).

As reported here, the trial featured no fact witnesses which led the judge to block the government from introducing most of its evidence until their closing argument.

Post-trial, Rovirosa filed a motion for a judgement of acquittal and among the reasons stated were the following:

(i) “the Government presented evidence to the jury that was either not properly admitted into evidence and/or that should not have been admitted into evidence;”

(ii) “the jury was provided with text messages to and from alleged co-conspirators that were never properly admitted into evidence, and the Government never offered evidence to satisfy any legal exception to the hearsay rule;” and

(iii) “the jury was provided with testimonial translations of text messages with no testimony by the translator, despite defense counsel’s request and objection, in violation of the Confrontation Clause.”

With that motion pending Rovirosa also filed a “Motion to Dismiss Case with Prejudice Based on the Court’s Supervisory Powers.” Among the reasons stated were the following: “the Government attorneys in this case (1) made misrepresentations to the Court and/or to the jury that willfully mispresented both the record and the legal standards; (2) failed to provide evidence to defense counsel, and (3) failed to present any witnesses at trial with actual knowledge of the facts. Even more alarming, the case was under the legal supervision of a Department of Justice supervisory attorney, who apparently allowed such conduct to occur.”

U.S. District Court Judge Kenneth Hoyt (S.D. Texas) granted the motion to dismiss and motion for acquittal. He concluded:

“After considering the relevant circumstances surrounding the government’s case, and its intended use of electronic messages between the alleged co-conspirators and the co-defendant, the Court determines that the messages are testimonial and are governed by common law and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The Court finds that the messages of the coconspirators and, in particular, the co-defendant Avila, while they constitute hearsay messages, and would be admissible in a conspiracy setting, they are not automatically admissible here because, as translations, and when used to establish the case, they are testimonial. The government’s primary purpose for offering the messages was to convict Rovirosa, i.e. to prove the elements of the crimes charged in the Indictment. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51.

In reaching this conclusion, the Court finds that the government has not produced evidence showing that the Translators were unavailable or that Rovirosa was given an opportunity to cross-examine them prior to trial. The precedent is clear, the government had a duty to produce the Translators for cross examination.

The government turns next to the certification sequence for admissibility. It argues that Google or Yahoo and WhatsApp recorded the transmittals between Rovirosa, and between the alleged co-conspirators that were made on their own electronic devices capturing them in the regular course of their business activities. Hence, the government argues the messages are admissible under the business [records] exceptions rules. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). The government also argues that the Translators certified their translations under oath; and that Special Agent Varga reviewed the Translators’ translations and certified the accuracy of their translations. The Court will address these arguments, however, they are all unavailing.

Fed. R. Evid. 801(c) and (d) and 803(6), address hearsay exceptions that apply to business records or electronic messages when they are offered into evidence. Rovirosa does not argue that the translations were not properly certified by Google or others, or that the business records exception, generally, satisfies the hearsay rule exception such that out-of-court hearsay statements or documents may be admitted. Instead, he argues that, even if the federal rules of procedure or evidence are satisfied, the electronic messages must be excluded because: (a) the messages offered were translations from Spanish to English, between and among alleged co-conspirators and, as such, the Confrontations Clause prohibits admission if they are testimonial statements by a non-testifying witness. The precedent exceptions to this rule do not apply here because Rovirosa had no prior opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses.

The record shows that the government intentionally did not call as witnesses the Translators. Hence, Rovirosa was not provided an opportunity to cross-examine them prior to or during trial. Moreover, there is no evidence that the government could not have produced them. Nor is there evidence that the government made an effort to produce them. Hence, the Court concludes that Rovirosa’s right to cross-examine the Translators and the co-defendant, cannot be truncated by offering certifications, particularly since the Translators were available to the government. Moreover, Rovirosa’s right to cross-examine the Translators is not satisfied by the government’s tender of Special Agent Varga to testify that she re-examined the Translator’s translations and is of the opinion that they are accurate. To permit this type of “expert” evidence, turns on its head the science and art of proper translation considerations.

It is well accepted that Translators fall into one of two camps, those who use the pedagogic/literal format – word for word, or exercise poetic/dynamic, where the Translator seeks the pulse and tone of expressions in order to capture words and expressions. Cross-examination permits recognition of cultural sensitivity issues, specialized knowledge, and the level at which the Translator’s education and usage of the language may rest. To that add regional nuances and contextual consideration as the occasion dictates. To ignore the art and science of the translation process is to render cross-examination of the Translators, useless or questionable.

The jury recognized that the English translations short-circuited its review of the evidence, an evidentiary fact missed by the Court. During deliberations, the jury requested that the Court provide the Spanish messages during deliberations. The Court could not provide the Spanish messages because they had not been offered into evidence by the government. This failing by the government becomes more poignant when considered in the light of Rovirosa’s complaint that the government failed to produce forensic copies of the Spanish messages taken from both defendants’ electronic devices.

The government promised to produce the screen shots on at least two occasions. On September 26 and October 1, 2025, Department of Justice Attorney, Bennett Starnes, promised the materials. The materials were never produced, and this failing is also fatal to the government’s case.”

In conclusion, Judge Hoyt stated:

“Based on the Court’s findings and conclusions, the Court GRANTS the defendant Rovirosa’s motion to dismiss the Indictment pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 29(c); alternatively, to ACQUIT him of all charges based on lack of evidence to support his conviction in violation of the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. He is ORDERED released, forthwith.”

Among the authors of the Morrison & Foerster alert is former DOJ FCPA attorneys Charles Duross and James Koukios. In pertinent part, the alert states:

“This ruling appears open to challenge on appeal. First, the emails themselves should be non-hearsay under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2) because they were offered against the defendant and were either statements of the defendant or statements of the defendant’s co-conspirators made during and in furtherance of the conspiracy. Second, the usual procedure for disputed translations is to allow both sides to submit their own translations to the jury. Third, to the extent that it believed that testimony from the government’s translators was nevertheless necessary, the court could have either required such testimony during the trial or ordered a new trial during which such testimony could be elicited; an acquittal may be viewed as an overly severe outcome under the circumstances. Even if not reversed, the order relates simply to an evidentiary issue and does not implicate any substantive FCPA issues. (The same judge was reversed in February 2023 for dismissing FCPA charges in another case)”

The Company’s solutions are found in the end markets of transportation (including automotive, commercial vehicle, e-bike, aerospace, bus and rail), cloud computing infrastructure, construction equipment and consumer appliance.

As highlighted in this prior post, in late 2024 Methode disclosed FCPA scrutiny.

The company stated:

“The Company received a subpoena from the SEC dated November 1, 2024 seeking documents and information relating to, among other things, the Company’s operations in certain foreign countries, certain financial and accounting matters relating thereto, compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other anti-corruption laws, and material weaknesses in the Company’s internal control over financial reporting previously reported in its public filings. The Company is cooperating with the SEC. The subpoena and related investigation or other future requests for information could result in costs to the Company, including the expenditure of financial and managerial resources. In addition, this request may lead to the assertion of claims or the commencement of legal proceedings against the Company, which in turn may lead to material fines, penalties or other liabilities. However, at this time, the Company is unable to reasonably estimate an amount or range of reasonably possible loss, if any, that may result from these matters.”

Methode’s most recent quarterly filing (March 2026) likewise stated:

“The Company received subpoenas from the SEC dated November 1, 2024 and March 12, 2025 seeking documents and information relating to, among other things, the Company’s operations in certain foreign countries, certain financial and accounting matters relating thereto, compliance with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and other anti-corruption laws, material weaknesses in the Company’s internal control over financial reporting previously reported in its public filings, deficiencies and significant deficiencies in the Company’s internal control over financial reporting, accounting and finance policies and procedures and other accounting and finance matters including new business bookings, certain financial metrics and performance indicators, performance relative to targets and guidance for certain periods, executive compensation policies and amounts, hotline tips and complaints, and terminations or resignations of company executives. The Company is cooperating with the SEC. The subpoenas and related investigation or other future requests for information have resulted and could result in future costs to the Company, including the expenditure of financial and managerial resources. In addition, this request may lead to the assertion of claims or the commencement of legal proceedings against the Company, which in turn may lead to material fines, penalties or other liabilities. However, at this time, the Company is unable to reasonably estimate an amount or range of reasonably possible loss, if any, that may result from these matters.”

In a recent filing, the company stated:

“As previously disclosed, the Company was subject to an investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission. On May 14, 2026, the SEC Staff notified the Company that it has concluded its investigation and does not intend to recommend an enforcement action.”