“We don’t have the sensors, and depending on where that swarm is going to attack, it depends on whether we have any sensors at all, and also on whether we’ve got any effectors to go after that problem,” Army Lt. Gen. Joseph Jarrard stated. He was addressing an audience at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium (SMD) in Huntsville, Alabama, attended by TWZ.

“So we are ill-equipped right now to handle something like that, and obviously we’ve seen it used,” the general added. “We’re seeing it used on a daily basis around the world, and we’ve got to figure out how to mitigate that threat, but we’re not there yet.”

Jarrard’s statements were a sharp admission by a U.S. military leader of a number of interconnected gaps, including the lack of domain awareness over the homeland. It is a topic TWZ has frequently raised over the years, but that U.S. officials would not admit to it or address until after the Chinese spy balloon floated over much of the country in 2023 before being shot down off the Carolinas. He was also raising other concerns we have often highlighted, like having the right systems in place to take drones down once they are detected and the proper authority to use them when needed.

Though Jarrard didn’t offer any specific examples of potential threat scenarios, the most glaring is Ukraine’s Operation Spiderweb attack on Russian air bases. Drones stored in prepositioned trucks were launched nearby remotely and destroyed a large number of Russian bombers and other critical aviation assets.

You can see a video of one of those attacks below.

Another example of a similar near-field attack was the first-person view (FPV) drone strike on a U.S. Army helicopter in Iraq earlier this year, which you can read more about here.

The following video captures that incident.

These incidents underscore the very real risk faced by military infrastructure, other critical assets and VIPs in the United States, a point that TWZ has repeatedly raised for a decade. In particular, near-field attacks like Operation Spiderweb pose a huge threat and one that would be hard to stop once it began. Compared to a combat theater, there are fewer defenses and far less surveillance, let alone similar alert levels, at sensitive installations all over the U.S. With advances in drone technology and accessibility, attacks coming from within the U.S. could be executed by longer-range drones, as well, which presents additional challenges for preparing defenses.

Speaking at SMD, Jarrard acknowledged many of these concerns and offered some insights into the challenges the command faces and how it is working to address them.

While the authority to use counter-drone systems is still catching up with the technology, Jarrard noted that his commands are working to apply lessons from Operation Noble Eagle (ONE) on the counter-drone effort. Operation Noble Eagle, which came into being following the September 11th attacks, changed America’s air defense posture. It included putting fighters on higher readiness and upping the surveillance over the United States with regular air patrols and flights by AWACS surveillance aircraft. In addition, new rules of engagement were put in place and trained for.

“We are integrating some of the TTPs [tactics, techniques and procedures] that we use in that mission to also incorporate with the counter-UAS mission, so some of that is just a natural flow from the ONE mission,” the general proffered at SMD without offering further details. “But the other problem is detection. That is obviously the biggest issue, and so how we are able to detect is one of our biggest concerns right now.”

“We’re using the assets that we have, radars, et cetera, but it’s going to be also involving local law enforcement because it’s not just installations, Army or military installations, but it’s also things like we did [by] interacting with the federal authorities and local law enforcement with respect to the FIFA World Cup,” Jarrard suggested. “We’ve got to be interoperable with the systems that they’re procuring, using, utilizing, and they’ve all got to talk together, and so that’s where we’ve got to get to with respect to the interoperability between not just military systems, but also those that are protecting our cities, critical infrastructure, et cetera, that are off our installations.”

As we have previously noted, NORTHCOM has taken measures to help base commanders protect against drones once they arrive. One example came earlier this year, after incursions over two installations, including Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, home of B-52 Stratofortress bombers and nuclear weapons storage facilities, and a key part of the airborne leg of America’s nuclear triad. NORTHCOM deployed its new counter-drone fly-away kit, designed to give installation commanders the ability to detect, quantify, and defeat small drones that they cannot defend against on their own.

However, given that these systems have to be requested and then delivered, there is a limit to just how much protection they can provide, especially against an attack like Spiderweb that popped up with no warning. The fly-away kits would not arrive until after such an attack occurred, unless there was intelligence that gave some kind of warning. Meanwhile, there is a huge lack of capacity when it comes to installing these systems on a more permanent basis at installations that really need them, let alone critical civilian infrastructure and other high-value targets.

Moreover, for years now, U.S. military officials have often pushed back on the utility and cost-effectiveness of investing more in the physical hardening of bases and other critical facilities, especially shelters to shield aircraft from drones and other threats. However, that is starting to change. In a notable shift in department policy, the Pentagon in February issued new guidance for defending critical infrastructure against drone attacks through the increased use of netting, cables, and other kinds of passive physical defenses.

Jarrard’s comments at SMD, while troubling, were also a refreshing acknowledgment by someone in charge of protecting the U.S. that we remain woefully vulnerable to the kind of attack Ukraine launched against Russia last year. Admitting the problem will hopefully help with putting in place real solutions to it in the not so distant future.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post U.S. Not Prepared To Handle Drone Attack From Inside Homeland: Deputy NORAD Commander appeared first on TWZ.

Wicher (Polish for gale) was floated off a semi-submersible heavy-lift barge in the Gulf of Gdansk today.

Yesterday, the frigate was still on dry land, in the dock at the PGZ Stocznia Wojenna (PGZ SW) yard in Gdynia, on the Baltic Sea, where it had been built. It was rolled out and placed on the barge there before its christening and naming ceremony attended by Polish President Karol Nawrocki.

“Within the PGZ Group, we are implementing projects of strategic importance to national security,” said Adam Leszkiewicz, CEO of PGZ. “The christening and launch of the first frigate under the Miecznik program is one of the most important milestones in rebuilding the operational capabilities of the Polish Navy.”

Yesterday’s ceremony was marked by the blasts from the ship horns of two of the warships that Wicher will replace. These are the Kościuszko, which accompanied Wicher during its launch today, and Pułaski, currently in dry dock at the shipyard.

These are Poland’s two Oliver Hazard Perry class frigates, dating from the late Cold War period and transferred from the U.S. Navy.

The three new multirole frigates being built in the Project 106 Miecznik (Swordfish) class — described as the largest program of its kind in Polish Navy history — are far more capable vessels, based on Babcock International’s Arrowhead 140 design.

The Arrowhead 140 design is derived from the innovative Iver Huitfeldt class frigate used by the Royal Danish Navy and also forms the basis of the U.K. Royal Navy Type 31 general-purpose frigate. Overall, the Arrowhead 140 has a modular structure and generous internal space, meaning it can be adapted for a variety of different systems and sub-systems, as required.

The new Swordfish frigates have a length of 138 meters (453 feet), a beam of approximately 20 meters (66 feet), and a maximum displacement (including additional equipment and armor) of approximately 7,700 tons. They will have a maximum range of approximately 8,000 nautical miles, and a maximum speed of 28 knots, powered by four combined diesel and diesel (CODAD) piston engines driving two propellers. Each will have a core crew of approximately 120, with space to embark an additional 60 personnel.

Babcock’s Arrowhead 140 design was selected by Poland in 2022, after which a keel-laying ceremony for Wicher was held in Gdynia in January 2024.

Construction of the second vessel, Burza (Storm), had begun by early 2026, which is planned to be followed by its launch in 2027 and commissioning in 2030. The keel for the third ship, Huragan (Hurricane), will be laid down in late 2026, followed by a planned launch in 2028 and commissioning in 2031.

While they are multirole vessels, the Miecznik design stresses anti-air warfare (AAW) and anti-submarine warfare (ASW).

Compared to the British Type 31, the Miecznik is more extensively equipped.

For its AAW mission, the primary weapon of the Polish warship is the MBDA CAMM, or Common Anti-air Modular Missile.

Firing trials of the CAMM (also known as Sea Ceptor) from the U.K. Royal Navy frigate HMS Argyll:

For medium-range threats, out to beyond 62 miles, the warship will be armed with the CAMM-MR, being jointly developed by Poland and the United Kingdom under the Future Common Missile (FCM) program.

The standard CAMM, with a maximum range of around 28 miles, will also be carried to engage targets at shorter distances.

Versions of the CAMM can be quad-packed, in this case in the U.S.-made Mk 41 vertical launch system (VLS), with 32 cells. That would provide for a maximum of 128 missiles, especially significant bearing in mind current concerns about magazine depth in the face of sustained drone and missile barrages.

Depending on the exact configuration of the VLS, other kinds of missiles and ASW weapons could potentially be integrated at a later date, too.

For ASW specifically, the Miecznik class is provided with two dual-tube launchers for MU90 Impact lightweight torpedoes. The same torpedoes arm the Polish Navy’s AW101 helicopters, seen in the tweet below, which can also be embarked.

For surface strike, the frigate will be armed with eight Kongsberg Naval Strike Missiles (NSM), stealthy weapons that can be used against other ships as well as against targets on land. There is an option to install an additional eight NSM launchers if required.

Gun armament will comprise a Leonardo 76mm Strales, which is compatible with guided ammunition. While these are dual-purpose weapons also capable of striking surface and land targets, the guns are optimized for the anti-missile and anti-drone defense role, for which they fire DART projectiles that employ radio-command guidance for accuracy. The video below shows the Strales/DART combination in action during peacetime:

Two 35mm guns will also be able to fire programmable ammunition. These guns will likely be the locally produced OSU-35K remote weapon stations, as seen below on a Polish Navy minehunter:

For self-defense, the vessels will be fitted with the Terma C-Guard system, with eight fixed 130mm launchers that can dispense infrared, radar-frequency, and acoustic countermeasures.

The majority of the sensor suite on the Miecznik class is provided by Thales, integrated under its TACTICOS combat management system (CMS), already used by the Polish Navy. Thales-provided equipment also includes primary and secondary multifunction radars, a panoramic electro-optical system, and an underwater detection suite comprising a hull-mounted sonar and a towed array sonar.

The electronic warfare system is from Rohde & Schwarz, based on that company’s KORA system.

Other additional systems include a laser warning system, navigation radars, and a diver detection sonar.

From the outset, the Polish Navy has schemed the Miecznik class around uncrewed systems, both in terms of operating these itself and countering hostile drones.

While it’s unclear what types of drones may be embarked, the Arrowhead 140 design includes four boat bays, which can accommodate uncrewed surface vessels (USVs) as well as traditional small, crewed boats. The large helicopter deck can also embark rotary-wing drones.

Bearing in mind the emphasis on ASW missions, USVs and rotary-wing drones equipped for this mission could become a regular fixture on the frigate, helping to extend its surveillance range and also for prosecuting targets, especially in high-risk and/or littoral environments.

Under current planning, Wicher is expected to be commissioned in 2029, following sea trials and qualification tests. Before then, the warship needs to be fully outfitted and its systems integrated, which will also be conducted at Gdynia.

The Miecznik program is scheduled for completion by the end of 2031, making it a remarkably compressed effort, reflecting the urgency behind Poland’s military modernization.

In the maritime realm, the new frigates are key to Poland’s efforts to transform its navy from a relatively small Baltic force centered on aging, second-hand warships into a more capable fleet able to make meaningful contributions to high-end NATO maritime operations.

The Miecznik class represents a substantial increase in both size and combat capability over the Polish Navy’s existing surface combatants. The transformation is being driven in large part by the changing security environment in the Baltic following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.

With Finland and Sweden joining NATO, Germany strengthening its maritime capabilities, and the Baltic states expanding their armed forces, Poland is positioning itself to play a much larger role in the alliance’s regional maritime architecture.

Russia retains substantial air defense, electronic warfare, and strike capabilities in the Baltic region, while its Baltic Fleet is relatively modern and well preserved compared with the Black Sea Fleet. Russian forces in and around the Baltic region — particularly Kaliningrad, western Russia, and Belarus — can combine these capabilities with long-range missiles, submarines, mines and other systems to threaten NATO forces before they even have the chance to concentrate.

Already, Russia is employing cyber operations, sabotage, GPS/electronic interference, drone activity and other “gray zone” measures around NATO’s eastern flank.

A modern frigate force, backed by advanced submarines, coastal anti-ship missiles, and other naval capabilities, will give Warsaw considerably more reach and flexibility both inside the Baltic and beyond it.

However, there remains a question over whether Poland can generate enough people, infrastructure, and sustained resources to turn its ambitious procurement plans into a genuinely effective fleet. The Polish Navy has historically operated with a relatively small personnel base, currently numbering just over 6,000, while the country’s armed forces are simultaneously pursuing one of Europe’s most expansive modernization programs. Manning, training, maintaining, and sustaining an expanded fleet could ultimately prove a challenge.

Poland has an option with Babcock to build a further five ships to the same design. Perhaps more significantly, construction infrastructure built for the program, and the accompanying skills base, will be available for projects in the future, helping the Polish Navy continue its modernization.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Poland’s Powerful New Frigate Marks Major Shift For Its Navy appeared first on TWZ.

U.S. Space Force Gen. Stephen Whiting made an explicit call for new “integrated space fires” capabilities, including both non-kinetic and kinetic options in orbit and/or within the atmosphere, during a talk yesterday at the annual Space & Missile Defense (SMD) Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, at which TWZ is in attendance. SPACECOM is the main joint service command in charge of all U.S. military activities in space.

“From the broadest perspective, maybe the most critical characteristic of the responsive and adaptive national security space architecture called for in the President’s Ensuring American Space Superiority executive order is that survivability matters at least as much as performance,” Whiting said. “In space, there is no safe harbor. You can’t dig a trench or build a shield. Our satellites are consistently or predictably in an opponent’s weapons engagement zone. And we can build the most high-performing, exquisite satellites in human history, but if they depend on fragile, targetable supporting infrastructure, their performance will drop to zero on the first day of the next war.”

“Space survivability isn’t just good to have or nice to have. It is need to have. Now let’s get specific. I’ve explained how durable we need our kit to be, but now I want to tell you about our FY29-to-33 [Fiscal Years 2029 to 2033] integrated priorities list,” the SPACECOM boss continued. “We’ve looked at risks and potential gaps and determined these are the top five capabilities we need to meet our Title 10 and Unified Command Plan responsibilities. This isn’t just a wish list. It’s a clear demand signal to several audiences, describing the warfighting capabilities we need to meet our mission.”

“Number one and two are integrated space fires and counter-pLEO that enable us to establish space superiority,” he said. pLEO, also sometimes written P-LEO, stands for proliferated low Earth orbit, and refers to distributed constellations of hundreds or potentially thousands of satellites in that orbital region. The U.S. military itself is investing heavily in this arena to develop and field new space-based capabilities that are more resilient to attack.

The other three lines of effort Gen. Whiting outlined during his talk had to do with improved command and control, better situational awareness in space, and increased ability to maneuver assets in orbit.

“We’re a combatant command, and we fight to win wars,” Whiting declared. “To win, we need credible, acknowledged, kinetic, and non-kinetic fires. They are a key component of how we establish space superiority and restore credible deterrence.”

“Our space assets need to shoot, move, and communicate just like the rest of the joint force, so that our space assets can enable the joint force to shoot, move, and communicate,” the head of SPACECOM also said. “In short, space needs to fight like the joint force to empower the joint forces’ ability to fight and undermine our adversaries’ ability to do so.”

Whiting did not elaborate on what these future integrated fires and counter-pLEO capabilities might look like. An accompanying briefing slide did include a graphic depicting a kinetic attack on a satellite originating from within the Earth’s atmosphere utilizing what might be a laser-directed energy weapon.

The threats that directed energy weapons, as well as cyber attacks, pose to friendly satellites, even ones in distributed constellations, had come up at a separate panel discussion at the SMD Symposium on Tuesday.

“If you have 10,000 satellites that are providing you with service, surely you’re not going to try and attack with a direct ascent ASAT [anti-satellite interceptors fired from within the Earth’s atmosphere] 10,000 satellites,” U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Rick Zellmann, Deputy Commander of SPACECOM, said during the panel. “I encourage our adversaries to try and shoot down 10,000 satellites that way. I don’t think they will. And, so, just like we do, our targeting folks will try to find the various nodes where you can get a one-to-many solution.”

“Those, I think, one-to-many solutions for proliferated constellations are twofold. One is cyber,” he continued. “I think the other is directed energy, because that doesn’t cost too much for a shot, right? So those two technologies are the ones I’d be concerned about.”

“Non-kinetic effects of directed energy, mounted on all types of platforms, from the surface all the way to space and everywhere in between,” could also be “opportunities,” Brig. Gen. Drew Morgan, the deputy head of the Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC), another one of the panelists, also said later on. In a space context, non-kinetic directed energy ‘effect’ could include what is known as ‘dazzling’ using lasers to blind optics on satellites without causing permanent damage. In the past, U.S. officials have said that friendly assets in orbit are routinely subjected to various kinds of non-destructive attacks.

At present, a family of ground-based electronic warfare systems called the Counter Communications System (CCS) is the U.S. military’s only publicly acknowledged offensive counter-space capability. In June, the U.S. Space Force announced it had “operationally accepted” the latest version of the system, called Block 10.3, and also known by the codename Meadowlands.

There have been hints for years that the U.S. military might have other operational anti-satellite capabilities in the classified realm, or at least have been actively experimenting with them. In 2019, then-Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson notably suggested a public live-fire demonstration of some kind could be necessary to deter potential opponents, such as Russia and China, from attacking American space-based assets.

It’s also worth noting that President Joe Biden’s administration announced a self-imposed moratorium on destructive direct ascent ASAT weapons testing in 2022, but it is unclear whether that is still in force. As TWZ pointed out at the time, this did not rule out the possibility that the U.S. military could use other testing means to help develop those capabilities. Space-based anti-missile interceptors are now a key component of President Donald Trump’s Golden Dome missile defense initiative.

“Protective measures on satellites is just like thinking about protective measures on aircraft, okay? And we’re working through that,” Lt. Gen. Gregory Gagnon, head of the Space Force’s Combat Forces Command (CFC), told TWZ and others more recently at a roundtable at the Air & Space Forces Association’s (AFA) Warfare Symposium in February. “I won’t provide specifics, because I want those protective measures to work, right? I don’t want to tell Beijing and Moscow what I’ve done.”

“But protecting and defending satellites can’t simply be done by protect and defend. You can’t run away from a bully forever. Sometimes you got to turn around and punch,” Gagnon continued. “So protect and defend, although necessary, is insufficient to deliver space control. We also need, as part of our joint force, the ability to attack.”

At that time, Gagnon also stressed that challenging China’s still-growing array of space-based capabilities was another key driver behind this desire for new offensive counter-space capabilities.

What “[China’s] President Xi [Jinping] has decided to do is build the second-best remote sensing architecture in the world from outer space, and that’s now what they have,” Gagnon also said at that time. “So when 2013 started, and he came to power, he had less than 100 satellites that were the total of what China had in outer space. They have about 1,900 today. Over 500 of those satellites are remote sensing satellites, which are purposely designed and networked to track mobile forces such as U.S. carriers, destroyers, and cruisers in the Pacific, as well as aircraft that deploy around the Pacific. Those have been built with a purpose. The purpose is to cue their long-range fire weapons.”

Gen. Whiting also said during his talk at the SMD Symposium yesterday that China, and its anti-satellite capabilities in particular, remained the greatest challenge facing the U.S. military in the space domain.

“Number one is the development of counter-space weapons that I highlighted in my remarks. These are not future possibilities,” the head of SPACECOM said. “Some of you have played the war games over the years where we have to give the ‘red force’ [the side playing the mock adversary] additional capability, maybe project five years forward and give them what we think they’ll have. And, no, the capabilities we talked about are real, they exist today, and we have to face them.”

“These include direct ascent ASAT missiles, ground-based lasers, jammers, and maneuverable co-orbital ASATs, and dual-use satellites like the SJ-21, which can target the satellites we rely upon for missile warning and defense missions,” the SPACECOM boss had said in his opening remarks. “They are, in no uncertain terms, expanding military options for sustained offensive operations against the satellites we rely on to defend the homeland and project power. These developments intend to degrade our current space superiority, and would potentially give China a maneuver and logistics advantage in space, something we would never accept on the land, at sea, or in the air.”

The SJ-21 satellite mentioned here has been a particularly hot topic of discussion since it was launched in 2021. It has a grappling arm with a demonstrated ability to tow other satellites in space. This is ostensibly intended to be used for non-military applications, such as on-orbit servicing and moving debris, but has obvious potential to be weaponized.

In general, so-called inspector-type satellites capable of rendezvousing and maneuvering closer to other objects in space have an inherent ability to be used to launch attacks, destructive and otherwise, using a variety of different means, as well as gather intelligence. This includes kinetic attacks where the inspector could be used as an interceptor and simply smashed into the target. U.S. military officials have been warning about the dual-use potential of inspector satellites for years now, especially in the context of examples that Russia has put into orbit.

This all speaks further to counter-space capabilities U.S. forces could themselves bring to bear in the future. Last month, Northrop Grumman in the United States notably launched the first of what it hopes will be a constellation of new Mission Robotic Vehicle (MRV) satellites capable of performing on-orbit refueling and other servicing missions for commercial and military customers. The U.S. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) played key roles in the development of a payload equipped with a pair of robotic arms for the MRV. Questions about whether the MRVs with their arms could also have an offensive counter-space role have already been raised, as you can read more about here.

American officials also regularly point to Chinese and Russian anti-satellite developments, as well as those by other countries, in pushing back on concerns about the steady weaponization of space. As an aside here, two years ago, the U.S. government very publicly accused its counterparts in Russia of pursuing a new nuclear-armed space-based anti-satellite weapon.

“Depends on where you sit, right, you know? But to say that it’s the responsibility for the U.S. government to protect its citizens from emerging threats makes perfect sense to me,” outgoing Chief of Space Operations Gen. Chance Saltzman said last year. “And we clearly see a country like the PRC [People’s Republic of China] investing heavily in these kinds of threats, whether it’s hypersonic [weapons], whether it’s threats from space. And so now it’s time for the U.S. government to step up to the responsibilities to protect American citizens from those threats.”

Saltzman was speaking at the time in the context of a discussion about Golden Dome’s space-based interceptors during an interview broadcast online as part of Defense One‘s State of Defense 2025: Air Force and Space Force virtual conference.

How much will ultimately be acknowledged about the U.S. military’s future planned “integrated space fires” capabilities, as well as exactly what might be in its anti-satellite arsenal already, remains to be seen. Regardless, Gen. Whiting’s comments this week have now at least made the active pursuit of new counter-space weapons a matter of public record.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post New Anti-Satellite Weapons Now Officially A Top U.S. Priority appeared first on TWZ.

VanHerck was in charge of both commands when drones of a still-mysterious origin began flying over the Virginian installation. He offered some lessons learned from that experience on Wednesday, during a panel at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium (SMD) in Huntsville, Alabama, attended by TWZ. VanHerck provided no new details about who was operating the drones. However, he did describe the frustration of knowing something like this could happen and the helplessness U.S. military installation commanders at the time were feeling about their inability to defend against such incursions.

“The first lesson I would tell you is there were no surprises, at least for myself and the team at NORAD/NORTHCOM and others,” VanHerck said of learning about the Langley incursions, which began on the evening of Dec. 6, 2023. “We’ve been articulating — my predecessors had been articulating — that this threat was here, it was real, it was now, and we weren’t ready for it.”

VanHerck said that two years before the Langley incursion, he expressed his frustrations to Lloyd Austin, defense secretary at the time.

“I actually had told the Secretary of Defense on the 16th of December 2021 that I lacked the domain awareness to really do my mission,” the retired general explained. “That we lack access to capabilities and capacity, timely access in the homeland to do the mission, not only for a drone threat but more broadly all threats.”

“Maybe the most important one,” he said he told Austin, “is that we’re not set up to fight in and from our own land. We make an assumption that we’re going to take the fight somewhere else, and it’s going to occur on somebody else’s land. And the fact is, it’s ready to happen here right now.”

The lack of domain awareness over the homeland is a topic TWZ has frequently raised over the years, but that U.S. officials would not admit to it or address until after the Chinese spy balloon floated over much of the country in 2023 before being shot down off the Carolinas.

As we described in our original story, a base official at the time told us that Langley “first observed UAS [uncrewed aerial systems] activities the evening of December 6 [2023] and experienced multiple incursions throughout the month of December. The number of UASs fluctuated and they ranged in size/configuration. None of the incursions appeared to exhibit hostile intent but anything flying in our restricted airspace can pose a threat to flight safety. The FAA was made aware of the UAS incursions.”

Beyond not having the means to detect and defeat incursions like the ones over Langley, VanHerck said he didn’t even have the authority to do so. It was not NORAD/NORTHCOM’s mission, VanHerck proffered. It was up to the individual services.

“But their responsibility and authority stopped at the fence line at the base, and immediately thereafter, it was really unclear to everybody whose responsibility and authority was it just outside the base,” the retired general noted.

“Our installation commanders didn’t feel empowered,” VanHerck remembered. “They really felt a lack of trust. That ‘hey, if I take action, am I going to be covered for taking action and shooting something down that might be a civilian drone, but it might be a hostile drone?’ And so there was a lot of work to be done in that aspect, on the policy side and the authority side.”

VanHerck said that the pressure to act mounted after the so-called Jersey Drone incidents, which we were also the first to report. For a few months beginning in November 2024, thousands of people began reporting mystery drones in the skies.

“After New Jersey, there were calls for ‘just shoot them down,’” the general recalled. “Well, you know, in your homeland, that’s pretty hard to do, especially when you don’t have domain awareness. But shooting missiles that accelerate to four times the speed of sound or more, that have exploding warheads with fragmentation devices that explode titanium rods at thousands of feet per second over Langley or New Jersey is probably not where we needed to be, and for me that was really the only option I had as the NORAD/NORTHCOM commander.” 

Besides, as we frequently noted, the vast majority of these so-called drones were reported by civilians and turned out to be misidentified manned aircraft and even stars and planets. In fact, we saw no visual evidence of any mass drone incursions or strange objects over New Jersey during this prolonged series of events.

You can see video of one of the Jersey Drone situations below:

VanHerck was bringing up issues we pointed out in our own coverage about the murky authorities and prohibitions on the use of directed energy weapons, like lasers and high-power microwave systems, let alone kinetic capabilities, to bring down drones over military bases. 

Frustrations over that lack of authority and ability to act are issues that VanHerck’s successor, Gen. Gregory Guillot, has also raised and in many ways successfully pushed to change. You can read more about his efforts to give commanders greater authority to act against drones in our coverage here.

As we previously reported, in the wake of drone incursions like those over Langley, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Picatinny Arsenal, and others, NORTHCOM was given the role of synchronizing the U.S. military response during Guillot’s tenure. U.S. INDOPACOM was given a similar role for the Pacific. 

In addition, as VanHerck noted on Wednesday, there have been additional much-needed changes under current Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth, “who has cleared up a lot of the responsibility [and] authority [issues] with some of his actions.”

Among them, the military has been using directed energy lasers against cartel drones flying across the border and is working to expand that capability.

Moreover, the federal Safer Skies Act, which gives the Departments of Homeland Security (DHS) and Justice (DOJ) as well as certain state, local and tribal agencies, limited authority to mitigate drone threats domestically, “really helps clarify things,” VanHerck stated.

Still, there is a long way to go, however, before the U.S. can fully protect its skies, the retired general suggested.

“We still have gaps and seams, and we need an integrated, layered approach driven by specific policy on what you must defend,” VanHerck posited. “These are the key lessons that I took away and put in memos years ago that we still have to fix today, and we’re seeing some of this play out not only in our homeland. We’re seeing some of it play out forward as well. So that’s a long answer, but there are a lot of lessons here.”

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Drone Swarms Over Langley AFB Didn’t Surprise General In Charge Of NORAD appeared first on TWZ.

“That’s embarrassing as an airman to me to say that happened,” VanHerck added, noting that this was the first time in decades U.S. forces had been subjected to an aerial attack of this kind.

A series of reports, as well as unconfirmed claims from Tehran, state that Iranian F-5s targeted Camp Buehring in Kuwait on an extremely dangerous low-level bombing mission. The attack reportedly came on or around March 1, just three days after U.S. and Israeli forces began launching combined strikes on Iran.

At the time of writing, the U.S. government still does not appear to have officially confirmed the Iranian F-5 strikes on Camp Buehring. TWZ has reached out to U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in light of VanHerck’s remarks today, and the command declined to comment.

NBC News was first to report on this attack in a story in April, citing anonymous U.S. officials. At that time, the outlet also said only that a single Iranian F-5 had struck Camp Buehring. American forces have been present at this base continuously since the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

In June, Iranian state media outlet PressTV aired a segment with additional claimed details about the operation, as well as interviews with what were said to be the pilots who took part. That report said that a trio of heavily refurbished Iranian F-5s, known locally as Kowsars, had been sent on the mission. Iran acquired a fleet of 166 F-5E/Fs from the United States in the 1970s under the regime of the Shah. How many of those jets were still operational to any degree when the latest conflict broke out on February 28 is unclear. The Iranian Air Force was heavily targeted by U.S. and Israeli forces from the start.

According to PressTV, the F-5s flew to Kuwait from Iran at extremely low altitudes, at times below 50 feet, and at high speed to evade detection, including by E-3 Sentry Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) jets flying above. The pilots maintained radio silence the entire time.

The PressTV report also claimed that pilots followed a route specifically designed to avoid Patriot surface-to-air missile batteries and other air defenses at Camp Buehring. Though this remains unconfirmed, it is worth noting that Patriot has known limitations when it comes to its engagement envelope. New capabilities are being developed for the system now to expand its flexibility to address targets approaching from different vectors, as well as ones that have already passed overhead. Without the aid of some type of look-down sensor capability, ground-based air defense systems more broadly cannot see through the horizon or topography, either.

Furthermore, the PressTV report claimed that F-5 strikes caused broader chaos and confusion that contributed to a Kuwaiti F/A-18 Hornet fighter shooting down three U.S. Air Force F-15E Strike Eagle combat jets. Americans and Kuwaiti authorities acknowledged this friendly-fire incident at the time, which thankfully did not result in any fatalities, but have yet to offer an official explanation for how it occurred.

Many questions remain about how Iranian F-5s would have been able to ingress and egress from Kuwait unscathed, and successfully drop unguided bombs on Camp Buehring in the process. It’s unclear where the jets launched from, and it is very possible they needed to carry significant extra fuel in external tanks just to have made the trip to and from Iran in the first place. This would also have impacted their top speed and capacity to carry ordnance.

As an aside, a pair of Iranian Su-24 Fencer swing-wing combat jets also attempted to strike targets in Qatar on March 2, but that would have been a much shorter trip across the Persian Gulf. Those jets were also shot down by Qatari F-15s before they could reach their destination.

In addition to the sensors associated with Patriot and other air defense systems on the ground, as well as E-3s in the air, the U.S. military has spent years developing a more integrated air and missile defense network with allies and partners across the Middle East. It is also worth noting here that Iran very actively targeted air and missile defense radars in the region early in the conflict, something we noted was its own separate wake-up call, as you can read more about here. This raises a question of what else Iran may have brought to bear in support of this operation. Iranian forces could have launched additional missile and/or drone strikes against sensors, command-and-control nodes, and other sites to help clear the way. Electronic warfare, cyber attacks, and/or deception of various kinds could have been employed, as well.

During the panel today, VanHerck said he did not believe any of this should have come as a surprise, and that it speaks to larger issues surrounding base defense facing the U.S. military today.

“People are like, ‘How come that happened? We got surprised.’ No, we didn’t get surprised,” he said. “What happened was we had two services pointing fingers at each other, and nobody made a decision on whose mission and role responsibility that was, candidly.”

Whether VanHerck’s comments here reflect his specific understanding of what happened during the attack on Camp Buehring in March, or if he was speaking more generally, is unclear. The two services he refers to here are the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army. As part of the delineation of official roles and responsibilities after the Air Force was split from the Army in 1947, the latter service was given the lead role in defending both services’ bases against aerial attacks. Today, the Army has a broader responsibility for ground-based air and missile defense across the joint force, abroad and at home, as well.

“The department needed to say it is this service or that service’s responsibility moving forward,” VanHerck continued today. “I’m not taking sides in that. The bottom line is, we didn’t make the decision, we accepted risk, and now we’re paying the price of that risk that we accepted, candidly.”

Now, “the Air Force chief has stood up and said, ‘Okay, I’m going to take that mission on,'” VanHerck also noted. “What we can’t have happen in the next year is a bifurcated solution where you have Patriots and THAADs [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense systems] operating up here, and you have counter-drone … down here, and they’re not fusing data and sharing C2 [command and control] and collaboration. That can’t happen, and we’ve got to make sure we get together and don’t allow that to happen.”

The Air Force is still very early in the process of taking on more responsibility for defending its facilities against aerial threats from the ground, and has been focusing first on acquiring and fielding new counter-drone and counter-cruise missile capabilities. Similar developments may now be afoot in the Marine Corps, particularly when it comes to ballistic missile defense. The Marines are already in the process of fielding a host of new and improved lower-tier anti-air and counter-drone systems.

For its part, in recent years, the Army has acknowledged significant gaps in its air and missile defense capabilities and capacity, especially when it comes to addressing drone threats. The service is also fully aware of the strains on its higher-end Patriot and THAAD units after decades of persistent operational demands in response to crises globally. TWZ has repeatedly called attention to concerns about the ability, or lack thereof, of the Army’s Patriot force to adequately meet operational demands now, let alone in the event of a future high-end fight against an opponent like China.

All of this is now further wrapped in a succession of reports that U.S. stockpiles of anti-air interceptors for Patriot and THAAD, as well as other critical munitions, are now very worryingly low after months of fighting with Iran. This follows heavy expenditures of surface-to-air missiles and other weaponry by U.S. and allied forces in the course of other conflicts and crises in recent years. Efforts to replenish those stocks, as well as expand other air and missile defense capabilities and capacity, are underway now, but are still years away from yielding real fruit.

When it comes to Iran’s reported F-5 attacks on Kuwait earlier this year, much remains unknown and unconfirmed. However, it is certainly the opinion of retired Gen. VanHerck that it should be taken seriously and speaks to the urgency with which much bigger problems with the U.S. air and missile ecosystem need to be addressed.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Iranian F-5s Bombing U.S. Forces In Kuwait Should Be A Wake-Up Call: Ex-USAF General appeared first on TWZ.

The military official told the newspaper that the Pentagon concluded that Iranian drones fed “critical pieces of information to Iranian commanders that helped them target the F-15E.” Thanks to these drones, Iranian forces were provided with the jet’s GPS location, speed, and direction, the same official said.

The New York Times reports that the F-15E’s defensive countermeasures suite provided only half a second of warning before the shoulder-launched missile — thought to be Chinese-made — struck its target. In fact, it would have provided none, since the F-15E is not equipped with missile approach warning systems (MAWS) to detect incoming infrared-guided threats.

While the pilot was recovered not too long after ejecting, there followed a frantic effort to find and retrieve the WSO, a rescue mission that involved hundreds of troops, scores of aircraft, and diversion operations over more than a half dozen different parts of Iran. The effort also saw the loss of a second aircraft, an A-10 attack jet in the air, as well as two MC-130J Commando II special operations cargo planes and several H-6 Little Bird special operations helicopters that were destroyed on the ground.

The latest account comes after a reported testimony from the Strike Eagle pilot, who described a “jellyfish-like” swarm of drones in the sky, moments before they ejected from the stricken jet. The pilot saw “multiple drones interconnected and moving as one with smaller drones below the bigger drones like legs,” CNN had previously reported, based on statements it said came from four unnamed sources familiar with the matter. Another source told the broadcaster that the same pilot described seeing a “minefield of drones” in the air.

We previously analyzed the possibilities behind this seemingly bizarre phenomenon here.

While they both come with the usual caveats, the two reports together paint an interesting picture of what might have happened over southern Iran on April 3, during the U.S.-Israeli war with that country.

Provided the available accounts are even partially accurate, the information is slowly painting a picture that suggests Iranian use of drone-based airborne sensors to help bring down an F-15E penetrating its airspace.

Previous reports had suggested that the apparent ‘jellyfish’ drone swarm could have been some kind of networked formation, while also emphasizing that the pilot had been concussed and it may have been unclear exactly what they had seen. It is also very possible that a drone system unrelated to whatever the localized ‘jellyfish’ sighting was was actually responsible for spotting the F-15E, and the two are unrelated.

At this point, it should be noted that, while the term ‘drone swarm’ is often used loosely in media reporting, having a large number of drones flying in roughly coordinated formations doesn’t necessarily mean Iran possesses a sophisticated autonomous cooperative swarming technology, although this isn’t much of a reach.

While talk of drone swarms is intriguing, even a single drone with a camera could have provided an alert that the jet was headed in a certain direction and at an approximate speed and altitude. Using multiple sensor-equipped drones would meanwhile provide commanders with a distributed network of relatively expendable airborne sensors that could possibly spot aircraft, even if doing so would provide rudimentary situational awareness information that can be used, at best, to assist in targeting.

As an asymmetric ad-hoc air defense solution, using even drones equipped with basic sensors to spot aircraft could offer a fallback, relatively resilient option, especially if Iran’s conventional air defense architecture, which relies on more expensive and more vulnerable radars and other sensors as well as command posts, was largely destroyed. This was indeed the case after extensive U.S. and Israeli attacks. Still, a spotting network of drones would be far less capable than those traditional systems, with luck being a large factor in spotting anything. A more advanced, networked system is something of a different story, but that would require a higher level of technology and would need complex command and control infrastructure behind it.

Drones could also be paired with payloads used to detect a hostile aircraft’s radar and other radio-frequency emissions, which could give away their presence and potentially geolocate them. This is especially true when drones are working in a network over a wider area. Ground stations can also be used in this manner, but they do not benefit from the line-of-sight at altitude, flexibility, and the possibility of pairing these operations with airborne decoys to stimulate an enemy aircraft’s radar, thus giving its location away.

Again, provided the account is accurate, many questions still remain about the kinds of sensors on the drone or drones, and how tracking information was obtained and then transmitted to what was, in the end, a relatively inexpensive shooter in the form of a shoulder-launched missile. But once again, simple spotting networks used to spot and track hostile aircraft are an art form going back to the dawn of military aviation. Putting parts of that in the air aboard rudimentary drones is hardly a complex achievement.

As for the shoulder-launched missile that appears to have brought down the F-15E, Iran has no shortage of these, widely dispersed, and these are known weapons of opportunity. They were also likely pre-placed in areas where U.S. and Israeli warplanes were known to be penetrating, especially since the rest of the Iranian air defense system had been extensively taken down already.

The claim that Ukrainian experiences helped inform the Iranian tactics is also interesting. It is unclear if this relates to a specific drone-based sensor network, or whether it is a reference to the Ukrainian use of drones more generally.

At the very least, Ukraine has repeatedly demonstrated how relatively inexpensive drones can perform reconnaissance, detect movement, track targets, identify air-defense activity, and help cue more expensive weapons. This is in addition to them being used as effectors themselves, or carrying weapon payloads. Ukraine also pioneered interceptor drones, as well, which also act as airborne spotters. With so many U.S. and Israeli drones to hunt over Iran, the lessons of interceptor drones from Ukraine would not have been lost on Iran, especially considering the country was the first to build and deploy a so-called ‘loitering SAM.’

Meanwhile, the broader lessons from the war in Ukraine include recognizing the value of layered networks of relatively cheap sensors, communications, decoys, and shooters, rather than relying on more expensive and vulnerable solutions alone. Iran clearly had planned for the demise of their traditional air defense network, so fallback concepts like using drones to spot enemy aircraft shouldn’t be a surprise.

Nevertheless, the new report combined with the ‘jellyfish’ sighting provides another fascinating, but still puzzling layer to one of the most dramatic air combat incidents of recent times.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Did Sensors On Iranian Drones Help Shoot Down F-15E? appeared first on TWZ.

“Historically, if you start from the high end here, missile defense and missile warning were operating on separate and distinct stovepipe networks,” Lt. Gen. Rick Zellman said during a panel at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium (SMD) in Huntsville, Alabama, attended by TWZ. “Missile warning, of course, was going to detect a launch and let people know something’s coming inbound and see a duck and cover and whatnot, and missile defenders were looking to get a little bit more fidelity in their track and be able to shoot down an incoming missile,” he continued. “But today we don’t really have any ballistic missiles. Everything is maneuvering. Everything is complex, and so we can’t provide warning without providing a lot more observations on these missiles.”

As a result of the evolution in missile technology, “the lexicon that we’re starting to see is missile tracking, right?” the general proffered. “And so missile warning and missile defense are really coming together in that realm. Missile warning was a space legacy mission area, and of course missile defense is missile defense. And you can see how these things are coming together. So really, the distinction between missile warning is almost obsolete at this point.”

The U.S. military has space-based early warning sensors that are integrated into its existing sensing, and has been for decades. But these warn of launches, they generally don’t track a weapon throughout its flight cycle. For some years now, work has been underway to substantially expand on space-based missile defense capabilities, to include the start of the fielding of new satellite constellations to help track ballistic missiles, as well as hypersonic boost-glide vehicles and other threats, during the mid-course portion of their flights. This is on top of a major push to move other kinds of terrestrial sensing to orbital layers, some of which could potentially have a secondary missile defense role.

To achieve the objective of fusing missile warning and tracking functions together, “we have to leverage a couple of really good partners,” Zellman stated, pointing to two in particular. One is the Space Development Agency (SDA), tasked with quickly delivering needed space-based capabilities to the U.S. military. The other is the Missile Defense Agency (MDA), charged with developing, deploying, and sustaining layered and integrated missile defense capabilities.

The SDA, noted the general, “is developing a number of missile-tracking satellites as part of their tranches that they’re launching.” The MDA, meanwhile, has “a long history of integrating battle management,” Zellman discussed.

“So those two together are really helping Space Command take separate disparate stovepipe information and bring it together,” he stated.

“It also has to talk about decision speed, and this really is going to require us to look at more than man-in-the-loop [MITL], and maybe a man on the loop [MOTL] situation,” he noted. MITL is when a human is fully engaged in assessing and controlling the operation compared to MOTL, which usually relies on more heavily automated systems where the human approves critical decisions, usually based on distilled data presented by the system. AI is becoming a large part of making that possible in an increasingly successful way.

The reason to make this change, Zellman explained, is that “we have to make these decisions faster, and that data flow has to be able to enable our layered defenses – whether that’s coming from a THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense], or a Patriot, or directed energy, or SM-3, or space-based interceptors in the future – all that is going to be dependent on our decision speed.”

“At the heart of all this for the United States Space Command is one of our unified command plan responsibilities, and that is as a global sensor manager,” the general said. 

“We don’t use sensors dedicated to a single mission,” he explained. “They may have originally been conceived to do space domain awareness or missile warning, or in some cases, missile defense, but we try to take the goodness of all those sensors and use them for all three of those mission areas.”

Under SPACECOM, “we take those sensors and we dynamically task them and prioritize accordingly, so we can support multiple commands around the globe. And that really, once again, gets to the theme about defending at home and abroad is being able to support these multiple commands simultaneously.”

The command’s “modern systems, whether it’s a long-range discrimination radar or some of our systems that have been around a little bit longer – like an upgraded early warning radar – they’re all inherently multi-mission,” Zellman put forth. “A single radar can see an object in space and give me space domain awareness information, and a little bit later it can see a missile launch and provide warning, and then hopefully down the road a bit more… provide essentially a track so that we can shoot an interceptor at it and kill it.”

“All these three things can be done in the same duty cycle with that same system, and so we have to be able to dynamically task these systems to ensure that whichever is the priority mission at that time is the one that is being serviced,” the general cautioned. “Historically, space domain awareness information went to space operators, and I would argue missile warning information probably went to both space operators and the missile defense community. But today, that information has to all be put in one data location, and we pull the information we need for the mission we have at hand.”

“We recognize that what we do in space at Space Command is really fundamental to what the missile defense community has to do for missile defense,” Zellman vocalized. “So that really talks about the high end. Let’s talk about the low end.”

Lt. Gen. John Rafferty, commander of the U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command, Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense, and Joint Task Force-Gold “mentioned some of this today,” Zellman noted, referring to an earlier SMD panel. “We see, I think, the low end on Epic Fury. Sure, the missiles are more high end, but we’ve seen our adversary employ a number of one-way attack systems that are coupled with these ballistic missile volleys, and we are really at this point in the history of warfare because of the democratization of space.”

“Space isn’t a sanctuary,” the general shared. “It’s no longer just the playground of nations with a lot of money. The commercialization of space has created what many call essentially a transparent battlefield. And because I can see everything all the time with commercial ISR, it’s given our adversaries capabilities that they haven’t had in the past.” 

“That ISR [intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance], if you couple it with a platform that has access to GPS or some other PNT [position, navigation and timing] system, and then you add in another layer of over-the-horizon comms, like say from an Iridium or a Starlink, and you have a pretty lethal asymmetric weapon system that our adversaries can get a hold of.”

Regardless of how much integration and automation occurs, it’s still a people business in Zellman’s eyes.

“So whether it’s a combination volley of attack drones or hypersonic glide vehicles, the mission at SPACECOM remains the same, and that’s to synchronize global missile defense and space domain awareness using a common set of information,” Zellman said. “But that synchronization doesn’t just happen in a vacuum; it happens with the joint warfighters that are standing on watch.”

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

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Guetlein, whose current title is Director of Golden Dome and is presently assigned to the U.S. Space Force, shared new details about the initiative during a talk today at the annual Space & Missile Defense (SMD) Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, at which TWZ is in attendance.

“What is the bill to the nation? How much national treasure are we asking the American public to commit to the defense of the homeland?” Guetlein said in his introductory remarks. “I’m on record, and I’m still up here saying the exact same number: $185 billion. We started at 175 billion dollars, and we added 10 more billion [dollars] worth of accelerating space capabilities that we thought the nation needed, that were not part of our original architecture.”

“That is a lot of money. It’s one of the biggest systems that we’ve ever put together as a nation. We [have] got to keep it affordable,” Guetlein continued. “There’s two other cost estimates out there that are exceptionally larger, but I’m going to tell you those cost estimates are not estimating what we are building.”

The general did not specify what cost estimates he was referring to, but the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has put out two top-level figures since the initiative was first unveiled in 2025. CBO’s first estimate in May 2025 said the complete architecture could cost up to $542 billion to develop, deploy, and then operate over a period spanning two decades. The office put out a second estimate in May of this year that said the full price tag might actually be nearly $1.2 trillion over the same 20-year timespan. At that time, CBO also explicitly said its analysis had been hampered by a lack of publicly available information about exactly what the so-called “objective architecture” for Golden Dome actually entails.

There are other independent estimates of Golden Dome’s full cost that are even higher than CBO’s May 2026 projection.

“We’re building something completely differently, and that architecture is coming together, and is being proven every single day,” Guetlein stressed today. “We have radars on contract. We have launchers on contract. We have space-based interceptors on contract. Hypersonic ballistic tracking system on contract. Space data network is on contract. Our construction contracts have been let [sic], and we are moving out with haste to get after what the President [Donald Trump] asked us to do in the summer of 2028.”

Space-based interceptors are notably vital to the Golden Dome plan as it has been described publicly to date. They are also central to CBO’s $1.2 trillion cost estimate, which projected that it would be necessary to have 7,800 of them in orbit at any one time for the architecture to work as intended.

The Northrop Grumman video below includes a computer-generated clip depicting a space-based interceptor engaging a target outside the Earth’s atmosphere, starting at 0:13 in the runtime.

“We have our first operational site. We are digging dirt around the homeland, getting ready for the capabilities that the President asked us to deliver in the summer of 2028,” Guetlein also said, but did not elaborate on where that work was being done or its exact purpose.

“We’ve had two tests. We can’t talk about those tests, but those tests were phenomenally successful, and they demonstrated that the capabilities that we are putting together, both command and control, our sensor network, and our effectors, are going to be effective against the threats as they are currently designed,” the Golden Dome director added.

“We had committed to the President last year that we would do a major test every single year. So in January this year, I gave a challenge to the Missile Defense Agency of what test I needed to happen in the summer of 2026, and we executed that test,” Guetlein did note later on in the talk. “It was the most complex test with the most threats in the air in the history of WSMR [the U.S. Army’s White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico]. MDA pulled that off and executed that test in six months, and met every single test objective that I gave them.”

“So the MDA team, plus the WSMR team, plus SMDC [the U.S. Army’s Space and Missile Defense Command], plus PAE Fires [the Army’s Portfolio Acquisition Executive for Fires], plus Fort Bliss [in Texas], plus a whole host of other agencies, all came together in less than six months, starting from scratch, and delivered what I will argue is the most complex integrated missile defense test that we have pulled off as a nation,” he continued. “But that test is a fraction of what we got to do to deliver what they’ve asked us to do in [20]28. So the test in [20]27 will be even more complex.”

Despite all of this apparent progress and significant authority to keep pushing ahead, Guetlein warned today that Golden Dome is facing a potentially insurmountable budget impasse. This has to do with how the initiative has been paid for so far, with core funding coming from outside normal defense spending streams via a process called reconciliation.

“When the President submitted his President’s Budget over to the Hill for FY27 [Fiscal Year 2027], I was not in the top line. I’m in what they call mandatory funding, which is another reconciliation-type funding bill,” Guetlein explained. So, yes, we have a CR [continuing resolution], and we’re not going to shut down the federal government, but a CR doesn’t help me under Golden Dome because I don’t have a top line to fall back to to get that percentage of the continuing resolution.”

Continuing resolutions are short-term spending bills Congress passes to keep the government running in the absence of the approval of a full annual budget.

The defense budget for the 2027 Fiscal Year that the Trump administration submitted earlier this year was already historically large, in part because of expected reconciliation funding. The $1.5 trillion “topline” was broken down into a base budget of $1.1 trillion and then “$350 billion in additional mandatory resources through reconciliation.”

“So we’ve got to figure out, as a nation, a different way of funding Golden Dome, at least for [20]27. Right now, that’s under reconciliation,” Guetlein added. “I will tell you that if they don’t figure it out, there is no Golden Dome because there is no funding.”

Guetlein said today that $22.5 billion has been appropriated for Golden Dome so far, and that 95 percent of that money is already committed to specific work.

“I do believe, as a nation, we’re going to figure this out just because the sense of urgency is so great, but it is a challenging budget environment,” he continued.

As an aside, the Senate, which is currently controlled by President Trump’s Republican Party, just passed its version of the new continuing resolution last week. It notably omitted certain defense spending provisions the White House had sought, including $1 billion for work on the Trump class battleship program, another top priority for the administration. That bill still needs to be reconciled with a separate temporary spending bill making its way through the Republican-controlled House of Representatives before it can be sent to President Trump’s desk to be signed into law (or vetoed).

On top of all this, there has been some bipartisan pushback to further use of the reconciliation process and related mechanisms to boost defense spending outside of the U.S. military’s base budget.

“I think it’s safe to conclude there will not be another reconciliation bill,” Kentucky Senator Mitch McConnell, a Republican, said during a hearing on the U.S. Air Force’s proposed 2027 Fiscal Year budget back in June.

It is also worth noting here that a significant delay in additional funding could have a cascading impact on Golden Dome and its aggressive schedule. The Pentagon could also seek to redirect funds from other parts of its budget, but this could then have similar effects on other efforts. Guetlein did tell reporters after his talk at the SMD Symposium that the Pentagon is looking at contingency options to keep Golden Dome running in the absence of direct funding, according to Air & Space Forces Magazine.

“Several of the space capabilities that we are investing in are also being invested in by the Space Force,” he said, per Air & Space Forces Magazine‘s report. “So, if Golden Dome is not able to continue to invest in those type of capabilities, then the Space Force could decide at that time to continue the investments.”

“Because we have diversified execution of a lot of these capabilities, and a lot of these capabilities are already requested by combatant commands, there are some alternatives that we can pursue. We have not made any decisions on any pathway,” he also noted.

Still, this all comes as the U.S. military is currently in the midst of a host of other major modernization programs, many of which are also deemed critical to national security. This is especially true of costly and expansive programs now underway to update all three legs of America’s nuclear deterrent triad, as well as the command and control architectures that underpin them.

Based on Guetlein’s comments today, Golden Dome now looks to be approaching its first major watershed moment, with this budgetary dilemma set to have significant impacts on how the initiative continues to progress.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Golden Dome Missile Defense Shield At Risk Of Grinding To A Halt Due To Budget Impasse appeared first on TWZ.

“We have now completed the first shipment of vehicles to Ukraine. The first one to be picked up was our fine BMP-1, and the second was the MT-LB SNAR-10. We hope they’ll last a long time and make a difference,” the museum said on social media today.

The museum describes itself as Scandinavia’s largest collection of vehicles, uniforms, and equipment from the former Eastern Bloc.

The donation includes a BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicle and an MT-LB amphibious tracked armoured fighting vehicle fitted with the SNAR-10 battlefield surveillance radar. This is an uncommon artillery reconnaissance variant that was designed to detect troop movements, vehicles, and artillery fire while directing friendly fires.

While governments across Europe have emptied Cold War stockpiles to support Kyiv, it is considerably rarer to see museum exhibits making the journey to the front. The transfer underscores the increasingly varied mix of equipment finding its way into Ukrainian service after more than four years of high-intensity warfare.

Entering service in the late 1960s, the BMP-1 is among the most iconic Soviet armored fighting vehicles ever built. Although obsolete by modern standards, Ukraine already operates the type in significant numbers, meaning integrating another example should be straightforward, assuming it remains mechanically sound.

The BMP-1 was a revolutionary design when it appeared, becoming the world’s first true infantry fighting vehicle by combining mobility, armor, and the ability for infantry to fight from within the vehicle. Armed with a 73mm low-pressure gun, a coaxial machine gun, and a 9M14 Malyutka (AT-3 Sagger) anti-tank missile launcher, it was designed to accompany tanks across the battlefield while carrying an eight-man infantry squad. More than 20,000 were built, and the vehicle was exported widely across the Warsaw Pact and beyond, spawning numerous variants and licensed copies.

Today, its armor and armament are outdated, but it continues to be prized on account of its amphibious capability, ease of maintenance, and the availability of extensive stocks of spare parts and upgrade packages.

Despite being more than half a century old, the BMP-1 continues to demonstrate its utility on modern battlefields. Reflecting sustained demand for the Soviet-designed infantry fighting vehicle, Slovakia’s STV Machinery secured a contract to serially produce newly manufactured BMP-1 hulls for an unnamed foreign customer. The company says the hulls will incorporate modern armor materials and updated production techniques, with manufacturing capacity expected to reach up to 100 vehicles annually, underscoring the enduring value of the platform.

Previously, there have been known BMP-1 transfers to Ukraine from Greek stocks (40 BMP-1A1s, delivered from October 2022 onwards), and from Slovak stocks (30 BVP-1s, from November 2022). Another 56 upgraded ex-East German BMP-1s were provided by the Czech Republic.

The more intriguing donation is the MT-LB SNAR-10. Based on the ubiquitous MT-LB multipurpose tracked vehicle, the SNAR-10 carries a ground surveillance radar intended primarily for artillery spotting and battlefield reconnaissance. The system can detect moving vehicles, troop concentrations, explosions, and shell impacts, helping artillery units adjust fire and build battlefield awareness.

Exactly what condition either vehicle is in is unclear. Museum vehicles are often maintained in running condition, particularly at private collections that conduct demonstrations, but they also lack military equipment, sensitive electronics, or functional weapons. The museum has not disclosed whether the vehicles required refurbishment or modification before transfer.

The donation nevertheless reflects a broader trend that has become increasingly apparent throughout the conflict. Ukraine has sourced equipment from virtually anywhere it can be found. Beyond government transfers, Kyiv has received privately donated vehicles, civilian pickups converted into military transports, restored Soviet-era equipment, commercially purchased armored vehicles, and even aircraft and helicopters acquired through unconventional channels.

As traditional Cold War reserves continue to shrink across Europe, previously overlooked sources of compatible Soviet-designed equipment have become increasingly valuable. Private collections, museums, training establishments, and industrial storage yards have all become potential sources of hardware that can be returned to operational service.

The SNAR-10 is especially noteworthy because it represents a relatively niche capability rather than simply another armored hull. Battlefield surveillance radars remain useful assets for locating enemy activity, adjusting indirect fire, and supporting reconnaissance, even if newer drone-based systems increasingly perform many of the same functions. Even if the SNAR-10 is delivered without an operational radar, it would still be useful for its MT-LB chassis.

More broadly, whether these two vehicles ultimately see frontline service, are used for training, or serve as sources of spare parts remains unknown.

However, the museum’s wording (“first shipment”) strongly suggests more donations for Ukraine may already be planned.

Beyond the BMP-1 and SNAR-10 that have now gone to Ukraine, the Panzermuseum East collection remains packed with Warsaw Pact hardware, including T-72 and T-55 main battle tanks, a PT-76 amphibious light tank, a 2S1 Gvozdika self-propelled howitzer, BRDM reconnaissance and anti-tank vehicles, BTR-60 command vehicles, and more. The museum also displays dozens of Cold War military trucks, field support vehicles, artillery pieces, and other specialist equipment.

Examples of foreign museums releasing collection vehicles for Ukrainian military use remain uncommon but not unheard of. Ukrainian museums have also returned equipment to military units, based on available reports, as well.

Britain’s Tank Museum did not donate vehicles, but it helped Ukraine by giving Cook Defense Systems — which also produces tracks for the British-made Challenger 2 main battle tank — access to its Soviet vehicle collection, manuals, and physical components to reverse-engineer tracks and sprockets for T-72s, BMPs, and MT-LBs. You can read more about that here.

The departure of these armored vehicles from a Danish museum floor for an active war zone is another reminder of the extraordinary lengths Ukraine and its supporters continue to go to sustain the country’s war effort, and of how almost any usable piece of Soviet-designed equipment can still find new life on today’s battlefield.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Ukraine’s Latest Armor Donor? A Military Museum appeared first on TWZ.

“For the last 14 months,” the 32nd Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC), based at Fort Bliss, Texas, “has been in the largest air and missile defense fight in U.S. history,” Rafferty said during a panel at the Space and Missile Defense Symposium (SMD) in Huntsville, Alabama, attended by TWZ. “Over the 12-day war [between Iran and Israel], they successfully engaged 125 ballistic missiles, and during Operation Epic Fury, over 1,200 ballistic, cruise and UAS threats have been neutralized.”

The 32nd AAMDC, which is responsible for all U.S. Army air and missile defense in the region, “adapted and innovated to overcome advanced threats,” Rafferty added. “The THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense], the Patriot, and our counter-UAS systems are the envy of the world, and that’s due in no small part to some of the efforts of the organizations that are represented by the leaders in the front row here, but also by the contributions of many of our industry partners and industry teammates here.”

Though he didn’t mention how many interceptions were performed by the U.S. Navy’s ship-launched SM-3 and SM-6 missiles, or Air Force air-to-air missiles and rockets, Rafferty’s comments added insight into the extent of the U.S. military’s defense of the region during numerous Iranian missile and drone barrages. It represented just a part of a much larger regional effort involving several nations that came under Iranian attack.

In May, Adm. Brad Cooper, commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), testified before Congress that Epic Fury “validated, at full scale and in actual combat, a combined Middle East Air Defense (MEAD) network – a concept the region had exercised for years but never fully operationalized.”

“During OEF, for the first time in history, U.S. air defenders stood shoulder to shoulder with partner air defenders across national systems… Over the course of the operation, this integrated architecture intercepted over 6,000 one-way attack drones and more than 1,500 ballistic missiles aimed at U.S. forces, Israel, and our Arab partners.”

Cooper did not break down how many interceptions were carried out by each country, but the figures provided by Rafferty suggest that the Army was responsible for about 16% of all of them. CENTCOM declined our request for the numbers of interceptions carried out by the Navy and Air Force.

As a result of this intense air and missile defense activity, partner nations, minus Israel which uses its own systems, have had their missile stocks backfilled by the U.S. due to the massive consumption of interceptors. It’s also worth noting that it is common to use multiple interceptors against each target to increase kill probability, so one target often doesn’t mean one missile was used to shoot it down.

As for the 12-Day War, Iran fired about 550 ballistic missiles and around 1,000 drones at Israel, according to the IDF. About 90% were intercepted by the U.S. and Israel, the Jerusalem Post reported at the time. While the Army engaged 125 Iranian missiles, the U.S. Navy played a large role in swatting down these threats as well. It is unclear just how many interceptions the Navy performed during that conflict, but former acting Chief of Naval Operations Adm. James Kilby told the Senate Appropriations Committee in June 2025 that the service fired interceptors at incoming Iranian threats “at an alarming rate.”

As we noted earlier in this story, we have been sounding the alarm about magazine depth for years, especially in regard to America’s air and missile defenses. In fact, we laid out in detail these exact concerns and how they would be a major issue in war with Iran just prior to the conflict starting in a feature you can read in full here.

The U.S. has burned through hundreds of THAAD and Patriot interceptors since a shaky ceasefire went into effect on April 8, according to the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ (CSIS) latest assessment. CSIS was updating a previous analysis of munitions expenditures during Epic Fury that you can read more about here.

According to CSIS, the U.S. had about 2,300 Patriot interceptors in its inventories before Epic Fury, 1,030 by the time the ceasefire was agreed to, and between 759 and 827 as of July 27.

As for THAADs, there were 452 interceptors in the U.S. inventory before Epic Fury, between 232 and 262 on the date of the ceasefire, and between 234 and 278 as of July 27.

During the SMD panel, Rafferty addressed magazine depth concerns but did not provide any granularity about the number of interceptors used. The bottom line, he said, is that THAAD and Patriot munitions are just one part of an overall defense.

“I cannot add anything to the emphasis on magazine depth… or for the need for cheaper and wide-ranging mix of interceptors,” he explained. “I mean that couldn’t be made more loud and clear from the highest levels of our government. But I do want to highlight the need that interceptors alone won’t do it, right? We need more of a comprehensive missile defeat strategy that focuses on interceptors, equally so on non-kinetic effects, both electronic warfare and directed energy.”

“And the type of targeting C2 enabled by a data strategy, and a cross-domain solution that works that helps us take data from TS [top secret], move it down to secret, and even down to CUI [controlled unclassified information], that’ll enable us to use that data to make decisions to engage targets faster,” he continued. “That’s the kind of comprehensive missile defeat strategy that isn’t just about more interceptors. It’s about integrating other capabilities, non-kinetics, and also decision-making into that.”

For the moment, things have calmed between the U.S. and Iran, with no major attacks against each other for several weeks. Media reports have suggested that President Trump has shifted to economic, rather than military pressure against Iran in large measure over concerns about the ability to sustain a conflict with greatly diminished magazine depth.

Still, Trump has been unable to compel Iran to give up its nuclear ambitions, reopen the Strait of Hormuz, pare its ballistic missile stocks or stop supporting proxies like the Houthis and Hezbollah. Given that, it remains possible the notoriously impatient president could resume hostilities at any time. So too could the Iranians, who have done it before.

Meanwhile, the heavy use of these expensive, hard-to-build, long-lead-time weapons raises additional questions about how the U.S. can defend itself from another major threat, and especially should a war break out with China. 

Rafferty didn’t bring up concerns about whether the supply of air defense munitions and general capacity was sufficient for a China fight, nor was he asked about it in the ensuing question and answer session. Still, he did imply that the U.S. Army’s air defenders were under significant stress battling Iran.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Army Downed More Than 1,400 Iranian Missiles And Drones During Epic Fury And 12-Day War appeared first on TWZ.

MDA put out a call yesterday for “innovative prototype concepts” for what it is currently calling the Forward-Based Mode (FBM) Radar Next. This notably came just ahead of the annual Space & Missile Defense (SMD) Symposium in Huntsville, Alabama, that opened today and at which TWZ is in attendance.

The contracting notice stresses that the agency is currently in the pre-solication phase of this effort, but that it does have plans to eventually pursue these prototypes through an Other Transaction Authority (OTA) agreement. OTA is a mechanism typically used to support rapid prototyping and other research and development work outside of a typical and often drawn-out contracting process. In its budget request for the 2027 Fiscal Year, which was released earlier this year, MDA also explicitly asked for funding for a pair of “next generation radar prototypes to prove out and mature emerging technologies for the future FBM Radar fleet.”

For some additional context, MDA uses the term FBM here to refer to a radar used to detect threats, traditionally ballistic missiles, after launch. Deployable radars like the AN/TPY-2 employed in this role are typically emplaced at semi-permanent sites. The U.S. military also has higher-end static strategic radar sites around the globe, along with space-based assets, to help provide additional layers of early warning detection.

FBM is one of two typical modes of operation for the X-band AN/TPY-2. The other is a terminal mode where the radar is used to cue interceptors to incoming threats. As mentioned, AN/TPY-2 is most commonly used in the terminal mode as part of the THAAD system, but it also has a demonstrated ability to feed data to Patriot surface-to-air missile systems.

At the time of writing, the U.S. military is publicly known to have two AN/TPY-2s deployed in the FBM mode in Japan, as well as three more at sites in Israel, Qatar, and Turkey. Additional AN/TPY-2 are also currently forward-deployed elsewhere globally as a component of the THAAD system.

AN/TYP-2s, as well as the generators needed to power them, are trailer-mounted and technically road mobile. However, they are not designed to be very rapidly relocated from one site to another. This brings us back to the FBM Radar Next.

“As adversarial missile capabilities become increasingly sophisticated, the need for agile, survivable, and highly precise forward-based sensors has never been greater. Current static or semi-mobile radars are vulnerable to counterattacks and lack the rapid relocation capabilities necessary for modern distributed operations,” the pre-solication notice explains. “FBM Radar Next will close this gap by providing a system that can be quickly transported, set up, and operated in austere forward locations while maintaining interoperability with existing Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) networks.”

In terms of transportability and deployability requirements, “the system must be capable of rapid deployment and transport via C-17 military airlift and tactical ground vehicles,” the notice says. “The radar must demonstrate rapid setup and teardown times (e.g., operational within specified hours of arrival, and tear down within minutes to maximize survivability).”

The next-generation radar must also be capable of “high-sensitivity detection, persistent tracking, and precise discrimination of advanced threats in high-clutter and contested electromagnetic environments,” the notice continues. MDA also wants “engineered physical, thermal, and electromagnetic signatures to
ensure platform survivability in contested environments.”

Furthermore, “the design must support remote operations, command and control integration, and automated system health monitoring,” the notice adds. Minimizing the onsite operator footprint is critical to improving personnel safety and increasing overall tactical flexibility.”

MDA wants the FBM Radar Next to be able to slot into more “versatile deployment architectures, with the capability to operate either as a highly integrated single aperture or as multiple distributed arrays to optimize geographical coverage, sensitivity, survivability, or electronic protection.” In line with this demand, there are additional requirements for a modular design with open architecture systems, as well as seamless integration with the existing Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications (C2BMC) architecture.

The MDA video below highlights the general capabilities of the C2BMC architecture in the context of a notional engagement of a hypersonic threat utilizing the still-in-development Glide Phase Interceptor (GPI).

A highly networked and distributed concept of operations could open the door to more novel radar configurations, including ones involving larger groups of smaller types, to succeed the AN/TPY-2. Smaller individual radars could also have reduced signatures, be easier to conceal, and be more readily relocatable, all helping to reduce vulnerability. This could also make the entire system more resilient in the event that nodes are lost or otherwise rendered inoperable for any reason.

There could be benefits in terms of unit cost and scalability of production from such an approach, too. Prime contractor Raytheon is understood to have only produced 16 AN/TPY-2s to date, in total, for all customers, not just the U.S. military. The unit cost of a single one of those radars is generally pegged at around $250 to $300 million, and these are long-lead-time items that take years to deliver.

“The system design must prioritize manufacturing ease, design-for-manufacturing-and-assembly (DFMA) principles, and cost-efficiency. It is critical that the prototype demonstrates a viable pathway to rapid, high-volume production at an affordable unit cost,” MDA’s FBM Radar Next notice makes clear. “This ensures the capability to quickly scale production and cost-effectively replace radar units in highly active forward-deployed environments.”

Regardless of the approach MDA ultimately decides to pursue, the threat ecosystem that is driving the FBM Radar Next plans is real now, and is not just limited to enemy missile attacks. Weaponized drones, especially long-range one-way attack types, present real dangers to high-value targets. This fact had already been driven firmly into the public consciousness by the ongoing war in Ukraine. It has now been further demonstrated by Iran’s aforementioned targeting of prized air and missile defense radars around the Middle East during fighting earlier this year. The ramifications of all of this go well beyond these particular conflict zones, too.

As we wrote back in March after Iran’s very deliberate targeting of U.S. and allied radars became clear:

“Strategic air and missile architectures, in general, exist in a world now where the threats they face are not limited to very-long-range standoff capabilities possessed only by peer or near-peer adversaries.“

“It used to be, generally, that you had to fire a ballistic missile or high-end cruise missile in an attempt to strike one of these systems. Now, long-range one-way-attack drones, as well as increasingly capable cruise and ballistic missiles, continue to proliferate steadily, including to smaller nation-state armed forces and even non-state actors. An attack could even come from a small drone with a C4 charge launched from a fishing trawler 10 miles away from one of these critical radar installations. The threat of these kinds of near-field attacks has largely been overlooked for years, even as the low-end drone threat has exploded and ‘democratized’ precision-guided weaponry, as they did not fit the established aerial threat matrix and the countermeasures used to repel those threats.”

…

“The scale and scope of Iran’s retaliatory attacks so far, while clearly threatening, pale in comparison to what one would expect to see in a major high-end fight between the United States and China in the Pacific. The overall ramifications would also be more severe.“

“Beyond the more immediate impacts of losing this kind of strategic radar coverage, there are far larger implications. In some cases, these radars are designed to provide critical early warning and verification of incoming nuclear strikes, or other large-scale attacks by a major adversary, targeting a nation’s home soil. They are critical parts of the nuclear deterrent. As such, losing these sensors can have major downstream impacts on strategic decision-making cycles based on concerns about what suddenly is not being seen. Fewer radars also means fewer ways to double-check that a track is not a false positive in a scenario where the total available decision-making time could be seriously truncated, to begin with. These are concerns TWZ explicitly highlighted after Ukraine’s attack on the Armavir Radar Station in Russia in 2024.”

During a panel discussion at the SMD Symposium today, U.S. Army Lt. Gen. Richard Zellmann, Deputy Commander of U.S Space Command, further underscored the reality of the current threat ecosystem, including one-way attack drones layered in with traditional missile barrages. The general also highlighted the impact of more readily available space-enabled targeting and navigation capabilities.

“We see, I think, the low end on Epic Fury [the official nickname for U.S. operations against Iran earlier this year]. Sure, the missiles are more high-end, but we’ve seen our adversary employ a number of one-way attack systems that are coupled with these ballistic missile volleys,” Zellman explained. “We are really at this point in the history of warfare because of the democratization of space. Space isn’t a sanctuary. It’s no longer just the playground of nations with a lot of money.”

“The commercialization of space has created what many call essentially a transparent battlefield. And because I can see everything all the time with commercial ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; in this case primarily satellite imagery], it’s given our adversaries capabilities that they haven’t had in the past,” he continued. “That ISR, if you couple it with a platform that has access to GPS or some other PNT [Position, Navigation, and Timing] system, and then you add in another layer of over-the-horizon comms, like say from an Iridium or a Starlink [satellite communications terminal], and you have a pretty lethal asymmetric weapon system that our adversaries can get a hold of.”

Munitions that use GPS, or a similar form of navigation, alone for guidance are only employable against static targets. This, in turn, only drives home even more the importance of the transportability and deployability requirements that are at the heart of the FBM Radar Next plan.

It’s also important to note that, like AN/TPY-2 now, FBM Radar Next will still be just one part of a larger air and missile defense architecture. In our analysis earlier this year, we noted that Iranian attacks on radars in the Middle East had reinforced arguments for new layered defenses to protect those and other prized assets and for migrating more early warning and missile tracking capabilities into space. There is still a question of how much of that functionality will be shared and eventually ported over into orbital sensing capabilities. As Lt. Gen. Zellmann pointed out today, threats to space-based capabilities continue to grow, and that domain can no longer be considered a sanctuary, either. Having a layered, redundant, and flexible mix of terrestrial and orbital sensing for ballistic missile tracking will remain highly important for the foreseeable future.

What exactly a successor to the AN/TPY-2 looks like in the end remains to be seen. What is clear now is that very real missile and drone threats have prompted a major rethinking on the part of MDA about how future missile defense radars will need to be employed to ensure they can survive going forward.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Hunt For New Mobile Missile Defense Radar Reinforced By Lessons From Iran War appeared first on TWZ.

Do you want more breaking news? More in-depth analysis? What about deep-dive features? And which of these is most important? Just ranking them from most to least and adding some extra color to your rankings would be extremely helpful for us!

So three general categories and what you would like to see more of most in those categories, such as:

-News (rolling coverage of conflicts or more specific news coverage of conflicts based around singular issues and events? Major defense procurement announcements? Trade show coverage? Open source intelligence posts?)

-Analysis (and what type? Open source investigations? Tech? Weapons systems profiles? Hot takes on procurement and strategy?)

-Deep dive features (what kinds? Interviews? ‘Confessions Of’ series installments? Historical pieces? Explanations on emerging technologies, tactics and capabilities?)

Leave it in the comments or shoot me an email (tyler@twz.com) along with all your other thoughts, such as who do you want to hear more from and about what.

What about video? We just launched our first official episode of Special Access on YouTube! If you haven’t checked it out, please do below and let us know what you think of it. What other video segments/shows would you like to see and from who?

What else? Please share! I want the good and the bad.

As always, thank you all so much for your continued support. We literally wouldn’t be able to do this awesome job without you.

Sincerely,

Tyler Rogoway

EIC TWZ

The post What Do You Want From TWZ? appeared first on TWZ.

Less than one week remains of the 60-day timetable initially agreed upon in the memorandum of understanding signed by Washington and Tehran in June to strike a deal to end hostilities. But as the deadline approaches, little tangible progress has been made, and U.S. President Donald Trump is reportedly leaning toward applying economic leverage over returning to all-out war, according to the Wall Street Journal. Regardless, the blockade of Iranian ports and coastal cities is still on in full force, supported by dual aircraft carriers, USS Abraham Lincoln and USS George H.W. Bush – two of more than 20 Navy warships enforcing the blockade and conducting other military missions across the region.

Both supercarriers are on station in the northern Arabian Sea. As of August 9, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forces have redirected 55 commercial vessels, kinetically disabled two, and boarded another two to ensure compliance.

USS Abraham Lincoln is approaching nine months deployed. A dozen family members of the crew told MS Now that conditions aboard the flattop have been difficult. In response to those accounts, the spokesperson for U.S. 5th Fleet, Cmdr. Joseph Hontz, said, “Though more than 250 days on deployment is challenging for the crew and their equipment, they remain resilient and ready to accomplish any tasking given to them.” He added that “the ship remains fully capable of meeting all mission tasking” and that the crew has “occasionally run low on certain supplies for brief time periods, but Abraham Lincoln and all ships in theater currently have an adequate supply of food and supplies to sustain operations.” TWZ has not independently verified the family accounts.

Spinning the globe east, the USS George Washington is operating in the South China Sea after completing a five-day port call in Vietnam. Open-source flight tracking data most recently placed the four-ship strike group to the west of the Philippines, approximately 100 nautical miles off the coast of Luzon. A CMV-22B Osprey with Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 5, callsign “RUDY73,” was spotted making a round trip to Clark Air Base, a Philippine Air Force base located 40 miles northwest of Manila that was previously operated by the U.S. military. George Washington is being escorted by a guided-missile cruiser, USS Robert Smalls, and two guided-missile destroyers, USS Shoup and USS Benfold.

Further east, USS Theodore Roosevelt returned home to San Diego after two months away following participation in large-scale exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2026. The flattop was pierside at Naval Air Station North Island before embarking nearly 2,000 friends and family for a ‘tiger cruise’ over the weekend, which included a massive display of air power. Whether the strike group deploys to the Middle East to relieve USS Abraham Lincoln and maintain dual-carrier coverage in CENTCOM, or conducts a routine Western Pacific patrol augmenting USS George Washington, will likely depend on how the negotiations with Iran shake out.

“This event showcases the talent, pride and professionalism of our Sailors aboard Theodore Roosevelt,” the commanding officer, Capt. William Mathis, said. “To be able to demonstrate this for their loved ones while underway brings a greater understanding to the people that are the foundation of their support. I believe that is so impactful.”

The “Gator Navy,” which includes the service’s fleet of big-deck amphibious assault ships that embark Marine Expeditionary Units, remains in high demand but is stretched thin, a dynamic TWZ has been covering for years. “I won’t say how many of the ARG-MEUs our combat commanders ask for, but it is well north of three… like double that,” the commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps, Gen. Eric Smith, said at the Modern Day Marine conference in April. The Navy opted to replace the Iwo Jima ARG in U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) with Littoral Combat Force-24, which embodies the Navy’s new, more flexible deployment strategy and is centered on a single amphibious transport dock ship with distributed land-based nodes. Two other ARGs are currently working up: USS Makin Island completed ARGMEUEX on July 31, and USS Essex departed Pearl Harbor last week after participating in RIMPAC. “I just wish I had more of them to offer,” Smith admitted.

Overall, three U.S. carriers are deployed, three are working up or at homeport in various states of readiness, four are in maintenance, and one is being used for training. One amphibious ready group is deployed, five are training or in port, and three are in maintenance availabilities.

Note: Positions are general approximations. Non-deployed LHA/LHD amphibious warships are not shown.

Contact the author: ian.ellis-jones@teamrecurrent.io

The post Where Are The Aircraft Carriers: August 11, 2026 appeared first on TWZ.

The latest such imagery was from Sunday, when Trump was attending the final round of the LIV Golf Bedminster tournament at his New Jersey golf course.

One photo shows Trump wielding a wedge with an Avenger behind concertina wire in the background. There is another photo of an Avenger, but it is unclear if it is the same one. There are certainly other protection platforms we don’t see, especially electronic warfare systems.

The White House on Monday confirmed the authenticity of the photos to us.

The following video shows the Avenger and an AN/MPQ-64 Sentinel air defense radar in the background.

As if to highlight the concerns, while Trump was at Bedminster on Sunday, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) F-16 Fighting Falcons intercepted two general aviation aircraft that violated the Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) airspace over the area.

“All general aviation aircraft were safely escorted out of the area by NORAD aircraft,” the command stated on X.

On Aug. 1, the White House shared a video of Trump talking with soldiers at Bedminster. In the background was an Avenger.

“I’m not worried about missiles and drones,” the president joked.

“We got it covered,” a colonel responded with a smile, pointing his right thumb over his shoulder to the Humvee-mounted SHORAD system.

The Avengers, which fire Stinger heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles, are a fast-reacting point defense asset, and do make some sense for protecting a golfing president. They have been upgraded to deal with drones and there is also a known rooftop Avenger missile turret near the White House for air defense purposes, which was installed not long after 9/11.

When deployed to assist the Secret Service in protecting POTUS, the Avenger systems are operated by the 263rd Army Air and Missile Defense Command, NORAD told us. A spokesperson declined to provide further details about how often the Avengers are used this way.

Drone technology, including first-person view types and those equipped with fiber optics, is rapidly proliferating around the world and Iran has been both a user and distributor of these weapons.

Trump, as we noted earlier in this story, has already been the subject of several assassination attempts and threats. A number of these threats involve golf. The most recent incident came earlier this month. 

“Authorities arrested a suspect who was allegedly photographing and recording security preparations ahead of a scheduled fundraising dinner at the Trump National Golf Club in Rancho Palos Verdes, California,” Fox News reported. “The suspect, Jeanine John Taele, 38, was found carrying a 16-round magazine loaded with ammunition, while investigators recovered an additional pistol and a fake ‘security protection agent’ badge from his truck.”

Prior to that, there was an attempt against Trump on Sept. 15, 2024, at the Trump International Golf Club in West Palm Beach, Florida. 

As Trump golfed, a Secret Service agent conducting a perimeter security sweep saw the partially obscured face of a man in the brush along the fence line near the sixth hole, according to a Justice Department media release at the time. 

“The agent observed the barrel of a rifle aimed directly at him,” the release stated. “As the agent began backing away, he saw the rifle barrel move, and the agent fired” at the man, later identified as Ryan Wesley Routh, 58, of Hawaii. Routh survived and is currently in prison awaiting trial.

A few months earlier, on July 13, 2024, at a campaign event in Butler, Pennsylvania, a man fired a shot at Trump, then the Republican presidential nominee. Thomas Matthew Crooks, 20, of Bethel Park, Pennsylvania, was later killed, and a bloodied Trump was whisked away. 

Prior to those attempts, Iran made a golf-related threat against Trump.

An image highly suggestive of a drone targeting the then-former President Trump on a golf course in a “vengeance” strike in retaliation for the death of Iranian General Qassem Soleimani was posted on Twitter by an account for Iran’s then-Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The U.S. military killed Soleimani in a drone strike in Iraq in January 2020, which had already prompted public threats from Iranian officials, including against Trump specifically.

Twitter suspended the @khamenei_site account around 15 hours after the post when the image first appeared on Jan. 21, 2020.

Khamenei himself was killed Feb. 28 during the opening night of Operation Epic Fury.

There has been extreme concern for Trump’s safety following the launch of that operation, with an Iranian revenge hit on the president being more plausible now than ever. This has triggered major changes in safety protocols, some of which have made headline news.

The Avenger isn’t the only specialized vehicle used to protect Trump while he golfs. As we previously reported, during a golf outing with his son Eric at his course in Scotland last year, Trump was trailed by an armored Polaris Ranger X utility task vehicle (UTV) designed to provide ballistic protection. The vehicle, dubbed Golf Force One by the press, was “part of the Presidential fleet of specialty vehicles,” a White House spokesperson told The War Zone at the time. The White House provided no further details. Trump was in Scotland to host a meeting with former British Prime Minister Keir Starmer at his resort, where security was beefed up.

So the next time you are having a tough time on the course, just remember this: At least you probably don’t need a Stinger-launching weapons system to ensure you make it safely to the clubhouse.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Avenger Surface-To-Air Missile System Protected Trump While Golfing appeared first on TWZ.

In its August 3 press release, the Navy said it planned to acquire 19 VPM-equipped Virginia class SSGNs across the Block V and Block VI subclasses. As TWZ noted at the time, this created a discrepancy of one submarine based on publicly stated procurement plans. It was already known that the first of the 12 Block Vs, the future USS Oklahoma, would lack a VPM, but the expectation had been that the other 11 would have this feature. The Block VI production run is currently set to consist of nine more submarines, all with VPMs. We correctly posited last week that the outlier could be the seabed warfare submarine, the basic plans for which emerged some years ago now.

“19 of the VPMs will be re-classified as SSGNs with two of the Block V SSNs to be built in non-VPM configurations,” a Navy spokesperson told TWZ when asked for clarification.

“A later Block V submarine will not have VPM and will be a Subsea and Seabed Warfare (SSW) focused platform,” the same Navy spokesperson subsequently confirmed to TWZ in response to our follow-up questions.

The Navy has declined to name the specific Block V Virginia class submarine that will be configured for the seabed warfare role. We know from the statement above that it will not be the future USS Oklahoma (also known by the hull number SSN-802). We also know that the second Block V Virginia, the future USS Arizona (SSGN-803), will be the first to feature the VPM.

So the seabed warfare version will be one of the other 10 planned Block V Virginia class submarines. All of those future boats (hulls 804 through 813) have already been assigned official names, which are, in order: USS Barb, USS Tang, USS Wahoo, USS Silversides, USS John H. Dalton, USS Long Island, USS San Francisco, USS Miami, USS Baltimore, and USS Atlanta. As an aside, Barb, Tang, Wahoo, and Silversides will be the first Navy submarines in decades to be named after ‘denizens of the deep.’ Since the 1970s, the service has largely been naming new attack submarines after cities and states, a decision you can read more about in detail here.

As noted, the Navy has previously disclosed plans to acquire a one-off Virginia class submarine in a seabed warfare configuration, but has offered little in the way of specifics to date. General Dynamics Electric Boat has shared some additional information in the past. This company is one of two prime contractors involved in producing Virginia class boats, with the other being the Newport News Shipbuilding division of Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII).

“Our Virginia class submarine program is evolving … over time to accomplish new missions, and we’re taking the existing hull form and modifying that to incorporate new weapons, sensors, and improved stealth features,” Kevin Graney, then President of General Dynamics Electric Boat, said during a presentation as part of a summit hosted by the Connecticut Business and Industry Association (CBIA) in 2022. “One of the most significant design changes we’ve implemented in recent times and currently ongoing is the Virginia Payload Module, which will carry an enhanced strike capability. …basically an 84-foot hull section that includes four additional missile tubes.”

You can watch Graney’s 2022 presentation in full below. His overview of the Virginia class program at that time starts at approximately 21:52 in the runtime, if the video does not advance to that point automatically.

General Dynamics Electric Boat’s main shipyard, as well as other facilities, are in Connecticut. The company also has a major hull-fabrication and outfitting facility in neighboring Rhode Island. Graney retired in 2024.

“We’re developing … a seabed warfare variant, and this ship is designed to interact with the seafloor,” Graney also said during his 2022 presentation. “This design will repurpose some of those missile tubes that I referred to in the VPM design to perform those missions.”

An accompanying slide in Graney’s presentation – seen in part at the top of this story and below – showed a rendering of the seabed warfare variant. As depicted, the design features a pronounced additional bulge under the center of the hull in the same general area where VPM will be fitted on other Block V boats.

This is fully in line with how Jimmy Carter is known to be modified. The main difference between that submarine and the other two Seawolf class boats is the addition of a 100-foot hull extension known as the Multi-Mission Platform (MMP). From what has been publicly released in the past, the MMP is capable of launching and recovering remotely operated vehicles (ROV), uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUV), and other specialized payloads. There is also a reconfigurable command and control room, storage spaces, and other special missionized equipment. The submarine also has auxiliary thrusters and other unique features to help it land on the seafloor or otherwise keep its position underwater. Altogether, Jimmy Carter‘s unique features are understood to be optimized for covert and clandestine underwater espionage missions, including inspecting, manipulating, and even collecting objects of interest from deep on the ocean floor.

Beyond repurposing the space set aside for the VPM, what other modifications the seabed warfare version of the Virginia might receive are unknown. The Seawolf class, in general, is understood to have particularly good deep-diving capabilities, among other attributes, even compared to the Virginia class that came afterward. All three Seawolf class submarines – the other two being the USS Seawolf and the USS Connecticut – continue to be in high demand because of the advanced capabilities the design offers at its core. The continued importance of these submarines is underscored by the Navy’s ongoing work to return Connecticut to service after it suffered major damage, particularly to its bow, from a collision with an underwater seamount in the South China Sea back in 2021.

The floor of the ocean has long been an important, but challenging domain for underwater operations, including when it comes to cutting or tapping into critical fiber optic communications cables and destroying pipelines. Being able to examine, or even recover, objects of interest from the seabed has been and continues to be a critical element of so-called foreign materiel exploitation (FME) operations, as TWZ has explored in great detail in the past.

The importance of the seabed is only set to grow going forward. China, Russia, and others are working to expand their undersea infrastructure, often in support of nominally civilian activities that could have obvious dual-use applications. The Russian Navy, in particular, and the Soviet Navy before it, has its own particularly long history of covert and clandestine seabed warfare operations utilizing special mission submarines and submersibles, specialized surface ships, and uncrewed platforms.

Overall, including a new highly specialized version of the Virginia class design to supplement, or even eventually supplant, Jimmy Carter makes good sense. The Navy currently expects the Block V Virginia class submarines to be delivered between 2028 and 2034. Jimmy Carter was commissioned in 2005 and will be 29 years old when the last Block V boat arrives, at least according to the present schedule. This one-of-a-kind subvariant of the Seawolf class itself replaced the equally uniquely modified Sturgeon class attack submarine USS Parche, which was inactivated in 2004 after three decades of service.

As TWZ discussed in detail last week, the decision to recategorize VPM-equipped Block V submarines as SSGNs is meant to underscore the Navy’s separate commitment to filling separate looming capability gaps. The Navy is now starting the process of retiring its four Ohio class SSGNs, all of which were originally built as nuclear ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). Those boats are also among the most heavily in-demand submarines the Navy has in service today. They are really more multi-mission platforms able to provide a wide range of special operation support, underwater command and control, and intelligence fusion functions, on top of their long-range strike capabilities, as you can read more about in this past feature of ours.

It has also been pointed out that the Navy is now unlikely to acquire a new SSN class, at least technically, for many years. The Navy has plans to acquire a new class of attack submarines, currently referred to as SSN(X), which has been discussed in the past as more of a true successor to the Seawolf class. However, the service does not now expect the first of those boats to enter service until the mid-2040s. At the same time, it is also worth noting that the decision to change the hull classification of VPM-equipped Virginia class from SSN to SSGN is largely administrative from what has been disclosed so far. Block V versions, at least, are expected to have the same capability mix as before.

SSN(X) “will complement the Virginia class to create a mixed attack submarine force built to penetrate and dominate heavily defended adversary areas,” according to the long-term shipbuilding plan the Navy released back in May. “With a larger payload volume, superior survivability, and organic hosting of unmanned robotic and autonomous systems (RAS), SSN(X) will assure continued persistent access to denied zones and eliminate enemy safe havens.”

“Block VI, really, that will become the jumping-off point, we think, for the SSN(X) program, and we expect to continue to incorporate even more advanced stealth and performance features,” General Dynamics Electric Boat’s Graney had also said back in 2022.

Whether the new SSGN nomenclature for Virginia class submarines equipped with the VPM results in any significant changes to how the submarines are employed remains to be seen.

What we do know now for sure is that two of the Navy’s future Block V Virginia class submarines will lack the VPM, and the second one will be a highly specialized seabed warfare version completely unlike any other.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Navy Is Getting A Unique Virginia Class Seabed Espionage Submarine appeared first on TWZ.

The installation was targeted by Iranian ballistic missiles during the Epic Fury operation, but the threat posed by drones is even more plausible for the island outpost, especially at this extremely tense time as the standoff between the U.S. and Iran grinds on.

The issue of reported drones over Diego Garcia highlights a plausible threat of sea-launched drones that TWZ has been drawing attention to for years now. It also again raises concerns about the danger to critical infrastructure and aircraft parked in the open at Diego Garcia and many other U.S. installations. This is another issue TWZ has been highlighting for years.

“We are aware of reported sightings of drones (UAS) over Diego Garcia,” the U.K. Defense Ministry (MoD) told us Monday morning. “We are unable to provide any details about a situation which may affect the security or operation of the joint U.K.-U.S. base on Diego Garcia.”

“The U.S. and U.K. Commanding Officers on Diego Garcia consider and implement appropriate measures to ensure the security and safety of the base and the safety of the personnel on the island,” MoD added.

U.S. officials were less forthcoming.

“As a matter of operational security, we do not discuss specific force protection measures or security procedures at U.S. military installations,” an official from U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) told us on Friday. “We remain vigilant in protecting U.S. personnel and facilities.”

Neither MoD nor PACOM would say what kinds of drones were sighted, when they were sighted, who was operating them or what, if any, defensive measures were taken as a result. Both military organizations were responding to our questions about an Aug. 7 posting on the Air Force amn/nco/snco Facebook page, an unofficial social media channel that posts about service topics.

“Inbox: ‘Diego Garcia. Drones spotted near fuel farm. Base on 0700 to 1900 curfew until further notice’ Note: message us if you have further information, thanks,” the post read.

On Sunday, the page published a second post on the topic titled “Diego Garcia Curfew reportedly due to Drone Threats.” The post displayed what the page purported to be an official listing of curfew times for various locations around the installation.

We cannot independently confirm the accuracy of these posts and have reached out to MoD and PACOM for details. MoD did not specify who reported the drone sightings over Diego Garcia, so we have asked for clarification. Making this an even more unusual event, Diego Garcia is essentially a closed island with no significant general population or tourists around to be operating drones on a recreational basis. So seeing one or more over the base would certainly raise alarms.

Though Diego Garcia is about 1,000 miles from Sri Lanka, the nearest large landmass, its remote location does not rule out the possibility of drone incursions by an adversary.

During the run-up to the launch of the Epic Fury operation against Iran, the FBI sent out an alert warning about the possibility of an Iranian drone attack on targets in California using uncrewed aircraft launched from ships off the coast. Though the alert was based on raw, unverified intelligence, and was sent out of an abundance of caution rather than any fears of an imminent action, the overall threat of drone attacks from ships is very real. You can read our feature about this very real threat vector and its relation to that questionable intelligence release here.

Generally speaking, there are long-standing concerns that Iran and/or other actors operating on its behalf could seek to launch asymmetric attacks on targets in the United States, as well as elsewhere outside of the Middle East, in retaliation for large-scale strikes or even in an unprovoked manner. The risks of Iranians deciding to take such action have historically been seen as especially high in any scenario where there might be an existential threat to the regime in Tehran.

There were enough concerns about an Iranian attack on Diego Garcia that F-16s were deployed there in February, before the war erupted, for protection primarily against one-way attack drones and cruise missiles. F-15Es were first deployed to Diego Garcia for this same purpose last year, in what appeared to be a first of its kind force protection change. As noted earlier, Iran clearly sees the installation as a top target, as it has long been something of a refuge for U.S. forces to fallback from the Middle East from, if need be. Iran subsequently launched two intermediate-range ballistic missiles at Diego Garcia during Epic Fury; however, neither struck the base.

The threat from drones launched by ships is not just limited to Iran. Russia is suspected of sending drones over key European military installations from vessels.

Long-range one-way attack drones with endurance measured in many hundreds of miles, if not more than a thousand miles, are increasingly a staple in military arsenals globally, and have also been proliferating to non-state actors. Yet the drone threat isn’t just limited to these kinds of weapons for remote locales like islands. Ukraine has carried out devastating attacks on Russian radars and other targets on Crimea and elsewhere using short-range aerial drones launched by uncrewed surface vessels (USVs). This same capability set is proliferating around the globe, allowing for the USV to work as a relatively low-cost delivery system for highly precise and relatively inexpensive short-range drones that can then execute near-field attacks. The U.S. and others are also developing similar capabilities for its submarines and future uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUVs), which could even more easily sneak into close proximity to targets ashore before launching their deadly drone munitions.

The following video shows a Ukrainian USV launching drones against Russian targets:

As we noted earlier in this story, the claims about drone sightings over Diego Garcia rekindle concerns that the U.S. is not doing enough to protect its aviation assets. This situation is another data point in the already heated debate over whether the U.S. military should be investing more in new hardened aircraft shelters and other base infrastructure amid rapidly evolving standoff aerial attack threats.

It is indisputable that aircraft sitting exposed on a flightline are particularly vulnerable to attack — even to drone threats leveraging commercially available technology. This is something we regularly highlight and that has been continually demonstrated in the ongoing war in Ukraine. The June 2025 Ukrainian Operation Spiderweb attack on Russian bombers is a glaring example of the dangers drones pose to aircraft. So too was the discovery of an explosive-laden drone found near a massive An-124-100 Ruslan (NATO reporting name Condor) cargo jet at Leipzig/Halle Airport in Germany last week.

There was just a reported drone incursion over RAAF Williamtown in Australia, an F-35A base, for instance, as well.

Even very troubling drone incursions on critical bases in remote areas aren’t entirely new. Between late February and early March of 2019, the massive installation at Andersen Air Force Base on the Island of Guam experienced repeated incursions by unmanned aircraft that appeared to be extremely interested in one highly sensitive area of the highly strategic base, the U.S. Army’s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) battery that is tasked with defending the island from ballistic missile attacks. 

Beyond threats from drones, the U.S. saw several aircraft parked out in the open destroyed or damaged by Iranian ballistic missile strikes on U.S. bases in the Middle East. Also during Epic Fury, troops were killed and radars and other critical assets were destroyed and damaged by Iranian long-range drone and ballistic missile attacks. Even short-range drones operated by Iranian-backed local militias scored hits on U.S. aircraft and infrastructure.

You can see an image of an E-3 Sentry destroyed in an Iranian attack on Prince Sultan Air Base in Saudi Arabia below:

The reports of drones over Diego Garcia are certainly very concerning, although we do not know anything more about them at this time. Above all else, they are a reminder that the threat this very diverse group of systems and their potential delivery systems presents is only becoming more troublesome and complex as time goes on.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com 

The post Drone Sightings Are Happening At Diego Garcia, America’s Remote Strategic Island Outpost appeared first on TWZ.

The total planned E-130J fleet size was included in a recently released Pentagon report. The so-called Modernized Selected Acquisition Report (MSAR) was produced as part of work on the U.S. military’s proposed Fiscal Year 2027 budget and is dated April 21, 2026. The report also acknowledges risks to the program associated with operational availability, which the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has previously highlighted publicly. Aviation Week was first to report on the new E-130J MSAR.

In terms of the acquisition plan, the Navy currently expects to acquire six pre-production E-130Js to support the type’s ongoing development, as well as 25 production examples. The service had only previously disclosed that it would be buying six aircraft as part of the development phase and that the initial low-rate production run would comprise three to six additional planes. Whether some or all of the pre-production Phoenix IIs might ultimately be used operationally is unknown.

The MSAR says the estimated Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC), which factors in research and development costs, for all 31 E-130Js, was $732.8 million apiece as of April. The Average Procurement Unit Cost (APUC) for just the 25 production examples, which also does not include research and development costs, was pegged at $360.9 million each. The report also says that these PAUC and the APUC figures are both lower – by 3.29 and 2.64 percent, respectively – than the baseline estimates as of December 2024.

As noted, the E-130Js, which are being converted from four-engine turboprop C-130J-30 Hercules cargo planes, are set to replace the existing fleet of E-6Bs. The Mercury aircraft are based on the larger, jet-engined Boeing 707 airliner. The E-6Bs first began entering service in an earlier E-6A configuration in 1989, and were some of the last 707-based planes ever produced. They were subsequently brought up to the current standard in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and have received additional upgrades since then. The Mercury fleet currently also supports a U.S. Air Force nuclear mission set called the Airborne Command Post (ABNCP), and more commonly known by the nickname Looking Glass. That mission entails providing aerial command and control support to nuclear-capable bombers and silo-based Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles. As part of this role, E-6Bs are equipped to initiate the launch of Minuteman IIIs while in flight. We will come back to this later on, as the stated plan now is for the Phoenix II planes to be capable of supporting the TACAMO mission only.

Overall, the April MSAR for the E-130J says the “program is on track and executing to the APB [Acquisition Program Baseline].”

“An Integrated Baseline Review (IBR) was conducted September 23-26, 2025 and formally closed on February 24, 2026. All actions resulting from IBR Findings have been successfully resolved,” the report adds. “Preliminary Design Review (PDR) for the first test aircraft configuration (AV1) was conducted March 31-April 1, 2026 with the full system PDR planned for July 2026.”

However, the report also lists a risk associated with “Operational Availability,” but says that “additional details can be found at the classified
level.”

This is in line with concerns raised publicly by GAO, a Congressional watchdog, starting last year.

“The C-130J aircraft – selected 4 years before E-130J’s development start – may not meet operational availability requirements. The E-130J’s technical risk assessment highlighted the complexity associated with integrating E-130J systems onto this aircraft,” GAO warned in a report published in June 2025. “The Navy’s technical risk assessment team expects the integration risks to translate to manufacturing issues given the potential deviation from standard components and the security environment required.”

“As we reported in last year’s assessment, the Navy awarded its contract despite significant technical risks it acknowledged the E-130J program faced. A September 2024 independent technical risk assessment highlighted the complexity associated with the program’s planned integration effort, which officials acknowledged could increase as they integrate additional technologies,” per another GAO report released just last month. “Since our 2024 report, the program has delayed its low-rate production decision by approximately a year as these system integration risks have morphed into realities.”

“For example, program officials said that contractors are now focused on modifying already-existing mission systems to reduce their weight, which the independent assessment anticipated would be necessary to accommodate them on the C-130J-30 airframe,” the July 2026 GAO report added.

GAO also said in that report that the Navy “acknowledges technical risk,” but also that the service had highlighted “risk reduction contracts with subcontractors to address obsolescence and size, weight, and power-cooling risks.”

Generally speaking, aircraft assigned the TACAMO mission require a highly specialized and extremely reliable communications suite to ensure they can perform under what could be extremely challenging conditions. Each E-6B notably has the ability to reel out a five-mile-long antenna to communicate with submerged submarines. The E-130J will have a very similar, if not identical, antenna system. Hardening against electro-magnetic pulses (EMP), which would be produced during the detonation of nuclear warheads, is another key requirement for these planes.

“Due to the highly sensitive and distinct strategic command and communications missions, the E-130J programs are managed with a zero-tolerance posture for foreign exploitation,” the April MSAR also highlights. “Program Protection is governed by stringent, continuously enforced plans addressing all Technology Security and Foreign Disclosure (TS&FD) elements, including Supply Chain Assurance and robust Information Assurance. Additional details are available in a classified environment.”

In the past, TWZ has discussed the potential operational readiness and other tradeoffs that could come from selecting a C-130-based platform to replace the 707-based E-6B in the TACAMO role. As we wrote previously:

“It’s certainly worth pointing out that the E-6Bs, conversions of what were some of the last and most modern 707 airliners built, were larger and higher performance platforms than the EC-130Qs. The C-130J-30 is certainly a more capable aircraft than the C-130H on which the EC-130Q was based, but it won’t have the base speed and altitude capabilities of an airliner-sized multi-engine jet. Compared to the Mercuries, any TACAMO-configured C-130J-30 would not be able to get on station as quickly, or fly as high, limiting its ability to get above bad weather or establish a better line of sight for its communications systems.”

“At the same time, as the Navy itself has noted, the C-130J-30 platform does immediately open up the ability to use a larger number of air bases, airports, and airfields, including austere ones that the E-6B cannot operate from. This could be very useful in a contingency scenario where an opponent may have destroyed or otherwise rendered unusable many well-established bases, as well as larger secondary dispersal sites, which include large commercial airports. Being able to fly from smaller, tertiary locations could help to ensure that the TACAMO mission continues without significant disruption under such circumstances. This is also true during peacetime as targeting the TACAMOs on the ground would be much harder if they could easily operate from and sit alert at a much larger number of airports.”

“A C-130J-30 configured for the TACAMO mission would certainly have a mid-air refueling capability and the Hercules is already a platform that has demonstrated the ability to loiter over particular areas for long periods of time. Unlike the Boeing 707, the C-130J is still in production, as well, meaning that TACAMO aircraft based on this plane would be inherently easier to maintain and support logistically, and may also be easier to convert to this specialized configuration to begin with. As time goes on, the J looks set to increasingly become the default base C-130 model across the U.S. military, as well. Compared to the long out of production 707-based E-6, support for the C-130J is already distributed across the U.S., and beyond. Training C-130J crews is even an easier proposition.”

How exactly operational considerations factored into the decision regarding the E-130J fleet size is unknown. There are additional tradeoffs to having a larger total fleet, but it should offer strategic readiness benefits based on available airframes alone. It is worth noting here that the Navy did operate TACAMO aircraft based on older C-130 variants before the E-6A entered service.

There is no debate that the aging E-6Bs are becoming increasingly more challenging to operate and sustain. The Mercury fleet has been further strained over the years given the need to use operational aircraft to support training demands. The Navy is now utilizing a contractor-owned, but government-operated (COGO) Boeing 737NG airliner to support pilot training requirements. This follows an abortive plan to convert an ex-Royal Air Force E-3D Sentry airborne early warning and control aircraft, another Boeing 707-based type, into a dedicated TE-6B crew trainer, which came to a halt last year, as TWZ was first to report.

To avoid any gaps in TACAMO coverage, the Navy has also said it will phase out the E-6Bs only as the new E-130Js enter service, which means that Mercury aircraft will have to keep flying until the transition is deemed complete. The initial operational capability timeline for the Phoenix II is currently classified, but the April MSAR says initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) is not set to start until June 2033, at the earliest. Completion of IOT&E is not automatically required for an IOC declaration.

As mentioned, despite the fleet size target, the E-130J is not set to take on the ABNCP/Looking Glass mission, at least currently. The Air Force is still in the very early stages of acquiring what it is currently calling Looking Glass-Next (LG-N) to assume this role. Among the questions still to be answered, at least that we know, is how many total planes the service will need to meet those mission requirements. Leveraging the forthcoming Boeing 747-based E-4C Survivable Airborne Operations Center (SAOC) jets has been raised as a possibility. However, the SAOC aircraft are set to have much broader ‘doomsday plane’ roles, just like the four E-4B Nightwatch types they are set to replace, as you can read more about here. The Air Force is also in the midst of a much larger modernization of its nuclear command and control architectures, work that is tied heavily to the much-delayed LGM-35A Sentinel intercontinental ballistic missile program, as we have detailed in the past. Nuclear command and control functions could increasingly move to space-based assets as part of these developments.

“I have full confidence in our ability to sustain existing capability and bridge to the next generation of capability,” Navy Adm. Richard Correll, head of U.S. Strategic Command, told TWZ and others at a media roundtable last week, when asked for an update on TACAMO and LG-N. Correll deferred to the Navy and the Air Force on more specific questions about those programs.

When it comes to TACAMO modernization, the Navy is pressing ahead with its plans, which are set to result in a major increase in at least the total number of aircraft configured for this critical mission.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Navy ‘Doomsday Plane’ Fleet To Almost Double In Size With New E-130Js appeared first on TWZ.

The components in question were on Kraken K3 Scout USVs, The Telegraph reports, citing an unnamed defense source familiar with the matter. The article states that Chinese-made components “secretly sent data to China,” forcing the Ministry of Defense to remove all internet connectivity from the cameras after they discovered the breach.

In a statement provided to TWZ, a Ministry of Defense spokesperson said: “The first duty of government is national security, and we take the security of our equipment, networks and data extremely seriously.”

The issue came to light in what the Ministry of Defense described as “a routine cyber vulnerability assessment,” after which an investigation “found no evidence of MOD data or systems being accessed, compromised or transmitted externally.”

“Our assurance and testing processes are designed to identify and address potential vulnerabilities early, and we continue to undertake routine security activity across our systems and equipment,” the Ministry of Defense added.

The K3 Scout USVs had been acquired under a deal worth around $16.2 million (£12 million) and had entered Royal Navy service in March. The USVs are operated by the Coastal Forces Squadron and 47 Commando of the Royal Marines.

The USV is designed to carry a 1,300-pound payload and operate continuously for 30 days. It is also used by U.S. Special Operations Command and has participated in NATO trials in the Baltic Sea.

According to The Telegraph, the British-operated USVs were due to be deployed to the Persian Gulf for use there by U.K. special forces, where they would help secure the freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.

As for the cameras, these were sourced by Kraken Technology Group from an undisclosed third party, rumored to be Canadian.

During a briefing at the annual Special Operations Forces (SOF) Week conference last year, Kraken told TWZ that the K3 “has four cameras that are just for situational awareness and a user-configurable sensor ball gimbal.” The latter can be a FLIR “or any number of other camera systems around the top for spotting longer range.”

The third-party supplier providing the component of the system in question had given assurances regarding its security, the Ministry of Defense told us.

The Telegraph reports its source as saying that preparations for the Persian Gulf deployment had already been conducted on the drones, adding: “This is a major failure to check origins of components and we have lost confidence in the platform.”

A Kraken Technology Group spokesman told The Telegraph: “We are aware that some third-party, NDAA-compliant cameras had a small number of components originating from outside the United Kingdom.”

“After a full audit by both Kraken and the Royal Navy, we are confident no sensitive information has ever been shared outside of intended channels, and any potential vulnerabilities have been identified and closed.”

The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) ensured that equipment does not contain components sourced from restricted manufacturers, for example those in China.

While the Ministry of Defense says that none of its data was compromised, The Telegraph claims that the investigation into the USVs revealed that their cameras were transmitting “heartbeat communications” to an IP address in China. Since this kind of data serves as confirmation that the cameras are online and functioning normally, it remains possible that the MOD does not classify it as proprietary or of military value.

Regardless, an issue was identified, and this did relate to potential cyber vulnerability.

The opposition Conservative Party has said it wants the government to “urgently audit” Ministry of Defense equipment for evidence of Chinese components with cybersecurity risks.

Referring to the USV issue, Alicia Kearns, the shadow security minister, said on X:

“This is not a procurement blunder, it is the predictable price of our dependence on Chinese components.”

She added: Under Chinese law, every Chinese company is legally bound to assist Beijing’s intelligence services and forbidden from ever telling us. So when cameras built on Chinese parts are found recording our special forces: their faces, training and operations, with data flowing back to Chinese IP addresses, we should not be surprised; we should be furious that we still haven’t woken up to the realities of the threat we face.”

This comes at a time of increasing concern about Chinese espionage directed against the U.K. Armed Forces and other British institutions.

Even before this incident, the MOD has responded to supply-chain vulnerabilities by removing Chinese hardware and cameras from sensitive spaces. The Special Boat Service (SBS) ordered Chinese-made electric cars to be banned from its base, also due to the potential for espionage.

MI5, the domestic counter-intelligence and security agency of the United Kingdom, has warned the government that Chinese intelligence services are “relentless” in trying to “interfere” and “influence” Parliament. Claimed activities include using employment websites to harvest sensitive information.

There have been recent cases of individuals, including those working in Parliament, going on trial on accusations of spying for Beijing.

One of the most high-profile Chinese espionage incidents involved the Chinese phone-maker Huawei. In 2020, the company was banned from the British 5G network due to security fears. The decision came after a recommendation from security officials in Washington. Two years earlier, the latest National Defense Authorization Act had barred the U.S. military from dealing with Huawei, primarily over fears that Chinese intelligence could exploit those links.

All of this is made more complicated by the changing relationship between Beijing and London.

The U.K. government has moved to expand its diplomatic connections with China, eager to secure trade agreements.

In the United States, meanwhile, China has shown its eagerness to use espionage to gather valuable intelligence on advanced military technologies including the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and F-22 Raptor. U.S. defense contractor Honeywell paid $13 million in civil penalties over the alleged unauthorized export of dozens of technical drawings relating to components of various aircraft, missiles, and tanks to multiple countries, including China.

Returning to the United Kingdom, the USV issue is also especially embarrassing since the government only recently unveiled its long-awaited Defense Investment Plan, in which uncrewed systems figure prominently, especially with the Royal Navy.

The new defense plan sees the Royal Navy sacrifice its future destroyer for a “hybrid,” distributed concept, with autonomous vessels being paired with crewed ones.

This will be driven by a budget of more than £5 billion ($6.6 billion) over four years just for drones and related capabilities.

The Royal Navy’s transformation has been spearheaded by Project Beehive.

Described as a spiral development, Project Beehive kicked off with the procurement of 20 USVs for “training, tactics development, warfare development, capability development, and operations in the U.K. area of responsibility and beyond.”

The USV chosen was the Kraken K3 Scout.

When the U.K. Defense Investment Plan was unveiled, TWZ warned that leaning so heavily on autonomous systems came with risks. In particular, most of the platforms envisaged don’t currently exist in physical form, at least as far as we know. At the same time, the effort stresses the rapid fielding of cutting-edge capabilities.

The MOD’s discovery of an “issue” relating to cyber vulnerability, and affecting the Kraken K3 Scout USV, suggests that rapidly getting new autonomous technologies into service could come with other risks, too.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Chinese Components In Royal Navy’s New Drone Boat Raise Cyber Security Concerns appeared first on TWZ.

In this episode, Jamie Hunter visits the U.S. Air Force A-10 Weapons Instructor Course that has been the center of excellence for the Warthog and its missions for nearly 50 years, but is now closing down as this close air support master nears retirement. Jamie had the rare opportunity to fly with the 66th Weapons Squadron’s A-10 team at Nellis Air Force Base, in Nevada, as they supported a capstone exercise one last time during the Weapons School’s final graduation events for new Weapon Instructors before they gain their prestigious graduate patches.

“The fundamentals of combat search and rescue, close air support, forward air control, even counter-maritime mission sets, as well, that starts the minute you walk in the door. The beauty of the weapons school is that it truly teaches you how to be an expert in your aircraft. It also teaches you, more importantly, how to be an expert in integration,” says Maj. Alex “Trippin” Boules, one of the last A-10 weapons instructor pilots at the 66th Weapons Squadron.

The final Weapons Instructor Course, or WIC, concluded in December 2025 as the last pair of students graduated from the six-month course, which has been run by the USAF Weapons School since 1977. Many graduates of the 66th Weapons Squadron have taken part in significant combat operations since that time, such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as the recent Operation Epic Fury in Iran. The latter saw A-10s taking on a critical role watching over combat search and rescue operations in partnership with special operations teams to recover downed U.S. aircrews.

Despite repeated calls for the A-10 to be retained in service, the Warthog is ultimately nearing retirement. Three squadrons have been granted a reprieve to continue operations until 2030, but the writing is on the wall for the Warthog as increasing numbers arrive at the 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group (AMARG) boneyard in Arizona for storage.

So get ready for one last blast of A-10 action from Nellis as the 66th Weapons Squadron winds down the Warthog Weapons School.

Contact the presenter: jamie.hunter@teamrecurrent.io

The post The Last Days Of The A-10 Warthog Weapons School appeared first on TWZ.

TWZ obtained the imagery showing the netting in place over submarines at the Russian Navy’s base at Rybachiy from Vantor. Business Insider was first to report on these images. Rybachiy is notably the homeport for the vast majority of Borei and Borei-A class nuclear ballistic missile submarines, or SSBNs, in service in Russia today. It is also home to various other guided missile and attack submarines assigned to the Russian Navy’s Pacific Fleet.

Images of Rybachiy from Vantor taken on August 4, seen at the top of this story and below, show several different types of submarines fully covered by nets. What is visible in the imagery is broadly consistent with netting that Russian forces have employed in and around Ukraine as a countermeasure against kamikaze drone attacks on ground assets and in the water. Similar netting has also been observed in use by other armed forces elsewhere globally.

Russian forces at Rybachiy look to have started using these nets back in May based on additional imagery from Vantor. The imagery from May and August show crane barges being used to help erect the nets around submarines at their moorings.

As an aside, floating booms are also seen strung around the piers at Rybachiy. This is something else that is now commonplace at naval bases across Russia, and can help provide an additional barrier to certain threats on or near the surface, particularly explosive-laden kamikaze drone boats.

On Tuesday, the Ministry of Defense in the United Kingdom also published additional imagery from Vantor of the Russian Navy’s base in Novorossiysk along the Black Sea taken back on June 13. The images show several Kilo class attack submarines partially submerged in port. Three of the boats also appear to have anti-drone armor screens installed over their conning towers. A cursory review of additional satellite imagery in Planet Labs’ archive suggests screens were a relatively new addition at that time.

“The Russian Black Sea Fleet has equipped three of its four Kilo class submarines with counter-UAS [uncrewed aerial systems] cages covering the vessels’ conning towers. This was applied as a preventive measure in response to Ukraine’s increased ability to strike targets further from the front line,” according to an accompanying assessment from British authorities earlier this week. “Analysis of commercial satellite imagery dated 13 June 2026 identified that three of the submarines had loosened their moorings and had submerged within the basin. Whilst the majority of the hull was below the surface, their conning towers remained above the waterline, explaining the need for the counter-UAS cage.”

“The fourth submarine, which had not been fitted with a counter-UAS cage, had slipped its mooring lines, manoeuvred away from nearby surface vessels and submerged within the harbour, its conning tower visible above the waterline,” the British government’s assessment continued. “The lack of a counter-UAS cage likely signifies this vessel has been de-prioritised compared to the other three.”

TWZ has also now obtained the June 13 image of Novorossiysk directly from Vantor, as well as another one taken on June 17, which shows the submarines surfaced and at their moorings as usual. This, in turn raises questions about whether or not the boats were submerged in response to an attack or indications that one might be imminent. There could be another explanation for why the submarines were temporarily submerged in port, including a force protection readiness exercise in preparation for such an incident.

Growing threats posed by uncrewed aerial systems, as well as uncrewed surface vessels (USV), have already had a marked impact on the establishment of new defensive capabilities and force protection postures at Russian naval and other facilities. This is especially true of sites in more immediate proximity to Ukraine.

Back in 2024, satellite imagery of Novorossiysk notably showed that forces there had painted a silhouette of a submarine and built an actual mock conning tower on a pier at the base. This reflected a broader trend at the time to implement countermeasures against Ukrainian munitions with autonomous image-matching targeting capabilities.

Also in 2024, what looked to be additional overhead protection against drone attacks appeared on the Delta-IV class nuclear ballistic missile submarine Tula at the Russian Navy’s base in Gadzhiyevo in the country’s far northern Murmansk region. What was seen fitted to Tula at that time was very rudimentary compared to what has now been seen erected over submarines at Novorossiysk and Rybachiy, which offers far greater and more elaborate coverage. More extensive counter-drone screens have also now appeared on other types of Russian naval vessels.

Ukrainian forces only continue to expand the area, both at sea and on land, that they can hold at risk with uncrewed systems, as well as more traditional missiles. As it stands now, Ukraine uses its ever more diverse arsenal of long-range kamikaze drones and cruise missiles to strike targets across whole swaths of Western Russia, including around the capital Moscow, on a near daily basis.

Ukrainian kamikaze USVs also regularly prowl the Black Sea. Submarines at Novorossiysk, as well as bases on the occupied Crimean Peninsula, have been the wide array of targets struck. There was another daytime USV attack just yesterday on the Russian-occupied port of Yalta in Crimea. It’s also worth noting here that Ukraine has developed USVs capable of launching kamikaze UAS, combining those two capabilities and creating additional threat vectors Russia’s forces have to contend with. In addition, Ukraine now has the ability to hit even moving targets using long-range drones equipped with miniaturized satellite communications terminals. This leaves even ships not sitting static in port very much at risk, which Ukraine has highlighted in recent months as it goes after Russia’s logistics ships in the Sea of Azov, a campaign that is only accelerating and spreading.

As noted, the appearance of the nets at Rybachiy, which sits thousands of miles from Ukraine, speaks to how much further the threat of drone attacks has expanded. This goes beyond long-range strikes, as well. Ukraine’s unprecedented Operation Spiderweb attacks on Russian airbases last year highlighted the dangers posed by near-field attacks launched from deep inside hostile territory closer to their actual targets. Bases in Russia’s far eastern regions were among those targeted in the clandestine operation. Ukrainian forces have also launched attacks on Russian-linked ships in the Mediterranean Sea.

It also worth mentioning here that just this week, a small quadcopter drone equipped with explosive payload was discovered next to a Ukrainian An-124 cargo plane at an airport in Germany. CNN reported today that U.S. authorities have now assessed that the uncrewed aerial system belonged to a Russian intelligence service. This follows years now of concerning drone incursions over military bases and other critical infrastructure across Western Europe.

Uncrewed aerial threats large and small are not at all limited to the context of the conflict in Ukraine and spillover from it into Europe, either. Drones have been a major factor in the conflict this year with Iran, as well as in other crises in and around the Middle East in recent years.

With the barrier to entry so low, drone threats are only becoming more commonplace globally as they proliferate to increasingly more capable degrees even among smaller nation state armed forces and non-state actors. For the U.S. government, counter-drone defenses for military installations and other critical infrastructure within the homeland, as to protect forces abroad, has become a major priority. Still, American authorities continue to lag in many respects in responding to the serious dangers that are very present already.

Altogether, the expansion of counter-drone defenses around submarines at the Russian Navy’s bases at Rybachiy and Novorossiysk reflect very immediate threats emanating from Ukraine, but are also a sign of larger trends globally. Similar force protection measures could well continue to emerge elsewhere, and not just in Russia.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Russian Nuclear Ballistic Missile Submarines Are Now Cocooned In Nets appeared first on TWZ.

This week’s caption reads:

U.S. Marines with 3d Reconnaissance Battalion, 3d Marine Division patrol through an underground tunnel in support of offensive operations during the Korean Marine Exercise Program 25.1 at Camp Stanley, South Korea, March 10, 2025. KMEP is a semi-annual exercise that provides iterative opportunities for Republic of Korea Marine Corps and U.S. Marine Corps units to train together, improving their combined capabilities to deter threats and maintain peace on the Korean Peninsula. (U.S. Marine Corps photo by Lance Cpl. Kendrick Jackson) 

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The post Bunker Talk: Let’s Talk About All The Things We Did And Didn’t Cover This Week appeared first on TWZ.

The new details about the Theodore Roosevelt‘s UAWC and other information about the MQ-25 are contained in a Modernized Selected Acquisition Report (MSAR) that the Pentagon recently released. The report itself is dated April 21, 2026, and it was produced as part of work on the U.S. military’s proposed Fiscal Year 2027 budget.

“In March 2026, the USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) UAWC became the first fully operational/deployable MQ-25 capable aircraft carrier,” according to the report. “The USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) UAWC is planned to be operational/deployable at the end of Aug 2026.”

“In August 2024, the first test Unmanned Air Warfare Center (UAWC), where Air Vehicle Pilots will control future MQ-25 airborne operations, was installed and tested aboard the USS George H.W. Bush (CVN 77),” the report also notes.

The USS Ronald Reagan and USS George H.W. Bush are also Nimitz class aircraft carriers. The Navy publicly announced the integration of the UAWC on the George H.W. Bush, a first-of-its-kind development, back in 2024. It is unclear why Theodore Roosevelt‘s UAWC has now become the first to be fully certified to support MQ-25 operations. It has been previously reported that the Navy’s plan is to deploy Stingrays first on the Theodore Roosevelt.

As mentioned, the MQ-25 program, overall, has been beset by delays, as well as cost growth, for years now. The Navy originally hoped to see the Stingray reach initial operational capability (IOC) in 2024. The IOC timeline subsequently slipped to July 2027 and has now been pushed even further to the right to February 2029. The first production representative example only made its maiden flight this past April. An earlier MQ-25 demonstrator, also known as the T1, has been flying since 2019.

The Navy currently plans to acquire a total fleet of 76 Stingrays, which will offer critical range extension for current and future aircraft in its carrier air wings. The aim, in turn, is also to eliminate the need for crewed F/A-18E/F Super Hornets to fly in the tanker role, which accounts for a significant portion of their sorties while deployed. This will free up those aircraft up for other missions and reduce overall wear and tear on the airframes. The new drones will also have a secondary intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability from the start.

“The MQ-25 Air System is integrating a Ground Control Station (GCS) managed by the Unmanned Carrier Aviation Mission Control System (UMCS) program within UCA [the Navy’s Unmanned Carrier Aviation program]. The UMCS program is a separate ACAT II [Acquisition Category II] program that integrates with multiple networks and systems both afloat and ashore,” the recently released MSAR also notes. “The MQ-25 and UMCS programs are synchronized to provide complete capability to the aircraft carrier.”

While Boeing is the prime contractor for the MQ-25 drone, Lockheed Martin has been leading work on the UMCS, and has described it previously as a “system of systems.” The central element is the MD-5E GCS, which consists of operator stations with arrays of monitors, tablet-like devices, and other computer hardware. What has been seen of the MD-5 system to date in terms of the physical hardware is fully in line with other known GCS designs, including ones the U.S. Air Force has used over the years to operate MQ-1 Predators and MQ-9 Reapers.

The UMCS also includes the Multi Domain Combat System (MDCX), an “autonomy platform” developed by Lockheed Martin’s famed Skunk Works advanced projects division. The company has told TWZ directly in the past that MDCX “provides uncrewed vehicle autonomy, mission planning, and command and control (C2) capability.”

“In October 2025, MQ-25A and the UMCS connected for the first time during air vehicle and Ground Control Station (GCS) Integration Checkout testing, allowing the Lockheed Martin GCS to establish command and control of the aircraft, which was critical to achieving First Flight,” per the recently released MSAR.

“The first Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) Operational Network Evaluation test event was also conducted in collaboration with the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN72),” the report also highlights. “This test event transmitted representative-network traffic between an at sea-configured aircraft carrier and a remote MQ-25 surrogate through operational C4I paths that include satellite communications links and the Navy’s primary tactical wide area network.”

The Navy has previously disclosed testing of the UMCS in conjunction with General Atomics MQ-20 Avenger drone to demonstrate the control system’s ability to support other uncrewed platforms beyond the MQ-25. The Navy does envision its future carrier air wings eventually incorporating multiple types of drones, including ones capable of attacking enemy forces at least 1,000 nautical miles away, as you can read more about here. A year ago, the service awarded contracts to Anduril, Boeing, General Atomics, and Northrop Grumman for work on concepts for future carrier-based Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) type designs. Navy officials have said in the past that the composition of the service’s carrier air wings could eventually become 60 percent or more uncrewed.

Beyond the important additional capabilities the MQ-25 will bring to the Navy’s carrier air wings, the Navy has long described the Stingray as a foundational “pathfinder” for its broader uncrewed aviation plans, something the new MSAR reiterates. As TWZ has explored in detail in the past, the MQ-25’s design and baseline performance, especially its extreme endurance and low-signature design, open the door to the Stingray itself being adapted to strike, advanced ISR, and other missions in the future.

There is more work still to be done before the MQ-25 can enter operational service, including demonstrating the ability of Navy carriers to launch and recover the drones. The service has laid at least some of the groundwork for that years ago with extensive testing involving a pair of X-47B stealthy demonstrator drones, which achieved many firsts for carrier-based uncrewed aviation. That very promising work was done under the Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS) program, which subsequently morphed into the radically different Carrier-Based Aerial-Refueling System (CBARS) effort in the mid-2010s. The reasons for that shift are still not entirely clear, as you can read more about in detail here. CBARS ultimately led to the MQ-25.

The Stingrays will have to be further integrated into routine flight deck operations, including just making sure they can be safely moved around with everything else going on. As we have previously written:

“Carrier decks are very constrained environments physically, and present very different conditions to operate in compared to bases on land. This is true even for crewed aircraft operations, where individuals onboard can provide additional situational awareness. A wearable glove-like system that personnel could use for deck handling was notably used during testing of the X-47B. A different kind of portable control device has been used in testing of the T1 MQ-25 demonstrator in the past, as well. The video released today does not appear to offer any major new insights into how the Navy plans to maneuver the Stingray around on carrier decks.”

It is still unclear what the Navy will be using to manage operational MQ-25s on carrier flight decks when the drones enter service.

The Navy has already been working to establish new units and training pipelines to support the future MQ-25 fleet. The Stingray force structure is set to be deeply intertwined with that of the Navy’s E-2 Hawkeye airborne early warning and control aircraft.

With the USS Theodore Roosevelt‘s UAWC now deemed fully able to support MQ-25 operations, the Navy has moved at least one more step closer toward finally fielding the Stingray.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post USS Theodore Roosevelt Is The First Carrier With A Drone Control Center Ready For MQ-25 Stingray Ops appeared first on TWZ.

The collision on March 12 killed the entire crew of the tanker, which had the call sign Zeus 95. Maj. John A. Klinner, Capt. Ariana G. Savino and Tech. Sgt. Ashley B. Pruitt were assigned to the 6th Air Refueling Wing, MacDill Air Force Base, Fla. Capt. Seth R. Koval, Capt. Curtis J. Angst and Master Sgt. Tyler H. Simmons (who was posthumously promoted) were assigned to the 121st Air Refueling Wing at Rickenbacker Air National Guard Base, Columbus, Ohio.

After the incident, the surviving jet, serial 63-8017, landed at Israel’s Ben Gurion Airport. Images emerged showing that half its tail was sheared off.

Little more was known publicly about the jet – assigned to the 314th Air Refueling Squadron at Beale Air Force Base, California – until it arrived at RAF Mildenhall in the United Kingdom on Aug. 2 with a replacement tail. Local aviation photographer Andrew McKelvey was kind enough to share images he took of the aircraft, one of which you can see below.

Serial 63-8017 left Mildenhall and finally arrived at Tinker on Aug. 3.

After McKelvey sent us the pictures, we reached out to the Air Force to find out how the aircraft was repaired and what would happen to it next. In addition, Mildenhall, as we have previously reported, was also a pit stop for at least two KC-135 tankers that returned from the Middle East full of patch mark repairs from shrapnel damage incurred during Iranian attacks.

“The aircraft are being inducted for programmed depot maintenance, where any damage patched by an Expeditionary Depot Maintenance (EDMX) unit will be fully repaired in conjunction with regularly scheduled 5-year maintenance,” an Air Force spokesperson told us Thursday afternoon. Located at Tinker, the EDMX is “responsible for maintaining the Air Force’s sole source for Aircraft Battle Damage Repair (ABDR) rapid repair capabilities for the entire tanker and bomber fleets,” according to the Air Force.

“Timelines for when the aircraft will fully return to the fleet ultimately depends on the extent of any additional defects or engineering issues identified during the inspection portion of the programmed depot maintenance,” the Air Force spokesperson added. “The current average for this regularly scheduled maintenance is 155 days, but it is reasonable to assume the timeline may be extended based on findings.”

The repair process to keep these aircraft able to maintain full mission capability can be much quicker, the Air Force spokesperson explained.

“Several damaged KC-135 Stratotankers were repaired by members of the 76th Aircraft Maintenance Group’s Expeditionary Depot Maintenance Flight [EDMX], allowing the aircraft to maintain full mission capability to complete deployed missions,” the Air Force added. The EDMX “completed more than 200 repairs over the course of three weeks; effective patches that also allowed the aircraft to return to Tinker Air Force Base for comprehensive repairs.”

The Air Force declined to provide details about the number of aircraft that arrived at Tinker to be repaired after being damaged in the war on Iran and did not immediately provide additional information about the work done on 63-8017 in Israel to enable it to fly again in the first place.

Whether coincidental or not, a few weeks after the mishap in March over Iraq, the Air Force pulled a Stratotanker out of storage and brought it to Tinker.

“At the request of the KC-135 System Program Office, the 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group regenerated KC-135R, tail number 58-011, to support operational requirements,” the Air Force told us back in April. “The aircraft departed on April 2, 2026, en route to the Oklahoma Air Logistics Complex at Tinker AFB, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma.”

The Air Force at the time declined to say if 58-011 was being used specifically to repair jets damaged during Epic Fury.

In addition to the tanker involved in the midair collision, an Iranian attack on Prince Sultan Air Base (PSAB) in Saudi Arabia is said to have damaged five tankers. However, the full destruction inflicted by it and subsequent strikes on PSAB remains murky, as do potential impacts to facilities and aircraft located across the region. The lack of regular satellite imagery from U.S. providers of the Middle East has made it harder to understand what has occurred, but as we state repeatedly, satellite images would not show more minor damage to aircraft, such as the shrapnel holes in images of two KC-135s that made a temporary stop at Mildenhall before heading to Tinker.

As we noted earlier in this story, on April 12, a KC-135, serial 59-1444, belonging to the Ohio Air National Guard’s 121st Air Refueling Wing, arrived at the air base in England covered in patches installed over shrapnel damage. You can see that jet’s arrival in the following photograph.

A little more than a month later, another Stratotanker, serial 63-8028, assigned to the Alaska Air National Guard’s 168th Wing, arrived at Mildenhall also peppered with temporary shrapnel damage repairs. The following photograph shows the aircraft at the base.

The damaged tankers are among at least 40 aircraft damaged or destroyed during the U.S. conflict with Iran. Our last tabulation is from April 10. There have been several other Iranian attacks on air bases in the region housing U.S. aircraft since then, but U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has declined to discuss battle damage. So it is possible, if not likely, that there have been additional assets destroyed or damaged.

The Air Force is seeking money to replace some of these aircraft.

“We hope to be able to address this in a supplemental for the aircraft that we’ve lost,” Air Force Chief of Staff Kenneth S. Wilsbach told Congress in April. “And the procurement going forward is meant to increase the number of tails we have, especially in the fighter force, but it will also include bombers and tankers as well. So both the supplemental and the ’27 budget is supposed to address those losses.”

You can get an idea of the extent of U.S. aircraft losses from our graphic linked here.

The fact that these tankers, which have all been in service for more than 60 years, were able to return to flight is a testament to the crews that fixed them. How much repair work they still have to undergo remains unclear.

Tankers are critical assets in high demand, and in this case of these jets, there may be at least one positive side effect from the damage. Executing a battle damage repair plan in the field to get a KC-135 back in the air is a good real-life exercise, one that could prove vital if a future conflict in the Pacific were to erupt. Lessons will certainly be learned on many levels from the war on Iran. And some of these lessons unfortunately, and perhaps needlessly, came the hard way.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post KC-135 That Lost Its Tail In Deadly Collision Over Iraq Now At Tinker AFB Repair Shop appeared first on TWZ.

The airport defense drill simulated an attempt by enemy airborne forces to seize Taiwan’s largest international airport and establish it as an airbridge for follow-on troops and logistics. Alongside M1A2T tanks, Republic of China Army (ROCA) Clouded Leopard 8×8 infantry fighting vehicles occupied defensive positions around the airfield while engineers erected obstacles across key approach routes.

During the exercise, armored vehicles from the ROCA’s 584th Armored Brigade, including four M1A2Ts and six Clouded Leopard vehicles in three different variants, established firing positions while engineering units emplaced temporary obstacles intended to prevent the landing of enemy aircraft, airborne troops, and special operations forces.

Combat engineers assembled steel “hedgehog” anti-vehicle obstacles in three-man teams, creating a defensive barrier along the airfield. Additional obstacles were constructed using cargo containers and airport vehicles provided by airport authorities, demonstrating how civilian infrastructure is incorporated into wartime defensive planning.

The scenario focused on preventing an airborne assault from establishing control of Taoyuan Airport, a long-recognized strategic objective in China’s People’s Liberation Army invasion planning because of its proximity to Taipei. Taiwanese military planners assess that if an attacking force secured the airport intact, it could serve as a hub for reinforcements, logistics, and the rapid advance of mechanized forces toward the capital.

The exercise also rehearsed casualty treatment and evacuation under combat conditions, with medical personnel conducting battlefield trauma procedures before evacuating simulated wounded. Meanwhile, Taoyuan Airport Fire Department firefighting vehicles participated by spraying water across parts of the training area to simulate decontamination and firefighting operations following chemical incidents or attacks.

Military officials said the drill was designed to validate joint military-civilian coordination during wartime while ensuring normal airport operations continued uninterrupted. Commercial flights continued to arrive and depart throughout the exercise.

The airport defense scenario also included a final escalation phase. Should defending forces prove unable to hold the airfield, other ROCA units would coordinate with the 53rd Engineer Group and airport authorities to demolish runways and other critical infrastructure, denying their use to an occupying force.

For a deeper look at how Taiwan plans to counter a Chinese invasion, you can read our detailed analysis here.

Suffice it to say, the Han Kuang 42 scenario echoes the battle for Hostomel Airport during the opening phase of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Russian airborne forces succeeded in capturing the airport after an initial helicopter assault, but the airfield was heavily contested and damaged in the ensuing fighting, preventing it from functioning as the airbridge Moscow had envisioned for rapidly flying in large numbers of reinforcements and heavy equipment. Ukrainian counterattacks ultimately forced Russian troops to abandon Hostomel as they withdrew from the Kyiv region weeks later.

Returning to Taiwan, the ROCA has received all 108 of the M1A2T tanks it ordered as part of the modernization of its armed forces, which face an expanding military threat from Beijing. Generally speaking, the M1A2T is equivalent to the M1A2 SEPv3 version — or System Enhancement Package version 3 — which you can read more about here.

Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) confirmed today that the first shipment of M1A2T tanks had arrived from the United States in December 2024, as we reported here. The final examples were reportedly delivered in April of this year.

The M1A2T procurement led to some questions about how suitable the big and heavy Abrams is for Taiwan’s very particular defensive requirements.

The Abrams is arguably not ideal for the kinds of urban warfare that the ROCA might have to engage in if it meets a PLA invasion — something that it already regularly trains for in these kinds of settings. Scenarios like this also pose a particular challenge for main battle tanks.

However, the drill at Taoyuan Airport reflects the reality that, were it to face a PLA invasion, Taiwan could not afford to leave any armored vehicle on the sidelines. Beijing continues to claim the self-governed island as its own and has repeatedly threatened to seize it by force if necessary, compelling Taiwan to keep even aging armored vehicles in service.

Despite questions about the utility of heavy armor in potential conflicts in the Indo-Pacific region, the ROCA is clearly looking at how the M1A2T and other armored vehicles could help defend key objectives in urban areas.

It’s also worth noting that the M1A2Ts are only one element of Taiwan’s layered defense. The ROCA also fields AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, long-range artillery, multiple-launch rocket systems, coastal anti-ship missile batteries, and air defenses intended to disrupt and attrit an invasion force well before it can land troops and armored vehicles on the island. Increasingly, drones, too, are part of this defensive equation.

Should the ROCA have to fight the PLA in its cities, this is another area in which specialist tactics are regularly trained.

We have reported in the past how Taiwan has demonstrated the extraordinary measures it is prepared to take to keep its armored forces alive in a conflict with China. During combat readiness drills, the ROCA conceals tanks and other armored vehicles throughout urban areas using improvised camouflage, disguising them as piles of scrap or civilian construction equipment in an effort to complicate PLA targeting.

Taiwan’s military has also begun incorporating Taipei’s subway system into its wartime planning. During exercises last year, troops — including teams armed with Stinger shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles — used the Taipei Metro to move around the capital in what appeared to be the first public demonstration of the concept. In a conflict with China, the underground network could provide a comparatively protected route for shifting troops, air defense teams, and supplies between key sectors while roads and other infrastructure above ground come under attack.

At the same time, it is clear that the PLA, too, would expect to take on Taiwanese forces in urban settings, and there is plenty of evidence of its units training accordingly.

The Han Kuang exercise has increasingly emphasized defending Taiwan’s critical infrastructure against airborne and special operations attacks. The appearance of the M1A2T at Taoyuan Airport marks the first time Taiwan’s newest and most capable tanks have participated in this high-profile airport defense mission, highlighting their growing operational role beyond conventional armored warfare.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post New M1A2T Abrams Tanks Guard Taiwan’s Main Airport During Invasion Drill appeared first on TWZ.

In a press release yesterday, Boeing announced that it had received an Undefinitized Contract Action (UCA) from the U.S. Air Force valued at $75 million related to JDAM-LR production for the Navy. The Air Force serves as the central manager for the joint-service JDAM program. By definition, a UCA means the parties still have to work out the final details of the deal, which could include the price point. UCAs are often used to kick-start work in response to urgent requirements.

“This first production contract is a major milestone for the JDAM LR program, demonstrating our ability to deliver long-range precision-strike capability at a significantly lower cost,” Bob Ciesla, Vice President of Boeing Precision Engagement Systems, said in a statement, underscoring confidence in the new UCA. “Scaling production of the GBU-75 will provide the fleet with an affordable, sustainable solution designed to eliminate long-range land and sea-based threats to U.S. and international forces and enable them to safely and effectively operate in a contested battlespace.”

GBU-75/B is the designation that has been applied, so far, to complete JDAM-LR munitions. Boeing’s release yesterday also revealed that the core component of the weapon, the so-called Payload Delivery Unit (PDU), has now also been designated BSU-111/B.

Like unpowered JDAMs, the JDAM-LR is more of a kit than a munition by itself. The PDU contains the guidance section, systems to interface with the launching aircraft, a pop-out wing kit, and a compact turbojet engine (understood to be the TDI-J85). PDU is then combined with a standardized low-drag 500-pound-class bomb as its ‘warhead’ to create a complete weapon.

As with JDAM variants – which also come in 1,000-pound-class and 2,000-pound-class variations – the modular kit-type design creates immense flexibility for how JDAM-LRs can be configured. In the past, Boeing has shown depictions of what it originally called the Powered JDAM (PJDAM) paired with general-purpose high-explosive bombs and air-dropped shallow-water anti-ship mines. There are many other 500-pound-class bombs with this same form factor already available, including specialized designs intended to reduce the risk of collateral damage.

In terms of guidance, JDAM-LR leverages the GPS-assisted inertial navigation system from the unpowered JDAM family. This guidance method can only be used to target static coordinates. Boeing has previously shown concepts for multi-mode guidance packages that could also include active seekers, such as a radar or imaging infrared system, which would enable strikes on moving targets at sea and on land. Boeing already produces a version of the 500-pound-class JDAM that adds a laser seeker to allow for the engagement of moving targets.

The biggest capability boost offered by the JDAM-LR over existing JDAM types is, of course, the stand-off range. Boeing says the powered version can hit targets more than 345 miles (300 nautical miles) away. A typical underpowered JDAM can still glide after release, but only out to around 15 miles, according to the Air Force. With the addition of a pop-out wing kit, JDAM-Extended Range (JDAM-ER) types have greater reach, extending out to roughly 45 miles. This all depends on various factors, especially release altitude and the speed of the launch platform.

There are also benefits to this design, and to leveraging existing technology from the JDAM family, when it comes to cost and scalability of production. Boeing says it has also invested nearly $100 million of its own money in this program, which traces its roots back to the late 2010s, at least.

What the exact unit cost of a typical JDAM-LR will be is unclear. However, historically, standard JDAM kits have cost between $20,000 and $30,000. The current price point for a TDI-J85 engine is unknown, but TWZ has used the Williams F107, a larger turbojet used in various cruise missiles, as a point of comparison in the past. Past reports have put the F107’s price tag at some $190,000. A typical 500-pound-class low-drag bomb would add another few thousand dollars to that total.

Regardless, for the Navy especially, JDAM-LR offers a lower-cost and lower-risk pathway to bolstering the standoff munition capabilities of its carrier air wings, and stockpiles of those weapons for future fights. The service notably cancelled previous plans to acquire a turbojet-powered version of the AGM-154 Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW) glide bomb back in 2021 in favor of a new version of the AGM-158C Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRAM) with secondary land attack capability. In 2024, the Navy also disclosed that it was axing plans to incorporate land attack functionality on the AGM-158C-3 variant. It should also be noted here that LRASM is a very capable, but also very expensive weapon, with unit costs generally pegged in the $3 million range, regardless of version.

Navy carrier air wings do also have access to the AGM-84K Standoff Land Attack Missile-Expanded Response (SLAM-ER) missile, which can be employed by F/A-18E/F Super Hornets. An air-launched land-attack outgrowth of the Harpoon anti-ship cruise missile, the SLAM-ER’s maximum range is reportedly around 170 miles. These missiles also have unit costs in the $3 million range.

Extending the reach of strike aircraft in Navy carrier air wings is already a top priority and is only set to continue being so in the future as adversaries, especially China, continue to expand their anti-access and area denial bubbles (A2/AD). This, in turn, will push carriers further and further from target areas. Standoff range also helps keep launch platforms further away from hostile air defenses.

On top of this, ongoing fighting with Iran, which has followed years of other crises in and around the Middle East and elsewhere globally, has also underscored concerns about munitions stockpiles and the ability to replenish them quickly. Alarm bells are now ringing very loudly. The U.S. military has been taking steps to reverse these trends, but they are still years away from yielding substantial results. Capabilities like JDAM-LR offer increasingly critical additional avenues for refilling stockpiles of standoff strike munitions.

With this in mind, it is possible, if not highly probable, that JDAM-LR production will expand to other services beyond the Navy. As noted, the Air Force is the central manager for the JDAM program and is the one placing the orders. Foreign allies and partners, especially ones that already have stocks of JDAMs, could also join in this new acquisition effort, creating additional economies of scale benefits.

If nothing else, after years of development, Boeing is now set to finally put the JDAM-LR into production starting with the orders for the Navy.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post Jet-Powered JDAM Production Is A Go For The U.S. Navy appeared first on TWZ.

OPVs are generally built for constabulary duties rather than high-end naval combat. Their primary missions include enforcing exclusive economic zones, countering piracy and smuggling, fisheries protection, search and rescue, and humanitarian assistance. As a result, they typically prioritize endurance, seakeeping, and low operating costs over heavy armament. Many Western designs in this category carry little more than a medium-caliber gun and a handful of remotely operated weapon systems, with no dedicated anti-ship missiles or significant air-defense systems.

The Falaj 3 takes a very different approach, as is immediately apparent from these photos.

Forward sits a Leonardo 76mm OTO Super Rapid gun equipped with the STRALES guided ammunition system, giving the ship a weapon capable of engaging everything from surface targets to fast-moving aerial threats. The STRALES system combines the 76mm gun with DART projectiles, which are guided to the target by a radio beam. The projectile is fitted with a proximity fuze, and the result is claimed to be especially effective against manoeuvring supersonic missiles, as well as fast-manoeuvring small boats. The DART ammunition also comes at lower cost than dedicated anti-air missiles, an increasingly important consideration, especially in the Middle East, where costly surface-to-air missile effectors are routinely expended, in significant quantities, against far cheaper incoming threats.

Directly behind the gun is an eight-cell vertical launch system loaded with MBDA VL MICA surface-to-air missiles. This ‘fire and forget’ missile can intercept targets at a range of up to around 12 miles and at altitudes of up to 30,000 feet.

Further aft is a 21-cell Raytheon Mk 49 launcher for the RIM-116 Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), giving the vessel a second, independent layer of point air defense. Most OPVs are fortunate to carry an adapted man-portable air defense system, if they have any dedicated air-defense system at all.

The offensive fit is equally notable. Four MM40 Exocet Block 3C anti-ship missiles provide over-the-horizon strike capability, while two 12-cell Low-cost Guided Imaging Rocket (LOGIR) guided rocket launchers offer an inexpensive way to engage drones, uncrewed surface vessels, and fast attack craft without expending much more costly missiles.

The MM40 Block 3C is the latest iteration of the well-known Exocet sea-skimming missile and has a range of around 150 miles.

The LOGIR, a weapon we have discussed in the past, is part of a growing number of 70mm rockets with an infrared seeker on the market now. A U.S.-South Korean co-production, the LOGIR was developed primarily for coastal defense and other maritime applications. It has a maximum range of around a few miles.

Completing the package are two Electro Optic Systems (EOS) R400-M 30mm remote weapon stations and two 32-barrel Rheinmetall Multi Ammunition Soft-kill System (MASS) decoy launchers, providing close-range firepower and survivability against incoming guided weapons, respectively.

The Falaj 3 class is also well equipped with sensors, including a Leonardo Kronos 3D G-band multifunction radar for air and surface search in the conical radome of the integrated mast. The mast also features the SPYNEL infrared search and track suite.

Combining all of these systems results in a ship with genuine layered air defense, anti-ship strike capability, counter-swarm weapons, modern electronic self-protection, and a sophisticated medium-caliber gun, all crammed into a hull roughly one-third the displacement of many contemporary corvettes.

Instead of sacrificing armament for patrol endurance, the Falaj 3 concentrates an extraordinary amount of firepower into a compact hull. The design is closer to a ‘pocket’ missile corvette optimized for Gulf operations than a conventional OPV.

The Persian Gulf is a relatively confined operating environment where naval combat is more likely to occur at short ranges, with vessels operating under constant threat from anti-ship missiles, drones, helicopters, and swarms of fast attack craft. In that environment, packing as many defensive and offensive systems as possible into a relatively inexpensive platform makes considerable operational sense.

For more demanding missions, including in true blue-water environments, the United Arab Emirates Navy can call upon close to a dozen true missile corvettes, with four different active classes constructed in France, Germany, and Italy. These carry many of the same weapons as found on the Falaj 3, but the largest examples displace close to 3,000 tons, and all can also embark a helicopter.

Based on the Fearless class patrol vessel operated by the Republic of Singapore Navy, the Falaj 3 class is built by the Abu Dhabi Ship Building (ADSB), a subsidiary of the UAE’s Edge Group. The first ship of the class, Altaf, was commissioned in February 2025.

The Edge Group is also building eight vessels of the same design for Kuwait, these being known as the Al Dorra class.

The design of the Falaj 3 reflects a broader trend in naval warfare. Advances in radar, combat management systems, vertical launch technology, and compact missile designs increasingly allow capabilities once reserved for frigates or larger vessels to be integrated successfully in much smaller vessels. Rather than relying exclusively on a handful of expensive large combatants, navies that operate heavily in littoral geography have the opportunity to field larger numbers of smaller ships that still possess credible offensive and defensive capabilities.

The Falaj 3 represents perhaps one of the most extreme examples of that philosophy.

Special thanks to X user @D__Mitch for alerting us to this story.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post The Falaj 3 May Be The World’s Most Heavily Armed Patrol Boat appeared first on TWZ.

The Houthis claim they killed and injured hundreds of the Saudi-aligned troops. Yemeni government officials said that at least 30 troops were killed while there has been no official comment from Riyadh. However, the U.S. Embassy in Yemen, the Yemeni Defense Ministry and the Saudi-led forces confirmed the attacks.

“Our armed forces carried out a broad and precise military operation targeting the Saudi enemy’s mobilizations in the areas of Al-Ruwaik, Al-Abr, and Al-Thaniyah, and other camps belonging to what is called the First and Third Emergency Divisions, using a large number of ballistic missiles and drones,” Houthi spokesman Yahya Saree stated on X. In addition to “the deaths and injuries of hundreds of Saudi enemy mercenaries,” Saree claimed the “destruction and burning of a large number of Saudi enemy camps, mobilizations, storage depots, and weapons in the Al-Wadiah area in the east of the country” as well as the “destruction of a large number of vehicles.”

Saree added that the actions were preemptive to prevent an assault on Houthi forces.

In a statement on X, the Yemeni Defense Ministry said the Houthis “carried out a treacherous attack using ballistic missiles and drones, targeting several camps and units of the Armed Forces deployed in the provinces of Marib and Hadramaut… The Ministry of Defense affirmed that the Yemeni Armed Forces will respond to this aggression at the appropriate time and place, and that this treacherous attack will not undermine the resolve of the Armed Forces’ heroes or affect their ability to perform their national duties; rather, it will increase their steadfastness, cohesion, and determination to defend the Republic, restore the state, and end the coup.”

The target of these strikes, the Yemen Emergency Forces (YEF), acknowledged they had been hit. 

“In a new military escalation, the Houthi terrorist militias targeted several military bases and military units, including emergency forces, resulting in material and human losses,” YEF claimed on Facebook. “This targeting comes after the military forces’ success in carrying out their duties under the directives of the Minister of Defense, aiming to secure areas, protect international roads, pursue gangs of kidnappers and smugglers, and apprehend those involved in robbery, kidnapping, and organized crimes.”

The Yemen Emergency Forces “are made up mostly of Salafi-aligned fighters from Yemen’s northern governorates and fall entirely under the Yemeni Forces Authority, itself commanded by the Saudi-led Joint Forces Command,” according to Defenseliney, an independent Yemeni media platform focusing on security issues. “Their roots trace to an earlier nucleus called the ‘Happy Yemen Forces,’ formed with Saudi funding, training, and support since 2019 and deployed along the Saada border strip extending north into Al-Jawf; most of its brigades had earlier operated under separate presidential decrees before being absorbed into the Emergency Forces.”

The U.S. Embassy in Yemen derided the Houthi attack as an act of terrorism.

“The U.S. Embassy to Yemen expresses our deepest condolences to the families of the brave Yemeni soldiers killed today in Hadhramawt and Marib,” the embassy announced on X. “The Iran-backed Houthis’ cowardly attacks represent yet another example of their terrorism against the Yemeni people. We wish the wounded a speedy recovery.”

Several videos emerged online purporting to show the Houthi attacks. They depict plumes of smoke wafting from what appear to be strikes and the sounds of small arms fire and what appears to be a drone strike can be heard, but they offer little real sense of the scope of the incidents or the damage inflicted.

There was also video purporting to show Houthi missile launches against the Saudi-backed forces; however TWZ cannot confirm any of the claims about these videos.

Today’s engagement marks a major escalation both in Houthi-Saudi hostilities and in the battle for Yemen, one of the world’s poorest countries, but strategically located along the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

The civil war in Yemen erupted in 2014 and expanded a year later when a Saudi-led coalition joined forces with the government ousted by the Houthis. For a while, the U.S. was supporting that coalition’s bombing campaign by providing aerial refueling and intelligence. However, then-Defense Secretary James Mattis ended that in 2018 during the first Trump presidency after growing concerns over the large number of civilian casualties being inflicted. The Saudi coalition’s fight against the Houthis also complicated the U.S. counterterrorism campaign against Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP).

The fighting between Saudi-led forces and the Houthis largely abated after a tenuous ceasefire was signed in 2022. Tensions, however, reignited in recent weeks after the Houthis joined the U.S.-Iran conflict on the side of their major supporter. The Houthis imposed a blockade on the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, and began striking Saudi ships in the southern part of the Red Sea as well as refineries along the northern portion. As we noted yesterday, the Yemeni rebel group said it was expanding its campaign against Saudi Arabia to strike vessels in the northern part of the Red Sea.

All this is adding to the pressure on oil supplies flowing out of the region, which has created global economic stress.

In response to attacks on its shipping, Saudi Arabia hit Houthi missile-launch platforms, a rocket-launch site, and weapons depots. However, the Saudi reaction was limited in nature. It remains to be seen how the kingdom will respond now given that many of the fighters it supports have been killed.

The uptick in Saudi-Houthi fighting comes as the region is already roiled in conflict, though efforts are underway to achieve a diplomatic solution to the U.S.-Iran war, now paused in an uneasy ceasefire.

As we have reported in the past, the two countries and Oman are working toward a deal that would essentially give Iran control over the Strait of Hormuz. 

Tehran is “insisting the framework represents a new security model for the strategic waterway rather than a full reopening of the strait,” CBS News reported on Thursday, citing Iran’s state news agency IRNA.

The proposed mechanism would regulate the movement of commercial vessels, with ships entering through Iranian waters and exiting through Omani waters.

IRNA said the talks are aimed at defining “a new model that is different from the 60-year-old practice of the past” in which ships passed through the strait at will.

The flow of traffic through the strategic chokepoint has become the main sticking point between Washington and Tehran as the two sides work toward ending hostilities. U.S. President Donald Trump has insisted that Iran must fully open the vital chokepoint or face new and more intense attacks that would include power plants, other civilian infrastructure and even leadership.

How much increased fighting between the Saudis and Houthis complicates these matters is an open question. As we have frequently noted, the closing of the BAM to Saudi oil traffic and now threats to the transit route north to the canal have already raised the specter of the U.S. having to get as involved as it did during the previous Houthi campaign against shipping that ended last September, which could pull resources away from Iranian-focused operations. It’s possible Egypt would have a major problem with such actions too, as it would impact the canal’s revenue and freedom of movement. 

A major intensification of Saudi-Houthi hostilities represents yet another complication in a region already in turmoil. 

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Houthis Stage Large-Scale Attack On Saudi-Aligned Forces In Yemen appeared first on TWZ.

In reporting on the crash, TWZ had a chance to speak yesterday with Steve Fendley, President of Kratos’ Unmanned Systems Division, who provided additional updates on the Valkyrie program. The U.S. Marine Corps notably previously announced that it is acquiring a fleet of Valkyries in the landing gear-equipped configuration under its Marine Air-Ground Task Force Uncrewed Expeditionary Tactical Aircraft (MUX TACAIR) Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program. Fendley also discussed developments across other parts of the company’s tactical drone portfolio.

To provide some quick additional context, the rocket-assisted takeoff (RATO) and landing gear-equipped conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) versions of the Valkyrie are the two main known configurations of the design. The RATO type, which first flew in 2019, also lands via parachute. Kratos has also developed a special launch trolley that allows RATO Valkyries to conduct runway takeoffs, though they still land using the parachute recovery system.

The CTOL version was first publicly announced in 2024. Drones in this configuration can also be launched via rocket, but then land conventionally. The addition of the landing gear does reduce the available internal payload space, as well, something we will come back to later on. In January, Kratos had told us it was targeting the early 2026 timeframe for a first flight, but we cannot confirm whether this has occurred. The Valkyrie crash on Tuesday did come after “takeoff from a test-range runway,” but Kratos would only say the drone in question was in “test configuration.” Whether or not this may have been the first flight of the CTOL variant is not clear.

More generally, Valkyrie is a highly modular design with an open mission systems architecture intended to be readily configurable to meet customer needs. Kratos has told TWZ in the past that it has developed at least five distinct versions of the drone. The company has also been steadily working to expand the performance envelope of the design.

“We have several CTOL aircrafts [sic] … we’ve been working on it for about a year and a half,” Kratos’ Fendley told TWZ. The CTOL configuration is now “in production. Started on those earlier this year, and again, those aircraft are – some are ready, and some still in the pipeline.”

Overall, work on the CTOL version is pressing ahead, he added, while noting that RATO versions are also still being actively produced. Kratos has customers now for both versions.

The U.S. Air Force was the first known XQ-58 operator, and continues to utilize RATO types in support of research and development and test and evaluation activities. The Marine Corps also has a handful of RATO Valkyries, which it has been using to help lay the groundwork for its future operational fleet of CTOL types, which are now sometimes also referred to as MQ-58Bs. The Marines are hoping to see the delivery of the first of these drones in 2029.

Kratos has also publicly announced a partnership with European aviation giant Airbus to develop a version of the Valkyrie aimed at meeting German requirements for a CCA-type drone. When asked about other Valkyrie sales opportunities yesterday, Fendley told TWZ that there are a “number of other international customers,” but could not elaborate.

“We have a set of customers for each configuration, and in many cases, we have customers that want both configurations,” he did note. “They’ll do test and training ops generally with the CTOL variant, but then for forward-deployed scenarios or for scenarios where they want to maximize the payload capacity, they’ll use the RATO configuration. which allows capacity inside the bomb bay.”

At the time of writing, Kratos’ website says RATO XQ-58s can carry up to 1,200 pounds of stores in their internal centerline bay, as well as payloads weighing up to 600 pounds on a single hardpoint under each wing. The bay itself is also said to be sized around a loadout consisting of four 250-pound-class GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bombs (SDB). The SDB is just under 71 inches long and has a body that is 7.5 inches in diameter. The CTOL has half the internal payload capacity, both in terms of weight and physical space, per Kratos’ factsheet. RATO and CTOL types can both also carry additional payloads weighing up to 600 pounds on two external hardpoints, one under each wing.

As TWZ has noted in the past, the ability to operate from traditional runways and conduct static RATO launches both offer certain advantages in different contexts. As Fendley reiterated yesterday, RATO types offer valuable runway independence for forward-deployed operations, and dramatically expand the total number of potential launch and recovery points. Previously, Kratos has shown a concept for an entirely containerized static launch system, which would offer further operational flexibility.

All of this, in turn, could help enable distributed concepts of operations that are also intended to reduce vulnerability and otherwise complicate an opponent’s decision-making cycles. The U.S. Marine Corps and U.S. Air Force, in particular, see distributed deployment concepts as critical to success in future conflicts, especially a potential high-end fight, such as one against China in the Pacific. The Air Force’s particular set of operational concepts, which it currently calls Aegis Combat Employment (ACE), were baked into the requirements for its CCA drone program from the start.

In general, static RATO launch does impose constraints on maximum takeoff weight and, by extension, on range and payload capacity. Kratos has previously told TWZ that just using the trolley launch method offers an increase “in the 10s of % for both fuel and payload capacity.” How exactly the CTOL’s payload and performance compare to the RATO version in either of these different launch modes is unclear. As already noted, the CTOL version does have less capacity available in its internal bay because of the landing gear.

Still, as we have previously written:

“The CTOL version offers a single platform with the flexibility to take off from conventional runways, which could allow for heavier overall weights, or to use the existing rocket-boosted method from a much wider array of potential operating locations. In a real-world operational scenario, the drones could fly a rocket-boosted mission to start, recover on a runway at a tertiary site, and then continue to fly sorties from there, or be deployed elsewhere. This would combine the benefits of runway independence, including the difficulties imposed on enemies trying to target what could be widely distributed launch points, during an initial wave, and the advantages offered by normal runway-centric tactical air operations for follow-on sorties.

…

“An XQ-58 that can land like any other fixed-wing aircraft on a runway offers advantages for resetting the drones and getting them back into the fight. It takes far more time and effort to get runway-independent types ready for relaunch after they touch down via parachute. That method of landing also relies on airbags to cushion the impact, and a failure of that element of the system can lead to significant damage. There is, of course, always the potential for accidents while operating from traditional runways. Regardless, a Valkyrie that uses a runway should be able to achieve significantly higher sortie rates.”

“The CTOL variant’s flexibility could also have benefits outside of a tactical scenario. TWZ has previously noted that a landing gear-equipped version would be easier to integrate, overall, with other tactical air assets that rely on traditional runways, which would also be relevant for training and other day-to-day peacetime activities. That being said, a significant portion of the Marine Corps’ future CCA fleets, as well as those that the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Navy plan to acquire and field, may not ever be daily fliers.”

As noted earlier, Fendley spoke directly to these latter points as important benefits of the CTOL configuration during his interview with us yesterday. There are still tradeoffs with the landing gear-equipped Valkyries, especially since they have to find a runway to touch down on even after a rocket-assisted launch. All of this, in turn, speaks to Fendley’s other comments about interest from customers in operating mixed fleets of RATO and CTOL types.

Beyond the core RATO and CTOL configurations, “we have many different configurations of Valkyrie for many different mission profiles and scenarios that our customers want to resolve, handle, address with unmanned, uncrewed systems,” Fendley also told us. “The ability for that system to couple with either a fourth-gen or a fifth-gen system and increase the survivability, increase the lethality of either of those systems is fantastic.”

This “has really served us with respect to our customers who want to be able to have a defensive capability like that without expending their entire annual budget,” he continued.

The current price point for Valkyries in either the RATO or CTOL configurations is unclear. Kratos has told TWZ in the past that RATO versions are in roughly the $4 and $6 million unit cost range. Years ago, the company also said it was hoping to eventually drive the purchase price down to around $2 million. Economy of scale benefits could be on the horizon as Kratos works to ramp up Valkyrie production. The company is hoping to see the annual production rate rise to 40 airframes by 2028.

“We have increased our full year 2026 organic revenue growth forecast up to approximately 18 percent to 23 percent as compared to full year 2025, which now also includes an expectation of approximately 10 percent organic growth for our Unmanned Systems business based upon recent contract awards, including Valkyrie,” Kratos’ President and CEO Eric DeMarco said just earlier this week around the comapny’s release of its second quarters earnings report.

Kratos is also seeing a surge in interest across its tactical portfolio more broadly, driven by demand both for reusable platforms and long-range one-way attack drones. In speaking to us yesterday, Fendley specifically highlighted the company’s Tactical Firejet design, also known as Airwolf, which has now been adapted into a kamikaze drone. That work has been done in partnership with Taiwan’s National Chung-Shan Institute of Science and Technology (NCSIST). You can read more about this variant, which is also called the Chien Feng IV (Mighty Hornet IV), here.

“And then, of course, our Mako system, which was our original tactical system, that we have a couple of customers who have become very interested in that,” Fendley also noted. This “is interesting because we developed that system in about the 2015-2016 timeframe, and all was quiet for a long time, and it’s really heated up in the, I would just say, in this calendar year. And I think some of that is based on world events, and some of it is based on the increase in budgets, particularly.”

Mako, also known as the UTAP-22, is a tactical combat drone derived from the BQM-167A Skeeter target drone, which Kratos also produces. Mako was at the center of a number of important experimental U.S. military drone programs in the late 2010s and early 2020s, but had appeared to be overtaken by the XQ-58, as well as more advanced designs from other companies. The design does still offer a tier of loyal wingman-type capability that could also come at lower cost compared to other options on the open market now. Mako might be adaptable to the one-way-attack role like the Tactical Firejet/Airwolf, as well.

In addition, Fendley offered positive assessments of ongoing development of the secretive Apollo, Athena, and Thanatos drones, but said he could not offer additional details given the level of classification surrounding those programs. This also just represents work the company is doing in the classified realm that we know about.

The Valkyrie family does remain front and center in Kratos’ tactical drone portfolio. This only looks set to continue with CTOL versions now being built and production ramping up overall for a growing number of customers globally.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post XQ-58 Valkyrie Drones With Built-In Landing Gear Are Now In Production appeared first on TWZ.

The acquisition was announced by Australia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Richard Marles during Exercise Pitch Black in Darwin, the country’s premier multinational air combat exercise. The missiles will be acquired through the U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.

“This announcement is the latest milestone in the delivery of long-range, high‑tech capabilities for our Defense Force,” Marles said. “The Albanese government continues to deliver critical capabilities that will allow the ADF to strike at a longer range, deter any adversary and protect our national interests. It is fitting to make this announcement at Exercise Pitch Black, which is an important demonstration of Australia’s commitment to the peace, stability and security of our region.”

According to the Australian government, the Lockheed Martin AIM-260 will first be integrated onto the RAAF’s F/A-18F Super Hornet fleet before being fielded on the F-35A and the EA-18G Growler electronic attack aircraft. Looking further ahead, the RAAF’s MQ-28 Ghost Bat collaborative combat aircraft (CCA) is a likely candidate to be armed with JATM. It has already fired an AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) from an external pylon, and the forthcoming Block 3 version of the drone will offer internal weapons carriage, too.

The integration of the AIM-260 on the EA-18G appears to be a new announcement; previously, the priority U.S. platforms to receive the missile were the F/A-18E/F and the F-22. However, considering the commonality between the Super Hornet and the Growler, integration should be straight-forward.

“JATM missiles are some of the most sophisticated air-to-air weapons in the world, and Australia will be the first country to operate them outside the United States,” added Australian Minister for Defense Industry, Pat Conroy. “This investment will deliver the most advanced capability for our ADF to detect and counter threats, and keep Australians safe. This is made possible thanks to the Albanese government’s record investment in Defense, including up to A$36 billion [approximately US$23.4 billion] over the next decade for Guided Weapons and Explosive Ordnance.”

The AIM-260 has been under development for years, but its capabilities remain highly classified. It is intended to succeed the AMRAAM, offering substantially greater range and improved performance against advanced threats while remaining compatible with existing fighter aircraft launchers and weapons bays restrictions. The AMRAAM is currently the primary beyond-visual-range air combat weapon currently used by the RAAF’s F/A-18Fs and F-35As.

As you can read about here, the first picture of the AIM-260 emerged in May of this year, involving an F/A-18F from Air Test and Evaluation Squadron 31 (VX-31) carrying the weapon on the fuselage station outboard of its right engine intake. Flight testing of the JATM is known to have started years earlier, however.

Although official specifications have never been released, the AIM-260 is reportedly designed to hit targets out to at least 120 miles, if not substantially further. It was designed in response to China’s long-range PL-15 air-to-air missile, restoring the U.S. and allied advantage in beyond-visual-range aerial combat. Being developed by the U.S. Navy in cooperation with the Air Force, the missile is expected to combine a compact form factor similar to the AIM-120 with significantly greater engagement range, allowing aircraft to carry the same number of weapons without sacrificing performance. It is also designed for internal carriage.

As TWZ has previously written:

“An advanced rocket motor with highly loaded propellant has long been seen as a likely route to give the AIM-260A significantly greater range, as well as speed, over the AIM-120 without making the new missile larger. A core known requirement for the JATM is that it has to have the same general form factor as the AMRAAM, in large part to ensure that it can fit inside the internal bays on stealth fighters like the F-22 and the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. In addition to crewed aircraft, AIM-260As are expected to arm future stealthy drones like the ones under development under the Air Force’s Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program.”

…

“The AIM-260A’s rocket motor is also likely to be a dual-pulse design that retains energy across the flight envelope to further extend range and help dramatically with endgame maneuverability. Thrust vectoring capability would also be a requisite to give the missile sufficient agility in the absence of additional control surfaces.”

…

“An active electronically scanned array radar (AESA) seeker is likely. Multi-mode seeker capability, potentially with imaging infrared and passive radiofrequency (RF) guidance capabilities, could be extremely valuable in the face of an ever-expanding countermeasure ecosystem, although we have no idea if this is a feature now or not. It’s also possible it could be introduced in later variants. Advanced networking capabilities would be a key feature, allowing the missile to get additional targeting information from an array of third-party sources. This is especially important for engaging targets beyond the reach of the launch platform’s own sensors, and it can allow the aircraft firing the missile, especially a stealthy one, to avoid having to switch on its radar and increase its vulnerability to detection as a result. Multiple networked JATMs might even be able to prosecute engagements cooperatively.”

U.S. Air Force officials have publicly acknowledged that the PL-15 was a key driver behind the AIM-260 program. According to the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the Chinese missile “out-ranges the U.S.-made AIM-120C/D AMRAAM series and has a comparable maximum range to the Meteor.”

The PL-15 is already widely fielded, while China has also developed even longer-range air-to-air missiles, including the much larger PL-17. This weapon is widely believed to be optimized for engaging high-value support aircraft, such as aerial refueling tankers and airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) platforms, at extreme distances. We have previously taken a closer look at the still largely mysterious PL-17 here.

Those two Chinese missiles are also expected to be joined by a new weapon currently referred to as the PL-16. The missile appears to have been developed to allow the J-20 to carry six long-range air-to-air missiles internally, rather than the four PL-15s it currently accommodates. While expected to retain a broadly similar overall design to the PL-15, the PL-16 is believed to use a compressed-carriage configuration, reducing its size to maximize the J-20’s internal missile load. In that respect, the PL-16 appears conceptually similar to the AIM-260, in its emphasis on internal carriage capacity.

The air-to-air threat in the Indo-Pacific is only set to increase, with the potential for the carriage of larger numbers of even bigger and further-reaching air-to-air missiles in the capacious weapons bays of new-generation Chinese combat aircraft.

As TWZ has reported in the past, the U.S. Air Force envisions a future in which counter-air missiles could engage targets at ranges of up to 1,000 miles by 2050. While such capabilities remain decades away and far exceed the reach of today’s longest-range air defense missiles, the projection underscores the trajectory of long-range aerial warfare and the growing emphasis on extending engagement distances.

Another U.S. response to China’s growing long-range air-to-air missile capability is the AIM-174B, currently carried by U.S. Navy F/A-18E/Fs. Derived from the SM-6 surface-to-air missile family, it is substantially larger and heavier than the AIM-260, trading compact size for dramatically greater engagement range.

RAAF officials have previously indicated that Australia has no plans to acquire the AIM-174B, according to FlightGlobal.

Australia’s decision to procure the missile aligns with its broader effort to modernize the Australian Defence Force’s long-range strike and air defense capabilities amid an increasingly contested Indo-Pacific security environment, in which the threat posed by China’s rapidly expanding military capabilities is paramount. Canberra’s recently released 2026 National Defence Strategy emphasizes the importance of a layered air and missile defense architecture capable of countering advanced regional threats.

The government says the AIM-260 will provide the RAAF with a more credible deterrent against hostile aircraft while complementing existing air-to-air missiles and the Australian Defence Force’s expanding inventory of ground-based air defense systems. The acquisition will also improve interoperability with U.S. forces, particularly as both countries increasingly operate together in the Indo-Pacific.

While the government has not disclosed delivery schedules or the number of missiles to be acquired, Australia is now set to become the AIM-260’s first export customer, giving the RAAF access to one of the world’s most advanced beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles once it enters operational service.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Australia To Become First Foreign Operator Of AIM-260 Air-To-Air Missile appeared first on TWZ.

This marks the first time that a drone with explosives has been found in Europe far from the Ukrainian border, The Guardian noted. The incidents, which spurred the opening of a counter-terror investigation and temporary closure of the airport, have raised the level of concern about these incursions and the threats to parked aircraft, issues TWZ has frequently covered for years.

That the drone was carrying explosives “is a new quality of danger,” German Interior Minister Alexander Dobrindt told reporters.

German officials have not said who was operating the drones, but Ukrainian officials are blaming Russia.

“During the night of August 4 to 5, 2026, an airport employee discovered a drone carrying an unknown explosive device in the security area of the cargo flight operations, near the ‘South Runway takeoff/landing strip,’” the Saxony State Criminal Police said in a release. “The object was examined with the support of the Federal Police and a bomb-disposal robot. The Federal Police’s IEDD (improvised explosive device disposal) unit removed the detonator from the explosive device.”

The explosive-laden drone was found near a massive An-124-100 Ruslan (NATO reporting name Condor) cargo jet. As we have previously reported, Antonov, which operates the aircraft, is now using Leipzig as its headquarters after its facilities at Hostomel Airport in Ukraine were destroyed in the opening days of the Russian all-out invasion. The airport is also used by NATO and the German military for transport.

In the context of a Russian threat, the Condor, in particular, represents an unsurprising target. Ukraine’s An-124s are a source of national pride and a big flying symbol of the country’s defiance and survival. They also provide much-needed revenue to Ukraine and strategic airlift to support the conflict. Ukraine’s An-124s have long provided charter cargo services for western militaries, companies and NGOs. Since the war began, Antonov Airlines An-124s have been used to deliver war materiel bound for Ukraine. So, these giant aircraft really check a lot of boxes if Russia was looking to drastically escalate to executing such brazen attacks in European countries. While they are clearly the logical suspect in this case, we still have no proof of who was behind these incidents.

In addition to the drone on the ground, “a presumed second, unknown flying object collided with a cargo aircraft after it aborted its landing and went around again due to the previously imposed runway closure,” the Saxony State Criminal Police added. “After landing in Hanover, the aircraft was found to have sustained minor damage.”

The cargo jet in the midair incident reportedly belonged to DHL. It should be noted that in 2024, Western security officials said they believed “that two incendiary devices, shipped via DHL, were part of a covert Russian operation that ultimately aimed to start fires aboard cargo or passenger aircraft flying to the U.S. and Canada, as Moscow steps up a sabotage campaign against Washington and its allies,” according to The Wall Street Journal at the time. However, there is no clear connection between these situations at this time.

“Leipzig Airport is part of our critical infrastructure,” stated State Minister of Justice Prof. Constanze Geiert. “Attacks on these structures must be pursued by the law enforcement authorities with full force and severity. It is therefore welcome that the investigation has been taken over by the Central Office for Extremism Saxony (ZESA), the Dresden General Prosecutor’s Office, and the Saxony State Criminal Police Office, and is now being conducted under high pressure and in close coordination with the federal security authorities.”

As noted earlier in this story, German officials have yet to point the finger at anyone, but Ukraine’s officials say Moscow is behind it.

Ukraine’s ambassador to Germany, Oleksii Makeiev, blamed Moscow. “Who else could it be but Russia?” he told German media, without offering any proof. Ukraine’s strategic communications center took a similar stance.

“New footage of yet another act of Russian terrorism on EU soil, showing the drone loaded with explosives on the tarmac at Leipzig/Halle Airport, just meters from a Ukrainian Antonov An-124 cargo aircraft,” Ukraine’s Center for Strategic Communications posited on X. “According to German authorities, the drone was carrying an improvised explosive device. Bomb disposal specialists rendered it safe after determining the detonator had malfunctioned, preventing the device from exploding. In a separate incident the same night, a DHL cargo aircraft reportedly struck an unidentified object shortly after departure—possibly another drone—before diverting safely. The aircraft landed without injuries, though inspectors found minor damage.”

While it is unknown how the UAS came to be found near the Condor, or what countermeasures are in place at the airport, if any, when taken at face value, it has all the hallmarks of an attempted near-field attack via short-range drone. This is the same kind of strike Ukraine famously pulled off last year during its Operation Spiderweb campaign against Russian strategic aviation. In that operation, Ukraine remotely launched drones, hidden in trucks parked near airfields across Russia, to hit parked bombers and other critical aircraft. Spiderweb hammered home a threat TWZ had raised for years — even the most important aircraft on earth largely sit vulnerable on the ground to large scale attacks by low-end drones launched nearby.

You can see a video of one of the Operation Spiderweb attacks below:

Europe, as we pointed out earlier, has seen many waves of suspected drone incursions over military installations and civilian airports. They have shut down airports, forced the deployment of a German frigate to provide air defense coverage for the European Union meetings in Copenhagen last year and spurred changes to increase the ability to counter these aircraft. 

Drone sightings over European military bases and critical infrastructure have occurred sporadically over the years, some raising serious concerns. We broke the news on several over U.S. bases in England late last year, for instance. The origin of these drones has sparked debate across Europe. While many officials have stopped short of saying definitively who is responsible, Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen last year suggested it could be Moscow, calling Russia the primary “country that poses a threat to European security.” The Kremlin has denied any involvement.

You can hear Frederiksen’s comments at the time in the following video:

However, the incidents at Leipzig are the most serious yet as they prove weaponization.

The issue of drone incursions is not unique to Europe, as we have highlighted for years. There have been numerous incursions at military installations across the U.S., including some near the water, like Langley Air Force Base in December 2023 that The War Zone was the first to report. More recently, Barksdale AFB in Louisiana, home of B-52 strategic bombers and nuclear weapons, experienced a similar series of very troubling incursions. Off the coast of California, American warships were swarmed sporadically for days in the summer of 2019. There are many other examples, as well, and as is the case in Europe, it remains publicly unknown who operated those drones in all those instances.

The weaponization of small, even off-the-shelf drones, is only proliferating, especially after half a decade of fighting in Ukraine where these types of drones are considered among the most important weapons on the battlefield today. The know-how to assemble and employ these ‘democratized’ smart munitions is only spreading and the threat of them showing up far beyond war zones will only grow. For years already, criminal organizations like drug cartels have been using drones as assassination tools, for instance. This and so many other factors have made the need for better means of detecting and defeating them all that more dire. But even in the hands of the lowest of non-state actors, or even nefarious individuals, small drones will be increasingly used to do big damage.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Explosive Drone Found Next To Ukrainian An-124 In Germany Signals A New Threat Reality appeared first on TWZ.

Andrii Cherniak of Ukraine’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR) told Reuters that the deployment will involve approximately 90 North Korean personnel stationed in Russia’s Voronezh region — which borders Ukraine — alongside the Russian military’s 112th Guards Missile Brigade. Ukrainian intelligence assesses the unit could ultimately field six launchers and as many as 120 KN-23 and KN-24 short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), although the final composition is expected to be determined during senior-level talks next month.

The Ukrainian intelligence assessment has not been independently verified.

If confirmed, the deployment would represent a further deepening of North Korean support for Russia, after supplying Russia with ammunition, smaller numbers of ballistic missiles, and troops.

The Ukrainian Air Force today said Russia launched another major overnight strike combining drones with ballistic missiles. Preliminary figures showed Ukrainian air defenses shot down 98 of the 115 drones launched, but failed to intercept a single ballistic missile. As well as the inherent difficulty of intercepting these threats, this statistic also points to the exhaustion of its Patriot interceptor stockpiles.

The attack killed at least 17 people and injured dozens more after strikes hit multiple locations across Kyiv.

President Volodymyr Zelensky directly linked the casualties to continued shortages of advanced air-defense systems.

“Ballistic missile interceptors could have saved the lives of those killed today,” Zelensky wrote on social media. “It is very important that our partners understand that delays in supplying them, or an unwillingness to provide anti-ballistic systems, lead directly to such horrific casualties and destruction.”

Ukraine has spent months urging Western partners to provide additional Patriot batteries and interceptor missiles, which remain among the few systems capable of defeating ballistic missile threats such as Russia’s Iskander and North Korea’s KN-23 and KN-24. While Ukrainian forces routinely claim to intercept the majority of incoming drones and many cruise missiles, ballistic missiles continue to present one of the most difficult threats to defend against.

Last month, U.S. President Donald Trump suggested Washington might grant Ukraine a license to manufacture Patriot interceptors domestically before later appearing to back away from the proposal, saying the technology was “a hard thing to give away.”

According to Ukraine’s military administration, seven sites across Kyiv were struck during the latest attack, which began shortly after midnight. Zelensky said the primary targets included civilian industrial facilities, among them a brewing company and warehouses storing construction materials.

“Partners who are not yet ready to play a more active role in supplying interceptors can help by implementing new sanctions. A significant share of Russia’s ballistic missile production is still not under sanctions,” Zelensky wrote on X. “Even now. New steps are needed — from the G7, the European Union, and everyone who supports the protection of life. Thank you to those who are willing to help in this way.”

Kyiv Mayor Vitali Klitschko said rescue operations continued throughout the day.

“There may still be people under the rubble,” he said.

Emergency crews rescued two survivors from a destroyed warehouse near the city center. Klitschko said 24 people were injured, including an ambulance driver, while four remained in critical condition. The strikes also ignited multiple fires at warehouses and industrial sites, while Ukrainian authorities reported an ammonia leak triggered by one of the impacts.

The latest attack coincides with what Ukrainian intelligence says was Russia’s first use of North Korean ballistic missiles since August 2025.

Cherniak told Reuters that Pyongyang recently delivered another batch of 40 KN-23 and KN-24 missiles to Russia, along with additional personnel. He said Russia ultimately expects to receive 120 North Korean ballistic missiles and six launchers.

According to Ukrainian authorities, one of the newly delivered North Korean missiles struck the central Ukrainian village of Radushne last week, flattening a residential home and killing at least five members of the same family.

Clearly, any increase in Russia’s ballistic missile inventory poses a serious challenge for Ukraine’s already strained air defenses. The situation is likely to become more difficult heading into the coming winter, when Russia normally steps up its strikes against Ukraine’s electrical grid.

The KN-23, known in North Korea as the Hwasong-11A, is a traditional SRBM that can reach out to around 800 kilometers (497 miles) and has a 500-kilogram (1,102-pound) class unitary high-explosive warhead. It offers greater range than Russia’s 9M723 Iskander SRBM, which carries a similarly sized warhead but has a range of 500 kilometers (311 miles). This weapon has also been fired from adapted railcars, a concept you can read more about here.

As for the KN-24, or Hwasong-11B, this has a range of approximately 410 kilometers (255 miles), making it more of a battlefield support SRBM, but still sufficient for Russia to strike many targets within Ukraine. It is often considered a North Korean analog of the U.S.-made Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS).

However, the North Korean SRBMs are considered less accurate than their Russian-made counterparts and have been associated with strikes causing significant civilian casualties.

According to a report from Ukrainian state prosecutors, around half of the KN-23s that had been launched by Russia between late December 2023 and late February 2024 not only deviated from their trajectory but also exploded in midair.

An investigation by Conflict Armament Research (CAR) into the wreckage of a KN-23/KN-24 missile used by Russia in Ukraine found that the missile contained more than 290 foreign-made electronic components, with approximately 75 percent linked to U.S. companies, 16 percent to European firms, and the remainder to Asian manufacturers. This suggests that North Korea continues to obtain critical Western technology despite longstanding international sanctions and points to continued limitations in Pyongyang’s high-technology production capabilities.

North Korea first began supplying KN-23 and KN-24 missiles to Russia in late 2023. Cherniak said Pyongyang delivered approximately 150 ballistic missiles between late 2023 and August 2025. Ukraine also says North Korea has supplied millions of much-needed artillery projectiles and deployed around 14,000 troops to Russia’s Kursk region under the countries’ 2024 mutual defense agreement.

Cherniak said roughly 9,500 North Korean troops remain in Kursk but are not currently engaged in combat operations against Ukraine. Zelensky said last month that Russia is seeking an additional 30,000 North Korean troops and is preparing facilities in the Voronezh region to receive them.

Overall, North Korean-supplied missiles make up only a very small fraction of the weapons used in Russian strikes on Ukraine, but there has long been concern about the direction the burgeoning military relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang could take. There have been particular concerns that Russian expertise in the development of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons — as well as other weapons and technologies — could be provided to North Korea.

The reported new deployment comes as Russia appears to be increasing its reliance on ballistic missiles to exploit one of Ukraine’s most significant military vulnerabilities. With few signs that Russia has been able to further ramp up production of its own Iskander missiles, an increased supply of North Korean ballistic missiles would take advantage of a gap in Ukrainian air defenses and further threaten its cities, energy infrastructure, and other targets. The bigger concern is not simply another shipment of missiles, but the prospect of Russia tapping into an expanding North Korean production base financed by Moscow, allowing it to sustain high-volume ballistic missile attacks for far longer than it otherwise could.

Ukraine’s ability to defeat ballistic missiles of any origin has become increasingly constrained by the availability of interceptor missiles. Patriot remains the primary system capable of reliably engaging Iskander, KN-23, and KN-24 ballistic missiles, but the U.S.-made interceptors are expensive, produced in relatively modest numbers, and are also needed to meet U.S. and allied needs around the world. European-supplied SAMP/T batteries also provide a limited anti-ballistic capability, but have been provided in only limited numbers so far.

Global demand for Patriot interceptors has surged amid conflicts in Europe and the Middle East, straining U.S. and allied inventories and production capacity. Those constraints have become significant enough that Congress has questioned whether the Pentagon can sustain higher transfer rates to Ukraine even as Kyiv presses for more interceptors. Meanwhile, although the United States continues discussing licensed Patriot production with Ukraine, any domestic manufacturing effort would take many months—if not years—to produce missiles in meaningful numbers, leaving Kyiv dependent on allied deliveries for the foreseeable future.

Whether or not the reported North Korean missile unit deployment materializes, the operational trend is becoming increasingly clear. Russia is continuing to expand the scale and complexity of its long-range strike campaigns, pairing mass drone attacks with growing numbers of ballistic missiles specifically intended to exploit one of Ukraine’s most difficult defensive challenges. As Kyiv’s leadership continues to press for additional Patriot batteries and interceptor missiles, the consequences of those shortages are becoming increasingly evident with every large-scale strike.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post North Korea Upping Ballistic Missile Supplies To Russia Would Be Bad News For Ukraine At The Worst Time appeared first on TWZ.

“A Kratos test configuration of Valkyrie experienced a mishap following takeoff from a test-range runway on Tuesday, August 4, 2026. This was a Kratos internally funded R&D event, part of continually adding configurations and capabilities,” according to a statement Kratos provided to TWZ. “No one was injured in the incident. As safety is our top priority, flight test operations for this system have been paused temporarily in an abundance of caution while we investigate the cause of the incident. Kratos has additional test systems ready once the investigation is complete.”

In response to our follow-up questions, Kratos declined to provide more information about the configuration of the drone. The statement’s mention of “takeoff from a test-range runway” would point to one of two versions of the Valkyrie the company has been developing capable of getting airborne from traditional runways, which we will come back to in a moment.

An installation spokesperson at Dugway separately confirmed to TWZ that an unspecified drone had crashed yesterday at around 8:00 AM local time. The uncrewed aircraft, which was not owned or operated by the U.S. military, went down shortly after takeoff for reasons that are still unknown. There were no casualties or damage to buildings as a result. When asked specifically, base officials had declined to say whether or not the drone was a Valkyrie.

Dugway’s Michael Army Airfield is a major hub for uncrewed aircraft testing, both by the U.S. military and private companies. Dugway also supports a wide range of other research and development and test and evaluation activities, with a heavy focus on defense against chemical and biological warfare threats.

Versions of the Valkyrie have been flying since 2019, with the U.S. Air Force being the first known operator of the type. The drone, also known as the XQ-58, was originally designed for rocket-assisted takeoffs via static launchers, and then recovery via parachute. Kratos subsequently developed a special launch trolley enabling takeoffs from traditional runways. In August 2024, the company announced plans for a new variant with built-in landing gear, also known as the Conventional Takeoff and Landing (CTOL) type, and said they hoped to see a first flight “soon.” The CTOL drones will still be capable of being launched via rocket.

Back in January, Kratos told TWZ that the target timeframe for a first flight of the CTOL Valkyrie had moved to early 2026. At that time, the company also confirmed that this version of Valkyrie, sometimes referred to as the MQ-58B, was being developed in part for the U.S. Marine Corps. The Marines are acquiring these drones under the Marine Air-Ground Task Force Uncrewed Expeditionary Tactical Aircraft (MUX TACAIR) Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) program. The service is hoping to take delivery of its first MQ-58s in 2029. The service has already been laying the groundwork for its future CCA fleets with XQ-58 variants of the Valkyrie.

Kratos has seen growing interest in the Valkyrie family globally in recent years. This includes a partnership with Airbus on a version of the stealthy XQ-58 Valkyrie drone for the German Luftwaffe.

More remains to be learned about the crash at Dugway and how it might affect ongoing work on the Valkyrie family.

Update: 6:25 PM ET –

TWZ has now had a chance to talk to Steve Fendley, President of Kratos’ Unmanned Systems Division, in light of yesterday’s crash.

“I can’t go into detail on the exact configuration because, of course, that’s related to the investigation and what we will dig into,” Fendley told us. “So that basically would be potentially affecting the investigation. The investigation goes through everything that occurs leading up to doing any kind of a test.”

“We push the envelope across all of our system types,” he added. “The other thing I can say is we are constantly increasing the capability of the system, both for what we think it needs to be, and in other cases to satisfy what a particular customer may want to do to satisfy a certain mission.”

“So we’re doing all of those things, and the kind of Silicon Valley approach, the more modern test approach for things is you accelerate quickly, you reduce risk where you can, you experience failures here and there, you learn from those failures and you move forward,” he continued. “Ideally, with that process, over time, what you do is – what you ultimately develop, achieve, and can move forward with is much faster than the I’m going to call it the legacy traditional approach, which has you know little or no tolerance for any missteps.”

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post XQ-58 Valkyrie Crashes At Dugway Proving Ground In Utah (Updated) appeared first on TWZ.

The Iranian-backed Houthis already struck Saudi ships in the southern part of that body of water and refineries along the northern portion after imposing a blockade on the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, leading several oil tankers in the Red Sea to avoid that route in favor of the Suez Canal. The expansion of the Houthi campaign against Saudi shipping began with an attack off the port of Yanbu on the NCC Wafa, a Saudi oil tanker, the rebel group claimed today.

“By God’s grace, the Yemeni Armed Forces succeeded in striking the Saudi oil vessel Wafa in the northern Red Sea off the area of Yanbu, using a number of ballistic missiles — and the hit was precise, by God’s grace,” Houthi spokesman Yahya Saree claimed on X. “In tightening the naval blockade on the Saudi enemy at Bab al-Mandeb in the southern Red Sea, the Saudi enemy has moved to reroute its oil vessels toward the northern Red Sea. The Yemeni Armed Forces therefore affirm that their operations will continue and escalate in targeting Saudi oil vessels in the northern Red Sea, to close off every route and prevent passage, in order to cement the ‘blockade for blockade’ equation.”

There was no immediate statement issued by the Saudis and TWZ cannot independently verify the Houthis’ claims.

As we have frequently detailed, a Houthi blockade of the BAM threatens to add far greater pressure on oil exports from the Middle East, already drastically affected by the Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the resumption of the U.S. blockade on Iranian ports. The kingdom has diverted millions of barrels of oil per day through pipelines to its Yanbu port on the Red Sea in an effort to minimize the energy shortages due to the hostilities in the Persian Gulf. As we have noted, the Suez Canal is an important artery in addition to the BAM for ships carrying Saudi energy supplies, though this route drastically increases the cost of exports to Asia given the need to travel around Africa. While tankers carrying Saudi oil through the BAM have been greatly reduced, they are still making their way through the Suez Canal. But that could change if the Houthis start making that route perilous too, which would put a tighter energy squeeze on the west, including Europe, as well as the rest of the globe. They could also continue to attack Saudi oil terminals on the Red Sea, making shipping a moot point if the transfer stations are not operational.

The closing of the BAM to Saudi oil traffic, and now threats to the transit route north to the canal, also raise the specter of the U.S. having to get as involved as it did during the previous Houthi campaign against shipping that ended last September, which could pull resources away from Iranian-focused operations. It’s possible Egypt would have a major problem with such actions too, as it would impact the Canal’s revenue and freedom of movement. This could widen the conflict.

Meanwhile, there are mixed signals about whether the Strait of Hormuz will be fully reopened to traffic and under what conditions.

“The U.S., Iran and Oman are closing in on an interim agreement to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, with the U.S. aiming for a Wednesday announcement,” Axios reported on Wednesday, citing two regional sources and a U.S. official. “According to two regional sources, the deal under discussion sets up a 60-day temporary arrangement between Oman and Iran in the Hormuz strait, which could be extended.”

All inbound traffic of ships through the strait and into the Gulf would go in a northern lane through Iranian waters, the publication noted. All outbound traffic through the strait and into the Arabian Sea would go in a southern lane through Omani waters, in coordination with Iran. In addition, there would be no tolls or fees charged during this interim two-month period and the parties would work to clear the median lane of the Strait of mines within 30 days.

“After the median lane is cleared, it would be used for inbound and outbound traffic under the terms of a permanent arrangement to be negotiated between Oman and Iran,” the outlet added.

The deal described by Axios largely mirrors the Iran-Oman negotiations we reported on yesterday, with the main differences being the involvement of the U.S. and no imposition of fees. As we noted, both Iran and the U.S. are currently following a bifurcated traffic pattern, with the U.S. Navy recommending transits close to the Omani coastline and Iran pushing shipping toward its shores. The middle of the Strait has been deemed too hazardous because of the threat primarily from mines.

Speaking to Fox News Tuesday night, President Donald Trump said negotiations with Iran have been ongoing but that Tehran faces severe consequences if it fails to open up the Strait.

“If they back out again, they are going to get hit really hard,” Trump proclaimed.

The president has insisted that Iran must fully open the vital chokepoint or face new and more intense attacks that would include power plants, other civilian infrastructure and even strikes on leadership.

There are indications from Iran, however, that any deal to open the Strait is between Iran and Oman and that it might not result in a quick resolution.

The official Iranian Press TV stated on X “that any potential bilateral agreement between Tehran and Muscat regarding maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz will not automatically lead to the immediate re-opening of the strategic waterway.”

Reuters on Wednesday concurred that any deal to open the Strait may not be as imminent as Trump has claimed.

“A proposed deal between Iran and Oman would give Tehran control over ships entering the Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz,” the outlet wrote, citing a senior Iranian source and two regional officials. “Despite the apparent step towards yielding to Iranian demands, the sources pushed back against assertions by U.S. President Donald Trump that ‌a deal reopening the strait was imminent, saying important details still had to be agreed.”

Regardless of negotiations, U.S. Central Command stated on X that the Strait of Hormuz southern route along the coast of Oman remains open and that over the past three months, “U.S. forces have assisted more than 1,000 vessels in successfully transiting the strait despite unwarranted Iranian aggression, and these transits continue today.”

Between Houthi actions in the Red Sea region and the ongoing closure of the Strait of Hormuz, commercial traffic in both areas continues to be greatly reduced, though transits through the BAM are spiking upwards, according to MarineTraffic.

The latest “data highlights how headline volumes can obscure underlying maritime risk. Strait of Hormuz crossings fell from 10 to eight on 4 August, with seven vessels exiting the Middle East Gulf and only one entering,” MarineTraffic stated on X. “Five of the eight movements used the Iranian Unilateral Scheme, while no Hormuz Traffic Separation Scheme crossings were recorded.”

Meanwhile, “Bab el-Mandeb traffic rose from 25 to 34, including 18 vessels entering the Red Sea and 16 exiting,” MarineTraffic added. “Yet four dark transits, two sanctioned crossings and six shadow fleet movements indicate that visibility, routing concentration and compliance exposure remain central concerns.”

Amid all this, oil prices have actually fallen, with Brent Crude now trading at slightly over $79 a barrel, down from nearly $85 per barrel yesterday. Still, there are many reasons Trump is pushing a rekindled effort to find a diplomatic off-ramp to a conflict that has killed 18 American troops, wounded hundreds more, drained U.S. weapons stocks and roiled international relations and global financial markets. In addition to the global economic pressures this conflict has created, it is unpopular among the American electorate and crucial mid-term elections will take place in November. Even Fox News, generally supportive of Trump, has released polling data that shows a “majority of voters oppose U.S. military action, and nearly two thirds think the conflict will last at least a year.”

The latest Fox News survey “finds 56% oppose U.S. military action against Iran, including 40% who “strongly” oppose.”

How much these factors will play a role in Trump’s decision-making should become clearer over the next hours and days.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Houthis To Expand Shipping Attacks To Northern Red Sea appeared first on TWZ.

Press releases today from Boeing and Northrop Grumman shared details of the recent P-8/MQ-4 teaming test. The testing was conducted in a laboratory environment and no real aircraft were involved.

“A P-8A operator issued machine readable, machine actionable mission tasking to a simulated MQ-4C Triton using UCI [Universal Command & Control Interface] formatted messages,” according to Boeing’s release. “The P-8A cued the Triton transit to a specific area. After receiving the request, the Triton autonomously planned and executed a transit to the area, employed sensors per the tasking, processed findings onboard, and reported results back to the P-8A Poseidon.”

“In the exchange, Triton’s system used AI [artificial intelligence] algorithms to collect, process and share intelligence data with P-8A Poseidon in response to a request sent by the P-8A Poseidon system,” Northrop Grumman also said in its release.

“Data routes included satellite relay to reflect realistic operational communications. Mission management and autonomy layers communicated via OMS/UCI [Open Mission Systems/Universal Command & Control Interface] rather than custom point to point interfaces,” Boeing’s release adds. “Using UCI, the platforms can collaborate with any U.S. or allied asset sharing the same interface – reducing operator workload by distributing the mission tasks and accelerating commander decisions, making integration across platforms quicker and more cost effective.”

The P-8A was designed primarily as a maritime patrol platform, but has substantial additional intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities baked in. This includes a surface search radar that also has a synthetic aperture radar (SAR) mode, allowing it to capture still radar ‘images,’ even through cloud cover, smoke, and dust, and at night. It also has a sensor turret with electro-optical and infrared full-motion video cameras, as well as a robust signals intelligence suite, as you can read more about here. Its communications capabilities are also critical to making use of all the intelligence it gathers, as well as leveraging data gathered by other platforms. The U.S. Navy also operates more specialized versions of the Poseidon with very advanced add-on sensor systems.

The MQ-4C, which was derived from the RQ-4 Global Hawk drone, has a radar with a SAR mode, as well as electro-optical and infrared cameras, as well. In addition, the drones have electronic support measures systems that allow for the collection of electronic intelligence passively. Unlike Global Hawk, Triton also notably has the ability to descend to lower altitudes to more closely investigate targets of interest.

So far, the United States and Australia are the only countries to operate the MQ-4C, and both of them also have fleets of P-8s. Canada, Denmark, Germany, India, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, and the United Kingdom all fly P-8s or are in the process of acquiring them, as well. Last month, Denmark, Finland, Germany, and Norway announced a new joint plan to acquire and operate a fleet of Triton drones under the umbrella of the NATO alliance.

As already noted, the intention has always been for the P-8A and MQ-4C to work closely together, and the U.S. Navy actively teams the two platforms up today.

“Currently, the MQ-4C is being used as a long endurance, maritime ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] asset, that often times feeds us updated posits [positions] on contacts of interest,” a P-8A pilot assigned to the Navy’s Patrol Squadron Five (VP-5), the “Mad Foxes,” explained to TWZ in an interview years ago. “They can fly significantly higher and longer than us and are able to provide a more constant feed of ISR.”

“The Triton will be flown and monitored out of NAS Jacksonville [Naval Air Station Jacksonville in Florida], and we have already seen some pilots and NFOs [naval flight officers] being selected to operate the aircraft,” the Navy P-8A pilot also noted at that time, and this is the crux of the matter.

What Boeing and Northrop Grumman have now demonstrated, at least in a test lab, is the ability of P-8A crews to dynamically task and retask MQ-4Cs without having to go through a command center on the ground that could be thousands of miles away. This, in turn, can only speed up the process of responding to sudden developments, which could include potential threats that pop up unexpectedly or targets of interest that appear to be fleeting.

As the pilot from VP-5 previously explained, the MQ-4C already offers a valuable broad-area maritime surveillance asset that can cover vastly more area, and do so more persistently, than a P-8A can by itself. This, in turn, can also help keep Poseidons further away from potential dangers.

Though treated as something of an aside in the press releases today, work to enable the MQ-4C to do at least some level of immediate autonomous processing of the data it collects using AI-driven systems is also an important development. The amount of data that drones like the Triton can collect can easily be overwhelming for sensor operators and intelligence analysts. A new electronic and signals intelligence (ELINT/SIGINT) suite is in development now for the MQ-4C that will only expand the breadth and volume of data the drones can collect. The U.S. Navy is also in the process of upgrading its P-8As with the explicit aim of improving their already substantial ISR, targeting, and networking capabilities.

With all this in mind, the ability to detect and classify potential items of interest and then highlight them for human personnel offers immense benefits for shrinking down the time it takes to go from data collection to appropriate action. Having a collection platform, crewed or uncrewed, do at least some of that work in an automated fashion upfront can only help further speed up the process. Not having to send as much data can help reduce bandwidth demands and, by extension, latency in the transfer, too.

The OMS/UCI architecture used to support the new P-8/MQ-4C teaming testing could further open the door to pairing the Poseidon with other uncrewed teammates, as well. General Atomics has already been pitching the SeaGuardian version of its MQ-9B drone as a new partner for the P-8A. In its standard configuration, the SeaGuardian is also primarily intended for maritime surveillance and reconnaissance. However, there has also been work to give the drone new capabilities to support anti-submarine warfare missions, including with underwing dispensers for sonobuoys and the ability to pass data they collect along to other nodes.

We could see more teaming opportunities emerge for the P-8A in the future on the smaller tactical side if the aircraft gain the ability to launch drones of their own. TWZ has laid out a detailed case for adding this capability to the Poseidon in the past. More broadly speaking, the U.S. military is investing heavily in crewed-uncrewed teaming capabilities in the air and in other domains, and this is also a growing trend globally.

Especially with the P-8 user base already large and continuing to expand, a new level of interoperability between the Poseidon and the Triton, specifically, could be valuable for the U.S. military and its allies and partners during future coalition operations. This could also create new interest in the MQ-4C among existing and future P-8 operators.

“MQ-4C Triton and P-8A are the backbone of the U.S. Navy’s maritime patrol and reconnaissance force, delivering complementary capabilities unmatched by any other platforms,” Jane Bishop, Vice President and General Manager of the Global Surveillance Division at Northrop Grumman, said in a statement today. “This demonstration underscores the flexibility of our systems, our unwavering industry investment and the strength of our industry relationships. Our commitment to pushing the boundaries of advanced technology ensures that the U.S. and allied nations operators maintain an unparalleled edge against evolving maritime threats.”

“This Poseidon-Triton teaming demonstration unlocks real-world capability and interoperability for the U.S. and allies,” Tory Peterson, Vice President of the P-8 program at Boeing, also said in a statement. “We’re investing so that current and future global P-8A operators can expand the scope and effectiveness of their missions with low risk, evolutionary enhancements on the most advanced maritime patrol and reconnaissance aircraft already in service.”

It remains to be seen when Boeing and Northrop Grumman might demonstrate the new P-8/MQ-4C teaming capabilities in a real-world flight test.

“Next steps and timing will depend on customer requirements and would follow established acquisition, testing and fielding paths,” a Boeing spokesperson told TWZ when asked about any potential flight testing plans. “This was a jointly funded technology collaboration between Boeing and Northrop Grumman, demonstrating a practical, low-risk approach for integrating standards-based capabilities into existing platforms.”

The recent laboratory test is still an important step toward a future in which P-8A crews are able to issue direct commands to their uncrewed MQ-4C partners.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post P-8 Poseidon Crews Controlling MQ-4C Triton Drones Becoming A Reality appeared first on TWZ.

Ranging from short-range systems optimized for a Taiwan contingency to intermediate-range weapons capable of striking Guam and threatening U.S. naval forces deep into the Western Pacific, these regional missiles have become the backbone of Beijing’s anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) strategy. The land-based examples are road-mobile, solid-fueled, and increasingly precise. Some are fitted with hypersonic or maneuvering warheads to further complicate the work of an adversary’s air defenses. As of last year, the Pentagon assessed that China fielded 600 missiles in the ‘boosted hypersonic’ category, which includes systems carrying hypersonic glide vehicles (HGVs) as well as air-launched ballistic missiles, also covered in this article.

This guide examines China’s principal short-, medium-, and intermediate-range ballistic missile systems, how they evolved, and the roles they are expected to play in any future conflict in the Indo-Pacific.

In this context, a short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) refers to a ballistic missile with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers (621 miles), typically intended for battlefield or nearby regional targets; a medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) covers ranges of 1,000-3,000 kilometers (621-1,864 miles) and is designed to strike targets across a broader region; and an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) has a range of 3,000-5,500 kilometers (1,864-3,418 miles), enabling it to reach distant regional targets.

This article also discusses multiple missiles that carry either a hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV) or a maneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV). These weapon types can potentially be adapted to hit moving vessels. A MaRV follows a roughly ballistic path to its impact point, maneuvering to improve terminal accuracy and defeat missile defenses. If paired with a seeker, among other alterations, they can potentially be used to strike ships. Meanwhile, unlike a traditional ballistic reentry vehicle, an HGV is designed to be boosted to high speed and released before proceeding along a relatively shallow, atmospheric flight path to its target. It remains maneuverable throughout much of its flight, allowing it to change course and vary its altitude. That combination of sustained hypersonic speed and unpredictable flight profile makes it far more difficult to successfully engage, while also reducing the time air defenses have to defend against it — provided they even have weapons that can successfully do so.

Short-range ballistic missiles

The PLARF fields multiple variants of the DF-11, DF-15, and DF-16 SRBM families. Among their most important roles is to hold Taiwan and the southern reaches of the Japanese archipelago at risk. Ongoing modernization efforts to improve accuracy, survivability, and operational flexibility underscore the continued importance of these systems, particularly for a cross-Strait campaign. Just as significant is their sheer quantity, which would enable sustained strikes against the many military and infrastructure targets that would need to be engaged in a major conflict.

DF-11A (CSS-7 Mod 2)

The origins of the DF-11 can be traced back to 1985, and work on a new single-stage solid-fuel ballistic missile. The initial requirement called for a 300-kilometer (186-mile) range, matching that of the widely used Soviet Scud-B, using a similar road-mobile transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). However, development trailed the DF-15, culminating in a successful flight test in mid-1990.

The DF-11 entered PLARF service in 1992, but work on an improved version reportedly began almost immediately. Development of the DF-11A started as early as 1993 and focused primarily on extending the missile’s reach to approximately 600 kilometers (373 miles), effectively doubling the range of the original design. Following its maiden flight in 1997, the program was publicly acknowledged the following year, and the DF-11A formally entered Chinese service in 1999.

China also developed a specialized bunker-busting variant known as the DF-11AZT, reportedly entering service in 2013. Believed to use the DF-11A airframe, the missile replaces the standard high-explosive payload with a penetrator warhead optimized for attacking hardened and fortified targets. Images of the system surfaced in Chinese media in 2016, followed by the release of footage showing a 2013 test launch the following year.

Although rumors have periodically claimed the DF-11 family can carry a nuclear warhead, the available evidence does not support that assessment. Today, it appears that only one brigade still operates the system.

DF-15 (CSS-6)

China began developing a new generation of conventionally armed, mobile SRBMs during the 1980s, mainly with export customers in mind. The DF-15 has evolved through several iterations, although publicly available information on the missile family remains fragmented and, in some cases, contradictory. The first major upgrade, the DF-15A, reportedly entered service in 1996 and has occasionally been described as being capable of carrying a nuclear payload. However, the only PLARF brigade still believed to operate the variant is consistently identified in open-source assessments as a conventional missile unit. Estimates of its maximum range are equally inconsistent, with figures ranging from the original 600 kilometers (373 miles) to as much as 900 kilometers (559 miles).

A more substantial redesign followed with the DF-15B (CSS-6 Mod 3), which reportedly entered operational service around 2006 before making its public debut during China’s military parade in 2009. The most obvious external change is its triconic reentry vehicle fitted with control fins, a configuration widely interpreted as incorporating a MaRV warhead.

Around 2013, another variant, the DF-15C (CSS-6 Mod 2), reportedly entered service. Based on the shape of its warhead, the missile is widely believed to be optimized for attacks against hardened and deeply buried targets, much like the previous DF-11AZT.

The DF-15 remains in service with only a small number of PLARF brigades and appears to be steadily giving way to the newer, longer-ranged, and more capable DF-16.

In 2022, the PLARF fired multiple DF-15s into the waters around Taiwan during live-fire drills following then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. This reflects the fact that missiles in this category remain central to any contingency involving the island.

DF-16 (CSS-11)

Another conventionally armed mobile SRBM, the DF-16 has steadily replaced the DF-15. Although it made its public debut during China’s 2015 military parade, the missile is widely believed to have entered PLARF service several years earlier, around 2011 or 2012. Nevertheless, much about the DF-16 remains unclear.

The DF-16 closely resembles the older DF-15, but lacks the prominent aerodynamic fins found on its predecessor. This suggests the missile relies on a more advanced guidance and flight-control system capable of maintaining stability without the need for large external control surfaces. There is also some uncertainty about its range: this could potentially surpass 1,000 kilometers (621 miles), a threshold that would place it in the MRBM category.

Stills from a video showing a test of a DF-16 with a submunitions warhead:

A version equipped with what appears to be a MaRV, commonly identified as the DF-16A (CSS-11 Mod 2), was spotted in footage of a Chinese military exercise released in early 2017, indicating it was already operational by that point. Chinese state media later revealed another DF-16 warhead configuration in 2018, widely interpreted as evidence of a further variant, the DF-16B (CSS-11 Mod 3?). Despite the emergence of multiple versions, open-source reporting consistently indicates that the DF-16 family is intended exclusively for conventional strike missions.

Medium-range ballistic missiles

Over the past decade, Beijing has invested heavily in modernizing both the quality and quantity of its medium-range ballistic missile forces. Today, it fields a diverse mix of MRBMs, backed up by long-range land-attack cruise missiles, capable of executing both conventional and nuclear missions across the Indo-Pacific. All of these MRBMs are road-mobile, carried on wheeled TELs, and powered by solid-fuel rocket motors, allowing them to disperse rapidly, launch with minimal preparation, and complicate efforts to destroy them either before or after firing.

DF-17 (CSS-22)

One of the PLARF’s most significant recent additions is the DF-17, the world’s first operational ballistic missile designed from the outset to deliver an HGV. Publicly unveiled during China’s 70th anniversary military parade in 2019, the system is estimated to have entered service shortly beforehand.

With an estimated range of 1,800-2,200 kilometers (1,118-1,367 miles), the DF-17 can reach targets across Taiwan, South Korea, and most of Japan, as well as U.S. military facilities throughout the First Island Chain. Traveling at speeds reportedly approaching Mach 10, the DF-17 could cover its maximum range in roughly a dozen minutes, representing a far more difficult target for existing air and missile defense systems.

The PLARF would likely employ the DF-17 during the opening stages of a conflict to neutralize high-value assets, including integrated air and missile defense sites, long-range radars, command-and-control nodes, and other time-sensitive targets, thereby improving the effectiveness of follow-on strikes by less advanced missile systems.

Although Beijing maintains that the DF-17 is conventionally armed, Chinese media and senior U.S. military officials have suggested the missile may also possess a nuclear capability. If confirmed, it would join several other PLARF missile systems believed to be dual-capable, further complicating an adversary’s ability to distinguish between conventional and nuclear strikes during a crisis, and potentially increasing the risk of miscalculation.

Reports have also periodically pointed to the development of an anti-ship variant, which would further expand the DF-17’s role within China’s growing long-range precision strike arsenal.

DF-21

The origins of the DF-21 can be traced back to the late 1970s, when China began working in earnest on solid-fuel ballistic missiles. Following successful tests of a large-diameter solid rocket motor in 1978, development of the road-mobile DF-21 accelerated (as did work on a larger solid-fueled missile that would eventually evolve into the DF-31 intercontinental ballistic missile and its submarine-launched counterpart, the JL-2, both described in the first part of this feature).

The DF-21 completed its maiden successful test in 1985 and rapidly entered operational service with the PLA. The original DF-21 carried a single nuclear warhead and formed the backbone of China’s first generation of solid-fuel strategic missile forces. Its range is estimated at more than 1,750 kilometers (1,087 miles).

Even before the original DF-21 entered widespread service, work had begun on an improved version. Approved in 1986, the DF-21A (CSS-5 Mod 2) focused on reducing structural weight while increasing propellant capacity, extending the missile’s range and improving overall performance. Flight testing began in 1991, and by the mid-1990s the PLA had begun replacing the original DF-21 with the upgraded variant.

The DF-21 subsequently evolved from a purely nuclear deterrent into a remarkably versatile missile family. Around 2004, the PLA fielded the DF-21C (CSS-5 Mod 4), widely believed to be the first conventionally armed member of the series. Designed for precision land attack, the missile introduced an entirely new mission for the DF-21 but also highlighted a growing escalation risk. The DF-21C appears to have been retired, with surviving units reportedly having transitioned to newer missile systems.

Public information on a supposed DF-21B remains sparse. The designation may have referred to an intermediate development fitted with a MaRV before that technology matured into the much better-known DF-21D.

It was the DF-21D (CSS-5 Mod 5) that really brought the missile family into the spotlight, as one of China’s most closely watched strategic weapons. Public attention surged in 2010 after a senior U.S. Navy officer stated that the missile had reached initial operational capability. Equipped with a MaRV and designed specifically to attack moving warships, the conventionally armed DF-21D became the world’s first operational anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) and quickly earned the nickname “carrier killer” (since applied to several other weapon systems). Western sources attribute the DF-21D with a range of more than 1,500 kilometers (932 miles).

The concept reflected Beijing’s broader A2/AD strategy, which seeks to hold U.S. carrier strike groups at risk and complicate U.S. military intervention inside the First Island Chain. U.S. defense reports had been tracking the program since the mid-2000s, and subsequent reports indicate the DF-21D has been tested against both land-based carrier mockups and actual targets at sea, underscoring China’s continued investment in long-range precision strike capabilities.

While both the DF-21C and DF-21D are conventionally armed, there is also a more modern nuclear-armed addition to the family. First reported in 2016, information about this missile is scarce. Some sources refer to this variant as the DF-21E, though this designation has not been seen in an authoritative context in China, and the Western reporting name CSS-5 Mod 6 has meanwhile been applied.

Intermediate-range ballistic missiles

For years, the medium-range DF-21 formed the backbone of China’s regional ballistic missile force, with different variants providing conventional land-attack, anti-ship, and nuclear strike capabilities. That role is increasingly being assumed by the longer-ranged DF-26 IRBM, which significantly expands the PLARF’s reach by bringing Guam, and its concentration of critical U.S. military facilities, within range. The in-development DF-27 looks set to push that range even further, blurring the boundary between an IRBM and an ICBM.

DF-26 (CSS-18)

Increasingly the centerpiece of the PLARF’s regional strike force is the DF-26, which appears to be a substantially enlarged and a more capable evolution of the DF-21. Development is believed to have begun before 2010, with the first images emerging from Chinese sources around 2012 before U.S. intelligence publicly acknowledged the missile’s existence in 2014. Mounted on a highly mobile six-axle TEL, the two-stage, solid-fueled DF-26 made its public debut during China’s 2015 military parade and entered operational service the following year.

The DF-26 combines significantly greater range with exceptional mission flexibility. Unlike many earlier PLARF missiles, it is believed to be genuinely dual-capable, able to carry either conventional or nuclear warheads that can reportedly be exchanged relatively quickly depending on operational requirements.

In addition to land-attack missions, China has also fielded an anti-ship variant, equipped with a MaRV, and effectively extending the DF-21D’s “carrier killer” concept many hundreds of miles farther out to sea.

The DF-26 is thought to have a range of more than 3,000 kilometers (1,864 miles).

Just as significant as the DF-26’s capabilities is the pace at which it has been fielded. The missile has become one of the fastest-growing elements of the PLARF’s inventory, reflecting Beijing’s increasing emphasis on longer-range conventional strike options. The U.S. Department of Defense estimated that China possessed more than 200 DF-26 launchers by 2020, a figure that had grown to around 250 just two years later. Combined with its ability to strike targets as far away as Guam while performing both conventional and nuclear missions, the DF-26 is poised to remain one of the PLARF’s most important regional strike weapons for the foreseeable future.

DF-27 (CSS-X-24)

A next-generation system, the DF-27, represents the PLARF’s continued modernization. The Pentagon’s 2023 assessment described the DF-27 as still being under development, but a tranche of leaked U.S. intelligence documents earlier that year suggested at least a limited number had already entered service. If accurate, the DF-27 would represent another significant leap in China’s long-range precision strike capabilities. The Pentagon has stated that the missile could have a range of 5,000-8,000 kilometers (3,107-4,971 miles), pushing it into the intercontinental-range category. Even at the lower end of this assessment, it could strike targets far beyond the Second Island Chain, including parts of Alaska and Australia, depending on launch location. At the higher end, it would be sufficient to reach Hawaii and potentially parts of the U.S. West Coast from some launch locations.

Available reports indicate the missile is designed to carry an HGV and will likely be fielded in both land-attack and anti-ship variants. That combination could substantially expand the PLARF’s ability to threaten high-value targets across the Western Pacific, extending the reach of China’s A2/AD network farther into areas where U.S. carrier strike groups have traditionally operated under reduced threat.

The missile’s payload remains undisclosed, but given the PLARF’s growing inventory of dual-capable ballistic missiles, it would not be surprising if the DF-27 were ultimately able to carry either conventional or nuclear warheads.

Air-launched ballistic missiles

Falling into an interesting category is the air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM). The ALBM concept is far from new, with designs dating back to the Cold War, although they are currently seeing something of a comeback, with multiple nations around the globe now pursuing their capabilities. China is among them, and the best-known of these weapons, the JL-1, is today considered to constitute the airborne arm of the Chinese nuclear triad.

JL-1

The JL-1 ALBM can be launched by the modernized H-6N missile carrier aircraft of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF). These aircraft feature a modified fuselage that allows for the external carriage of these large weapons, as well as an in-flight refueling probe, extending their range.

The JL-1 ALBM is assumed to be the same missile that has been referred to in the past in the West as the CH-AS-X-13, and which is understood to have been in development since at least the mid-2010s. This missile is reported to be an adapted, air-launched version of the DF-21 MRBM and similarly equipped with a MaRV. The possible relationship with the DF-21, and the DF-21D specifically, has prompted previous speculation about the H-6N having an anti-ship role, particularly against U.S. carrier strike groups, as well as being able to hit land targets.

China has said the JL-1 (presumably coupled with the H-6N) has a range of approximately 8,000 kilometers (4,971 miles), although this is very much unconfirmed.

The latest Pentagon report on Chinese military capabilities refers to the H-6N as a “nuclear weapons-capable bomber,” and that its JL-1 ALBM is a “highly precise theater weapon that would be well suited for delivering a low-yield nuclear weapon.” However, it may also have the option of a conventional warhead.

Imagery has also emerged in the past, as seen below, which has contributed to discussions about the possibility of a second variation on the Chinese ALBM concept, with what may be a wedge-shaped unpowered HGV on top. As with the JL-1, this weapon could also be anti-ship capable.

KD-21

Finally, the H-6K variant can carry the smaller KD-21 ALBM on its center-wing pylons. This designation indicates an anti-ship missile, but it may well have the capability to strike ground targets, too.

In terms of its appearance, the weapon is very similar to the Russian Kinzhal (known in the West as the AS-24 Killjoy), a missile that is launched from adapted MiG-31 Foxhound interceptors and which has been employed in the war in Ukraine, apparently with only mixed success. Like the Kinzhal, which is an air-launched development of the Iskander SRBM, the KD-21 may be derived from a land-based weapon. In particular, the Chinese missile bears a close resemblance to the CM-401 land-based anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM), a weapon offered for export. The truck- or ship-launched CM-401 is also capable of hitting static land targets and is said to have a terminal speed of between Mach 4 and 6 and a range of up to 290 kilometers (180 miles).

Missile numbers

Estimating the size of the PLARF’s missile arsenal remains challenging, and, understandably, publicly available figures differ depending on whether they refer to launchers or missiles.

Recent Pentagon assessments estimate the PLARF operates roughly 200 SRBM launchers backed by around 1,000 missiles, approximately 300 MRBM launchers with some 1,300 missiles, and another 300 IRBM launchers fielding roughly 550 DF-26-class missiles.

While the number of Chinese SRBM launchers used for the DF-15 and DF-16 missiles, both of which are conventionally armed, has remained static in recent years according to Western estimates, Beijing has prioritized the development and deployment of land-based MRBMs and IRBMs, such as the dual-capable DF-21 and DF-26. From 2018 to 2019, for example, the Pentagon noted that the number of Chinese IRBM launchers and missiles had at least roughly tripled from roughly 30 to 80. In its 2020 report, the Pentagon noted that the PLARF had further increased this number to approximately 200 launchers.

These figures are informed estimates, and they vary noticeably across successive Pentagon reports as intelligence assessments evolve. Even so, they underscore the extraordinary scale of China’s regional strike force and, perhaps more importantly, its substantial magazine depth. This would allow the PLARF to conduct repeated waves of missile strikes in a high-intensity campaign. Current conflicts, especially between Iran and the United States/Israel, as well as in Ukraine, have shown just how critical these weapons are, and underscore that they can be a deterrent just by existing in huge numbers. The cost of air defense is also very high for the one being targeted. These lessons learned will likely accelerate China’s acquisition of more missiles and improved designs.

Taken together, the missile families detailed here illustrate how dramatically the PLARF has evolved from a relatively small strategic force into one of the world’s most capable missile services. Older systems such as the DF-11, DF-15, and DF-21 continue to provide valuable magazine depth, while newer designs including the DF-16, DF-17, DF-26, and emerging DF-27 emphasize greater range, improved accuracy, enhanced survivability, and increased operational flexibility.

Just as importantly, Beijing has increasingly blurred the line between conventional and nuclear deterrence by fielding a growing number of dual-capable missile systems, complicating an adversary’s ability to determine China’s intentions during a crisis.

Coupled with expanding production, continued technological refinement, and the proliferation of hypersonic and anti-ship capabilities, the PLARF’s regional missile arsenal has become a central pillar of China’s military modernization and one of the most consequential strike forces in the Indo-Pacific. Any future conflict involving Taiwan, the First Island Chain, or U.S. forces in the Western Pacific is certain to feature these missiles prominently from its opening hours.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post China’s Growing Regional Ballistic Missile Arsenal: A Guide appeared first on TWZ.

The $5 million to $6 million construction cost, Trump proclaimed in June, is being paid for by Sikorsky, the Lockheed Martin subsidiary that makes the VH-92A. It is unclear whether the company will be charged any additional costs or if the timeline for completion will change. We reached out to Lockheed Martin, Sikorsky, and Clark Construction, which is performing the work, for details. Lockheed Martin and Sikorsky referred us to the White House. Clark Construction did not immediately respond.

Photographs obtained by The Washington Post on Tuesday “show how contractors have taken apart their work, including a 100-foot-wide granite presidential seal that was beginning to take shape last week,” the paper pointed out. 

Trump ordered the helipad redo because he was “frustrated with its appearance and questioning whether the slope of the White House lawn needs to be changed,” the newspaper reported, citing two people who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss his private comments.

Construction crews have been working around-the-clock on the project in order to complete it before Chinese President Xi Jinping visits in late September, The Washington Post reported last month.  

A major issue is that the White House’s South Lawn, where the helipad is being built, “slants downward,” the newspaper explained. “Trump has expressed a desire for a landing pad that sits level with the horizon, prompting contractors to disassemble their work and consider whether to start by changing the lawn itself, the people said.”

Federal recommendations state that helipads should be flat for safety but do not need to be perfectly horizontal, to ensure water runoff. 

“The South Lawn, used for decades by helicopters that transport the president, slopes downward about 20 degrees in some places, the White House has previously said,” according to the Post. “That exceeds the recommended slant for helipads. The area chosen for the new helipad is flatter than other places.”

“For years, the White House has desperately needed a proper helipad on White House grounds that will allow the President to land safely and also protect the beautiful South Lawn grass from the fierce exhaust fumes of the incredible Marine One,” White House spokesman Davis Ingle told us. “Thanks to President Trump, the White House has never looked better, and it will only continue to get better under his leadership.” 

“We continue to make improvements and adjust accordingly as part of the ongoing project to best match the needs of the White House,” a White House official added, speaking on condition of anonymity to discuss the matter.

As we noted earlier in this story, the whole project now being fixed was in itself a fix for a long-standing problem.

“For 50 years we’ve been landing helicopters on grass,” Trump told reporters at the White House in June while announcing the helipad construction. “The grass is wet, soggy, and our other Marine Ones are about 40 years old.”

Aging VH-3Ds currently used for the mission are set to be retired completely sometime this year. However, the Marines expect to keep flying their VH-60Ns through at least 2030 because of their particular ability to operate in hot and/or high-altitude environments. 

The VH-92As “are about two and a half times more powerful than the old ones,” the American leader explained. “And when you land on the grass, it’s not that the grass gets discolored, it gets ripped out.”

The problems of downforce and heat generation, as we reported on for years, led to delays in the operational deployment of the VH-92A.

“This was a little bit of a planning mistake,” Trump explained. “So they landed the helicopter, and half of the grass was sitting in front of the Oval Office front door. The rest, it was scattered all over.”

The grass was also singed, Trump added.

“Everybody said, ‘well, we’ll keep using the old helicopters when we have to land at the White House, and for everything else we use the new helicopters.’ That’s a pretty expensive deal, you wouldn’t do that for your company.” 

Upon learning that Sikorsky was footing the bill, Trump said he decided to go for granite.

“Let’s do a beauty, let’s not just do a piece of concrete and paint it white,” he proclaimed. “This one is a beauty. It’s got the seal of the White House, it’s beautiful, the eagle, and it’s carved out of granite stone by some of the most talented people you’ll ever meet. And you’re landing on granite, which is the strongest stone that we can like.”

Trump suggested that when the helipad isn’t being used for Marine One, it can be used for events or even press conferences. The president also stated that once the helipad is finished, “we’ll be able to finally retire 45-year-old helicopters.”

The helipad work isn’t the only construction project taking place on the White House grounds. Trump has also ordered the construction of a new fortress-like ballroom, which you can read more about here, among many other smaller projects.

In the meantime, Trump is using the Ellipse — a park south of the White House — as a temporary landing zone for Marine One.

He did so again today as he flew to Joint Base Andrews, before departing for the West Coast, first for a fundraising event for the RNC in Los Angeles, and then to Nevada for an event to be held tomorrow, where he is expected to deliver remarks on the economy. 

How much longer this workaround will be needed isn’t clear. However, having to redo work on the White House helipad could mean that the first ‘White Top’ helicopter to land there will be pushed farther to the right of whatever timeline the White House had in mind.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Trump Orders White House Helipad Construction Redo: Report appeared first on TWZ.

According to the latest issue of The Outpost, the in-house news organ of the Army’s Yuma Proving Ground, the test marks the first successful live-fire demonstration of a full-scale hypersonic warhead launched from what it describes as a “cannon base test system.” Rather than relying on an expensive flight test of an operational hypersonic missile, the approach uses a gun to accelerate the warhead to high speed before impact, allowing engineers to study its lethality under controlled conditions. Hypersonic velocity means speeds of Mach 5 and above.

The concept has been under development for roughly two years as a way to create what the Army calls “a high throughput, alternative method for assessing terminal effects at velocity and scale.” While the release does not disclose the velocity achieved during the test, or exactly when it occurred, the underlying idea is straightforward. Hypersonic weapons derive some of their destructive effect from the enormous kinetic energy they carry into a target, as well as, at least in some cases, a relatively small warhead. A large-caliber gun offers a comparatively inexpensive way to reproduce at least part of a hypersonic weapon’s terminal conditions without expending an entire missile or firing from an airborne launch platform, costing millions of dollars.

The effort brought together researchers from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the Army Combat Capabilities Development Command Armaments Center (DEVCOM-AC), which developed a specialized launch package capable of surviving the extreme acceleration generated inside the gun barrel. Engineers also incorporated a DEVCOM-AC electronic safe-and-arm fuze while analyzing the internal ballistic forces the warhead would experience during launch. The extreme acceleration of being fired out a cannon is one major difference a warhead or test article would have to endure compared to being mounted on an actual missile and that must be accounted for.

Before the live-fire event, the team conducted an inert proof-of-concept firing that validated the overall approach. Army officials said those results led to a series of design refinements before progressing to a live warhead.

The service offered a detailed description of the final firing sequence.

After instrumentation checks and target preparation were completed, crews positioned the launch package, armed the fuze, and loaded the warhead and propelling charge. Personnel then withdrew to protective bunkers while test officials monitored telemetry.

As the article describes it, the test director issued the command to fire, followed by “a massive boom” that echoed across Yuma Proving Ground. Once the dust settled, engineers reviewed high-speed camera footage before confirming the shot had achieved all of its objectives. According to the Army, the silence was “quickly broken by loud cheers confirming a complete success.”

Beyond the immediate test, the Army reckons the capability could significantly increase the pace of hypersonic weapons development. Instead of relying exclusively on limited and expensive missile flight tests, engineers could use cannon-launched surrogates to generate impact data earlier and more frequently during development. The release says the demonstration has already attracted interest from multiple hypersonic programs that are considering incorporating the methodology into future test campaigns.

Although not mentioned in the article, the “cannon base test system” seen in the accompanying photo is the Heavy Artillery Test System (HATS) that was developed under the Strategic Long Range Cannon (SLRC) program before that was axed, when Congress directed the Army to stop funding the weapon in its fiscal 2022 appropriations act.

At the time, the service said it wanted to move funds into a more general account that it could use to help mature various advanced technologies.

The Army also said that it planned to complete various research and development and testing of SLRC components in the 2021 fiscal year. This included work on the very large rocket-assisted projectile that was supposed to give the cannon its 1,000-mile-plus range, as well as “system integration and technology maturation for SLRC to include designs for long lead prototypes to be used in upcoming major system level demonstrations.”

Returning to hypersonic testing, other alternatives to end-to-end missile flights include rocket sleds, which have long been used to replicate high speeds to test different technologies.

Back in 2022, as you can read about here, the U.S. Air Force successfully recovered a reusable rocket sled after traveling at a recorded speed of 6,400 feet per second, or just about Mach 5.8, beyond the hypersonic threshold, at Holloman Air Force Base, New Mexico.

This was the first time the Air Force successfully recovered a reusable rocket sled after traveling at such a speed. Being able to recover reusable sleds after traveling at hypersonic speeds allows for the collection of critical post-testing data, which is particularly important for hypersonic weapons testing.

Roughly 10 miles long, the Holloman High-Speed Test Track (HHSTT) is the only track capable of recovering sleds that hit hypersonic velocity via high-speed braking.

The Air Force also began the Hypersonic Readiness program (HSR) in 2020, which focused principally on fielding a hypersonic nine-inch monorail sled test with high-speed braking capability.

In general, hypersonic testing, a major priority across the U.S. military, is intended to push weapons and their components to the limits of what they can withstand. Test articles are subjected to the extreme heat, pressure, and mechanical loads associated with sustained flight at speeds above Mach 5 to determine whether materials, structures, and subsystems can survive the operational environment.

If the new gun-based approach proves broadly applicable, it could offer one answer to a persistent challenge in hypersonic development: generating meaningful terminal-effects data without consuming scarce and costly prototype missiles.

Exactly how closely the cannon-launched tests replicate the conditions experienced during an actual hypersonic weapon’s flight, and what velocity envelope the Army has achieved, remain unclear. Those details may ultimately determine how valuable the new test capability becomes across the Pentagon’s growing portfolio of hypersonic weapons. At the same time, any help in accelerating hypersonic weapons development would likely be of high value as China, in particular, has gained a clear lead in this critical new capability set.

Special thanks to X user @lfx160219 for alerting us to this story.

Contact the author: thomas@thewarzone.com

The post Army Revives Giant Cannon to Advance Hypersonic Testing appeared first on TWZ.

Highlighting the precarious nature of vessel transits through this narrow passage between Iran and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), another ship was struck by Iran overnight as it was leaving the Strait, a maritime security official told TWZ.

The Gulf of Oman, which is the eastern approach to the Strait and the Persian Gulf, is largely controlled by Iran to the north and Oman to the south. Under the emerging agreement between those countries, “vessels heading into the Persian Gulf will transit a channel controlled by Iran, and close to its coast. Ships leaving the Gulf will travel on a channel near Oman,” The New York Times reported.

Both Iran and the U.S. are already following this general traffic pattern, with the U.S. Navy recommending transits close to the Omani coastline and Iran pushing shipping toward its shores. The middle of the Strait has been deemed too hazardous because of the threat primarily from mines. The new plan being pushed by Iran and Oman would expand the use of these traffic patterns. Unless there is some special cutout made in the deal, it could require the U.S. Navy to seek permission to enter the Persian Gulf and then have to make the transit deep in Iranian waters, giving American warships degraded defensive options and putting them in the heart of Iran’s weapons engagement envelope.

While Iranian officials say that they won’t impose tolls, the accord does include a charge for service fees to cover the environmental impact of the shipping, security for the cargo ships and tankers, and staffing, the publication added. Revenues would be divided equally between Iran and Oman, two Iranian officials told the Times.

Reuters reported on Tuesday that “Tehran ​is unlikely to change its position,” because it has already shown flexibility by moving from its initial position of seeking full control over ​traffic in both directions in the strait.

But a U.S. official familiar with the negotiations told the Times on Monday that the Iranian account was “not accurate,” and said that any “temporary” routes established through the strait would not involve approvals or permissions by Iran, and would involve no tolls.

If this sounds familiar, there is good reason. We wrote about a similar scheme that was floated by Iran and Oman back in May. And, just like now, it came during a lull in fighting and as Trump insisted the Strait be open for all with no fees for transit.

Regardless of the plans for the Strait being discussed by Iran and Oman, the Trump administration on Tuesday said it could soon work out a deal with Iran on the matter.

“We are in talks with the Iranians,” Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent told CNBC’s “Squawk Box.” “There is a chance we may have a deal today or tomorrow to open the Strait and move towards a more normalized position in this conflict.”

“It would be freedom of movement,” the Treasury Secretary said when asked whether Iran would be allowed to charge a toll.

All this follows Trump’s claims on Monday that talks with Iran were ongoing and that he is giving Tehran a “last chance” before ordering new strikes. Iranian officials, however, vociferously denied Trump’s claim and said they are prepared to fight.

“We’re talking, and we’re talking at the request of Iran, backed by Saudi Arabia, backed by UAE and backed by Qatar in particular, but others also,” Trump told reporters Monday at the White House. “They all wanted to give this a last chance. This is a last chance. This is not something that if it doesn’t happen. This is the last chance for them.”

On Sunday, Trump stated that he called off a major attack on Iran to give diplomacy another chance to work. Asked Monday what his message to the American people is now that he has called off strikes at least five times, Trump replied: “Well, you don’t know, I don’t know, I think we’re going to maybe get something. But I want to give them every last chance before decapitation. Very tough to do what we have planned, still planned. We’ll see what happens.”

Hours before Trump spoke at the White House, Iranians dismissed both the notion of ongoing talks and U.S. control of the Strait.

“We currently have no negotiations with the United States,” Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baqaei told reporters, according to the official Iranian Fars news agency. “Instead, we are working, in consultation with Oman, to determine a route for vessel traffic through the Strait of Hormuz at the earliest opportunity. This arrangement is naturally temporary and is intended to ensure the safety of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.”

Responding to claims that Pakistani and Qatari representatives were involved in negotiations with the United States, Baqaei said, “I am not aware of any such matter. We are neither expecting to host a delegation in the coming days nor planning to send one abroad.”

The Iranians appear to be coalescing around hardliners from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. One Israeli journalist suggested that Supreme Leader “Mojtaba Khamenei has given IRGC Commander Ahmad Vahidi the final say on all key decisions regarding the United States.”

This is an outcome we predicted before Epic Fury was launched.

As we noted earlier in this piece, amid debate over control of the Strait, Iran struck the Liberian-flagged bulk carrier Minoan Pioneer with an unknown projectile near the Oman coast, a maritime security official told us.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations center (UKMTO) stated on X that it “received a military-source report of a mayday from a vessel. A second vessel relayed that the first vessel was struck by an unknown projectile in its engine room and crew accommodations.”

“One crew member was reported missing and the remaining crew evacuated safely, UKMTO added. “A fire was reported, the vessel lost power and required assistance. The vessel was last reported at anchor. UKMTO has been unable to contact the vessel.”

Meanwhile, United States Central Command (CENTCOM) still enforces a blockade of Iranian ports, an operation that remains a sticking point in the negotiation process.

“As of Aug. 3, CENTCOM has redirected 44 commercial vessels, disabled 2, and boarded 2,” the command stated on X Monday afternoon.

As the U.S. continues to maintain a large presence in the region, another report emerged highlighting the immense expenditure of munitions during this conflict.

The U.S. Army has “used up much of its stockpile of highly accurate long-range missiles” since Epic Fury was launched on Feb. 28, Reuters reported, citing three people familiar with the data.

The missiles are principally the Army’s surface-to-surface weapons, known as Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) and Precision Strike Missiles (PrSM). The U.S. has used “virtually all” of these weapons, according to two of the sources. The sources all declined to say how many of each munition the U.S. ​had left.

Supply figures on ATACMS and PrSMs “circulated inside the federal government over the last week during tense conversations inside the Trump administration about how much longer the U.S. can continue striking Iran without drawing down the stockpile to levels that would ⁠limit the military’s ability to respond to crises elsewhere,” Reuters added.

Several days earlier, “the top U.S. general in Europe privately warned the Pentagon…that he lacks sufficient naval forces to continue protecting Israel from incoming ballistic missiles,” The Washington Post reported.

Gen. Alexus Grynkewich, the head of U.S. European Command, “sent written notification to senior Pentagon officials saying that without another Navy destroyer he will be forced to choose defense of the United States ‘homeland’ over that of Israel, said the officials,” the Post stated. “A U.S. defense official said Grynkewich’s notification appears consistent with past outreach to the Pentagon from the military’s top generals when they see certain risks that require Washington’s consideration. This can occur, the official said, as commanders compete for finite resources and weapons.”

The depletion of ATACMS and PrSMs and Grynkewich’s notification come amid growing concerns over the supply of munitions, especially air defense interceptors. The lack of sufficient magazine depth is an issue that TWZ has raised frequently for years, and especially in regard to America’s air and missile defenses, in particular. In fact, we laid out in detail these exact concerns and how they would be a major issue in war with Iran just prior to the conflict starting in a feature you can read in full here.

Meanwhile, fighting between the Iranian-backed Houthi rebels of Yemen and Saudi Arabia continues.

The Houthis, who have already struck Saudi ships and refineries after imposing a blockade on the Bab al-Mandab Strait (BAM), on Tuesday said they struck Najran Airport using a drone.

“This targeting comes in response to the Saudi enemy’s violation of the airspace in the provinces of Saada and Hajjah using its drones,” Houthi spokesman Yahya Saree claimed on X. “We affirm to the Saudi enemy that any violation of our airspace will not go unpunished or without retaliation.”

There was no immediate confirmation about the attack from the Saudis. The Houthis often exaggerate or make up claims and TWZ cannot independently verify this one.

However, Saudi ship transits through the BAM are now almost non-existent since the Houthis imposed their blockade, according to the Windward maritime intelligence firm.

“Crossings fell to a lower baseline after the July 20 Houthi threat announcement, driven almost entirely by the collapse in Saudi-linked traffic,” Windward noted on X. “Non-Saudi vessels have held steady for two weeks at an average of 37 crossings per day — roughly 22% below pre-announcement levels. Saudi-linked crossings dropped to just 0.86 per day last week, the lowest recorded so far, with zero crossings on three of the seven days.” The threat “is functioning as a selective pressure on Riyadh’s Red Sea export route rather than a blanket corridor shutdown,” Windward added. “This matters because Saudi Arabia had already shifted significant volumes to Yanbu and the Red Sea to bypass Hormuz. That alternative is now under direct commercial strain.”

As we have frequently detailed, a Houthi blockade of the BAM threatens to add far greater pressure on oil exports from the Middle East, already drastically affected by the Iranian closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the resumption of the U.S. blockade on Iranian ports. Asia in particular relies on these shipments. The Yemeni rebel group has expanded its target set, hitting oil terminals and infrastructure Saudi Arabia is using to pump supplies to tankers in the Red Sea. The kingdom has diverted millions of barrels of oil per day through pipelines to its Yanbu port on the Red Sea in an effort to minimize the energy shortages due to the hostilities in the Persian Gulf. Even with the BAM closed, oil exports could still head to the West, via the Suez Canal.

But if the infrastructure used to convey these energy products is put out of action, the consequences could be even more severe, with far less or even no energy supplies from Saudi Arabia moving out of the Red Sea. The closing of the BAM also raised the specter of the U.S. having to get as involved as it did during the previous Houthi campaign against shipping that ended last September, which could pull resources away from Iranian-focused operations.

Though there is conflict in two regions of the Middle East, an expansion to Ukraine appears to have been avoided.

Major General Mohsen Rezaei, military adviser to Iran’s Supreme Leader, claimed on Monday that Tehran was prepared to launch a strike against Ukraine in retaliation for a Ukrainian attack on an Iranian ship in the Caspian Sea last month.

However, that was called off after Ukraine apologized, Rezaei reportedly claimed.

The situation dates back to July 26, when Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy reported a successful long-range strike on a ship in the Caspian Sea that, according to him, was being used to transport military cargo to Russia. Iran accused Ukraine of attacking a civilian vessel in the Caspian Sea, claiming that one sailor was killed and another wounded.

That’s it for now. We’ll update this story when new details emerge.

Contact the author: howard@twz.com

The post Iran And Oman Working To Control Strait Of Hormuz, Shaky Ceasefire Still Holding appeared first on TWZ.

The Air Force and Lockheed Martin shared details about the new testing involving the X-62A, which is a uniquely modified F-16, today. The U.S. Air Force Test Pilot School (USAF TPS), Lockheed Martin’s famed Skunk Works advanced projects division, and other unmanned “industry partners” supported what is described variously as a “closed‑loop AI combat test” and a demonstration of “autonomous AI sensor-to-vehicle control.” The X-62A, which started life as a two-seat F-16D Viper and is also known as the Variable Stability In-flight Simulator Test Aircraft (VISTA), is assigned to the USAF TPS. The Air Force also nicknamed this particular test effort Have Heat.

“Leveraging Lockheed Martin’s Infrared Search and Track Legion Pod, during the HAVE HEAT program, the X-62 VISTA platform demonstrated the ability of AI agents to ingest live infrared sensor data, directing the X-62 to autonomously intercept an airborne target in real time,” according to a release from the Air Force’s 412th Test Wing at Edwards Air Force Base in California.

“An artificial intelligence (AI) agent used targeting information from an operational sensor to execute successful air intercepts against a live target,” a separate release from Lockheed Martin also explained. “Across eight flights, the X-62 Variable In-flight Simulation Test Aircraft (VISTA) executed 27 AI-controlled intercepts.”

A T‑38 jet trainer was used as the live target during the tests, per Lockheed Martin.

The Air Force has clearly been building up to tests like Have Heat for years now. The service, together with General Atomics, has notably used the latter company’s MQ-20 Avenger drone equipped with this same pod to demonstrate autonomous target detection and tracking capabilities in the past.

As an aside, it is also worth noting here that Legion Pod has been in active operational use on crewed Air Force fighters for some time now. This reflects a separate renaissance that infrared search and track (IRST) capabilities have been seeing across the U.S. military. IRSTs are especially valuable for helping spot stealthy targets with features designed to reduce their radar cross-sections since they detect and track infrared emissions. By extension, IRSTs are also immune to radio frequency electronic warfare jamming. As passive sensors, they do not emit their own signals that could alert a target to the fact they are being tracked, either. IRSTs can still be used to cue or otherwise be linked to other sensors, including active electronically-scanned array radars. Fusing data from multiple sources can provide higher fidelity tracks of multiple targets, as well as improved situational awareness overall.

The Air Force, together with various industry partners, including Lockheed Martin, General Atomics, Shield AI, Anduril, and others, have also made other important strides in autonomous air combat capabilities in recent years. This includes a ground-breaking mock dogfight between the X-62A and a crewed F-16 back in 2024.

What Have Heat has now demonstrated is the ability of an autonomous platform to use its own closed data loop to directly prosecute an aerial intercept of a physical aircraft. It also showed that the parties involved could move “AI testing from simulated target data to real-time, on‑board sensor streams, mirroring the data environment pilots will face in future high-stakes engagements,” Lockheed Martin’s press release notes.

This all speaks to a core challenge in the development of advanced autonomous aircraft: situational awareness limitations. While the aforementioned simulated dogfight in 2024 was a breakthrough event, the Air Force subsequently disclosed that the X-62A and the F-16 had been directly exchanging data the entire time. This, in turn, underscored the difficulties of ensuring an autonomous platform can safely operate closely together with friendly aircraft, let alone engage a non-cooperative hostile threat, as TWZ explored in detail at the time. The Air Force, as well as other branches of the U.S. military, have been open about the need to overcome these hurdles and the difficulties of doing so.

It is also important to note that the commercial and military aviation sectors have been developing and fielding ever-more advanced automated ‘sense and avoid’ systems for crewed aircraft for decades now. This technology has already been working its way into the uncrewed aviation realm. However, at least so far, the main focus has been on flight safety in controlled airspace rather than dynamic air combat operations over hostile territory where threats and other hazards could emerge unexpectedly.

“Our autonomous agents consumed classified infrared search and track feeds and executed combat‑critical maneuvers in real time. This achievement marks a decisive advance toward delivering AI‑augmented air dominance for the United States,” Ron Fehlen, Vice President and General Manager of Lockheed Martin Skunk Works, stressed in a statement today about Have Heat.

“Our ability to provide reliable sensor data is critical, but the real advantage comes when that data can connect seamlessly with AI to take action,” Stacy Kubicek, Vice President and General Manager at Lockheed Martin Sensors and Global Sustainment, also said in a statement. “This project demonstrates how sensing and autonomous AI can come together as a force multiplier to make faster, more informed action in complex environments.”

“HAVE HEAT represents a meaningful expansion of avionics capability towards integrated, AI-driven control of multiple sensors and air vehicles for mission autonomy,” Air Force Lt. Col. Joshua Strafaccia, Dean of Faculty for Research at the USAF TPS, said in his own statement. “This bridges a capability gap and positions us to test advanced autonomy faster.”

As mentioned at the start, for the Air Force more specifically, Have Heat is another important stepping stone toward the air combat capabilities the service wants at least from its initial tranche of CCA drones. Using CCAs as forward IRST nodes is clearly a top priority. Putting the passive sensors out ahead of manned platforms, especially in groups, will generate high-quality target data independent of radars that even stealth aircraft cannot hide from. It will also help with survivability of the drones compared to equipping them with radars, but some will likely be equipped that way, as well. With all this in mind, IRST has already been emerging as a key capability for CCA-type programs more broadly, and not just in the United States.

The service’s initial CCA fleet is set to be made up of a mix of General Atomics FQ-42 Dark Merlin and Anduril FQ-44 Fury types. The Air Force is already using pre-production versions of those drones to help develop new concepts of operations and tactics, techniques, and procedures to go with them. This includes an operational test at Creech Air Force Base in Nevada just last month, which TWZ was first to report.

The Air Force does still see human operators at least being on the loop for the foreseeable future, especially to authorize lethal attacks. The service’s F-22 Raptors are in line to be the first airborne controllers for operational CCA drones. At the same time, the exact command and control schema can be expected to evolve as autonomous capabilities continue to advance, and human operators gain more trust in those platforms to perform their assigned tasks.

All of this is directly intertwined with tests like Have Heat to expand what the autonomous packages for those uncrewed aircraft are capable of doing. The X-62A has been especially deeply involved in this work for years now. The aircraft itself has been receiving new upgrades specifically to expand its own autonomous and other capabilities. The Air Force’s press release on Have Heat today also touched on another recent effort called Have Holidays, which focused on rapid testing of new software and hardware. Have Heat and Have Holidays were conducted in parallel.

“HAVE HOLIDAYS saw simultaneous integration and evaluation of a wide suite of modular technologies into the X-62’s Enterprise Open Mission System Architecture computer,” according to the Air Force’s release. “This included the integration of a non-prime, third-party autonomous agent onto the X-62, testing of enhanced safety rules to prevent autonomous vehicles from violating user-established operational limits, and further chip integration for advanced sensor exploitation.”

TWZ has previously explored in detail the importance of rapid, iterative testing in the development of new AI-driven autonomous capabilities, including in the virtual realm. Lockheed Martin says that it was able to complete “full integration and ground test of the agents” used in Have Heat in just three months using its “‘Supermassive’ AI agent generation capability.”

“This system-of-systems test served as critical technical risk mitigation on the design and development of logistics and integration frameworks required to maximize flight opportunities post-MSU, paving the way for broader government, academic, and industry partnerships,” the Air Force’s release today also added.

MSU here is the larger Mission Systems Upgrades plan for the X-62A. The MSU effort is currently working toward the integration of Raytheon’s PhantomStrike radar onto the aircraft, as well as other new “sensor and computing capacity” and “modern network data communications” capabilities, per the Air Force. The addition of PhantomStrike, a lower-cost lightweight active electronically-scanned array radar, is particularly significant and will give the test jet another important boost in situational awareness, as you can read more about here.

“X-62 is continued proof that an agile, dedicated team can rapidly advance Department of War initiatives through intentional collaboration,” Air Force Col. Maryann Karlen, Commandant of the USAF TPS, said in a statement today. “Accomplishing these significant milestones is a direct reflection of the adaptability and warfighter focus personified by all members of the school.”

Beyond the unique VISTA aircraft, the Air Force has also been modifying six other F-16s to help support advanced autonomy work as part of Project Viper Experimentation and Next-Gen Operations Mode (VENOM). The service announced the start of actual flight testing involving Project VENOM jets last month.

The Air Force has also been making use of a variety of other crewed and uncrewed aircraft, including the aforementioned MQ-20 Avenger, to support autonomy testing and otherwise help lay the groundwork for its future CCA fleets, as well. The service has been closely coordinating with the U.S. Marine Corps and the U.S. Navy on this work, and all three services have a formal agreement to develop a common command and control architecture for future CCA-type drones. The Air Force has also been working to bring in foreign allies and partners into its CCA program, starting with the Netherlands.

The Air Force is now hoping to begin fielding its first operational CCAs by 2030. In the meantime, tests like Have Heat utilizing the X-62A and other platforms will only become more important to help build the foundation for the air combat capabilities those drones will provide on day one.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

The post X-62A Toting Infrared Search And Track Pod Used Its AI ‘Brain’ To Autonomously Intercept An ‘Enemy’ T-38 appeared first on TWZ.

USS George Washington dropped anchor off the coast of Da Nang, Vietnam, on July 30, beginning a five-day port call. The carrier entered the South China Sea the prior week and conducted operations southwest of Luzon, Philippines, from July 24 to 28. This marks the fourth time a U.S. aircraft carrier has visited the country since normalizing relations in 1995 and the first time since 2023. The crew aboard George Washington welcomed the local community, hosting public tours and participating in local events. Guided-missile cruiser USS Robert Smalls and destroyer USS Shoup also arrived alongside the flattop.

“While our ship represents the high-end capabilities of the U.S. Navy, our visit here to Vietnam supports a U.S.-Vietnam relationship that continues to grow stronger across an increasingly broad range of subjects, reflecting our shared interest in a free and open Indo-Pacific,” the commanding officer of George Washington, Capt. Nicholas DeLeo, said. “Our Sailors are excited to step ashore, learn about Vietnam’s rich culture, and work side-by-side with the community here in Da Nang. It is through these personal connections that we build the trust necessary for a peaceful and prosperous region.”

The Theodore Roosevelt CSG returned to Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on July 28, after completing the at-sea phase of exercise Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2026. The large-scale exercise, which successfully concluded on July 31, brought 30 nations, 30,000 personnel, 30 surface ships, five submarines, and nearly 200 aircraft together to execute 2,400 sorties and respond to 5,000 scenario-based operational problem sets.

“No single nation can ensure security in the Pacific alone,” the commander of the RIMPAC Combined Task Force, Vice Adm. Jeff Jablon, said. “The network of allies and partners in the region is an asymmetric advantage. The work participating nations do at RIMPAC builds the combined and joint ability to deter conflict and supports all nations in exercising their sovereign rights and freedoms in the maritime domain.”

USS Theodore Roosevelt departed Pearl Harbor over the weekend and will head back to San Diego before deploying, likely to replace the Abraham Lincoln CSG in the Middle East, depending on how negotiations with Iran play out in the near term. Less than two weeks remain on the 60-day timetable initially agreed upon in the Memorandum of Understanding signed by both countries on June 17.

In the Middle East, U.S. forces, led by USS Abraham Lincoln and USS George H.W. Bush, “continue to strictly enforce the U.S. blockade against Iran,” U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) posted on X this morning. To date, CENTCOM has redirected 44 commercial vessels, disabled two by force, and boarded another two to ensure compliance. The pace of redirections is ramping up, with more vessels turned around in the past week (27) than in the first two combined (17). In audio released with the update, dock landing ship USS Comstock, part of the three-ship Boxer ARG – the only amphibious group in the region – issued a simple warning: “If you do not comply, we will compel compliance with force.”

Overall, three U.S. carriers are deployed, three are working up or at homeport in various states of readiness, four are in maintenance, and one is being used for training. One amphibious ready group is deployed, five are training or in port, and three are in maintenance availabilities.

Note: Positions are general approximations. Non-deployed LHA/LHD amphibious warships are not shown.

Contact the author: ian.ellis-jones@teamrecurrent.io

The post Where Are The Aircraft Carriers: August 3, 2026 appeared first on TWZ.

The Navy currently plans to acquire 19 VPM-equipped Virginia class SSGNs, according to a press release the service put out today. The first boat in this class to feature the VPM will be the future USS Arizona, which is actually the second Block V subvariant being built. The first Block V version, the future USS Oklahoma, will lack a VPM, but the other 10 boats in this batch are expected to have this feature.

Block VI Virginia class submarines are also expected to have VPMs, as well as other upgraded capabilities. However, last week, the Navy announced a new monster $76.6 billion contract award for nine Block VI boats, as well as five additional Columbia class nuclear ballistic missile submarines, or SSBNs. This creates a discrepancy of one submarine (11 Block Vs together with nine Block VIs, for a total of 20, not 19) when it comes to the stated SSGN plans. One possible explanation might be that the outlier is a planned one-of-a-kind seabed espionage subvariant. TWZ has reached out to the Navy for clarification.

Regardless, the decision to formally recategorize Virginia class submarines with VPMs as SSGNs is significant.

“This reclassification is a clear acknowledgment of the increased lethality VPM brings to the undersea fight,” Navy Vice Adm. Rob Gaucher, Director of Submarine Programs, said in a statement. “These VPM-equipped SSGNs will ensure the Navy continues to dominate the undersea domain for decades to come. By integrating this additional payload capacity, we will have the ability to surge strike power to assure our allies, deter aggression, outmatch any adversary, and give our Fleet commanders an incredibly versatile, hard-hitting instrument of national power.”

“Reclassifying Virginia Payload Module-equipped submarines as SSGNs accurately reflects the extraordinary strike capacity, operational flexibility, and global reach these platforms bring to the Fleet,” Navy Adm. Daryl Caudle, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), the service’s top office, also said in his own statement. “These submarines will provide our Nation with a powerful and persistent deterrent, expand options for our combatant commanders, and ensure the Navy remains ready to fight and win whenever and wherever called upon.”

Virginia class submarines with VPMs do have significantly greater magazine depth than their predecessor. Block I and II boats had vertical launch system (VLS) arrays capable of firing a dozen Tomahawks. Block III and IV versions have a pair of Virginia Payload Tubes (VPT) in place of the earlier VLS configuration, but with the same number of tubes (12) for Tomahawks.

VPM-equipped types will be able to carry 28 more Tomahawks for a total load of 40. Using different inserts, future Virginia class SSGNs will be able to carry other munitions in those tubes. This includes the aforementioned IRCPS hypersonic missiles. The Navy is also now looking to acquire a surface-to-air missile designed to be fired vertically from these submarines, which you can read more about here.

It should be noted here that all Virginia class submarines have four 21-inch torpedo tubes, which also offer another option for launching Tomahawks. They can also be used to fire Harpoon anti-ship cruise missiles, as well as launch and recover uncrewed underwater vehicles (UUV). It’s also possible, if not highly probable, that the VPMs will be capable of launching (and potentially recovering) other payloads, including additional uncrewed platforms.

Some existing Virginia class submarines can be fitted with Dry Deck Shelters (DDS) on top of their hulls for deploying special operations forces, swimmer delivery vehicles (SDVs), and other assets, as well. That is a capability that could be carried over to the enlarged SSGNs.

All of this brings us to the matter of the Ohio SSGNs. These boats are best known for being able to carry up to 154 Tomahawks at once, though they more typically deploy with loads of around 100 of those missiles. However, these submarines, which were converted from Ohio class SSBNs, are really multi-mission platforms. Beyond their ability to launch barrages of dozens of Tomahawks, they can act as motherships for special operations forces and uncrewed platforms, as well as serve as underwater intelligence fusion nodes and command centers. You can read more about their capabilities in this past War Zone feature.

“This transition [in categorization from SSN to SSGN] comes at an important moment as USS Georgia, one of the Navy’s four Ohio class guided-missile submarines, begins the inactivation process after more than four decades of exceptional service,” CNO Caudle also said in his statement today. “Georgia and her sister ships proved the enduring value of combining undersea stealth with unmatched clandestine strike capability. The next generation of Virginia class SSGNs builds on that legacy with greater survivability, adaptability, and sustained combat power.”

USS Georgia returned home from its final scheduled operational patrol last month. It is now scheduled to be formally inactivated next year.

At the same time, as TWZ has noted for years, the VPM-equipped Virginia class boats will not be a one-for-one replacement for the Ohio class SSGNs, at least based on what is publicly known about the former’s expected capabilities. Just in terms of missile launch capacity, each one of the converted Ohios is equal to roughly four Block V/VI Virginias. This means the Navy will need to field 16 new Virginia SSGNs before it fills the gap left by the retirement of USS Georgia and its three sisters, and can then start adding capacity with three additional boats. The Navy is facing a broader deficit in VLS capacity across its surface and subsurface fleets in the coming years, due also in part to the impending retirement of the last of its Ticonderoga class cruisers.

It is unclear what other capabilities the Block V and VI Virginia class submarines might have that will help make up for the loss of the specialized intelligence gathering and command and control tasks currently performed by the Ohio class SSGNs. As noted, some existing Virginia class submarines also perform the special operations support mission, but on a more limited level.

“By putting high-volume, long-range precision strike capabilities directly into the hands of the Fleet, these SSGNs will serve as a vital cornerstone for Distributed Maritime Operations and high-end warfighting,” the Navy’s press release today says. “Once operational, these highly survivable platforms will be dynamically employed across crucial global theaters – providing persistent forward presence, reinforcing robust alliance deterrence, and standing ready to project decisive combat power at a moment’s notice.”

On top of all this, the Navy does not expect the full fleet of 19 Virginia SSGNs to be in service until Fiscal Year 2038, at the earliest. This will be nearly a decade after the last Ohio SSGNs sail into mothballs. Concerns are regularly voiced now about the ability of General Dynamics Electric Boat and Newport News Shipbuilding (a division of Huntington Ingalls Industries) to keep up with demand for submarines in this class. There is even more pressure on the program with the addition of plans to sell some of those boats to Australia as part of the trilateral Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) defense pact. The Navy is hoping to see the Virginia class production rate eventually rise to two per year, but is not expecting that to come until sometime in the 2030s.

If nothing else, the Navy has at least outlined more of a formal plan to supplant the Ohio class SSGNs with what it has now dubbed Virginia class SSGNs.

Contact the author: joe@twz.com

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