Thomas Rid

Penquin’s Moonlit Maze

Thomas Rid — Sat, 08 Apr 2017 00:27:23 +0000

Juan Andres Guerrero-Saade, Daniel Moore, Costin Raiu, Thomas Rid, “Penquin’s Moonlit Maze. The Dawn of Nation-State Digital Espionage,” Securelist, Kaspersky Lab, 3 April 2017, 65p.

Full report (65 pages)

This paper offers a fresh take on MOONLIGHT MAZE, the world’s first known state-on-state espionage campaign. Our source: previously undiscovered original intercepts from 1998–1999. The intercepts enabled a detailed historical log- and binary-analysis.

Covered, among others, in WIRED, Motherboard, and Россия-24.

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Testimony, US Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

Thomas Rid — Thu, 30 Mar 2017 21:05:28 +0000

“Disinformation. A Primer in Russian Active Measures and Influence Campaigns,” Testimony, United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC, 30 March 2017, 15p.

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Rise of the Machines

Thomas Rid — Mon, 08 Feb 2016 05:50:21 +0000

Published in 2016 in the United States with W. W. Norton, in Australia and in the UK with Scribe; in German as Maschinendämmerung with Propyläen Ullstein. In 2017 Machines will be out in paperback, as well as in Mandarin with China Machine Press; in Russian with Eksmo; in Japanese with Sakuhin Sha; and in Turkish with Siyah Kitap. Recorded Books is doing the audiobook.

“A common theme connects war machines, computer networks, social media, ubiquitous surveillance, and virtual reality. For fifty years or more the same people and the same ideas weave through these innovations united by the term ‘cyber,’ as in cyberspace and cybernetics. Read this amazing history and you’ll go: ‘Aha!’”
— Kevin Kelly, founder of Wired magazine, author of What Technology Wants and The Inevitable

“Sometimes the most important things are hiding in plain sight. At least that’s what I concluded from Rise of the Machines, Thomas Rid’s masterful blending of the art of a storyteller, the discipline of an historian, and the sensitivity of a philosopher. Machines unmasks how really disruptive this ‘cyber thing’ has been and will continue to be to nearly all aspects of human experience. It’s more than food for thought. It’s a banquet.”
— General Michael Hayden, former director of NSA and CIA

“Rise of the Machines isn’t just an insightful history of cybernetics but also a fascinating journey with the twentieth-century thinkers—from tech giants and eccentric mathematicians to science fiction writers and counterculture gurus—who have shaped how we understand machines and ourselves.”
— P. W. Singer, author of Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know and Ghost Fleet: A Novel of the Next World War

“Rise of the Machines is a fascinating history of cybernetics, and of the visionaries like Norbert Wiener who first imagined the potential—and peril—of machines that would begin to replicate the capabilities of the human mind.”
— Martin Ford, author of Rise of the Robots

“Thomas Rid has provided a gripping account of how after the Second World War, cybernetics, a theory of machines, came to incite anarchy and war half a century later. Thanks to his extensive research we can now read for the first time the real story of ᴍᴏᴏɴʟɪɢʜᴛ ᴍᴀᴢᴇ, the first big state-on-state cyber attack, setting a new narrative standard for historians and journalists alike.”
— Sir David Omand, Director of GCHQ (when ᴍᴏᴏɴʟɪɢʜᴛ ᴍᴀᴢᴇ began), former UK Security and Intelligence Coordinator

“Rise of the Machines is strikingly original, compellingly written and deeply topical. It is a guide to our hopes and fears of robotics and computers. Thomas Rid weaves together technological innovation, social change and popular culture in a way that is both surprising and approachable.”
— Gordon Corera, BBC Security Correspondent, author of Intercept

“Everyone I know should read this book. It will be a classic.”
— Robert Lee, former U.S. Air Force Cyber Warfare Operations officer and SANS instructor

“Technology at once defines and exceeds our hopes for the future; it transforms and escapes us. As Thomas Rid makes clear, we live in a world riddled with technological mythologies; where our relationships both with and through machines mould not only daily experience, but our collective unconscious. There can be few finer guides to the geographies of human fear and dreaming within our machine age.”
— Tom Chatfield, author of Live This Book

“An ingenious look at how brilliant and not-so-brilliant thinkers see—usually wrongly but with occasional prescience—the increasingly intimate melding of machines and humans … suberbly recounted”
— Kirkus Reviews (starred), issue 15 May 2016

Reviewed in Booklist, c’t Magazin, Cosmos, Esquire, Financial Times, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, FAZ Hochschulanzeiger, Der Freitag, The Guardian/The Observer, International Affairs, Kirkus, Nature, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, New Scientist, The New York Times, Prospect Magazine, Scientific American, The Spectator, Spektrum der Wissenschaft, Der Standard, Süddeutsche Zeitung, tageszeitung, Technology Review (Germany), Universum, Wall Street Journal, War on the Rocks; ABC (Australia), Bayrischer Rundfunk, Deutschlandfunk, Deutschlandradio Kultur, NPR Marketplace, WDR, 3sat.

Listed as one of the best books of 2016 by MIT Technology Review, Esquire, and Fortune. Shortlisted as “Wissenschaftsbuch des Jahres 2017.”

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Cryptopolitik and the Darknet

Thomas Rid — Tue, 19 Jan 2016 17:10:37 +0000

“Cryptopolitik and the Darknet,” with Daniel Moore, Survival, 2016, February/March, vol 57, iss 1, 7–38, DOI 10.1080/00396338.2016.1142085

Encryption policy is becoming a crucial test of the values of liberal democracy in the twenty-first century. The trigger is a dilemma: the power of ciphers protects citizens when they read, bank and shop online — and the power of ciphers protects foreign spies, terrorists and criminals when they pry, plot and steal. Encryption bears directly on today’s two top threats, militant extremism and computer-network breaches — yet it enables prosperity and privacy. Should the state limit and regulate the fast-growing use of cryptography? If so, how?

[…] Crypto systems are not politically neutral; they embody political choices. In some cases, the costs incurred by establishing a specific cryptographically enabled service may outweigh the benefits. We test and establish this argument by critically assessing one of the most sophisticated and controversial encryption platforms today: the Tor Project. If there is a line that demarcates liberal from illiberal cryptographic architectures, it runs right through Tor. To be more precise, it runs right through hidden services.

Technical annex and discussion on Tor Hidden Services (requires Tor Browser) at http://35oktenzdrt2v4o5.onion

On Altmetric

Launched at IISS on 3 February.

Covered in Motherboard, Telegraph, Süddeutsche Zeitung, Tecmundo, Fars, BBC Newsday, Naked Security, Schneier on Security, BBC 5 Live, BBC World Service, Sky News, Die Zeit, Herald Sun, The Telegraph (Australia), Quartz, Nextgov, more

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Attributing Cyber Attacks

Thomas Rid — Tue, 10 Nov 2015 09:53:46 +0000

“Attributing Cyber Attacks,” with Ben Buchanan, Journal of Strategic Studies, 2015, February, vol 39, iss 1, p. 4-37, DOI:10.1080/01402390.2014.977382

Who did it? Attribution is fundamental. Human lives and the security of the state may depend on ascribing agency to an agent. In the context of computer network intrusions, attribution is commonly seen as one of the most intractable technical problems, as either solvable or not solvable, and as dependent mainly on the available forensic evidence. But is it? Is this a productive understanding of attribution? — This article argues that attribution is what states make of it. To show how, we introduce the Q Model: designed to explain, guide, and improve the making of attribution.

In Japanese: Thomas Rid and Ben Buchanan (translated by Motohiro Tsuchiya), “Cyber Kogeki wo Okonau no ha Dare ka (Attributing Cyber Attacks),” Senryaku Kenkyu (Journal of Strategic Studies), 18, 2016, 59-98. (Japanese PDF)

In Chinese: translated by a government-affiliated entity in Beijing (Chinese PDF).

On Google Scholar
On Altmetric

Coverage and mentions by Quartz, TIME, Heise, Telegraph, Bruce Schneier, Eugene Kaspersky, Richard Bejtlich (before the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in the US House of Representatives).

Launched at RUSI in London on 11 February 2015.

Briefed at the US Department of Defense, OSD, and a PLA workshop in Beijing, among others.

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Cyber War Will Not Take Place

Thomas Rid — Sun, 10 Mar 2013 21:29:10 +0000

Rid, T. Cyber War Will Not Take Place, London: Hurst/Oxford University Press (2013) 256p

‘This book will be welcomed by all those who have struggled to get the measure of the “cyber war” threat. As Thomas Rid takes on the digital doomsters he also provides a comprehensive, authoritative and sophisticated analysis of the strategic quandaries created by new technologies.’
Sir Lawrence Freedman, Professor of War Studies, King’s College London and author of Strategy: A History

‘Thomas Rid provides an unusually level-headed view of where we are in the cyber arms race. This book nips in the bud the loose talk of cyber war and illustrates what’s really happening. Anyone involved in building defences against future attacks should read this book first.’
Mikko Hypponen, virus analyst and Chief Research Officer, F-Secure

‘We’re in the early years of a cyber war arms race, one fuelled both by fear and ignorance. This book is a cogent counterpoint to both the doomsayers and profiteers, and should be required reading for anyone concerned about our national security policy in cyberspace.’
Bruce Schneier, security guru and author of Liars and Outliers: Enabling the Trust Society Needs to Thrive

‘With news of cyber war, terrorism and espionage seemingly everywhere, separating hype from reality is not always easy. Many agencies and companies stand to gain by inflating cyber security fears. Thomas Rid takes a razor to the evidence and carefully dissects the evolution of conflict and espionage in the cyber age. The result is a compelling and authoritative take on war and strategy in cyberspace, one that will surely be seminal in this area for years to come.’
Ronald J. Deibert, Citizen Lab Director, Professor of Political Science, University of Toronto and author of Black Code: Inside the Battle for Cyberspace

Amazon.com | Amazon.co.uk | Amazon.fr | Amazon.de

‘Cyber war is coming,’ announced a landmark RAND report in 1993. In 2005, the U.S. Air Force boasted it would now fly, fight, and win in cyberspace, the ‘fifth domain’ of warfare. This book takes stock, twenty years on: is cyber war really coming? Has war indeed entered the fifth domain?

Cyber War Will Not Take Place cuts through the hype and takes a fresh look at cyber security. Thomas Rid argues that the focus on war and winning distracts from the real challenge of cyberspace: non-violent confrontation that may rival or even replace violence in surprising ways.

The threat consists of three different vectors: espionage, sabotage, and subversion. The author traces the most significant hacks and attacks, exploring the full spectrum of case studies from the shadowy world of computer espionage and weaponised code. With a mix of technical detail and rigorous political analysis, the book explores some key questions: What are cyber weapons? How have they changed the meaning of violence? How likely and how dangerous is crowd-sourced subversive activity? Why has there never been a lethal cyber attack against a country’s critical infrastructure? How serious is the threat of ‘pure’ cyber espionage, of exfiltrating data without infiltrating humans first? And who is most vulnerable: which countries, industries, individuals?

(Cover in high resolution)

Coverage (selection)

“Cyberwar and Peace,” Excerpt in Foreign Affairs, December 2013

In Japanese
In German
In French

“Digital Destruction,” Fincancial Times, 10 May 2013

“Digital Doomsters,” The Economist, 27 June 2013

“Cyberspace is not a Combat Zone,” The Globe and Mail, 6 July 2013

“Is Cyberwar Really War?” Boston Globe, 15 September 2013

“The fanciful world of cyber warfare,” The Sydney Morning Herald, 3 September 2013

International Affairs, 90, 1, 2014, p. 203-204

The RUSI Journal, December 2013, p. 106-107

Survival, September/October 2013, p. 221-223

Politique Étrangère, 3/2013, 196-97

“La guerra cyber non avrà luogo,” sicurezzanazionale.gov.it, 7 August 2014

H-Diplo, 10 October 2013

Schneier on Security, 25 October 2013

“Cyber war is mostly bunk,” Reason.com, 16 August 2013

Interview, 2.34 mins, BBC Today, Radio 4, 13 March 2013

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Deterrence Beyond the State

Thomas Rid — Fri, 13 Apr 2012 16:35:28 +0000

Rid, T (2012) “Deterrence Beyond the State. The Israeli Experience” Contemporary Security Policy, April, vol 33, iss 1, p. 124-147, DOI:10.1080/13523260.2012.659593

Israel’s experience with deterrence is unique: it is older, more diverse, and more experimental than that of any other state. How did Israel’s strategy of deterrence evolve? How was it adapted to fit the non-state threat? And what is its utility? This article argues that Israel’s experience with deterrence beyond the state can best be understood through the conceptual lenses provided by the other grand deterrence debate, that in the philosophy of law, not international relations. Israel’s use of military force against non-state enemies doesn’t fit the classic concepts of strategy: it is not just one act of force to compel one actor to fulfill one specific political goal at one given time; deterrence consists of a series of acts of force to create — and maintain — general norms of behavior for many political actors over an extended period of time. Using force, consequently, doesn’t represent a principal failure of deterrence but its maintenance through swift, certain, but measured responses. The inquiry concludes by identifying the method’s limitations.

Deterrence is as old as fear. Punishing offenders is a common theme in the Bible. Threatening potential aggressors with costly consequences has been a subject of political philosophy for centuries, especially in the theory of law. Yet in the history of strategy and international relations, deterrence received remarkably little attention before the mid 20th century. None of the masters of strategy of the 19th century has left much worthy of note about the age-old practice of administering threats by military means. Only in the Cold War were deterrence and retaliation explored in theory and elevated to policy. ‘The twentieth century is not the first century in which “retaliation” has been part of our strategy’, observed Thomas Schelling in the 1960s, ‘but it is the first in which we have systematically recognized it.’ […]

Covered by

“Deterrence — The Israeli Experience” (27min) War Studies Podcast, 18 March 2012

[audio:http://warstudies.podomatic.com/enclosure/2012-03-18T10_27_04-07_00.mp3]

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Cyber-Weapons

Thomas Rid — Wed, 29 Feb 2012 18:01:16 +0000

Rid, T and P McBurney (2012) "Cyber-Weapons" The RUSI Journal, vol 157, iss 1, February, 6-13, DOI:10.1080/03071847.2012.664354

What are cyber-weapons? Instruments of code-borne attack span a wide spectrum, from generic but low-potential tools to specific but high-potential weaponry. This distinction brings into relief a two-pronged hypothesis that stands in stark contrast to some of the received wisdom on cyber-security. Maximising the destructive potential of a cyber-weapon is likely to come with a double effect: it will significantly increase the resources, intelligence and time required for development and deployment – and more destructive potential is likely to decrease the number of targets, the risk of collateral damage and the political utility of cyber-weapons.

战争2.0

Thomas Rid — Mon, 07 Nov 2011 16:09:20 +0000

War 2.0 is available in paperback in Chinese, published by the People’s Liberation Army Press.

战争2.0 信息时代的非常规战, 托马斯里德 (作者), 马克海克 (作者), 金苗 (译者), 出版社: 解放军出版社; 第1版 (2011年5月1日), 302页

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Cyber War Will Not Take Place

Thomas Rid — Mon, 10 Oct 2011 08:31:16 +0000

Rid, T (2012) "Cyber War Will Not Take Place" Journal of Strategic Studies, vol 35, no 1, 5–32, February, https://perma.cc/U7QZ-UQ58*

Out soon: significantly expanded and updated version as a book.

For almost two decades, experts and defense establishments the world over have been predicting that cyber war is coming. But is it? This article argues in three steps that cyber war has never happened in the past, that cyber war does not take place in the present, and that it is unlikely that cyber war will occur in the future. It first outlines what would constitute cyber war: a potentially lethal, instrumental, and political act of force conducted through malicious code. The second part shows what cyber war is not, case-by-case. Not one single cyber offense on record constitutes an act of war on its own. The final part offers a more nuanced terminology to come to terms with cyber attacks. All politically motivated cyber attacks are merely sophisticated versions of three activities that are as old as warfare itself: sabotage, espionage, and subversion.

In the mid-1930s, inspired by the lead-up to World War I, the French dramatist Jean Giraudoux wrote a famous play, La guerre de Troie n’aura pas lieu, the Trojan War will not take place. The English playwright Christopher Fry translated the two acts in 1955 as Tiger at the Gates. The plot is set inside the gates of the city of Troy. Hector, a disillusioned Trojan commander, tries to avoid in vain what the seer Cassandra has predicted to be inevitable: war with the Greeks. Giraudoux was a veteran of 1914 and later worked in the French foreign office. His tragedy is an eloquent critique of Europe’s leaders, diplomats, and intellectuals who were, again, about to unleash the dogs of war. The play premiered in November 1935 in the Théâtre de l’Athénée in Paris, almost exactly four years before the dramatist’s fears would come true.

Judging from present pronouncements about cyber war, the world seems to be facing another 1935-moment. ‘Cyberwar is Coming!’ declared the RAND Corporation’s John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt in 1993. It took a while for the establishment to catch on. ‘Cyberspace is a domain in which the Air Force flies and fights’, announced Michael Wynne, a US Air Force Secretary, in 2006. Four years later the Pentagon leadership joined in. ‘Although cyberspace is a man-made domain’, wrote William Lynn, America’s Deputy Secretary of Defense, in a 2010 Foreign Affairs article, it has become ‘just as critical to military operations as land, sea, air, and space’. In the same year, Richard Clarke, the White House’s former cyber tsar, invoked calamities of a magnitude that make 9/11 pale in comparison and urged taking a number of measures ‘simultaneously and now to avert a cyber war disaster’.4 In February 2011, then-Central Intelligence Agency Director Leon Panetta warned the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence: ‘The next Pearl Harbor could very well be a cyber attack.’ That year a highly sophisticated computer worm may have significantly damaged the Iranian nuclear enrichment program at Natanz. One much-noted investigative article in Vanity Fair concluded that the event foreshadowed the destructive new face of twenty-first century warfare, ‘Stuxnet is the Hiroshima of cyber-war.’

But is it? Are the Cassandras of cyber warfare on the right side of history? Is cyber war really coming?

Presenting the argument at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 23 January 2012

Covered by:

“La cyberguerre n’aura pas lieu, mais il faut s’y préparer” Politique étrangère, 2/2012, p. 305-316

“War and Peace” Joel Brenner, Foreign Policy, May/June 2012

“La cyberguerre est un mythe” Slate.fr, 10 April 2012

“Web Worriers” Standpoint, April 2012

“On cyberwar hype” Patch Monday (ZDNet), 2 April 2012

[audio:http://media.cnetnetworks.com.au/audio/musiccentre/patch_monday/patch_monday_ep132_01.mp3]

“Must-read” Council on Foreign Relations, March/April 2012

“Hype or Reality?” Naked Security (Sophos), 20 March 2012

“Xinhua ‘borrows’ a Foreign Policy article” Foreign Policy, 14 March 2012

“On Cyberwar Hype” Schneier on Security, 14 March 2012

“网络战难成现实威胁” People’s Daily, 10 March 2012, reprinted in Xinhua

“Cyber War Is Already Upon Us,” John Arquilla, Foreign Policy, March/April 2012

“Think Again: Cyberwar” the author, Foreign Policy, March/April 2012

“The empty threat of cyber war,” The Wilson Quarterly, Winter 2012

“Cyber war may not happen,” Comment, iss 198, January 2012

“Rid hat eine philosophisch-technische Diskussion ausgelöst” ZDNet (Germany), 17 November 2011

“Not theoretical, can actually kill” ZDNet (Asia), 17 November 2011

“网络战争还不会发生” Science and Technology Daily (China), 4 November 2011

“War and freedom” KCL Comment (podcast), 4 November 2011

[audio:http://podcast.ulcc.ac.uk/accounts/kings/KCL_PR_podcasts/cyberspace_final.mp3]

Recommended by Schneier on Security, 3 November 2011

“No cyber war, no nuclear war” Forbes, 3 November 2011

“Wahl der Waffen” Süddeutsche Zeitung, 2 November 2011

“Cyber war (is not)” Department of War Studies’ Podcast, 27 October 2011

[audio:http://warstudies.podomatic.com/enclosure/2011-10-27T09_31_22-07_00.mp3]

“Rid’s essay has added fuel to the debate” Forbes, 26 October 2011

“no lethal act of force” Computer Weekly, 25 October 2011

“Clausewitz and Cyber War” Digital Dao, 23 October 2011

“Still not a thing” Reason.com, 21 October 2011

“Die Hard 4 is just a movie, kids” The Register, 20 October 2011

“Миру не грозит война в киберпространстве” SecurityLab, 20 October 2011

“an exceptional read” Infosec Island, 20 October 2011, cross-posted from Cyber Arms

“convincing” Ink Spots, 20 October 2011

“myth or reality?” InKings, 17 October 2011

“Hollywood producers short on ideas should talk to Rid” (.pdf) InTouch, Autumn 2011, p. 20-23

* Published with iFirst in the JSS in early October 2011.

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Abschreckung zwecklos?

Thomas Rid — Thu, 25 Aug 2011 08:42:20 +0000

Rid, T. (2011) "Abschreckung zwecklos?" Internationale Politik 66/5 September-Oktober, p. 80-88

An analysis of different deterrence scenarios that should be discussed if Iran acquired nuclear weapons.*

Arabischer Frühling und weltweite Schuldenkrise haben das iranische Atomprogramm während der vergangenen Monate beinahe in Vergessenheit geraten lassen. Dabei strebt das Regime in Teheran trotz schärferer Sanktionen mit noch größerem Ehrgeiz nach der nuklearen Waffe. Je näher der Iran seinem Ziel kommt, desto dringlicher wird eine neue Abschreckungsstrategie des Westens. Doch wie könnte eine solche Strategie aussehen?

Drei Szenarien sind zu berücksichtigen: Eine iranische Atombombe führt zu einem Wettrüsten im Mittleren Osten; ein nuklear bewaffneter Iran würde auf konventionellem sowie subnuklearem Niveau – also ohne die Waffe direkt einzusetzen – aggressiver auftreten; der Iran oder ein nach ihm die nukleare Schwelle überschreiten- der Staat könnte die Bombe offensiv einsetzen. Erst nach einer solchen Risikoanalyse ist eine mögliche Abschreckungsstrategie abzustecken und zu bewerten. Diese Überlegungen haben natürlich spekulativen Charakter, das liegt im Wesen der Abschreckung. […]

Risse im Dschihad

Thomas Rid — Mon, 02 May 2011 10:52:21 +0000

Rid, T. (2011) "Risse im Dschihad" Internationale Politik 66/1 Januar-Februar, p. 10-19.

The article was republished online with a new introduction after Bin Laden’s death on 2 May 2011.

Osama Bin Laden ist tot. Bedeutet das den Sieg im Kampf gegen den Terrorismus, womöglich das Ende der Dschihad-Bewegung? Nein. Der Heilige Krieg wird wohl noch unübersichtlicher. Das könnte seine Eindämmung erschweren.

Osama Bin Ladens Tod ist ein herber Rückschlag für Al-Kaida und die breitere Dschihad-Bewegung, psychologisch wie organisatorisch. Das Timing der amerikanischen verdeckten Operation im pakistanischen Abbottabad ist dabei ein zusätzliches Problem für die Gotteskrieger: Erst die arabischen Frühjahrsrevolten, bei denen Al-Kaida durch Abwesenheit glänzte, und jetzt das Ende ihrer Gallionsfigur. Zudem mussten die extremsten Taliban im pakistanisch-afghanischen Grenzgebiet in den vergangenen Monaten weitere Rückschläge einstecken.

Doch ist Vorsicht geboten. Jetzt könnte die Gefahr wachsen, dass Terroristen, mit dem Rücken zur Wand, verzweifelten Tatendrang entwickeln. Auch könnten sie das revolutionäre Chaos in einigen Ländern ausnutzen, etwa im Jemen. Pakistan bleibt in höchstem Maße instabil. Die Identitätskrise in muslimischen Diaspora-Gemeinden bleibt akut, gerade in den USA. Der globale Dschihad wird sich weiterhin in drei Strömungen aufspalten.

Da sind zum einen lokal agierende islamische Aufständische, die sich aus dem Unmut über den autoritären Führungsstil, die Korruption oder die Zusammenarbeit angeblich „abtrünniger“ arabischer Regime mit „ungläubigen“ äußeren Mächten rekrutieren. Aus Sicht mancher Extremisten ist eine Hinwendung zur Demokratie nur ein anderes Übel. Die zweite Strömung formiert sich aus einem mit organisiertem Verbrechen kombinierten Terrorismus, der vor allem in Afghanistan und Indonesien, aber auch in Europa zu beobachten ist und der sich unter anderem durch Drogenhandel und Erpressung finanziert. Die Mitglieder der dritten Strömung lassen sich schwerer als einheitliche Gruppe definieren. Es handelt sich dabei vornehmlich um junge Muslime, die in der zweiten oder dritten Generation in der Diaspora leben und sich in einem anhaltenden Zustand des Heiligen Krieges wähnen. Deren Motivation zum Kampf speist sich aus ihrer eigenen Unzufriedenheit, die sich auf eine Vielzahl von Gründen zurückführen lässt. Für die Al-Kaida-Führung heißt das zweierlei: Die Legitimität eines radikalen Islamismus nimmt in den Augen des „Mainstream“ der Muslime ab, und die Ränder der militanten Bewegung fransen aus.

The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine

Thomas Rid — Fri, 22 Oct 2010 08:55:32 +0000

Rid, T. (2010) "The Nineteenth Century Origins of Counterinsurgency Doctrine" The Journal of Strategic Studies 33/5 October, p. 727-758.

Counterinsurgency is a military activity centered on civilians. The counterinsurgent competes against the insurgent for the trust and the support of the uncommitted, civilian population. These assumptions have become a core conceptual foundation of today’s counterinsurgency debate and doctrine. The publication of a much-discussed US manual in December 2006, so-called FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, prepared the ground for a fundamental reorientation of the use and the utility of force. Then, in 2008, the United States Army updated its most elemental capstone doctrine, Field Manual 3-0 Operations. It recognized and consolidated a ‘revolutionary departure from past doctrine’, its foreword announced. Modern wars are ‘increasingly fought ‘‘among the people’’’, General William Wallace wrote there. In more detail:

Previously, we sought to separate people from the battlefield so that we could engage and destroy enemies and seize terrain. While we recognize our enduring requirement to fight and win, we also recognize that people are frequently part of the terrain and their support is a principal determinant of success in future conflicts

Wallace’s carefully pronounced ‘previously’ hints at a historical trend that is as old as modern, industrial-age armies: the professionalization of military organizations, so succinctly described in Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State. Officers became specialists in planning, equipping, training, and using industrial force to fight one another. The battlefield, in Winston Churchill’s words, turned into ‘a common professional meeting ground between military men’. Political affairs, be it in capitals or in theater, ceased to be the prerogative of officers who were trained as apolitical experts in the ‘management of violence’, not public administration. Against this background, the current shift appears remarkable and perhaps indeed revolutionary. So it is highly desirable to better understand the emergence of the military focus on the civilian population in theater. What are the roots of population-centric operations?

Read more (PDF | html | in a library)

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Stratégies et politiques de communication des belligérants non-étatiques

Thomas Rid — Fri, 30 Apr 2010 07:28:46 +0000

with Marc Hecker, “Stratégies et politiques de communication des belligérants non-étatiques,” Centre d’Etudes en Sciences Sociales de la Défense (C2SD), Paris, Les Thématiques du C2SD, n° 21, 192 pages

[…]

Le constat de faiblesse pourrait conduire les « belligérants non-étatiques » àne pas se lancer dans la lutte. Tel n’est pas le cas. Combattre est en effet perçu par ces derniers comme une obligation éthique, résultant de la supériorité morale de la cause qu’ils défendent. L’origine de cette supériorité varie selon les situations. Les deux cas de figure les plus fréquents sont les luttes de libération nationale et les soulèvements à caractère religieux. Dans le premier, les insurgés combattent pour l’indépendance, la liberté et l’égalité, contre un adversaire étatique décrit comme un tyran impérialiste déniant au peuple son indépendance et ses droits civiques. Dans le second, ils considèrent comme un devoir religieux de mener une guerre contre un ennemi impie. L’exemple des jihadistes est, à cet égard, éloquent. Abdallah Azzam, perçu par certains comme le père spirituel d’Oussama Ben Laden, distinguait ainsi le « jihad offensif » du « jihad défensif ». Le « jihad offensif », qui consiste à « attaquer les infidèles dans leur pays », est considéré comme une « obligation collective » à laquelle il est possible, sous certaines conditions, de déroger. Le « jihad défensif » est en revanche une « obligation individuelle » et même « le plus important devoir individuel » lorsque « les infidèles pénètrent dans l’un des territoires musulmans » ou encore lorsqu’ils « font prisonniers des musulmans ».

Que ce soit dans le cadre d’une lutte de libération nationale ou d’une confrontation religieuse, le statu quo est si inconcevable pour les « belligérants non-étatiques» qu’ils sont prêts à mourir pour modifier la situation. L’importance de l’enjeu transparaît dans les slogans révolutionnaires. Le bataillon de Ngo Van Chieu avait par exemple choisi comme mot d’ordre « Mieux vaut mourir pour l’indépendance que de vivre en esclave ». Dans le même esprit, Amilcar Cabral, chef de la guérilla en Guinée et au Cap-Vert, ponctua son discours à la première conférence tricontinentale des peuples d’Asie, d’Afrique et d’Amérique latine (janvier 1966) en reprenant une devise chère aux guérilleros cubains : « Patria o Muerte ! Venceremos ! ».

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Das Militär verdient Gehör

Thomas Rid — Tue, 13 Apr 2010 08:09:25 +0000

With Martin Zapfe, Financial Times Deutschland, 13 April 2010, p. 24.

In der Debatte über den Afghanistaneinsatz fehlt es oft an militärischem Sachverstand. Daher sollten sich Soldaten häufiger zu Wort melden — und auch mal Widerspruch wagen.

Die Bundeswehr steht im politischen Gefecht. Die Meldungen aus Afghanistan sowie die Kundus-Debatte haben das Verhältnis von militärischer und politischer Führung ins Scheinwerferlicht gerückt. Sind die zivil-militärischen Beziehungen in Deutschland dem Afghanistaneinsatz angemessen?

Die deutsche Haltung zum Einsatz militärischer Gewalt ist aus historischen Gründen besonders sensibel: Die Politik allein definiert das nationale Interesse und die Aufgaben der Streitkräfte, nicht Soldaten. Das Militär bleibt also immer Instrument. Es kann nichts anderes sein. Aber das Instrument agiert nicht immer militärisch.

[…]

Das Instrument Militär ist nicht mehr nur stumpfer Hammer, sondern ein scharfes Allzwecktaschenmesser. Soldaten müssen alles können: kämpfen, aufbauen, verhandeln. Das bleibt jedoch schwierig für eine Organisation, die dazu nicht ausgebildet wurde. Aber um als Allzweckwerkzeug zu funktionieren, braucht die Bundeswehr scharfsinnige — und manchmal scharfzüngige — Offiziere, die risikobereit sind und improvisieren können. Der Wetzstein für dieses Allzweckmesser kann nur die öffentliche Debatte sein. Und die braucht den Sachverstand der Soldaten.

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Understanding Counterinsurgency

Thomas Rid — Thu, 08 Apr 2010 07:25:20 +0000

Rid, T. and T. Keaney (eds) Understanding Counterinsurgency London: Routledge (2010) 280p

This textbook offers an accessible introduction to counterinsurgency operations, a key aspect of modern warfare. Featuring essays by some of the world’s leading experts on unconventional conflict, both scholars and practitioners, the book discusses how modern regular armed forces react, and should react, to irregular warfare. The volume is divided into three main sections:

Doctrinal Origins: analysing the intellectual and historical roots of modern Western theory and practice
Operational Aspects: examining the specific role of various military services in counterinsurgency, but also special forces, intelligence, and local security forces
Challenges: looking at wider issues, such as governance, culture, ethics, civil-military cooperation, information operations, and time.

Understanding Counterinsurgency is the first comprehensive textbook on counterinsurgency, and will be essential reading for all students of small wars, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, strategic studies and security studies, both in graduate and undergraduate courses as well as in professional military schools.

To request a copy for review, please contact:
Jessica Plummer, jessica.plummer@taylorandfrancis.com, +1 212 216 7897

* Cover image courtesy of the U.S. Army.

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Mehr Köche als Diplomaten

Thomas Rid — Sat, 06 Feb 2010 21:28:34 +0000

With Timo Noetzel, Financial Times Deutschland, 5 February 2010, p. 26.

Die Bundesregierung behauptet zwar, mit Militär allein sei Afghanistan nicht zu gewinnen — tatsächlich aber entsendet sie fast nur Soldaten. Fünf Vorschläge für mehr ziviles Engagement.

Erfolg in Afghanistan kann nicht mit militärischen Mitteln allein herbeigeführt werden. Diese Feststellung ist zum parteiübergreifenden Mantra geworden. Doch in der Praxis bleibt die Bundeswehr der entscheidende Akteur. Um dies zu ändern, muss nun vor allem Außenminister Guido Westerwelle Worten Taten folgen lassen.

Nicht gute Absichten sind entscheidend. Die neue Strategie will umgesetzt und implementiert werden – und das kann nur das entsprechende Personal vor Ort leisten. Das heißt: nicht nur Soldaten, sondern auch Diplomaten; nicht nur mehr Truppen, sondern auch Entwicklungshelfer.

Die Bundeswehr hat derzeit eine Mandatsgrenze von 4500 Soldaten. Die Bundesregierung plant, nun bis zu 850 weitere Einsatzkräfte nach Afghanistan zu schicken. Zum Vergleich: Derzeit arbeiten insgesamt drei Mitarbeiter des höheren Dienstes des Auswärtigen Amts im Norden Afghanistans — in den Wiederaufbauteams in Kundus und Faisabad sowie beim Regionalkommandeur Nord in Masar-i-Scharif — sowie noch drei im gehobenen Dienst. Deutschland hat wohl mehr Köche als Diplomaten im Einsatz im Norden Afghanistans.

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Lessons of War

Thomas Rid — Tue, 02 Feb 2010 13:07:47 +0000

“What the Prussians learned at the hands of Napoleon,” The Weekly Standard, 8 February, vol 15, no 20, review of Peter Paret’s The Cognitive Challenge of War. Prussia 1806. Princeton, 2009

It must have been an eerie Monday afternoon, on October 13, 1806. Napoleon rode through Jena, where French troops had already started looting. Hegel, in his study, was working on the last pages of his Phenomenology of Spirit. From a window the philosopher was able to spot “the Emperor” ride out of town: “Truly it is a remarkable sensation to see such an individual on horseback, raising his arm over the world and ruling it,” he later wrote to a friend. Europe was on the eve of one of the most momentous battles of its bloody history. Before sunrise on the next day, the fields still covered by mist, Bonaparte ordered an attack.

[…]

Prussia’s reaction to what could not be imagined, the shock of 1806, is the subject of The Cognitive Challenge of War. In what turned out to be a spectacularly productive quest, Germany’s greatest minds — among them artists, writers, and military intellectuals — went to work and wrestled with the consequences of France’s revolutionary wars. Paret is at his best when he deciphers some of the paintings and engrav- ings that depict the battle. Perhaps the most impressive is Caspar David Friedrich’s The Chasseur in the Forest. It is an elaborate allusion to Prussia’s defeat. On a narrow opening framed by a stand of firs, a chasseur à cheval, his horse and strength vanished, walks slowly into the dark forest. Watching is a raven on a tree stump, symbols of death.

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Cracks in the Jihad

Thomas Rid — Sat, 09 Jan 2010 07:45:29 +0000

Rid, T. (2010) "Cracks in the Jihad" The Wilson Quarterly 34/1 Winter, p. 40-48

“Get ready for all Muslims to join the holy war against you,” the jihadi leader Abd el-Kader warned his Western enemies. The year was 1839, and nine years into France’s occupation of Algeria the resistance had grown self-confident. Only weeks earlier, Arab fighters had wiped out a convoy of 30 French soldiers en route from Boufarik to Oued-el-Alèg. Insurgent attacks on the slow-moving French columns were steadily increasing, and the army’s fortified blockhouses in the Atlas Mountains were under frequent assault.

[…]

Later that year, a well-known military thinker from Prussia traveled to Algeria to observe Bugeaud’s new approach. Major General Carl von Decker, who had taught under the famed Carl von Clausewitz at the War Academy in Berlin, was more forthright than his French counterpart. The fight against fanatical tribal warriors, he foresaw, “will throw all European theory of war into the trash heap.”

One hundred and seventy years later, jihad is again a major threat—and Decker’s dire analysis more relevant than ever. War, in Clausewitz’s eminent theory, was a clash of collective wills, “a continuation of politics by other means.” When states went to war, the adversary was a political entity with the ability to act as one body, able to end hostilities by declaring victory or admitting defeat. Even Abd el-Kader eventually capitulated. But jihad in the 21st century, especially during the past few years, has fundamentally changed its anatomy: Al Qaeda is no longer a collective political actor. It is no longer an adversary that can articulate a will, capitulate, and be defeated. But the jihad’s new weakness is also its new strength: Because of its transformation, Islamist militancy is politically impaired yet fitter to survive its present crisis.

In the years since late 2001, when U.S. and coalition forces toppled the Taliban regime and all but destroyed Al Qaeda’s core organization in Afghan istan, the bin Laden brand has been bleeding popularity across the Muslim world. The global jihad, as a result, has been torn by mounting internal tensions. Today, the holy war is set to slip into three distinct ideological and organizational niches. The U.S. surge in Afghanistan, whether successful or not, is likely to affect this development only marginally.

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The Terror Fringe

Thomas Rid — Tue, 01 Dec 2009 16:57:55 +0000

Rid, T. and M. Hecker (2009) "The Terror Fringe" Policy Review 158 December-January, p. 3-19

The Afghan-Pakistan border region is widely identified as a haven for jihadi extremists. But the joint between local insurgencies and global terrorism has been dislocated. A combination of new technologies and new ideologies has changed the role of popular support: In local insurgencies the population may still be the “terrain” on which resistance is thriving — and counterinsurgency, by creating security for the people, may still succeed locally. But Islamic violent extremism in its global and ambitious form is attractive only for groups at the outer edge, the flat end of a popular support curve. Jihad failed to muster mass support, but it is stable at the margin of society. Neither the West nor its enemies can win — or lose — a war on terror. […]

The linkage between terrorism and insurgency has been altered in the early 21st century. Instead of seeing high-volume popular support in an insurgency as the “soil” on which resistance and terrorism are flourishing — and counterinsurgency as a competition for that support — an additional paradigm is needed: the “tail.”

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Counterinsurgency and the Allies

Thomas Rid — Tue, 24 Nov 2009 17:00:47 +0000

Forum: Progress, Dissent and Counter-Insurgency: An Exchange, Gian P. Gentile; Thomas Rid; Philipp Rotmann; David Tohn; Jaron Wharton, Survival, vol 51, iss 6, p. 189-202

In the August-September 2009 issue of Survival (vol. 51, no. 4, pp. 31-48), Philipp Rotmann, David Tohn and Jaron Wharton argued that the US military’s change to a counterinsurgency posture in the on-going conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq was catalysed by two products of an institutional culture that strove to be self-learning: the response of junior leadership to tactical problems and senior institutional dissidents driving deep, controversial changes in doctrine and culture. In this Survival Exchange two experts offer US and European perspectives on the authors’ argument and recommendations to preserve and advance this dynamic in anticipation of future requirements for rapid change. A response from Rotmann, Tohn and Wharton concludes the debate.

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Germany’s Options in Afghanistan

Thomas Rid — Wed, 30 Sep 2009 07:32:38 +0000

Noetzel, T. and T Rid "Germany's Options in Afghanistan" Survival 51/5, October-November, p. 71-90

Germany’s military mission in Afghanistan has become increasingly politicised in the eight years since it was launched. Political and ideological differences between parties and even between ministries are becoming more pronounced, not less. This trend narrows the room for manoeuvre and limits the strategic debate. Greater instability in Kunduz province, at the heart of Germany’s area of regional responsibility in Afghanistan, has two immediate effects: it both increases the need to act decisively and it heightens the risk of political paralysis in Berlin. This article argues that the latter is likely to prevail.

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Razzia

Thomas Rid — Fri, 11 Sep 2009 05:17:44 +0000

Rid, T. (2009) “Razzia. A Turning Point in Modern Strategy” Terrorism and Political Violence 21/4, p. 617-635 10.1080/03071847.2014.969932

The razzia, a tactic of swift and brutal raids used by the French military against recalcitrant tribes in Algeria in the 1840s, was a necessary step in modern military thought. At first glance the destructive and violent razzias stand in stark contrast to the constructive and non-violent bureaux arabes — an institutional ancestor of Provincial Reconstruction Teams. But both were developed in the same conflict and by the same men. These two innovations, this article argues, were also flipsides of the same coin: what today is called war “among the people.” The razzia consequently appears as a necessary historic precursor for contemporary counterinsurgency doctrine.

Algiers in the 1840s was tantalizing. Seen from the deck of an approaching Alexandrian steamer, the “Pirate’s Daughter” — as contemporary travelers nicknamed the city — appeared like a triangular shape of chalk on a slope of green hills, the dark Atlas mountains rising menacingly in the distance behind. In 1837, just after the French had taken Algeria’s last Ottoman city in Constantine, it was the muezzin’s monotonous cry from a towering minaret that roused the traveler from his morning sleep. Such observed Thomas Campbell, a poet and one of the first Britons to describe Algeria after the French conquest. Ten years later, the sound that made sleep fragile in the mornings was the “irritating rattle of the regimental drums,” noted a later traveler from England. A “lively masquerade” awaited European visitors: narrow streets winding steeply up the hills, more like staircases than roads, spilling into public squares with porcelain pavement, framed by pillars and arches and palm trees. There they found French women wearing white aprons and handkerchiefs, Minorcan laborers returning from lush gardens, dark-skinned Kabyles offering fresh fruits, Berbers with embroidered coats, Jewish dandies with blue turbans, dark-eyed girls with bright sashes, old men playing chess. As bewildering as the peculiar smells and sounds were military men in their harlequin uniforms: zouaves with red pantaloons and white jackets; indigènes with black instead of yellow gaiters; spahis with red jackets and blue pantaloons; the chasseurs d’Afrique mounted on formidable Arab horses.

It was alien territory that awaited Major General Carl von Decker, a military thinker who had taught under Clausewitz at the Kriegsschule in Berlin. “Hopefully you left all your European ideas over there in Toulon,” a French officer greeted the Prussian general as he debarked from his vessel in Algiers. Decker came to Africa to observe the ongoing French campaign against Abd el-Kader’s insurrection. But the study of European warfare and its history was of limited use on the Mediterranean’s southern shores. Decker soon discovered that the essential elements of war as he knew it were missing in Algeria: There were no enemy positions that could be attacked, no fortifications, no operationally relevant locations, no strategic deployments, no lines of communication, no army, no decisive battles — in a word: there was “no center of gravity,” he noted in a direct, puzzled hint at Clausewitz. “The finest gimmicks of our newest theoreticians of war lose their magic power [in Africa].” One new element of war that baffled European observers was that territory could not be held. If a soldier “can’t even remain on the square-inch of land which he fought for with his own blood, then indeed the most sublime ‘Theory of Great War’ will be obsolete and one has … to come up with a new one,” Decker concluded.

How did that new theory of war emerge? …

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Virtueller Erfolg

Thomas Rid — Wed, 01 Jul 2009 12:03:23 +0000

With Marc Hecker, Internationale Politik, Juli-August, p. 46-53

Die Afghanistan-Strategie der amerikanischen Regierung sowie der NATO geht von der Annahme aus, das Problem des Terrorismus werde an der Wurzel gepackt. Diese Prämisse – nämlich den Kampf gegen den Terrorismus in Afghanistan zu führen, um ihn nicht in Amerika führen zu müssen – hat Präsident Barack Obama von seinem Vorgänger George W. Bush übernommen. In der deutschen Afghanistan-Politik baut Bundes-kanzlerin Angela Merkel ebenfalls auf dem griffigen Diktum ihrer Vorgängerregierung auf, dass Deutschland auch am Hindukusch verteidigt werde. Eine ernsthafte Auseinandersetzung mit den Schwächen dieser Sichtweise blieb jedoch aus. Welche Wirkung hätte es auf den globalen Terrorismus, wenn die NATO in Afghanistan erfolgreich wäre? Dass dieses Szenario derzeit unwahrscheinlich ist, macht die Frage nur noch dringlicher. Denn stimmen die Annahmen überhaupt, auf denen die Aufstandsbekämpfung und die Afghanistan-Strategie der westlichen Verbündeten beruhen? Oder haben moderne Informationstechnologien, im Verbund mit neuen Ideologien, nicht vielmehr veränderte Voraussetzungen für politische Gewalt geschaffen?

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Jihadistes de tous les pays, dispersez-vous !

Thomas Rid — Tue, 16 Jun 2009 13:10:18 +0000

Hecker, M. and T. Rid (2009) "Jihadistes de tous les pays, dispersez-vous !" Politique Internationale, 123 printemps, p. 175-189

Le terrorisme est souvent considéré, de nos jours, comme la menace numéro un planant sur les sociétés occidentales. Il suffit, pour s’en rendre compte, de comparer deux documents français : le Livre Blanc sur la Défense de 1994 et le Livre Blanc sur la Défense et la Sécurité nationale de 2008. Dans ce dernier, contrairement à celui de 1994, le terrorisme est omniprésent, à tel point que cette forme de conflictualité semble éclipser la menace de la guerre. […]

Où en est l’organisation jihadiste aujourd’hui ? A-t-on raison de l’ériger en menace suprême ? Comment la mouvance jihadiste internationale a-t-elle évolué depuis une dizaine d’années ? Et selon quels scénarios pourrait-elle décliner à l’avenir ?

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The Roots of Germany’s Russia Policy

Thomas Rid — Wed, 25 Mar 2009 17:04:45 +0000

Chivvis, C. and T. Rid (2009) "The Roots of Germany's Russia Policy" Survival 51/2 April-May, p. 105-122 10.1080/00396330902860850

In the aftermath of the Cold War, many American observers expected that the new Germany would more or less follow in the strong Atlanticist tradition of the old West Germany and its Conservative leadership in particular. A rejuvenated, reunited Germany is now seeking a more prominent role in international affairs, but its foreign policy is evolving away from the staunch Atlanticism that predominated during the Cold War. Two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Germany unquestionably sees the United States as a crucial ally, but also sees Russia as an inevitable partner for the stability of the European order. The bottom line for most German leaders is that the isolation of Russia is unacceptable and must be avoided at all costs. It would deprive the West of its few remaining economic levers over Russian policy and leave Europe and the United States with only cruder means of influencing Russian behaviour. Meanwhile, Russian nationalism and even militarism could accelerate. The sense that Germany has become Russia’s last strong link with the West only intensifies German concern, driving German leaders to redouble their efforts to maintain good relations.

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War 2.0

Thomas Rid — Wed, 04 Feb 2009 18:33:28 +0000

Rid, T. and M. Hecker War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age Westport: Praeger (2009) 280p

New: War 2.0 in Chinese by the People’s Liberation Army Press, as “战争2.0“

War 2.0: Irregular Warfare in the Information Age, co-authored with Marc Hecker, argues that two intimately connected trends are putting modern armies under huge pressure to adapt: the rise of insurgencies and the rise of the Web. Both in cyberspace and in warfare, a public dimension has assumed increasing importance in recent years. After the dot-com bubble burst in 2000, Web 2.0 rose from the ashes. This newly interactive and participatory form of the Web promotes and enables offline action. Similarly, after an attempt to transform the U.S. military into a lean, lethal, computerized force faltered in Iraq in 2003, counterinsurgency rose from the ashes. Counterinsurgency is a social form of war — indeed, the U.S. Army calls it “armed social work” — in which the local population becomes the center of gravity and public opinion at home the critical vulnerability.

War 2.0 traces the contrasting ways in which insurgents and counterinsurgents have adapted irregular conflict. It examines the public affairs policies of the U.S. land forces, the British Army, and the Israel Defense Forces. Then it compares the media-related counterinsurgency methods of these conventional armies to the more diverse methods devised by their asymmetric adversaries, showing how such organizations as al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and Hezbollah use the Web not merely to advertise their political agenda and influence public opinion, but to mobilize a following and put insurgent operations into action. But the same technology that tends to level the operational playing field in irregular warfare also incurs heavy costs on terrorists and insurgents. (hardback)

Thematically rich and masterfully constructed, this book shows how our wired-up world has changed the operational environment, making both war and insurgency more complex, decentralised, and bottom-up. Few other books have grasped so effectively the seismic change in the character of war. War 2.0 is Clausewitz rebooted for the 21st century.
— Christopher Coker, Professor of International Relations, The London School of Economics, author of Humane Warfare

War, flowing from society as a whole, is constantly evolving. Winning wars requires understanding the changing environment and adapting faster than the enemy. Rid and Hecker provide powerful case studies on how our primary enemies have understood and adapted to the changes Web 2.0 is driving. It would behoove professionals to read and understand this remarkable book.
— T.X. Hammes, Colonel (Ret), U.S. Marine Corps, author of The Sling and the Stone

High-tech revolutions are rocking the military and the media, toppling hierarchies, and upending traditional players. Until now, no one has shown how these twin upheavals are linked–and feeding one an-other. War 2.0 reveals how the old ways of war and communications are coming apart, and what the chaotic, self-organizing, networked future is likely to be.
— Noah Shachtman, Wired magazine, editor of Danger Room, a security blog

The public, more than ever before, has become the center of gravity in irregular warfare. Sharp and testing, War 2.0 probes the burgeoning impact of the new media.
— Gérard Chaliand, author of History of Terrorism. From Antiquity to Al Qaida.

For review copies, contact reviewcopies@abc-clio.com

Reviews

Jem Thomas, Media, War, and Conflict, Vol 3; Iss 1, 2010, p. 114-115 (.pdf)

George Michael, Terrorism and Political Violence, Vol 22, 2 April 2010, 332-334

Robert Cassidy, “War in the Information Age,” Parameters, winter 2009/2010, 117-122 (.pdf).

A. C. Tuttle, Choice (Association of College & Research Libraries), February 2010

Stéphane Taillat, Revue Française de Sciences Politiques, No 6, Vol 59, Décembre 2009 (.pdf)

Défense et Sécurité Internationale, No 51, décembre 2009, p. 98 (.pdf)

Jacques Perriault, Hermès, No 55, décembre 2009

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War and Media Operations

Thomas Rid — Wed, 28 Jan 2009 00:28:00 +0000

Rid, T. War and Media Operations. The US Military and the Press from Vietnam to Iraq London: Routledge (2007) 229p

In late summer 2002 the Pentagon considered giving the press an inside view of the upcoming invasion of Iraq. The decision that followed seemed to contradict earlier more restrictive policies, and the innovative “embedded media program” itself received intense coverage in the media. Many observers denounced the program as a new and sophisticated form of propaganda. The critics implicit assumption was that the Pentagon had become better at its news management and that the American military had learned to co-opt the media. War and Media Operations tests this assumption. It introduces a model of organizational learning and military innovation, redraws the US military’s cumbersome learning curve in public affairs from Vietnam, Grenada, Panama, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and the Balkans to Afghanistan, and finally examines whether the lessons of the past were implemented during the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

“War and Media Operations is must-reading for anyone who wants to understand how modern wars are sold to public opinion.”
— Jamie Shea, Director of Policy Planning at NATO, alliance spokesman during the Kosovo War

“Those who support or oppose ‘embedded’ journalism will find ammunition here but Rid himself doesn’t take shots.”
— Steven Komarow, USA TODAY, embedded with the US Army’s V Corps during the Iraq War

“thought-provoking, insightful, and deeply engaging”
— Ikujiro Nonaka, Graduate School of International Corporate Strategy, Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo, author of The Knowledge Creating Company

“The best analysis I have yet seen of the role of Public Affairs within the wider context of Information Operations.”
Philip Taylor, University of Leeds, UK, author of Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda

Reviews

Naveen Sharma, Pointer, 2011, vol 36, no 3-4, p. 74-75 (.pdf)

Politique étrangère, 2007, no. 3, p.674-675

British Journalism Review, vol. 18, no. 3, 2007, p.89-91

Steve Tatham, The War and Media Network, April 2008

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