So, yes, with all of the sarcasm intended, "send in the clowns." The United Nations has a track record of peace keeping, doesn't it? Of course, it could be that establishing an International force on the Mexican side of the U.S. border might create a demilitarized zone and protect U.S. citizens from the terror foisted upon us by the cartels.

We need to understand that the drug cartels have not respected our borders. Most recently, in a culmination of Project Coronado 50 more members of the newest, and maybe deadliest cartel, La Familia Michoacana were arrested.

La Familia Michoacana drug cartel is formally allied to Gulf Cartel, as a part of Los Zetas, and has split off into it's own organization during 2006. The cartel's active leader Nazario Moreno Gonzalez, known as El Mas Loco, was said to teach his organization the "devine right" to eliminate enemies, a true test of the La Familia Michoacana drug cartel.

During this 44 month operation more than 1200 people and nearly 12 tons of narcotics were seized.

How bad is this situation really? The Forbes Magazine list named Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman, head of the Sinaloa cartel, as 41st in its list of "World's Most Powerful People."

And by the way, according to a comment by an official on the Joint Terrorism Task Force, Los Zetas and the rest of the drug cartels, are not considered a terrorist threat, and instead are the responsibility of the counter-drug agencies.

This dovetails with two pieces up today at ThreatsWatch.

• Afghanistan - PrincipalAnalysis: All The King's Horses
• Intelligence - Commentary: Time, Complacency, Catastrophe

The military and its veterans and supporters fear most a politically motivated decision on Afghanistan rather than one based on a strategy for American security. Now is the time for wisdom, principle and leadership, not campaign considerations or past promise fulfillment. In Afghanistan, there is no middle ground.

Well, on the aspect of scale the massacre at Ft. Hood may not be a 9/11, but in many other respects it is still an astonishing failure.

Leave ethnicity and religion out of it: A man who seemed at odds with his oath to his country; a man whose superiors questioned his fitness to serve and his mental state; a man who openly communicated with people who advocated violence against Americans and in particular soldiers; a man who donned the garb of those who have a substantial track record of violence and hatred against Americans; does this sound like the sort of person who shouldn't have been under intense scrutiny for the threat he posed? Someone whose ability to carry out such acts should have been minimized?

Of course he was under some scrutiny, but what data was collected and evaluated was given short shrift for myriad reasons, not the least of which is political correctness. Yet if we take ethnicity and religion out of the equation again, we would still find ourselves in a place where the people who could have made the most use of the information at hand - the people with the most to lose given the circumstances - were apparently ignorant of the threat in their midst.

Barring the revelation of some greater and more sinister plot that Major Hasan was linked to, and to which our ability to deal with effectively would have been compromised had he been taken out of play (his violent actions being an unforeseen event), there are far too many indicators that point this being yet another intelligence failure. To be more accurate, an intelligence-mechanism failure: a failure of the system to serve all its customers - not a simple case of being caught unawares because of ignorance.

Of course post-9/11 the ODNI was supposed to help fix all of that. New rules about "responsibility to share" and new tools to help collaborate across the intelligence community were supposed tear down stovepipes and help ensure that everyone studying the same problems worked together to cut down on institutionalized ignorance and reduce opportunities for surprise.

How's that working out then?

No security mechanism in place on any military base or shopping mall or high school stops what happened at Ft. Hood last week from happening tomorrow. Nothing, except for what intelligence we have on those like Maj Hasan (ethnicity or religion immaterial). Is this an intelligence problem? Yes. Is this a law enforcement problem? Yes. But the age-old argument about what to do with such people (law enforcement says get them off the street, intelligence says keep them around to see what else they drag up) comes to the same conclusion: they are threats to be dealt with rapidly and comprehensively. If they cannot be isolated, it should be made painfully clear to them that they are under intense scrutiny, thereby neutralizing their effectiveness as instruments of terror and death.

Somewhere, someone new to this business is tacking up a picture of the victims of the Ft. Hood massacre and telling themselves "never again." Next door to that person is an old intelligence hand shaking his head and wondering "why can't we get this right?"

There is a fine line between careful consideration and dithering. Most were too quick to accuse the president of dithering. The importance, after all, is in making the sound decision, not the fastest. But that line has now clearly been passed, as the strategic recommendations on Afghanistan both sound and stupid have apparently been cast aside and the entire exercise set to stunningly begin anew. There is little else to be read into the fact that President Obama now wants his war options changed. All of them. Back to square one. This is now disconcerting.

It was bad enough when the leaks changed from President Obama considering General McChrystal's recommendations to some inexplicable middle ground between McChrystal's and Vice President Joe Biden's. "McChrystal Light" or "Biden Heavy" the reader may recall it termed. That Joe Biden was even at the head of the table remains bewildering, what with decades of experience at being on the wrong side of virtually every foreign policy issue and absolutely no experience in nor grasp of counterterrorism or counterinsurgency. But no matter. They are all equally tossed, along with the recommendations of various other commanders and civilian advisors in and outside Afghanistan.

So what are the options in dealing with Afghanistan? To be quite honest, the answer to that question is as elusive as and difficult as holding a handful of water in the palm of your hand. This complexity is why the 'dithering' descriptor was a bit premature. As jay Leno said in imagining President Obama thinking aloud on National Security matters not long after the inauguration, "Wow. This is hard." It is. Especially with what can be described as questionable instincts at best in the wrong place at the wrong time.

But a fine start is to consider what Afghanistan itself is, and what it is not.

AFGHANISTAN IS: HYPER-LOCAL
The bottom line is that the central government, headed by Hamid Karzai or any other, is a mirage. Ineffectual, corrupt, unpopular and confined, beyond Kabul it is but a picture in a newspaper that never gets printed and no one reads. The results of the election, while the exercise a vital developmental step, matters much less than the act itself in the long run. And everything in Afghanistan is a long, long run. This is why the corruption of the vote was disheartening.

The key to Afghanistan is its tribal leaders throughout the many villages in the incredibly vast Afghan landscapes. More to the point, each key is in each set of hyper-local tribal leadership councils (jirgas). There is no painting with broad strokes.

This point was made quite capably by Major Mehar Omar Khan, a Pakistani officer studying at Fort Leavenworth's US Army Command and General Staff College. He recently wrote a very intelligent paper on Afghanistan in which he poses 'Seven Fundamental Questions.' It is thoughtfully written with some sound thinking. Likewise, the comments at the Small Wars Journal post are as well, and to the point. They always are.

Major Khan stresses, as I have noted above, that to 'win' in Afghanistan America and the West must win the local tribal leaders' trust and confidence. As he describes it, rightly, each village is different and virtually none of them have any faith or stock in the Kabul government. Their concerns are for the security, well-being and advancement of their own respective communities, not grand statements or strategies and surely not handshakes with visitors from Kabul who then skirt off safely back to their "well-heated homes" and high-end hotels.

And security is pre-requisite for all other things. Beheadings and shootings tend to put a damper on visions of the new water well assured by Kabul or NATO forces, to say nothing of greater development. And Khan makes a sound observation in that we cannot be everywhere. So, he suggests, we should focus on key areas and do the job well there first rather than stretched too thin and, from the tribal leaders' perspective, doing little well.

But going through and summarizing all of Khan's thinking is not the intent here. It is, as Small Wars' commenters duly note, from a Pakistani perspective. And Pakistani interests are far from parallel to our own regarding Afghanistan.

However, in reading through the paper, an ever-present thought whispered consistently from beginning to end:

"If only Pakistan's government and military conduct themselves in their own Wild West as Major Khan wishes America and the West to conduct themselves in Afghanistan."

The thought stayed with me throughout.

AFGHANISTAN IS NOT: FUNCTIONAL OR GOVERNED
The administration seems bent on conducting counterinsurgency (COIN) only to the extent there is a worthy or capable government - and notably, this means Kabul - to hand off to. This was a realistic expectation in Iraq.

But let's be clear: This will not materialize within this president's term. An entire generation of Afghans has been shredded by wars. The society is broken - not by simply our standards, but theirs. There are no institutions to build upon - they must be built from dry, unfertile dirt. Education, the key to any society, is virtually non-existent making every other task demoralizingly difficult.

Furthermore, we cannot build any plan or strategy that hinges on even the most modest assistance from the region and little else from beyond. In fact, there is little compelling interest for a stable, productive Afghanistan from its neighbors. There never has been.

Afghanistan's dysfunction is exacerbated, fed and prolonged by the unmistakable absence of neighborhood friends. The collection of distinct ethnicities, tribes, and clans that makes what we call Afghanistan has no bona-fide enemies either. That is to mean that Afghanistan's neighbors have and do play one group against the other to serve whatever aims present themselves at the time. Is it any wonder that the people of Afghanistan have been embroiled in conflict for as far as memory can recall?

Pakistani and Indian interests are far less about Afghanistan than their own lethal sibling rivalry. Iran supports the Taliban so long as they are killing Americans. But in our absence, the Iranian regime will readily revert to keeping Afghans fighting Afghans, lest the Sunni ire turn fully north to the Shi'a. Russia has no interest whatever in seeing America successfully tame their Vietnam. And China's interests in the region are only as deep as oil, and Afghanistan has none.

ON THE TABLE: ZERO PALATABLE OPTIONS
Whatever is to be done to stand Afghans up we will do ostensibly alone or it will not be done at all. Not attempting that is, of course, an option.

This alternative, however, creates a greater vacuum than the one which fertilized the ground for al-Qaeda in the late '90s through 2001. The consequences are self-evident.

There are zero palatable options.

More than that, there are no middle grounds. There is no such thing as "McChrystal Light." "McChrystal" is already "Light," with our Afghanistan commander's resource requests already tempered by political expectations. Without sufficient resources it will be impossible to provide significant zones of sustained security to begin building with. And without successfully applied security, and then trust, the whole exercise is academic in its value and not practical.

If "McChrystal-Light Light" is the path to be chosen, it makes oldpapjoe's observation at Small Wars Journal very relevant. Right or wrong about whether "no infidel--no outsider who is an infidel-- will ever win an Afghan Muslim's heart," his challenging comment asking how we can "make ourselves useful to the Afghans" is perhaps one of the most astute I have heard in a long time. It really boils down to that.

And it's hyper-local in its application by the necessity of reality. Kabul is a photograph. It's each Afghan tribal leader (as opposed to "Afghan tribal leaders") and most certainly not the hopelessly corrupt and distant Afghan government, nor its untrustworthy police forces or its heroin-addicted army ranks. The force multiplier has no uniform and wears un-nice, dusty clothing.

And if Pakistan applied itself within its own domestic insurgency as Major Khan suggests for the West in Afghanistan, it would be most helpful. The violence and terrorist resources streaming over the border is rather unhelpful. We'd then be able to count ourselves a couple hundred feet closer to the finish of the marathon barely begun.

President Obama is not in a good position with zero palatable options. This is exacerbated exponentially by two cold hard facts: Warfare is wholly outside his wheelhouse; and there is no evidence he has surrounded himself with capable daily White House advisers between himself and his experienced wartime holdovers, Secretary of Defense Gates and General David Petraeus. The closest may have been former Marine Corps general Jim Jones, at least until he had his 'come to Jesus moment' in order to save his job in a military-averse administration.

And so it seems as if Humpty Dumpty fell off the wall and Humpty Dumpty had a great fall. And now all the king's horses and all the king's men can't settle on a way to try and put the over-sized Afghan egg back together again.

The trick, perhaps, is in recognizing that the egg was never whole to begin with.

One thing is for certain. The egg rots in the sun while the king and his men are astutely scratching their chins in strategy sessions and floating endless streams of conflicting leaks for sensing public approval.

One senior officer, Lt. General Rick Lynch leading the 3rd Infantry Division in Iraq says that of the 150 troops killed in combat, 122 might have lived, if only the U.S. had sent a bigger and better-capable robot army in Iraq . "80 percent of those soldiers didn't have to die."

The exploits of the explosive ordnance disposal teams and the robots they employ to clear roadside bombs are well known. But Lynch doesn't consider those devices robots because they require humans to control them remotely. "I'm talking about a system that has a certain degree of autonomy," he said.

That General Lynch holds a Master's Degree in Robotics from M.I.T. helps to establish his credibility in making this assertion and in arguing for more support. Lynch focuses on four separate areas in which he believes robots could play an expanded and important role:

1) Unmanned route clearance.
2) "Persistent stare" (diligent observation of known hotspots with armed robots)
3) Convoy following (having only the lead truck of a convoy manned, the rest being "directed" by a robot.
4) "Robotic wingman" (in which "an unmanned vehicle that will mirror the movements of others with a certain degree of autonomy')

The reality is that this vision of deploying robotic war fighters to substitute for human soldiers in known dangerous situations is still not on the horizon because of limited field testing. Yet the argument for greater testing an deployment is compelling and is underscored by the numbers of soldiers killed or wounded in battle situations. General Lynch's desire is

He said seven soldiers under his command were killed and three were captured because they were out watching IED hotspots. "That didn't have to happen." Robots can take the soldiers' places, he said. They can continuously keep watch on an area, and if nefarious activity is spotted, "We can take appropriate action. ... We can kill those bastards before they plant the IEDs," he added

The future of war fighting included many new technologies. Some seemed like science fiction a decade ago, even while military research was being conducted. Limiting funding for innovative programs like the ones supported by General Lynch would be a mistake paid for by the lives and limbs of our soldiers. New technologies are being tested and developed all of the time. The chance that wars will end, or conversely, never return to conventional means, is unlikely. How we fight on the field of battle, should. We have the means.

According to the FBI release, on subsequent days, Nozette received "questions" as well as money.

On or about October 1, 2009, Nozette was filmed on videotape leaving a manila envelope in the post office box. Later that day, FBI agents retrieved the manila envelope left by Nozette and found a second set of answers from him. The answers contained information classified as both Top Secret and Secret that concerned U.S. satellites, early warning systems, means of defense or retaliation against large-scale attack, communications intelligence information, and major elements of defense strategy.

The motivations of people with access to classified information is astounding. He needed money so badly that he was willing to sell secrets to another country? During the period of 2000 to 2006, Nozette held positions at DARPA, Naval Research Laboratory and the NASA Goddard Space Flight Center.

It is a sacred trust when you receive clearance. Allegedly he was quoted as saying to undercover FBI agents, "Well I should tell you my first need is that they should figure out how to pay me ... they don't expect me to do this for free."

Why do "smart" people do dumb things? Among his list of credentials, Novette holds a Ph.D. in Planetary Sciences from MIT in 1983. It must be the money. If convicted, he faces up to life in prison. OK.

Tonight, we will be tackling the NFL and the controversy over Rush Limbaugh's ejection from the bidding process for the purchase of the St. Louis Rams. Also on tap will be Federal Spendulus, Obama's battle royale of terror experts Biden v. McChrystal on Afghanistan, the strange nature of events unfolding in Pakistan and our resident Maoist atop the White House Communications office.

The program is streamed Live below, and the call-in number will scroll across the screen for you to chime in and join the conversation.

Turn back the clock a few years and recall the proclamation of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad that Iran would soon "wipe Israel off the map." When called on this, Ahmadinejad and his defenders - many of them right here in America - dismissed this as purely rhetorical. They said that what was meant was merely figuratively speaking, through the collapse of the Israeli government and not actually physically "wiping Israel from the map."

Curious then that Iran, in its 2004 Sacred Defense Week military parade in Tehran, the regime draped its ballistic missiles on public display with banners in Persian which read "Israel must be wiped off the map" and "We will crush America under our feet."

One side in this conflict means business. That would be the side training, funding and arming radical elements to kill Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan today. And the side which demonstrates its intent, beyond rhetoric, almost daily.

On the other side, our government remains convinced it can negotiate away a nuclear program which Iran has stated over and over and over again is non-negotiable. Our government hedges, sputters, and works overtime to modify language to perfection.

The unfortunate thing in all of this is that the Iranians are rather blunt and direct. A haunting yet refreshing bit of clarity and truth.

Our carefully and ably crafted wordsmithing is lost on the Iranians, who chuckle at us as too cute by half.

The intelligent counter to this is to argue that our language is crafted for broader consumption and employ beyond Iran. Most notably Russia and China. Unfortunately, both Russia and China are sided with Iran. And our government laps up their Mandarin and Cyrillic wordsmithing as it would desire they to ours.

Too cute by half. This serves as an assault on clarity. And the absence of clarity is the harbinger of conflict and never resolution unless through preemptive surrender.

Such is our path.

Language absent clarity serves no good nor supports any fruitful endeavor.

A Washington Times editorial calls it "Incorrigible Iran." The messianic and tyrannical regime is certainly that. While most of us recognize the Iranian regime for precisely what it is - a maniacal theocratic dictatorship bent on exporting and executing terrorism to achieve its aims - we must pay careful attention to the tweaking of language we use in dealing with the world's foremost state sponsor of terrorism. Because, quite simply, words mean things.

While Secretary of State is executing President Obama's foreign policy with regard to Iran, media reports abound note the US and Russia "seeing eye to eye" now on Iran. But the question is not whether this is true, but rather who moved toward the other's position.

In Moscow, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stood in approval as Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov stated that Russia still stands "in principle very reserved on sanctions, as they rarely produce results." As the Washington Times describes it, the take-away is "that sanctions should only be a last resort when all diplomatic means are exhausted."

This is not a subtle change in language for American policy. Not long ago, it was war or limited strikes which was "a last resort when all diplomatic means are exhausted," with economic sanctions considered a part of that process. No more, apparently. Our potential actions and recourses are being walked back like a dog that has strayed too far from the yard.

Lavrov is, of course, right. Russia remains as it has always been, "in principle very reserved on sanctions." And sanctions indeed "rarely produce results." And sanctions have produced none whatsoever with Iran.

Yet this is a curious play. Beyond sanctions, what would Russia then do to "produce results"? Furthermore, what "results" does Russia actually seek? None of this is explained or answered in the detailing of the new Russo-Yankee eye-to-eye understanding.

Perhaps we can employ the logic and deduction given human beings by God and peel away from a rather poorly written mystery and glean some intent from the fact that Russia continues to build Iran's nuclear reactor at Bushehr.

Or perhaps we can also gain some understanding from Israeli PM Netanyahu's emergency visit to the Kremlin where he reportedly produced a list of Russian nuclear physicists currently helping Iran in its nuclear weapons research. That was a meeting was described as tense.

And perhaps in exploring just a bit and employing a combination of logic, deduction and lessons learned from history we can also conclude that walking back our rhetoric, if not action, is one of the most unwise diplomatic efforts we could employ. This is certainly true in the face of a determined enemy who has good reason to declare victories at every turn in a war of words with an administration whose primary skillset centers around precisely that: words and speech.

One thing is certain. While the Obama administration claims a not un-small victory in 'bringing aboard' the Russians, it is painfully clear that it is Russia claiming true victory by 'bringing aboard' the United States. This is, by very short extension, another victory for Iran.

Our stance toward Iran hangs in curious limbo, suspended by the straps of tepid language. Russia and China are truly the Iranian protectorate. (Consider from the New York Times, "In Face of Sanctions, China Premier Warms to Iran.") And all of this is to say nothing of the error of a hyper-focus on their still-developing nuclear weapons aims at the expense of disregarding their established export of terrorism which exacts a daily death toll.

So long as we follow Russia - or China for that matter - rather than lead on the Iranian situation, the Iranian regime will achieve its aims beneath that security blanket. This is an inconvenient truth. Our manipulation of language in a war of words reinforces it, even while the American body count at the hands of the Iranians grows in both Iraq and Afghanistan.

The U.S.S. New York, forged from the steel of the World Trade Center.

USS New York LPD-21 under construction at Northrop Grumman Ship Systems' shipyard in Avondale, LA, will be the fifth amphibious transport dock of the San Antonio class. The ship was named New York after the state and incorporates in its construction steel salvaged from the World Trade Centers. Her ship motto is "Never Forget." "We're very proud that the twisted steel from the WTC towers will soon be used to forge an even stronger national defense," New York Gov. George Pataki spoke in 2002.

Interesting that there is that linkage, the U.S.S. New York, a San Antonio class ship. It would be great to be able to see it sail past the Statue of Liberty and then up the Hudson. What a sight it will surely be.

Eight years after the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks and despite repeated mandates from Congress, the United States still has no reliable system for verifying that foreign visitors have left the country.

New concern was focused on that security loophole last week, when Hosam Maher Husein Smadi, a 19-year-old Jordanian who had overstayed his tourist visa, was accused in court of plotting to blow up a Dallas skyscraper. . . .

Since the Sept. 11 attacks, immigration authorities, with more than $1 billion from Congress, have greatly improved and expanded their systems to monitor foreigners when they arrive. But despite several Congressional authorizations, there are no biometric inspections or a systematic follow-up to confirm that foreign visitors have departed.

What does $1 billion dollars get you? Well, it doesn't get a wall (actual or virtual) across the southern border, but it does get you a very sophisticated exit verification process:

The current system relies on departing foreigners to turn in a paper stub when they leave.

As is all too typical Washington, there is no one to blame:

"You can't ask the immigration system to do everything," said Doris Meissner, a senior fellow at the Migration Policy Institute, a research center in Washington, and a former commissioner of the immigration service.

Apparently for some, having the immigration organ of our state security apparatus to actually keep track of immigrants is really just too much to ask.

2. White House gives signals it is seeking middle ground between McChrystal and Biden plans. Less than the 40,000 troops recommended are expected to be supplied. Outstanding Long War Journal analysis spells out in detail why an al-Qaeda-centric approach inside Pakistan is wrong, makes little sense, and doomed to failure.

3. In Iran, a wave of executions is seen as an attempt to intimidate the still-protesting opposition movement, a movement that continues without American support from Washington.

4. US special envoy to the Middle East says Washington supports a "contiguous" Palestinian state, though what he means may not be as clear as some suggest. Meanwhile, Hamas warns Fatah's Abbas not to call new elections - elections that Hamas would likely lose much ground in.

President Obama's MidEast envoy George Mitchell said from the West Bank that the US doesn't just support a Palestinian state, but that Washington wants a "contiguous" Palestinian state.

U.S. special envoy to the Middle East George Mitchell told reporters after meeting with Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas on Saturday that Washington supports the creation of a Palestinian state with "contiguous territory."

The "contiguous" Palestinian state suggests that Palestinians would be able to travel between any two places of their future state without entering Israel.

Analysts believe that Mitchell was reassuring Palestinians over its position of upholding the creation of a Palestinian state.

Jonathan Rynhold, a senior research associate at the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies near Tel Aviv, said Mitchell used the word "contiguity" to make the Palestinians understand that the U.S. is not prepared to allow Israel to continue settlement expansion, despite Benjamin Netanyahu's reticence over a complete freeze on Israeli construction in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

Mitchell "used the word "contiguity" to make the Palestinians understand that the U.S. is not prepared to allow Israel to continue settlement expansion"?

Or does it, Mr. Rynhold? A "contiguous" Palestinian state may also mean taking land from Israel and giving it to the Palestinians to connect the West Bank with Gaza. The West bank is not a Palestinian state. The West Bank and Gaza would form a Palestinian state.

With the way language can be twisted around presumptions, I'd prefer to hear clarification from George Mitchell (or the White House) rather than a third party opining on perceived intent.

Mr. Mitchell?

Once before it was declared that the Taliban was dead and gone from the Afghan landscape. This individual made a strong argument (in late 2005) that "Afghanistan is the most successful operation...ever seen when you see what is going on in Kabul in particular. NATO, in particular, has really stepped up. This is not the opinion of the news media...The Afghan people have been given a good shot to have a decent future..." Oddly, now it is al Qaeda that is being declared out of Afghanistan.

Of course, history already has shown us that the Taliban was never gone, and their resurgence in the last 3 years has once again seen violence and terror plague the people of Afghanistan. In fact, a recent intelligence estimate indicates a quadrupling of Taliban strength in the last four years.

Simultaneously, it seems that the Administration has concluded that as approximately 100 al Qaeda fighters remain in Afghanistan that they are not the problem in Afghanistan. Michael Scheuer debunking the "al Qaeda is gone from Afghanistan" approach to U.S. policy:

Michael Scheuer, a former CIA analyst who tracked bin Laden for three years, believes the administration may have underestimated al-Qaida's role here because the organization prefers to work in the background providing logistics, propaganda and training to local allies. "When you see less and less of al-Qaida in an Islamist insurgency, it almost certainly means that it is more effective than when you saw more of it," Scheuer said. "I am sure that al-Qaida is still fielding some field-grade cadre to toughen the Taliban's ranks."

The concept of believing that al Qaeda and the Taliban are separate is equally bankrupt. In fact, Bruce Riedel, the President's former advisor on Afghan issues has commented that if would be a "fairy tale" for the US to think it could split the Taliban away from al-Qaeda.

Mr Riedel, a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, a Washington thinktank, is dismissive of the talk of splitting Afghan factions of the Taliban away from the foreign jihadists of Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terror faction. "This is a fairy tale," he said. "al-Qaeda and the Taliban have been closely aligned ever since Osama bin Laden came back to Afghanistan in the mid-1990s," he said. "What is most remarkable about that partnership is that it has survived and endured.

Aside from all of the above, it is interesting that recent news reports have differentiated between the Afghan Taliban and the Pakistani Taliban. It is clear that the Taliban (and their al Qaeda influencers) operate interchangeably across the mountains on Afghanistan and Pakistan. And while the linkage of the Taliban with the Pakistani ISI is vehemently denied by Pakistan, the "safe haven" for al Qaeda/Taliban is hard to argue. If you believe that al Qaeda is really gone from Afghanistan, or that the Taliban has died and come back, then you might also believe that the Taliban is really split between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Of course the final "bedtime story" for those who wish to believe is the Taliban's claim that it doesn't pose a threat to the West.

Indeed, it helps to believe in fairy tales.

1. Surveillance - Someone recording or monitoring activities. This may include the use of cameras, note taking, drawing diagrams, annotating on maps, or using binoculars or other vision-enhancing devices.
2. Elicitation - People or organizations attempting to gain information about military operations, capabilities, or people. Elicitation attempts may be made by mail, email, telephone, or in person. This could also include eavesdropping or friendly conversation.
3. Tests of Security - Any attempts to measure reaction times to security breaches, attempts to penetrate physical security barriers, or monitor procedures in order to assess strengths and weaknesses.
4. Funding - Suspicious transactions involving large cash payments, deposits, or withdrawals are common signs of terrorist funding. Collections for donations, the solicitation for money and criminal activity are also warning signs.
5. Supply - Purchasing or stealing explosives, weapons, ammunition, etc. This also includes acquiring military uniforms, decals, flight manuals, passes or badges (or the equipment to manufacture such items) and any other controlled items.
6. Impersonation - People who don't seem to belong in the workplace, neighborhood, business establishment, or anywhere else. This includes suspicious border crossings, the impersonation of law enforcement, military personnel, or company employees is also a sign.
7. Rehearsal - Putting people in position and moving them around according to their plan without actually committing the terrorist act. An element of this activity could also include mapping out routes and determining the timing of traffic lights and flow.
8. Deployment - People and supplies getting into position to commit the act. This is the person's last chance to alert authorities before the terrorist act occurs.

Thanks to @Terrorismwatch for sharing via Twitter.

Readers can also follow me on Twitter here: @SteveSchippert.