SARAJEVO, February 21, 2008 – The Democratization Policy Council (DPC) today released a briefing titled “Understanding and Breaking Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Constitutional Deadlock: A New Approach for the European Union and United States.” It calls on the EU and its member states, backed by the US, to adopt a strategy to help the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina – and pressure its politicians – to adopt a constitution allowing for a functional state.

“The international community places blind faith in the EU’s standard enlargement script to work in Bosnia and Herzegovina, treating it as if it were Slovenia instead of tailoring its policies to the different realities here. This approach has led to political deadlock and caused Bosnian politicians to question the EU’s credibility” said Senior Associate Kurt Bassuener.

The country remains crippled by the Dayton constitutional order, which empowers a political oligarchy that has remained dominant from even before the war. “With weak international engagement, the current political system defaults toward partition,” said Senior Associate Scott Lang. The EU must adopt an accession strategy specific to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and develop appropriate sticks and carrots as incentives for sufficient constitutional change. “The EU must use its ‘soft power’ to spark a new constitutional and electoral order as the price of admission into its club,” Lang stated. “This demands some simple and clear criteria, as well as imaginative new incentives.” The criteria should include a rejection of ethno-territorialism, less disruptive methods to protect the vital national interests of constituent peoples, and greater local control of governance and revenue. Among the potential wedge issues that can be leveraged toward this end are visa liberalization, greater support for rural development, and support for improved rail and road links with the country’s neighbors and the EU.

These should be marshaled toward building support among the population, and pressure on politicians, for a constitutional convention. “Bosnia and Herzegovina’s politicians have monopolized the constitutional issue for too long. It’s time to draft a constitution according to citizens’ concerns and desires, unlike the life-support system Dayton provides for the ruling political class” noted Bassuener. “A constitutional convention should include civic representatives and mayors, as well as state-level parliamentarians.”

Until there is a constitutional framework that allows Bosnia and Herzegovina to move toward European Union membership on its own, it remains essential to keep the full set ofDayton instruments, including a High Representative with executive “Bonn Powers.”

To facilitate this process in concert with the EU, the US should designate a senior American politician or diplomat as special envoy, wielding incentives and disincentives, in coordination with the EU. “Senator Joseph Biden, with his long commitment to Bosnia and Herzegovina, legislative, and legal know-how, would be an ideal choice,” Lang stated.

The Democratization Policy Council is a transatlantic initiative for accountability in democracy promotion, established in 2005 by a group of international affairs professionals. This briefing was written by DPC Senior Associates based in Bosnia and Herzegovina,Belgium, and Germany.

The full briefing is available here.

For media enquiries, please contact Kurt Bassuener, kbassuener@democratizationpolicy.org, at +387 61 489 653, or Scott Lang at +387 62 374 904, slang@democratizationpolicy.org.

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I am often approached by both Westerns as well as Bosnians with the idea that the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina along ethnic lines is a logical, imminent and perhaps desirable outcome. Benign, yet naïve Westerners seem to believe in the theory of “ancient hatreds and antagonisms” which, in their view, led to the break-up of the former Yugoslavia and the 1992-1995 war. (They find this theory particularly applicable to Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is often seen as ‘a small Yugoslavia’). Some of them, however, do not believe in the ‘ancient hatreds’ theory because they remember the peaceful days of the 1984 Sarajevo Winter Olympic Games, but they still think that the recent war has damaged the fabric of the multiethnic society beyond repair. Ergo, they argue, all of our efforts to preserve the country and its cosmopolitan character are doomed to failure. They think that we should end this agony, declare the state dead, and find a pragmatic and an amicable agreement on dissolution. Luckily, there are still those from the West that haven’t given up on Bosnia yet.

It is not a secret that the majority of Bosnian Serbs and, to a lesser extent Croats, wish that the country divide and each ethnic group gets its own territory to administer and decide its future (i.e. join Serbia or Croatia proper). What I find shocking are the increasing number of Bosniak voices – who have so far been adamant defenders of the Bosnian statehood under its internationally recognized borders – in letting Serb and Croat dominated regions of the country go their separate ways. These voices can most often be heard in Sarajevo – the most prosperous city/region in the country where Bosniaks are a demographic majority. They argue that the country will never go forward because of ethnic Serbs’ (and to a lesser extent Croats’) objections to the reforms that would make the country less burdened by bureaucracy and less prone to crime, corruption, etc. (manifested in opposition to Constitution and Police reforms). This defeatist approach is understandable given the inability of the Bosniak political leaders to formulate a strategy of making Bosnia and Herzegovina a more unified and functioning country and attractive not only to Bosniaks but also to Serbs and Croats. The failure of such a strategy stems from the Bosniaks’ political philosophy which emphasizes that all ethnic groups should live together in a single state despite the fact that it also states that Serbs are guilty of having committed genocide against Bosniaks. It is a conflicting strategy that reinforces ethnic divisions and obstructs meaningful reconciliation, which is the foundation for building a better society and a stronger state.

After the recent political showdown where the Republika Srpska leadership was on the verge of pulling out of the state institutions (and shutting down the state government), the voices of those mulling an amicable breakup of the country seem to have multiplied. The idea of federalizing Bosnia and Herzegovina on the basis of ethnic principle (which is, in fact, a legal precursor to a formal break-up of the country based on ethnic lines) is gathering momentum and it is viewed as a legitimate political goal as any other. It seems that those who hope for the division and federalization of Bosnia and Herzegovina outnumber by far those who argue for its preservation as a multiethnic society. Because of this development, I feel compelled to write (again) about why the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina along ethnic lines is politically wrong, immoral, and dangerous.

The present-day ethnic make-up of the country is based on the campaign of extreme violence, brutality, and state-sponsored terrorism against civilians, based solely on the ethno-religious principle. Because of that extreme violence – which included mass executions of civilians, random shelling and sniping, starvation, mass expulsion, mass imprisonment, rape, destruction of cultural sites, etc. – we cannot take the current demographics as the guiding principle for any future internal structuring (administrative and territorial) of the country. As a counterargument, some will say that refugees have had a chance to return to their pre-war homes. But this line of thinking is nothing more than further legitimization of ethnic cleansing that started in 1992 and is ending just now. Yes, many refugees and displaced people have had a chance to receive grants to fix their homes. But how can they return to the places where they will not be able to find any jobs? Can they be expected to send their children to schools in which history classes teach that their ethnic group is an enemy to another group? Can they be expected to go to the local police or municipality (or any other local government institution) and meet face-to-face with the same people who harassed them 15 years ago, maybe even raped or killed someone they used to know? Can they be expected to live at a street address whose name glorifies the military (and paramilitary) units and commanders who executed or oversaw ethnic cleansing? The list can go on and on. Refugees and displaced persons have never had a chance of returning to their homes in real and tangible numbers. And then, there are those who were killed and will never return anywhere – 60,000 Bosniaks, around 30,000 Serbs, and close to 10,000 Croats, according to the latest, most scrutinized figures and widely-accepted figures. What makes ethnic cleansers really successful is being able to come away with a victory (an ethnically “purified” territory) under the guise of democracy and transparency.

The second reason against dividing (and destroying Bosnia and Herzegovina) has to do with the cultural belief that various ethno-religious groups can live and prosper side by side. This is not a utopian view. It has been a centuries-old reality of this country and the whole region. The long stretches of multiethnic peace and prosperity were not an exception to the rule; they were the norm. The recent war is an exception. Today, I see ordinary people regularly crossing the country’s ethnic and entity borders for commerce, sport, cultural events, etc. The so-called ancient antagonisms do not exist despite the fresh memories of war and violence. Ordinary people do what they have to do to survive and to provide for their families. Ethnic tensions exist only on the political level because they are tools of mass manipulation and staying in power (with all the financial benefits that such a situation brings to those purporting these views). In the age of increasing clash between civilizations, especially the Islamic East and the Judeo-Christian West, it would be a real tragedy and an irrecoverable cultural loss to sentence to death a small but (once) very vibrant multiethnic society for the sake of short-term political pragmatism.

Even if we put aside the moral and cultural implications of dividing Bosnia and Herzegovina, there are serious political and security ramifications of such an outcome. Naturally, if Republika Srpska would become a separate state, it would strengthen its ties with Serbia just to the East. At the same time, Bosnian Croats would look to the West and make a stronger connection with Croatia. This would leave a small, isolated patch of land in Central Bosnia for the Bosniak population to form their own country – a Gaza Strip in the middle of Europe, a country and a people with no future. Under such circumstances, Bosniaks could become prime targets for extremist religious and political views – disenfranchised and desperate people often are. They may vent their anger not only against their former neighbors (who had destroyed their country), but also against the West (that has abandoned them one more time, just like in Srebrenica in 1995, and left them with no future). The break-up of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the isolation of Bosniaks would add to the list of grievances of global Islam against the West. It would be another example to Muslims all over the world of how the West treats them – by placing an entire country and people into an enlarged Abu Ghraib centered around Sarajevo. This would be the greatest PR victory and a wonderful recruitment event for Al Qaeda and similar groups.

On the other hand, preserving Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a “Mission Impossible.” Yes, there are difficulties in reaching an outcome that is acceptable to all groups and interests. But the Western countries – especially EU and US – have more power and tools to reach those goals than they think. All it takes is a more active diplomatic and economic engagement and a better harmonized long-term strategy for the Balkans. The current attitude of providing quick fixes to hot problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be substituted with a clear strategy of reforming the country’s institutions and integrating them into the European mainstream. Federalization of the country is not the answer. Quite the opposite, it is the entrenchment of the idea that various groups – that have lived and inter-married for centuries - now cannot live together and must be separated. Federalization of the country undoubtedly leads to dissolution.

Preserving the country and integrating it into EU is a winning solution for all of its residents (save for a few politicians who plan on becoming rich overnight by preying on ethnic fears). Having a once war-torn nation join the European community of nations as a self-sustainable democracy would represent a major diplomatic and moral victory for EU. It would also be an American victory against extremism and a testament to the fact that US is not at war with the entire Muslim world; it would be a foreign policy victory for the administration that knows only foreign policy defeats. Finally, the preservation of the multiethnic Bosnian state and society would be a clear statement that the widening gap between civilizations (East and West) is not irreparable. Jews, Christians, Catholics, Muslims and Atheists can live together in peace, harmony, and prosperity. They have in the past. They can do it again if given an honest chance. If these goals are not worth fighting for, then Bosnia and Herzegovina, indeed, is not worth saving.

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The more optimistic view holds that Dodik has succumbed to the international pressure and given in to demands imposed by Lajcak (who was backed by virtually the entire international community). Some hold that Dodik was threatened not only by removal from office (exercised by the OHR’s “Bonn Powers”) but also with indictments for crime and corruption. Those who are really optimistic believe that Dodik has suddenly realized that he could not “swim against the European tide.” Another view holds that Dodik responded to the “carrot” of Bosnia’s initialing of the SAA with EU without police reform; EU dropped police reform as a requirement in order to solve the current political crisis in Bosnia. Dodik gets to retain his precious RS Police, Bosnia and IC get the SAA initialed.

The other, more pessimistic school of thought holds that Dodik did not give up any major concessions, while, in turn, he received major concessions from OHR and the international community in general. Specifically, this view holds that the compromise reached over OHR-imposed reforms on the Council of Ministers and the BiH Parliament is still subject to interpretation by each side (in fact, Mladen Ivanic, Dodik’s sidekick, has made statements to that effect). In the meantime, there are rumors that Dodik has ensured that Lajcak will not exercise his Bonn Powers to remove officials and enact legislation. If that is true, OHR has reduced its status from the enforcer and guarantor of the Dayton peace agreement to that of an observer. In the current balance of the political forces in BiH, such a concession would mean giving the RS leadership total freedom to say and act as it pleases.

While we can guess which school of thought is right in this case, it is important to look at the general public response to these events. It is very interesting that there is no outraged opposition to Dodik’s giving in to Lajcak’s demands. Although the RS opposition is small and concentrated around the really-far-right parties, it is vocal. They were vocal every time when the RS entity jurisdiction and authority were “jeopardized” in favor of the state. They were quite vocal in their opposition to April 2006 constitutional reform proposal (which Dodik supported). Yet, their response to the passage of Lajcak’s reforms that caused the whole political turmoil has been mild. Their response could very likely indicate that RS has not made any real concessions; therefore, there is nothing to object to.

In the meantime, Dodik has asserted publicly again that Bosnia has no future as a state (stated on Croatian national HRT TV station that Bosnia would probably fall apart within next 10 years); that RS is a permanent category with inviolable borders; that BiH must not recognize Kosovo independence or “politicians in Sarajevo would have a problem with him”; that Bosniaks suffered the most during the war because they were the most numerous group that was fighting Serbs and Croats at the same time. Looking past these offensive remarks, it is obvious that Dodik has not stopped his rhetoric (as one would expect from a person who was slapped on the wrist because of his misbehavior). In fact, he is ratcheting it up at every opportunity as a prelude to the talks on constitutional and police reforms.

What emerges from this analysis is that the previous political tension has not been solved with Dodik’s change of heart, but merely postponed; and that Dodik may have very well extracted important concessions from Lajcak (who came to see Dodik in Banjaluka – not the other way around - just before Dodik announced his acceptance of Lajcak’s measures). If this indeed is the case, than Bosnia may be entering another cycle of real political crisis as soon as talks on constitution and police reform resume, or once Kosovo announces its independence from Serbia – whichever comes first.

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The way things are moving, Kosovo will unilaterally announce independence after December 11. United States, Islamic nations and several key EU nations will most likely recognize Kosovo as an independent state, with certain provisions in regards to ethnic minorities, etc. Kosovars will ask Bosnia for recognition and establishment of diplomatic relations. How will Bosnian government respond, it is hard to say. But this will be another divisive issue that will add to the already long list of such issues (police reform, constitutional reform, OHR-imposed rules on quorum in the Council of Ministers and BiH Parliament, etc.) that are plaguing this country.

As problems multiply, the response from EU and US is still limited to individual diplomat lip service to the Bosnian state integrity without a clear plan how to actually defend and support it. There is no doubt that various analysts on the ground in Bosnia have become quite aware of the severity of the situation and have reported about it, but their political bosses in Brussels and Washington still wish to pretend that everything is great and that Bosnia is a big success story for Western diplomacy and peacekeeping forces (in lieu of “real” problems in mid East and elsewhere where such “successes” are not within reach).

Luckily, there is a growing number of people who are openly speaking out on the deteriorating situation in Bosnia and have specific recommendations on how to address it. Today’s Financial Times offers a very good analysis by Tomas Valasek, the director of foreign policy and defence at the Centre for European Reform. You can find his article here.

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Back to the Brink In the Balkans

By Richard Holbrooke
Sunday, November 25, 2007; B07

At a most inopportune time, the Balkans are back. On Dec. 10, the U.S.-E.U.-Russian negotiating team tasked with getting the Serbs and Albanians to agree on Kosovo’s future status will report to the United Nations that it has failed. A few weeks later Kosovo’s government will proclaim that Kosovo is an independent nation — a long overdue event.

The United States and most of the European Union (led by Britain, France and Germany) will recognize Kosovo quickly. Russia and its allies will not. Kosovo’s eight-year run as the biggest-ever U.N. project will end with great tension and a threat of violence that could spread to Bosnia.

Because security in Kosovo is NATO’s responsibility, there is an urgent need to beef up the NATO presence before this diplomatic train wreck. Just the thought of sending additional American troops into the region must horrify the Bush administration. Yet its hesitations and neglect helped create this dilemma — which Russia has exploited.

There is more bad news, virtually unnoticed, from nearby Bosnia. Exactly 12 years after the Dayton peace agreement ended the war in Bosnia, Serb politicians, egged on by Moscow and Belgrade, are threatening that if Kosovo declares its independence from Serbia, then the Serb portion of Bosnia will declare its independence. Such unilateral secession, strictly forbidden under Dayton, would endanger the more than 150,000 Muslims who have returned there.

Recent American diplomacy led by Undersecretary of State Nicholas Burns and special envoy Frank Wisner, working closely with E.U. negotiator Wolfgang Ischinger, has largely succeeded in persuading most of our European allies to recognize Kosovo rapidly. But NATO has not yet faced the need to reinforce its presence in Kosovo. Nor has serious transatlantic discussion begun on Bosnia, even though Charles English, the American ambassador in Sarajevo, and Raffi Gregorian, the deputy high representative in Bosnia, have warned of the danger. “Bosnia’s very survival could be determined in the next few months if not the next few weeks,” Gregorian told Congress this month. Virtually no one paid any attention.

The icing on the cake? Russia has threatened to link the Kosovo issue to the claims of two rebellious areas of far-away Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

These issues had seemed largely resolved in the late 1990s. For such extensive backsliding to occur took a poisonous combination of bad American decisions, European neglect and Russian aggressiveness.

When Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic was ousted in September 2000 and a reformist government took over, the road seemed open to a reasonably rapid resolution of Kosovo’s final status. But the new Bush team hated anything it had inherited from Bill Clinton — even (perhaps especially) his greatest successes — and made no effort to advance policy in Kosovo until 2005 and ignored Bosnia. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld even sought to pull American troops out of the NATO command in Kosovo, which Secretary of State Colin Powell prevented. (However, the State Department did not prevent Rumsfeld from prematurely turning the NATO command in Bosnia over to a weak E.U. Force, a terrible mistake.)

By the time meaningful diplomatic efforts started in 2006, the reformist prime minister in Belgrade had been assassinated by ultranationalists. And Vladimir Putin decided to reenter the Balkans with a dramatic policy shift: No longer would Russia cooperate with Washington and Brussels in the search for a peaceful compromise, as it had in 1995 when Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin sat on the hillside at Hyde Park and reached a historic agreement to put Russian troops under NATO command. Today, Putin seeks to reassert Russia’s role as a regional hegemon. He is not trying to start another Cold War, but he craves international respect, and the Balkans, neglected by a Bush administration retreating from its European security responsibilities, are a tempting target.

Putin was hardly quiet about this; I watched him bluntly warn German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Defense Secretary Robert Gates and delegates to the Munich security conference in February that Russia would not agree to any Kosovo settlement that Belgrade opposed. There was a vague feeling in Washington and Brussels that Putin was bluffing — and no real planning in case Putin meant it.

Not only did he mean it, Putin upped the ante by extending his reach into the Serb portion of Bosnia. Using some of his petrodollars, Putin turned its mildly pro-Western leader, Milorad Dodik, into a nasty nationalist who began threatening secession. The vaunted Atlantic alliance has yet to address this problem at a serious policy level– even though, as Gregorian warned, it could explode soon after Kosovo declares independence.

The window of opportunity for a soft landing in Kosovo closed in 2004. Still, Bush should make one last, personal effort with Putin. His efforts must be backed by temporary additional troop deployments in the region. It is not too late to prevent violence, but it will take American-led action and time is running out.

Richard Holbrooke was the chief architect of the Dayton peace agreement, which ended the war in Bosnia. He writes a monthly column for The Post.

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Last Friday’s (15 Nov 07) issue of the Bosnian weekly magazine “Slobodna Bosna” features a story speculating that OHR will remove Milorad Dodik as the head of the RS government within next two months. This story, based on the account of an “unnamed high-ranking foreign diplomat,” basically repeats the general attitude that Dodik is no longer a viable political partner. The unnamed diplomat also alleges that Dodik has been working on introducing the Russian political and economic presence in the Balkans that has been very irritating to the Americans because they installed Dodik to political power with their money and effort.

The article further speculates that there is a major rift between Dodik and his fellow SNSD party member, Nikola Spiric. According to the article, Spiric’s resignation from the post of BiH Prime minister was not coordinated with Dodik and that has caused friction between them. Allegedly, Spiric has been unhappy with Dodik’s power and arrogance for some time. Nebojsa Radmanovic (SNSD member of the state tri-partite presidency) is mentioned as the next SNSD leader.

The article ends with the speculation that the international community estimates that Dodik’s removal from power will not be met with high levels of civil unrest. They base their estimate on the relatively low turnout at the rallies across RS last month giving support to Dodik.

If this is indeed the thinking of the international community in Bosnia, there is a good reason to be concerned. Dodik’s removal from power will not solve the current political crisis because it is, and has been for a while, beyond him. Removing Dodik would be like firing an operator of a runaway train.

I believe that this measure alone would deepen the crisis. Dodik has been merely a spokesperson for a much larger and very popular political movement aimed at extracting the RS from Bosnia-Herzegovina. His removal would only galvanize that movement. Already pervasive feeling among the RS population that OHR – indeed the entire International Community save for Russia - is biased against the Serbs would gain further legitimacy. Combined with the prospect of the Kosovo independence, the RS runaway train would gain further speed and there would be nothing to stop it.

Last month rallies in support for Dodik should not be taken as a measure of RS population’s empathy for their leader and his politics. Instead, international diplomats and analysts should recall the demonstrations held a few years back against the rebuilding of a famous Ferhadija mosque in Banja Luka; or they should remember demonstrations against Bosniak returnees to Brcko (when American troops, part of the SFOR mission, were chased by an angry mob over the bridge into the neighboring Croatia).

The fact is that Dodik – or any RS nationalist leader – can summon not only large numbers of people but also groups that do not shy away from instigating violence not only against non-Serb civilians but also international troops and police. Dodik has already displayed his unscrupulousness in that regard tolerating (if not sending) a group of Chetniks brandishing flags with skulls and bones and all other “lovely” paraphernalia to hold a rally in Bratunac (near Srebrenica) this past summer. Therefore, I do not doubt for one second that if OHR tries to remove Dodik, he would muster at least 100,000 people on the streets of Banja Luka to “protect” him and “the republic”. Such a large event would be a prelude to other, bigger things. For one, such demonstrations would expose all of the international community’s inability to deal with Dodik’s defiance.

Therefore, physical confrontation with Dodik on the streets of Banjaluka is a losing proposition. Banjaluka and Belgrade will most likely try to deepen the crisis and make Bosnia’s state government completely dysfunctional. Here is why…

It is safe to assume that the Bosnian Serbs have always and will always strive for independence from Sarajevo. Dayton peace agreement has put that idea on hold for a while, but it did not shut it down completely. The very existence of Republika Srpska is the perpetuation of that idea – an inactive virus waiting for the right moment to re-emerge.

It is also safe to assume that the current domestic and international climate is ideal for turning this idea into reality. Every step that Bosnia-Herzegovina makes toward becoming a more functional state would decrease the RS chances of separation. They cannot allow that.

Regionally, Bosnia’s current crisis is viewed in the context of Kosovo (and Montenegro!) independence. Dodik stated earlier this week that if Kosovo unilaterally declares independence from Serbia, it would be very difficult to explain to his electorate why they are not entitled to the same principle.

Internationally, the focus on the Balkans has given way to Middle East and Afghanistan for quite some time – politically, strategically and (perhaps most importantly) militarily. United States have been steadily giving way to EU’s management of Bosnia’s problems under the assumption that as long as EU dangles the carrot of possible membership to Bosnia, local politicians will play along. Unfortunately, that has been a wrong assumption because Dodik and Kostunica would sacrifice Bosnia’s membership to EU any day over the prospect of creating a Greater Serbia.

Given the pervasive political ideology in Banja Luka and Belgrade, given the current political climate in the country, region and internationally, it is more than likely that Dodik and his mentors will continue to deepen the crisis. Backing away from their strategic goals now and allowing Bosnia to start functioning as a normal state will bring their nationalist dreams to an end and completely disqualify them as political figures among their supporters who have steadily cheered them on. Therefore, it is not very likely to see a reversal in their policies whose culmination will come around the time for Kosovo independence. EU and USA have until then to make a workable contingency plan for Bosnia. Removing one or two figures will not solve anything at this time.

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Last week, New York Times editorial also warned about the crisis in Bosnia. When Bosnia turns up on the NYT editorial page, things are not good.

Talking to people, listening to radio shows and watching TV programs where public calls in and comments on various topics, it has become quite obvious that everyone expects the International Community to step in and reassure the public that there will be no conflict. Unfortunately, such reassurances are hard to come by. EUFOR commander commented recently that his troops are ready to respond in case of such an event, without giving any specifics. Bosnian Minister of Security, Tarik Sadovic, and NATO Commander, Gen. Wightman, stated that the curent security situation in country is stabile. NATO spokesperson said, commenting on a news article speculation that Bosnian-Serb seccession would be prevented with a large scale occupation of Republika Srpska, that occupation is out of the question because NATO and EUFOR troops were already in the country at the request of the local government. He further stated that the international peacekeeprs have various contingency plans.

Unfortunately, these comments have done very little to alay fears among the general public because Bosnians, regardless of ethnicity, do not see a clear way out of this crisis. The current political situation and international community’s vagueness on possible options (especially military options) irresistibly remind common Bosnians of the situation in early 1992.

I do not believe that there will be war in Bosnia like in the period between 1992-1995. However, as I statred in my other posts, I fear that the country may split up and that there could be residual violence against minority returnees, massive demonstrations, even open conflict in contentious places like Brcko and Mostar.

Tonight, I went food shopping in the local supermarket. I decided not to buy any oil - we rarely cook and almost never use cooking oil. However, after seeing an empty shell where hundreds of bottles of vegetable, soybean, corn and sunflower oil used to stand, I panicked, and picked up two liters of soybean oil directly from an unopened carton box that was sitting on the floor. Fear is contagious and, in the Balkans, it is very dangerous. International presence in Bosnia and their bosses in European capitals and Washington, DC must do much more to put peoples’ fears to rest. Otherwise, all of their other efforts may be overtaken by unwanted events.

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PEACE IMPLEMENTATION COUNCIL STEERING BOARD POLITICAL DIRECTORS

Sarajevo, 31 October 2007

Declaration by the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council

Political Directors of the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board met in Sarajevo on 30 and 31 October 2007. The Chairman and Ministers of the Council of Ministers as well as leaders of the governing coalition were present during parts of the meeting.

In line with the decision taken at its June meeting, the PIC Steering Board reviewed the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since then, the situation in BiH has deteriorated further. Responsibility lies with political leaders from both entities who have blocked progress and undermined the political situation with their aggressive rhetoric. The situation is now of the utmost concern to the international community. The PIC Steering Board underscores that it is time for BiH politicians to end the practice of questioning the fundamental structure of the state or its component parts.

BiH urgently needs reform to build the kind of modern, efficient state that can take its place in Euro-Atlantic institutions and fulfil the promise of the Dayton Peace Agreement. This can only be achieved through compromise.

However, since June, BiH has moved no closer to initialling a Stabilisation and Association Agreement. Some political leaders have not honoured their previous commitments to meet EU requirements. These requirements must be fulfilled if the country is to conclude an SAA. BiH leaders should adopt a positive approach, based on full respect for the Dayton Peace Agreement and dialogue. The Mostar Declaration of 28 October can serve as the starting point for a positive reengagement of the government coalition parties. Concrete steps are now needed to demonstrate that this is a serious effort. If they follow-up, BiH would be able to progress towards conclusion of the SAA.

Given the lack of progress on key reforms, a focus on completing implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement, including efforts to tackle the evident dysfunctionality of state institutions, is necessary. The PIC Steering Board fully supports this approach.

The Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council also supports the High Representative’s decisions and proposed actions, which are fully in line with his mandate and the Constitution of BiH. The only objective of these measures is to streamline the decision-making process in the Council of Ministers and the Parliament, and they are necessary for speeding up the reform process. Certain political leaders have overreacted to these measures in order to create a political crisis. They have also challenged the legitimacy and authority of the High Representative and Peace Implementation Council. In particular, the PIC Steering Board calls upon RS leaders to abide by their obligations [1].

The PIC welcomes the High Representative’s initiative to provide a note explaining that the measures maintain the constitutional protection of constituent peoples and Entities. We encourage RS legal experts to engage constructively with OHR legal experts on the explanatory note.

The PIC Steering Board reminds all signatories and parties of their obligation under Annex 10 of the Dayton Peace Agreement to cooperate fully with the High Representative and his staff. Decisions of the High Representative must be fully respected and promptly implemented.

The PIC Steering Board reiterates it will not remain passive in the face of provocative statements or acts. Any BiH political leaders or institutions that challenge the High Representative and the PIC Steering Board will be subject to appropriate measures. The Steering Board underlines that the international community retains the necessary instruments to counter destructive tendencies and that it will not allow attempts to undermine the Dayton Peace Agreement, whether from inside or outside the country.

The Steering Board underlined that BiH is a recognised sovereign state whose territorial integrity is guaranteed by the Dayton Peace Agreement. The Steering Board recalls that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina recognises that Bosnia and Herzegovina consists of two entities and that Bosniacs, Croats and Serbs are constituent peoples. The Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council remains committed to the principles on which the General Framework Agreement for Peace is founded and notes that the High Representative’s measures in no way change these principles.

The PIC Steering Board also re-emphasises its concern regarding suggestions that certain reforms could be reversed unilaterally by entity decisions retrieving competencies previously transferred to the state. An entity cannot withdraw unilaterally from a previously agreed reform. The consolidation of state-level institutions must continue.

In this context, the Steering Board deplores the lack of progress regarding the transfer from the entities to the state of all property needed for defence purposes as required by the Defence Law. The Steering Board stresses the urgent need to resolve this issue and requests the High Representative to engage with the parties and take appropriate measures to bring this issue to a conclusion by the end of the year.

The Steering Board also deplores the fact that state and entity authorities have failed to reach an agreement apportioning the ownership and use of state property, despite the strong appeal that they do so issued by Political Directors in June of this year. It reminds the three prime ministers of the urgent need to reach an inter-governmental agreement on this question and requests the High Representative to undertake all appropriate measures to bring this issue to a conclusion.

The Steering Board calls upon Serbia, a Dayton signatory, as well as the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially those in Republika Srpska, to abide by their obligations under international law to cooperate fully with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), playing a proactive role in apprehending all remaining indictees, including Radovan Karadzic and Ratko Mladic, without further delay, dismantling the networks offering support to such fugitives, and ensuring they are transferred to the ICTY.

Also in that regard, the Steering Board welcomes the steps taken by the High Representative to augment the capacity of the BiH authorities to investigate and prosecute war crimes suspects.

The PIC Steering Board will review the situation at its next meeting in February 2008, which will take place in Brussels on 26 and 27 February 2008.

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[1]The Russian Federation expresses its special opinion regarding the measures of the High Representative.

The Russian Federation expresses its deepest concern by the consequences of the measures taken by the High Representative that change the procedures of the adoption of decisions by the Council of Ministers and the Parliamentary Assembly of BiH.

Taking into account the lack of agreement on these measures among the BiH leaders, the Russian Federation considers that the elaboration of the measures in a more stable environment would have been more productive. It is essential that the efficiency of BiH institutions be improved not in an atmosphere of growing tensions, but in a more stable context.

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Today, we commonly hear both domestic politicians and international diplomats in Bosnia and Herzegovina that the country has entered a period of political crisis and instability that is the worst since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in late 1995. EUFOR Commander’s statement that, “EUFOR is ready to respond in case of a new war,” shows just how serious political
problems are. In order to predict how the current situation will play out in the short term and long term, it is important to look back at the genesis of the problem and clearly state some of the most important benchmarks.

First, it is important to realize that the current situation is not an exclusive fault of the current Bosnian Serb leadership. Many non-Serb domestic political leaders and intellectuals and foreign diplomats point at the RS Prime Minister Milorad Dodik as the principal villain in the current political strife because of his refusal to pass police
reform and other reforms that would bring Bosnia and Herzegovina closer to EU integration and because of his ultra-nationalist and, at times, secessionist rhetoric that is reminiscent of Slobodan Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic in the early 1990s. Most recently, Dodik has threatened to withdraw all RS representatives from Bosnia’s joint
legislative and executive bodies (and, effectively shut down the government) as a protest to measures imposed by the International Community that are meant to make the work of the state government more efficient. RS deemed these measures unconstitutional and unacceptable. In order to display the popularity of his words and actions, Dodik organized relatively small, peaceful demonstrations throughout RS in which citizens voiced their support for his policies.

It is, therefore, very tempting to think that Dodik is at the root of the current political problem. If one believes in this premise, it would seem logical that Dodik’s removal by the High Representative would solve the problem. This would have been true a year ago; Dodik’s dismissal from the post would have sent a clear message that the International Community was firmly in control over the situation on the ground. However, today such an action would only exacerbate problems and lead to further radicalization of the Bosnian Serb population. Instead, Dodik’s politics should be viewed as the logical step in the evolution of
the Serbian national politics that started with Milosevic in the late 1980s. In other words, the Dayton Peace Agreement has merely delayed the execution of a plan to tear Bosnia along ethnic lines, leading to the addition of the “Bosnian Serb territories” (legitimized by Dayton as
Republika Srpska) to Serbia proper. Given that Serbia is facing an inevitable loss of Kosovo, the plan to replace some of the lost territories is given even more priority - both in order to soften popular anger about the loss of Kosovo, and to create a Serbian super-state that would encompass all Serbs into a single state, which has been the strategic goal since the 1980s. In this context, Dodik
should be viewed as merely a man who was in power when the time arrived to execute this stage of the plan. His removal, outside a wider political strategy for Western Balkans, would be disastrous at this time.

For the past twelve years, RS has greatly evolved politically and economically. Large-scale returns of non-Serb population to RS did not happen, and, as a result, RS is nearly ethnically pure entity (which translates into no organized political, and more importantly, military
opposition to secessionist plans). At the same time, all of the RS leaders have led careful political strategy that aimed at strengthening RS institutions while rendering Bosnia’s state institutions weak and ineffective (and, as a result, illegitimate). The goal was to build a political,
economic and security infrastructure that would make the eventual secession from the rest of the country as easy as possible when time comes. This plan has succeeded brilliantly.

The non-Serb political leadership has been completely oblivious to what has been going on in RS, using their positions of power in the Federation BiH and state institutions for nothing more than personal and financial gain. Not a single Bosniak political leader or a party has formulated a strategy that would make the state stronger and more self-reliable. Aside from the catchy pre-election slogans like “100% Bosnia and Herzegovina,” Bosniak parties have shown no creativity in proposing constitutional, economic and other reforms. In other words, during the post-war period, Bosniak and Bosnian-Croat parties have displayed a dismaying amount of political immaturity and incompetence (and complete intellectual and political inferiority to their RS counterparts) and have greatly contributed to the present political quagmire.

The burden of keeping Bosnia and Herzegovina functioning fell on the shoulders of the International Community. International Community has played a key role in bringing the 1992-1995 war to an end, reaching a
political agreement in Dayton and implementing peace both militarily and politically in the period after the war. If it were not for the International Community’s insistence on certain reforms, Bosnia and Herzegovina would not have a single currency, would not have unified vehicle license plates (which are key for safe travel through the
country), would not have a unified customs and border control agency, etc. The list could go on and on.

Given these artificial and imposed reforms, many non-Serb political parties and remaining International Community factors have become complacent into thinking that Bosnia was on an “automatic pilot” to becoming a more functioning state, on the way to joining EU and NATO,
which would eventually lead to a complete self-sufficiency. As a result, the previous international High Representative (Christian Schwarz-Schilling) insisted on a policy that the domestic political factors reach key agreements without the international interference. The strategy failed miserably, creating series of mini crises over policies and ushering the way for the current political showdown.

At the same time, EUFOR and NATO (two international military peacekeeping missions in the country) have steadily reduced their numbers and closed down all camps except for the Headquarters camp near Sarajevo.
Reduced military capability has resulted into a more brazen political challenge by the RS leadership. Despite EUFOR commander’s statement that they are ready to intervene in the case of renewed violence, RS leadership knows very well that if it comes down to RS secession, under the current international force posture, there would be no domestic or foreign military intervention against them.

Bottom line: the belief that Serbia and their protégés in Bosnia have accepted Bosnia as the end result and have given up hopes of creating a state that would bring all Serbs in the Balkans under one state roof, has been the single greatest miscalculation by both the domestic non-Serb political leaders and the International Community. Today, we are living through the consequences of that strategic blunder.

What Happens Next? - A Likely Scenario

The current situation is such that the RS leadership has all the initiative and is, in effect, controlling the political and security developments in the country. The RS national assembly has nominally declared the latest OHR’s measures as overstepping his authority and putting the Bosnian Serbs on an unequal footing with Bosniaks and Bosnian-Croats in the state institutions. Aside from declaring their
displeasure with OHR’s measures, they have not yet announced concrete steps to counter them. The RS Assembly, as well as the RS government,
is taking a break from making decisions on further actions until the international Peace Implementation Council (a body that gives OHR its mandate and creates a broad political strategy for OHR) finishes their meetings in Sarajevo this week.

If PIC decides to completely support OHR, as expected, the RS leadership will most likely answer by withdrawing the Bosnian-Serb representatives in the state legislative and executive bodies, and incapacitate the state government, leading to a further deterioration of the political and security situation. That action would be a cause for
further OHR measures, and this would be met by large-scale demonstrations and civil disobedience in RS, which is the situation that Dodik and his coaches in Belgrade are trying to reach. Last Monday’s demonstrations were simply a small-scale dress rehearsal for larger and wider events, but their message was clear.

Just about any OHR’s decision, aside from completely reversing their own measures, would lead to popular unrest in RS. Given that the international community has staked its reputation on their ability to oversee peace implementation in Bosnia, it is unreasonable to
expect them to simply reverse their measures and give in to Dodik in order to avert bigger mess. Therefore, by all accounts, it is very likely that Bosnia and Herzegovina is entering a period of not only severe political turmoil, but also civil unrest, insecurity for minorities (Bosniak returnees to RS) and complete failure of the state
government.

In the ensuing chaos, the RS leadership will most likely take measures to effectively run RS separately from the rest of the country (much like the Slovenians did when they declared independence from former Yugoslavia). A referendum for the RS autonomy would give their actions
an appearance of democratic and popular legitimacy. Despite the domestic and international protests, there would be no actual intervention aimed at preventing RS from a de facto secession. Serbia would react by shrewdly giving lip service to Bosnia’s territorial integrity, in order to void international condemnation and sanctions. There would be no rush with integration of RS into Serbia. Meanwhile, Belgrade would provide complete financial assistance to Banjaluka in the face of the international reaction that would most likely include a package of sanctions against RS. Despite all reactions, RS would complete the
secession, which would be virtually impossible to reverse later. At best, a political deal (Dayton 2 perhaps) based on a new reality on the ground, would be reached giving RS a complete autonomy in a confederative type of
arrangement with Sarajevo, with the guaranteed right to vote regarding its destiny a few years later (as in Serbia-Montenegro model prior to Montenegro’s final vote on breakup with Serbia).

Endgame

This scenario may seem pessimistic, but it is based on the previous political experience in regards to Serbian strategic goals which seem to be entrenched in a cultural belief that assumes that all Serbs must live in a single state, and that they must be in a complete, sovereign control of the space in which they reside if non-Serbs occupy the same
space. The collateral damage of this belief translated into political action, are the neighboring non-Serb populations and the administrative units (Bosnia as a state) where power is shared between Serbs and non-Serbs.

Understanding this cultural-political concept is the key in formulating a strategy to countering it if that is the policy in order to save the Bosnian statehood and territorial integrity. The International Community has lost time, and with time, political options for effectively countering the RS secessionist drive. Today, those options must include severe political and economic pressures on both Banja Luka and Belgrade (because they are two sides of the same problem) backed by a clear, displayable show of force to RS. It is not too early to start thinking about preparing military increases to EUFOR and NATO.

But most importantly, it would be prudent to organize a regional political conference (much like Dayton) where the future of Bosnia, and its internal structure that is rendering it unworkable at this time, would be decided for good. A solid plan that includes constitutional reform of the country, backed by Zagreb, Belgrade, US and EU would save Bosnia and Herzegovina from certain disintegration and would automatically bring it closer to joining the European community of nations as a stable country with equal rights for all its peoples.

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