To look at the economy, or areas within the economy, from a complexity viewpoint then would mean asking how it evolves, and this means examining in detail how individual agents’ behaviors together form some outcome and how this might in turn alter their behavior as a result. Complexity in other words asks how individual behaviors might react to the pattern they together create, and how that pattern would alter itself as a result. This is often a difficult question; we are asking how a process is created from the purposed actions of multiple agents. And so economics early in its history took a simpler approach, one more amenable to mathematical analysis. It asked not how agents’ behaviors would react to the aggregate patterns these created, but what behaviors (actions, strategies, expectations) would be upheld by–would be consistent with–the aggregate patterns these caused. It asked in other words what patterns would call for no changes in micro-behavior, and would therefore be in stasis, or equilibrium. (General equilibrium theory thus asked what prices and quantities of goods produced and consumed would be consistent with—would pose no incentives for change to—the overall pattern of prices and quantities in the economy’s markets. Classical game theory asked what strategies, moves, or allocations would be consistent with—would be the best course of action for an agent (under some criterion)—given the strategies, moves, allocations his rivals might choose. And rational expectations economics asked what expectations would be consistent with—would on average be validated by—the outcomes these expectations together created.)
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If we assume equilibrium we place a very strong filter on what we can see in the economy. Under equilibrium by definition there is no scope for improvement or further adjustment, no scope for exploration, no scope for creation, no scope for transitory phenomena, so anything in the economy that takes adjustment—adaptation, innovation, structural change, history itself—must be bypassed or dropped from theory.

The focus on financial stability, and system risk in the banking system, is due to concerns that a sudden shift in asset prices could lead to a breakdown in the financial system – due to concentration, bank-runs, or some concern about fragility.

This is all well and good.  I think we need to be careful with these arguments.  I think we also need to identify why and what the failures are.  But, overall this is a way forward.

And it does nothing to truly “prevent bubbles”.  If someone wants to “overpay” for something, they can, and will – and as a society we shouldn’t give two hoots about someone pissing their own money against the wall.  True story.

If we tell people the RBNZ is “stopping bubbles” they will just assume that whatever is happening isn’t a bubble.  Does this actually seem like it will help anyone?  The RBNZ can’t really control asset prices, and it definitely can’t control them in the face of “irrational exuberance” (protip, the RBNZ doesn’t control people’s expectations of future house price appreciation).  The goal is to prevent the popping of a bubble having enormous spillover effects onto the broader economy.  If the RBNZ is doing its job right we will STILL HAVE BUBBLES – and people who took on the risk will still HURT THEMSELVES.

As a result, I hate the current description.  I hate the focus on asset prices themselves, rather than the direct stability of the banking system.  And I hate that we aren’t more focused on trying to identify where the risks and failures and and how to quantify them.

I’m not being greedy, these four things will pretty much do me

I’ve noticed that they are talking about building costs, and housing supply.  Fair enough.  I also noticed something about milk/food in schools, fair enough as well (wonder how it will compare with the Labour scheme, which I was favourable about – and note nice post over at Offsetting).  Will be good to see these points comes out.

What are you hoping will be in your Budget day stocking?

Update:  I see alternative budgets from Don Brash and Roger Douglas.  While I agree about the long-term budget concerns (due to things like healthcare spending and superannuation), and I can understand the worries about housing investment I broadly disagree with everything else in these pieces – it isn’t that I think they are being inaccurate (they are not), I’m just not persuaded that the arguments they are making reflect the full equity-efficiency trade-off society is willing to undertake.

The regime shift we are seeing in Japan is just the kind of bold action that might actually succeed in changing both inflation and growth expectations a substantial amount. As a result, it may be an effective tool for encouraging robust recovery and an end to deflation.

Nick Rowe has been saying that for a while but, before we get too gung-ho, Romer cautions:

I don’t know if the Japanese experiment with monetary regime change will work. But I am confident that we will learn a great deal because they had the nerve to try.

We focus on two specific issues, the way taxes distort behaviour, and the idea of where the burden of tax falls.  As we explained in the first article these issues are really really difficult to actually work out – and the purpose of the second argument is just to give a “flavour” to the argument.  In honesty, if you wanted to figure out the true burden and distortions you’ll have to get yourselve a series of these CGE modeling economists armed with other economists who focus on normative judgments.

Last time I promised to discuss tax systmes that seem idea, that we don’t use.  And why we don’t.  Well, that is now the next article.

Also, thanks to Agnitio who helped me clear up this article.  It is a fairly wonkish one, and he came in at the last minute and helped me clarify what the hang I was doing

Ever since the crisis erupted I have, especially privately, called the “rebalancing” argument one of the most pathetic quasi-economic arguments imaginable.  I found it difficult when a large section of the New Zealand economics community started using it, because apart from being a close to meaningless metaphor it also has the disadvantage of misleading people – confusing macroeconomic policy ideas with “compositional” issues, leading to the typical “fallacy of composition arguments” which lead to bad bad policy.

It is with this in mind that a good friend of mine sent me this BERL report on rebalancing the macroeconomy.  And it is with the recognition that it is not just BERL – but a large section of New Zealand’s economists – who make this argument that I aim to discuss why the focus on discussing rebalancing is bad economics.

Rebalancing is a term used to hide value judgments and sell a moral argument about the “right structure of the economy” – it is not an objective way of facing the trade-offs of policy choices, and as a result is it a bastardisation of what economists should be describing for the public.

“Rebalancing is a morality play about borrowing – nothing more”

When talking about rebalancing people throw out lots of statistics and ratios, making it sound like we can be better off in some way by changing what “NZ Inc” produces.  This is popular with the left and right – with left wing and right wing think tanks both going on about this.  We need to “improve tradable GDP” and do less “non-tradable GDP” and make NZ Inc more like China Inc.

But like political discussions on productivity, or the assumption that we can redistribute income without any efficiency cost, this is entirely missing the point.

See this line in the BERL report:

We conclude that the underlying factors driving New Zealand’s macroeconomic imbalances have deteriorated considerably since 2008

They take a panel of UK Competition Commission decisions from 1970–2003 and evaluate the effect of the chairman’s experience on the probability of an adverse finding. Using a panel of that size allows them to control for various effects such as the chairman’s age.

Using a unique data set of companies investigated under UK competition law, we find very strong experience effects for chairmen of investigation panels, estimated from the increase in experience of individual chairman. Probit and IV probit regressions indicate that replacing an inexperienced chairman with one of average experience increases the probability of a ‘guilty’ outcome by approximately 30% and, after chairing around 30 cases, a chairman is predicted to find almost every case guilty.

There is strong evidence that house prices and consumption are synchronised. There is, however, disagreement over the causes of this link. This study examines if there is a wealth effect of house prices on consumption. Using a household-level panel data set with information about house ownership, income, wealth and demographics for a large sample of the Danish population in the period 1987–96, we model the dependence of the growth rate of total household expenditure with unanticipated innovations to house prices. Controlling for factors related to competing explanations, we find little evidence of a housing wealth effect.

But, I have to slightly take issue with this:

Especially so since the Reserve Bank yesterday voiced concern at signs that the improvement in household saving rates may be stalling and that household debt is rising from a level already high relative to incomes.

The Government also argues that by running a tight fiscal policy it allows the bank to keep monetary policy looser than it otherwise could – lowering pressure on interest rates and the dollar.

However, as the bank reminded us yesterday, that silver lining comes with an increasingly ominous cloud in the form of rampant house price inflation, most notably in Auckland.

With the dollar as high as it is, the bank is reluctant to raise interest rates.

With the supply side of the housing market, especially in Auckland, unlikely to relieve the pressure on prices for years, and with gruesome examples in the Northern Hemisphere of what happens to an economy when a housing bubble bursts, at some point the bank is going to have to crush the demand side by raising interest rates.

If that coincides with fiscal contraction from a debt-obsessed Government, the effects could be unpleasant.

I don’t like where this logic is starting to go.  The RBNZ is responsible for “aggregate demand” in the economy.  If this is too low, then the RBNZ has set monetary conditions too tight, it is their fault.  Sure they may say it is not, some may say I am being unfair saying this … but if there is anything history has shown us, whenever we try to say “this time is different” with regards to a demand shortfall we usually end up coming back to blaming the central bank.

Relatively high debt levels and high house prices are not a monetary policy or demand issue.  They are an issue of financial stability, an issue of economic structure.  Yes, they create risks and can have negative welfare consequences.  Yes, competition, fiscal, and financial stability policy needs to account for them.  But monetary policy needs to take fiscal, competition, and financial stability policy AS GIVEN and then focus on “demand” from there.

Not dealing with demand because of concerns about these issues isn’t prudent, it is policy failure.  Blatant policy failure.  If you don’t believe me, ask someone who is both smarter and more articulate than me such as Nick Rowe.

Now, if the government remains on course and the RBNZ tightens monetary conditions to “fight the housing market” while it expects inflation to be low and unemployment high, they are explicitly violating their mandate and best practice of a central bank.  It is as simple as that.  I’m happy saying this out loud because they would not do that, they know these things, and will continue attempting to set monetary policy at the right level to deal with demand issues (as represented by their forecasts for inflation and unemployment over the next two years).  But given that the RBNZ does this appropriately, the government deficit does not matter outside of its impact on the composition of the economy.

If we want to criticise government policy during the recession, do it in terms of investment (it would have been a good time to move a bit more investment forward), and social policy related things.

Note:  If we believe that the response to interest rate changes will be very small, that in some sense investment demand is very “inelastic” then we can make a claim for government investment – we just need to be very clear on that AND we need to ask why in that case we still have a positive cash rate.  Remember, government investment here also works by driving up the “natural” interest rate … so through the same logic it will lead to a higher real exchange rate and higher government borrowing … unless the “cumulative impact” of rising demand pushing activity towards potential outweighs that.  And if we are using that “cumulative impact” argument for government spending then it also holds for a cut in domestic interest rates, just with a lower real exchange rate and compositionally more private sector activity.  So protip:  we can’t complain the exchange rate is too high and that government spending is too low at the same time!

Update:  Also after today’s unemployment and employment numbers I think people should be willing to rethink whether they think there is a “demand” issue in NZ going forward …

You get trade theorists who have built their entire careers on “anomalous” results who are at the same time the greatest defenders of free trade. …the minds of analytically sophisticated [economists] turn into mush when they are forced to take seriously the policy implications of their own models.

This is something that we all encounter constantly: people who ‘should know better’ advocating a policy that seems poorly designed. Why might it happen? It is common to resort to explanations that involve mendacity and duplicity, but they are as unsatisfying as they are implausible. It is highly unlikely that everybody we disagree with lies, while we ourselves are paragons of virtue and transparency. In fact, Rodrik identifies the most convincing explanation later in his essay: “There are powerful forces having to do with the sociology of the profession and the socialization process that tend to push economists to think alike.” Exactly, and none of us are immune to it.

Psychologists have demonstrated that logic tends to be used only as a post-hoc rationalisation of our intuitive response to ideas. When economists respond to a new policy idea they will tend to draw on their toolbox of ideas to defend whatever intuitive response they have to it. Those intuitions are greatly influenced by our social identity, which develops to align the intuitions of social groups. As Rodrik points out, the prevailing view of economists at the time that free trade and unfettered markets are a good thing was far more influential than the, more ambiguous, implications of current research. Of course, economists had a vast stock of reasons why governments might fail and could mount a very convincing justification for their free market intuitions. It takes other experts with different intuitions to cut through that fog as they justify their own beliefs.

What does this mean for the way we listen to experts and interpret their opinions? As Tyler Cowen says, “Evaluate literatures not individual papers.” Individuals are incredibly unreliable for the reasons outlined above. The aggregated view of a range of people with different intuitions is much likelier to represent the truth. No individual is an oracle and following the teachings of a few people is likely to lead us astray. That is why economists tend to be sceptical of ‘surgical policy interventions’ and far more trusting of markets than most people. Of course, in saying that I’m probably exhibiting my groupish bias in favour of market solutions!