One thing that good leaders do when assuming responsibility for an action, activity, job or command is to research it to death.  Can you relate to this?  To really know a subject you must study everything about it to gain situational understanding.  Some call this issue immersion.  In fact, we have immersed ourselves here at the IW Fusion Center about the subject of irregular warfare. Here is one shocking conclusion:  the term itself lacks clarity, as any review of the definition of IW will show that it is defined in MANY ways.

It was a term first coined by the Marines in their 1940 Small Wars Manual and has been restated and changed to things like low intensity conflict, guerrilla warfare, unconventional warfare, revolutionary warfare, partisan warfare, military operations other than war, etc. Additionally, there is much variance in the activities that comprise irregular warfare.  Department of Defense Directive 3000.07 Irregular Warfare (Dec 08) lists five activities: counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, foreign internal defense, stability operations, and unconventional warfare, but other literature and guiding documents list many other activities. Consider these official documents and testimony:

• QDR, 6 Feb 06:  4 IW activities
• JFCOM IW Special Study, 4 Aug 06:  10 IW activities
• BG Otis statement to HASC, 27 Sep 06:  8 IW activities
• ADM Olson testimony to HASC, 27 Sep 06:  5 IW activities
• IW JOC 1.0, 11 Sep 07:  14 IW activities
• FM 3-05.130, Sep 08:  14 IW activities
• DoDD 3000.07, 1 Dec 08:  5 IW activities
• JP 1, 20 Mar 09:  7 IW activities
• IW JOC 2.0, 17 May 10:  11 IW activities

Yes, this is confusing – not only for the Soldiers and Marines who must execute it, but also to the “generating force” who have to develop IW doctrine and training and education. Our aim is to help the Army and others in the Joint Force create a coherent strategy for irregular warfare.  As a result of our immersion and study, we will publish a monograph on irregular warfare which includes a robust discussion about what comprises IW with recommendations for a way ahead. See this link for detail on the various definitions here. In the meantime, tell me what you think on the AIWFC blog or send us an email.

Thanks for your service.

                                         COL Nestor Sadler, Director

To view the rest of the AIWFC Newsletter, click this link.

Our experience with collecting counterinsurgency and irregular warfare lessons learned from units returning from OEF (and OIF) shows that units have become extremely proficient in understanding the operating environment – in gaining and maintaining a deep understanding of both operational and mission variables such as PMESII, METT-TC, OAKOC, ASCOPE, etc.  We have accumulated a lot of evidence that units have mastered this aspect of intelligence preparation of the battlefield. One thing that isn’t so evident (at least to us) is assessing the state of an insurgency itself. 

This is what I mean:  “Knowing the commonly accepted general patterns or strategies of insurgency helps in predicting the tactics and techniques they may employ against the government.” This quote is from FM 3-24.2, Tactics in Counterinsurgency.  In this FM, insurgency dynamics, phasing, patterns and strategies have a broader and deeper treatment than any other conventional doctrinal publication.  It is very good information – knowledge, but I think that very few in the Army know it. Knowing and applying this doctrinal information about insurgencies can be extremely beneficial for predictive analysis and shaping operations.

Does it really matter now, since we are drawing down operations in Afghanistan and the Army shifts to regaining offensive and defensive combat skills?  I think it is still relevant, for two important reasons.  First, many of our BCTs will have advising missions associated with Regionally Aligned Forces.  SFA operations in countries even in Phase I (Latent and Incipient) insurgencies require US units to themselves understand insurgent strategies – to better advise host nation security forces.  Second, as a superpower, we can be certain to face hybrid challenges and threats at home and abroad.  Understanding insurgent strategies is vital – similar to how we once intensely studied Soviet order of battle. It was not just an S2 function during the Cold War, but commanders and staffs were required to have that knowledge as well. 

What is your experience and what do you think?  Please comment on our blog or email us your ideas: usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil.

Thanks for your service.

                                         COL Nestor Sadler, Director
To view the rest of the AIWFC Newsletter, click this link.

Does the Army lack unity of effort to effectively integrate, synchronize and institutionalize IW activities?

Is there a need for the Army to develop a coherent approach that synchronizes and integrates DOTLMPF functions for IW activities?

Should there be a single Army proponent for IW?

AIWFC is researching these questions and many others like them in order to establish a foundational framework that will allow us to inform/recommend a unified way ahead for the institutionalization of IW activities across the Army. 

We must not rely on “good-enough” when it comes to capturing and capitalizing on the lessons of the last eleven years of operations – the Army must get this right and not fall into the syndrome that we will never do this (IW) again.  Our enemies will not give us the choice.

What are your thoughts?  Please comment on our blog or email us your ideas: usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil.

Thanks for your service.

                                         COL Nestor Sadler, Director

To view the rest of the AIWFC Newsletter, click this link.

Download the summary, slideshow and other webcast products here.

Our colleague Phil Smith over at the USMC Small Wars Center for Irregular Warfare recently reviewed the book, Arms of Little Value: The Challenge of Insurgency and Global Instability in the Twenty First Century (see here). He notes on Small Wars Journal that the author, G.L. Lamborn is explicit about the lack of understanding of the nature of irregular warfare in America.  Lamborn states that “The American society, along with civilian and military leaders remain unprepared to deal with the complexities of insurgencies and small wars.”

Phil Smith writes: “Lamborn peppers his book with poignant questions, in a manner expected in a seminar, framed to educate through cognitive dissonance. What is our response to the overwhelming historic fact that conventional forces have usually outnumbered irregular forces 30-40 times but rarely ‘defeat’ the insurgents politically or strategically?  Where in our PME for leaders and planners is the dedicated study to small wars?  Why do so many of our leaders still think that firepower, massive force and high technology are keys to winning in small wars?  Which of our adversaries present an existential technological or conventional threat to the USA?”

Phil  goes on to show that we in America (and especially the US military), “even while we have been engaged in many small wars we have yet to institutionalize, or commit to philosophy and organizational memory the national, strategic and tactical lessons.”

From a national level, it is vital for civilian leaders in the security apparatus to themselves understand history and the nature of irregular challenges so they can properly weigh the advice of their military counterparts when irregular threats and challenges arise.  From a military readiness standpoint, it is even MORE important for soldiers to maintain a satisfactory level of knowledge of small wars – to be ready when given the task to plan and execute counterinsurgency operations, stability operations, or security force assistance operations.

Thoughts?  Please comment on our blog or email us your ideas: usarmy.leavenworth.cac.mbx.coin@mail.mil.

Thanks for your service.

COL Nestor Sadler, Director

To view the rest of the AIWFC Newsletter, click this link.

Download the summary, slideshow and other webcast products here.