Tracked, ValueCruncher, StockTwits, and many more are the leading edge of a revolution — a revolution in what finance has been for the last several centuries, and what it must become in the 21st.

That is really cool.

One of the scenarios being Rock Stars.  We described the Rock Star scenario as:

Rock Stars – Retail investors seek advice from communities of other investors and are willing to pay. Investors make their trading accounts transparent on-line. Successful investors open their accounts to act as virtual fund managers. Virtual fund managers and community owners split a management fee paid by investors. Winners – Covestor, KaChing.

Last week Dan Carroll and the team at KaChing announced their new offering - and started to show how this scenario may play out. There was a feature in the NY Times which described the business model.

Customers will be able to open a brokerage account with Interactive Brokers and link their account with their choice of investors on KaChing. KaChing charges customers a single management fee of 0.25 percent to 3 percent, set by each investor. KaChing keeps a quarter of the fee, and the investors get the rest.

Each time the investors make a trade, KaChing will automatically make the same trades for the customer. Customers can log on whenever they want to check their portfolio’s performance. They can send the investor private messages and receive alerts if the investor does something unusual. With the click of a mouse, customers can stop mirroring an investor.

KaChing has an A-list team of investors behind them. The on-line finance space has a lot of interesting experiments going on - but we think this is a particularly interesting one. A lot of us will be watching closely how KaChing goes.

Disclosure: I met Dan and Jonathan from KaChing at the FinovateStartup09 event in San Francisco in April 2009. We had the stand next door. Good guys, smart guys - doing interesting things.

The company is planning an IPO on the NZX (New Zealand Share Market).  Gareth Vaughan in The Independent has a good summary of the details. There is a Prospectus expected in the next week. We thought that we would get in early and put out some high-level estimated numbers. We have not seen anything that has not been in the media - these are high-level estimates only. Commentators are estimating the IPO will value the company at around NZ$450 million.

Our base case assumptions are NZ$400 million of 2009 revenues with a 10% EBIT margin. We have also assumed capital expenditures of NZ$30 million per annum. We have assumed that revenues grow at 10% per annum and that profitability (at the EBIT line) remains constant at 10%.

Valuecruncher has completed a base case valuation and three separate scenarios for Kathmandu. The first scenario (EBIT 8%) assumes EBIT margins of 8% against 10% in the base case. The second (Growth 5%) assumes 5% growth not the 10% of the base case. The third (CAPEX $40m) assumes CAPEX of NZ$40m compared to NZ$30m in the base case.

This base case and three scenarios give an enterprise value range of NZ$354 million to NZ$460 million (8.9 to 11.5x estimated 2009 EBIT). Valuecruncher gave a 25% weighting to each scenario which gives a NZ$411 million valuation (10.3x estimated 2009 EBIT). This NZ$411 million is our mid-point valuation of Kathmandu.

An enterprise value is the value of the whole business - debt and equity. To calculate the value of the equity in Kathmandu we need to deduct net debt (long-term borrowings less cash). Without these numbers available we have only calculated a value of the whole business - debt and equity. The ultimate value of the equity would depend on the debt and cash on the balance sheet.

When the actual numbers are released it will be worth looking at some comparators. We have a range that you can look at – you can choose your own. But here are some suggestions:

Nordstrom ($JWN) - Interactive Comparator Analysis

The Gap ($GPS) - Interactive Comparator Analysis

Limited Brands ($LTD) - Interactive Comparator Analysis

Below is a link to the static Valuecruncher valuation report for Kathmandu. The report outlines more details about our initial valuation. It is a piece of high-level analysis based on limited available information.

Valuecruncher-Valuation-Report-Kathmandu-IPO-Estimates-20091007

Valuecruncher Interactive Analysts Report For Apple ($AAPL)

We have the comparator group set as Microsoft ($MSFT), IBM ($IBM), Google ($GOOG) and Hewlett-Packard($HPQ). You can change these peer companies on the site. For example you could add:

1. Research In Motion ($RIM) - Interactive Analyst Report For $RIM
2. Palm ($PALM) - Interactive Analyst Report For $PALM
3. Qualcomm ($QCOM) - Interactive Analyst Report For $QCOM

So what do we think?

Discounted Cash Flow Valuation

We have completed a discounted cash flow valuation using our interactive tools (there is a “discounted cash flow analysis” link just under the company name on the company page). We have populated our model with a mixture of consensus analyst estimates and Valuecruncher estimates. Our analysis produces a valuation of US$176.16 for $AAPL - 7.3% below the current share price. We see $AAPL overvalued at the moment. But how about compared to a peer group?

Comparison Analysis

I changed the peer group companies to $IBM, $RIM, $PALM and $QCOM.  I am going to look at two of the metrics we use at Valuecruncher - Enterprise Value (EV)/Revenue and EV/EBITDA. Enterprise Value (EV) is simply market capitalization plus net debt [long-term borrowings less cash]. We use EV to capture the impact of debt and cash on a company’s balance sheet - market capitalization doesn’t capture different capital structures when comparing companies.

EV/Revenue shows how a dollar or revenues is being valued by the market against the comparator set. On an EV/Revenue basis $AAPL is trading at 4.5x ($AAPL is being valued at 4.5x last year’s revenues). This compares to $IBM at 1.7x, $RIM at 3.5x, $PALM at 3.4x and $QCOM at 5.8x. $AAPL’s profit margins (at the EBITDA line) are 20.9% of revenues.  A dollar of $AAPL revenues is being valued more than a dollar of $RIM revenues - despite that dollar of revenues producing less profit (on an EBITDA basis) than the $RIM revenues.  A dollar of $AAPL revenues is being valued less than a dollar of $QCOM revenues - but $QCOM produces nearly twice the profit (on an EBITDA basis) as $AAPL.  We would expect the difference between the multiples for $QCOM and $AAPL to be larger - in $QCOM’s favour. There are some big growth expectations for $AAPL - on an EV/Revenue basis there appears to be a premium being paid for $AAPL against the peer group.

If we lower the $AAPL EV/Revenue multiple to 3.75x (a slight premium to $RIM) then this gives a share price of $163.30 - 14% below the current share price.

EV/EBITDA shows how a dollar of profit (measured in as Earnings Before Interest Taxes Depreciation and Amortization) is being valued by the market against the comparator set. On an EV/EBITDA basis $AAPLT is trading at 21.51x ($AAPL is being valued at 21.5x last year’s profit at the EBITDA line). A dollar of $AAPL EBITDA is worth more than double a dollar of $IBM, $RIM or $QCOM EBITDA ($PALM is losing money at the EBITDA line).

If we lower the $AAPL EV/EBITDA multiple to 17.5x (a slight premium to $QCOM) then this gives a share price of $160.06 - 16% below the current share price.

Summary

Based on our DCF valuation - $AAPL looks overvalued. Looking at some comparators - the market is valuing $AAPL highly compared to some peers. We believe if you are investing in $AAPL at the current price - you are paying a full price and there are cheaper options available. We do recognize that there are a lot of $AAPL fans out there however.

Disclosure: no positions.

Mark will be at the Finovate conference in New York on the 29 September and also attending the StockTwits StockCamp event at NASDAQ on the 2 October.

You can follow Mark on Twitter - @Valuecruncher.

Where We Are Today

We view the on-line finance space in three broad areas: Information, Analysis and Execution.

Pre-1995 this whole area was dominated by brokerage firms with full-service offerings. They had the information, did the analysis and the executed the trades. Since 1995 that has changed pretty significantly.

Information – background operational and financial information. The main players in this space are now the large finance portals (Yahoo, AOL, MSN, Google, etc). They built and extended these offerings in the Web 1.0 and 2.0 days. The business model is primarily advertising – free to consumers. It should also be noted that there is still a paid market for detailed and timely financial information (Reuters, Bloomberg, Capital IQ, etc).

Analysis – what does the information mean? Should I buy a particular stock? What is this stock worth? Full-service brokers still compile research notes and reports for clients – but this space has begun to be disrupted. This disruption is coming from a number of areas:

Qualitative – primarily finance blogs. These take two main forms: user-generated content aggregators (i.e. SeekingAlpha) and traditional journalism on the web (i.e. The Business Insider).

Community Sites – where retail investors look to communities of investors for advice on where to invest. Examples: The Motley Fool, Wikinvest, Covestor, KaChing, etc.

Niche Tool Providers – primarily quantitative-based tools. For example Valuecruncher.

Execution – the actual buying and selling of stocks. The discount brokers have come to dominate this space (i.e. Charles Schwab, ETrade, etc). They disrupted full-service brokers with simple flat-rate commission structures starting in the Web 1.0 days.

That is a high-level view of where we are today. What might happen next?

We completed a scenario planning exercise based on the frameworks developed by people like Peter Schwartz.

We started with an analysis of trends and uncertainties. A trend is something that we feel certain is occurring. An uncertainty is something that could still go either way.

Trends

1. Execution becomes a commodity – executing trades will continue as a low-cost business. There will be some geographic-based regulatory moats – but no ability to generate abnormal returns. Other parties could enter this market (i.e. portals).
2. Death of traditional equity research – the current model is too expensive and producing research reports that are complex and hard for retail investors to consume. Traditional equity research will head the way of newspapers. Equity research is important but the delivery methods must change. There will be a space at the top-end for high-quality  research (that clients will pay for) but only a niche.
3. Investor knowledge continues to improve – the level of general investor knowledge continues to improve but there still remains a significant gap between the average retail investor and the corporate finance professional.
4. Financial blogs continue to be influential – high-quality analysis continues from blogs. There are two broad models – aggregating content (i.e. SeekingAlpha) and traditional journalism on the web (i.e. The Business Insider).

Uncertainties

1. Individual VS Collaborative – how will retail investors choose to research investment decisions? Individual analysis – retail investors (with improving education) complete their own analysis on where to invest – both qualitative and quantitative. Collaborative – retail investors look to communities of investors for advice on where to invest – track record is vital.
2. Free VS Paid – financial information has proven to be an isolated area on-line where paid models have worked (i.e. WSJ). Moving forward – will retail investors be prepared to pay for financial information or will free win out?

We then construct a basic scenario matrix. These scenarios are not meant to reflect concrete versions of possible future states but rather to illustrate the potential impact of the identified trends and uncertainties. There will be components of all of the scenarios in the future – this analysis is intended to emphasize trends and uncertainties. We look at the winners in each scenario and where the portals come out.

Scenarios

1. We Live In Public – Retail investors seek advice from communities of other investors. Track record is vital – this is open to abuse. Retail investors won’t pay for this advice. Community owners seek models to monetize the audience not the content – none is initially obvious beyond advertising. Winners – The Motley Fool, StockTwits. Portals – business as usual providing (mostly) raw data.
2. Rock Stars – Retail investors seek advice from communities of other investors and are willing to pay. Investors make their trading accounts transparent on-line. Successful investors open their accounts to act as virtual fund managers. Virtual fund managers and community owners split a management fee paid by investors. Winners – Covestor, KaChing. Portals – business as usual providing (mostly) raw data.
3. Super Commons – Retail investors value analysis and tools but are not willing to directly pay. There is a move from traditional on-line financial information providers (i.e. Capital IQ) to low-cost/no-cost providers (i.e. financial portals). Retail investors and corporate finance professionals use the same tools. New tools are added (i.e. Google Domestic Trends). Pay-walls come down – financial blogs are at their most influential. Winners – Portals and financial blogs
4. Walled Garden – Retail investors value analysis and tools. The financial blogs continue to exert influence. However the pay-wall remains at the WSJ and on-line information providers (Reuters, Capital IQ) have a valuable and growing business. Winners – Reuters, Bloomberg, Capital IQ. Portals – Opportunity to launch a low-cost disruption strategy aimed at on-line information providers (a good enough offering to tempt [for example] Capital IQ’s clients).
   

Implications

• Discount Brokers – Challenged across all scenarios. Must follow a low-cost strategy and only add services if that will increase trades (and commissions).
• Financial Blogs – Winners across all scenarios (a role to play in all scenarios). Two distinct approaches – aggregating content VS traditional journalism on the web. We would expect one to come to the forefront (our bet would be on aggregating content – but it is too early to say).
• Community Sites – Winners in the “We Live In Public” and “Rock Stars” scenarios. Significant opportunity if community is the way that people choose to make investment decisions. A business model has proven to be a challenge to date for players like the Motley Fool (“We Live In Public” scenario). It is more obvious if investors will pay to be part of the community (“Rock Stars” scenario) – this is currently unproven however.
• Paid Finance Services – Business as usual in the “Walled Garden” scenario and challenged across all other scenarios. Even in the “Walled Garden” scenario there is the potential for the paid financial services to be disrupted (low-cost disruption) by the portals offering extended services (i.e. Google Domestic Trends). Currently users of paid services also use the free portal services (Yahoo Finance and Google Finance). There are limited options to defend this. Paid services do provide the data used by the finance portals. Reuters are also moving into the free space.
• On-Line Finance Portals – Winners across all other scenarios. In the “We Live In Public” and “Rock Stars” scenarios – it is closest to business as usual. These players are the ones with the ability to acquire or build community sites. Investors that are part of communities still require basic financial information and tools. In the “Super Commons” and “Walled Garden” scenarios there are big opportunities. Both require adding analysis tools. Partnering with financial blogs is key. Adding analysis tools is an arms race between the different finance portals.

This is one view of the potential future. Tell us what you think.

Valuecruncher Future Of On-Line Finance Summary (Four-page PDF summary).

Google Domestic Trends track Google search traffic across specific sectors of the economy. From advertising and marketing to unemployment to air travel.

Google is taking very basic search patterns (at this stage) and showing trends over time. This is an early first draft - but shows the huge potential of Google leveraging the massive information assets they possess. The value starts to come when you layer additional information over the top of this base data. For example - looking at search traffic for air travel then layering the share price movements of two airlines (Southwest [$LUV] and Delta [$DAL]) over the top. Search traffic for air travel is down - but the two share prices examined have taken much bigger hits. Is this an example of an over-reaction?

This type of data will get more sophisticated over time. It is also but another data point for analysis. However, I think that this release from Google Finance is a fascinating step in the on-line finance space. There are elements of the failed Monitor110 business with this. But there is also a reason that people were excited about what Monitor110 could have been. Google Domestic Trends isn’t yet perfect - but it could be a game-changer.

TechCrunch has a good review - and also nails the Gordon Gekko Wall Street quote.

“The most valuable commodity I know of is information.”

Valuecruncher Interactive Analysts Report For Starbucks ($SBUX)

The key comparators are Tim Hortons ($THI), a direct competitor, and McDonalds ($MCD), a low-cost substitute.  You can change the generated peer companies on the site.

So what do we think?

Discounted Cash Flow Valuation

We have completed a discounted cash flow valuation using our interactive tools (there is a “discounted cash flow analysis” link just under the company name on the company page). We have populated our model with a mixture of consensus analyst estimates and Valuecruncher estimates. Our analysis produces a valuation of US$11.95 for $SBUX - 38.7% below the current share price. We see $SBUX well overvalued using a discounted cash flow model. But how about compared to a peer group?

Comparison Analysis

I am going to look at two of the metrics we use at Valuecruncher - Enterprise Value (EV)/Revenue and EV/EBITDA. Enterprise Value (EV) is simply market capitalization plus net debt [long-term borrowings less cash]. We use EV to capture the impact of debt and cash on a company’s balance sheet - market capitalization doesn’t capture different capital structures when comparing companies.

EV/Revenue shows how a dollar of revenues is being valued by the market against the comparator set. On an EV/Revenue basis $SBUX is trading at 1.5x ($SBUX is being valued at 1.5x last year’s revenues). This compares to $THI at 3.0x and $MCD also at 3.0x. $SBUX’s profit margins (at the EBITDA line) were 11.6% of revenues last year - against 25.4% at $THI and 31.5% at $MCD.  A dollar of $SBUX revenues is being valued at half that of a dollar of $THI and $MCD revenues - this is broadly in-line with the difference in profit margins in the businesses last year.  This is what we would expect.

EV/EBITDA shows how a dollar of profit (measured in as Earnings Before Interest Taxes Depreciation and Amortization) is being valued by the market against the comparator set. On an EV/EBITDA basis $SBUX is trading at 12.7x ($SBUX is being valued at 12.7x last year’s profit at the EBITDA line). $THI is trading at 11.8x and $MCD is trading at 9.3x. This difference will represent the different expected profit margins and growth prospects between the businesses - as being valued by the market. We are surprised that $SBUX profits are being more highly valued than their competitors. This suggests that the market currently believes that $SBUX’s fortunes are about to improve significantly and some of the gains are already being priced into the stock.

Summary

Based on our DCF valuation - $SBUX looks significantly overvalued. Looking at some comparators we are surprised that $SBUX is being so highly valued (especially on an EV/EBITDA basis) agaist key comparators $THI and $MCD. $SBUX looks a sell at these prices.

Disclosure: no positions.

After the IPO $GOOG was had a market capitalization of US$27 billion and five years later that has risen to US$140 billion - it has been higher.  Over five years $GOOG’s market capitalization has grown at a compound annual growth rate of just under 39%. That is pretty impressive. The graph below shows the closing prices for $GOOG over the last five years.

At Valuecruncher we have an interactive analyst report for $GOOG. Based on our discounted cash flow analysis - we believe $GOOG is currently fairly valued.

Disclosure: no position

Valuecruncher Interactive Analysts Report For Coca-Cola ($KO)

The key comparator is PepsiCo ($PEP). You can change the generated peer companies on the site.

So what do we think?

Discounted Cash Flow Valuation

We have completed a discounted cash flow valuation using our interactive tools (there is a “discounted cash flow analysis” link just under the company name on the company page). We have populated our model with a mixture of consensus analyst estimates and Valuecruncher estimates. Our analysis produces a valuation of US$51.86 for $KO - 4.9% above the current share price. We see $KO broadly correctly valued at the moment. But how about compared to a peer group?

Comparison Analysis

I am going to look at two of the metrics we use at Valuecruncher - Enterprise Value (EV)/Revenue and EV/EBITDA. Enterprise Value (EV) is simply market capitalization plus net debt [long-term borrowings less cash]. We use EV to capture the impact of debt and cash on a company’s balance sheet - market capitalization doesn’t capture different capital structures when comparing companies. That is less important in this case as $KO and $PEP have broadly similar capital structures.

EV/Revenue shows how a dollar of revenues is being valued by the market against the comparator set. On an EV/Revenue basis $KO is trading at 3.7x ($KO is being valued at 3.7x last year’s revenues). This compares to $PEP at 2.2x. $KO’s profit margins (at the EBITDA line) are 31.4% of revenues - against 20.7% at $PEP.  A dollar of $KO revenues is being valued at 170% of a dollar of $PEP revenues - this is broadly in-line with the difference in profit margins in the business.  This is what we would expect.

EV/EBITDA shows how a dollar of profit (measured in as Earnings Before Interest Taxes Depreciation and Amortization) is being valued by the market against the comparator set. On an EV/EBITDA basis $KO is trading at 11.9x ($KO is being valued at 11.9x last year’s profit at the EBITDA line). $PEP is trading at 10.6x. This difference will represent the different profit margins and growth prospects between the two businesses. There is a difference - but it isn’t material. Again this is what we would expect. Nothing in the comparator analysis looks out of line - and thus a buying opportunity.

Summary

Based on our DCF valuation - $KO looks correctly valued. Looking at some comparators - the market is valuing $KO in line with the key peer company ($PEP).

Disclosure: no positions.