The current cocktail used for lethal injection includes two drugs, one of which (sodium thiopental) is not produced in the U.S. and must be imported. This gave some death penalty opponents the idea to try again, this time alleging that the FDA violated federal law by allowing the importation of sodium thiopental without first ensuring it is effective. They sued in federal district court, and won. In Beaty v. Food and Drug Administration, Judge Richard Leon concluded that because the FDA had not approved sodium thiopental for lethal injection the agency was required to prevent its importation.

The fight’s not over, however, as the FDA plans to appeal. Some states, such as California, also appear ready to resist the ruling and are refusing to return their supplies to the FDA, likely due to hope or anticipation that Judge Leon’s opinion will be overturned on appeal.

A recent essay by Kevin Cave and Einer Elhauge provides a handy example of the misuse of Coase’s work. Cave and Elhauge have sought enlist Coase’s seminal essay in support of the constitutionality of the individual mandate. “A dose of Coase,” they argue, shows that “the issue at stake is not individual liberty, but individual responsibility.” In the process they manage to misapply “The Problem of Social Cost” and misrepresent the law they seek to defend.

Cave and Elhauge start with Coase’s observation that “social costs” are reciprocal. So, for example, where there is a conflict between two neighboring uses, as between ranchers and farmers.

In The Problem of Social Cost, Coase invoked the example of a farmer whose crops are trampled by the neighboring rancher’s cattle. Before Coase, it would have been common to view the rancher as the culprit responsible for imposing costs on the blameless farmer. Coase pointed out that no matter which way the legal rights were allocated, one was imposing costs on the other. If the law forces the rancher to keep his cattle fenced in, the farming imposes fence-building costs on the rancher. If the law gives the rancher the right to let his cattle roam free, then the farmer bears the social cost.

So far so good. Then Cave and Elhauge claim health care costs should be seen in the same way.

it is surprising how little role the core Coasian insight had in the Supreme Court’s recent oral argument about the Obamacare mandate. Much of the discussion seemed to take for granted that this mandate encroaches on individual liberty, depriving individuals of the “freedom” not to purchase health insurance.

But as Coase’s analysis makes clear, framing the issue in terms of individual liberty is deeply misleading. When the uninsured get sick and go to the emergency room for care they cannot afford, someone has to pay the costs. If the law gives the uninsured the right not to buy health insurance, then the costs for their emergency care are imposed on the insured, whose payments must cover the hospital’s costs. If the law instead requires the uninsured to buy health insurance, they become personally responsible for the cost of the care they receive.

In other words, the issue is not whether to have a mandate, but rather on whom the mandate should be imposed. If the Supreme Court strikes down Obamacare, we will simply return to the old mandate, which was imposed on the insured rather than on the uninsured. It is not clear why that mandate would be constitutionally preferable to a mandate that everyone pay his or her own way. It surely does not involve any less of an infringement on liberty.

Where to begin? The reciprocal nature of the conflict between the rancher and farmer arises because the social costs are a consequence of decisions made by both parties. If there are no roaming cattle, no crops get trampled. The same is true if there are no crops. Only if both the rancher and farmer choose their respective courses of action do we have a social cost. In order to see health care costs as reciprocal in the same way we need more than an emergency room visit by an uninsured individual. We also need a requirement that the hospital provide care. Without both pieces, the costs are not reciprocal. That is, we need both the consumption of health care by those unable to pay for it (which, in point of fact, is only a portion of the uninsured) and a requirement that care be provided without regard to ability to pay — and we have both. But what does this have to do with the mandate? Not much. And what does this have to do with the constitutional arguments about the mandate? Even less. Of course the costs of emergency room care can be born either by those who consume such care (through fee-for-service or insurance) or by others, and there are many mechanisms that can be used to achieve either result. Trying to frame the question in Coasean terms does no work toward resolving the underlying legal or policy debate.

Based on their “Coasean” analysis, Cave and Elhauge suggest that the primary purpose and effect of the mandate is to prevent the uninsured from imposing costs on the insured. But this is not so. With or without the mandate, taxpayers will pay for a disproportionate share of emergency room visits. This is because those on Medicaid and Medicare account for the lion’s share of emergency room visits — more than double the proportion of visits by the uninsured. Because the PPACA expands Medicaid coverage, this proportion will only increase — with or without the mandate.

Cave and Elhauge further pretend that imposition of the individual mandate somehow prevents the “insured” from subsidizing the care of others. But this too is false. The point of the mandate is not to reduce public expenditures on emergency room care as much as it is to prevent adverse selection in health insurance markets and force relatively healthy individuals to subsidize insurance for others. In other words, the purpose of the mandate is to offset the predictable consequences of prohibiting medical underwriting (as forthright defenders such as Mark Hall, acknowledge). Insurance companies, in particular, insisted on the mandate to help defray the costs of providing insuring those with preexisting conditions at rates below-expected-cost. So the mandate does precisely what Cave and Elhauge say they are trying to avoid: forcing one group in society be responsible for the health care costs of another. [As an aside, they also try to claim the mandate does not force individuals to buy insurance coverage beyond what they need to avoid imposing costs on others, pointing to high-deductible “bronze” plans, but ignore that even these plans must cover a wide range of services many will never want or need. See Randy's post here.]

But, again, what does any of this have to do with Coase or the questions confronting the Supreme Court? Not much. The reason Coase pointed out that social costs were reciprocal was to show that one could not assume that imposing costs on one party or the other would necessarily increase social welfare. His target was A.C. Pigou, who had argued that the imposition of pollution taxes would maximize the value of production. Coase showed that Pigou was wrong. Specifically, Coase demonstrated that if one assumes transaction costs are zero – as Pigou had – the initial allocation of the entitlement is irrelevant. Coase then went on to show that if one accounts for transaction costs (as Coase urged economists to do) then Pigou’s claim that pollution taxes increase the value of production depends on the particulars of a specific case. In any event, Coase’s aim was to challenge Pigou’s claims about the sorts of policies that would enhance social welfare, not make broader claims about what sorts of policies are desirable, let alone constitutional. Coase’s analysis also has absolutely nothing to say about whether one policy instrument, such as the mandate, is more or less consistent with constitutional constraints than other policy instruments that could produce the same effect, let alone whether a given view of federal power is consistent with the constitutional design. Further, Coase would urge any analysis of this question to engage in a serious comparative analysis that accounts for relevant facts — such as who pays for emergency visits now and how this will actually change under the PPACA and so on — facts of the sort Cave and Elhauge completely ignore.

Coase’s argument was expressly confined to the welfare economics paradigm he was challenging. Yet, as Coase readily acknowledged, most questions of public policy implicate normative questions well beyond what policy is more or less efficient. At the close of his essay Coase explicitly called for the policy debate to be “carried out in broader terms,” recognizing that in such a debate questions of welfare economics would “dissolve into a study of aesthetics and morals.” If Cave and Elhauge want to make the case for the mandate on these terms, all the better, but they should not pretend Coase has anything to do with it, nor claim that “The Problem of Social Cost” somehow shows the mandate is constitutional.

These incidents appear to be only the latest and most extreme examples of efforts to silence political and ideological opponents by any means necessary. Comments Jim Geraghty:

Notions like “SWATing” feel like a dangerous escalation of already excessive expressions of ideological rage; once the genie is out of the bottle, then every extremist who feels the ends justify the means will use the tactic against those they hope to harass (or worse). The options for police are truly grim; must they become skeptical or wary about 911 calls describing violent situations?

The only real solution is to catch the perpetrators and prosecute them to the fullest extent of the law. If I were a prosecutor, and some malcontent was manipulating my city’s police force to be their own tool for harassment, I’d be hell-bent on finding the persons responsible.

One thing I do not comprehend about either story is the apparent reticence of local authorities. I would think local law enforcement would move heaven and earth to uncover who sicced SWAT on Patterico’s home and it is unconscionable the local authorities in Montgomery County, Maryland would sit by and allow the continued abuse of legal process that has victimized Worthing.

UPDATE: RAdley Balko comments:

Dear God. I hadn’t been following all of this. Patterico and I have had some heated, downright ugly exchanges in the past, but let’s be clear on this: What’s happening to him right now is terrifying. It’s an attempt to terrorize political opponents into silence.

A couple commenters here have suggested there’s some sort of lesson in all of this about SWAT teams or police or something or other.

No. There are no lessons here. The sociopaths who are harassing Patterico and the other bloggers involved need to be arrested and charged with about a dozen different crimes.

Congress violated constitutional standards on legalized bigotry when it denied federal benefits from same-sex spouses and excluded domestic partners of state employees from long-term health coverage, a federal judge ruled Thursday.

The decision by U.S. District Judge Claudia Wilken of Oakland was the second by a Bay Area judge this year to strike down the Defense of Marriage Act, the 1996 law withholding more than 1,000 federal benefits – such as joint tax filing, Social Security survivor payments and immigration sponsorship – from gays and lesbians legally married under state law.

Wilken also overturned another 1996 law that denied federal tax benefits to long-term health insurance plans for state employees if they included domestic partners.

Specifically, the court found that Section 3 of DOMA “violates the equal protection rights of . . . same-sex spouses.” The opinion is available here.

Civility and respect for order – nay, demand for order – have always been tenets of conservatism. The most prominent work of history’s most prominent conservative, Edmund Burke, was a reaction to the anger and hatred that swept France during the revolution. It would eventually rip the country apart and plunge all of Europe into decades of war. Such is the rotted fruit of mass-produced hate and rage. Burke, not incidentally, was a true Tea Party supporter, risking everything as a member of Parliament to support the rebellion in the United States.

All of today’s right-wing darlings got there by mastering what Burke feared most: screaming “J’accuse! J’accuse!” Turning people against each other. Taking seeds of fear, anger and hatred and planting them to grow a new crop.

That the other side may or may not have done it first is no excuse. If civility and tolerance are virtues — and I believe they are — than one should be civil and tolerant, without regard to what one’s opponents do. More Fumento:

Incivility is hardly the domain of the new right. American society grows ever coarser. But this is cold comfort. Conservative ideology demands civility of conservatives; demands, yes, self-policing. Let others act as they will, bearing evidence of the shallowness of their positions. It also demands respect for official offices, such as the presidency. When our guy is in office, you give him that modicum of respect – and when your guy is in office, we do the same. The other party is to be referred to as “the loyal opposition,” not with words the FCC forbids on the air.

Fumento also suggests this approach can get in the way of meaningful reforms, and I think he has a point here too.

The new right cannot advance a conservative agenda precisely because, other than a few small holdouts like the American Conservative magazine or that battleship that refuses to become a museum, George Will, it is not itself conservative. Pod people are running the show. It has no such capability; no such desire. I find that disturbing for obvious reasons. But, based on my own conversations with liberals, I think – nay, I know – that if more of these allegedly godless, treasonous people understood real conservatism a lot would embrace many conservative positions.

Thus everybody realizes government spending has lost its airbrakes. But while the new right screams the most about big government, it nonetheless supported President George W. Bush as he presided over the largest expansion of government spending since uber-liberal FDR and left us with a massive debt before President Obama was sworn in. Why? Silly rabbit! Because the left opposed him.

It is often said that politics is the art of the possible. The problem with too many politicians is not that they compromise, but that they have no principles to guide them. The American political system is structured to make dramatic change extremely difficult. Major reforms take time, and must often be achieved step by step. Blind ideological rigidity, such as to an anti-tax pledge that would prevent Congress from repealing ethanol subsidies, is no help, and is certainly not conservative. This is not a call for moderation, but for prudence. One can seek dramatic, even revolutionary, changes in the size and scope of government without resort to the tactics Fumento finds so distasteful.

In apparent panic at the tenor of the Supreme Court argument over the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act (aka ObamaCare), liberal law professors have exploded with anticipatory denunciations of the court’s conservative justices—claiming that it would be “hypocritical” and “partisan” of them to invalidate legislation passed by Congress when they generally oppose “judicial activism.”

It appears the professors’ idea of sound jurisprudence is that their favored justices are free to invalidate statutes that offend their sensibilities whether or not the words of the Constitution have anything to say on the matter, as in the case of same-sex marriage or partial-birth abortion, and even if the Constitution seems to endorse it, as in capital punishment. But if conservative justices have the temerity to enforce actual limits on government power stated in Article I, Section 8—over liberal dissents—then they are acting as shameless partisans.

It seems unlikely this one-sided definition of “activism” will persuade anyone. Judicial review might be aggressive and it might be deferential, but there cannot be one set of rules for liberal justices and another set for conservatives.

His brief piece goes on to explain how the argument against the mandate is grounded in the bedrock constitutional principle that ours is a federal government of limited and enumerated powers — and that the enumeration of certain powers presupposes powers not enumerated. Opponents have argued that the mandate transgresses the limits of federal power (not, as critics have claimed, that the mandate violates any independent limitation on federal power, such as due process or any enumerated rights). Supporters of the mandate, on the other hand, have failed to offer any principled constitutional theory that would allow for the Court to uphold the mandate without giving Congress a blank check. This failing is what doomed the Gun Free School Zones Act in United States v. Lopez, and it’s what has placed the mandate in jeopardy as well. The Solicitor General and others have tried to explain why health care is “different” but none of these arguments are “grounded in any principle based in constitutional text, history or theory.”

Rumors were flying around the Capitol this week that the Supreme Court would decide the health care cases on Thursday. They were wrong.

Hill staffers, Health and Human Services Department employees, and think-tankers were all abuzz on Wednesday with speculation that the Supreme Court of the United States might issue its opinion on the Affordable Care Act case on Thursday, a month sooner than most court-watchers predict. . . .

[Although the rumors were incorrect,] it was tough for people who cared about the case to ignore the rumors entirely, despite their implausibility. And the Court’s press office, which does not comment on cases, was unable to deny it. Many government staffers and reporters were on edge. A survey at Scotusblog’s live blog announcing Thursday’s decisions showed that more than a third of people watching were there only because they thought the health care case would land.

Whether this is the right answer is not clear. It’s a special case of warnings to hide one’s illegal conduct because the police are coming — though here done by a stranger rather than by a lookout who’s in league with the criminals — and that in turn is a special case of what I call Crime-Facilitating Speech (see 57 Stan. L. Rev. 1095 (2005)), which is to say speech that conveys information that makes it easier for people to commit crimes or to get away with crimes. The Supreme Court has never squarely confronted this question.

When I’ve blogged about this in the past, some people have argued that flashing headlights should be protected because it’s encouraging legal behavior (slowing down) rather than illegal behavior, but I don’t think that can dispose of the issue: Many lookouts do the same, e.g., when a lookout warns would-be robbers to abandon their plans because a police car is driving by.

For an interesting similar question though one that doesn’t involve encouraging people to temporarily act legally), this story:

An advocate for immigrant and civil rights has started using text messages to warn residents about crime sweeps by a high-profile Arizona sheriff.

Lydia Guzman, director of the nonprofit immigrant advocacy group Respect/Respeto, is the trunk of a sophisticated texting tree designed to alert thousands of people within minutes to the details of the sweeps, which critics contend are an excuse to round up illegal immigrants.

Guzman said the messages are part of an effort to protect Latinos and others from becoming victims of racial profiling by sheriff’s deputies….

What’s the First-Amendment-relevant difference, if there is one, between this and a lookout who alerts criminals when the police are coming? (Assume that the lookout isn’t getting a share of the loot, but is just helping his friends avoid getting locked up.) Should it matter, as one expert who’s mentioned in the article suggests, whether Ms. Guzman’s real goal is preventing lawful arrest of illegal immigrants (as opposed to preventing racial profiling, assuming such profiling is unlawful)? I think there may indeed be a difference between such revelation of facts to the public and individualized communications to a small group of criminals, and I don’t think it should turn on jury inferences about the speaker’s true purpose; my article discusses the question at length. But in any event it’s helpful to think about what the difference might be.

A Los Angeles County Superior Court judge has reversed the 2002 rape and kidnapping conviction of former Long Beach Poly football standout Brian Banks.

Banks, now 26, was wrongly convicted of the charges based on the testimony of Wanetta Gibson, an acquaintance.

Gibson testified that Banks raped her on the Poly campus. Banks said the encounter was consensual.

Rather than face a prison term of from 41 years to life, Banks accepted a plea deal that [led to his spending 5 years in prison].

Gibson sued the Long Beach Unified School District, claiming the Poly campus was not a safe environment, and won a $1.5-million settlement.

Nearly a decade later, Gibson contacted Banks on Facebook, met with him and admitted that she had fabricated the story.

The AP account adds a twist:

According to documents in the case, she met with Banks and said she had lied; there had been was no kidnap and no rape and she offered to help him clear his record.

But she subsequently refused to repeat the story to prosecutors because she feared she would have to return a $1.5 million payment from a civil suit brought by her mother against Long Beach schools.

She was quoted as telling Banks: “I will go through with helping you but it’s like at the same time all that money they gave us, I mean gave me, I don’t want to have to pay it back.”

It’s not clear whether she ultimately did repeat the story to prosecutors, or whether the prosecutors got her admission some other way. In any event, I assume that — absent some statute of limitations barrier (a subject on which I’m not knowledgeable) — what’s left of the $1.5 million will indeed have to be paid back. (Thanks to Robert Dittmer for the pointer.)

This, by the way, raises again a difficult problem with he-said-she-said rape cases, where civil liability is available. I suspect that in a typical such case, one factor that cuts in the prosecution’s favor is “Why would she lie?” A defendant has ample reason to lie by saying that nonconsensual sex was actually consensual — his liberty is at stake. But a complainant in many cases has much less reason to lie by saying that consensual sex was actually nonconsensual; sure, in some situations there might be possible motivations for lying, but they are usually not nearly as strong as the defendant’s motivation.

Yet when the complainant can get millions of dollars in damages, either from a rich defendant on an intentional tort theory, or from some other entity — such as an employer or a school district — that could be held liable on a negligence theory, the complainant now has lots of reason to lie. Of course, this by no means that such a complainant will be lying, just as the defendant’s incentive to lie doesn’t mean that all defendants who testify that they’re innocent are lying. But it does, I think, make the defense’s case stronger and the prosecution’s case weaker.

The jurors don’t know for sure who’s telling the truth. But once they know that the complainant has a potential motive to lie, they’ll be less inclined to believe her — and at least to conclude that there’s a reasonable doubt about whether she’s telling the truth. If you were a juror and the evidence against the defendant besides the complainant’s testimony was weak, wouldn’t you be influenced by evidence that the complainant has a possible financial motive for making up the charges?

What to do about this, though, is not clear. Even if negligence liability against employers, school districts, and others for crimes by their employees or on their property is cut back — some people have argued that it should be — a victim could still sue a rich defendant, or even an upper-middle-class defendant who has some assets that could be seized. If someone physically attacks you, you’re entitled to get compensation from him. But this very possibility makes it harder to criminally prosecute rapists. I don’t know of a good solution to the problem, absent perfect lie detection technology or pervasive recordi

In his public statement, the EU’s vice president for competition policy, Joaquin Almunia, seemed to say that Google is abusing a dominant position in search by “copying original material from the websites of its competitors such as user reviews and using that material on its own sites without their prior authorisation.” This is bad, says the EU, because:

 ”In this way they are appropriating the benefits of the investments of competitors. We are worried that this could reduce competitors’ incentives to invest in the creation of original content for the benefit of internet users. This practice may impact for instance travel sites or sites providing restaurant guides.”

This is odd language for a competition case, but quite familiar in an intellectual property context. The United States and the Europeans have a demanding copyright regime precisely to prevent companies from “appropriating the benefits” of other people’s content; and this regime has been expanded many times in living memory to better protect the investments of copyright owners.  Indeed, going the U.S. one better, the EU has adopted an additional set of intellectual property protections for compilers of databases; these protections cover uncopyrightable compilations, like phone books. 

Again, the point of both laws is to create “incentives to invest in the creation of original content” — and to balance those incentives against society’s interest in the free exchange of information.

If Google had violated either regime, presumably it would be in court or under investigation for doing so. (Marvin Ammori has a recent post explaining why they aren’t.) 

Instead,the European Union’s competition bureau seems to be saying that the balance struck by the EU in its two highly IP-friendly regimes isn’t, well, IP-friendly enough. 

Vertical search providers apparently need a kind of super-copyright.  Indeed, reading the EU’s press release, it appears that vertical search providers need a super-copyright not only in their own work but in their users’ comments as well. 

That may or may not be good competition law, but it sure looks like overkill when viewed through an intellectual property lens.

CAVEAT LECTOR: My law firm and I have done work for Google, though not in connection with competition or EU issues.

Minnesota has an interesting statute that allows courts to enjoin speech that “ha[s] a substantial adverse effect … on the … privacy” of a person, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 609.748. Five months ago it was used to issue an injunction banning online speech by a person about his ex-girlfriend, Johnson v. Arlotta (2011), but it has been used before as well.

I’m curious what people think of this — again, especially people who generally support the disclosure tort — given the lack of a statutory or judicial definition of what constitutes “privacy” for purposes of the statute, and the criminal penalties for violating the order. How should the statute be read, and is it constitutional? Should “privacy” be read as tortious invasion of privacy, with all the common-law twists on that (e.g., the exception for newsworthy speech, and the requirement that the speech be said to the public and not just as gossip within a circle of friends)? Is that sufficiently clear for an order that can be enforced through criminal penalties? Also, are temporary restraining orders under the statute — which may be issued ex parte — unconstitutional prior restraints?

Here’s the relevant excerpt:

(a) “Harassment” includes:
(1) a single incident of physical or sexual assault or repeated incidents of intrusive or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that have a substantial adverse effect or are intended to have a substantial adverse effect on the safety, security, or privacy of another, regardless of the relationship between the actor and the intended target;
(2) targeted residential picketing; and
(3) a pattern of attending public events after being notified that the actor’s presence at the event is harassing to another….

(c) “Targeted residential picketing” includes the following acts when committed on more than one occasion:
(1) marching, standing, or patrolling by one or more persons directed solely at a particular residential building in a manner that adversely affects the safety, security, or privacy of an occupant of the building ….

Subd. 4. Temporary restraining order. (a) The court may issue a temporary restraining order ordering the respondent to cease or avoid the harassment of another person or to have no contact with that person if the petitioner files a petition in compliance with subdivision 3 and if the court finds reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment. When a petition alleges harassment as defined by subdivision 1, paragraph (a), clause (1), the petition must further allege an immediate and present danger of harassment before the court may issue a temporary restraining order under this section….

(b) Notice need not be given to the respondent before the court issues a temporary restraining order under this subdivision….

(c) The temporary restraining order is in effect until a hearing is held on the issuance of a restraining order under subdivision 5. The court shall hold the hearing on the issuance of a restraining order if the petitioner requests a hearing. The hearing may be continued by the court upon a showing that the respondent has not been served with a copy of the temporary restraining order despite the exercise of due diligence or if service is made by published notice under subdivision 3 and the petitioner files the affidavit required under that subdivision.

(d) If the temporary restraining order has been issued and the respondent requests a hearing, the hearing shall be scheduled by the court upon receipt of the respondent’s request. Service of the notice of hearing must be made upon the petitioner not less than five days prior to the hearing. The court shall serve the notice of the hearing upon the petitioner by mail in the manner provided in the Rules of Civil Procedure for pleadings subsequent to a complaint and motions and shall also mail notice of the date and time of the hearing to the respondent. In the event that service cannot be completed in time to give the respondent or petitioner the minimum notice required under this subdivision, the court may set a new hearing date….

Subd. 5. Restraining order. (a) The court may grant a restraining order ordering the respondent to cease or avoid the harassment of another person or to have no contact with that person if all of the following occur:
(1) the petitioner has filed a petition under subdivision 3 [and the order has been served on the respondent];
(2) the sheriff has served respondent with a copy of the temporary restraining order obtained under subdivision 4, and with notice of the right to request a hearing, or service has been made by publication under subdivision 3, paragraph (b); and
(3) the court finds at the hearing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the respondent has engaged in harassment.
A restraining order may be issued only against the respondent named in the petition; except that if the respondent is an organization, the order may be issued against and apply to all of the members of the organization. If the court finds that the petitioner has had two or more previous restraining orders in effect against the same respondent or the respondent has violated a prior or existing restraining order on two or more occasions, relief granted by the restraining order may be for a period of up to 50 years. In all other cases, relief granted by the restraining order must be for a fixed period of not more than two years. When a referee presides at the hearing on the petition, the restraining order becomes effective upon the referee’s signature….

(c) If the court orders relief for a period of up to 50 years under paragraph (a), the respondent named in the restraining order may request to have the restraining order vacated or modified if the order has been in effect for at least five years and the respondent has not violated the order….At the hearing, the respondent named in the restraining order has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that there has been a material change in circumstances and that the reasons upon which the court relied in granting the restraining order no longer apply and are unlikely to occur. If the court finds that the respondent named in the restraining order has met the burden of proof, the court may vacate or modify the order. If the court finds that the respondent named in the restraining order has not met the burden of proof, the court shall deny the request and no request may be made to vacate or modify the restraining order until five years have elapsed from the date of denial. An order vacated or modified under this paragraph must be personally served on the petitioner named in the restraining order.

Subd. 6…. (b) Except as otherwise provided in paragraphs (c) and (d), when a temporary restraining order or a restraining order is granted under this section and the respondent knows of the order, violation of the order is a misdemeanor.
(c) A person is guilty of a gross misdemeanor who knowingly violates the order within ten years of a previous qualified domestic violence-related offense conviction or adjudication of delinquency.
(d) A person is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than five years or to payment of a fine of not more than $10,000, or both, if the person knowingly violates the order:
(1) within ten years of the first of two or more previous qualified domestic violence-related offense convictions or adjudications of delinquency;
(2) because of the victim’s or another’s actual or perceived race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, disability as defined in section 363A.03, age, or national origin;
(3) by falsely impersonating another;
(4) while possessing a dangerous weapon;
(5) with an intent to influence or otherwise tamper with a juror or a judicial proceeding or with intent to retaliate against a judicial officer, as defined in section 609.415, or a prosecutor, defense attorney, or officer of the court, because of that person’s performance of official duties in connection with a judicial proceeding; or
(6) against a victim under the age of 18, if the respondent is more than 36 months older than the victim….

Two groups of defendants were tried by different federal district judges for attempted piracy – they had been caught before boarding the targeted vessel (which was unfortunately for the defendants, a U.S. warship). They were charged under 18 U.S.C § 1651 with “piracy as defined by the law of nations.” Both cases turned on whether that “definition” extends to attempts. One district court said yes, in the Dire case. Another district judge, in Said, said no. He looked the important 1820 piracy case of U.S. v. Smith, where the Supreme Court discussed the definition of piracy, and said everyone agreed it was “robbery on the high seas.” Since there was no robbery here – no piracy.

The Fourth Circuit yesterday reversed the dismissal. It held that the statute refers to “the law of nations” and that is understood to change over time, and the definition of piracy with it. We are not stuck with the 1820 definition of Smith; we look to the definition today. I don’t think the Court had to get into to this evolving-international law inquiry; Said was simply wrong to read Smith’s definition as excluding attempts. Some other noteworthy features:

The Define and Punish Clause. The Fourth Circuit endorsed my position, which had been very generously expounded by the district court, that the Constitution’s Define and Punish Clause only allows for universal jurisdiction over crimes that clearly have that status in international law. Slip Op. at 15-16. The court also suggested that Congress could not define international “conduct beyond the scope of the [international legal] definition” of offenses, as I argued in this forthcoming paper.

The standard for determining law of nations violations. Because Congress did not define attempts as part of the piracy prohibition, the Court looked to international law. The Law of the Sea Treaty – just as the Senate began to debate it again this week – was an important starting point, because it provides an easy-to-refer-to definition of piracy. By its terms, the Law of the Sea definition seems to include attempts. But the Fourth Circuit did not stop there, but continued to examine how courts in prior cases in other countries had ruled, including a famous Privy Council decision from the 1930s, and rulings of the Kenyan courts that have taken a leading role in prosecuting Somali pirates today, and an U.S. case.

Thus there has been actual state judicial practice establishing “attempts” as part of piracy; the Court didn’t just read this off a treaty that had never been applied in any case. Indeed, the decision could have gone the other way if the court was asked to be the first to “apply” such a theoretical norm: the opinion noted the “necessity of looking to… case law from other countries” to find that a putative norm exists. Slip op. at 19.

This has immediate relevance for the ATS, and Kiobel. (Indeed, the court borrowed freely from ATS decisions.) The existence of relevant judicial precedents is of course what is missing in several kinds of ATS claims, and especially for corporate liability.

Perhaps later I’ll say some more about how I think the decision may have been a bit too broad, or cavalier about Congress’s failure to “define.”

[W]hy exactly shouldn’t [Chief Justice John Roberts] worry if he believes that a Court decision — any one, really — will impair the Court’s legitimacy, in the sense that it would make it more difficult for the Court to hold public support for its (other) decisions? Or, believes that a decision will not be seen in retrospect as a wise one (the “verdict of history” point)? I’m not here endorsing the view that a decision striking down the Affordable Care Act would impair the Court’s legitimacy or be seen in retrospect as unwise, just wondering what’s wrong with taking those things into account when a justice is thinking about how best to interpret the Constitution. (Would Justice Henry Billings Brown have been wrong to think about them when trying to decide whether to pull his draft opinion in Plessy v. Ferguson in favor of Justice Harlan’s dissent?…)

This is a good question. The answer, in my view, is that the job of Supreme Court justices is to enforce the Constitution, not to make decisions that will have broad public support or be perceived as legitimate. Indeed, judicial enforcement of constitutional restrictions on government power is particularly crucial precisely in those cases where violations of those restrictions enjoy strong political support. To turn Mark’s question about Plessy around: Was Justice Brown’s decision justified by the fact that a contrary result might have been considered “illegitimate” by majority public opinion in the 1890s, and deeply resented by millions of white southerners? Was Korematsu justified because the internment of Japanese-Americans enjoyed overwhelming public support at the time, and a decision striking it down would have been widely denounced as an illegitimate intrusion on the wartime powers of the political branches?

This point applies to legitimacy in the eyes of future public opinion, as well as contemporary opinion. Future public opinion can easily be wrong, and can often support violations of the Constitution. For example, public opinion in 1900 was far less favorable to judicial enforcement of African-American rights than public opinion in the 1870s. If 1870s Supreme Court justices could accurately predict that trend, would they have been justified in cutting back on enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment? It’s possible that future terrorist attacks will turn majority public opinion strongly against the Supreme Court’s Guantanamo decisions. If the justices believed that to be likely, should they have endorsed the Bush administration’s position in those cases in order to get on the “right side” of history?

Nonetheless, I think there are narrow circumstances where courts can legitimately take account of legitimacy. One such situation is when a correct constitutional decision would attract such wide opposition that it cannot be effectively enforced. If that is the case, courts are simply incapable of doing their normal duty, and perhaps they would be justified in not even trying. The case for making discretion the better part of valor in such situations might be especially strong if a the correct-but-unenforceable decision undermines the Court’s ability to enforce other parts of the Constitution in future cases. Perhaps a decision like Korematsu can be defended on that basis. A contrary ruling would almost certainly have been successfully disobeyed by the president and Congress. On the other hand, it’s possible that correct decisions in such cases would at least increase the chance that public opinion would change in the future, making it possible to eventually enforce the Constitution at a later date.

It’s also possible that a decision perceived as illegitimate is itself enforceable, but might still undermine enforcement of future decisions by compromising the Court’s reputation. If this is the case, the justices will have to consider whether the future damage to the Constitution outweighs the constitutional principles that would be sacrificed by reaching the wrong result in the present case. I think this kind of scenario is unlikely. If people are willing to obey the initial “illegitimate” decision, it seems like they would also obey future decisions that are less controversial. But it’s not impossible.

In both of these scenarios, the reason why it is legitimate for the justices to consider legitimacy is because of its potential effect on their ability to do their proper job of enforcing the Constitution – not because legitimacy is valuable in itself.

I think it’s fairly clear that a decision striking down the mandate doesn’t even come close to falling into one of these two categories. As I discussed in my previous post, the vast majority of the public – including many Democrats – would actually support such a ruling.

One can reasonably argue that legitimacy should play a much larger role in judicial decision-making than I would support. Perhaps the justices should value legitimacy for its own sake. Alternatively, perhaps widespread and deeply felt public opposition to a given ruling should lead the justices to doubt the validity of its reasoning. However, anyone who believes that the Court should uphold the mandate because of the perceived illegitimacy of a contrary ruling must also oppose other decisions that are viewed as illegitimate by a larger proportion of the population. These include cases such as Roe v. Wade, Kelo v. City of New London, the school prayer and religious display decisions, the Guantanamo cases, several of the Warren Court’s defendants’ rights rulings, the flag burning cases, and other decisions supported by liberal constitutional theorists. At the time they were decided – and in some cases even today – each of these rulings were perceived as illegitimate by a larger proportion of the public than is likely to oppose a decision striking down the mandate. Some of them also attracted vociferous criticism by parts of the legal elite.

In my view, many of the above decisions were actually correct. That’s because I do not think that perceived legitimacy should be an important factor in Supreme Court decision-making, except in very rare instances. But if you believe that legitimacy should be a major factor when it comes to the mandate, that principle cannot be limited to the present case. You have to apply it consistently across the board. Doing so would call into question a wide range of Supreme Court decisions.

UPDATE: I have slightly edited this post to fix one or two typos.

The parties stipulated to the facts underlying this appeal. Baker was charged with violating section 720.4 based on a telephone conversation Baker had with Debra Krause, who had recently served as a juror in a criminal proceeding against one Greg Schoo, a friend of Baker. On May 8, 2003, the jury convicted Schoo of first-degree burglary, which carries a mandatory twenty-five-year prison sentence.

The day after the verdict was rendered Krause received a phone call that began with the caller’s question, “Is this Deb?” Because Krause and Baker had previously worked together, Krause recognized Baker’s voice. In addition, Krause’s caller ID confirmed the call was made from Baker’s telephone. When Krause responded that yes, she was Deb, the caller stated, “This is Rose.” The caller then asked Krause “if [she] knew that [she] gave him 25 years.” Krause understood Baker was referring to Schoo. Krause told Baker she did not know what sentence Schoo had received. Baker then stated: “Well, I just thought you should know you gave him 25 years,” and hung up the phone.

Krause notified law enforcement of Baker’s call. Although Krause did not feel threatened by Baker, she was bothered and upset by the call and Baker’s tone of voice. According to Krause, she “was in disbelief that [Baker] had called [her] to say that.” Krause said she “did not beg and plead to be one of the jurors,” and would rather not have been picked, but it was “something [she] had to do — whether [she] wanted to or not!”

Baker was charged with jury tampering, under a statute that provides, “A person who … in retaliation for anything lawfully done by any witness or juror in any case, harasses such witness or juror, commits an aggravated misdemeanor.” “Harassment” is in turn defined as, “with intent to intimidate, annoy, or alarm another person, … [c]ommunicat[ing] with another by telephone, telegraph, writing, or via electronic communication without legitimate purpose, and in a manner likely to cause the other person annoyance or harm.” The court of appeals concluded that the prosecution could go forward:

Here there was clearly a jury question under the stipulated facts whether Baker contacted Krause to gather factual information about Krause’s knowledge and views of the sentencing system, or whether the contact was intended to intimidate or alarm Krause in retaliation for her role in convicting Schoo.

Rosemary Baker was ultimately convicted on remand.

The court of appeals decision, it seems to me, is wrong and quite dangerous. The court seems to be suggesting that the impermissible purpose might be a purpose to make Krause feel frightened (“intimidate[d] or alarm[ed]“) — but if the stipulated facts are sufficient to permit a prosecution based on this theory, then no-one is safe expressing to a juror that they thought the juror helped work an injustice, or for that matter expressing to other people that they thought those people did something bad. There is always the danger that a hostile prosecutor, judge, and jury will infer a bad purpose on your part, even when there were no threatening words, the listener makes clear that she didn’t feel threatened, and the listener knows you and has no reason from past contact to fear you. Whatever the scope of the “true threats” exception to the First Amendment, I doubt it can be broad enough to cover speech such as this.

Of course, it’s plausible, given the stipulated facts, that Baker might have wanted Krause to feel sorry or unhappy about what she helped do. But I doubt such a desire can strip such speech of constitutional protection, and in any event it seems to me a “legitimate purpose” for purposes of the statute (or else any call to someone to tell them that they did something bad, and to make them feel bad about it, would potentially be criminal “harassment”). At the very least, the phrase “without legitimate purpose” doesn’t sufficiently inform people that such a purpose is impermissible (and is, I think, unconstitutionally vague).

More broadly, I’m quite troubled by such laws that prohibit a considerable amount of conduct, much of which would be constitutionally protected, and then try to avoid this overbreadth by limiting the prohibition to conduct that lacks a “legitimate purpose.” Who can know what purposes the legal system will eventually find “legitimate”? If you want to punish threats, punish threats. If you want to punish behavior that has the purpose of assisting some crime, punish that. But don’t just leave to future prosecutors, judges, and juries the decision about what’s “legitimate” and what isn’t — and thus leave citizens uncertain about what’s allowed and what’s not.

This is our lot if we live so long and labour unto the end –
Then we outlive the impatient years and the much too patient friend:
And because we know we have breath in our mouth and think we have thought in our head,
We shall assume that we are alive, whereas we are really dead.

We shall not acknowledge that old stars fade or stronger planets arise
(That the sere bush buds or the desert blooms or the ancient well-head dries),
Or any new compass wherewith new men adventure ‘neath new skies.

We shall lift up the ropes that constrained our youth, to bind on our children’s hands;
We shall call to the waters below the bridges to return and to replenish our lands;
We shall harness (Death’s own pale horses) and scholarly plough the sands.

We shall lie down in the eye of the sun for lack of a light on our way –
We shall rise up when the day is done and chirrup, “Behold, it is day!”
We shall abide till the battle is won ere we amble into the fray.

We shall peck out and discuss and dissect, and evert and extrude to our mind,
The flaccid tissues of long-dead issues offensive to God and mankind –
(Precisely like vultures over an ox that the army left behind).

We shall make walk preposterous ghosts of the glories we once created –
Immodestly smearing from muddled palettes amazing pigments mismated –
And our friend will weep when we ask them with boasts if our natural force be abated.

The Lamp of our Youth will be utterly out, but we shall subsist on the smell of it;
And whatever we do, we shall fold our hands and suck our gums and think well of it.
Yes, we shall be perfectly pleased with our work, and that is the Perfectest Hell of it!

This is our lot if we live so long and listen to those who love us –
That we are shunned by the people about and shamed by the Powers above us.
Wherefore be free of your harness betimes; but, being free be assured,
That he who hath not endured to the death, from his birth he hath never endured!

In his 1998 book, Rethinking the New Deal Court, legal historian Barry Cushman has called this conventional wisdom into question by noting (among other reasons) that, because the conference vote on West Coast Hotel took place before FDR announced his plan, Owen Roberts’ vote could not have been a product of the threat.  Cushman contends instead that the Owen Roberts’ change of heart was motivated, not by politics, but instead by a growing dissatisfaction with the workability of the Court’s Due Process doctrines.  But Cushman’s is probably still the minority view.  Fairly or not, Justice Owen Roberts will likely forever be known as the justice who succumbed to political pressure to change his vote.

Rubin and Parker’s columns made me wonder whether President Obama, Senator Leahy, and pundits like Jeff Rosen have now put Chief Justice John Roberts in the same position as FDR put Justice Owen Roberts.  Had the Chief Justice already provided the fifth vote in conference to uphold the ACA, and had these critics quietly respected the deliberations of the Court after the case was submitted, nearly everyone would have accepted that Chief Justice Roberts’ decision to uphold the ACA was motivated by legal rather than political concerns.  Now, however, if the Chief Justice rules to uphold the ACA after all these nonlegal pleas and threats, he will always be suspected by both supporters and opponents of the ACA of having changed his vote in response to this political pressure.  As with Justice Owen Roberts’ vote, the supporters of the law will cheer and the opponents will complain, but both groups will have reason to believe that Chief Justice Robert’s decision reflected political considerations rather than his considered legal judgment in a close case.  And, because Supreme Court deliberations are secret, he cannot defend himself by revealing that he did not in fact change his vote after conference.

Years from now, some historian may try to rescue Chief Justice Roberts’ reputation as Barry Cushman tried to rescue Owen Roberts.  But until then, thanks to the President, Senator Leahy and the pundits and professors who have so loudly called upon the Chief Justice to decide this case politically or risk the legitimacy of the Court, should he now decide to uphold the ACA, he will always be suspected of being the second Justice Roberts to switch in time.

Thanks to Boston.com for the pointer. (I don’t know whether this was inserted by the alumnus himself — apparently the norm for the directory — or by someone else.)

Note that the government acting as employer has much more power over on-the-job speech of its employees than it does over the speech of private citizens and private employees (more on that here). In particular, it’s possible that the Department could restrict the display of items that cause substantial tension among coworkers, though it sounds like in this instance the Department ultimately chose not to do this (whether based on a judgment that the plate wasn’t disruptive enough, a desire to avoid litigation, or something else).

I. Why there is no Doctrinal Connection Between Lochner and the Individual Mandate.

In reality, the individual mandate has no doctrinal connection to Lochner or any other economic liberties or property rights cases. I covered the reasons why in detail in this article (pp. 99-101). Co-blogger David Bernstein, a leading academic expert on Lochner, makes some additional relevant points here.

To briefly summarize, this case is different from Lochner for two reasons. First, Lochner restricted some types of economic regulations by the states as well as the federal government. If the Supreme Court invalidates the federal individual mandate because it is beyond the scope of congressional authority, states such as Massachusetts would remain free to adopt mandates of their own.

Second, even the federal government would still have extraordinarily broad authority to regulate actual economic transactions, including employment relationships, manufacturing, the purchase of goods and services, and so on. Congress would only be denied the power to impose mandates under the Commerce Clause in the absence of some preexisting “economic activity.” Even the Court’s most extreme previous Commerce Clause decisions – such as Gonzales v. Raich – would remain in force. I would be very happy to get rid of Raich, a dubious decision that concluded that Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce allowed it to forbid the possession of medical marijuana that had never crossed state lines or been sold in any market. But doing so isn’t necessary to strike down the mandate.

Conversely, if the Court upholds the mandate, that will in no way prevent it from strengthening enforcement of constitutional protections for economic liberties and property rights in future cases. Even if there are no enumerated powers limits to congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, that authority is still limited by the individual rights provisions of other parts of the Constitution. Many libertarians, including myself, believe that the Constitution imposes both stringent structural limitations on federal power and substantial individual rights-based ones. But it is perfectly possible for one to exist in the absence of the other. A decision upholding the individual mandate would not dictate the proper interpretation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Thus, it would not make it any less feasible for the Court to alter the questionable second class status of property rights in current doctrine.

It also would not dictate the correct interpretation of the Due Process Clausesof the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, or the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Thus, the Court could uphold the individual mandate, yet still (in future cases) enforce these clauses’ protections for economic liberties, which as David Bernstein and others have shown, are deeply rooted in the text and original meaning of the Amendment. And even if the Court did begin to protect property rights or economic liberties more strongly, it would not necessarily go as far as the pre-1930s Court did, which itself was not nearly as far as many modern liberals imagine (the Lochner-era Court upheld far more economic regulations than it struck down).

Indeed, the case for increased enforcement of individual rights constraints on Congressional power would be stronger if the Court ruled that there are no structural limitations on its authority to impose whatever mandates it wants. And that is the likely effect of a decision upholding the mandate.

II. Lochner as Epithet and Guilt by Association.

Some of those who raise the spectre of Lochner to attack the case against the individual mandate may not have any specific legal doctrine in mind. They might simply be using Lochner as a synonym for any decision striking down “economic” laws that they think are constitutional. If that’s the case, however, then the Lochner analogy is just a political epithet rather than a serious argument – much like Republicans calling Obama a “socialist.” As David Bernstein puts it in his important recent book on Lochner, it’s yet another example of commentators using the case as a “vacuous, rhetorical shortcut” for denouncing “what [they] consider the ‘activist’ sins of their opponents” even in situations where the legal issues in question have little or no connection to either Lochner or the Fourteenth Amendment. Conservatives have often used Lochner as an epithet themselves. So it’s understandable that liberals would do the same thing. But such rhetorical ploys are not substantive arguments.

Finally, there is the notion that the case against the individual mandate is discredited by its association with “radical” libertarian arguments against various other parts of the post-New Deal legal order. Some invocations of the Lochner analogy may be intended to reinforce this meme.

David effectively dismantles such guilt by association claims here. I would add that the case against the mandate has attracted support far beyond libertarian circles, “radical” or otherwise. The anti-mandate plaintiffs include 28 state governments and many private organizations, including many who are far from libertarian. It also has the support of most of the GOP and the vast majority of the general public. As a libertarian myself, I wish it were true that all of these people had suddenly bought into a broad libertarian agenda. In reality, however, their support for the case against the mandate is mostly a result of the fact that it’s perfectly possible to conclude that this law is unconstitutional without being either libertarian or an opponent of the entire post-New Deal legal regime.

UPDATE: I have made a few slight revisions to this post in order to increase clarity and correct a typo.

Let’s see what the left is asking Roberts to do. It’s quite a Faustian bargain it proposes.. The liberal advocates ask Roberts to knuckle under to the president’s public intimidation of the Supreme Court, begun when he attempted to humiliate publicly the justices on Citizens United and continuing up to his public scolding. They ask he accept the Supreme Court as an agent of the executive branch, ready to do its bidding. They ask Roberts to embarrass himself before fellow justices, who already know Roberts’s views of the case. They’ll certainly see if Roberts took a fall. Rosen et. al would have the chief justice sacrifice, perhaps permanently, the respect of his colleagues who know all too well the intimidation game afoot. The left would need Roberts to drag a fellow colleague, Justice Anthony Kennedy, along for cover — for it would be untenable for the chief justice to be lonely vote-changer. Kennedy’s robust and insightful questioning in oral arguments, in which he captured the essence of Obamacare (i.e. it would fundamentally alter the relationship between the individual and the federal government), would have to be swept aside. The Obama-Leahy-Rosen tag team would ask that Roberts subscribe to some alternate political reality in which Obamacare is very popular and the public would be shocked and rise up in anger that the Supreme Court would overturn the “popular will.” (They must assume Roberts isn’t aware more than 70 percent of the public think the law is unconstitutional.) The pleaders would ask Roberts to adopt the left’s contention that conservative justices who adhere to the meaning and text of the Constitution can’t all vote one way for fear it will “look bad,” but liberal justices are free to march uniformly as they see fit. In essence, the left asks Roberts, knowing he believes the law to be unconstitutional, to nevertheless switch sides and thereby violate his oath of office. That’s the one where he swore to “administer justice without respect to persons, and do equal right to the poor and to the rich.” And without regard to which side whines the loudest. I think the left asks waaay too much. The chief justice, I am certain, doesn’t want to go from umpire to the judicial equivalent of the 1919 Black Sox.

Read the whole thing here.

Michigan is one of 10 states in which gun deaths now outpace motor vehicle deaths, according to a study released Thursday by the Washington, D.C.-based Violence Policy Center.

But don’t expect the from-my-cold-dead-hands crowd to embrace the center’s conclusion that the disparity has everything to do with federal regulation — extensive and wildly successful in the case of motor vehicles, and virtually non-existent in the case of firearms.

“The idea that gun deaths exceed motor vehicle deaths in 10 states is stunning when one considers that 90% of American households own a car, while fewer than a third own firearms,” VPC Legislative Director Kristen Rand said. “It is time to end firearms’ status as the last unregulated consumer product.” …

“Motor vehicle deaths are on the decline as the result of a successful decades-long public health-based injury prevention strategy that includes safety-related changes to vehicles and highway design informed by comprehensive data collection and analysis,” a release accompanying the VPC study said. “Meanwhile, firearms are the only consumer product not regulated by the federal government for health and safety.”

But wait: The number of accidental gun deaths in Michigan in 2009 (the most recent year reported in WISQARS) was … 12, compared to 962 accidental motor-vehicle-related deaths. 99% of the gun deaths in Michigan that year consisted of suicides (575) and homicides (495).

Now say what you will about whether some gun control laws might reduce suicides or homicides, but it’s extremely unlikely that any “safety-related changes” or “regulat[ions] … for health and safety” are going to eliminate all but a tiny fraction of those suicides and homicides, which are overwhelmingly intentional acts by people who are willing to kill and are unlikely to be stopped by “regulat[ion] by the federeal government for health and safety.” Yet curiously the op-ed says nothing about how few of the gun deaths were accidental, and how few homicides or suicides could be prevented by “safety-related changes” along the lines of the safety regulations imposed on cars.

This also helps explain, I think, why gun rights supporters are so worried about “health and safety” proposals. Precisely because such proposals are so unlikely to have much of an effect, the gun rights supporters naturally assume that the backers of the proposals aren’t really after modest car-like “regulat[ions] … for health and safety,” but are actually trying to bring about much more aggressive sorts of gun restrictions.

(1) It’s the 1930s. The Scottsboro Boys are represented by a known Communist Party front, beholden to the agenda Josef Stalin and his minions have dictated to the the C.P., including the creation of a separate country for American blacks in the “Black Belt.” The Supreme Court should rule against the Scottboro Boys because otherwise the Court will be well on its way to adopting the Communist agenda.

(2) It’s the 1980s. The EEOC is before the Supreme Court arguing that Title VII protects women from sexual harassment. The intellectual energy behind this claim comes from radical feminist Catherine MacKinnon, who also supports such things as “comparable worth” and a ban on indecent sexual speech. The Supreme Court should rule against the EEOC, lest it be well on its way to adopting the radical feminist aganda.

(3) It’s the 2000s. Various War on Terror detainees are challenging their detention. While the detainess have some mainstream support, much of the energy behind their challenges comes from elements of the radical left who, for example, want the U.S. Constitution to be subordinated to “international law” as elaborated by left-wing NGOs, and who in some cases adhered to an ideology most would describe as “anti-American.” The Supreme Court should rule against the detainees, lest it be well on its way to adopting the radical left’s aganeda.

Obviously, these arguments are all flawed; the strength and validity of legal arguments before the Court does not depend on who is representing the parties, nor on whether the relevant legal arguments were invented or influenced by “radicals” who have a political agenda that extends well beyond the precise issues before the Court. Nor does adopting one argument supported by “radicals” in any way obligate the Court to adopt the “radicals’” agenda in any future ligitation. Not surprisingly, the Court rejected arguments to the contrary in all of the examples above, which were made especially vociferously in examples 1 & 3.

This has not prevented a meme from developing, led by some prominent Supreme Court commentators who should know better, that if the USSC invalidates the ACA it will somehow be well on its way to adopting a broader libertarian agenda supported by some of those, including some of my co-bloggers, who helped craft the arguments against the ACA currently before the Court.

In fact, if the Court rules against the ACA, the other 90+% of the U.S. government loathed by libertarians will still be going strong.

Those Supreme Court watchers who are pushing the “liberarians are coming” meme are well aware that the Supreme Court has historically never strayed much from mainstream public and elite opinion, both of which remain decidely not libertarian. Nor is there any particular reason to believe that John Roberts, Samuel Alito, et al., are in thrall to libertarian ideology. So all we have left is the disreputable rhetorical technique of trying to asssociate in the public mind sound legal arguments with unpopular “radicals”, and to eke out a victory on the basis of the libertarian equivalent of red-baiting rather than on the merits. To say the least, such arguments do no credit to those advancing them.

Novelist John Grisham could hardly spin a more provocative fiction: The president and his surrogates mount an aggressive campaign to intimidate the chief justice of the United States, implying ruin and ridicule should he fail to vote in a pivotal case according to the ruling political party’s wishes. If only it were fiction. The justice is, of course, John Roberts and the case involves the Affordable Care Act(ACA), a.k.a. Obamacare, which would be affordable only if the Supreme Court upholds the individual mandate requiring all Americans to buy health insurance. The left’s narrative goes as follows: If the justices side with the Obama administration, they will be viewed as brilliant and nonpartisan. If the reverse occurs, why then, the justices are partisan, judicial activists who have delegitimized the court. . . .

She concludes:

This not-so-stealth campaign to influence the Supreme Court is obnoxious, if not unethical. . . .  Publicly chastising the court — and now taunting Roberts specifically — seems to have two purposes. One is to get under Roberts’s skin in the hopes that he’ll rule the “correct,” if not necessarily “legally correct,” way. Two is to lay the groundwork for declaring the court illegitimate if all or part of Obamacare is overturned. Either way, it’s politics at its filthiest and is beneath the dignity of the court — and of the White House. Unfortunately for Roberts, it’s up to the chief justice to hold the bar high.

[Read the whole thing here.]

The irony here is the sustained campaign by the President, Senator Leahy, and Left commentators like Jeff Rosen has now tainted as political any decision by Chief Justice Roberts to uphold the mandate, even if he did cast (or switch) his vote solely as a matter of legal principle.

In October 2009, defendant worked as a security guard for a private company at Newark Liberty International Airport. Vice–President Biden had recently flown into the airport, and President Obama was scheduled to arrive the next day on Air Force One.

Defendant and two other individuals who worked at the airport were standing at a lunch truck near the runway where the President’s plane was scheduled to land, when defendant remarked how easy it would be for someone to shoot the President. He pointed out that anyone with a gun could fire at the President, as he left his plane, from surrounding locations, such as defendant’s work post, the roofs of nearby buildings or the fenced area enclosing the runway. The men defendant spoke to were sufficiently alarmed by his statements to report them immediately to the Port Authority police.

Within hours, law enforcement personnel questioned defendant and, with his consent, searched his residence. There, law enforcement discovered and seized about seventy weapons, including rifles, handguns, hunting knives, crossbow and arrow sets, hollow point bullets and other ammunition, as well as permits and storage cases. A record check revealed that one of the guns had been stolen from Alabama. Defendant was arrested and charged with terroristic threats against the President, N.J.S.A. 2C:12–3b, receiving stolen property, N.J.S.A. 2C:20–7a, and unlawful possession of hollow point bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39–3f(1). A restraining order was issued barring defendant from any contact with the President or his family.

Defendant is from a family of hunters and had an extensive and valuable gun collection. With the exception of one gun which, unknown to defendant, was reportedly stolen from Alabama, defendant legally possessed the other guns and had the appropriate firearms permits. No weapon was found in defendant’s possession when he was arrested at his place of employment….

On November 12, 2009, defendant pled guilty to two counts of disorderly persons harassment against the two individuals who heard defendant’s conjectures at the lunch truck, N.J.S.A. 2C:33–4. Both weapons charges were dismissed. At that time defendant requested the return of all property seized from his home, but the prosecutor refused.

On July 12, 2010, defendant moved before the trial judge who had taken his guilty plea for an order compelling the State to return his property, except for the hollow point bullets and stolen rifle. The State filed a written opposition to the motion, which failed to cite any statutory, regulatory or precedential authority. At the hearing on the motion, the assistant prosecutor “concede[d] that after thorough investigation by the federal authorities, the Port Authority police and my office, that we did not see this as a major threat.” The prosecutor also acknowledged the two mental health evaluations that defendant had in prison, which “the State concede[d] he passed.” Nonetheless, based upon “the whole totality of the circumstances,” the State opposed the return of the weapons. In denying defendant’s motion, the trial judge, without providing any legal basis, ruled:

[W]e live in a very different time [since September 11, 2001] and in a very different world; we don’t engage in certain conduct involving words or acts that can be interpreted as threats to our elected officials, threats to our citizens, threats to the health, safety and welfare of everyone. And that phrase, or concept, the public health, safety and welfare, I think trumps everything…. Mr. Brek’s character is not at issue. At no time has the State — at least to my knowledge — brought … [Mr.] Brek’s character into this…. I believe that the public health, safety and welfare of our citizens does come into play here, and accordingly, I am going to deny Mr. Brek’s application for the return of his weapons.

This appeal followed.

Guess how the New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division ruled, and then read on.

It is not disputed that the property seized by the State that defendant requests be returned was lawfully acquired, that plaintiff had obtained the necessary permits to purchase the firearms, and that defendant’s possession of the firearms and other weapons in his residence was lawful. Thus, the State has alleged no facts before the trial judge or on appeal that would give rise to a claim of prima facie forfeiture. N.J.S.A. 2C:64–1a(1). Consequently, the State could only seek derivative forfeiture of defendant’s property, for which it was required to bring a civil action within ninety days of its seizure. N.J.S.A. 2C:64–3a.

Not only has the State failed to file a timely civil action, it has provided no extenuating circumstances to request an equitable extension of time. More importantly, the State does not make a claim or allege any facts to demonstrate that the property seized meets the statutory definition of derivative contraband, N.J.S.A. 2C:64–1a. Nowhere in the record does the State allege that the property at issue was used in furtherance of a crime, as an integral part of an illegal activity, or as the proceeds of illegal activity.

Instead, the State argued that forfeiture was appropriate because defendant’s possession of hollow point bullets and a stolen rifle had shown that he was a threat to the public health, safety and welfare. The State compared the forfeiture of defendant’s property to the revocation or denial of a firearms permit if a person is found to be a threat. N.J.S.A. 2C:58–3. The trial judge, without referencing any statute, also used this analogy. We reject this argument as inapposite. This action does not involve the application for or revocation of a firearms permit under N.J.S.A. 2C:58–3, which is based upon a different statutory scheme than the Forfeiture Act. Furthermore, the property held by the State consists of many items, such as knives and bows and arrows, not covered by the firearms law.

Based upon the record before us, we cannot uphold the trial judge’s finding that the State had the right to retain defendant’s property as it was not based upon the required procedure in the Forfeiture Statute. Under that law, the State was required to file a civil action for forfeiture within ninety days of the seizure of the property. N.J.S.A. 2C:64–3a. The State neither made the requisite filing nor proffered extenuating circumstances for an extension of that time limitation. Even when requesting a remand for a forfeiture hearing, the State did not contend that requisite facts existed to prove the elements for prima facie or derivative contraband under N.J.S.A. 2C:64–1a. Accordingly, as the State had not moved timely under the Forfeiture Act, defendant is entitled to have his property returned to him.

From ABC News:

Dewitt told ABC News she has no regrets about the incident and said there was “no ill intent” in what she was doing.  Dewitt said her colleagues brought the pinata and were using it as a “memoir” of Haley’s words and actions towards unions in her time as governor.

“They made it and I would have played the game with them no matter it would have been pin the tail on the donkey with Nikki Haley’s face on it.  I still would have played,” Dewitt told ABC News over the phone.  ”There was no ill intent.  We were certainly have a good time.  I’m not mad or angry.”

“We’ve been the brunt of her comments now for two years and that’s what the whole thing was.  She’s been whacking at us over the last two years,” Dewitt, who has been president of the South Carolina AFL-CIO for the past 16 years and will retire at the end of June, continued. “Anyone that knows me knows there was no ill intent at all.  Our folks don’t go to speeches with guns and things like that.  We have very loving people in our unions who will take up money for people or a vet.  We just heard these comments by the governor for over the two years.  They were using a memoir of the last two years I’ve lived under her leadership.”

“Kids use piñatas all the time,” she added.

In Rosen’s world, avoiding 5–4 decisions at all costs is apparently a higher virtue than following the law. But, for the sake of argument, let’s set aside the question whether the law obligated the chief justice to vote a certain way. And let us also stipulate, for the sake of argument, that Rosen is right to place such high value on consensus. Rosen’s assertion that the chief justice would be an ”irredeemable failure” is still a dramatic overstatement.

First, it ignores the fact that the chief can only directly control his own vote and therefore would only be in a position to flip a 5–4 decision against the mandate to another 5–4 decision in favor of it. If Rosen is really concerned more about the vote counts than the ultimate results, both results would leave identical black marks on the chief justice’s record.

To the extent that Rosen hopes the chief justice will engage in lobbying of his colleagues reminiscent of the Warren-era court, such a strategy is inherently limited. Even if the chief justice were able to articulate a narrow decision that avoided making any major constitutional ruling (and if there were an obvious route to such a ruling, it is hard to imagine another of the many parties and amici would not have hit upon it), a determined coalition of four liberal justices would still be in a position to foreclose a consensus result simply by rallying around a position they knew none of the conservatives would accept.

The disproportionate weight Rosen places on this case also suggests he is more concerned about the outcome of the case than progressing toward unanimity. Take, for example, Sackett vs. EPA and Hosanna-Tabor, two of this term’s most important cases that could have been decided 5–4. Both were decided unanimously. Apparently a 5–4 ruling in the Obamacare case would cancel out these significant unanimous decisions. I would be curious to hear Rosen’s explanation.

 

The Court recognizes that under current law there is no established upper limit as to when the government must review seized electronic data to determine whether the evidence seized falls within the scope of a warrant. See, e.g., Mutschelknaus, 564 F.Supp.2d at 1076 (“Neither Fed.R.Crim.P. 41 nor the Fourth Amendment provides for a specific time limit in which a computer may undergo a government forensic examination after it has been seized pursuant to a search warrant.”). However, the Fourth Amendment requires the government to complete its review, i.e., execute the warrant, within a “reasonable” period of time. Numerous cases hold that a delay of several months between the seizure of electronic evidence and the completion of the government’s review of that evidence as to whether it falls within the scope of the warrant is reasonable. See id. at 1076–77 (finding a two-month delay reasonable); see also Burns, 2008 WL 4542990, at *8–9 (finding a ten-month delay for completion of the government’s review reasonable).

The parties have not provided the Court with any authority, nor has the Court found any, indicating that the government may seize and image electronic data and then retain that data with no plans whatsoever to begin review of that data to determine whether any irrelevant, personal information was improperly seized. The government’s blatant disregard for its responsibility in this case is unacceptable and unreasonable. See United States v. Debbi, 244 F.Supp.2d 235, 237–38 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (finding a Fourth Amendment violation in the search, seizure, and retention of seven boxes of documents from the defendant’s home, which included “personal and religious files, general correspondence, [and] family financial records,” when “no meaningful attempt” was made to separate and retain only the items the warrant permitted to be seized). The government contends that Debbi is inapposite because, in that case, the government retained original paper documents, whereas, in this case, the government returned the original electronic documents and equipment and retained only the imaged electronic documents. The Court disagrees. It is a distinction without a difference. The government’s retention of all imaged electronic documents, including personal emails, without any review whatsoever to determine not only their relevance to this case, but also to determine whether any recognized legal privileges attached to them, is unreasonable and disturbing.

. . .
The Court has not reached this conclusion lightly. However, the Court cannot, in the interest of justice and fairness, permit the government to ignore its obligations. Otherwise, the Fourth Amendment would lose all force and meaning in the digital era and citizens will have no recourse as to the unlawful seizure of information that falls outside the scope of a search warrant and its subsequent dissemination. Accordingly, Metter’s motion to suppress is granted. This conclusion is limited to the electronic evidence seized and imaged pursuant to the Metter Home Search Warrant, Office Search Warrant, and Email Search Warrant and does not include the paper documents and currency seized pursuant to those warrants.

It sounds like Judge Irizarry was really annoyed by the Government’s conduct. At the same time, I have trouble understanding exactly what Fourth Amendment principle Judge Irizarry thinks was violated here. She seems to be assuming that the Fourth Amendment ensures a right to the privacy of information seized pursuant to a search warrant if the information seized is not within the scope of the warrant. The idea seems to be that the government needs to complete its review of seized information quickly so the data outside the scope of the warrant can be taken outside the government’s reach — kind of a duty to separate the digital wheat from the digital chaff in a reasonable period of time, even if the government has warrants and the owners have their computers back. The assumption seems to be that evidence outside the scope of the warrant will be destroyed or made unavailable to the government after that search is completed, so the government needs to complete the forensic process quickly to enable that to happen. We saw some of this thinking in Judge Kozinski’s Compehrensive Drug Testing opinion, although it’s not generally found in existing Fourth Amendment caselaw. (It’s not clear if Judge Kozinski was trying to apply the Fourth Amendment, some other legal rule, or was just announcing new rules as some sort of advisory opinion.) Anyway, it will be interesting to see how this goes: This seems like the kind of case that would merit an interlocutory appeal, and I’m not sure the Second Circuit would look at this the same way.

Hat tip: Cybercrime Review.

[A] claim of harassment is … actionable if the harassment to which Complainant has allegedly been subjected was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of Complainant’s employment….

In this case, Complainant has alleged that he notified the Postmaster as early as March 2011 of employees repeatedly wearing Confederate flag t-shirts to work, but it was not until May 2011, that the Postmaster finally instructed the supervisor to start sending the employees home to change. Complainant argues that the Postmaster “procrastinated in taking action on my complaint” and that he filed the complaint, in part, because of the Postmaster’s “lack of concern for my feelings associated with this matter.” Complainant explained that he was offended by the t-shirts because he saw the Confederate flag as a symbol of racism that evoked the history of slavery. Complainant also alleged that he is now fearful of one the employees he complained about because the employee has started parking his car off Agency properly and Complainant believes he might have a weapon in his car.

Based on the circumstances alleged by Complainant, we conclude that he has stated a viable claim of discriminatory harassment which requires further investigation…. [U]nder certain circumstances, a limited number of highly offensive slurs related to a federal employee’s race may in fact state a claim or support a finding of discrimination under Title VII. Moreover, Complainant has alleged that it took the Postmaster nearly two months to finally take action to stop his coworkers from wearing the offensive t-shirts….

This case involved a government employer, but the EEOC applies precisely the same standards — speech is actionable if it is “severe or pervasive” enough to create a hostile, abusive, or offensive work environment based on race, religion, sex, and so on for a plaintiff and for a reasonable person — to government employment as courts do to private employment. So under the EEOC’s reasoning, an employer must order its employees to stop wearing Confederate flag T-shirts whenever someone complains, or risk massive liability in court.

As I’ve argued before, hostile work environment harassment law suppresses a broad range of speech, including speech related to political, religious, social, or artistic matters. And when applied to what I call “one-to-many” speech (as opposed to speech that is said to one particular person), I think the law is unconstitutional: It involves the government, acting as sovereign, imposing a content-based and viewpoint-based restriction on people’s speech.

To be sure, a private employer has broad authority to restrict speech on its property (just as a private blog operator, service provider, commercial landlord, university, church, or homeowner has such authority). And a government employer has fairly broad such authority as well, for instance if it concludes that such speech sufficiently undermines the employer’s mission. But harassment law involves the government using legal coercion to pressure employers to restrict people’s speech; that’s where the strong First Amendment constraints on government action should come in. Much as I dislike displays of the Confederate flag, the First Amendment can’t allow the government to suppress them through the threat of legal liability.

In any event, this case, I think, helps illustrate my point. If the EEOC is right, then employers essentially have a legal duty to suppress Confederate flag displays whenever they are engaged in by an employee and a coworker is offended. Employers also have such a duty whenever they are engaged in by patrons and an employee is offended, since employers have a duty to prevent “hostile work environments” created by patrons. Bars and other places of public accommodation would also have a similar duty not to display Confederate flags and similar imagery, and to eject patrons who do the same, so long as a patron complaints that he is offended.

And of course the same could in principle apply not just to speech that is perceived as racist, but also speech that is perceived as anti-Islam, anti-Christianity, anti-Hispanic-immigrant, anti-women, anti-men, and so on. (See, e.g., the Tufts anti-Islam ad incident, Doe v. City of New York & Bruce Tefft, and Rodriguez v. Maricopa County Community College Dist..) “Hostile environment harassment law” is a serious and often unconstitutional threat to free speech, whether in workplaces — where most people spend a third of their waking hours — or universities or places of public accommodation; this incident is just the latest example.

UPDATE: Hans Bader (Open Market) has more.