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      <title>Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</title>
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         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70051?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
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         <title>Outwardly Strong, Internally Brittle: Dissecting the MBS Regime</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 105-109, Summer 2026. </description>
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         <dc:creator>
Mohammed Ayoob
</dc:creator>
         <category>EDITORIAL</category>
         <dc:title>Outwardly Strong, Internally Brittle: Dissecting the MBS Regime</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70051</dc:identifier>
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         <prism:section>EDITORIAL</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
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         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70013?af=R</link>
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         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
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         <title>The Middle East in 1958: Reimagining a Revolutionary Year Edited by Jeffrey G. Karam. I.B. Tauris, 2021. 248 pages. $39.95, paper.</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 376-378, Summer 2026. </description>
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         <dc:creator>
Elifnur Düzsöz
</dc:creator>
         <category>BOOK REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>The Middle East in 1958: Reimagining a Revolutionary Year Edited by Jeffrey G. Karam. I.B. Tauris, 2021. 248 pages. $39.95, paper.</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70013</dc:identifier>
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         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70013</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70013?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>BOOK REVIEW</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
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         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70015?af=R</link>
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         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
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         <title>How Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic Warfare By Narges Bajoghli, Vali Nasr, Djavad Salehi‐Isfahani, and Ali Vaez. Stanford University Press, 2024. 212 pages. $24, paper.</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 368-370, Summer 2026. </description>
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         <dc:creator>
Bahram P. Kalviri
</dc:creator>
         <category>BOOK REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>How Sanctions Work: Iran and the Impact of Economic Warfare By Narges Bajoghli, Vali Nasr, Djavad Salehi‐Isfahani, and Ali Vaez. Stanford University Press, 2024. 212 pages. $24, paper.</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70015</dc:identifier>
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         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70015</prism:doi>
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         <prism:section>BOOK REVIEW</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
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         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70016?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
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         <title>The Presidential Difference and Iran's Foreign Policy Under Khatami from 1997 to 2005 By Azadeh Momeni. Bloomsbury Academic, 2024. 144 pages. $70, hardcover.</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 365-367, Summer 2026. </description>
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         <dc:creator>
Mahmood Monshipouri
</dc:creator>
         <category>BOOK REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>The Presidential Difference and Iran's Foreign Policy Under Khatami from 1997 to 2005 By Azadeh Momeni. Bloomsbury Academic, 2024. 144 pages. $70, hardcover.</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70016</dc:identifier>
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         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70016</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70016?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>BOOK REVIEW</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
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         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70017?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
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         <title>States Without People: Revolt and Defeat in the Middle East By Billie Jeanne Brownlee and Maziyar Ghiabi. McGill‐Queen's University Press, 2025. 252 pages. $39.95, paper.</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 374-375, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description/>
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         <dc:creator>
 İlhan Bilici
</dc:creator>
         <category>BOOK REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>States Without People: Revolt and Defeat in the Middle East By Billie Jeanne Brownlee and Maziyar Ghiabi. McGill‐Queen's University Press, 2025. 252 pages. $39.95, paper.</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70017</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70017</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70017?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>BOOK REVIEW</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70050?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
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         <title>Power Competition in the Red Sea: Testing the Post‐Liberal International Order By Federico Donelli. Bloomsbury Academic, 2025. 296 pages. $82.80, ebook.</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 371-373, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator>
Riccardo Gasco
</dc:creator>
         <category>BOOK REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>Power Competition in the Red Sea: Testing the Post‐Liberal International Order By Federico Donelli. Bloomsbury Academic, 2025. 296 pages. $82.80, ebook.</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70050</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70050</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70050?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>BOOK REVIEW</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
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      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70056?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
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         <title>America's Middle East: The Ruination of a Region By Marc Lynch. Oxford University Press, 2025. 272 pages. $34.99, hardcover.</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 358-360, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator>
Yasir Kuoti
</dc:creator>
         <category>BOOK REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>America's Middle East: The Ruination of a Region By Marc Lynch. Oxford University Press, 2025. 272 pages. $34.99, hardcover.</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70056</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70056</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70056?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>BOOK REVIEW</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
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      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70026?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
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         <title>Making Aid Work: Dueling with Dictators and Warlords in the Middle East and North Africa By Guilain Denoeux, Robert Springborg, and Hicham Alaoui. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2025. 347 pages. $29.95, paper and ebook.</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 361-364, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator>
Naomi Sakr
</dc:creator>
         <category>BOOK REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>Making Aid Work: Dueling with Dictators and Warlords in the Middle East and North Africa By Guilain Denoeux, Robert Springborg, and Hicham Alaoui. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2025. 347 pages. $29.95, paper and ebook.</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70026</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70026</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70026?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>BOOK REVIEW</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70085?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
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         <title>The Long War of Ideas: American Public Diplomacy in Arabic After 9/11By Nathaniel Greenberg. Columbia University Press, 2026. 352 pages. $36, paper.</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 383-387, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator>
A.R. Joyce
</dc:creator>
         <category>BOOK REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>The Long War of Ideas: American Public Diplomacy in Arabic After 9/11By Nathaniel Greenberg. Columbia University Press, 2026. 352 pages. $36, paper.</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70085</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70085</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70085?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>BOOK REVIEW</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.12818?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
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         <title>Class, Capital, State, and Late Development: The Political Economy of Military Interventions in Turkey By Gönenç Uysal. Brill, 2024. 272 pages. $161, hardcover.</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 379-382, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator>
Yusuf Murteza
</dc:creator>
         <category>BOOK REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>Class, Capital, State, and Late Development: The Political Economy of Military Interventions in Turkey By Gönenç Uysal. Brill, 2024. 272 pages. $161, hardcover.</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.12818</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.12818</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.12818?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>BOOK REVIEW</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70030?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
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         <title>Fallen Cedar: Lebanon's Debt Diplomacy, 2015–2020</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 249-266, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
This article examines Lebanon's economic crisis, with a focus on the international debt negotiations and financial interventions from 2015 to 2020, arguing that it stemmed from a failure not only of economic policies but of trust—both between Lebanon and its creditors as well as among domestic actors. The study traces the limitations of Western‐led debt diplomacy, from the unsuccessful Paris conferences to the 2018 CEDRE initiative, which conditioned financial assistance on neoliberal reforms without collaboratively addressing Lebanon's underlying structural economic and governance deficiencies. The Banque du Liban's financial‐engineering strategies, designed to sustain capital inflows, ultimately exacerbated economic instability, leading to currency devaluation, capital controls, and social unrest. The article concludes that Lebanon's default was not a strategic reset but an economic surrender that followed decades of conducting economic policy in an environment devoid of trust among relevant actors. The Lebanon case demonstrates the need for a reimagined approach to debt diplomacy, one that de‐emphasizes ad hoc, transactional financial arrangements and prioritizes trust building, shared responsibility for reform and reconstruction, and a collaboratively agreed‐upon and funded plan for sustainable economic growth.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This article examines Lebanon's economic crisis, with a focus on the international debt negotiations and financial interventions from 2015 to 2020, arguing that it stemmed from a failure not only of economic policies but of trust—both between Lebanon and its creditors as well as among domestic actors. The study traces the limitations of Western-led debt diplomacy, from the unsuccessful Paris conferences to the 2018 CEDRE initiative, which conditioned financial assistance on neoliberal reforms without collaboratively addressing Lebanon's underlying structural economic and governance deficiencies. The Banque du Liban's financial-engineering strategies, designed to sustain capital inflows, ultimately exacerbated economic instability, leading to currency devaluation, capital controls, and social unrest. The article concludes that Lebanon's default was not a strategic reset but an economic surrender that followed decades of conducting economic policy in an environment devoid of trust among relevant actors. The Lebanon case demonstrates the need for a reimagined approach to debt diplomacy, one that de-emphasizes ad hoc, transactional financial arrangements and prioritizes trust building, shared responsibility for reform and reconstruction, and a collaboratively agreed-upon and funded plan for sustainable economic growth.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Kevin Rosier
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Fallen Cedar: Lebanon's Debt Diplomacy, 2015–2020</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70030</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70030</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70030?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
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      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70033?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
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         <title>Federalism in Post‐Assad Syria: Toward Durable Peace in a Pluralist Society</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 206-227, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Syria's civil war has left behind a fractured state. While the new president, Ahmed al‐Sharaa, seeks to unify the country and restore centralized governance, this appears unworkable. Instead, this article contends, asymmetrical federalism offers a pathway toward stability. The analysis identifies three dimensions necessary for a durable settlement: regional security autonomy; equitable management of key resources, particularly oil and agriculture; and credible international guarantees to maintain autonomy. Drawing on cases from Iraq, Bosnia‐Herzegovina, and Canada, the examination shows how asymmetrical arrangements can accommodate powerful regional actors, such as the Kurdish‐led Syrian Democratic Forces, while preserving national cohesion. The article outlines mechanisms to address Syria's pluralism, including constitutional recognition of regional jurisdictions, a Federal Security Council with veto provisions, binding revenue‐sharing agreements, and joint security protocols. It also evaluates the role of international actors, especially the United States, as potential guarantors of autonomy and security in the absence of a strong central state. By grounding asymmetrical federalism in Syrian realities, the article demonstrates its potential for representative governance.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Syria's civil war has left behind a fractured state. While the new president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, seeks to unify the country and restore centralized governance, this appears unworkable. Instead, this article contends, asymmetrical federalism offers a pathway toward stability. The analysis identifies three dimensions necessary for a durable settlement: regional security autonomy; equitable management of key resources, particularly oil and agriculture; and credible international guarantees to maintain autonomy. Drawing on cases from Iraq, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Canada, the examination shows how asymmetrical arrangements can accommodate powerful regional actors, such as the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces, while preserving national cohesion. The article outlines mechanisms to address Syria's pluralism, including constitutional recognition of regional jurisdictions, a Federal Security Council with veto provisions, binding revenue-sharing agreements, and joint security protocols. It also evaluates the role of international actors, especially the United States, as potential guarantors of autonomy and security in the absence of a strong central state. By grounding asymmetrical federalism in Syrian realities, the article demonstrates its potential for representative governance.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Dilan Okcuoglu
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Federalism in Post‐Assad Syria: Toward Durable Peace in a Pluralist Society</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70033</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70033</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70033?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70034?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70034</guid>
         <title>Plastics Pollution in the Gulf Countries: Problems and Policy Solutions</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 267-291, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Plastics pollution is one of the most pressing environmental issues humanity faces; its ever‐increasing production is overwhelming nations’ capacities to address the long‐term consequences, including the impact on ecosystems. Different policy approaches have been developed to minimize plastics consumption and pollution, especially with regard to packaging and the use of the materials in consumer goods. Kuwait and the Gulf countries generate considerable plastic waste but appear to lag regarding the implementation of public policies designed to mitigate the negative effects. Analysis of policy approaches to the plastics pollution issue in the Gulf is sparse. This article reviews the effect of plastic pollution in the Gulf countries and outlines some of the measures that could be put in place in Kuwait to create a more sustainable future for the ecosystems in the subregion. Using key stakeholder interviews and synthesizing governance and policy approaches, the authors develop an environmental policy integration framework for Kuwait. This harmonizes regulatory, market, and voluntary measures, including awareness campaigns, curriculum integration, public health initiatives, media campaigns, financing, community participation, sustainable development concepts, tax incentives, and environmental cleanup efforts.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Plastics pollution is one of the most pressing environmental issues humanity faces; its ever-increasing production is overwhelming nations’ capacities to address the long-term consequences, including the impact on ecosystems. Different policy approaches have been developed to minimize plastics consumption and pollution, especially with regard to packaging and the use of the materials in consumer goods. Kuwait and the Gulf countries generate considerable plastic waste but appear to lag regarding the implementation of public policies designed to mitigate the negative effects. Analysis of policy approaches to the plastics pollution issue in the Gulf is sparse. This article reviews the effect of plastic pollution in the Gulf countries and outlines some of the measures that could be put in place in Kuwait to create a more sustainable future for the ecosystems in the subregion. Using key stakeholder interviews and synthesizing governance and policy approaches, the authors develop an environmental policy integration framework for Kuwait. This harmonizes regulatory, market, and voluntary measures, including awareness campaigns, curriculum integration, public health initiatives, media campaigns, financing, community participation, sustainable development concepts, tax incentives, and environmental cleanup efforts.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Richard Rutter, 
Stuart Barnes, 
Konstantinos Chalvatzis, 
Meshari Al‐Harbi
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Plastics Pollution in the Gulf Countries: Problems and Policy Solutions</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70034</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70034</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70034?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70059?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70059</guid>
         <title>Constructing Social Cohesion in Qatar: National Vision, Strategy, and Constitution</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 292-308, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Social cohesion is eroding around the world, and governments are working to foster cohesiveness. This study explores how the State of Qatar has integrated social cohesion into its key strategic planning documents. We do so by integrating locally relevant conceptualizations, as well as Western ideas, of social cohesion. Our central analysis is of three key national documents: the Constitution of the State of Qatar, Qatar National Vision 2030, and the Third Qatar National Development Strategy 2024–2030. We coded each document for mentions of social cohesion along with eight other Western and Islamic concepts. We find that these legal and strategic policy blueprints integrate both traditions, thus creating a model of social cohesion that is rooted in the Qatari context while being cognizant of global principles. This study contributes to the broader decolonization of policy discourses by engaging new epistemological orientations for understanding and assessing social cohesion and its related concepts.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Social cohesion is eroding around the world, and governments are working to foster cohesiveness. This study explores how the State of Qatar has integrated social cohesion into its key strategic planning documents. We do so by integrating locally relevant conceptualizations, as well as Western ideas, of social cohesion. Our central analysis is of three key national documents: the Constitution of the State of Qatar, Qatar National Vision 2030, and the Third Qatar National Development Strategy 2024–2030. We coded each document for mentions of social cohesion along with eight other Western and Islamic concepts. We find that these legal and strategic policy blueprints integrate both traditions, thus creating a model of social cohesion that is rooted in the Qatari context while being cognizant of global principles. This study contributes to the broader decolonization of policy discourses by engaging new epistemological orientations for understanding and assessing social cohesion and its related concepts.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Logan Cochrane, 
Kim Moloney, 
Khalid Al‐Kuwari, 
Mehdi Riazi, 
Mohammed Abubakar Metcho, 
Jawaher Al Majed
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Constructing Social Cohesion in Qatar: National Vision, Strategy, and Constitution</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70059</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70059</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70059?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70062?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70062</guid>
         <title>A Heuristic Equation of Transformation, Justice, and Violence in Post‐Assad Syria</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 175-205, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
The Syrian conflict, in a fragile transition after Bashar al‐Assad's ouster, raises urgent questions about the conditions for sustainable peace. Rather than viewing postwar Syria solely through the lens of return and reconstruction, this article conceptualizes peace through a heuristic framework in which enabling variables are persistently eroded by structural violence. Drawing on fieldwork conducted in six Syrian provinces, it employs a triangulated qualitative methodology combining participant observation, visual ethnography, and documentary analysis. The findings show that communities enact resilience through grassroots reconstruction, memorialization, and everyday survival, even as authoritarian continuities, fragmented governance, and humanitarian collapse dominate. Symbolic gestures mask carceral practices and inequality. Women and children, central to survival, remain excluded from decision making, reinforcing cycles of vulnerability. The study introduces an original interpretive model—Peace = (X × I) + (T + R) − S—where conflict transformation (X), institutional peace building (I), transitional justice (T), and representation (R) interact but are undermined by structural violence (S). This framework functions not as a mathematical but a conceptual device linking theory with field evidence, situating Syria's transition between negative peace and the unrealized promise of positive peace.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Syrian conflict, in a fragile transition after Bashar al-Assad's ouster, raises urgent questions about the conditions for sustainable peace. Rather than viewing postwar Syria solely through the lens of return and reconstruction, this article conceptualizes peace through a heuristic framework in which enabling variables are persistently eroded by structural violence. Drawing on fieldwork conducted in six Syrian provinces, it employs a triangulated qualitative methodology combining participant observation, visual ethnography, and documentary analysis. The findings show that communities enact resilience through grassroots reconstruction, memorialization, and everyday survival, even as authoritarian continuities, fragmented governance, and humanitarian collapse dominate. Symbolic gestures mask carceral practices and inequality. Women and children, central to survival, remain excluded from decision making, reinforcing cycles of vulnerability. The study introduces an original interpretive model—Peace = (X × I) + (T + R) − S—where conflict transformation (X), institutional peace building (I), transitional justice (T), and representation (R) interact but are undermined by structural violence (S). This framework functions not as a mathematical but a conceptual device linking theory with field evidence, situating Syria's transition between negative peace and the unrealized promise of positive peace.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Zeynep Banu Dalaman
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>A Heuristic Equation of Transformation, Justice, and Violence in Post‐Assad Syria</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70062</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70062</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70062?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70064?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70064</guid>
         <title>Explaining Saudi Arabia's Inaction During the Gaza War: Why No Oil Embargo?</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 137-155, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Why did Saudi Arabia not take direct action against US support for Israel in the Gaza war, given the enormous destruction and loss of life? In 1973, when Washington similarly backed the Israeli effort against Arab states, the kingdom and other regional countries raised the price of petroleum through an embargo and production cuts, sparking an oil crisis in the West. But the recent period has featured no analogous attempts to influence Washington. We argue that over the past five decades, a hegemonic coalition of governmental and private‐sector elites in the United States and Saudi Arabia developed a business‐security structure that prevented Riyadh from punishing the West over the Gaza war. Our analysis of empirical data and secondary sources shows that this dominant transnational investment bloc deeply integrated the kingdom into the US‐led global capitalist economy. As a result, imposing an oil embargo or other punitive measures was no longer viable.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Why did Saudi Arabia not take direct action against US support for Israel in the Gaza war, given the enormous destruction and loss of life? In 1973, when Washington similarly backed the Israeli effort against Arab states, the kingdom and other regional countries raised the price of petroleum through an embargo and production cuts, sparking an oil crisis in the West. But the recent period has featured no analogous attempts to influence Washington. We argue that over the past five decades, a hegemonic coalition of governmental and private-sector elites in the United States and Saudi Arabia developed a business-security structure that prevented Riyadh from punishing the West over the Gaza war. Our analysis of empirical data and secondary sources shows that this dominant transnational investment bloc deeply integrated the kingdom into the US-led global capitalist economy. As a result, imposing an oil embargo or other punitive measures was no longer viable.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Mazaher Koruzhde, 
Eric Lob
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Explaining Saudi Arabia's Inaction During the Gaza War: Why No Oil Embargo?</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70064</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70064</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70064?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70068?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70068</guid>
         <title>Cryptocurrency Regulation in MENA: From Prohibition to Conditional Legalization</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 228-248, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
While there has been an upsurge in the use of cryptocurrency worldwide, several states in the Middle East and North Africa initially attempted—implicitly or explicitly—to ban it. However, the regional markets for crypto continued to grow, and the number of users increased despite the illegality of trading or mining. In response, states began around 2020 to lift their prohibitions and regulate crypto. This article argues that this policy shift was driven not by virtual currency's promise as a means of decentralizing monetary systems but instead by the governments’ needs to reassert control. The study maps and investigates the evolution of cryptocurrency regulation by 14 MENA governments before and after 2020. The analysis finds that these states, in both periods, used the same language of national security, economic stability, and Sharia—first to justify their bans and then to allow cryptocurrency but only within their systems of control.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While there has been an upsurge in the use of cryptocurrency worldwide, several states in the Middle East and North Africa initially attempted—implicitly or explicitly—to ban it. However, the regional markets for crypto continued to grow, and the number of users increased despite the illegality of trading or mining. In response, states began around 2020 to lift their prohibitions and regulate crypto. This article argues that this policy shift was driven not by virtual currency's promise as a means of decentralizing monetary systems but instead by the governments’ needs to reassert control. The study maps and investigates the evolution of cryptocurrency regulation by 14 MENA governments before and after 2020. The analysis finds that these states, in both periods, used the same language of national security, economic stability, and Sharia—first to justify their bans and then to allow cryptocurrency but only within their systems of control.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Bassant Hassib, 
Fatimah Ayad
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Cryptocurrency Regulation in MENA: From Prohibition to Conditional Legalization</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70068</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70068</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70068?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70069?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70069</guid>
         <title>Iran's Forward Defense in Sub‐Saharan Africa</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 57-71, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
This article examines Iran's security and defense initiatives in sub‐Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2024 and how they reflect the extraterritorial application of the regime's forward defense doctrine. In response to the long‐term erosion of its homeland defense capabilities since the Iran‐Iraq War of the 1980s—driven by infrastructure degradation, international sanctions, and increasing Israeli and US pressure—Tehran has sought to expand its strategic depth beyond the Levant. Through partnerships with states such as Sudan and South Africa, as well as discreet engagement with nonstate actors, Iran approaches sub‐Saharan Africa as a peripheral buffer zone. These interactions aim to project influence, safeguard national interests, and counter rival actors. The article analyzes how the Islamic Republic uses dynamic, subversive, and hybrid approaches, including pragmatic alliances, interference, arms transfers, intelligence cooperation, terrorism, and cyberwarfare. These practices illustrate how sub‐Saharan Africa is becoming an increasingly relevant extension of Iran's forward defense strategy within a competitive, zero‐sum security environment.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This article examines Iran's security and defense initiatives in sub-Saharan Africa between 1990 and 2024 and how they reflect the extraterritorial application of the regime's forward defense doctrine. In response to the long-term erosion of its homeland defense capabilities since the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s—driven by infrastructure degradation, international sanctions, and increasing Israeli and US pressure—Tehran has sought to expand its strategic depth beyond the Levant. Through partnerships with states such as Sudan and South Africa, as well as discreet engagement with nonstate actors, Iran approaches sub-Saharan Africa as a peripheral buffer zone. These interactions aim to project influence, safeguard national interests, and counter rival actors. The article analyzes how the Islamic Republic uses dynamic, subversive, and hybrid approaches, including pragmatic alliances, interference, arms transfers, intelligence cooperation, terrorism, and cyberwarfare. These practices illustrate how sub-Saharan Africa is becoming an increasingly relevant extension of Iran's forward defense strategy within a competitive, zero-sum security environment.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Ariel Limanya Limbu, 
Ronen A. Cohen
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Iran's Forward Defense in Sub‐Saharan Africa</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70069</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70069</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70069?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70070?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70070</guid>
         <title>Signals, Red Lines, and Collision: The Israel‐Iran Spiral and US Intervention</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 5-23, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
The Iran War erupted in February 2026 without UN authorization, and Washington's rationales—Iranian nuclear ambitions, missile capacity, and proxy threats—map more closely onto Israeli than US security interests. Why have we seen two major conflicts between these belligerents in less than one year? This study argues that the Israel‐Iran escalation spiral between 2023 and 2026 followed the logic of an iterated chicken game. Incremental brinkmanship gradually normalized direct conflict, which sparked the 12‐day war of 2025. A ceasefire was reached only after the combatants' calculations were altered by Washington's bombing of Iran's nuclear sites and its forcing Israel to stop short of destroying the regime. However, this left the underlying incentive structure intact, resulting in a far more destructive offensive in 2026. The article contends that the June 2025 collision did not restore deterrence but transformed the conflict into a more volatile US‐Iran confrontation. Israel's escalatory threshold has been lowered as it assumes continued American backing, while Iran's incentives to pursue nuclear breakout have increased. The conclusion lays out steps the United States must take to prevent more devastation.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Iran War erupted in February 2026 without UN authorization, and Washington's rationales—Iranian nuclear ambitions, missile capacity, and proxy threats—map more closely onto Israeli than US security interests. Why have we seen two major conflicts between these belligerents in less than one year? This study argues that the Israel-Iran escalation spiral between 2023 and 2026 followed the logic of an iterated chicken game. Incremental brinkmanship gradually normalized direct conflict, which sparked the 12-day war of 2025. A ceasefire was reached only after the combatants' calculations were altered by Washington's bombing of Iran's nuclear sites and its forcing Israel to stop short of destroying the regime. However, this left the underlying incentive structure intact, resulting in a far more destructive offensive in 2026. The article contends that the June 2025 collision did not restore deterrence but transformed the conflict into a more volatile US-Iran confrontation. Israel's escalatory threshold has been lowered as it assumes continued American backing, while Iran's incentives to pursue nuclear breakout have increased. The conclusion lays out steps the United States must take to prevent more devastation.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Buğra Sari
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Signals, Red Lines, and Collision: The Israel‐Iran Spiral and US Intervention</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70070</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70070</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70070?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70071?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70071</guid>
         <title>From Palestine Ally to Zionist Partner: India‐Israel Relations, 2014–2025</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 156-174, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
India's pro‐Palestinian diplomatic posture, which held for nearly 70 years, has been transformed within a single decade of rule by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), turning New Delhi into one of Israel's most consequential Asian partners. This shift has narrowed the coalition supporting the Palestinian cause. The new orientation was illustrated after the deadly October 7 attacks: The government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi muted criticism of, and avoided UN resolutions to end, the Gaza war, as Israel considered replacing Palestinian workers with thousands of Indian nationals. This article argues that India's reorientation is driven by three converging forces: strategic incentives such as access to defense technology and intelligence cooperation; ideological affinities between Zionism and the Hindu nationalist ideology Hindutva; and the absence of opposition from Gulf states. This allowed New Delhi to deepen ties with Israel without jeopardizing regional partnerships. The study shows that India‐Israel cooperation accelerated after the BJP came to power in 2014, soon consolidated into a strategic partnership, and influenced India's position on Israel during the post‐October 7 wars.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;India's pro-Palestinian diplomatic posture, which held for nearly 70 years, has been transformed within a single decade of rule by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), turning New Delhi into one of Israel's most consequential Asian partners. This shift has narrowed the coalition supporting the Palestinian cause. The new orientation was illustrated after the deadly October 7 attacks: The government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi muted criticism of, and avoided UN resolutions to end, the Gaza war, as Israel considered replacing Palestinian workers with thousands of Indian nationals. This article argues that India's reorientation is driven by three converging forces: strategic incentives such as access to defense technology and intelligence cooperation; ideological affinities between Zionism and the Hindu nationalist ideology Hindutva; and the absence of opposition from Gulf states. This allowed New Delhi to deepen ties with Israel without jeopardizing regional partnerships. The study shows that India-Israel cooperation accelerated after the BJP came to power in 2014, soon consolidated into a strategic partnership, and influenced India's position on Israel during the post-October 7 wars.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Yücel Bulut
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>From Palestine Ally to Zionist Partner: India‐Israel Relations, 2014–2025</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70071</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70071</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70071?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70072?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70072</guid>
         <title>New Political Actors in Palestine: The Digital Efficacy of Gen Z</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 110-120, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
In 2021, Palestinians rallied to save families in East Jerusalem from eviction by launching the online #SaveSheikhJarrah campaign. These activists, many of them young, used platforms like Instagram, Twitter, and TikTok to share footage, mobilize support, and inform global audiences. The campaign illustrated the growing role of digital advocacy in shaping narratives around the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict. This study examines perceived political efficacy among Palestinians aged 18–27, commonly referred to as Gen Z. The quantitative descriptive‐analytical design based on an online survey of 402 respondents finds high levels of daily platform usage, with social media serving as a primary source of political information. Correlation and regression analyses reveal statistically significant associations among digital platform usage, political participation, beliefs about censorship of online content, and perceptions of digital political efficacy. The results provide evidence of how Palestine's Generation Z understands and experiences digitally mediated political engagement and the constraints of their platforms.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In 2021, Palestinians rallied to save families in East Jerusalem from eviction by launching the online #SaveSheikhJarrah campaign. These activists, many of them young, used platforms like Instagram, Twitter, and TikTok to share footage, mobilize support, and inform global audiences. The campaign illustrated the growing role of digital advocacy in shaping narratives around the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This study examines perceived political efficacy among Palestinians aged 18–27, commonly referred to as Gen Z. The quantitative descriptive-analytical design based on an online survey of 402 respondents finds high levels of daily platform usage, with social media serving as a primary source of political information. Correlation and regression analyses reveal statistically significant associations among digital platform usage, political participation, beliefs about censorship of online content, and perceptions of digital political efficacy. The results provide evidence of how Palestine's Generation Z understands and experiences digitally mediated political engagement and the constraints of their platforms.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Abdalraheem S.H. Shobaki, 
Mahmoud S.H. Shobaki
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>New Political Actors in Palestine: The Digital Efficacy of Gen Z</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70072</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70072</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70072?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70075?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70075</guid>
         <title>Between Fatigue and Fear: West Bank Student Solidarity During the Gaza War</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 121-136, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
This study analyzes why university students in the West Bank appeared to show minimal public and collective engagement during the Gaza war. Drawing on semi‐structured interviews with 62 students from six Palestinian universities, the research indicates that young people's responses were shaped by intersecting emotional, structural, and political factors. While students expressed deep moral and identity‐based solidarity with the people of Gaza—mainly through online expression—they also described feelings of exhaustion, fear, and political disillusionment that limited their capacities for organized action. Many reported self‐censorship, caution, and selective forms of engagement such as digital advocacy, boycotts, and humanitarian donations. These patterns reflect the tensions among enduring empathy and the constraints imposed by repression, surveillance, and factional division. The study offers insight into how Palestinian youth navigate activism and resistance under occupation, and how their emotional and political fatigue may reshape the future of student mobilization in the occupied territories.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This study analyzes why university students in the West Bank appeared to show minimal public and collective engagement during the Gaza war. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with 62 students from six Palestinian universities, the research indicates that young people's responses were shaped by intersecting emotional, structural, and political factors. While students expressed deep moral and identity-based solidarity with the people of Gaza—mainly through online expression—they also described feelings of exhaustion, fear, and political disillusionment that limited their capacities for organized action. Many reported self-censorship, caution, and selective forms of engagement such as digital advocacy, boycotts, and humanitarian donations. These patterns reflect the tensions among enduring empathy and the constraints imposed by repression, surveillance, and factional division. The study offers insight into how Palestinian youth navigate activism and resistance under occupation, and how their emotional and political fatigue may reshape the future of student mobilization in the occupied territories.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Mert Öztürk, 
Oqab Jabali
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Between Fatigue and Fear: West Bank Student Solidarity During the Gaza War</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70075</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70075</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70075?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70076?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70076</guid>
         <title>Between Ideology and Strategy: The Iranian Revolution and the Reconfiguration of Middle Eastern Security</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 41-56, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
The Iranian revolution of 1979 is generally portrayed either as the catalyst of sectarian polarization in the Middle East or, more recently, as the foundation of a pragmatic grand strategy shaped by geopolitical insecurity and learning forged by decades of war. This article challenges this binary opposition between ideology and strategy. It contends that the rise of the Islamic Republic reshaped the wider region through the co‐constitution of revolutionary identity and security doctrine. The experience of the Iran‐Iraq War institutionalized a strategic culture in which ideological mobilization and asymmetric adaptation became mutually reinforcing, eventually crystallizing into the doctrine of forward defense. Drawing on regional security complex theory and analysis of Iran's application of the doctrine in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, the article demonstrates that sectarian narratives function not as autonomous drivers of conflict but as politically activated instruments within broader geopolitical rivalry. The revolution's enduring regional impact lies in the normalization of hybrid power projection and the transformation of deterrence and sovereignty practices across the region.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The Iranian revolution of 1979 is generally portrayed either as the catalyst of sectarian polarization in the Middle East or, more recently, as the foundation of a pragmatic grand strategy shaped by geopolitical insecurity and learning forged by decades of war. This article challenges this binary opposition between ideology and strategy. It contends that the rise of the Islamic Republic reshaped the wider region through the co-constitution of revolutionary identity and security doctrine. The experience of the Iran-Iraq War institutionalized a strategic culture in which ideological mobilization and asymmetric adaptation became mutually reinforcing, eventually crystallizing into the doctrine of forward defense. Drawing on regional security complex theory and analysis of Iran's application of the doctrine in Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, the article demonstrates that sectarian narratives function not as autonomous drivers of conflict but as politically activated instruments within broader geopolitical rivalry. The revolution's enduring regional impact lies in the normalization of hybrid power projection and the transformation of deterrence and sovereignty practices across the region.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Alabbas F. Alsudani
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Between Ideology and Strategy: The Iranian Revolution and the Reconfiguration of Middle Eastern Security</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70076</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70076</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70076?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70083?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70083</guid>
         <title>Crisis in the Strait of Hormuz: What Lies Ahead?</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 72-84, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has emerged as the central dilemma of the Iran War. The strategic waterway accounted for at least 20 percent of liquid petroleum flows before the American‐led conflict. This article contends that the crisis could transform not just the Gulf's maritime order but the wider global energy and trade system tied to it. The study first analyzes Iran's dominance in the strait and compares it with the governance of other regional chokepoints, including the Turkish straits, the Suez Canal, and the Bab al‐Mandeb linking the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. It then turns to the regional responses and examines the limitations of alternative routes, such as Iran's Jask port, the Kirkuk‐Ceyhan Oil Pipeline from Iraq to Turkey, the Saudi Aramco East‐West Pipeline to the Red Sea, and the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline from the United Arab Emirates to the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman. The article finds that the postwar order in the Gulf is unlikely to be binary—that is, either unrestricted navigation or full Iranian control. Instead, the post‐conflict environment may feature partial restrictions, negotiated passage, and episodic disruptions.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The closure of the Strait of Hormuz has emerged as the central dilemma of the Iran War. The strategic waterway accounted for at least 20 percent of liquid petroleum flows before the American-led conflict. This article contends that the crisis could transform not just the Gulf's maritime order but the wider global energy and trade system tied to it. The study first analyzes Iran's dominance in the strait and compares it with the governance of other regional chokepoints, including the Turkish straits, the Suez Canal, and the Bab al-Mandeb linking the Red Sea to the Indian Ocean. It then turns to the regional responses and examines the limitations of alternative routes, such as Iran's Jask port, the Kirkuk-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline from Iraq to Turkey, the Saudi Aramco East-West Pipeline to the Red Sea, and the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline from the United Arab Emirates to the port of Fujairah on the Gulf of Oman. The article finds that the postwar order in the Gulf is unlikely to be binary—that is, either unrestricted navigation or full Iranian control. Instead, the post-conflict environment may feature partial restrictions, negotiated passage, and episodic disruptions.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Gawdat Bahgat
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Crisis in the Strait of Hormuz: What Lies Ahead?</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70083</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70083</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70083?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70084?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70084</guid>
         <title>GCC‐Asia Pacific Energy Nexus: Navigating Shifts in Demand and Geopolitics</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 85-104, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
As the 2026 Iran War intensifies pressure on energy export routes, relations between states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Asia‐Pacific region are undergoing a structural shift with implications beyond bilateral trade. This article contends that the nexus among these countries increasingly combines hydrocarbon interdependence and downstream integration with selective but expanding cooperation on renewables, hydrogen and ammonia value chains, and finance dedicated to the energy transition. To illustrate these dynamics, the analysis employs a case‐based assessment using project‐level evidence such as named partners, finance, and implementation status; effects of constraints, including delays, costs, certification bottlenecks, and rerouting; and institutional deliverables like workstreams, mechanisms, and finance tools. The examination demonstrates three crucial findings. First, the relationship between the GCC and the Asia‐Pacific is increasingly dual‐track, with hydrocarbon interdependence persisting alongside energy‐transition activities. Second, the evolution is constrained by infrastructure, regulatory, financial, and geopolitical frictions. Third, these dynamics reflect a broader shift toward multipolar energy governance through emerging institutional coordination among China, the GCC states, and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;As the 2026 Iran War intensifies pressure on energy export routes, relations between states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the Asia-Pacific region are undergoing a structural shift with implications beyond bilateral trade. This article contends that the nexus among these countries increasingly combines hydrocarbon interdependence and downstream integration with selective but expanding cooperation on renewables, hydrogen and ammonia value chains, and finance dedicated to the energy transition. To illustrate these dynamics, the analysis employs a case-based assessment using project-level evidence such as named partners, finance, and implementation status; effects of constraints, including delays, costs, certification bottlenecks, and rerouting; and institutional deliverables like workstreams, mechanisms, and finance tools. The examination demonstrates three crucial findings. First, the relationship between the GCC and the Asia-Pacific is increasingly dual-track, with hydrocarbon interdependence persisting alongside energy-transition activities. Second, the evolution is constrained by infrastructure, regulatory, financial, and geopolitical frictions. Third, these dynamics reflect a broader shift toward multipolar energy governance through emerging institutional coordination among China, the GCC states, and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Umud Shokri
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>GCC‐Asia Pacific Energy Nexus: Navigating Shifts in Demand and Geopolitics</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70084</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70084</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70084?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.12804?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.12804</guid>
         <title>China's Hajj‐Related Infrastructure Diplomacy with Saudi Arabia</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 326-338, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 calls for promoting modernization and developing the industry centered around the hajj, the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca. China, with its robust capabilities in transportation and high‐tech infrastructure, sees assisting in these processes as a way to advance its Belt and Road Initiative and strengthen its relationship with Riyadh. The government in Beijing and its enterprises provide expertise in road transportation, high‐tech communications, and cutting‐edge energy technologies that can serve the hajj. This includes the construction of the Mecca Light Railway and the Haramain High Speed Railway, the provision of 5G telecommunications, and exports of buses, both traditional and electric. The article examines these projects and shows how China uses them as a form of diplomacy that increases mutual trust, which can enhance other areas of the political and economic relationship between the East Asian giant and the Gulf power.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Saudi Arabia's Vision 2030 calls for promoting modernization and developing the industry centered around the hajj, the annual Muslim pilgrimage to Mecca. China, with its robust capabilities in transportation and high-tech infrastructure, sees assisting in these processes as a way to advance its Belt and Road Initiative and strengthen its relationship with Riyadh. The government in Beijing and its enterprises provide expertise in road transportation, high-tech communications, and cutting-edge energy technologies that can serve the hajj. This includes the construction of the Mecca Light Railway and the Haramain High Speed Railway, the provision of 5G telecommunications, and exports of buses, both traditional and electric. The article examines these projects and shows how China uses them as a form of diplomacy that increases mutual trust, which can enhance other areas of the political and economic relationship between the East Asian giant and the Gulf power.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Song Niu, 
Danyu Wang
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>China's Hajj‐Related Infrastructure Diplomacy with Saudi Arabia</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.12804</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.12804</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.12804?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.12820?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.12820</guid>
         <title>Chinese‐Arab Scientific Cooperation and Effectiveness</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 339-357, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
This analysis of scientific cooperation between China and the Arab world uncovers the common concerns, research domains, achievements, and competitiveness of this output. The 22 Arab countries in this study have established extensive relations with China in fields like chemistry, engineering, agriculture, and medicine, as well as emerging areas like computer science, environmental science, green finance, sustainable development, and technological innovation. While the scope of scientific cooperation between China and the Arab world has expanded over time, there are disparities. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, for instance, have achieved high levels of cooperation, competitiveness, and achievement in collaborations between their scholars and those from China. Other countries, such as Qatar and Morocco, are less engaged with China in scientific fields, and they have enjoyed fewer cooperative achievements and lower levels of competitiveness. This suggests that Beijing may seek to implement policies to address such imbalances. The findings also provide insights into how this cooperation can increase and achieve greater success in science, technology, and innovation.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This analysis of scientific cooperation between China and the Arab world uncovers the common concerns, research domains, achievements, and competitiveness of this output. The 22 Arab countries in this study have established extensive relations with China in fields like chemistry, engineering, agriculture, and medicine, as well as emerging areas like computer science, environmental science, green finance, sustainable development, and technological innovation. While the scope of scientific cooperation between China and the Arab world has expanded over time, there are disparities. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates, for instance, have achieved high levels of cooperation, competitiveness, and achievement in collaborations between their scholars and those from China. Other countries, such as Qatar and Morocco, are less engaged with China in scientific fields, and they have enjoyed fewer cooperative achievements and lower levels of competitiveness. This suggests that Beijing may seek to implement policies to address such imbalances. The findings also provide insights into how this cooperation can increase and achieve greater success in science, technology, and innovation.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Minglian Long, 
Yijia Luo, 
Yi Zhang
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Chinese‐Arab Scientific Cooperation and Effectiveness</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.12820</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.12820</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.12820?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70007?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70007</guid>
         <title>Saudi Arabia's Deepening Engagement With Asia‐Pacific Nations</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 309-325, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Since coming to power in 2015, the leadership of King Salman bin Abdulaziz and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has increased Saudi Arabia's economic, energy, investment, and diplomatic engagement with the Asia‐Pacific region, and it has become a major player in the region. This article demonstrates the extent of this activity and explains the motivations behind it. The analysis identifies key drivers of Riyadh's ambitious policies, which include changes in petrodollar arrangements due to waning US interest in Saudi security and oil, economic diversification under Vision 2030, and diplomatic experience from the G20, as well as the receptiveness of Asia‐Pacific countries to Saudi overtures and shifts in the global power structure. Reforms within the kingdom have facilitated this engagement, which is not limited by the size, distance, or religious and political orientation of other countries. This engagement is parallel to Saudi Arabia's longstanding relationship with the United States, which is likely to strengthen during the second term of President Donald Trump. The findings of this article also provide insights into the Saudi diplomatic approach to regions outside the Asia‐Pacific.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Since coming to power in 2015, the leadership of King Salman bin Abdulaziz and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has increased Saudi Arabia's economic, energy, investment, and diplomatic engagement with the Asia-Pacific region, and it has become a major player in the region. This article demonstrates the extent of this activity and explains the motivations behind it. The analysis identifies key drivers of Riyadh's ambitious policies, which include changes in petrodollar arrangements due to waning US interest in Saudi security and oil, economic diversification under Vision 2030, and diplomatic experience from the G20, as well as the receptiveness of Asia-Pacific countries to Saudi overtures and shifts in the global power structure. Reforms within the kingdom have facilitated this engagement, which is not limited by the size, distance, or religious and political orientation of other countries. This engagement is parallel to Saudi Arabia's longstanding relationship with the United States, which is likely to strengthen during the second term of President Donald Trump. The findings of this article also provide insights into the Saudi diplomatic approach to regions outside the Asia-Pacific.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Ghulam Ali
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Saudi Arabia's Deepening Engagement With Asia‐Pacific Nations</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70007</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70007</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70007?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70074?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70074</guid>
         <title>Trump's Transactional Diplomacy: Breakthrough or Breakdown?</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 24-40, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
The US‐Israeli war on Iran appears to demonstrate the perils of a transactional diplomacy that dismisses the rules‐based, liberal international order in pursuit of American dominance. Much of the growing literature assumes transactional diplomacy will be a temporary, Trump‐driven departure from traditional, values‐based statecraft. By contrast, while we harbor reservations about transactionalism, we refuse to embrace such predetermined conclusions. Moreover, we do not believe transactionalism will fade after Trump, as a number of states are embracing it, especially in the Middle East. Despite this, to our knowledge, there has been no effort to assess transactionalism through case studies from the region. This article provides a comparative evaluation of transactional and traditional diplomacy through a cost‐benefit analysis of their objectives and methods. It then examines two examples of transactional diplomacy, the Gaza peace plan and US support for post‐Assad Syria. Our findings provide leverage to analyze Washington's 2026 war on Iran. The evidence indicates that the conflict should not be interpreted as a failure of transactional diplomacy, since the administration never genuinely engaged in reciprocal bargaining. Instead, it demonstrates that transactionalism is of limited use in crises defined by maximalist demands and rapid escalation.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The US-Israeli war on Iran appears to demonstrate the perils of a transactional diplomacy that dismisses the rules-based, liberal international order in pursuit of American dominance. Much of the growing literature assumes transactional diplomacy will be a temporary, Trump-driven departure from traditional, values-based statecraft. By contrast, while we harbor reservations about transactionalism, we refuse to embrace such predetermined conclusions. Moreover, we do not believe transactionalism will fade after Trump, as a number of states are embracing it, especially in the Middle East. Despite this, to our knowledge, there has been no effort to assess transactionalism through case studies from the region. This article provides a comparative evaluation of transactional and traditional diplomacy through a cost-benefit analysis of their objectives and methods. It then examines two examples of transactional diplomacy, the Gaza peace plan and US support for post-Assad Syria. Our findings provide leverage to analyze Washington's 2026 war on Iran. The evidence indicates that the conflict should not be interpreted as a failure of transactional diplomacy, since the administration never genuinely engaged in reciprocal bargaining. Instead, it demonstrates that transactionalism is of limited use in crises defined by maximalist demands and rapid escalation.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Guilain Denoeux, 
Robert Springborg
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Trump's Transactional Diplomacy: Breakthrough or Breakdown?</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70074</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70074</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70074?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70088?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 03:49:44 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-09T03:49:44-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70088</guid>
         <title>Issue Information</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, Volume 33, Issue 2, Page 1-4, Summer 2026. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator/>
         <category>ISSUE INFORMATION</category>
         <dc:title>Issue Information</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70088</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70088</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70088?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ISSUE INFORMATION</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>33</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>2</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70078?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 11:34:48 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-02T11:34:48-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70078</guid>
         <title>A Daring Enterprise: A US‐Egyptian Partnership and the Case for Soft Power By James A. Harmon, Cornelius Queen, and Mark Warren. The American University in Cairo Press, 2026. 240 pages. $35, hardcover.</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator>
Robert Springborg
</dc:creator>
         <category>BOOK REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>A Daring Enterprise: A US‐Egyptian Partnership and the Case for Soft Power By James A. Harmon, Cornelius Queen, and Mark Warren. The American University in Cairo Press, 2026. 240 pages. $35, hardcover.</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70078</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70078</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70078?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>BOOK REVIEW</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70080?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 02 Jun 2026 11:28:53 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-06-02T11:28:53-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70080</guid>
         <title>Trajectories of Extremism: Child and Youth Radicalization and Recruitment in the Shadow of ISIS By Haval Ahmad. Palgrave Macmillan, 2026. 181 pages. $109, ebook.</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator>
Usman Anwar, 
Muhammad Atif
</dc:creator>
         <category>BOOK REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>Trajectories of Extremism: Child and Youth Radicalization and Recruitment in the Shadow of ISIS By Haval Ahmad. Palgrave Macmillan, 2026. 181 pages. $109, ebook.</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70080</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70080</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70080?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>BOOK REVIEW</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70060?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Thu, 28 May 2026 02:28:54 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-28T02:28:54-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70060</guid>
         <title>The Persian Gulf: Historical Perspectives, Maritime Silk Road, and Hydropolitics By Nezameddin Faghih, S. Abolghasem Foroozani, and S. Sara Foroozani. Springer, 2025. 162 pages. $119, ebook.</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator>
Ahmed Bux Jamali
</dc:creator>
         <category>BOOK REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>The Persian Gulf: Historical Perspectives, Maritime Silk Road, and Hydropolitics By Nezameddin Faghih, S. Abolghasem Foroozani, and S. Sara Foroozani. Springer, 2025. 162 pages. $119, ebook.</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70060</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70060</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70060?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>BOOK REVIEW</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70079?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Thu, 21 May 2026 10:44:45 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-21T10:44:45-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70079</guid>
         <title>From Competition to Compartmentalization: Rethinking Türkiye‐Gulf Relations</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
For nearly a decade following the Arab uprisings, relations between Ankara and key Gulf capitals were marked by intense rivalry and proxy contestation across several regional arenas, notably in Egypt and Syria. Why did relations shift toward pragmatic cooperation after such prolonged polarization? This study revisits the concepts of the Turkish and Gulf models of regional order. It argues that Türkiye's behavior during the Arab uprisings was shaped primarily by geopolitical calculations and regime‐alignment logic rather than by a coherent project of democracy promotion. The tensions that emerged between Ankara and Gulf states therefore reflected competing visions of regional order. Between 2011 and 2021, these rival models generated polarization, after which relations shifted toward compartmentalization and pragmatic normalization. This article is part of a series guest edited by Hamdullah Baycar and Betul Dogan‐Akkas, based on the Gulf Studies Symposium organized by the Gulf International Forum, April 11–12, 2025, at Georgetown University in Washington.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;For nearly a decade following the Arab uprisings, relations between Ankara and key Gulf capitals were marked by intense rivalry and proxy contestation across several regional arenas, notably in Egypt and Syria. Why did relations shift toward pragmatic cooperation after such prolonged polarization? This study revisits the concepts of the Turkish and Gulf models of regional order. It argues that Türkiye's behavior during the Arab uprisings was shaped primarily by geopolitical calculations and regime-alignment logic rather than by a coherent project of democracy promotion. The tensions that emerged between Ankara and Gulf states therefore reflected competing visions of regional order. Between 2011 and 2021, these rival models generated polarization, after which relations shifted toward compartmentalization and pragmatic normalization. This article is part of a series guest edited by Hamdullah Baycar and Betul Dogan-Akkas, based on the Gulf Studies Symposium organized by the Gulf International Forum, April 11–12, 2025, at Georgetown University in Washington.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Betul Dogan‐Akkas
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>From Competition to Compartmentalization: Rethinking Türkiye‐Gulf Relations</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70079</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70079</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70079?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70077?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 01:42:43 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-15T01:42:43-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70077</guid>
         <title>The Torturous Turkey‐PKK Peace Process</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
This article analyzes the peace process between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has been playing out since fall 2024, and explains why it is unlikely to succeed. As of spring 2026, negotiations had reached an impasse over how the Turkish constitution should be amended to recognize Kurdish rights. Obstacles also included how to facilitate the reintegration into society of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and his militants; renewed violence between Turkey and the PKK's ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces, which had been embroiled in fighting with the militias of post‐Assad Damascus; and a deadlock in the Turkish parliamentary committee charged with implementing the peace process. Despite these setbacks, the analysis suggests, Ankara could still calculate that it would gain strength rather than weaken if it were to extend to the Kurds constitutional recognition and rights, as the resulting peace and unity could bolster its domestic and international position.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This article analyzes the peace process between Turkey and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), which has been playing out since fall 2024, and explains why it is unlikely to succeed. As of spring 2026, negotiations had reached an impasse over how the Turkish constitution should be amended to recognize Kurdish rights. Obstacles also included how to facilitate the reintegration into society of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan and his militants; renewed violence between Turkey and the PKK's ally, the Syrian Democratic Forces, which had been embroiled in fighting with the militias of post-Assad Damascus; and a deadlock in the Turkish parliamentary committee charged with implementing the peace process. Despite these setbacks, the analysis suggests, Ankara could still calculate that it would gain strength rather than weaken if it were to extend to the Kurds constitutional recognition and rights, as the resulting peace and unity could bolster its domestic and international position.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Michael M. Gunter
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>The Torturous Turkey‐PKK Peace Process</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70077</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70077</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70077?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70061?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 15 May 2026 01:40:05 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-15T01:40:05-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70061</guid>
         <title>Urban Displacement: Syria's Refugees in the Middle East Edited by Are John Knudsen and Sarah A. Tobin. Berghahn Books, 2024. 330 pages. Open access, ebook.</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator>
Zubair Hussain
</dc:creator>
         <category>BOOK REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>Urban Displacement: Syria's Refugees in the Middle East Edited by Are John Knudsen and Sarah A. Tobin. Berghahn Books, 2024. 330 pages. Open access, ebook.</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70061</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70061</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70061?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>BOOK REVIEW</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70055?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Thu, 07 May 2026 06:54:05 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-05-07T06:54:05-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70055</guid>
         <title>Israel and the Gaza Strip since 1967: A History of Occupation, Domination and Unilateralism By Trude Strand. I.B. Tauris, 2026. 272 pages. $26.95, paper.</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator>
Abdulgani Bozkurt
</dc:creator>
         <category>BOOK REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>Israel and the Gaza Strip since 1967: A History of Occupation, Domination and Unilateralism By Trude Strand. I.B. Tauris, 2026. 272 pages. $26.95, paper.</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70055</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70055</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70055?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>BOOK REVIEW</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70063?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 08 Apr 2026 00:06:08 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-08T12:06:08-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70063</guid>
         <title>Social Perceptions in Yemen: Fragmented Power and Everyday Survival</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Yemen's protracted civil war has fractured governance, undermined education, and deepened social vulnerability. This study examines how ordinary Yemenis perceive power, precarity, and education in this context of crisis. An Arabic‐language survey of 50 participants across Sanaa, Aden, Marib, and Hadramout combined structured items with open‐ended responses in a convergent mixed‐methods design. Findings show that the most decisive sources of power were perceived to be economic resources and political authority, while education and professional careers carried less weight. Displacement was widely linked to pressure on services, rising rents, and job scarcity. Education emerged as one of the most severely disrupted sectors, including unpaid salaries, institutional breakdown, and student disengagement. The survey results highlight two concrete policy entry points. First, stabilizing teacher livelihoods and restoring school functionality can help counter educational collapse. Second, strengthening regulatory frameworks for basic services and labor markets can reduce the vulnerabilities exacerbated by displacement. While donor support remains important in the short term, sustainable recovery entails equitable governance, allowing Yemen to mobilize its natural resources—oil, gas, agriculture, and fisheries—to rebuild institutions and reduce external dependency.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Yemen's protracted civil war has fractured governance, undermined education, and deepened social vulnerability. This study examines how ordinary Yemenis perceive power, precarity, and education in this context of crisis. An Arabic-language survey of 50 participants across Sanaa, Aden, Marib, and Hadramout combined structured items with open-ended responses in a convergent mixed-methods design. Findings show that the most decisive sources of power were perceived to be economic resources and political authority, while education and professional careers carried less weight. Displacement was widely linked to pressure on services, rising rents, and job scarcity. Education emerged as one of the most severely disrupted sectors, including unpaid salaries, institutional breakdown, and student disengagement. The survey results highlight two concrete policy entry points. First, stabilizing teacher livelihoods and restoring school functionality can help counter educational collapse. Second, strengthening regulatory frameworks for basic services and labor markets can reduce the vulnerabilities exacerbated by displacement. While donor support remains important in the short term, sustainable recovery entails equitable governance, allowing Yemen to mobilize its natural resources—oil, gas, agriculture, and fisheries—to rebuild institutions and reduce external dependency.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Anef Taher, 
Ahmed Alduais, 
Muhammed Al Khayyatt
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Social Perceptions in Yemen: Fragmented Power and Everyday Survival</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70063</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70063</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70063?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70035?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 18 Feb 2026 01:08:55 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-02-18T01:08:55-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70035</guid>
         <title>War in Syria and the Middle East: A Political and Economic History By Federico Manfredi Firmian. University of Texas Press, 2025. 288 pages. $65, hardcover.</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator>
Bahram P. Kalviri
</dc:creator>
         <category>BOOK REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>War in Syria and the Middle East: A Political and Economic History By Federico Manfredi Firmian. University of Texas Press, 2025. 288 pages. $65, hardcover.</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70035</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70035</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70035?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>BOOK REVIEW</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70032?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 18 Feb 2026 01:07:59 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-02-18T01:07:59-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14754967?af=R">Wiley: Middle East Policy: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/mepo.70032</guid>
         <title>Contested City: Citizen Advocacy and Survival in Modern Baghdad By Alissa Walter. Stanford University Press, 2025. 330 pages. $35, paper.</title>
         <description>Middle East Policy, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description/>
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         <dc:creator>
Yasir Kuoti
</dc:creator>
         <category>BOOK REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>Contested City: Citizen Advocacy and Survival in Modern Baghdad By Alissa Walter. Stanford University Press, 2025. 330 pages. $35, paper.</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/mepo.70032</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Middle East Policy</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/mepo.70032</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/mepo.70032?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>BOOK REVIEW</prism:section>
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