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      <title>Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</title>
      <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R</link>
      <description>Table of Contents for Political Psychology. List of articles from both the latest and EarlyView issues.</description>
      <language>en-US</language>
      <copyright>© International Society of Political Psychology</copyright>
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      <pubDate>Fri, 10 Apr 2026 07:18:00 +0000</pubDate>
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      <dc:title>Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</dc:title>
      <dc:publisher>Wiley</dc:publisher>
      <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
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         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70138?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Thu, 09 Apr 2026 03:52:15 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-04-09T03:52:15-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
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         <title>The misery of misbelief: People are more disturbed by others' false beliefs than by differences in beliefs</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, Volume 47, Issue 3, June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Belief homophily—the tendency to associate with others who hold similar beliefs and the distaste for different beliefs—is often seen as a major cause for belief‐based social segregation and polarization. We question, however, whether social scientists have been correct in identifying belief‐homophily as the primary force driving these pernicious social effects. We argue that when people face others who hold beliefs different from their own, they find these encounters disturbing, primarily when they are convinced that others' beliefs are false. In four pre‐registered online studies (N = 2027 U.S. adults) featuring self‐recalled experiences and vignette scenarios, we find that participants express stronger negative feelings when others hold false beliefs, compared to when others' beliefs are merely different from their own. We also document that higher confidence that others hold false beliefs evokes more negative emotions, triggers stronger avoidance behaviors, and reduces people's desire to form any kind of relationship with others. These findings highlight the possibility that many of the effects that have been previously attributed to belief homophily may be better explained by the desire to avoid others holding false beliefs.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Belief homophily—the tendency to associate with others who hold similar beliefs and the distaste for different beliefs—is often seen as a major cause for belief-based social segregation and polarization. We question, however, whether social scientists have been correct in identifying belief-homophily as the primary force driving these pernicious social effects. We argue that when people face others who hold beliefs different from their own, they find these encounters disturbing, primarily when they are convinced that others' beliefs are &lt;i&gt;false&lt;/i&gt;. In four pre-registered online studies (&lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 2027 U.S. adults) featuring self-recalled experiences and vignette scenarios, we find that participants express stronger negative feelings when others hold false beliefs, compared to when others' beliefs are merely different from their own. We also document that higher confidence that others hold false beliefs evokes more negative emotions, triggers stronger avoidance behaviors, and reduces people's desire to form any kind of relationship with others. These findings highlight the possibility that many of the effects that have been previously attributed to belief homophily may be better explained by the desire to avoid others holding false beliefs.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Andras Molnar, 
George Loewenstein
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>The misery of misbelief: People are more disturbed by others' false beliefs than by differences in beliefs</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70138</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70138</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70138?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>47</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70135?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 31 Mar 2026 22:00:19 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-31T10:00:19-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
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         <title>Intergroup contact with people experiencing poverty reduces hostile but not benevolent classism</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, Volume 47, Issue 3, June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Intergroup contact can reduce bias against disadvantaged groups, yet it may differentially shape ambivalent attitudes. This project examines how contact with people experiencing poverty relates to ambivalent classism and its policy consequences. We hypothesized that positive and frequent contact would have mixed effects, reducing the hostile dimension of classism while reinforcing benevolent forms (protective paternalism and complementary class differentiation). We conducted a multi‐country correlational study (N = 4209) examining associations between intergroup contact and hostile and benevolent dimensions of ambivalent classism, incorporating support for social policies in separate models for women and men experiencing poverty. We then carried out two experimental studies. In Study 2 (N = 784), we used a recall paradigm to manipulate contact quality. In Study 3 (N = 931), a conceptual replication, we employed a fictitious society paradigm to manipulate both contact quality and quantity with women and men experiencing poverty. Across studies, positive contact consistently reduced hostile classism but increased complementary class differentiation. Effects on protective paternalism and support for dependency‐oriented policies were less consistent. Overall, the findings suggest that while contact may attenuate overt hostility, it can simultaneously reinforce benevolent representations of poverty, with implications for support of restrictive policy measures.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Intergroup contact can reduce bias against disadvantaged groups, yet it may differentially shape ambivalent attitudes. This project examines how contact with people experiencing poverty relates to ambivalent classism and its policy consequences. We hypothesized that positive and frequent contact would have mixed effects, reducing the hostile dimension of classism while reinforcing benevolent forms (protective paternalism and complementary class differentiation). We conducted a multi-country correlational study (&lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 4209) examining associations between intergroup contact and hostile and benevolent dimensions of ambivalent classism, incorporating support for social policies in separate models for women and men experiencing poverty. We then carried out two experimental studies. In Study 2 (&lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 784), we used a recall paradigm to manipulate contact quality. In Study 3 (&lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 931), a conceptual replication, we employed a fictitious society paradigm to manipulate both contact quality and quantity with women and men experiencing poverty. Across studies, positive contact consistently reduced hostile classism but increased complementary class differentiation. Effects on protective paternalism and support for dependency-oriented policies were less consistent. Overall, the findings suggest that while contact may attenuate overt hostility, it can simultaneously reinforce benevolent representations of poverty, with implications for support of restrictive policy measures.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Mario Sainz, 
Gloria Jiménez‐Moya, 
Roberto M. Lobato, 
Andreas Laffert, 
Alexandra Vázquez, 
Roberto González
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Intergroup contact with people experiencing poverty reduces hostile but not benevolent classism</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70135</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70135</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70135?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>47</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70136?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2026 00:00:00 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-30T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
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         <title>Issue Information</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, Volume 47, Issue 3, June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator/>
         <category>ISSUE INFORMATION</category>
         <dc:title>Issue Information</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70136</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70136</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70136?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ISSUE INFORMATION</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>47</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70127?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 30 Mar 2026 00:00:00 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2026-03-30T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDate>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate>Mon, 01 Jun 2026 00:00:00 -0700</prism:coverDisplayDate>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70127</guid>
         <title>Susceptibility to misinformation and propaganda during wartime: Evidence from the Israel‐Gaza war</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, Volume 47, Issue 3, June 2026. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Advances in digital technologies have facilitated the creation and dissemination of misinformation, creating a complex information ecosystem where distinguishing between real and fake content has become increasingly challenging. Wars, in particular, present a unique case in which misinformation is often weaponized to shape public perception, both domestically and internationally. While individual differences in susceptibility to misinformation are well documented, research in this context remains sparse. Our study addressed this gap by examining individual differences in susceptibility to misinformation and propaganda during the Israel‐Gaza war. Using a sample of 792 Israeli participants, we assessed participants' ability to distinguish between real and fake news headlines, covering both war‐specific and war‐neutral content. We tested a range of predictors, including cognitive, moral, socio‐political, and conflict‐specific variables. The results showed that enemy dehumanization, conspiracy mentality, willingness to act violently for political ideology, social media activity, and skepticism are associated with lower discrimination ability. In addition, discrimination ability was lower for war‐specific news and among participants with right‐wing political ideology. Taken together, the study offered insights into the mechanisms underlying susceptibility to misinformation during wars.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Advances in digital technologies have facilitated the creation and dissemination of misinformation, creating a complex information ecosystem where distinguishing between real and fake content has become increasingly challenging. Wars, in particular, present a unique case in which misinformation is often weaponized to shape public perception, both domestically and internationally. While individual differences in susceptibility to misinformation are well documented, research in this context remains sparse. Our study addressed this gap by examining individual differences in susceptibility to misinformation and propaganda during the Israel-Gaza war. Using a sample of 792 Israeli participants, we assessed participants' ability to distinguish between real and fake news headlines, covering both war-specific and war-neutral content. We tested a range of predictors, including cognitive, moral, socio-political, and conflict-specific variables. The results showed that enemy dehumanization, conspiracy mentality, willingness to act violently for political ideology, social media activity, and skepticism are associated with lower discrimination ability. In addition, discrimination ability was lower for war-specific news and among participants with right-wing political ideology. Taken together, the study offered insights into the mechanisms underlying susceptibility to misinformation during wars.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Nur Givon‐Benjio, 
Yaniv Reingewertz, 
Michael L. Gross
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Susceptibility to misinformation and propaganda during wartime: Evidence from the Israel‐Gaza war</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70127</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70127</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70127?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
         <prism:volume>47</prism:volume>
         <prism:number>3</prism:number>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70107?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 30 Dec 2025 02:19:57 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-12-30T02:19:57-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70107</guid>
         <title>Changes in support for free speech and hate speech restrictions: Cohort, aging, and period effects among ethnic minority and majority group members</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
How do attitudes toward free speech and hate speech restrictions change across the adult lifespan? The current research utilizes data from five annual waves of longitudinal data from 2019 to 2024 (N &gt; 50,000) to examine the extent to which cohort, period, and age effects contribute to changes in attitudes toward free speech and hate speech among ethnic majority and minority group members during a period of changing societal norms about freedom of expression. Through a series of cohort‐sequential latent growth models, we assess whether changes in tolerance follow a common aging pattern across the lifespan and/or depend on contextual characteristics (cohort and period effects). Results revealed that general support for free speech decreased across all birth cohorts of both ethnic majority and ethnic minority groups from 2019 to 2024. This downward shift in support for free speech during this period suggests that larger sociopolitical changes during the assessment period shaped public sentiments toward free speech. By contrast, there was little change in support for restricting hate speech during the assessment period, especially among ethnic minority group members, with data revealing largely normative aging processes involved in changes for support of hate speech restrictions.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;How do attitudes toward free speech and hate speech restrictions change across the adult lifespan? The current research utilizes data from five annual waves of longitudinal data from 2019 to 2024 (&lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; &amp;gt; 50,000) to examine the extent to which cohort, period, and age effects contribute to changes in attitudes toward free speech and hate speech among ethnic majority and minority group members during a period of changing societal norms about freedom of expression. Through a series of cohort-sequential latent growth models, we assess whether changes in tolerance follow a common aging pattern across the lifespan and/or depend on contextual characteristics (cohort and period effects). Results revealed that general support for free speech decreased across all birth cohorts of both ethnic majority and ethnic minority groups from 2019 to 2024. This downward shift in support for free speech during this period suggests that larger sociopolitical changes during the assessment period shaped public sentiments toward free speech. By contrast, there was little change in support for restricting hate speech during the assessment period, especially among ethnic minority group members, with data revealing largely normative aging processes involved in changes for support of hate speech restrictions.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Maykel Verkuyten, 
Kumar Yogeeswaran, 
Elena Zubielevitch, 
Kieren J. Lilly, 
Chris G. Sibley
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Changes in support for free speech and hate speech restrictions: Cohort, aging, and period effects among ethnic minority and majority group members</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70107</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70107</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70107?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70106?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 30 Dec 2025 01:09:25 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-12-30T01:09:25-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70106</guid>
         <title>Conspiracy theories as instruments of power: The case of conspiracy beliefs in the wake of the 2023 earthquakes in Türkiye</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
The prevalent view associates political disempowerment with increased conspiracy beliefs. However, the function of conspiracy theories for those in power to sustain their dominance is less understood, particularly in ecologically valid and non‐WEIRD (Western, Educated, Industrialized, Rich, Democratic) settings. Our research examined the emergence of conspiracy theories following the 2023 earthquakes in Türkiye and their relation to voting behavior in the subsequent general election, which occurred three months later. In Study 1, we analyzed the activities of 26,992 users on X (Twitter), identifying a preference among supporters of Erdogan, the incumbent president, for earthquake‐related conspiracy theories. In Study 2, face‐to‐face interviews with a nationally representative sample of 3568 individuals showed a correlation between the endorsement of these theories and increased support for Erdogan and his coalition, independent of other variables. These findings highlighted the significant role conspiracy theories that can play in bolstering authority and shaping electoral outcomes.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The prevalent view associates political disempowerment with increased conspiracy beliefs. However, the function of conspiracy theories for those in power to sustain their dominance is less understood, particularly in ecologically valid and non-WEIRD (&lt;span style="text-decoration:underline"&gt;W&lt;/span&gt;estern, &lt;span style="text-decoration:underline"&gt;E&lt;/span&gt;ducated, &lt;span style="text-decoration:underline"&gt;I&lt;/span&gt;ndustrialized, &lt;span style="text-decoration:underline"&gt;R&lt;/span&gt;ich, &lt;span style="text-decoration:underline"&gt;D&lt;/span&gt;emocratic) settings. Our research examined the emergence of conspiracy theories following the 2023 earthquakes in Türkiye and their relation to voting behavior in the subsequent general election, which occurred three months later. In Study 1, we analyzed the activities of 26,992 users on X (Twitter), identifying a preference among supporters of Erdogan, the incumbent president, for earthquake-related conspiracy theories. In Study 2, face-to-face interviews with a nationally representative sample of 3568 individuals showed a correlation between the endorsement of these theories and increased support for Erdogan and his coalition, independent of other variables. These findings highlighted the significant role conspiracy theories that can play in bolstering authority and shaping electoral outcomes.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Sinan Alper, 
Onur Varol, 
Onurcan Yilmaz
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Conspiracy theories as instruments of power: The case of conspiracy beliefs in the wake of the 2023 earthquakes in Türkiye</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70106</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70106</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70106?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70105?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 26 Dec 2025 22:14:13 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-12-26T10:14:13-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70105</guid>
         <title>Beliefs about collective victimization in contexts of ongoing and historical oppression: A Q methodology study among Kurds from Turkey and Northern Kurdistan in Germany</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
The scarce political and social psychological research on the Kurdish–Turkish context primarily addresses intergroup relations and general perceptions of the conflict. Conversely, Kurds' experiences of and beliefs about collective victimization in this context have not been examined much to date. The present study examines how diaspora Kurds (from Turkey and Northern Kurdistan) who came to Germany as refugees or immigrants make sense of their group's experiences of collective victimization. Using Q methodology, an underutilized method that captures holistic, shared viewpoints on a given issue, we aimed to uncover the distinct viewpoints on Kurdish collective victimization in this community and contribute to the literature on collective victimization beliefs. Through purposive sampling, we recruited a diverse sample (N = 50). We identified three distinct viewpoints concerning the ingroup's victimization: (1) a focus on the importance of ingroup cohesion rather than centering intergroup relations; (2) promoting positive intergroup relations through solidarity with other oppressed groups and structural attributions for the ingroup's victimization; and (3) upholding the victimized ingroup's honor by demanding justice and apology and supporting self‐defense. Our findings indicate that Kurds' understanding of their collective victimization goes beyond commonly studied collective victimization beliefs and that intergroup attitudes were less central than often assumed.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The scarce political and social psychological research on the Kurdish–Turkish context primarily addresses intergroup relations and general perceptions of the conflict. Conversely, Kurds' experiences of and beliefs about collective victimization in this context have not been examined much to date. The present study examines how diaspora Kurds (from Turkey and Northern Kurdistan) who came to Germany as refugees or immigrants make sense of their group's experiences of collective victimization. Using Q methodology, an underutilized method that captures holistic, shared viewpoints on a given issue, we aimed to uncover the distinct viewpoints on Kurdish collective victimization in this community and contribute to the literature on collective victimization beliefs. Through purposive sampling, we recruited a diverse sample (&lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 50). We identified three distinct viewpoints concerning the ingroup's victimization: (1) a focus on the importance of ingroup cohesion rather than centering intergroup relations; (2) promoting positive intergroup relations through solidarity with other oppressed groups and structural attributions for the ingroup's victimization; and (3) upholding the victimized ingroup's honor by demanding justice and apology and supporting self-defense. Our findings indicate that Kurds' understanding of their collective victimization goes beyond commonly studied collective victimization beliefs and that intergroup attitudes were less central than often assumed.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Helin Ünal, 
Johanna Ray Vollhardt
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Beliefs about collective victimization in contexts of ongoing and historical oppression: A Q methodology study among Kurds from Turkey and Northern Kurdistan in Germany</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70105</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70105</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70105?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70101?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 26 Dec 2025 00:00:00 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-12-26T12:00:00-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70101</guid>
         <title>The effects of perspective‐taking on multiple dimensions of discrimination: Can one size fit all?</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Perspective‐taking reduces discrimination, but research has taken a one‐size‐fits‐all approach, focusing on single attributes triggering discrimination, particularly ethnic origin, and has paid insufficient attention to heterogeneous treatment effects. Our study asks: How effective is perspective‐taking across different traits triggering discrimination, including gender, age, and profession, and how effective is it among individuals with strongly principled attitudes? We develop a conjoint experiment for a sample in Germany to measure discrimination through participants assessing the allocation of administrative help to non‐national EU citizens seeking social benefits. We apply a perspective‐taking treatment, randomly allocating participants to envision relocating abroad and needing to deal with local bureaucracies. Our results confirm that perspective‐taking is less effective for principled individuals, such as respondents with strong anti‐immigrant attitudes. Additionally, while the treatment reduced discrimination based on nationality, it inadvertently increased bias for attributes such as gender and profession. Further analysis suggests that these side effects are tied to the associations participants have when undertaking the task. Researchers should consider the associations respondents report after engaging with treatments as a source of heterogeneous treatment effects.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Perspective-taking reduces discrimination, but research has taken a one-size-fits-all approach, focusing on single attributes triggering discrimination, particularly ethnic origin, and has paid insufficient attention to heterogeneous treatment effects. Our study asks: How effective is perspective-taking across different traits triggering discrimination, including gender, age, and profession, and how effective is it among individuals with strongly principled attitudes? We develop a conjoint experiment for a sample in Germany to measure discrimination through participants assessing the allocation of administrative help to non-national EU citizens seeking social benefits. We apply a perspective-taking treatment, randomly allocating participants to envision relocating abroad and needing to deal with local bureaucracies. Our results confirm that perspective-taking is less effective for principled individuals, such as respondents with strong anti-immigrant attitudes. Additionally, while the treatment reduced discrimination based on nationality, it inadvertently increased bias for attributes such as gender and profession. Further analysis suggests that these side effects are tied to the associations participants have when undertaking the task. Researchers should consider the associations respondents report after engaging with treatments as a source of heterogeneous treatment effects.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Carolin Rapp, 
Anita Manatschal, 
Oliver James, 
Xavier Fernandez‐i‐Marìn, 
Christian Adam
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>The effects of perspective‐taking on multiple dimensions of discrimination: Can one size fit all?</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70101</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70101</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70101?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70102?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 23 Dec 2025 00:56:57 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-12-23T12:56:57-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70102</guid>
         <title>Emotional representation: Identifying the characteristics and consequences of elected officials mirroring the emotions of their constituents</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
This study examines which elected officials are most likely to mirror their constituents' emotions in public outreach—a concept we term emotional representation. We also analyze the significance of emotional representation for the targeted group. To accomplish these goals, we examine the degree to which members of Congress mirrored Black people's documented increase in expressions of anger following the murder of George Floyd in the summer of 2020. Using a regression discontinuity design and the sentiment analysis of 305,358 tweets, 190,192 Facebook Posts, and 35,409 press releases, we show that descriptive representatives provide the highest levels of emotional representation. To examine the impact of emotional representation, we deployed a two‐stage experiment to 390 Black respondents. We find that Black people who increased in anger after being primed with images of police violence view elected officials who engage in emotional representation as more favorable, empathetic, and trustworthy.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This study examines which elected officials are most likely to mirror their constituents' emotions in public outreach—a concept we term &lt;i&gt;emotional&lt;/i&gt; representation. We also analyze the significance of emotional representation for the targeted group. To accomplish these goals, we examine the degree to which members of Congress mirrored Black people's documented increase in expressions of anger following the murder of George Floyd in the summer of 2020. Using a regression discontinuity design and the sentiment analysis of 305,358 tweets, 190,192 Facebook Posts, and 35,409 press releases, we show that descriptive representatives provide the highest levels of emotional representation. To examine the impact of emotional representation, we deployed a two-stage experiment to 390 Black respondents. We find that Black people who increased in anger after being primed with images of police violence view elected officials who engage in emotional representation as more favorable, empathetic, and trustworthy.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Christopher Stout, 
Davin Phoenix, 
Gregory Leslie, 
Elizabeth Schroeder
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Emotional representation: Identifying the characteristics and consequences of elected officials mirroring the emotions of their constituents</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70102</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70102</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70102?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70099?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Thu, 18 Dec 2025 21:42:59 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-12-18T09:42:59-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70099</guid>
         <title>From cognitive coherence to political polarization: A data‐driven agent‐based model of belief change</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Political polarization represents a rising issue in many countries, making it more and more important to understand its relation to cognitive‐motivational and social influence mechanisms. Yet, the link between micro‐level mechanisms and macro‐level phenomena remains unclear. We investigated the consequences of individuals striving for cognitive coherence in their belief systems on political polarization in society in an agent‐based model. In this, we formalized how cognitive coherence affects how individuals update their beliefs following social influence and self‐reflection processes. We derive agents' political beliefs as well as their subjective belief systems, defining what determines coherence for different individuals, from European Social Survey data via correlational class analysis. The simulation shows that agents polarize in their beliefs when they have a strong strive for cognitive coherence, and especially when they have structurally different belief systems. In a mathematical analysis, we not only explain the main findings but also underscore the necessity of simulations for understanding the complex dynamics of socially embedded phenomena such as political polarization.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Political polarization represents a rising issue in many countries, making it more and more important to understand its relation to cognitive-motivational and social influence mechanisms. Yet, the link between micro-level mechanisms and macro-level phenomena remains unclear. We investigated the consequences of individuals striving for cognitive coherence in their belief systems on political polarization in society in an agent-based model. In this, we formalized how cognitive coherence affects how individuals update their beliefs following social influence and self-reflection processes. We derive agents' political beliefs as well as their subjective belief systems, defining what determines coherence for different individuals, from European Social Survey data via correlational class analysis. The simulation shows that agents polarize in their beliefs when they have a strong strive for cognitive coherence, and especially when they have structurally different belief systems. In a mathematical analysis, we not only explain the main findings but also underscore the necessity of simulations for understanding the complex dynamics of socially embedded phenomena such as political polarization.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Marlene C. L. Batzke, 
Peter Steiglechner, 
Jan Lorenz, 
Bruce Edmonds, 
František Kalvas
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>From cognitive coherence to political polarization: A data‐driven agent‐based model of belief change</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70099</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70099</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70099?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70100?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 17 Dec 2025 05:16:10 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-12-17T05:16:10-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70100</guid>
         <title>How leading climate movement advocates perceive collective gridlock in social change advocacy</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Despite mass mobilization efforts, most countries are failing to meet their internationally agreed 2030 goals to mitigate climate change, representing a failure of the climate movement to achieve their key aspirations. Most research on failure and collective action examines one‐off failures but does not address lasting failure. We conceptualize this ongoing failure as collective gridlock: times in social change advocacy where insufficient progress is caused by antagonistic intergroup stalemates, preventing groups from achieving shared goals and addressing joint problems. We used semi‐structured interviews with climate movement leaders (N = 28) to explore collective gridlock and the processes that may be associated with it. Most advocates believed they were in gridlock as they perceived insufficient progress toward their movement's goals. Evidence for the proposed processes of attrition, group norms of purity and intransigence, moral conviction, hostility toward the outgroup, radicalization, and perceived counter‐mobilization emerged in the interviews. Contrary to expectations, climate movement leaders also reported a need to build coalitions and compromise, and they also discussed negative well‐being as an outcome of collective gridlock. The current study contributes to our understanding of persistent failure in the climate movement and its implications for social change advocacy.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Despite mass mobilization efforts, most countries are failing to meet their internationally agreed 2030 goals to mitigate climate change, representing a failure of the climate movement to achieve their key aspirations. Most research on failure and collective action examines one-off failures but does not address lasting failure. We conceptualize this ongoing failure as collective gridlock: times in social change advocacy where insufficient progress is caused by antagonistic intergroup stalemates, preventing groups from achieving shared goals and addressing joint problems. We used semi-structured interviews with climate movement leaders (&lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 28) to explore collective gridlock and the processes that may be associated with it. Most advocates believed they were in gridlock as they perceived insufficient progress toward their movement's goals. Evidence for the proposed processes of attrition, group norms of purity and intransigence, moral conviction, hostility toward the outgroup, radicalization, and perceived counter-mobilization emerged in the interviews. Contrary to expectations, climate movement leaders also reported a need to build coalitions and compromise, and they also discussed negative well-being as an outcome of collective gridlock. The current study contributes to our understanding of persistent failure in the climate movement and its implications for social change advocacy.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Janquel D. Acevedo, 
Ava Disney, 
Kelly S. Fielding, 
Catherine E. Amiot, 
Matthew J. Hornsey, 
Fathali M. Moghaddam, 
Emma F. Thomas, 
Stewart Sutherland, 
Susilo Wibisono, 
Winnifred R. Louis
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>How leading climate movement advocates perceive collective gridlock in social change advocacy</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70100</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70100</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70100?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70097?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 05 Dec 2025 23:00:42 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-12-05T11:00:42-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70097</guid>
         <title>The dangers, directness, and purposes of online collective actions</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Most research on online collective action investigates low‐effort, social media‐based actions rather than tactics with highly disruptive potential. To better account for the variety of forms of collective actions that use digital technologies, we conducted an open‐source intelligence search (Study 1a) and an expert consultation survey (Study 1b; N = 21), to create a database containing 31 types of actions. In Study 2, we interviewed activists (N = 20) and found six key dimensions underlying those actions. In Study 3, participants (N = 273) rated the actions across the dimensions. Based upon the (dis)similarities of each action's rating across the dimensions, we identified two main types and five subtypes of online collective actions: Ingroup‐assisting actions (collaborative resource generation, ingroup mobilization, and digital picketing) and outgroup‐attacking actions (disruptive clicktivism and technology‐enabled attacks). The results showed that digital collective actions substantively differ from each other based on the six underlying dimensions, from the social psychological function, to the skill required, to the groups being targeted. This work offers a multi‐dimensional explanation for the variations across the domain of online activism and offers a way forward for future collective action work to explore psychological motivations underlying choices across action type.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Most research on online collective action investigates low-effort, social media-based actions rather than tactics with highly disruptive potential. To better account for the variety of forms of collective actions that use digital technologies, we conducted an open-source intelligence search (Study 1a) and an expert consultation survey (Study 1b; &lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 21), to create a database containing 31 types of actions. In Study 2, we interviewed activists (&lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 20) and found six key dimensions underlying those actions. In Study 3, participants (&lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 273) rated the actions across the dimensions. Based upon the (dis)similarities of each action's rating across the dimensions, we identified two main types and five subtypes of online collective actions: Ingroup-assisting actions (collaborative resource generation, ingroup mobilization, and digital picketing) and outgroup-attacking actions (disruptive clicktivism and technology-enabled attacks). The results showed that digital collective actions substantively differ from each other based on the six underlying dimensions, from the social psychological function, to the skill required, to the groups being targeted. This work offers a multi-dimensional explanation for the variations across the domain of online activism and offers a way forward for future collective action work to explore psychological motivations underlying choices across action type.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Catherine G. Lowery, 
Matthew Edwards, 
Laura G. E. Smith
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>The dangers, directness, and purposes of online collective actions</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70097</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70097</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70097?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70090?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 03 Dec 2025 23:25:06 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-12-03T11:25:06-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70090</guid>
         <title>“I had to open my eyes”—A narrative approach to studying the process of adult belief change</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Why do people, socialized and sedimented in their political beliefs, change their convictions in adulthood? Belief change has a long history of research in the social sciences. Yet, in quantitative research, belief change is studied largely through cognitive and behavioral lenses, that, however valuable, struggle to capture how people themselves experience and narrate transformation and how this is made meaningful and sustained as a social process. Additionally, qualitative studies on belief change remain marginal in the field and are often confined to case‐specific analyses of radical conversions. In response to this gap, this paper develops a qualitative and narrative approach to studying belief change. First, we argue that belief change is biographically situated, culturally mediated and socially embedded. Then, we draw on two contrasting case studies—on turning towards conspiracy theories and gaining anti‐racist awareness through film—to find “master narratives” of belief change. We offer a framework that distinguishes three recurring narrative steps, rooted in cultural repertoires: retrospective constructions of past selves, narrations of transformation, and interpretations of present selves in relation to these transformations. This theoretical and methodological framework aims to contribute to the further understanding of belief change as not only an attitudinal shift but also a reworking of one's life story.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Why do people, socialized and sedimented in their political beliefs, change their convictions in adulthood? Belief change has a long history of research in the social sciences. Yet, in quantitative research, belief change is studied largely through cognitive and behavioral lenses, that, however valuable, struggle to capture how people themselves &lt;i&gt;experience&lt;/i&gt; and &lt;i&gt;narrate&lt;/i&gt; transformation and how this is made meaningful and sustained as a &lt;i&gt;social process&lt;/i&gt;. Additionally, qualitative studies on belief change remain marginal in the field and are often confined to case-specific analyses of radical conversions. In response to this gap, this paper develops a qualitative and narrative approach to studying belief change. First, we argue that belief change is biographically situated, culturally mediated and socially embedded. Then, we draw on two contrasting case studies—on turning towards conspiracy theories and gaining anti-racist awareness through film—to find “master narratives” of belief change. We offer a framework that distinguishes three recurring narrative steps, rooted in cultural repertoires: retrospective constructions of past selves, narrations of transformation, and interpretations of present selves in relation to these transformations. This theoretical and methodological framework aims to contribute to the further understanding of belief change as not only an attitudinal shift but also a reworking of one's life story.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Marcel van den Haak, 
Kamile Grusauskaite
</dc:creator>
         <category>SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>“I had to open my eyes”—A narrative approach to studying the process of adult belief change</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70090</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70090</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70090?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70098?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 03 Dec 2025 00:00:00 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-12-03T12:00:00-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70098</guid>
         <title>Adult belief change: New theoretical and empirical perspectives. Special issue introduction</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Belief change in later life is understudied as it goes against the well‐established idea that political attitudes are formed early on in life and remain mostly stable thereafter. Recently, some studies have emerged that address adult belief change. However, these studies are mostly descriptive and offer relatively little insight into how, for whom, and under which conditions adult belief change takes place. This special issue on adult belief change addresses new theoretical and methodological perspectives and sets the agenda for future research on this highly relevant theme. Together, the special issue contributions provide robust evidence for changing beliefs well into adulthood. This implies that attitudes are not as fixed or settled as previously thought. A better understanding of the processes of adult belief change is vital to understand the social and psychological aspects of national and international political developments, especially in the current context of ongoing political change. The works presented in this special issue form an important starting point for further advancing research in this direction.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Belief change in later life is understudied as it goes against the well-established idea that political attitudes are formed early on in life and remain mostly stable thereafter. Recently, some studies have emerged that address adult belief change. However, these studies are mostly descriptive and offer relatively little insight into how, for whom, and under which conditions adult belief change takes place. This special issue on adult belief change addresses new theoretical and methodological perspectives and sets the agenda for future research on this highly relevant theme. Together, the special issue contributions provide robust evidence for changing beliefs well into adulthood. This implies that attitudes are not as fixed or settled as previously thought. A better understanding of the processes of adult belief change is vital to understand the social and psychological aspects of national and international political developments, especially in the current context of ongoing political change. The works presented in this special issue form an important starting point for further advancing research in this direction.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>Katerina Manevska,  Kaat Smets</dc:creator>
         <category>EDITORIAL</category>
         <dc:title>Adult belief change: New theoretical and empirical perspectives. Special issue introduction</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70098</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70098</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70098?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>EDITORIAL</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70095?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Sun, 30 Nov 2025 00:00:00 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-11-30T12:00:00-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70095</guid>
         <title>A certainty‐weighted, belief‐based model of political attitudes: A Bayesian analysis of American public attitudes toward the Affordable Care Act</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
This study proposes a novel, certainty‐weighted account of the process by which political beliefs shape political attitudes. Building upon expectancy‐value frameworks, this paper introduces belief certainty as a moderator of belief impact. A Bayesian partial‐pooling approach is used to test a model positing how beliefs about what the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act does and does not do relate to overall attitudes toward the law. This analytic method manages the complexity of multiple potentially correlated beliefs and evaluations by imposing a structural constraint to avoid multicollinearity and enable accurate estimation of parameters. Data from a nationally representative sample survey of American adults support the model's core propositions. Counterfactual simulations further reveal that belief certainty substantially amplifies the weight of both accurate and inaccurate beliefs, thereby intensifying attitudes and amplifying polarization. These findings highlight the role of belief certainty in shaping political judgments and offer a methodological pathway for researchers to model the interplay of multiple correlated political beliefs in an era of abundant—sometimes erroneous—information.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This study proposes a novel, certainty-weighted account of the process by which political beliefs shape political attitudes. Building upon expectancy-value frameworks, this paper introduces belief certainty as a moderator of belief impact. A Bayesian partial-pooling approach is used to test a model positing how beliefs about what the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act does and does not do relate to overall attitudes toward the law. This analytic method manages the complexity of multiple potentially correlated beliefs and evaluations by imposing a structural constraint to avoid multicollinearity and enable accurate estimation of parameters. Data from a nationally representative sample survey of American adults support the model's core propositions. Counterfactual simulations further reveal that belief certainty substantially amplifies the weight of both accurate and inaccurate beliefs, thereby intensifying attitudes and amplifying polarization. These findings highlight the role of belief certainty in shaping political judgments and offer a methodological pathway for researchers to model the interplay of multiple correlated political beliefs in an era of abundant—sometimes erroneous—information.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Gabriel Miao Li, 
Josh Pasek, 
Jon A. Krosnick
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>A certainty‐weighted, belief‐based model of political attitudes: A Bayesian analysis of American public attitudes toward the Affordable Care Act</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70095</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70095</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70095?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70092?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 26 Nov 2025 23:15:58 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-11-26T11:15:58-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70092</guid>
         <title>Religious‐based homonegativity as a function of the endorsement of traditional gender norms</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Religious individuals tend to express negative attitudes toward members of the LGB population. The explanations for this relationship have mostly pointed to endorsement of conservative and authoritarian ideological systems. However, the theoretical perspective of sexuality‐as‐gendered proposes that beliefs about gender norms and gender role expectations play a primary role in explaining the relationship, given religious motivations for social control of men and women and views that LGB individuals violate traditional gender expectations. Using two data sets representing 80,000 individuals across more than 60 countries, we test mediation models to determine the relative role of these different ideological systems. While conservative and authoritarian belief systems consistently play an important mediating role between religiosity and homonegativity, on average neither is as strong cross‐nationally, or across religious groups, as beliefs about gender. The results show further support for the importance of beliefs about gender as a central ideological system in social and political worldviews.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Religious individuals tend to express negative attitudes toward members of the LGB population. The explanations for this relationship have mostly pointed to endorsement of conservative and authoritarian ideological systems. However, the theoretical perspective of sexuality-as-gendered proposes that beliefs about gender norms and gender role expectations play a primary role in explaining the relationship, given religious motivations for social control of men and women and views that LGB individuals violate traditional gender expectations. Using two data sets representing 80,000 individuals across more than 60 countries, we test mediation models to determine the relative role of these different ideological systems. While conservative and authoritarian belief systems consistently play an important mediating role between religiosity and homonegativity, on average neither is as strong cross-nationally, or across religious groups, as beliefs about gender. The results show further support for the importance of beliefs about gender as a central ideological system in social and political worldviews.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
P. J. Henry, 
Matthew Nielson, 
Jaime L. Napier
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Religious‐based homonegativity as a function of the endorsement of traditional gender norms</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70092</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70092</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70092?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70091?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 26 Nov 2025 03:10:53 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-11-26T03:10:53-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70091</guid>
         <title>Examining the correspondence between political ideology and gun policy attitudes among Black and White people in the United States</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
The present research examined whether political ideology corresponded with gun attitudes among people disproportionately experiencing gun violence—Black people in the United States. Across four studies (N = 25,847) we found that race (Black vs. White) interacted with political ideology to predict gun attitudes, safety perceptions, and policy preferences. Among White participants, being more conservative corresponded with more positive gun attitudes, perceptions, and support for pro‐gun policies. Among Black participants, the relationship was weak or nonsignificant. Further, experience with gun violence also interacted with political ideology such that the relationship between gun attitudes, policy preferences and political ideology was weaker among participants who reported experience with gun violence compared with participants that reported no experience. These results have implications for the generalizability of the single‐item political ideology scale. This research also indicates that efforts to reduce gun violence focusing on reducing political polarization overlook that the polarization occurs largely among White people which may ultimately divert attention and resources from Black communities most impacted by gun violence.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The present research examined whether political ideology corresponded with gun attitudes among people disproportionately experiencing gun violence—Black people in the United States. Across four studies (&lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 25,847) we found that race (Black vs. White) interacted with political ideology to predict gun attitudes, safety perceptions, and policy preferences. Among White participants, being more conservative corresponded with more positive gun attitudes, perceptions, and support for pro-gun policies. Among Black participants, the relationship was weak or nonsignificant. Further, experience with gun violence also interacted with political ideology such that the relationship between gun attitudes, policy preferences and political ideology was weaker among participants who reported experience with gun violence compared with participants that reported no experience. These results have implications for the generalizability of the single-item political ideology scale. This research also indicates that efforts to reduce gun violence focusing on reducing political polarization overlook that the polarization occurs largely among White people which may ultimately divert attention and resources from Black communities most impacted by gun violence.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Joy E. Losee, 
Gerald D. Higginbotham, 
Gaby C. Pogge, 
Liz Kerner, 
James A. Shepperd
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Examining the correspondence between political ideology and gun policy attitudes among Black and White people in the United States</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70091</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70091</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70091?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70096?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 25 Nov 2025 02:56:42 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-11-25T02:56:42-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70096</guid>
         <title>The psychology of political attitudinal volatility</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
The assumption that political beliefs are formed by early‐life socialization and psychological predispositions, leading to stability in adulthood, increasingly acts as a theoretical cornerstone in the literature. However, politics is replete with examples of attitudinal change; this article proposes that certain stable psychological predispositions are likely to foster volatility in attitudes and general cognition. Using British electoral panel data, it shows that social distrust, open‐mindedness, and tolerance for uncertainty are associated with greater volatility in attitudes to immigration, redistribution, European integration, environmentalism, capital punishment, and Scottish independence. Locus of control, need‐for‐cognition, empathy, and risk tolerance are associated only with volatility in attitudes to some issues. Age, education, household income, being male, and lower partisanship are all negatively associated with attitudinal volatility. Overall, this study suggests that attitudinal volatility itself constitutes a meaningful dimension of political behavior, rooted in stable psychological predispositions.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The assumption that political beliefs are formed by early-life socialization and psychological predispositions, leading to stability in adulthood, increasingly acts as a theoretical cornerstone in the literature. However, politics is replete with examples of attitudinal change; this article proposes that certain stable psychological predispositions are likely to foster volatility in attitudes and general cognition. Using British electoral panel data, it shows that social distrust, open-mindedness, and tolerance for uncertainty are associated with greater volatility in attitudes to immigration, redistribution, European integration, environmentalism, capital punishment, and Scottish independence. Locus of control, need-for-cognition, empathy, and risk tolerance are associated only with volatility in attitudes to some issues. Age, education, household income, being male, and lower partisanship are all negatively associated with attitudinal volatility. Overall, this study suggests that attitudinal volatility itself constitutes a meaningful dimension of political behavior, rooted in stable psychological predispositions.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
James Dennison
</dc:creator>
         <category>SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>The psychology of political attitudinal volatility</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70096</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70096</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70096?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>SPECIAL ISSUE ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70089?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 21 Nov 2025 02:01:35 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-11-21T02:01:35-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70089</guid>
         <title>Symbolic racism against black people among black and white Americans: A system justification account</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Using three nationally representative, probability samples of Americans (Ns range from 848 to 20,728), we examined the endorsement of symbolic racism against Black people among both Black and White Americans through the lens of system justification. We found (1) endorsement of symbolic racism among Black Americans is not trivial and (2) acceptance of income inequality is a robust predictor of symbolic racism for all respondents, above and beyond political conservatism, ingroup and outgroup affect (Studies 1 and 3), racial stereotype endorsement (Study 2), desire for social dominance, and group consciousness (Study 3). Furthermore, the association between acceptance of inequality and symbolic racism is mediated by perceptions of system fairness for both Black and White respondents (Study 3). This large‐scale analysis suggested that both Black and White Americans have a motivation to perceive the system as fair, and this manifested in similar justifications of racial inequality, even when such beliefs are antithetical to group or self‐interests.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Using three nationally representative, probability samples of Americans (&lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt;s range from 848 to 20,728), we examined the endorsement of symbolic racism against Black people among both Black and White Americans through the lens of system justification. We found (1) endorsement of symbolic racism among Black Americans is not trivial and (2) acceptance of income inequality is a robust predictor of symbolic racism for all respondents, above and beyond political conservatism, ingroup and outgroup affect (Studies 1 and 3), racial stereotype endorsement (Study 2), desire for social dominance, and group consciousness (Study 3). Furthermore, the association between acceptance of inequality and symbolic racism is mediated by perceptions of system fairness for both Black and White respondents (Study 3). This large-scale analysis suggested that both Black and White Americans have a motivation to perceive the system as fair, and this manifested in similar justifications of racial inequality, even when such beliefs are antithetical to group or self-interests.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Alexandra Suppes, 
Jaime L. Napier, 
P. J. Henry, 
Kodai Kusano
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Symbolic racism against black people among black and white Americans: A system justification account</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70089</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70089</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70089?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70088?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Thu, 06 Nov 2025 02:47:15 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-11-06T02:47:15-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70088</guid>
         <title>Victimhood claims in German political manifestos</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Political campaigns often work with victimhood claims—stories construed around an (alleged) injustice that needs to be redressed or retaliated against. Notably, scholars have argued that victimhood claims have become more important in societal discourses over the last 20 years. In this research, we investigate the prevalence of victimhood claims (and a potential increase) in political election and party programs. More specifically, we analyzed programs from German Federal Parliament Elections between 2002 and 2021. Analyzing 157 documents from 69 parties, we show that (a) the number of victimhood claims has increased in parties represented in the Federal Parliament, and (b) that parties at the left and right fringes of the political spectrum employ victimhood claims more frequently than parties of the political center. We discuss these results with regard to the role that victimhood claims play in political campaigns and what consequences an increased prevalence of victimhood claims entails.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Political campaigns often work with victimhood claims—stories construed around an (alleged) injustice that needs to be redressed or retaliated against. Notably, scholars have argued that victimhood claims have become more important in societal discourses over the last 20 years. In this research, we investigate the prevalence of victimhood claims (and a potential increase) in political election and party programs. More specifically, we analyzed programs from German Federal Parliament Elections between 2002 and 2021. Analyzing 157 documents from 69 parties, we show that (a) the number of victimhood claims has increased in parties represented in the Federal Parliament, and (b) that parties at the left and right fringes of the political spectrum employ victimhood claims more frequently than parties of the political center. We discuss these results with regard to the role that victimhood claims play in political campaigns and what consequences an increased prevalence of victimhood claims entails.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Marlene Voit, 
Lucas John Emmanuel Köhler, 
Stefan Matern, 
Karsten Fischer, 
Mario Gollwitzer
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Victimhood claims in German political manifestos</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70088</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70088</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70088?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70087?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 04 Nov 2025 03:08:53 -0800</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-11-04T03:08:53-08:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70087</guid>
         <title>How many words? Precision‐based sample sizes for assessment at‐a‐distance</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Assessment at‐a‐distance studies often assess whether a leader is high or low on a score by whether or not the leader's score is a standard deviation higher or lower than the reference group mean, both as a way of assessing an individual leader and of comparing two or more leaders. This practice assumes that scores derived from the minimum number of words are sufficiently precise and that comparisons with the reference group mean are meaningful. However, no information on the precision of these estimates has been available. The precision estimates generated in this study provide new tools to more robustly assess differences between leaders, including in cases where the original data is not available or not appropriate for other statistical tests.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Assessment at-a-distance studies often assess whether a leader is high or low on a score by whether or not the leader's score is a standard deviation higher or lower than the reference group mean, both as a way of assessing an individual leader and of comparing two or more leaders. This practice assumes that scores derived from the minimum number of words are sufficiently precise and that comparisons with the reference group mean are meaningful. However, no information on the precision of these estimates has been available. The precision estimates generated in this study provide new tools to more robustly assess differences between leaders, including in cases where the original data is not available or not appropriate for other statistical tests.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Michael D. Young
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>How many words? Precision‐based sample sizes for assessment at‐a‐distance</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70087</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70087</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70087?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70075?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Thu, 30 Oct 2025 23:41:25 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-10-30T11:41:25-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70075</guid>
         <title>
Review of Daniel Bar‐Tal’. Sinking into the honey trap: The case of the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict. Translated into English by Barbara Doron, Westphalia Press. 2023. 466 pp.
</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description/>
         <content:encoded/>
         <dc:creator>
Marc Howard Ross
</dc:creator>
         <category>BOOK REVIEW</category>
         <dc:title>
Review of Daniel Bar‐Tal’. Sinking into the honey trap: The case of the Israeli‐Palestinian conflict. Translated into English by Barbara Doron, Westphalia Press. 2023. 466 pp.
</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70075</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70075</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70075?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>BOOK REVIEW</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70074?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 29 Oct 2025 05:30:35 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-10-29T05:30:35-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70074</guid>
         <title>Love him for the enemies he has made: Signaling by inflammatory pro‐gun rhetoric</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
American politics is rife with messages designed to anger one's political enemies. In this paper, we propose and test a model suggesting that such inflammatory messages are effective because they signal that the messenger is unwilling to compromise with the groups they have offended. Taking the example of inflammatory pro‐gun messaging, we show, in three preregistered experiments with American conservatives (total n = 1742) that conservatives view such messages as offending liberals, and, to the extent that they feel negatively toward Democratic politicians, they view the producers of these inflammatory messages positively, seeing them as the sort of politician who should be trusted by conservatives and as the sort of politician that they would be willing to vote for. However, this is not true across the entire conservative electorate, as conservatives who feel more warmly toward Democratic politicians view politicians posting inflammatory messages (and therefore offending liberals) as less trustworthy and less vote‐worthy. As affective polarization is on the rise in the United States, these inflammatory, bridge‐burning messages may become more prevalent with politicians trying to appeal to voters who are increasingly suspicious of anyone who might be tempted to compromise.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;American politics is rife with messages designed to anger one's political enemies. In this paper, we propose and test a model suggesting that such inflammatory messages are effective because they signal that the messenger is unwilling to compromise with the groups they have offended. Taking the example of inflammatory pro-gun messaging, we show, in three preregistered experiments with American conservatives (total &lt;i&gt;n&lt;/i&gt; = 1742) that conservatives view such messages as offending liberals, and, to the extent that they feel negatively toward Democratic politicians, they view the producers of these inflammatory messages positively, seeing them as the sort of politician who should be trusted by conservatives and as the sort of politician that they would be willing to vote for. However, this is not true across the entire conservative electorate, as conservatives who feel more warmly toward Democratic politicians view politicians posting inflammatory messages (and therefore offending liberals) as less trustworthy and less vote-worthy. As affective polarization is on the rise in the United States, these inflammatory, bridge-burning messages may become more prevalent with politicians trying to appeal to voters who are increasingly suspicious of anyone who might be tempted to compromise.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Sosuke Okada, 
Nicholas Buttrick
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Love him for the enemies he has made: Signaling by inflammatory pro‐gun rhetoric</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70074</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70074</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70074?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70079?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 28 Oct 2025 06:02:58 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-10-28T06:02:58-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70079</guid>
         <title>“We have nothing to do with it”: How statements of denial by armed actors shape public perceptions and emotions</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Armed groups operating in conflicts around the world publish statements of denial to dissociate themselves from acts of violence. Existing research argues that armed groups publish denial statements to avoid public backlash, favorably frame the conduct of their campaigns, and distance themselves from unsanctioned actions conducted by rank‐and‐file members. However, the broader psychological impact of denial statements on public perceptions remains unexplored. Investigating the effects of denial statements published by armed groups, we conducted a novel survey experiment with a national sample of 1616 adults in the United States. Participants were presented with a fictional attack attributed to an armed group by the government and randomly assigned to conditions in which the group denied, claimed, or remained silent about the attack. Our findings reveal that denials reduce perceived culpability in attacks, undermine trust in government, and alter emotional responses to violence. These results highlight how denial statements may serve as important rhetorical tools in armed groups' discursive repertoire. This study contributes to scholarship on the communication strategies of armed groups, psychological responses to violence, and the effects of militant discourse on public perceptions.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Armed groups operating in conflicts around the world publish statements of denial to dissociate themselves from acts of violence. Existing research argues that armed groups publish denial statements to avoid public backlash, favorably frame the conduct of their campaigns, and distance themselves from unsanctioned actions conducted by rank-and-file members. However, the broader psychological impact of denial statements on public perceptions remains unexplored. Investigating the effects of denial statements published by armed groups, we conducted a novel survey experiment with a national sample of 1616 adults in the United States. Participants were presented with a fictional attack attributed to an armed group by the government and randomly assigned to conditions in which the group denied, claimed, or remained silent about the attack. Our findings reveal that denials reduce perceived culpability in attacks, undermine trust in government, and alter emotional responses to violence. These results highlight how denial statements may serve as important rhetorical tools in armed groups' discursive repertoire. This study contributes to scholarship on the communication strategies of armed groups, psychological responses to violence, and the effects of militant discourse on public perceptions.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Ilayda B. Onder, 
Mark Berlin
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>“We have nothing to do with it”: How statements of denial by armed actors shape public perceptions and emotions</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70079</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70079</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70079?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70084?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 28 Oct 2025 04:45:12 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-10-28T04:45:12-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70084</guid>
         <title>Should “sisters” be doing it by themselves? Leadership, allyship, and mobilization for gender equality</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
While gender equality initiatives have historically been spearheaded by women, male allies' contribution is increasingly recognized—and challenged. Our article examines the pivotal yet neglected intersection of women's leadership and allyship for gender equality. Across two experiments with community samples (total N = 801), we investigate how message framing (common cause vs. women's issue; Experiment 1), intergroup/male versus intragroup/female allies (Experiments 1–2), and transformative versus tokenistic allyship (Experiment 2) affect female leaders' capacity to mobilize both men and women for gender equality. We demonstrate that common cause (vs. women's issue) messages more readily mobilize men for collective action, whereas women's mobilization remains high irrespective of message framing. We also show that a female leader supported by an intergroup/male rather than an intragroup/female ally is more likely to be seen as “one of us,” have greater influence, and be more effective at mobilizing both men and women for collective action (Experiments 1–2). Critically, men are mobilized by transformative allyship (regardless of ally gender) and disengage from both the leader and the cause in response to tokenistic allyship (Experiment 2). While male allies can be important, our results suggest that transformative allyship is essential for mobilization across gender boundaries.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;While gender equality initiatives have historically been spearheaded by women, male allies' contribution is increasingly recognized—and challenged. Our article examines the pivotal yet neglected intersection of women's leadership and allyship for gender equality. Across two experiments with community samples (total &lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 801), we investigate how message framing (common cause vs. women's issue; Experiment 1), intergroup/male versus intragroup/female allies (Experiments 1–2), and transformative versus tokenistic allyship (Experiment 2) affect female leaders' capacity to mobilize both men and women for gender equality. We demonstrate that common cause (vs. women's issue) messages more readily mobilize men for collective action, whereas women's mobilization remains high irrespective of message framing. We also show that a female leader supported by an intergroup/male rather than an intragroup/female ally is more likely to be seen as “one of us,” have greater influence, and be more effective at mobilizing both men and women for collective action (Experiments 1–2). Critically, men are mobilized by transformative allyship (regardless of ally gender) and disengage from both the leader and the cause in response to tokenistic allyship (Experiment 2). While male allies can be important, our results suggest that transformative allyship is essential for mobilization across gender boundaries.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Emina Subašić, 
Michelle K. Ryan, 
Lisa Joye, 
Mitchell Young, 
Stephanie Hardacre, 
Katherine J. Reynolds, 
Nyla R. Branscombe
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Should “sisters” be doing it by themselves? Leadership, allyship, and mobilization for gender equality</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70084</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70084</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70084?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70083?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Tue, 28 Oct 2025 02:39:52 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-10-28T02:39:52-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70083</guid>
         <title>Diversity politics: The effects of elite rhetoric and issue racialization on support for descriptive representation</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Although the importance of diversity is hotly contested in U.S. politics, political parties have increasingly embraced descriptive representation as an important ideal. Indeed, in recent years both Democratic and Republican political leaders have even publicly committed to selecting underrepresented candidates for powerful roles. We examine how different types of elite rhetoric promoting racial diversity can influence evaluations of the government body, the selected candidate, and general efforts to diversify politics. With two survey experiments, we find that rhetoric emphasizing the value of diverse representation increases support for political representation of racialized minorities only when the policy domain itself is racialized. But when the policy is not racialized, even positive rhetoric about diverse representation has negative effects on evaluations of the selection process and candidate. Furthermore, leaders' commitment to select an underrepresented candidate has largely negative effects, regardless of policy racialization. This work holds important implications for how elite rhetoric can contribute to normative goals of increasing diverse political representation while minimizing undue negative evaluations of political leaders and institutional legitimacy.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Although the importance of diversity is hotly contested in U.S. politics, political parties have increasingly embraced descriptive representation as an important ideal. Indeed, in recent years both Democratic and Republican political leaders have even publicly committed to selecting underrepresented candidates for powerful roles. We examine how different types of elite rhetoric promoting racial diversity can influence evaluations of the government body, the selected candidate, and general efforts to diversify politics. With two survey experiments, we find that rhetoric emphasizing the value of diverse representation increases support for political representation of racialized minorities only when the policy domain itself is racialized. But when the policy is not racialized, even positive rhetoric about diverse representation has negative effects on evaluations of the selection process and candidate. Furthermore, leaders' commitment to select an underrepresented candidate has largely negative effects, regardless of policy racialization. This work holds important implications for how elite rhetoric can contribute to normative goals of increasing diverse political representation while minimizing undue negative evaluations of political leaders and institutional legitimacy.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Nicole Huffman, 
H. Hannah Nam
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Diversity politics: The effects of elite rhetoric and issue racialization on support for descriptive representation</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70083</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70083</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70083?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70086?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Sun, 26 Oct 2025 00:00:00 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-10-26T12:00:00-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70086</guid>
         <title>How deep a divide do we tolerate? Measuring the willingness to engage with differently minded others (WEDO)</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Fostering contact across political camps is crucial to combat affective polarization and to sustain healthy democratic discourse. Researchers therefore have become increasingly interested in better understanding the factors that promote or hamper political exchange. The present research contributes to this goal by introducing WEDO, a new measure to assess the willingness to engage with differently minded others based on behavioral preferences in hypothetical scenarios. This measure integrates the advantages of topic‐specific assessment, fine‐grained response, and economical administration. Across four studies (N = 1215) conducted in diverse sociopolitical contexts, we examine WEDO's associations with conceptually related variables. Our findings indicate that WEDO is linked to various individual characteristics (e.g., analytic thinking, intellectual humility) and further predicts behavior in a selective exposure task. Overall, WEDO offers a nuanced tool for understanding how personal characteristics, situational factors, and sociopolitical contexts influence individuals' openness to political discourse.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Fostering contact across political camps is crucial to combat affective polarization and to sustain healthy democratic discourse. Researchers therefore have become increasingly interested in better understanding the factors that promote or hamper political exchange. The present research contributes to this goal by introducing WEDO, a new measure to assess the willingness to engage with differently minded others based on behavioral preferences in hypothetical scenarios. This measure integrates the advantages of topic-specific assessment, fine-grained response, and economical administration. Across four studies (&lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 1215) conducted in diverse sociopolitical contexts, we examine WEDO's associations with conceptually related variables. Our findings indicate that WEDO is linked to various individual characteristics (e.g., analytic thinking, intellectual humility) and further predicts behavior in a selective exposure task. Overall, WEDO offers a nuanced tool for understanding how personal characteristics, situational factors, and sociopolitical contexts influence individuals' openness to political discourse.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Melissa Jauch, 
Olivia Fischer, 
Mariela E. Jaffé, 
Rainer Greifeneder
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>How deep a divide do we tolerate? Measuring the willingness to engage with differently minded others (WEDO)</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70086</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70086</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70086?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70085?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 22 Oct 2025 21:39:08 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-10-22T09:39:08-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70085</guid>
         <title>Not a real meritocracy? How conspiracy beliefs reduce perceived distributive justice</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
The meritocracy principle, along with other distributive justice principles such as equality and need, is fundamental to the healthy functioning of modern societies. However, our understanding of the factors that shape citizens' perceptions of these principles remains limited. We proposed that conspiracy beliefs are negatively related to distributive perceptions and tested these relationships in four studies. Study 1 analyzed a global dataset (90,837 participants; 68 societies) and identified a negative relationship between conspiracy beliefs and meritocracy perceptions. Study 2a (preregistered; N = 403; US) and Study 2b (preregistered; N = 788; China) manipulated conspiracy beliefs in societal settings. Conspiracy beliefs consistently reduced perceptions of meritocracy, perceived equality, and need principles. Study 3 (preregistered; N = 403) replicated these results in a hypothetical organizational setting. These findings suggest that conspiracy beliefs reduce citizens' perceived fairness of resource allocations across different distributive justice rules.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The meritocracy principle, along with other distributive justice principles such as equality and need, is fundamental to the healthy functioning of modern societies. However, our understanding of the factors that shape citizens' perceptions of these principles remains limited. We proposed that conspiracy beliefs are negatively related to distributive perceptions and tested these relationships in four studies. Study 1 analyzed a global dataset (90,837 participants; 68 societies) and identified a negative relationship between conspiracy beliefs and meritocracy perceptions. Study 2a (preregistered; &lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 403; US) and Study 2b (preregistered; &lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 788; China) manipulated conspiracy beliefs in societal settings. Conspiracy beliefs consistently reduced perceptions of meritocracy, perceived equality, and need principles. Study 3 (preregistered; &lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 403) replicated these results in a hypothetical organizational setting. These findings suggest that conspiracy beliefs reduce citizens' perceived fairness of resource allocations across different distributive justice rules.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Qi Zhao, 
Jan‐Willem van Prooijen, 
Giuliana Spadaro
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Not a real meritocracy? How conspiracy beliefs reduce perceived distributive justice</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70085</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70085</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70085?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70073?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 22 Oct 2025 21:29:36 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-10-22T09:29:36-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70073</guid>
         <title>Emotion (dys)regulation and national narcissism</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Emotional struggles have the potential to shape our perceptions of the social world. This research examined how emotion dysregulation—a difficulty in managing one's emotional experiences—relates to national narcissism, an inflated belief in the unparalleled greatness of one's nation, often driven by psychological shortcomings. Across three cross‐sectional studies conducted among British (N = 473), American (N = 444), and Polish (N = 633) participants, we found that deficiencies in emotion regulation were consistently linked to higher national narcissism. Importantly, national narcissism partially accounted for the link between emotion dysregulation and conspiracy beliefs. These results extend prior work by illuminating the emotional underpinnings of national narcissism and demonstrating how individual emotional challenges resonate within broader social phenomena.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Emotional struggles have the potential to shape our perceptions of the social world. This research examined how emotion dysregulation—a difficulty in managing one's emotional experiences—relates to national narcissism, an inflated belief in the unparalleled greatness of one's nation, often driven by psychological shortcomings. Across three cross-sectional studies conducted among British (&lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 473), American (&lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 444), and Polish (&lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 633) participants, we found that deficiencies in emotion regulation were consistently linked to higher national narcissism. Importantly, national narcissism partially accounted for the link between emotion dysregulation and conspiracy beliefs. These results extend prior work by illuminating the emotional underpinnings of national narcissism and demonstrating how individual emotional challenges resonate within broader social phenomena.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Zuzanna Molenda, 
Marta Marchlewska, 
Aleksandra Cislak
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Emotion (dys)regulation and national narcissism</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70073</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70073</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70073?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70082?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 22 Oct 2025 21:19:24 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-10-22T09:19:24-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70082</guid>
         <title>Extremism at the center: Uncovering political diversity among midpoint responders on the left–right self‐placement item</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
The midpoint of the left‐right self‐placement item is hiding important political diversity, and may be conflating moderate responders with populists and other political sub‐groups. Survey researchers should consider this problem when examining relationships between political orientation and political attitudes. We suggest testing for non‐linearity in these relationships, and measuring anti‐establishment and populist beliefs separately. Researchers interested in building theories explaining the psychological underpinnings of ideological extremism should also consider the possibility that a qualitatively different type of ideological extremist self‐places on the midpoint.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The midpoint of the left-right self-placement item is hiding important political diversity, and may be conflating moderate responders with populists and other political sub-groups. Survey researchers should consider this problem when examining relationships between political orientation and political attitudes. We suggest testing for non-linearity in these relationships, and measuring anti-establishment and populist beliefs separately. Researchers interested in building theories explaining the psychological underpinnings of ideological extremism should also consider the possibility that a qualitatively different type of ideological extremist self-places on the midpoint.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Edward J. R. Clarke, 
Frank Eckerle, 
John R. Kerr, 
Stephen R. Hill, 
Mathew Ling, 
Mathew D. Marques, 
Matt N. Williams
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Extremism at the center: Uncovering political diversity among midpoint responders on the left–right self‐placement item</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70082</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70082</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70082?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70078?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 20 Oct 2025 01:15:52 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-10-20T01:15:52-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70078</guid>
         <title>Competing moral minds? Estimating moral disagreement in American politics</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
What drives ideological and partisan divisions in contemporary American politics? An influential line of research suggests they are rooted in disagreement about the nature of morality. While the left uses principles of care and fairness in moral judgment, the right considers loyalty, authority, and sanctity to be additional morally relevant values. This creates a “moral empathy gap” that makes it difficult for people to understand the perspective of their political opponents and fosters intolerance and gridlock. Evidence for moral disagreement between the left and right rests largely on a survey measure with significant limitations—the moral foundations questionnaire. We review the methodological issues associated with this measure and use two alternative strategies to examine moral disagreement in American politics. Across six distinct empirical tests with U.S. adults, we find that moral differences between the left and right are smaller than what is measured with the moral foundations questionnaire.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;What drives ideological and partisan divisions in contemporary American politics? An influential line of research suggests they are rooted in disagreement about the nature of morality. While the left uses principles of care and fairness in moral judgment, the right considers loyalty, authority, and sanctity to be additional morally relevant values. This creates a “moral empathy gap” that makes it difficult for people to understand the perspective of their political opponents and fosters intolerance and gridlock. Evidence for moral disagreement between the left and right rests largely on a survey measure with significant limitations—the moral foundations questionnaire. We review the methodological issues associated with this measure and use two alternative strategies to examine moral disagreement in American politics. Across six distinct empirical tests with U.S. adults, we find that moral differences between the left and right are smaller than what is measured with the moral foundations questionnaire.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Christopher D. Johnston, 
David J. Ciuk, 
Jesse Lopez
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Competing moral minds? Estimating moral disagreement in American politics</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70078</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70078</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70078?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70080?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 17 Oct 2025 03:49:01 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-10-17T03:49:01-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70080</guid>
         <title>Introducing a novel method to support polarized citizens to sustain political dialogue</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
This article offers a novel quasi‐experimental method over two studies for exploring how individuals can navigate politically polarizing discussions to sustain dialogue. Study one (N = 28) involved in‐person, stimulus‐led interviews in England and Scotland to understand the dialogical political positions being adopted on the UK's post‐Brexit European relationships. Study two (N = 10) created quasi‐experimental participant pairings on shared political positions before introducing a researcher‐led polarizing rupture to explore how individuals navigate challenging political discussions. These positions and projected polarizing issues are understood via a dialogue sustainment theoretical model, which focuses on: (1) Internalized—social representations of the political issues, (2) Interactive—the political positions adopted during discourse, and (3) Dimensional—the temporal/spatial focus of the interaction. Results show a triad of influences determine how pairs independently sustained dialogue: (1) Shared core positions in the first stages of discourse, (2) Shared‐affective responses to the polarizing issue, and (3) Adopted “distancing” positions to navigate the vexed issue and sustain dialogue. This article considers the implications of this alternative method as a first step for political psychologists in exploring dialogue sustainment in politically polarizing contexts.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;This article offers a novel quasi-experimental method over two studies for exploring how individuals can navigate politically polarizing discussions to sustain dialogue. Study one (&lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 28) involved in-person, stimulus-led interviews in England and Scotland to understand the dialogical political positions being adopted on the UK's post-Brexit European relationships. Study two (&lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 10) created quasi-experimental participant pairings on shared political positions before introducing a researcher-led polarizing rupture to explore how individuals navigate challenging political discussions. These positions and projected polarizing issues are understood via a dialogue sustainment theoretical model, which focuses on: (1) Internalized—social representations of the political issues, (2) Interactive—the political positions adopted during discourse, and (3) Dimensional—the temporal/spatial focus of the interaction. Results show a triad of influences determine how pairs independently sustained dialogue: (1) Shared core positions in the first stages of discourse, (2) Shared-affective responses to the polarizing issue, and (3) Adopted “distancing” positions to navigate the vexed issue and sustain dialogue. This article considers the implications of this alternative method as a first step for political psychologists in exploring dialogue sustainment in politically polarizing contexts.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Anthony English, 
Kesi Mahendran
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Introducing a novel method to support polarized citizens to sustain political dialogue</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70080</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70080</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70080?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70071?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Mon, 29 Sep 2025 07:49:08 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-09-29T07:49:08-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70071</guid>
         <title>An adversarial collaboration on the rigidity‐of‐the‐right, symmetry thesis, or rigidity‐of‐extremes: The answer depends on the question</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
In an adversarial collaboration, two preregistered U.S.‐based studies (total N = 6181) tested three hypotheses regarding the relationship between political ideology and belief rigidity (operationalized as less evidence‐based belief updating): rigidity‐of‐the‐right, symmetry, and rigidity‐of‐extremes. Across both studies, general and social conservatism were weakly associated with rigidity (|b| ~ .05), and conservatives were more rigid than liberals (Cohen's d ~ .05). Rigidity generally had null associations with economic conservatism, as well as social and economic political attitudes. Moreover, general extremism (but neither social nor economic extremism) predicted rigidity in Study 1, and all three extremism measures predicted rigidity in Study 2 (average |bs| ~ .07). Extreme rightists were more rigid than extreme leftists in 60% of the significant quadratic relationships. Given these very small and semi‐consistent effects, broad claims about strong associations between ideology and belief updating are likely unwarranted. Rather, psychologists should turn their focus to examining the contexts where ideology strongly correlates with rigidity.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;In an adversarial collaboration, two preregistered U.S.-based studies (total &lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 6181) tested three hypotheses regarding the relationship between political ideology and belief rigidity (operationalized as less evidence-based belief updating): rigidity-of-the-right, symmetry, and rigidity-of-extremes. Across both studies, general and social conservatism were weakly associated with rigidity (|&lt;i&gt;b&lt;/i&gt;| ~ .05), and conservatives were more rigid than liberals (Cohen's &lt;i&gt;d&lt;/i&gt; ~ .05). Rigidity generally had null associations with economic conservatism, as well as social and economic political attitudes. Moreover, general extremism (but neither social nor economic extremism) predicted rigidity in Study 1, and all three extremism measures predicted rigidity in Study 2 (average |&lt;i&gt;b&lt;/i&gt;s| ~ .07). Extreme rightists were more rigid than extreme leftists in 60% of the significant quadratic relationships. Given these very small and semi-consistent effects, broad claims about strong associations between ideology and belief updating are likely unwarranted. Rather, psychologists should turn their focus to examining the contexts where ideology strongly correlates with rigidity.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Shauna M. Bowes, 
Cory J. Clark, 
Lucian Gideon Conway III, 
Thomas Costello, 
Danny Osborne, 
Philip E. Tetlock, 
Jan‐Willem van Prooijen
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>An adversarial collaboration on the rigidity‐of‐the‐right, symmetry thesis, or rigidity‐of‐extremes: The answer depends on the question</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70071</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70071</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70071?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70070?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 26 Sep 2025 05:01:28 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-09-26T05:01:28-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70070</guid>
         <title>Integrating insights into radicalization: A text‐mining systematic review</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
The study of radicalization encompasses a broad spectrum of perspectives, with scholars from diverse disciplines – ranging from psychology, sociology, political science, criminology, to economics – contributing to its multifaceted comprehension. Despite this substantial body of empirical research, the knowledge is fragmented across disciplines, emphasizing the need for integration to establish a cohesive framework. As laying the groundwork for a unified framework begins with identifying relevant phenomena, this systematic review analyzed 4019 research articles using text mining to detect phenomena associated with radicalization. Author keywords and abstracts were analyzed by examining term frequency as an indicator of relevance and term co‐occurrence as an indicator of association. The results reflect themes commonly featured in theory, such as ideology, identity, and social networks, but also identified themes not well developed in theory. Macro‐level phenomena, including the role of the state, economy, elections, policy, and regional factors, as well as micro‐ and meso‐level phenomena like the internet, social media, adolescence, personality, language, education, and mental health, are not sufficiently embedded in theory. The findings further provide the first empirical evidence confirming the fragmentation of research on radicalization. This review represents a crucial step toward synthesizing existing knowledge and advancing a unified understanding of radicalization.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;The study of radicalization encompasses a broad spectrum of perspectives, with scholars from diverse disciplines – ranging from psychology, sociology, political science, criminology, to economics – contributing to its multifaceted comprehension. Despite this substantial body of empirical research, the knowledge is fragmented across disciplines, emphasizing the need for integration to establish a cohesive framework. As laying the groundwork for a unified framework begins with identifying relevant phenomena, this systematic review analyzed 4019 research articles using text mining to detect phenomena associated with radicalization. Author keywords and abstracts were analyzed by examining term frequency as an indicator of relevance and term co-occurrence as an indicator of association. The results reflect themes commonly featured in theory, such as ideology, identity, and social networks, but also identified themes not well developed in theory. Macro-level phenomena, including the role of the state, economy, elections, policy, and regional factors, as well as micro- and meso-level phenomena like the internet, social media, adolescence, personality, language, education, and mental health, are not sufficiently embedded in theory. The findings further provide the first empirical evidence confirming the fragmentation of research on radicalization. This review represents a crucial step toward synthesizing existing knowledge and advancing a unified understanding of radicalization.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Anna Knorr, 
Nikita Podolin, 
Gabriele Di Cicco, 
Małgorzata Kossowska
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Integrating insights into radicalization: A text‐mining systematic review</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70070</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70070</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70070?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70069?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Fri, 12 Sep 2025 23:59:19 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-09-12T11:59:19-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70069</guid>
         <title>Benevolent authority beliefs, democratic values, and public support: A comparative study of China and Japan</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Emergencies and crises, such as the COVID‐19 pandemic, pose significant challenges to a country's governance, and public approval is crucial for effectively managing such crises. China and Japan are two East Asian countries that share Confucian cultural legacies but have undergone distinct political transformations since World War II. In light of these contextual differences, this study argues that the benevolent authority system of governance remains influential in China, while its influence has diminished in Japan, where public approval of the government is primarily rooted in democratic values. Using survey data from the general public in both countries, the results reveal that benevolent authority beliefs continue to sustain public approval in China, while their effects were insignificant in Japan. Democratic values were positively associated with public approval in Japan but negatively associated with that in China. Moreover, democratic values among younger generations in Japan were significantly lower than those of their older counterparts, whereas younger individuals in China exhibited higher levels of benevolent authority beliefs compared to the older generation. Economic recession and widening income inequality may help explain the conservative shift among younger generations.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Emergencies and crises, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, pose significant challenges to a country's governance, and public approval is crucial for effectively managing such crises. China and Japan are two East Asian countries that share Confucian cultural legacies but have undergone distinct political transformations since World War II. In light of these contextual differences, this study argues that the benevolent authority system of governance remains influential in China, while its influence has diminished in Japan, where public approval of the government is primarily rooted in democratic values. Using survey data from the general public in both countries, the results reveal that benevolent authority beliefs continue to sustain public approval in China, while their effects were insignificant in Japan. Democratic values were positively associated with public approval in Japan but negatively associated with that in China. Moreover, democratic values among younger generations in Japan were significantly lower than those of their older counterparts, whereas younger individuals in China exhibited higher levels of benevolent authority beliefs compared to the older generation. Economic recession and widening income inequality may help explain the conservative shift among younger generations.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Yida Zhai
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Benevolent authority beliefs, democratic values, and public support: A comparative study of China and Japan</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70069</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70069</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70069?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
      </item>
      <item>
         <link>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70068?af=R</link>
         <pubDate>Wed, 03 Sep 2025 02:40:36 -0700</pubDate>
         <dc:date>2025-09-03T02:40:36-07:00</dc:date>
         <source url="https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/14679221?af=R">Wiley: Political Psychology: Table of Contents</source>
         <prism:coverDate/>
         <prism:coverDisplayDate/>
         <guid isPermaLink="false">10.1111/pops.70068</guid>
         <title>Proximity to settlements in the West Bank shifts protest behavior toward higher‐risk actions and increases perceived collective injustice</title>
         <description>Political Psychology, EarlyView. </description>
         <dc:description>
Abstract
Engagement in political conflict has been linked to various material and psychological motives, while the role of perceived collective injustice remains empirically contested. We examine this hypothesis for protest behavior in the West Bank. Since 1967, civilian Israeli settlements have been established here, making salient stark local inequalities. Across two primary and four secondary data collections (N = 8360), exploiting geographical coordinates, we show that proximity to settlements increased the relative likelihood of participating in higher‐risk political action (between +41% and +82%) at the cost of moderate protest (−30% to −36%), flanked by corresponding attitudinal shifts. Effects were spatially limited to a 3‐kilometer distance, time‐insensitive, and validated through separate administrative data on protest events during the same ten‐year observation period. Moreover, the shift toward high‐risk protest engagement was not associated with past negative contact—instead, we find support for the perceived collective injustice mechanism, ruling out several socio‐psychological alternatives. Salience of group‐based moral outrage can shape political behavior in settings of violent asymmetrical conflict.
</dc:description>
         <content:encoded>
&lt;h2&gt;Abstract&lt;/h2&gt;
&lt;p&gt;Engagement in political conflict has been linked to various material and psychological motives, while the role of perceived collective injustice remains empirically contested. We examine this hypothesis for protest behavior in the West Bank. Since 1967, civilian Israeli settlements have been established here, making salient stark local inequalities. Across two primary and four secondary data collections (&lt;i&gt;N&lt;/i&gt; = 8360), exploiting geographical coordinates, we show that proximity to settlements increased the relative likelihood of participating in higher-risk political action (between +41% and +82%) at the cost of moderate protest (−30% to −36%), flanked by corresponding attitudinal shifts. Effects were spatially limited to a 3-kilometer distance, time-insensitive, and validated through separate administrative data on protest events during the same ten-year observation period. Moreover, the shift toward high-risk protest engagement was not associated with past negative contact—instead, we find support for the perceived collective injustice mechanism, ruling out several socio-psychological alternatives. Salience of group-based moral outrage can shape political behavior in settings of violent asymmetrical conflict.&lt;/p&gt;</content:encoded>
         <dc:creator>
Nils Mallock, 
Christian Krekel
</dc:creator>
         <category>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</category>
         <dc:title>Proximity to settlements in the West Bank shifts protest behavior toward higher‐risk actions and increases perceived collective injustice</dc:title>
         <dc:identifier>10.1111/pops.70068</dc:identifier>
         <prism:publicationName>Political Psychology</prism:publicationName>
         <prism:doi>10.1111/pops.70068</prism:doi>
         <prism:url>https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pops.70068?af=R</prism:url>
         <prism:section>ORIGINAL ARTICLE</prism:section>
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