Casual Fridays

Martin Van Creveld's book "The Changing Face of War" is an unusual reading selection, but I was drawn to it due to his past works. I am not sure if it will rank up there with his best, but it is provocative.  For about two-thirds of the book, Van Creveld reviews the history of war between 1900 and the present, with the intent of reviewing what's being done in counterinsurgency today and to make some remarks on the conduct of war in general. He never uses the term "generations of war", but one gets the feeling that he would like to.

He runs through World War I, the inter-year wars, World War II, and the Cold War rather quickly. As some of the reviewers at the Amazon site note, there are some really strange errors within the book that might make the reader think that some junior intern did the research. The one comment that leapt out at me was the "American forces at Arnhem" during World War II. Huh?? Trying to cover 80 years of war turns this front section of the book into a very quick, general, almost flash-card type run through his major topics. But the discussion of changing our style of fighting after World War II from general combat to deterrence was good. He credits Israel, Iraq, Iran, and North Korea with acting logically in their pursuit of nuclear weapons.

Given President Bush's national security strategy emphasizing pre-emption even against non-nuclear countries, and also in view of what happened to Saddam Hussein, whoever rules in Tehran has excellent reason to build such weapons as fast as possible. ... Its possession may increase the mullahs' self-confidence and lead to aggression, but it may also increase self-confidence and lead to restraint. Given the historical record since 1945, the second is more likely than the first.

His short rant against think tanks is worth the price of the book alone. He really clarifies exactly how these civilian experts became part of the military-industrial complex, and he's not very happy about today's think tanks.

Sometimes defined as universities without students, think tanks cannot charge tuition. Assuming they have no access to foundation money, most depend on contracts for financial support and are therefore predisposed to tell their clients what the latter want to hear. ... The outcome is that many think tanks are so close to the military's apron strings as to form part of a single complex, stifling dissent before it can even be born.

At best, the blizzard of paper issuing from think tanks, universities, and higher institutes of military learning provides work for a great many people who would otherwise be unemployed and, perhaps, unemployable. ... Dazzled by the king's new clothes, most people see, or claim to see, all this studying as proof of modernity and progress. In reality, it is often a sign of irrelevance, decline, and impotence as many of the world's most powerful armed forces vainly to try to deal with opponents so much smaller and weaker than themselves that it should be no contest.

His discussion at the end about counterinsurgency frankly baffled me, and I probably need to re-read it and digest it again. If I read it correctly, Van Creveld says that there's only two ways to address counterinsurgency. You can either use good intel to go after the bad guys, and using troops with iron discipline and solid professionalism, take down the insurgents. Or if you do not have good intel, then you have to strike hard - better too hard than not hard enough - strike quick, and explain why those actions were necessary without apologizing about them. So which one better matches the American military strategy? Neither?

Van Creveld shows a great deal of disdain for US national strategy, and he savages the current administration's strategy in Iraq. That's not to say that he's necessarily wrong, but it's an unexpected barrage from this scholar. This is a relatively short book, and so Van Creveld really doesn't mince words and he doesn't fully explain his ire. At the end of the day, I would recommend taking this book out of the library and giving it a look before you think about buying it. It's not going to be a vital part of my research library, but I have to say that I enjoyed the journey.