In March 2026, the High Court found that a claimant who sues for personal-injury damages may be compelled to provide consent for the defendant to access relevant medical records where such records are central to the claim and necessary for the defendant to prepare its defence.

The claimant had sued for damages arising from an injury allegedly sustained at his employer’s premises. He relied on medical allegations and sought damages for both past and future medical treatment. Yet when the employer asked for a signed consent form to obtain the underlying medical records from the treating practitioners, the claimant repeatedly refused. The claimant argued that he had already provided all documents he intended to use at trial and that further disclosure would violate his privacy and disrupt the binding pre-trial timetable.

The defendant employer explained that without the treating practitioner’s medical records, its experts could not properly assess the merits of the claim or advise whether to settle or defend. The documents already discovered included some expert reports but not the foundational clinical records showing the nature, extent and management of the injuries. According to the employer, this severely prejudiced its ability to prepare its case.

The court accepted while medical information is protected and patient confidentiality is essential; this protection must be balanced against the opposing party’s right to a fair trial. The court held that the medical records were directly relevant because they stemmed from the very injury on which the claimant’s case was based. Without these documents, the employer could not properly test or respond to the damages claim. The court distinguished authority concerning unauthorised disclosures, noting that this case dealt instead with whether a refusal to provide consent was justified in the context of active litigation.

In finding that the medical records were “founding documents” necessary for the fair ventilation of the dispute, the court held that the claimant’s refusal was unjustified and prejudicial. It ordered the claimant to sign the necessary consent form and pay the costs of the application.

Coca Cola Beverages South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Daswa (7480/2020) [2026] ZALMPPHC 20 (6 March 2026)

The deceased was enrolled as a mechanical engineering student at the college. Whilst students were working on a motor vehicle, the vehicle caught fire. The deceased sustained third-degree burns over approximately 48% of his body, including severe inhalation injuries. He was transported to hospital and admitted to the intensive care unit. Despite surgical and medical interventions, including ventilatory support, he developed septicaemia and passed away approximately ten days later.

The claimants, who were the mother and brother of the deceased, claimed delictual damages against the college and its lecturers, including general damages in the form of emotional shock, arising from the death of deceased, which was caused by the negligence of the defendants.

It was common cause that the college’s lecturers involved acted within the course and scope of their employment. The college lecturers admitted that they were aware of the risks in conducting a mechanical engineering course and that they owed students a legal duty to prevent harm. The defendants argued that reasonable steps had been taken, including providing fire extinguishers and implementing safety measures.

However, the evidence led on behalf the claimants painted a different picture. A former student testified that no safety training was provided and that students were not properly taught on the safe use of tools. Further evidence was led that most fire extinguishers were not in good working order and that although students were expected to wear full protective clothing, it was inconsistently worn. An expert witness testified that, in terms of the Occupational Health and Safety Act, safety measures should be in place on premises where dangerous materials are used and students should receive proper training. Documentation to substantiate safety measures in place as pleaded by the college were requested by the claimants. However, the defendants were unable to produce any of the requested documentation.

At the close of the claimants’ case, the defendants applied for absolution from the instance. They argued that the cause of the deceased’s death was septicaemia, constituting a novus actus interveniens, and that no causal link had been established between the fire and his death. They further contended that insufficient evidence had been led on damages.

The court held that burn injuries trigger systemic inflammatory responses and that septicaemia was a foreseeable complication of severe burn trauma. The medical evidence confirmed that the septicaemia did not constitute a new intervening cause breaking the chain of causation. The burn injuries sustained in the fire were the direct and factual cause of death. The defendants’ negligence remained legally and factually linked to the harm suffered by the claimants.

The court further found that the claimants had established a prima facie case for the defendants to answer. Although the defendants pleaded that reasonable steps were taken to ensure safety, they failed to produce supporting evidence. The court dismissed the application for absolution from the instance.

The court concluded that, on a balance of probabilities, the college and its lectures failed in their duty of care to take positive steps to ensure the deceased’s safety. The burn injuries sustained by the deceased were the direct cause of his death. The defendants were held 100% liable for any proven damages suffered by the claimants.

Steyl and Another v Motheo TVET College and Others, Case No 3368/2020

The conflict in the Middle East has caused multiple disruptions across the shipping and aviation sectors.  A disruption to the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for global oil trade, triggered a roughly 70% spike in Jet A1 prices at South African coastal airports within a single week.  Some airlines in South Africa have already informed their customers that ticket prices would increase due to the price increase of jet fuel as jet fuel represents a third of operating expenses.  In this blog, we unpack how fuel prices, including the price of jet fuel, are determined and regulated.  In short, jet fuel prices in South Africa are beyond the control of airlines, regulators and oil companies.  The pricing is market-based and tracks international benchmarks rather than statutory pump formulas.

The building blocks of jet fuel pricing

Fuel prices in South Africa reflect a chain of import costs and domestic add-ons.  For regulated fuels such as petrol and diesel, South Africa’s Basic Fuel Price (BFP) models the import-parity landed cost.  It draws on Platts spot assessments from key refining hubs and adds freight, insurance, cargo dues, coastal storage, and stock-financing costs, all converted at the daily rand/US dollar exchange rate.  Downstream statutory imposts, the Fuel Levy and RAF Levy then explain why the final pump price can diverge significantly from that import-parity base.  Geopolitical volatility, currency swings and emerging sustainability pressures will also continue to shape jet fuel costs.

What makes jet fuel different

Jet fuel sits outside the regulated framework.  Parliament and aviation regulators have confirmed that there is a deregulated regime where prices are set by contract and competition.  In practice, suppliers and airlines reference Platts jet assessments, including the jet fuel cost and freight (Jet CFR) South Africa marker within the Africa basket, while the International Air Transport Association/Platts Jet Fuel Price Monitor provides widely used reference points.  The International Civil Aviation Organisation’s technical standards keep Jet A-1 fungible across borders, reinforcing benchmark-linked trade.

How benchmarks and logistics interact on the ground

Shipping costs and currency are live price levers.  Tanker market movements feed directly into delivered values at South African ports, while rand weakness increases import costs for all buyers. Airport infrastructure also matters: OR Tambo draws heavily on pipeline-delivered refinery output, largely avoiding marine freight and port dues, while coastal airports rely more on imported cargoes priced off Platts spot assessments and exposed to shipping delays.

Fuel prices are regulated – except for jet fuel

The BFP is an administrative methodology used under the Minister’s statutory powers to regulate prices of specified petroleum products, but it is not itself a statute or regulation and does not extend to setting jet fuel prices.  The Petroleum Products Act, 1977 provides the enabling authority to prescribe prices for petroleum products and to regulate the downstream system, while leaving jet fuel pricing to the market in practice.

Outlook

Geopolitical volatility, refined-product tightness, and currency swings will continue to transmit quickly into South African jet fuel prices via Platts-linked assessments and import-parity economics.  The case for benchmarks literacy, logistics resilience, supply diversification, and currency risk management in fuel procurement has never been stronger.  While there is no formal government contingency framework in place, this absence presents challenges that the aviation sector will need to navigate carefully.

Contact Kiasha Nagiah and Eric Geldenhuys for more information. 

A March 2026 High Court decision highlights that procedural irregularities in arbitration proceedings can affect the material and financial nature of the award. The court held that the arbitrator acted unfairly by not opening a sealed settlement offer before making the award and by not allowing the parties to comment on it. The Court also found that the arbitrator was wrong to dismiss one of the contractor’s claims without seeking more documents, even though the arbitration rules allow for the request of additional information.

A dispute arose between a homeowner and contractor in the process of constructing a new dwelling. The dispute proceeded to arbitration. The arbitrator awarded most of the contractor’s claims but dismissed one claim for unpaid work.  During the arbitration, the homeowner had presented the arbitrator with a sealed settlement offer that was higher than the final award, conditional on the completion of certain work.  The arbitrator only opened the offer after making their decision and handing down the award. The arbitrator had not allowed either party to make submissions in respect of this offer either during the arbitration or thereafter. Considering that the settlement offer was greater than the eventual award, the arbitrator’s conduct affected the outcome of the dispute and had financial ramifications for the contractor. The court held that the arbitrator’s approach was unfair and ordered the decision be reconsidered.

The court then turned to the contractor’s dismissed claim. The arbitrator held that the contractor failed to provide sufficient supporting documentation for the quantum claimed.  The court explains that although all necessary documents must be provided for the arbitrator to make a fair and complete decision, the arbitration rules allow the arbitrator to request further documentation when necessary. The arbitrator should, therefore, have exercised this power instead of dismissing the claim.

This judgment emphasises that in the assessment of a claim all relevant documents must be provided or requested when necessary to establish a fair and reasonable award, while allowing a response to all evidence from each side.

Pinnacle Project Management (Pty) Ltd v Mitchell NO and Another (2025/005316) [2026] ZAWCHC 104 (6 March 2026)

The claimant gave birth to a stillborn baby at the hospital in September 2020. After the birth, arrangements were made for the remains to be released to the claimant’s family for burial. Due to a failure in the mortuary’s identification process, the remains of another infant were mistakenly handed to the claimant’s family and buried. The error was discovered the following day when the other child’s family went to the mortuary. The incorrect remains were then exhumed and the infants buried.

The claimant mother sought R500 000 in general damages for emotional shock, trauma and psychological distress arising from burying the wrong infant. She testified that she continued to experience headaches and emotional suffering as a result of the incident.

The central issue before the court was not whether negligence had occurred, but whether the claimant had proved a detectable psychiatric injury, which she should be compensated for. South African law recognises claims for emotional shock only where a claimant establishes a detectable psychiatric injury, not just grief, trauma or distress. A detectable psychiatric injury must be proven through expert evidence.

Although the claimant indicated that an expert medical report existed, no expert was called to testify. No evidence was led to establish that the claimant had been diagnosed with a detectable psychiatric injury. The court emphasised that to find in favour of the claimant, who subjectively and without expert medical diagnosis claims headaches or psychiatric injury, will lead to chaos and open floodgates for undeserving matters.

While the court acknowledged the deeply distressing circumstances of the matter and accepted that negligence had been established, it held that negligence alone is not enough to establish liability in claims for emotional shock. In the absence of expert psychiatric evidence, the claimant failed to prove her claim. The claim was dismissed with costs.

The judgment reaffirms that in delictual claims for emotional shock, the existence of negligence is only part of the enquiry. Even troubling facts will not result in an award of general damages.

GKM v Lehurutshe Hospital and MEC for Health, North West, Case No 83/2021B

The case arose from a claim brought on behalf of a minor child who developed cerebral palsy following complications during birth at a State hospital. The child’s mother pursued an action for damages against the Member of the Executive Council (MEC) for Health. The claim was resolved by way of a settlement order granted on 18 April 2024. In terms of the order, the MEC agreed to provide specified medical and therapeutic services and devices to the child within a period of three months.

The settlement order contained an enforcement clause stipulating that if the MEC failed to meet the deadline, the applicant would be entitled to apply to court for a monetary order for the capitalised value of the unprovided services and items. The MEC failed to comply, and the applicant brought an application for payment of the agreed capitalised sum of R1 629 230.

The MEC opposed the application, contending that it was premature, that the order had been misinterpreted, and that its failure to comply was due to an innocent miscommunication rather than bad faith. It argued that the court should allow the State to fulfil its constitutional obligation to provide healthcare through public facilities rather than ordering monetary payments.

The court found that the settlement order was unambiguous about both the deadline and the remedy for non-compliance. The enforcement clause was triggered by failure to perform, not by wilful contempt. The court was not persuaded by the submission that the clause was intended to apply only to instances of partial non-compliance. The court held that the excuse of internal miscommunication was offered without detailed explanation or accountability, particularly given that the MEC had the order for months, received reminders, and failed to take substantive action.

The court emphasised that the State, as a primary agent of the Constitution, must be held to the highest standard in obeying court orders, and following Constitutional Court jurisprudence. There was a precedent involving the same defendant, a similar order, similar non-compliance, and the same remedy. The application succeeded and the MEC was ordered to pay the capitalised sum.

M.K.P. obo O.M. v Member of Executive Council for Health of Gauteng Provincial Government (2015/21739) [2026] ZAGPJHC 125 (16 February 2026)

The finding was reinforced by a notable concession from the department’s own orthopaedic expert. In the joint minutes and under cross-examination, the expert acknowledged that no healthcare professional who treated the patient recognised the presence of CRPS, describing this as “regrettable”. He conceded that his use of the word “regrettable” was synonymous with negligence.

In February 2016, a brick fell on the patient’s right index finger, causing a laceration and a fracture of the distal phalanx. She attended at the hospital the same day, where the finger was cleaned, sutured, and bandaged. Over the months that followed, she returned to the hospital on multiple occasions with ongoing pain and a fracture that was not healing. At no point did any treating healthcare professional identify the developing CRPS.

When the patient sought private medical treatment and returned to the hospital with a referral from a private practitioner, a doctor employed by the department refused to act on the referral and reprimanded her for consulting privately.

The court held that the department’s employees breached the duty of care owed to the patient. The court found that a reasonable healthcare professional would have foreseen the possibility of harm and would have taken steps to prevent it. Both experts agreed that the patient now suffers severe and permanent impairment affecting her ability to work and carry out daily activities, with a whole person impairment of 15%.

The judgment is a reminder that public healthcare providers owe a duty to recognise known complications of common injuries, particularly where patients present repeatedly with worsening symptoms. The determination of quantum was postponed, with the department ordered to pay costs.

Pheko v Member of the Executive Council for the Department of Health, North West (99/2019) [2026] ZANWHC 43(3 March 2026)

The claimant insurer issued marine hull and marine hull war policies covering a fleet that included a tanker that later disappeared. The insurer obtained complete facultative reinsurance for the war policy from the defendant reinsurer in terms of a reinsurance policy.

Following the disappearance of the tanker, the insured sought indemnification from the insurer under the marine policies. The insurer avoided these policies for misrepresentation and late notification and defended legal proceedings brought against it by the insured.  The insurer was granted judgment in its favour and later sought a declaration against the reinsurer, in separate proceedings, to confirm that it was entitled to an indemnity for its defence costs.

The court found that English law governed the reinsurance contract. Under English law, terms may be implied only if necessary for business efficacy or if supported by a clear, invariable market custom.

The decisive issue was whether UAE market practice existed requiring reinsurers to indemnify defence costs. The court preferred the evidence of the insurer’s expert, an experienced participant in the Middle East insurance and reinsurance market, who described a consistent and uniform practice: unless expressly excluded, reinsurers reimburse litigation and associated costs incurred by the reinsured.

The court accepted this evidence as establishing a regional custom that operated as an implied term. The reinsurer’s expert evidence on London market practice was found irrelevant to Middle Eastern practice. The court held that this implied term was not inconsistent with the express terms in the reinsurance policy.

While the court found that, although avoidance of the underlying marine policies meant there was no continuing exposure on the vessel risk, the implied term, arising from established Middle East market practice, meant the insurer retained an insurable interest in recovering its defence costs.

This judgment serves as a reminder that reinsurance placed in the Middle East is influenced by regional custom distinct, for instance, from London market practice. For reinsurers operating in South Africa, this judgment reaffirms an understanding that local market practice may influence implied or tacit terms even when English law governs the contract.

Al Buhaira National Insurance Company v Arab War Risks Insurance Syndicate [2024]DIFC CFI 013

Travel insurance is designed to cover individual mishaps such as cancellation or interruption of travel, lost property including luggage, illness, or personal health emergencies, but it is commonly drafted to exclude war-related losses. In March 2026, a travel insurer explained that war is treated as uninsurable because it is widespread, unpredictable and can cause losses that happen simultaneously across large numbers of policyholders.

In South African law, that outcome is driven by policy interpretation. The result turns on what the policy covers, and critically what it excludes.

The exclusion that drives the outcome

In practice, the decisive issue is often the war/hostilities exclusion. A typical exclusion removes cover for losses connected to: “War, invasion, acts of foreign enemies, hostilities, or war-like operations (whether declared or not), civil war, mutiny, military rising, usurped power, martial law, state of siege, insurrection, rebellion, or revolution.”

Where wording like this applies, a traveller who incurs extra hotel and meal costs or other losses because flights are grounded or airspace is restricted may find the claim is excluded if the cause of the event is classified as war/hostilities. The legal contest is usually not whether costs were incurred, but whether those costs are sufficiently linked to the excluded peril.

Medical cover may remain, even if disruption cover falls away

Some policies may still respond to certain medical events even where disruption claims are excluded. Emergency medical and related expenses may remain covered if a traveller is injured as an innocent bystander in a war situation (provided they are not participating in hostilities), while trip cancellation and disruption losses linked to war remain excluded.

If insurance does not pay, remedies often sit with airlines and local authorities

When flights are cancelled or routes suspended, the immediate practical steps often run through the airline rather than the insurer. During March 2026, airlines were reported to be offering refunds and flexible rebooking options for affected travel dates (including date-change windows and waived cancellation charges for certain disrupted flights). There were also announcements in some circumstances of local support such as hotels and meals for passengers stranded due to airspace closures.

This division of responsibility matters because travel insurance may not be designed to replace contractual airline remedies where flights are cancelled or rescheduled, and policies may also expect policyholders to mitigate losses and pursue available third‑party recoveries.

A planning point for future travel

The practical lesson is to check wording early, separate disruption losses from medical benefits, and keep clear written confirmation of the reason for any cancellation or delay.

This note is general information for clients and is not legal advice.

The mv Happy Aras was on a voyage from the Ukraine to Mersin in Turkey with a cargo of soyabeans.  At 20:00 one clear evening, the Master relieved the officer of the watch.  The passage plan required regular plotting of the ship’s position in order to follow the course as it threaded its way through the islands off Mersin reflected in the figure at the end of this summary. Instead of diligently following the planned route, the Master made an alteration of course in a southerly direction in order to cut the corner and then failed to alter course to starboard to follow the passage plan.  The vessel ran aground at 20:57.  Following a salvage operation, the owners declared general average and cargo insurers provided general average security for a claim being pursued in London, governed by English law and subject to the York-Antwerp Rules.

Cargo interests refused to pay the GA contribution once it had been adjusted on the basis that the loss or expenditure was caused by an actionable fault on the part of the owners which included a causative breach of the contract of carriage.  This followed the decision of the Supreme Court in the CMA CGM Libra case which we have commented on several times.  In general, claims under bills of lading or charterparties are usually met by one of the several defences available to carriers under the Hague, Hague-Visby or Rotterdam Rules.  The most common are errors in navigation or management, fire and perils of the sea.

The error-in-navigation or management defence allows carriers to escape liability for a loss if the cause of that loss was negligence on the part of the Master or crew.  In order to overcome that defence, cargo interests have to satisfy a court on a balance of probabilities that the owners have breached one of their fundamental obligations which includes the obligation to ensure, prior to and at the commencement of the voyage, that they have exercised due diligence to make the ship seaworthy.

Seaworthiness has been given a broad definition by courts and requires the vessel to be fit in every respect to carry out the contemplated voyage with that cargo.  This applies not only to the mechanical and water tight integrity of the ship, but also to ensuring that she has the correct certificates, equipment, fuel, firefighting apparatus, navigational equipment and competent seafarers to safely complete the voyage.

The English courts have over the last several years imposed a stricter burden on shipowners with regard to proving that they exercised due diligence.  In the Eurasion Dream [2002] 1 Lloyds Rep 719, the court held that it was not sufficient for the shipowners to simply prove that they provided firefighting equipment.  They had to prove that the crew had specialised training in using that equipment on a car carrier.  In the CMA CGM Libra,[2021] UKSC 51,the court held that it was not sufficient for the owners to rely on the Master and navigating officer to produce and follow a proper passage plan.  The owners should themselves ensure that the passage plan was appropriate. 

In this instance, cargo interests pointed out that the Master: dismissed the lookout from the bridge to make tea; failed to plot the ship’s position regularly; failed to make any logbook entries, particularly relating to the deviation from the passage plan; failed to alter course to starboard to resume the intended passage after cutting the corner; and failed to maintain a proper lookout.

The owners of the vessel alleged that these series of events may well amount to negligence on the part of the Master, but did not make him incompetent and even if he was incompetent, they had exercised due diligence as he had the appropriate certificate, had worked without incident for them for three years, and was well recommended. 

The court held that:

“The test of unseaworthiness is whether a prudent owner would have required the relevant defect, had he known of it, to be made good before sending his ship to sea”.

“Incompetence or inefficiency may consist of a disabling want of skill or a disabling want of knowledge.”

This has been extended to include a “disabling lack of will to use the skill and knowledge”.

While conceding that even a number of negligent actions may not amount to incompetence, the court was of the view that such a series of events indicated that the Master was incompetent.  Although the owners provided hearsay evidence with regard to his qualification, experience and a positive reference, they did not provide direct evidence either from the owner or the Master to prove that they diligently determined whether or not the Master was competent.  As a result, the owners were found actionably at fault and accordingly could not recover the general average contribution.

In passing, the court considered whether or not the passage plan was appropriate, but took the view that the passage plan itself was not causative of the grounding and accordingly not relevant.

The principles set out by this case, which may well be taken on appeal, places an additional burden on shipowners and carriers to ensure that they are satisfied, not only at the time the Master is employed, but on a continuous basis, that the Master is competent and able to properly carry out the duties of that position. Failure to do so will override errors of navigation or management defences for claims under bills of lading and charterparties and prevent recovery of general average contributions following a casualty.